Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER CAMPOS, District Judge. This litigation ensues from a surface mining (strip mining) project proposed for a tract in northwestern New Mexico on the Navajo Reservation. Plaintiffs consist of the National Indian Youth Council (NIYC), a nonprofit organization headquartered in Albuquerque, New Mexico, which characterizes its purpose as “preserving and protecting the traditional life-styles of Native American people”; and twelve individual members of the Navajo Tribe residing on the Reservation at Burnham, New Mexico. Federal Defendants are officials of the United States Department of the Interior and include Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary of the Interior (Secretary), and Forrest J. Gerard, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs. Intervenor-Defendants are El Paso Natural Gas Company (El Paso) and Consolidation Coal Company (Consol). Plaintiffs have petitioned this Court for declaratory and injunctive relief based upon allegations that Defendants’ approvals of (1) a mining lease executed in 1976 between Intervenors and the Navajo Tribe, and (2) a subsequent mining plan violate the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Section 4321 et seq.; the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. Section 470 et seq.; Exec.Order No. 11593, 3 C.F.R. Part 154 (1971 Compilation); the Historic and Archeological Data Preservation Act of 1974 (HADPA), 16 U.S.C. Section 469 et seq.; 36 C.F.R. Part 800 et seq.; and 40 C.F.R. Part 1501 et seq. Plaintiffs have also alleged that the approval of the lease by Defendants constitutes a breach of a fiduciary duty owed by Defendants to the individual Plaintiffs. At the close of the evidence on Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the parties indicated that there would be no further evidence to present at a hearing on the merits. Thus, this Court is able to bypass the preliminary injunction issues and decide the case on its merits pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. BACKGROUND. In 1959, the Navajo Tribe granted a coal prospecting permit to El Paso for exploration of 85,760 acres on the Navajo Reservation. As a result of coal discoveries El Paso and Consol, as joint venturers, entered into a lease with the Navajo Tribe in 1968 for the extraction of an estimated 678,000,000 tons of coal on 40,286 acres located on the Burnham Chapter of the Reservation. The 1968 Lease was approved by the Secretary in December 1968. This was prior to the passage of NEPA in 1969. During 1970 El Paso evaluated the potential of utilizing the leasehold for a coal gasification project and in 1973 proposed to the Tribe that two coal gasification facilities be installed on the leasehold. During 1973 and 1974 the Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), pursuant to NEPA, made environmental studies and analyses of the impacts of the proposed gasification project and alternatives. On July 16, 1974, Reclamation submitted its draft environmental statement, DES 74-77, to the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ). DES 74-77 was also presented to other federal and state agencies and the public for review and comment. DES 74-77 addressed the environmental impacts associated with the proposed gasification project and the attendant surface mining and support activities. In 1975, El Paso and Consol revised the proposed project, eliminating one of the gasification complexes. This revised plan divided the leasehold into two distinct mining areas. The northernmost 9,000 acres of the leasehold was designated as a thermal mine (Northern Mine), the coal from which was proposed to be used for direct commercial sale. The remaining acreage was designated as a gasification mine (Southern Mine). The production from this mine is intended to supply the coal requirements of the gasification facility. In December 1975, Consol submitted a Mining and Reclamation Plan (1975 Mining Plan) to the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Navajo Tribe, in accordance with 25 C.F.R. Part 117. This mining plan described the revised project (ConPaso Project) and its environmental implications. The plan included, among other detail, descriptions of the proposed mining operations, the existing environment on the leasehold, potential impacts of strip mining, and measures to mitigate those impacts, including reclamation and revegetation associated with the ConPaso Project. In 1976, the 1968 Lease was renegotiated between the Tribe and Intervenors. The revised lease (1976 Lease) encompassed the identical 40,286 acres of its predecessor but increased the Tribe’s control over the operations, increased the financial benefits accruing to the Tribe, guaranteed preferential employment on the project for Tribe members, and designated certain procedures to be followed to protect the environment and paleontological and archeological resources on the leasehold. The 1976 Lease was executed on August 26, 1976. On February 8, 1977, Reclamation issued its final environmental statement on the project, FES 77-03. FES 77-03 mentioned, but did not discuss, the changes in the proposed project that had occurred since the filing of DES 74-77. Reclamation did note in FES 77-03 that a subsequent environmental impact statement (EIS) would be prepared by BIA which would address the 1976 Lease and the 1975 Mining Plan and the environmental impacts of the ConPaso Project as revised. The draft environmental statement issued by BIA, DES 77-04, was submitted to CEQ on February 9, 1977. DES 77-04 was issued as a supplement to FES 77-03. Following circulation for review and comment among the federal and state agencies and the public, BIA filed the final environmental statement, FES 77-13, on May 11, 1977. On July 1,1977, the Tribe approved the 1975 Mining Plan. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary gave the Office of Surface Mining (OSM) the assignment of reviewing the 1975 Mining Plan and making recommendations as to its approval. On August 31, 1977, the Secretary approved the 1976 Lease based upon the information contained in FES 77-03 and FES 77-13. On October 23, 1978, Consol submitted a Restructured Mining and Reclamation Plan (1978 Mining Plan) to OSM. This revised mining plan was required by OSM after its examination of the 1975 Mining Plan. The 1978 Mining Plan addressed only the proposed mining operations and impacts for the Northern Mine. This Plan was subsequently approved by the New Mexico Coal Surface Mining Commission, the Tribe, USGS and BIA. On August 27, 1979, OSM issued an Environmental Assessment (EA) of the Plan. The EA was revised and reissued on November 2, 1979. On January 11, 1980, Assistant Secretary Gerard issued a “Finding of No Significant Impact” (FONSI) with regard to the 1978 Mining Plan. The 1978 Mining Plan was given final approval that same day. In Count One, Plaintiffs allege that the two FESs prepared in this case are inadequate, thereby violating NEPA. The four specific deficiencies propounded by Plaintiffs are (1) failure to adequately discuss the potential for unsuccessful land reclamation, (2) failure to adequately discuss other alternatives to the proposed action, (3) failure to adequately investigate and discuss the significance of archeological and paleontological resources on the leasehold, and (4) the failure to adequately discuss the human impacts upon the residents of the Burnham area. Several threshold issues must be resolved before the adequacy of the environmental impact statement record (EIS record) can be addressed. First, there is an issue as to whether the 1979 CEQ regulations are applicable in this case. Second, there is a question as to what constitutes the EIS record upon which the NEPA-related issues should be decided. Third, there is an issue as to whether NEPA was violated by the Assistant Secretary in finding that no supplementation of the EIS record was required prior to the approval of the 1978 Mining Plan. The preliminary disposition of these three interrelated subissues is necessary for a proper resolution of the NEPA issues, although this method of analysis will require the Court to follow a somewhat regressive chronology. APPLICABILITY OF THE 1979 CEQ REGULATIONS. The CEQ Regulations, 40 C.F.R. Parts 1501, et seq., are the detailed embodiment for NEPA through which its purposes are implemented. The revised regulations were designated effective July 30, 1979, subject to the following qualifications and exceptions: These regulations shall apply to the fullest extent practicable to ongoing activities and environmental documents begun before the effective date. These regulations do not apply to an environmental impact statement or supplement if the draft statement was filed before the effective date of these regulations. No completed environmental documents need to be redone by reason of these regulations .... However, nothing shall prevent an agency from proceeding under these regulations at an earlier time. 40 C.F.R. Part 1506.12(a) (1979). Plaintiffs contend that the Assistant Secretary's FONSI and the EA prepared by OSM to aid the Assistant Secretary in making the supplementation decision are subject to review under the 1979 regulations. Defendants and Intervenors contend that the new regulations are not applicable to this case because FES 77-03 and FES 77-13 were filed prior to the effective date. FES 77-03 and FES 77-13 were both filed prior to July 30, 1979, and are, themselves, exempt from scrutiny under those provisions; however, the corollary urged by Defendants and Intervenors that subsequent activities, especially those surrounding the mining plan approval, are also excluded from the purview of the revised regulations is defective. The first sentence of Part 1506.12 clearly states that.the 1979 regulations are to be applied to “the fullest extent practicable to ongoing activities and environmental documents begun before the effective date.” Both the FONSI and the EA are “environmental documents” within the meaning of 40 C.F.R. Part 1508.10 (1979). The EA was begun on June 11, 1979, only seven weeks before the effective date. It was not completed until November 2, 1979, over three months after the 1979 regulations became effective. The FONSI was not issued in finality until January 11, 1980, over five months following the implementation of the new regulations. Defendants and Intervenors have failed to submit any evidence as to why it would not have been “practicable” to apply the 1979 regulations to the EA and the FONSI. On the contrary, the evidence and the provisions of Part 1506.12(a) compel the conclusion that not only was it “practicable” for OSM and the Assistant Secretary to apply the new regulations to the preparation of the EA and the FONSI, it was mandatory. More important, the FONSI states on its face that it was prepared “pursuant to 40 C.F.R. Part 1508.13 (1979)....” Also, in the notice of OSM’s recommendation of approval of the mining plan issued on September 24, 1979, it indicates that it was being published “(p)ursuant to Section 1506.6 (1979) of Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations . 44 Fed.Reg. 51711 (1979). This was over five weeks before the final submission of the EA. Even if Defendants and Intervenors could argue successfully that the Assistant Secretary could not have been compelled to comply with the 1979 regulations with regard to his FONSI, the force of that argument vanishes with the Assistant Secretary’s acquiescence in “proceeding under these regulations at an earlier time.” Therefore, the Assistant Secretary’s decision that a supplemental EIS did not have to be prepared and considered prior to his approval of the 1978 Mining Plan is reviewable under the 1979 version of the regulations, as is the EA. COMPOSITION OF THE EIS RECORD. At this stage of the analysis, it becomes necessary to discuss the makeup of the EIS record relative to which the NEPA issues will be decided. Defendants and Intervenors contend that the EA is, in essence, equivalent to an EIS or a supplement to an EIS and that, therefore, the EIS record in this case is a triology composed of FES 77-03, FES 77-13 and the EA. In effect, Defendants and Intervenors are seeking to have the Court hold that this EA is a supplement to the FESs. For the reasons discussed subsequently it is concluded that the EA is not a part of the EIS record. The status to be given this EA must be determined with reference to the basic function of NEPA and the roles played by the EIS, the supplement and the EA in the implementation of that function. The fundamental function of NEPA was recently discussed by the Court of Appeals of the Tenth Circuit. It is the discharge of an obligation that “before an agency takes major action it must have taken a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences (associated with that action).” Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368, 1378 (10th Cir. 1980); see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2730 n. 21, 49 L.Ed.2d 576, 590 n. 21 (1976). Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires the preparation of an EIS whenever federal agencies engage in “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. Section 4332(2)(C). The EIS’s primary role is an “an action-forcing device to insure that the policies and goals defined in (NEPA) are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal Government.” 40 C.F.R. Part 1502.1 (1979); see, Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. at 350-51, 99 S.Ct. at 2337-2338. In other words, the EIS functions as a “lens” through which NEPA compels a decision-making agency to take the “hard look” at the environmental impacts of a proposed action. See, Environmental Defense Fund, 619 F.2d at 1375. The role of the supplement is coincident to that of the EIS. A supplement is only required when it is necessary to update an existing EIS because of either “substantial changes in the proposed action” or the development of “significant new circumstances or information” pertaining to that action or its impacts. 40 C.F.R. Part 1502.9(c)(1) (1979). The revised EIS record, consisting of the original EIS and the supplement, becomes a more refined environmental “lens” through which the responsible federal agency must take another “hard lo'ok” at the environmental impacts of a proposed action. The supplement’s function then is on an equivalent plane with the function of an EIS. The EA, by comparison, plays a dual role in NEPA compliance that differs markedly from the roles of the EIS and the supplement. First, the EA is intended as a prelude to an EIS which surveys a proposed project for the purpose of determining whether that project comes within the purview of Section 102(2)(C), thereby requiring the preparation of an EIS. See, 40 C.F.R. Parts 1501.4 and 1508.9(a) (1979). When this preliminary determination has been made, the EA performs a second, disjunctive function to either “(f)acilitate preparation of (an EIS) when one is necessary,” 40 C.F.R. Part 1508.9(a)(3) (1979), or facilitate preparation of a “finding of no significant impact (Part 1508.13), if the agency determines on the basis of the environmental assessment not to prepare (an EIS).” 40 C.F.R. Part 1501.4(e) (1979); compare 40 C.F.R. Part 1508.9(a)(2) (1979) with 40 C.F.R. Part 1508.13 (1979). It is apparent under these regulations that an EA is not the functional equivalent of an EIS or a supplement. Of course, if a particular EA did, in actuality, fulfill the function of the EIS or supplement, the Court would have no difficulty in considering such a misnomered document as the functional equivalent of an EIS or supplement. Besides the functional disparity between the EIS and the supplement, on the one hand, and the EA, on the other, there is a concomitant procedural disparity between these documents as well. The EIS is subjected to a rigorous procedure under the regulations. The regulations impose exacting requirements for format and content. A supplement, with only a few exceptions, is also required to comply with these same procedural mandates. 40 C.F.R. Part 1502.-9(c)(4) (1979). In contrast, the EA need only comply with minimal procedural conditions. See, 40 C.F.R. Part 1508.9(a)(2) (1979). Procedural requirements in the regulations concerning the formulation of an EIS or a supplement are not mere pro for-ma technicalities. They set forth the procedure for environmental documentation (such as for the EIS) through which NEPA’s mandate is enforced. To preserve the efficacy of NEPA, it is necessary that courts demand “strict compliance with the disclosure and procedural provisions of the Act.” Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 565 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). Courts must also insist on strict adherence to the CEQ regulations through which NEPA’s mandate is administered. Therefore, before á document designated as an EA can be considered the equivalent of an EIS or supplement, it must not only fulfill the function of an EIS or supplement, it must also strictly comply with the procedural requirements for preparation of an EIS or supplement. A review of the history of this EA indicates that it was never intended to function as a supplement to the FESs. Rather, its purpose was to “(b)riefly provide sufficient evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an (EIS or supplement) or a finding of no significant impact” regarding the changes in the project as proposed in the 1978 Mining Plan. See, 40 C.F.R. Part 1508.9(a)(1) (1979). The Assistant Secretary reviewed the EA to determine whether NEPA required that the FESs be supplemented before the revised mining plan could be approved. “(O)n the basis of the (EA) ... ”, 40 C.F.R. Part 1501.4(e) (1979), the Assistant Secretary agreed with the conclusion drawn by OSM that any “significant impacts that could ensue from the (approval of the 1978 Mining Plan) have been addressed in (FES 77-03 and FES 77-13).” 44 Fed.Reg. 51711 (1979). This means that the Assistant Secretary concluded that a supplement was not required for the mining plan approval and so he decided “not to prepare (an EIS or supplement).” 40 C.F.R. Part 1501.4(e) (1979). He then executed the FONSI as required under the regulations. Id. The Assistant Secretary’s “Finding,” then, was simply a finding that the FESs provided adequate environmental documentation of the impacts of the 1978 Mining Plan and that it was not necessary under NEPA to take another “hard look” at those impacts. The format and content of this EA shows that it did not track the procedural path of an EIS or a supplement to an EIS. First, the EA’s format does not comply with the required format for an EIS as set forth in 40 C.F.R. Part 1502.10 (1979). Second, the notice given by OSM in the Federal Register allowed only 20 days for commenting on the EA, whereas the minimum comment period for an EIS is 45 days. 40 C.F.R. Part 1506.10(c) (1979). Third, if the EA had been the procedural equivalent of a supplement, then OSM should have “(o)btain(ed) the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved or which is authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards.” 40 C.F.R. Part 1503.1(a)(1) (1979); accord, 42 U.S.C. Section 4332(2)(C). No comments were made by any federal agencies on the proposed 1978 Mining Plan other than by the National Park Service whose “comment” was not really a comment as defined in 40 C.F.R. Part 1503.3(a) (1979), but was, rather, an “archeological clearance” submitted to further the project’s compliance with the provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. Section 470 et seq. By comparison, there were extensive comments from federal agencies included in both FESs. See, FES 77-03, Vol. II at pp. 10-1 through 111 (19 agencies commented); FES 77-13 at pp. 9-9 through 35 (11 agencies commented). Fourth, the substantive comments received (from other than federal agencies) were never officially “attached to the final (EA) ...” as required by 40 C.F.R. Part 1503.4(b) (1979). Fifth, the EA was never filed with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as is required for all EISs by 40 C.F.R. Part 1506.9 (1979). This particular omission is very critical because, under Section 309 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 7609, the EPA has a duty to “review and comment in writing on the environmental impact of any matter ... to which (Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA) applies....” Sixth, there is no record that “(t)he Environmental Protection Agency (published) a notice in the Federal Register ...” of the EA as it is required to do for all EISs and supplements. See, 40 C.F.R. Part 1506.10(a) (1979). This means that the notice published by OSM is tainted because the notice did not come from the proper authority-the EPA. See, 40 C.F.R. Part 1506.10(a), (b) (1979). Seventh, the EA was not prepared in “draft” and “final” versions as required for an EIS and supplement. Compare 40 C.F.R. Part 1502.9(a), (b) (1979) with 40 C.F.R. Part 1502.9(c)(4) (1979). Eighth, there were no public hearings held on the EA as there were for FES 77-03 and FES 77-13. That which prompted public hearings in connection with FES 77-03 and FES 77-13 would seem to have dictated, under present criteria, public hearings on the EA if the latter was intended as a supplement. See, 40 C.F.R. Part 1506.6(c)(1) (1979). The evidence indicates that this EA is neither the functional equivalent nor the procedural equivalent of an EIS or supplement. Therefore, the EIS record which this Court will review to determine if there was adequate NEPA compliance for the approval of the 1978 Lease approval and the 1978 Mining Plan approval consists solely of FES 77-03 and FES 77-13. THE DECISION NOT TO SUPPLEMENT THE EIS RECORD. The final preliminary matter to be resolved before the adequacy of the EIS record is addressed revolves around the Assistant Secretary’s FONSI prepared pursuant to Part 1508.13. This document was issued as a formalized finding that no further supplementation of the EIS record was necessary before the 1978 Mining Plan could be approved. The FONSI concluded that “approval of the Restructured Mining and Reclamation Plan does not constitute a major Federal action having a significant effect of the human environment for which there has not already been adequate compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 4321, et seq.” Plaintiffs challenge both the utilization by the Assistant Secretary of Part 1508.13 for documenting his decision not to supplement and the decision itself. Plaintiffs’ contention that the Assistant Secretary erred in proceeding to document his negative supplementation decision.with a FONSI is based upon their interpretation of 40 C.F.R. Parts 1501.4(e) (1979) and 1508.13. They would confine the applicability of Part 1508.13 to the threshold decision that a proposed action is not “major Federal action” under Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA. They argue that when such a negative determination has been made a FONSI is prepared, upon completion of which Part 1508.13 ceases to have any further applicability to that action. Plaintiffs maintain that if the threshold decision is made in the affirmative, meaning that an EIS must be filed, then Part 1508.13 can never have any application or serve any function in that action. Intervenors contend that Part 1508.13 is applicable not only when the threshold determination is made that a proposed action is not governed by NEPA, but also when a decision is made not to supplement an existing EIS. 40 C.F.R. Part 1502.9(c)(1) (1979) sets forth a dual standard which agencies are to apply when deciding whether to supplement an EIS record. Both Plaintiffs and Intervenors agree that Part 1502.9(c)(1) provides the exclusive criteria for a supplementation determination. These parties also agree that if the supplementation decision is in the affirmative then a supplement must be prepared in accordance with the procedure designated for an EIS. See, Part 1502.-9(c)(4). The parties disagree, however, as to what procedure follows a decision not to supplement. Plaintiffs contend that the agency is precluded from utilizing a FONSI to document its decision not to supplement. Intervenors maintain that when there has been a decision not to, supplement the agency must follow the same procedure required for a threshold decision that no EIS will be prepared for an action because it does not constitute a Section 102(2)(C) “action”. This interpretation would require that an agency prepare a FONSI whenever a decision not to supplement is made. Plaintiffs’ argument is based upon a very constricted reading of the regulation. It is true that no reference is made in Part 1508.13 to a “supplement”, nor is there any cross reference between Parts 1502.9(c)(1) and 1508.13. Also, Part 1501.4(e), which states when a FONSI must be prepared, refers only to a “statemenf’-presumably an EIS. It does not follow, however, that an agency cannot comply with this provision when a decision not to supplement is reached. Furthermore, it is true that a decision not to supplement under the standard of Part 1502.9(c)(1) is not technically a FONSI. Meticulous precision might suggest a finding of no “substantial changes” nor “significant new circumstances or information” which are “relevant to environmental concerns” since the preparation of the latest EIS. See, Part 1502.9(e)(1). Intervenors’ rationale is that a supplement is an EIS as referred to in Part 1508.-11 and defined in Part 1508.12. Thus, they claim, the procedures for an EIS must be followed. These include preparation of a FONSI when a negative determination is made regarding environmental impact of an action. See, Part 1501.4(e). Although ambiguity attends the regulations with respect to this particular issue, the Court believes that it is more consistent with the intent of the regulations and with the purposes of NEPA to allow an agency to formally document its reasons for not supplementing an EIS through a FONSI, as was done in this case. The Court’s conclusion is based upon the following rationale. First, a determination not to supplement an EIS is “very similar” to a determination not to prepare an EIS at the outset. Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Thone, 604 F.2d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 1979). Second, a decision to supplement must be implemented through the same procedure which is required when there is a decision to prepare an EIS initially. See, Part 1502.9(c)(4). Third, one of NEPA’s secondary functions, enforced primarily through the EIS and supplement, is that of public disclosure. E. g., National Helium Corporation v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1002 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993, 94 S.Ct. 2405, 40 L.Ed.2d 772 (1974); Com. of Mass. v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 872, 883 (1st Cir. 1979); see, Parts 1502.1 (1979) and 1506.6 (1979). It furthers the purpose of the disclosure function to allow an agency the discretion to document a decision not to supplement with a FONSI. Fourth, no other “environmental document” specifically provided for in NEPA or the Regulations (40 C.F.R. Part 1508.10 (1979)) is designed to discharge the disclosure function for the reasons underlying the decision not to supplement. See, Parts 1502.2(g) (the EIS); 1508.9 (the EA); 1508.13 (the FONSI); 1508.22 (the “notice of intent”). Upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that when an agency reviews an EIS pursuant to Part 1502.9(c)(1) and reaches a decision not to supplement it, that agency may choose to issue a FONSI to document the grounds for that decision. Plaintiffs contend that in this case the Assistant Secretary did not apply the standard of Part 1502.9(c)(1) in his decision not to supplement, but that he erroneously applied the standard of Part 1508.13. This attack is based upon the Assistant Secretary’s statement in the FONSI that “approval of the (1978 Mining Plan) does not constitute a major Federal action having a significant effect on the human environment for which there has not already been adequate compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act” (emphasis added). Plaintiffs cite the Assistant Secretary’s use of the phrase “having a significant effect on the human environment” as evidence that he employed an erroneous standard. This is the standard found in Part 1508.13 (which, in turn, reiterates the standard imposed by Section 102(2)(C)), See, 42 U.S.C. Section 4332(2)(C)). The Court concludes, however, that the modifying phrase “for which there has not already been adequate compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act” brings the Assistant Secretary’s conclusion within the standard of Part 1502.9(c)(1). From another, but yet reasonable, perspective, the Assistant Secretary’s statement inferentially says that there exist no “substantial changes” nor “significant new circumstances or information” which require a supplement under Part 1502.9(c)(1). Therefore, the Court concludes that the Assistant Secretary followed an acceptable procedure in formulating and announcing his decision not to supplement. The merits of that determination will now be reviewed. The standard of review of an agency’s determination that further supplementation of an EIS is not required by NEPA is the same standard which is applied to review an initial determination that an EIS is not required for a particular action. Warm Springs Dam, 621 F.2d at 1024; Monarch Chemical, 604 F.2d at 1087. The reason why the same standard is applied is that: an agency’s determination that a change in a project for which an EIS has been previously prepared is not a “significant” change requiring the preparation of a new or amended EIS (or supplement) . . . is very similar to an agency’s threshold determination that a particular project does not “significantly affect() the quality of the human environment” such as would require the preparation of an original EIS. Monarch Chemical, id. In this circuit, the standard of review for a decision that no EIS is required for a proposed action was originally set forth in Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973). Wyoming Outdoor teaches that an agency’s determination as to whether or not an EIS needed to be prepared for a particular action was not discretionary, but was a mandatory duty imposed by NEPA, thereby precluding judicial review of that determination under the “arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion” standard of Section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2)(A). Wyoming Outdoor, 484 F.2d at 1248-49; accord Jette v. Bergland, 579 F.2d 59, 64 (10th Cir. 1978). The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the appropriate standard of review of an agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS is: whether the negative determination was reasonable in the light of the mandatory requirements and high standards set by (NEPA) so as to be “in accordance with law”-another ground of review in Section 706(2)(A) which may be applied consistently with the procedural demands of NEPA. 484 F.2d at 1249; accord, Jette v. Bergland, 579 F.2d at 64 (quoting from Wyoming Outdoor). Therefore, in this case, the Assistant Secretary’s FONSI will be reviewed to determine whether his finding that no “substantial changes” nor “significant new circumstances or information” accrued during the interim between the filing of the FESs and the date of the mining plan approval on January 11,1980, was “reasonable ... so as to be ‘in accordance with the law.’ ” Review of the Assistant Secretary’s decision not to supplement under the dual standards of Part 1502.9(c)(1), must be made keeping in mind NEPA’s purpose of making agencies take a “hard look” at the environmental impacts of a proposed action. See, Environmental Defense Fund, 619 F.2d at 1378. Also, it must be remembered that when reviewing the reasonableness of a decision not to supplement the Court must not substitute its judgment for that of the Assistant Secretary. Monarch Chemical, 604 F.2d at 1090. A conclusion under either prong of the supplementation standard that the Assistant Secretary’s determination was not “reasonable” is tantamount to a finding that the existing EIS record was per se inadequate for the 1978 Mining Plan Approval. The supplementation criteria are necessarily utilized through a comparative analysis. Plaintiffs argue that the relevant comparison must be made between the 1975 Mining Plan (which was never given final approval by Defendants) and its revision, the 1978 Mining Plan. The Court, however, concludes that the appropriate comparison is between the mining plan as envisioned in the EIS record and as finally approved. It would not further the purpose of NEPA to require the supplementation of an existing EIS merely because there have been “substantial changes” or “significant new circumstances or information” arising during the evolution of a project if they have already been adequately envisaged in the original EIS. There is no benefit in taking another “hard look” at an action if that view is taken from the same vantage point and overlooks the same environmental panorama. It does not matter how different the 1978 Mining Plan is from the 1975 Mining Plan. Therefore, the comparison under Part 1502.9(c)(1) must be between the EIS record and the 1978 Mining Plan as approved. The 1975 Mining Plan is, perhaps, of some marginal relevance, but only as a bench mark reference for this comparison. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES. Supplementation of an EIS is required under Part 1502.9(c)(l)(i) if “(t)he agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns .... ” This “substantial change” prong is consistent with the judicial conclusion that a new or supplemental EIS needs to be prepared only when there has been a “ ‘significant’ change” in a project during the interval since the existing EIS record was prepared. E. g., Environmental Defense Fund, 619 F.2d at 1377; Monarch Chemical, 604 F.2d at 1087. As noted previously, the “substantial changes” must be ones for which there do not already exist formal EIS analysis and documentation. Plaintiffs contend that there are “substantial changes” evident from the incorporated stipulations alone. Review of these reveals, however, that they are essentially concerned with increasing OSM’s control over the project, especially reclamation. Examination of the EA shows that OSM determined that any environmental impacts associated with the stipulations had already been discussed in the FESs. EA at 2. Any differences between the mining plan as approved and as described in the EIS record do not rise, cumulatively, to the level of significance or “substantial(ity)” justifying yet another environmental statement. The differences are, for the most part, matters of detailed site-specificity, e. g., placement of facilities, roads, etc., and mandatory procedures to be followed for reclamation and revegetation. NEPA simply does not require that every facet of a proposed action be set forth in the EIS record in absolute detail. Environmental Defense Fund, 619 F.2d at 1376. In addition, Plaintiffs’ desire for proliferous detail contravenes the intent of the revised regulations for conciseness and brevity in EISs. See, 40 C.F.R. Parts 1502.2(c) and 1502.7 (1979); 43 Fed.Reg. 55978-79 (1978). Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the 1978 Mining Plan, as approved, is a “substantial change” solely because it addresses mining activity for only the northernmost quarter of the Leasehold. They contend, also, that the OSM stipulations address activities in an area smaller than the northern sector of the lease. Although the 1978 Mining Plan does not discuss mining activity for the entire leasehold as was done in the EIS record, this fact alone is not sufficient to establish a “substantial change” requiring further supplementation of the EIS record. If the EIS record indicates proper consideration of the environmental consequences of mining in the northern sector of the project, then no supplementation is necessary unless Plaintiffs can show a “substantial change” between mining under the 1978 Mining Plan and mining as originally foreseen and discussed in the EIS record. See, Environmental Defense Fund, 619 F.2d at 1377. Plaintiffs have not made specific allegations as to “substantial changes” in the plan for the Northern Mine “that are relevant to environmental concerns.” Part 1502.-9(c)(lXi). A comparison of the plan as finally approved and as originally considered shows the lack of any “substantial changes.” For example, (1) the mine will be in the same location (the northernmost sector of the leasehold); (2) the same environment will be affected; (3) the same amount of acreage will be mined (6,831 acres); (4) the mining will take place over the same period of time (38 years); (5) the rate of production will be the same (increasing from 300 tons the first year to 6,400 tons per year from years five through thirty-eight); (6) the mining method will be the same (surface mining); (7) the reclamation method is basically the same; (8) the reclamation is being undertaken for the same end use (grazing); (9) the reclamation schedule will be approximately the same (compare EA at 73 with FES 77-13 at p. 1-15); and (10) the coal is being mined for the same purpose (commercial resale). Plaintiffs do contend that the mining' plan which was actually approved was only for a 935-aere segment of the Northern Mine, which will be mined over the first seven years of this project. It is upon this sector that OSM focused its stipulations which require the establishment of a trend towards successful reclamation in this sector before mining can go forward on the remainder of the Northern Mine. The Assistant Secretary’s approval of the mining on the remaining portion of the Northern Mine was conditioned upon compliance with the stipulations within the targeted 935-acre segment. Rather than a change in the mining plan, these stipulations impose an overlay of continuing control on mining activities previously contemplated. These enhance fulfillment of NEPA’s purposes. See, Environmental Defense Fund, 619 F.2d at 1382; Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 560-61 (10th Cir. 1977); Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 1978). Therefore, under the standard of “reasonableness”, this Court concludes that the Assistant Secretary’s finding, based upon OSM’s evaluation, that there were no “substantial changes” between the project as analyzed in the FESs and as finally approved in the 1978 Mining Plan, was “reasonable ... so as to be ‘in accordance with the law’ ”, even under the “high standard” of NEPA. Jette v. Bergland, 579 F.2d at 64; Wyoming Outdoor, 484 F.2d at 1249. SIGNIFICANT NEW CIRCUMSTANCES OR INFORMATION. The second prong of the mandatory supplementation standard, Part 1502.9(c)(l)(ii), requires supplementation of an EIS when “(t)here are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” Application of this subpart is much more troublesome to the Court than its counterpart. Any project, although it may undergo no “change” during its evolution, will, undoubtedly, generate “information” as it progresses. This new regulatory provision must be considered contemporaneously with NEPA’s mandate as enforced through the EIS record. This means that in order for “new circumstances or information” to attain the status of “significant” these must reach that level where, reasonably, it becomes necessary to focus attention once more upon the environmental aspects of a project. See, Warm Springs Dam, 621 F.2d at 1024. That is, a “hard look” must again be taken in the light of the “new circumstances or information.” An otherwise unguarded reading of this subpart could unleash a procedural plague repeatedly impairing worthwhile projects even though there might be environmental data sufficient for the “hard look.” An integral component of this project is reclamation and revegetation which will closely follow the actual mining in time and distance. Plaintiffs claim that since the time FES'77-03 and FES 77-13 were prepared, there has been “significant new . . . information” which has come forth regarding the potential for successful reclamation in the arid southwest. This assertion is based upon data gathered over the past 3 to 4 years from experimental reclamation plots at the Utah International Mine, a project mentioned in the FESs which is very near the ConPaso Project. At Utah International, there have been ongoing efforts to reclaim land which is almost identical in composition to that at the Burnham location. However, Plaintiffs’ allegation of “significant new . . . information” is not supported by the evidence. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Robert R. Curry, testified that in his opinion there was not enough information available in 1976 and 1977 to substantiate the conclusion in the EIS record that reclamation at the Utah International project was being successfully established. He further stated that upon a return visit to the Utah project, subsequent to the 1978 Mining Plan approval, he again observed the experimental plots and concluded that there was not enough data from which one could conclude that reclamation was being successfully established. Not only did Dr. Curry think that reclamation had not been successfully established at the Utah project in 1976 and 1977, this also was his conclusion upon his reobservation of that project in February 1980. He stated that, from the time artificial irrigation is terminated, it would take a period of time of not less than 22 years before judgments could be made concerning the success of revegetation in this area. Dr. Curry’s testimony does not establish that there has been “significant new .. . information” arising during the interim between the FESs and the mining plan approval. The mere accumulation of data over a period of time, although of value, is not necessarily significant. Unless there is a marked deviation from the previous record, the significance of each year’s activity is measured relative to the cumulative record then existing. It is the agency which has been endowed with expertise to determine whether the increased information available during a given interval is “significant.” Cf., State of Alaska v. Andrus, 188 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 580 F.2d 465, 475 (D.C. Cir.1978), vacated in part on other grounds sub nom. Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 303, 58 L.Ed.2d 315 (1978). In this case OSM, the federal expert on mining reclamation, concluded that the cumulative reclamation data obtained since the FESs were filed in 1977 were not “significant.” See, EA at 2. If data collected during this period indicated that reclamation would not be successful, that could be significant. However, Plaintiffs did not present that kind of testimony. All that Plaintiffs were able to establish through Dr. Curry was that as of the date of the 1978 Mining Plan approval the information received from the Utah International Mine was as inconclusive in early 1980 as it had been in 1976-77. The Court concludes that the finding by the Assistant Secretary that there were no “new circumstances or information” relative to reclamation which warranted supplementation of the EISs was “reasonable ... so as to be in accordance with the law.” Jette v: Bergland, 579 F.2d at 64; Wyoming Outdoor, 484 F.2d 1249; see, Warm Springs Dam, 621 F.2d 1024. This conclusion is buttressed by the continuing reclamation controls imposed by the stipulations. See, Environmental Defense Fund, 619 F.2d at 1382; Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 560-61; Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d at 1168. A second area of “new . .. information” alleged by Plaintiffs pertains to archeological and paleontological resources. Plaintiffs contend that surveys which have been conducted during the relevant interval had established “new ... information” on this project. Prior to the preparation of the FESs, there was only one archeological survey conducted on the leasehold. This survey was a cursory, vehicular inspection conducted by the Museum of New Mexico in mid-1973 during which the surveyor travelled about 150 linear miles within the boundaries of the Northern Mine. This survey was acknowledged as “preliminary” by the surveyor. During this survey 15 sites were found. None was considered “major” by the surveyor. However, the report states that “(o)ther unrecorded sites might be found if a more intensive survey were undertaken.” Peckham Report at 4. The EIS record also incorporated findings by the University of New Mexico on lands immediately north of the ConPaso Project where a site density of “approximately 10 sites per square mile” was established. The FESs also listed the proposed surveys that would be required before mining activity could commence on the project. Subsequent to the filing of the FESs, additional archeological surveys were performed that validated the site density of “approximately 10 sites per square mile” in the Northern Mine area. It is true that the findings of these latter surveys would negate some of the opinions expressed in the FESs, but it cannot be said that the invalidation of those comments renders this new information “significant”, especially when the countervailing opinions are expressed in the statements. These surveys only substantiated the basic conclusion drawn in the FESs that there would be “approximately 10 sites per square mile” in the Northern Mine region. These surveys did establish site-specificity in this area. However, in this case, this specificity is neither inconsistent with the basic conclusions drawn in the FESs nor in conflict with the factual premises underlying those conclusions. As to the paleontological claims, no paleontological surveys were conducted on the leasehold until after the filing of the FESs. However, the conclusions drawn in the EIS record were, again, substantiated by the subsequent surveys. Again, of course, site-specificity was established. Based upon the fundamental agreement between data and opinions expressed in the EIS record and subsequent findings, and based upon the ongoing controls over this project (including not only the requirement of surveying prior to mining but also compliance with archeological and paleontological law), the Court concludes that the Assistant Secretary’s finding that there were no “significant new circumstances or information” relative to archeological and paleontological resources was “reasonable” under Jette v. Bergland and Wyoming Outdoor. Plaintiffs’ claim that the Assistant Secretary violated NEPA and its regulations, specifically Part 1502.9(c)(1), by approving the 1978 Mining Plan without a supplement, fails. ADEQUACY OF THE EIS RECORD. Although the Court has concluded that supplementation of the EIS record was not required prior to the approval of the 1978 Mining Plan, this does not resolve the issue as to the adequacy of the EIS record for that approval or for the approval of the 1976 Lease. The Court must now examine FES 77-03 and FES 77-13 to determine whether they contain sufficient environmental documentation and discussion as required by Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA to have allowed the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary to have taken a “hard look” at the environmental consequences associated with the 1976 Lease and the 1978 Mining Plan prior to their approvals. Indeed, “once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot ‘interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken.’ Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2730 n.21,49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976).” Strycker’s Bay, 444 U.S. at 228-229, 100 S.Ct. at 500 (emphasis added); accord, Environmental Defense Fund, 619 F.2d at 1378. This “hard look” adequacy of an EIS record is reviewed by the courts in this circuit under a “rule of reason.” This standard was originally adopted by the Tenth Circuit in National Helium, 486 F.2d at 1002-03, and has been consistently applied by the Court of Appeals in this circuit from that time to the present. Under the “rule of reason” judicial review of an EIS record is limited to the following three-part analysis: 1) whether (the EIS record discusses all of the five procedural requirements of (Section 102(2)(C) of) NEPA; 2) whether (the EIS record) constitutes an objective good faith compliance with the demands of NEPA; and 3) whether (the EIS record) contains a reasonable discussion of the subject matter involved in the five required areas. Id. This “rule of reason” precludes the Court from reviewing FES 77-03 and FES 77-13 on their merits to determine sufficiency. Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 559. Defendants assert that in this circuit when a court is confronting the issue of the EIS record’s adequacy the court is precluded from considering any evidence which is outside of the administrative record. This position is based upon dicta in National Helium, where the Court of Appeals did state that “(t)he hearing in the district court (to determine the adequacy of an EIS) consisted of a judicial review of the administrative record. It was not a trial de novo." 486 F.2d at 998. Defendants contend that the administrative record in this case consists solely of the EIS record itself and that the Court is confined exclusively to a review of that record. This Court does not agree. The “rule of reason” requires that “an EIS (be) tested by the concepts of ‘good faith’ and a ‘reasonable’ discussion of the five mandated areas of subject matter (in Section 102(2)(C)).” Save Our Invaluable Soil, 542 F.2d at 543; accord, Environmental Defense Fund, 619 F.2d at 1376 (quoting from Save Our Invaluable Soil). It is the opinion of this Court that when an EIS record is to be reviewed for adequacy, extra-administrative evidence may be received for the limited purpose of determining whether there has been a “good faith” and “reasonable” discussion of those five Section 102(2)(C) areas. See, County of Suffolk v. Secretary of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1384-85 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064, 98 S.Ct. 1238, 55 L.Ed.2d 764 (1978). Such extra-administrative evidence may be necessary in NEPA cases because: 1) it is the administrative record itself— the EIS and its supporting documents-which is the target of a court’s scrutiny under the “rule of reason,” County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1384; and 2) a court is applying a more stringent standard than it would be applying with the “arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion” standard. Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1973); Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F.Supp. 457, 491 (D.Kan.1978), aff’d on other grounds 602 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073, 100 S.Ct. 1019, 62 L.Ed.2d 755 (1980). Thus, information outside the administrative record may be necessary in order for a court to fully discharge its duty under the “rule of reason.” See, County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1384-85; Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Callaway, 459 F.Supp. 188, 193 (D.D.C.1978). Although the Tenth Circuit has never formally abandoned the dicta in National Helium, district courts in this circuit have allowed extra-administrative evidence to be introduced at NEPA hearings. Hiatt Grain & Feed, 446 F.Supp. at 492; see, Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d at 789 (six-day evidentiary hearing held in the district court). Contra, Central Okl. Preservation A. v. Okl. City, etc., 471 F.Supp. 68, 72-73 (W.D.Okla.1979). Such an examination of material outside of the administrative record for the very limited purpose of ascertaining whether the administrative record itself represents a “good faith” and “reasonable” effort to discuss the pertinent environmental impacts of a proposed action does not constitute holding a “trial de novo.” The evidence outside the administrative record which the Court allowed to be presented was addressed to the breadth of opinions held by members within a partieular scientific community, e. g., reclamation, and whether an opinion expressed in the EIS record was based upon a school of thought that was widely acknowledged by members of that scientific community. County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1385. The Court also received evidence focused on the scientific methodology supporting statements made in the EIS record to determine the general acknowledgment of that methodology within its associate substantive community. See, Id. To the extent that these considerations required that the Court glance at the merits, the Court found it necessary to do so in order to make its determination as to “good faith” and “reasonableness.” But see, Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 559. When sufficient evidence had been received to enable the Court to consider the doctrinal and methodological bases for opinions made in the FESs relative to their “good faith” and “reasonableness,” no further intrusion into the merits was permitted. For example, a comparative analysis of the merits of one school of thought or methodology over another is beyond the scope of judicial review. See, id. at 560. However, without the right to superficially scan the merits for a limited purpose, the Court could easily be relegated to perfunctorily pronouncing an EIS as adequate solely because of the appearance of its format rather than upon a determination as to the “good faith” of its “compliance with the demands of NEPA” and the “reasonableness” of its “discussion of the five required areas.” This would be in derogation of the “rule of reason.” Plaintiffs contend that the EIS record in this case is too deficient to satisfy the demands of Section 102(2)(C). Plaintiffs challenge the sufficiency of the FESs in four areas, claiming that they contain inadequate discussion of land reclamation, alternatives to the proposed action, paleontological and archeological resources, and impacts of the human environment. Plaintiffs do not contest the discussions of these areas relative to the first prong of the “rule of reason” since it is obvious from a brief inspection of the FESs that “(the EIS record) discusses all of the five procedural requirements of (Section 102(2)(C)).” Plaintiffs do, however, allege that the discussions of these four areas fail to satisfy both the “objective good faith” and the “reasonable” prongs of the “rule of reason” standard. The type of environmental statement required for a proposed action which is subject to NEPA, and the extent of environmental discussion within that statement which is necessary to fulfill the requirements of Section 102(2)(C) is dependent partly upon the kind of action which is involved, Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co. v. S. C. R. A. R, 422 U.S. 289, 322, 95 S.Ct. 2336, 2357, 45 L.Ed.2d 191 (1975); Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 560, and partly upon the circumstances surrounding that action, especially where continuing agency control over the project is involved. Environmental Defense Fund, 619 F.2d at 1382; Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 560-61; Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d at 1167-68; County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1378-82; Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 827-28 (5th Cir. 1975). There are two distinct kinds of “major Federal action” involved in this case-the 1976 Lease approval and the 1978 Mining Plan approval. Because each of these actions has its own unique surrounding circumstances, a determination as to whether the discussions contained in the FESs constitute “good faith” and “reasonable” discussions of the four areas targeted by Plaintiffs requires that the EIS record be tested for adequacy with respect to each of these actions. RECLAMATION AND REVEGETATION. Plaintiffs first challenge the adequacy of the discussion of reclamation and revegetation in the FESs. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend (1) that there is a void of discussion as to the prevalent “state of the art” as to reclamation and revegetation; (2) that various essential elements of reclamation were omitted from the statements, e. g., geology, soil and plant ecology, biogeography, and climatic history; (3) that there was insufficient observation of experimental reclamation plots on comparable lands; and (4) that the FESs fail to accurately depict the potential for failure of reclamation and revegetation. As for the “state of the art” contention, there simply is no requirement in Section 102(2)(C), or elsewhere in NEPA, that the “state of the art” of a scientific discipline be explicitly discussed in an EIS, especially as an autonomous category. See, 42 U.S.C. Section 4332(2)(C). It is implicit in the reclamation discussion in the FESs that there is a divergence of opinion as to what the “state of the art” of reclamation may be. It suffices that the diversity of thought within the reclamation community was reflected in the FESs and that the prevalent opinions, however contradictory one with another, were expressed. The “state of the art” of reclamation is far from settled. To the extent that it is ascertainable, it has been interwoven into the fabric of the EIS record through the opinions expressed regarding the potential for either success or failure of reclamation and revegetation within this project. Further discussion of the “state of the art” is not required by NEPA. Plaintiffs’ second reclamation allegation-that vital elements of reclamation were omitted from consideration in the statements-met its demise during the presentation of Plaintiffs’ own case. Plaintiffs’ reclamation expert, Dr. Robert R. Curry, candidly admitted that there is an inability within the reclamation discipline to agree on a basic definition of reclamation or, indeed, its elements. Under the “rule of reason,” a “controversy of experts” is beyond the scope of judicial review. See, Many-goats, 558 F.2d at 560; County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1383. A “controversy of experts” must remain free from judicial intervention where, as here, the experts within a particular scientific field are engaged in internal conflict to establish the parameters of their expertise. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ second reclamation contention necessarily fails. Plaintiffs’ third contention is that at the time the FESs were compiled there were insufficient empirical studies of reclamation to substantiate conclusions stated in the EIS record that reclamation could be successfully accomplished on the ConPaso Project. This is an attempt to have the Court review the EIS record on the merits. This is prohibited by Manygoats. 558 F.2d at 559. The extent of field observation which must be done before conclusions regarding the potential for successful reclamation can be drawn is within the realm of expertise of the reclamation community. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Curry, testified that it would take approximately 22 years (the equivalent to one-half of a major drought cycle), once artificial irrigation had terminated on a test plot, before there could be definitive evidence that a reclamation program could be successful in arid southwest regions such as at the Project. Intervenors’ reclamation expert, Dr. Earl F. Alden, stated that there was more than enough reclamation data available in 1977, prior to the finalization of the FESs, from which one could have concluded that the chances for successful reclamation at the ConPaso Project were good. Obviously, this is another arena of reclamation controversy that is off limits to the Court. The fourth basis for Plaintiffs’ attack on the sufficiency of the reclamation discussion is that the EIS record does not accurately depict the potential for unsuccessful reclamation of the leasehold. It