Full opinion text
POST-REMAND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION WALTER L. NIXON, Jr., District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION—BACKGROUND This class action was filed by Henry J. Kirksey and sixteen other black citizens and registered voters of Jackson, Mississippi on March 10, 1977 after the defeat of a citywide referendum held on February 22, 1977 on the issue of changing Jackson’s city government from the present three-member commission form, consisting of the may- or and two commissioners, all elected at large in citywide voting to four-year terms of office, to a mayor-council form, under which the council members would have been elected from single-member districts or wards. The plaintiffs contend that the present at-large system for electing the mayor and two city commissioners abridges the rights of the city’s black citizens secured by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 and 1983. Jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and 2201, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(d) and 1973j(f). Named as defendants are the city, its mayor and two commissioners who were sued individually and in their official capacities, the Jackson Municipal Democratic Executive Committee and its chairman, and the Jackson Municipal Election Commission and its members. The Jackson Municipal Republican Executive Committee and its chairman were dismissed as defendants by Order of this Court dated March 28, 1977. On March 21, 1977, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, seeking to halt the municipal Democratic and Republican primary elections scheduled for May 10, 1977 and the municipal general election scheduled for June 7, 1977. On March 31, 1977, after an extensive hearing on the motion, this Court, in a bench opinion, denied plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. This denial was affirmed on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on April 21, 1977. The Court of Appeals directed this Court “to expedite hearing on the merits at the earliest feasible time.” Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 552 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1977). Subsequently, this case was tried on its merits on July 6-8, 1977 during which extensive evidence was adduced, and the Court found for the defendants after applying the principles of both Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff’d. per curiam on other grounds, sub nom. East Carrol Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976), which at that time was the polestar of the Fifth Circuit on the question of voter dilution and methods of proof thereof, and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). This Court rendered its Memorandum Opinion in this case on August 30, 1978, making specific Findings of Fact and reaching specific Conclusions of Law as dictated by the Fifth Circuit in Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978) and its companion cases. See Kirksey v. City of Jackson, Miss., 461 F.Supp. 1282 (S.D.Miss. 1978). In its “Conclusion” this Court found that Under the facts of this case, the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the claimed dilution was the result of any invidious discriminatory purpose or intent. In the aggregate the Zimmer criteria do not point to intentional discrimination as a motivating factor in either the enactment or maintenance of the present form of municipal government and the present electoral process in Jackson, Mississippi. Id. at 1314. This Court’s decision was appealed to the Fifth Circuit, and oral argument was scheduled by the court for May 7,1980. Prior to that time, on April 22, 1980, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), in which the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that the plaintiffs’ satisfaction of the criteria set out in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra, standing alone, was insufficient to establish a discriminatory purpose or intent. The Supreme Court relied primarily upon its earlier decisions in Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). Oral argument of this case was made before a panel of the Fifth Circuit as scheduled on May 7, 1980, and despite the fact that both the appellants and appellees urged the court of appeals to decide this case on the record before it, the Fifth Circuit, consistent with the usual practice of appellant courts in a situation of this type, declined to do so, and on August 13, 1980 vacated this Court’s 1978 Judgment and remanded this case for a supplemental evidentiary hearing and reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra. See Kirksey v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 625 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1980). In its per curiam opinion remanding this case, the court of appeals stated that although it was unable to decide the appeal at that time, it recognized the importance of this case and its urgency in terms of the impending 1981 City of Jackson municipal elections and went on to state: Therefore we make clear that on the remand the parties shall be free, subject to the initial control of the District Judge, to offer further evidence, to be considered in conjunction with the present record which need not be repeated. Furthermore, we direct that reconsideration and decision of this case be expedited by the Trial Court.... Id. at 22. II. POST-REMAND PROCEEDINGS A. Pretrial Conference and Proceedings. On August 20,1980, six days after receipt of the Fifth Circuit Opinion remanding this case, this Court called a conference of counsel for the purpose of discussing the status of the case and establishing ground rules for the post-remand preparation and trial of this case, in which the parties would be given the opportunity to offer further evidence, to be considered in conjunction with the record of the original trial, in accordance with the opinion of the Fifth Circuit. At that conference counsel for both sides advised the Court that the supplemental hearing would probably be concluded in two days, and that the presentation of further expert testimony was not anticipated. During the conference the plaintiffs were directed to provide the defendants with a statement of issues to be presented and decided at the hearing as well as a list of their witnesses, by September 5, 1980. The defendants were instructed to submit the same information to the plaintiffs by September 15, 1980. At the conclusion of the conference the parties were advised by the Court that a trial date would be set in late October or early November, 1980, which would be announced in the immediate future by the Court after it had an opportunity to check its schedule and make some necessary changes. The Court also instructed counsel that application for leave to conduct discovery should be made directly to the Court. By letter of September 9, 1980 plaintiffs’ counsel requested an extension of time until September 19,1980 to submit the plaintiffs’ “Proposed Pretrial Order,” and the requested extension was granted without objection of the defendants. Subsequently, on September 12,1980 the parties were notified by the Court that the post-remand or supplemental trial would be conducted on October 27, 1980. On September 20, 1980 the defendants received the plaintiffs’ “Proposed Pretrial Order” which incorporated a list of witnesses, at least four of whom were experts. Defendants’ counsel obtained an agreed extension of time until October 9, 1980 to submit their statement of issues and list of witnesses, and on October 1, 1980 sought leave to submit a limited set of interrogatories and depose the plaintiffs’ witnesses after receipt of expedited responses. This Court issued an appropriate order on October 2, 1980 and the defendants filed their interrogatories on that date, directing the plaintiffs to respond thereto by October 13, 1980. By letter of October 3, 1980, a request to conduct some discovery was made by the plaintiffs, which was granted by Order dated October 9, 1980 which in addition required the defendants to respond to the plaintiffs’ interrogatories by October 17, 1980. Also, on October 9, 1980 the defendants timely submitted their statement of issues and list of witnesses to the Court and opposing counsel. The plaintiffs’ responses to the defendants’ interrogatories which were due October 13,1980 were hand delivered to defendants’ counsel on the evening of October 14, 1980 and contained a second list of eleven witnesses, at least four of whom were experts. John L. Grimm, M.B.A., was listed for the first time as a witness (expert), and it was stated that he would testify as to “factors influencing 1977 voters to retain commission form of government.” It was further stated that Mr. Grimm at that time had not completed collection and analysis of the data upon which his opinion would be based. In response to the defendants’ interrogatory concerning materials relied upon by Grimm in preparing his testimony and formulating opinions, five treatises were listed, and it was stated that he would also rely upon “questionnaires and computer printouts not yet in existence.” Plaintiffs’ Answers to Defendants’ Interrogatories at pages 5 and 7. On October 17, 1980, the deposition of Gery A. Cummings was taken by the plaintiffs in New Jersey. Also on that date, the defendants filed timely responses and objections to plaintiffs’ interrogatories. These responses were supplemented on October 20, 1980, in which the same original six witnesses were listed by the defendants. The deposition of Robert Wise was also taken by the plaintiffs on October 21 and 22, 1980, and during the taking of that deposition counsel for the plaintiffs hand delivered a “Statement of Issues and List of Witnesses” to the offices of counsel for the defendants. This third list of witnesses contained twelve names, at least six of whom were experts, and for the first time the plaintiffs listed Dr. Rommel Benjamin and Dr. Neil McMillen as expert witnesses, with no indication as to the nature and substance of their testimony or the issues concerning which they would testify. On October 23, 1980 plaintiffs supplemented their answers to interrogatories to indicate for the first time that plaintiff, Henry J. Kirksey, would testify as an expert in “cartography” and “participation in political process.” In the exchange of documents which took place on October 23,1980, just three full days before the trial scheduled for the morning of October 27, 1980, the defendants for the first time received a copy of a report prepared by John L. Grimm, one of the expert witnesses listed by plaintiffs. On that same date, defendants’ counsel advised the Court and opposing counsel of their intention to object to the testimony of Dr. Benjamin, Dr. McMillen and Mr. Grimm. The plaintiffs’ attorneys responded to these objections on that same date. On October 24,1980 the deposition of Dr. Larry Powell, the defendants’ only expert witness, was taken by the plaintiffs, and on Saturday, October 25, 1980 counsel for the defendants received the plaintiffs’ Second Supplemental Answers to defendants’ Interrogatories, which contained further information relative to the testimony of Drs. McMillen and Benjamin. This Court found it necessary to relate the above sequence of events in view of the fact that during the supplemental hearing we sustained the defendants’ objection to the testimony of Dr. McMillen and Mr. Grimm, precluding their testimony for the reasons stated in our bench opinion, which is briefly restated infra. B. Exclusion of the Testimony of Dr. Benjamin and Mr. Grimm During this Post-Remand Trial. The supplemental trial was held on October 27-30, 1980 during which this Court again heard extensive testimony and received substantial documentary evidence. The plaintiffs called eight witnesses, four of whom were experts, and offered the deposition of Gery A. Cummings which was admitted into evidence. All objections and motions to strike made by the defendants thereto have now been overruled by the Court. The defendants called three witnesses, which included one expert. At the outset of this supplemental trial the Court heard arguments on the defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Rommel Benjamin, Dr. Neil McMillen and John L. Grimm, M.B.A. This motion was premised on the plaintiffs’ failure to timely provide information concerning these witnesses in interrogatory responses, which the defendants contended constituted a violation of the ground rules laid down by this Court as well as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Based upon the sequence of events previously related, this Court in its bench opinion granted the defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. McMillen and Mr. Grimm for reasons stated therein, but permitted Dr. Benjamin to testify inasmuch as the plaintiffs represented to the Court that his testimony was being substituted for that of Dr. Jerry Himelstein. Dr. Himelstein had been listed as a witness in the plaintiffs’ original witness list. Plaintiffs represented that Dr. Benjamin’s testimony would be similar or identical to that of Dr. Himelstein, who had unexpectedly become unavailable to the plaintiffs as a witness. We now reaffirm our previous decision to exclude the testimony of the witnesses McMillen and Grimm for the reasons stated in our bench opinion, after which we permitted the plaintiffs to make appropriate offers of proof of what these witnesses would testify to and what evidence they would sponsor if permitted to testify. In its per curiam opinion vacating and remanding this case to this Court, the court of appeals authorized a supplemental hearing on the merits, which was conducted herein and explicitly stated that the presentation of additional evidence was “subject to the initial control of the District Judge....” (Emphasis added). Kirksey v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 625 F.2d 21, 22 (5th Cir. 1980). This Court set the ground rules during the conference of August 20, 1980, and, despite the plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were certainly applicable to this supplemental hearing on the merits. As previously stated by this Court in its bench ruling on the defendants’ motion to exclude the testimony of the witnesses in question, the plaintiffs’ interrogatory response concerning Grimm’s testimony, served on the defendants on the evening of October 14, 1980, was incomplete to say the least, and was not in compliance with the ground rules established by this Court nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Actually, a copy of his report was not furnished to the defendants until October 23, 1980, just three days prior to the date of trial. Similarly, Dr. McMillen and Dr. Benjamin were not listed as witnesses until October 21,1980 and supplemental interrogatory responses concerning their testimony was not provided to the defendants until October 23 and 25, 1980, respectively. This Court was and is of the definite opinion that to permit Dr. McMillen and Mr. Grimm to testify would constitute prejudice to the defendants inasmuch as they were deprived of the right and ability to adequately prepare for cross-examination of these witnesses or the right to attempt to obtain and present rebuttal evidence; to permit them to testify would be to countenance a “trial by ambush.” While the Court recognizes its duty to permit the proffer of all relevant evidence by parties to a trial, we are of the opinion and find that the plaintiffs failed to exercise reasonable diligence to give defendants adequate information concerning these witnesses, in compliance with the ground rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus it would be unfair to the defendants to have permitted these witnesses to testify in view of the foregoing actions and inactions of the plaintiffs’ attorneys. See Shelak v. White Motor Compa ny, 581 F.2d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1978); Davis v. Marithon Oil Company, 528 F.2d 395, 403-404 (6th Cir. 1975). Mindful of the teachings of City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra, decided by the Supreme Court in 1980, the plaintiffs in this supplemental trial have limited their presentation of evidence and their attack on the constitutionality of the mayor-commission form of government in the City of Jackson to the enactment and adoption of that form of government in Jackson in the early 1900’s as well as the maintenance thereof since that time, principally as a result of the referendum of 1977. Succinctly, they contend and have offered evidence in an attempt to prove racially discriminatory intent in the enactment and adoption of the challenged form of government as well as its maintenance for the alleged purpose of devaluing the votes of minorities. The defendants of course have challenged these contentions and offered contradictory evidence, and it is this Court’s duty to now discuss and resolve these issues pursuant to the teachings of City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). The plaintiffs attacked the establishment of the mayor-commission form of government in the City of Jackson on two fronts, namely, the enactment by the Mississippi Legislature of the legislation permitting the adoption of this challenged form of government by the City of Jackson in 1908 and 1912 and its actual adoption by a referendum election held in the city in 1912, after its rejection in the referendum of 1908. Of course, the present challenged form of government and the election of the mayor and city commissioners in at-large voting would never have been established in the City of Jackson despite the enabling legislation passed by the Mississippi Legislature in 1908 and 1912, had not the electorate of the City of Jackson adopted it by majority vote in the 1912 referendum. In addition to their attack on the constitutionality and validity of the enactment by the Mississippi Legislature of the necessary legislation permitting the voters of the City of Jackson to determine whether they would adopt the mayor-commission form of government being challenged herein, the plaintiffs challenge the two referenda of 1912 and 1977 as evidencing a racially discriminatory intent or purpose of the majority of the voting electorate to violate the rights of the black citizens of the City of Jackson guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1973). It is to be noted that on the maintenance issue, the only action of which the plaintiffs complain is the vote of the majority of the voting electorate to retain the challenged form of government in the 1977 referendum. It is necessary for this Court to initially address the propriety of this two-fold attack by the plaintiffs with reference to the intent of the majority of the electorate who voted in the 1912 and 1977 referenda, i. e., whether the motivation of these voters is a proper subject of judicial inquiry in determining the constitutional challenge made by the plaintiffs. III. PROPRIETY OF JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO MOTIVATION OF THE ELECTORATE The Supreme Court has recognized that legislative or administrative history may be highly relevant in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed in connection with official actions taken by those bodies, especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decision-making body in minutes of its meetings or reports. Furthermore, in some extraordinary instances the members might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the official action, although such testimony frequently will be barred by privilege. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., supra at 268, 97 S.Ct. at 565, where the Supreme Court recognized that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of government and that placing a decision maker on the stand is therefore usually to be avoided. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., supra at 268, fn. 18, 97 S.Ct. at 565 fn. 18. In the instant case, however, the plaintiffs have attempted to prove that a discriminatory purpose was the motivating factor in the decision of the electorate who voted to adopt the commission form of government in 1912 and to retain it in the 1977 referendum. This Court is of the opinion that an inquiry into motives of legislators or other administrative or legislative bodies in search of a discriminatory purpose, even if proper, is not justification for a similar inquiry into the motives of a voting electorate in referenda. Certainly, if the plaintiffs’ position in this case is such that it assumes that the referenda determining Jackson’s form of government involved the delegation of legislative power, it is without merit because such position was rejected by the Supreme Court in Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 49 L.Ed.2d 132 (1966), where it was contended that a city’s zoning referendum constituted such a delegation. In Eastlake the Court .«held that a referendum cannot be characterized as a delegation of power because under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people who can delegate it to representative instrumentalities which they create, and that a referendum is a means for direct political participation, allowing the people the final decision, amounting to a veto power over enactment of representative bodies, which practice is designed to give the citizens a voice on questions of public policy. Id. at 672-73, 96 S.Ct. at 2361-2362. In Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 84 S.Ct. 454, 11 L.Ed.2d 430 (1964) the Supreme Court held that a state requirement that nomination papers and ballots designate the race of candidates for public office operated as an unconstitutional discrimination against Negro candidates where the requirement was enacted when there were unfavorable private attitudes and pressures against Negroes. However, since that private repressive effect was brought to bear only after the exercise of governmental power, the Court significantly stated: At the outset it is well that we point out what this case does not involve. It has nothing whatever to do with the right of the citizen to cast his vote for whomever he chooses and for whatever reason he pleases or to receive all information concerning a candidate which is necessary to a proper exercise of his franchise. Id. at 402, 84 S.Ct. at 455. An inquiry of this type into the motives of voters may very well constitute an unwarranted and unconstitutional undermining of one of the most fundamental rights of the citizens under our constitutional form of government, that is, to exercise their franchise, as was recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City, Col., 424 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1970). In Union City the Court observed: If the voters’ purpose is to be found here, then, it would seem to require far more than a simple application of objective standards. If the true motive is to be ascertained not through speculation but through a probing of the private attitudes of the voters, the inquiry would entail an intolerable invasion of the privacy that must protect an exercise of the franchise. Also see Ranjel v. City of Laming, 417 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir. 1969), where the court of appeals stated that “if the electors had a legal right to a referendum, their motive in exercising that right would be immaterial.” In American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 395-96, 70 S.Ct. 674, 682, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950), the Supreme Court stated that “under the First Amendment, the public has a right to every man’s views and every man the right to speak them.... Speech may be fought with speech, falsehoods and fallacies must be exposed, not suppressed.... ” See also Rudisill v. Flynn, 470 F.Supp. 1269 (N.D.Ill.1979); Good v. Roy, 459 F.Supp. 403 (D.Kan.1978). Private conduct on the part of voters is to be distinguished from acts of individuals engaged in state action when performing a public function. The latter has been characterized as public action, Tiryak v. Jordan, 472 F.Supp. 822, 824 (E.D.Pa.1979), whereas the former is purely a private exercise of the right to vote. There is no claim by the plaintiffs nor could they properly contend that those voters who voted to establish and maintain the mayor-commission form of government challenged herein in the 1912 and 1977 referenda were, by virtue of voting, performing a public function, as distinguished from expressing their private, constitutional, political views in determining the form of government under which they wished to live as citizens of Jackson, Mississippi. In summary, this Court is of the opinion and finds that the motivation of the majority of the electorate who voted in the 1912 and 1977 referenda in question is not a proper inquiry. Nevertheless, assuming that this determination is erroneous and that the Court may inquire into the motivation of the electorate in these referenda, we are nevertheless of the opinion that the plaintiffs have failed to prove racially discriminatory intent or purpose in either the enactment or establishment or maintenance of the challenged form of government in the City of Jackson for the following reasons. IV. MOTIVATION OF THE ELECTORATE IN THE 1912 AND 1977 REFERENDA The plaintiffs contend, inter alia, that race was a significant motivating factor in the enactment of the enabling legislation of 1912 by the Mississippi Legislature permitting the citizens of the City of Jackson to hold a referendum to decide whether the governing body of that City should be changed from a mayor-alderman to a may- or-commission form of government. Furthermore, they contend that the majority of the electorate who voted in favor of the change in 1912 was racially motivated in casting their ballots resulting in the change to the present form of government which provides for at-large elections of the mayor and two commissioners. In this Court’s original opinion we found that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving these contentions by a preponderance of the evidence. See Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 461 F.Supp. 1282, 1313 (S.D.Miss.1978). After this post remand hearing, applying the criteria of City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), we are even more convinced that invidious racial discrimination was not a motivating factor in either the enactment of the legislation or the adoption of the at-large voting scheme by the electorate in 1912. It is undisputed that in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s in Mississippi, and in Jackson in particular, there was a concerted effort to disenfranchise black voters who had gained-control of government following the war between the states as a result of the Mississippi Constitution of 1868 (The Black and Tan Convention), following which blacks were elected to state and local office during the Post-Civil War. Indeed, the 1890 Constitutional Convention in Mississippi was called for the purpose of ex-eluding blacks from voting. This purpose was accomplished by the adoption of the following prerequisites to voter registration: literacy and constitutional interpretation tests, poll tax, residency requirements, and the listing of disenfranchising crimes. Also, the institution of “white primaries” was enacted in 1902. The foregoing “requirements” were extremely effective, and all of the witnesses who testified in this case, including Dr. William Charles Sallis, Professor of History at Millsaps College, the only witness who testified for the plaintiffs at the post-remand hearing herein on the questions of “enactment” and “adoption” in 1912, agreed that at the time of the enactment of the enabling legislation in 1912 and the holding of the 1912 referendum pursuant thereto, black disenfranchisement was virtually complete in Jackson. At the time of the adoption of the commission form of government in Jackson, the City was governed by a mayor and a board of eight aldermen. The mayor and two aldermen were elected at large, and the six remaining aldermen were each elected from one of six wards. At the time of the enactment and adoption in 1912, the mayor and all eight aldermen were Caucasians. The last Negro alderman in the City of Jackson was elected in 1899, some thirteen years prior to the adoption of the commission form of government. In 1908, the legislature had enacted legislation to permit Jackson voters to hold a referendum on whether to make a change to the very form of government being attacked herein, and although practically all of the voters of the City of Jackson were white, this referendum failed by a vote of 447 to 399. At the time of the 1908 referendum, Jackson was governed by an all white governing body, just as it was in 1912 when the referendum subsequently passed. During this time Jackson’s eight aldermen were elected from four wards, two from each of three wards, one from one ward and one at-large. In reporting on the defeat of the referendum in 1908, the Jackson Daily News reported the reasons for the failure to be lack of understanding of the proposition by the electorate as well as voter apathy. The paper also reported that the City of Laurel, Mississippi had previously held a referendum on changing to the at-large mayor-commission form of government and had likewise rejected the change. Significantly, James K. Vardaman, who in the opinion of Dr. Sallis, was the foremost racist of his time, supported the proposed change of 1908, which was defeated by the virtually all white electorate of the city. It is significant that plaintiffs’ witnesses could point to no racial statement by Vardaman as a basis for his support of the proposed change which was rejected in 1908. The adoption of the mayor-commission form of government by the voters of Jackson in the 1912 referendum was part of the progressive reform movement throughout the United States at a time when countless other municipalities and other local governmental units throughout the United States adopted the same basic electoral system of at-large voting to elect their governing bodies. See City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra at 1496, and Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion. This movement originated in Galveston, Texas and was motivated solely by the twofold desire to eliminate corruption in government which was widely felt resulted from the election of governing officials from small wards or districts and also because of the lack of efficiency in municipal and local governments. This same desire and motivation is reflected in the Jackson newspaper articles admitted in evidence. (General Exhibit D-48). More significantly, plaintiffs’ witness, Dr. Sallis, admitted that he could point to no evidence of any statement of any supporter or proponent of the commission form of government with its at-large voting corollary that in any way reflects race as a motive for the adoption of the present form of government in 1912. He further admitted on cross-examination that he had not made a detailed study of Jackson’s 1912 referendum or the factual circumstances surrounding it and candidly admitted that he could not say what was in the minds of the voters in that referendum. In a textbook co-authored by Drs. Sallis and Lowen entitled “MISSISSIPPI: CONFLICT AND CHANGE” (1974), which discussed various devices initiated to disenfranchise blacks, the adoption of at-large voting in municipalities or other local governments was not listed or alluded to as one of those disenfranchising devices. Although Dr. Sallis on cross-examination attempted to explain or justify its omission on the basis that one must be selective in writing a textbook of this kind, this Court finds it very significant and supportive of our conclusion that the adoption of at-large voting was not motivated by racial considerations. Following the passage of the 1912 referendum, the all-white city government of Jackson refused to certify the results of the referendum, contending that the enabling legislation which permitted the change was unconstitutional because it required a party primary election. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court judgment for the State of Mississippi which brought a mandamus action against the city council to compel it to comply with state law as a result of the passage of the referendum, and it was only in this manner that the present form of government of the City of Jackson came into being. Jackson’s adoption of its present form of government in 1912 closely paralleled that of many other municipalities throughout the South and other parts of the nation and was brought about by the desire of the electorate to eliminate corruption, with no racial overtones or motivation. As previously stated, blacks had been virtually disenfranchised, and actually, at the time of the 1908 and 1912 referenda, had been completely excluded from participation in the Democratic Party primaries in Mississippi, which were tantamount to general elections. This fact, together with all of the other disenfranchising devices, had completely negated any racial motivation of the legislature in enacting the 1912 enabling legislation or the voters who voted for the change. Thus, this Court finds that race was not a motivating factor in the enactment of the legislation permitting the referendum of 1912 or the adoption of the commission form of government with at-large voting by the electorate of Jackson in 1912. Following what the Court stated in City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), if the plaintiffs herein contend that the state legislature in 1912 is presumed to have intended that there would have been no Negro commissioners, simply because there was a foreseeable consequence of at-large voting, [they] applied an illegal standard. Discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as volition or intent has awareness of consequences .... It implies that the decision maker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Id. at 1502, fn.17. We therefore must address the remaining issue to be decided by this Court, namely, whether the plaintiffs have proved by a preponderance of the evidence racial discrimination in Jackson’s maintenance or retention of its present form of city government. V. MAINTENANCE OR RETENTION OF JACKSON’S PRESENT FORM OF GOVERNMENT In our original opinion, we recognized that it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to prove racially discriminatory motivation in the enactment of a challenged plan, but that it suffices if they prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the plan has been maintained for the purpose of excluding minority input or of devaluing or diluting the votes of minorities. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, supra at 1313. The Supreme Court in Bolden alluded to the fact that there was evidence in that case that several proposals that would have altered the form of Mobile’s municipal government had been defeated in the state legislature, including at least one that would have permitted Mobile to govern itself through a mayor and city council with members elected from individual districts within the city. The Court went on to state “whether it may be possible ultimately to prove that Mobile’s present governmental and electoral system has been retained for a racially discriminatory purpose, we are in no position now to say.” City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra at 1504, fn. 21. In contrast, the Mississippi Legislature in 1976 did enact legislation to permit the electorate of Jackson to hold a referendum to determine whether they wished to retain the present challenged form of government or adopt a mayor-council form government with the mayor to be elected from the city at large and nine councilmen to be elected from nine single-member districts or wards. Following an intensive and quite lengthy campaign by proponents and opponents of the proposed change, including the extensive use of the news media by both sides as well as news articles and editorials written with reference to the impending referendum, the election was held on February 22, 1977 and resulted in the defeat of the proposed change by a vote of 14,935 to 11,497. Immediately following this referendum the plaintiffs filed this action. Before addressing the specific contentions and complaints of the plaintiffs relating to the 1977 referendum, it is important to note what they do not charge or challenge in connection therewith. First, they do not complain about the enabling legislation which permits any municipality in the State of Mississippi, regardless of the form of government under which it is operating, to adopt the mayor-council form of government by the procedure set forth therein. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-8-1 et seq. (1972) as Amended. Of course if the enabling legislation had not been enacted, the defendants would have been subject to the same type allegation made in the Bolden case, i. e., that the legislature refused to permit the electorate to make a desired change from the mayor-commission form of government. In addition, the legislation was enacted as a result of the efforts of those who favored the proposed change, including many of the plaintiffs herein, and was openly and actively supported by them as a way to have blacks elected to municipal government in the City of Jackson. Secondly, the plaintiffs do not contend that the holding of the referendum in and of itself was racially motivated, and as stated previously, a large number of blacks, including the plaintiffs Fred L. Banks, Jr. and Henry J. Kirksey, supported the holding of the referendum and were active in various phases of the campaign. Thirdly, no claim whatsoever has been made or is being made, nor was any evidence ever adduced by the plaintiffs in support of any claim of fraud or irregularity in the actual conduct of the election, in the voting procedures utilized, or in the tabulation of the results. Also, there has never been any contention by the plaintiffs and there is none now, nor have they ever adduced or attempted to adduce any evidence whatsoever of any inhibitions or interference with the rights of Negroes to become candidates in any elections in the City of Jackson in recent years prior to 1977. Furthermore, no claim has been made that Negroes in any way have been inhibited or discouraged from registering and voting, not only in this referendum but in other recent elections in the City of Jackson. Plaintiffs have absolutely failed to prove any lack of access in the electoral process either in slating, registering or voting in the City of Jackson in the last few years prior to or in the 1977 referendum. We previously pointed out in our original opinion that anyone who seeks nomination in the Democratic or Republican primaries may do so by merely having his application certified by either the Democratic or Republican Executive Committee, which is a mere formality. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, Miss., supra at 1288. Although this Court has found a past history of official racial discrimination in the state of Mississippi, we further found and now reiterate that the defendants herein have met their burden of proving that enough incidents of the past have been removed and the effect of past denials of access have been dissipated to the extent that there was equality of access and effective meaningful participation of blacks in the electoral or political process in the City of Jackson in 1977 and several years prior thereto. Furthermore, the absence of lingering effects of past discrimination which preclude effective participation of blacks in the election system makes for open and equal access to the election process by blacks in Jackson. We also found that the existing systematic and rapidly increasing responsiveness of the city government to the needs and interest of black Jacksonians is a reality. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, Miss., supra at 1313. Plaintiffs, dissatisfied with the outcome of the 1977 referendum, attack the result by claiming that certain persons were racially motivated to vote against the proposed change of government. As previously stated, even assuming (although we have reached a contrary conclusion) that an inquiry into the voting majority’s motives and intents is proper, we are nevertheless firmly convinced after weighing all of the evidence and judging the credibility of all witnesses who testified, that the plaintiffs have wholly failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the retention of the mayor-commission form of government in the City of Jackson was racially motivated. Stated differently, the plaintiffs have failed to prove any intentional and purposeful racial motivation for the retention or maintenance of Jackson’s form of government in violation of either the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment or Fifteenth Amendment constitutional rights or any other civil rights, pursuant to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), which are discussed infra. A. We first note that racially discriminatory motivation or intent is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980); Wright v. Rockefellar, 376 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 603, 11 L.Ed.2d 512 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960). As previously stated, there did not exist in the City of Jackson in 1977 or for several years prior thereto, and there does not now exist, any hindrance, impediment or interference with the rights of black citizens to register and vote, as well as to qualify and seek office in the Democratic and Republican primaries or the general election. No individual’s vote is worth less than any other’s. What is really contended herein is that the political structure that exists in the City of Jackson by virtue of at-large voting treats all individuals as equals but adversely affects the political strength of a racially identifiable group. The Fifteenth Amendment does not insure the right to have Negro candidates elected but prohibits only purposeful discriminatory denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to vote “on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude.” This Court previously found and now readopts its finding that Negroes in Jackson register and vote without hindrance; therefore, the plurality test of Bolden is satisfied. Also, in applying the objective effects of the political decision, rather than the subjective motivation of the decision makers, as did Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion, this Court finds that the commission form of government in Jackson is not extraordinary and is not merely a vestige of history with no greater justification than the grotesque figure in Gomillion, but on the contrary the decision to adopt and maintain the commission form of government with its at-large voting requirement is a political decision that is supported by valid and articulable justifications inasmuch as its basic election system is the same as that followed by literally thousands of municipalities and other governmental units throughout the nation. The fact that these at-large systems characteristically place one or more minority groups at a significant disadvantage in the struggle for political power cannot invalidate all such systems. See City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra at 1496, fn. 7. Thus, the at-large voting system and concomitant form of government being attacked herein are generally accepted in the United States. Dr. Gordon Henderson, a witness for the plaintiffs, admitted on cross-examination that the 1977 Municipal Year Book reflects that fifty per cent of the states in the United States have one or more cities with the commission form of government; also, less than fifty per cent of the cities in only two regions of the United States, the Northeast and West South Central, have systems of government that provide for at-large voting, whereas, over fifty per cent of the cities in the remaining regions of our country, including the Solid South, Middle Atlantic, East South Central, Border States and Mountain States have city governing officials elected by at-large voting. In addition, he admitted that quite a number of large cities in the United States still maintain the mayor-commission form of government, despite the fact that he contends that it is “inefficient and on the way out.” According to the 1979 Municipal Year Book, most municipalities of over 25,000 conducted at-large elections of their city commissioners or council members in 1977. See City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra at 1496, fn. 7. Applying each of the foregoing standards of proof in determining the plaintiffs’ claimed Fifteenth Amendment violation, this Court finds that plaintiffs have totally failed to sustain their burden of proving that the defendants invaded the protection of that amendment in the case sub judice under either of those standards. B. In their proposed memorandum opinion submitted to this Court subsequent to the supplemental trial, the plaintiffs argue that even if not racially motivated, at-large voting in Jackson violates plaintiffs’ rights secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1870, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1971, and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. Their argument states that in enacting voting rights legislation, Congress has the power to legislate beyond the specific prohibitions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to protect rights secured by those Amendments, and legislatively to prohibit and enjoin practices which have a racially discriminatory effect or impact and which perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. In support of this contention they cite City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980); Fullilove v. Klutznick, __U.S.__, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2774, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980); and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). The plaintiffs contend that neither a majority of the Supreme Court in Bolden, nor the Fifth Circuit has specifically decided the issue of whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 prohibits election practices having a racially discriminatory impact and which perpetuate the effects of past purposeful and intentional discrimination, citing United States v. Uvalde Cons. Indep. School Dist., 625 F.2d 547, 554, fn. 12 (5th Cir. 1980). First, we note that there has been no proof whatsoever offered by the plaintiffs herein of any violation by the defendants of plaintiffs’ rights secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1971. Turning next to the claimed violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, we note that the plurality in Bolden, Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, held that even assuming without deciding that Section 2 permits a private right of action to enforce it, it is apparent that its language no more than elaborates upon that of the Fifteenth Amendment and that its sparse legislative history makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth Amendment. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra at 1496. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, agreed with the plurality in the above observation but disagreed with their construction of the Fifteenth Amendment. For the same reasons that this Court has rejected the plaintiffs’ Fifteenth Amendment violation claim, we likewise reject their Section 2 complaint. We now turn to the plaintiffs’ complaint of the defendants’ violation of their Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Guarantee. C. Briefly stated, the question before the Court is whether the plaintiffs have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the majority of voters in the City of Jackson were racially motivated in rejecting the change to the mayor-council form of government and voting to retain or maintain the present challenged mayor-commission form of government with its at-large voting requirement. Initially, it is important to reiterate that the plaintiffs do not contend that there has been any impediment or hindrance of their ability to qualify for office or to register or vote in the 1977 referendum or in any election in Jackson in the recent past. Nor do they challenge the enactment of the legislation providing for the referendum or challenge the conduct of that election. Their sole Fourteenth Amendment complaint is premised upon the fact that since Negroes are in the minority in the City of Jackson in population, voting age population, and number of registered voters, they cannot elect Negro candidates to serve on the three-man governing body of the city in at-large voting. They contend that this would only be possible if the city were divided into districts or wards with the voters in each district or ward to elect members of the municipal governing body. It is now well established that in order to prevail in a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation claim plaintiffs must prove that the disputed plan was conceived or operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination, City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra at 1499, and that its purpose was invidiously to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 85 S.Ct. 498, 13 L.Ed.2d 401 (1965). This burden of proof is simply one aspect of the basic principle that only if there is purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). This principle applies to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other claims of racial discrimination. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Wright v. Rockefellar, 376 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 603, 11 L.Ed.2d 512 (1964). Thus, the impact of the official action—whether it bears more heavily on one race than another, Washington v. Davis, supra at 242, 96 S.Ct. at 2048-49—may provide an important starting point; but where the character of the law is readily explainable on grounds apart from race, as would nearly always be true where, as in the ease sub judice, an entire system of local government is brought into question, disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and Courts must look to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory purpose. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048-49, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). In its original opinion, this Court assessed the plaintiffs’ claims in light of the criteria set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen, supra, which was decided prior to Washington v. Davis, supra, and according to the Supreme Court in City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra, was “decided upon the misunderstanding that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory purpose in order to prove a violation of the equal protection clause, but that proof of a discriminatory effect is sufficient.” Unlike the district court in Bolden, this Court, after making its specific findings under each of the principal and enhancing factors articulated in Zimmer, as mandated by the Fifth Circuit in Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1978) (hereinafter referred to as Nevett II), found that the aggregate of the factors articulated in Zimmer weighed in favor of the defendants. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, supra at 1313. We found in our original opinion, and reaffirm that finding with even more conviction, that although there is admittedly a past history of official discrimination in the state of Mississippi, incidents of the past have been removed and that the effects of past denial of access have been dissipated with the result that there is present equality of access and effective and meaningful participation by blacks in the electoral process in the City of Jackson under its present form of government. Furthermore, the plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the city officials of Jackson are unresponsive to the needs of black Jacksonians, but on the contrary, based upon all of this Court’s specific findings of fact in its original opinion, we are firmly of the opinion that the governing body of Jackson has in the recent past become, and is now, increasingly and systematically responsive to the interests and desires of the black citizens of the City and is thus representative of all its constituency. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, Miss., 461 F.Supp. 1282 (S.D.Miss.1978). In conclusion, this Court has previously found, and reaffirms its finding, that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the claimed voting dilution was the result of any invidious discriminatory purpose or intent, and that the aggregate of the Zimmer criteria do not point to intentional discrimination as a motivating factor in either the enactment or maintenance of the present form of municipal government and electoral process in Jackson, Mississippi. We thus previously ordered the dismissal of this suit with prejudice at the cost of the plaintiffs, Id. at 1314. We are mindful of the fact that a majority of the Court in Bolden has rejected the Zimmer analysis which mistakenly held that it is not necessary to show a discriminatory intent in order to prove a violation of the equal protection clause, but that proof of discriminatory effect is sufficient. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra at 1502-1503, 1512 (Stevens, J. concurring). Nevertheless, consideration of the Zimmer criteria is relevant in considering the question of whether discriminatory intent or purpose has been proved. This Court therefore readopts and reaffirms all of its findings of fact arrived at in its original opinion and concludes that the aggregate of the Zimmer criteria strongly preponderates in favor of the defendants herein; i. e., that the plaintiffs have failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, inferentially or circumstantially, any intentional or purposeful racial discrimination against them in either the enactment or maintenance of the at-large voting electoral process in Jackson. This Court cautioned in its original opinion that: In determining whether unconstitutional dilution exists ... care must be taken not to disenfranchise the majority because this results in merely replacing one evil with another. It also compartmentalizes the electorate, reinforces the bloc voting syndrome and prevents minority class members from exercising any influence on the political system beyond the boundary of their single-member wards... . Kirksey v. City of Jackson, Miss., supra at 1312. This observation comports with the expression by the Supreme Court in Bolden. Certainly the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which guarantees equal participation in the electoral process to all does not protect any “political group,” however defined, from electoral defeat, does not entail the right to have one’s candidate prevail, and does not require proportional representation of races in city government. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra at 1504-1507 and 1510, fn. 6 (Stevens, J. concurring). It has certainly been established that Negro candidates have been defeated in their bids for election in the City of Jackson, but that fact alone does not work a constitutional deprivation. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,100 S.Ct. 1490,1503, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, fn. 15, 97 S.Ct. 555, 564 fn. 15, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1877, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971). The plaintiffs concede on page eleven of their post-trial Proposed Memorandum Opinion filed subsequent to the original trial of this case, that there is no evidence that blacks are currently being discriminated against in voter registration; likewise, this Court found in accordance with the testimony of Mrs. Evelyn Ballard, City Clerk of the City of Jackson for the past thirteen years, that black registration has been in rapid ascendency since passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The Court found that the record is completely devoid of any evidence supportive of any present fear or reluctance by or interference with the efforts of blacks to register, vote or seek public office, which is evidenced by the turn-out among black registered voters in the recent past in the City of Jackson, including the referendum of 1977. This Court therefore concluded that the failure of black candidates to win election in recent city elections prior to 1977 did not result from preclusion of effective participation by blacks in the electoral system because of past discrimination. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, Miss., supra at 1291-1292. The Supreme Court in Bolden likewise held that past discrimination cannot in the manner of original sin condemn governmental action that is not itself unlawful. The ultimate question remains whether discriminatory intent has been proved in a given case. More distant instances of official discrimination in other cases are of limited help in resolving that question. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, supra at 1503-1504. This Court finds language in Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion to be very appropo to the case sub judice, and more particularly his observation in disagreeing with Justice Marshall that the votes cast in an at-large election by members of a racial minority can never be anything more than “meaningless ballots.” Justice Stevens stated that he has no doubt that analyses of presidential, senatorial and other state-wide elections would demonstrate that ethnic and racial minorities have often had a critical impact on the choice of candidates and the outcome of elections, and that there is no r