Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM — DECISION AND ORDER MUNSON, Chief Judge. The named plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenors, and absent proposed class members are aged, blind, or disabled adults, their spouses, and any dependent children. All named plaintiffs have sought medical assistance [medicaid] as medically needy persons. In this action for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, the plaintiffs aver, inter alia, that the defendants, administrators of the medicaid program for the State of New York, have determined the medicaid eligibility of medically needy persons in a manner different from, and less generous than, the methods used to compute the medicaid eligibility of categorically needy persons. This disparate treatment, the plaintiffs alleged, has violated certain provisions of the Social Security Act, various regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supremacy Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently before the Court are motions by the plaintiffs for class certifications and for summary judgment, and by the defendants for dismissal of the complaint and for cross-summary judgment. I. A. Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k, has created a cooperative federal-state medical assistanee [medicaid] program designed to enable each State, “as far as practicable under the conditions of each State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services, . .. . ” 42 U.S.C. § 1396(1). If a state chooses to participate in the medicaid program, it must submit to the Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], the administrator of the federal medicaid program, see 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.1-.1011, a medical assistance plan that comports with the requirements of the Social Security Act and of the regulations promulgated by HHS. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396, 1396a; 42 C.F.R. § 435.10. With respect to these requirements, the federal program distinguishes two groups of medicaid recipients. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A), a participating State must provide medical assistance to the “categorically needy,” those aged, blind, or disabled individuals, and families and children, whose levels of income and resources are low enough to qualify them for federal cash assistance under the Supplementary Security Income [SSI] program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c, or under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC] program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.4 (amended 45 Fed.Reg. 24883, April 11, 1980). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C), a participating State may provide medicaid benefits to the “medically needy”, those aged, blind, or disabled individuals, and families and children, whose levels of income and resources are too low to cover the costs of medical care, but too high to qualify them for cash grants under the SSI or AFDC programs. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.4. This class of medically needy may thus be divided into two subgroups: the SSI medically needy, those aged, blind, or disabled individuals in need of medical assistance who are ineligible for SSI, and the AFDC medically needy, those families and children in need of medical assistance who are ineligible for AFDC. The State of New York is one state that participates in the cooperative medicaid program. See N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law §§ 363-369. In this regard, the State of New York also operates under a state constitutional mandate to affirmatively aid the needy. N.Y.Const. Art. XVII, § 1. See Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d 453, 373 N.E.2d 247, 402 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1977); Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 449, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728 (1977). Under the New York medicaid scheme, which is administered by the departments of social services of the State, counties, and of the City of New York, the State furnishes medical assistance to both the categorically and medically needy. N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law §§ 366(l)(a)(l), (2) & (5). Since the commencement of this action, the State of New York has converted to a different medical assistance plan, effective August 29, 1980. Under the new “209b” plan, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f), the State, instead of HHS, determines SSI eligibility, and may apply to aged, blind, or disabled individuals medicaid eligibility criteria that are more restrictive than the criteria utilized under the SSI program. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.121 (amended 45 Fed. Reg. 24883, April 11,1980). Thus, this opinion must address two separate time frames, the pre- and post-conversion periods. B. At dispute in this action are the budgeting procedures used by the defendants in ascertaining the eligibility for and amount of, medical assistance for the medically needy. For purposes of clarity, the plaintiffs fall into four groups. The first group of plaintiffs is comprised of several aged, blind, or disabled, SSI medically needy persons: Kenneth Calkins, a blind resident of Onondaga County; Gerald Makin, a disabled resident of Steuben County; Mary Toomey, a disabled resident of Monroe County; Curtis and Addie Williams, disabled residents of Orleans County; Jane Kliss, a disabled resident of Monroe County; Isahiah and Louise Floyd, disabled residents of Genesee County; and Connie Hodeker, a disabled resident of Monroe County. The second group of plaintiffs represent the spouses of these aged, blind, or disabled, SSI medically needy persons, who join this action because they bear the financial responsibility for the medical and non-medical care of their medically needy spouses: Martin E. Toomey, Sr., a resident of Monroe County; Alexander Kliss, a resident of Monroe County; and David Hodeker, a resident of Monroe County. The third group of plaintiffs includes individuals who reside with SSI medically needy persons and who are AFDC medically needy by virtue of their children’s deprivation of parental support, which stems from the disabilities of the parents: Yvonne Cal-kins, a resident of Onondaga County and a caretaker relative of two minor children; Curtis and Addie Williams, residents of Orleans County and caretaker relatives of three minor children; Isahiah and Louise Floyd, residents of Genesee County and caretaker relatives of one minor child; and Helen Makin, a resident of Steuben County and a caretaker relative of four minor children. The final group of plaintiffs consists of aged, blind, or disabled SSI medically needy persons who reside with AFDC medically needy persons, and who thus qualify as both SSI and AFDC medically needy: Kenneth Calkins, Gerald Makin, Curtis and Addie Williams, and Isahiah and Louise Floyd. The defendants are administrators of the New York medicaid program. The defendant Blum, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, is the chief administrator of that Department, and is responsible for exercising general supervision over all local welfare authorities, pursuant to N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law § 34. The defendants Lascaris, Commissioner of the Onondaga County Department of Social Services; Curtis, Commissioner of the Steuben County Department of Social Services; Richardson, Commissioner of the Monroe County Department of Social Services; Klapper, Commissioner of the Orleans County Department of Social Services; and Crabb, Commissioner of the Genesee County Department of Social Services, are responsible for the general operations of their respective departments, pursuant to N.Y. Soc.Serv.Law § 65. Those plaintiffs who are aged, blind, or disabled, SSI medically needy, and those plaintiffs who are AFDC medically needy and reside with SSI medically needy persons, sought medical assistance from their local county departments of social services. In each case, these plaintiffs were informed that because of excess income, they or their spouses would have to incur varying amounts of medical expenses before satisfying the eligibility requirements of the medicaid program. None of the aged, blind, or disabled, SSI medically needy plaintiffs had the earned income of their spouses computed according to the income disregard provisions of the SSI program. Cf: 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1112 (45 Fed. Reg. 65549, October 3, 1980). Furthermore, none of these same plaintiffs had their income computed according to the SSI budgeting scheme set forth in 42 C.F.R. § 435.-721. In the cases of the AFDC medically needy plaintiffs who reside with aged, blind, or disabled, SSI medically needy spouses, none had their income determined without regard to the income of their spouses. Cf: 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24). Finally, the plaintiffs who are both SSI and AFDC medically needy were presented no option of having their income calculated according to the SSI budgeting methodology. Cf: 42 C.F.R. § 435.404. After receiving their medicaid determinations from the county departments of social services, the plaintiffs sought and secured administrative fair hearings before the New York State Department of Social Services. The decisions after fair hearing affirmed the county determinations of each plaintiff’s medicaid eligibility. Alleging no adequate remedy at law, the plaintiffs raise two basic claims before this Court in regard to the defendants pre-August 29, 1980 practices. Firstly, the plaintiffs who are SSI or AFDC medically needy, and the spouses of such persons, contend that, among other requirements under the federal medicaid program, the defendants should have evaluated the income of SSI medically needy persons on the basis of the SSI budgeting methodology, and the income of AFDC medically needy persons on the basis of the AFDC budgeting methodology —or, in short, that the defendants use comparable standards in computing the eligibility of categorically and medically needy persons. Secondly, the plaintiffs who are both SSI and AFDC medically needy maintain that, pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 435.404, they should have been permitted to select the category under which they wish to be treated. For these allegedly unlawful practices, the named plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment relief and monetary damages in the form of restitution of the amounts wrongfully paid by them for medical care. Responding to these arguments, the defendants argue that the federal medicaid program imposes none of the requirements urged by the plaintiffs. In regard to the post-conversion period, only one group of plaintiffs seeks injunctive relief in addition to declaratory judgment and monetary relief against these same allegedly unlawful practices: the plaintiffs who are AFDC medically needy and reside with SSI medically needy persons. These plaintiffs contend that under the “209b” plan their claims remain alive, and that, accordingly, they are entitled to relief. Before addressing these claims, it is necessary to turn to various preliminary issues that the parties have raised. II. A. The plaintiffs have alleged that jurisdiction over this action lies under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, or, in the alternative, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Moving to dismiss the complaint for want of jurisdiction, the defendants have disputed this allegation on several grounds. One argument raised by the defendants is that this Court should not assume jurisdiction over this case because it “would be to accept a federal court review power over almost every ruling of the [commissioners] in the day-to-day operations of the state welfare laws .. . . ” McCall v. Shapiro, 416 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1969). The Second Circuit, however, made this statement in the context of finding that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction under § 1343 to hear the asserted claim. Id. Such a statement, then, by itself, hardly amounts to a ruling that this Court must decline to exercise jurisdiction in all cases that implicate day-to-day aspects of welfare administration. In addition, the defendants argue that pursuant to the decision of the Second Circuit in Andrews v. Maher, 525 F.2d 113, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1975), the Social Security Act confers no jurisdiction under § 1343(a)(3) or (4), and the Supremacy Clause furnishes no jurisdictional predicate under § 1343(a)(3). The defendants have not raised a third aspect of the Andrews decision, namely, the Second Circuit’s ruling that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not an “Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights”, as this phrase appears in § 1343(aX4). Id. at 119-20. In this regard, since the commencement of this action, the United States Supreme Court has substantially confirmed these positions of the Second Circuit. In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), the Court first addressed the issue of whether the Supremacy Clause secures rights within the meaning of § 1343(3) [now (a)(3)]. Id. at 612-15, 99 S.Ct. at 1913-15. Resolving this question in the negative, the Court concluded that “an allegation of incompatability between federal and state statutes and regulations does not, in itself, give rise to a claim ‘secured by the Constitution’ within the meaning of § 1343(3).” Id. at 615, 99 S.Ct. at 1915. Next, the Court considered the question of whether § 1983 was an Act of Congress that provided either for “equal rights” within the meaning of § 1343(3) or for the protection of “civil rights” within the meaning of § 1343(4) [now (a)(4)]. Id. Reasoning that § 1983 provides no substantive rights, the Court found that this Statute cannot supply a basis for the invocation of jurisdiction under § 1343(3). Id. The Court ruled further that because § 1983, standing alone, offers no protection for civil rights, jurisdiction similarly would not lie under § 1343(4). Id. Finally, the Court held that the Social Security Act “is not a statute providing for ‘equal rights’ ” under § 1343(3), id. at 623 (citing Andrews v. Maher, supra), or for the protection of “civil rights” under § 1343(4), id. (citing McCall v. Shapiro, supra). See Podrazik v. Blum, 479 F.Supp. 182,187 (N.D.N.Y.1979) (Foley, C. J.), aff’d, 622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980). In view of the Chapman decision, then, this Court concludes that in this action the Social Security Act and, by themselves, the Supremacy Clause and § 1983 provide no bases for jurisdiction under § 1343. The plaintiffs, however, have not argued that the Supremacy Clause and § 1983, by themselves, confer jurisdiction under § 1343. Instead, the plaintiffs aver additionally that this Court has jurisdiction under § 1343 to decide this action because they have asserted substantial claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this contention, the plaintiffs state that at least three classifications are present in this action. Firstly, because aged, blind, or disabled, SSI medically needy persons have not received the benefit of all the disregards and exclusions which are automatically accorded to SSI recipients, these persons have retained less money for their non-medical needs than those similarly situated persons who receive SSI benefits. Secondly, AFDC medically needy families of aged, blind, or disabled, SSI medically needy persons have been disadvantaged by the failure of the defendants to regard the income of the aged, blind, or disabled person as invisible in computing the budgets of AFDC medically needy families, as has been the case where actual SSI and AFDC recipients are involved. Thirdly, the plaintiffs have been disadvantaged insofar as the defendants have failed to implement the contested portions of the federal regulations regarding medicaid eligibility. Because at least the first two classifications allege a disparity between categorically and medically needy persons with respect to the amount of income available for non-medical expenses, the plaintiffs contend that these classifications raise substantial equal protection claims that confer jurisdiction upon this Court under § 1343. Citing Greklek v. Toia, 565 F.2d 1259 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Blum v. Toomey, 436 U.S. 962, 98 S.Ct. 3081, 57 L.Ed.2d 1128 (1978); Aitchison v. Berger, 404 F.Supp. 1137, 1142-43 (S.D.N.Y.1975), aff’d, 538 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890, 97 S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976). In response to these arguments, the defendants maintain that the Equal Protection Claims lack substantiality because, in actuality, there is no disparity of treatment between the categorically and medically needy; because the defendants have merely followed the requirements under the federal statutes and regulations, and because the plaintiffs’ claims fall under a rational basis standard of review. Given the insubstantiality of the Equal Protection Claims, the defendants contend, this Court consequently lacks jurisdiction to consider the pendent statutory claims raised by the plaintiffs. With respect to the arguments asserted by the parties, the Supreme Court catalogued the various tests for insubstantiality in its seminal decision in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974): “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit,” . . .; “wholly insubstantial,” ...; “obviously frivolous,” ...; “plainly unsubstantial,” ...; or “no longer open to discussion: . ... Id. at 536-37, 94 S.Ct. at 1378-79 (citations omitted) “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court and otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the District Court, whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the federal issues on the merits.” Id. at 543, 94 S.Ct. at 1382 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-67, 94 S.Ct. 772, 777, 39 L.Ed.2d 73 (1974)). After examining the Equal Protection issues raised in Hagans in light of these tests, the Court found that it was not so “immediately obvious ... from the face of the complaint” that the challenged practices were “so patently rational as to require no meaningful consideration.” Id. at 541, 94 S.Ct. at 1381. Applying the Hagans substantiality tests to the plaintiffs’ complaints, this Court similarly concludes that the allegations of disparate treatment between categorically and medically needy persons are not insubstantial. See Greklek v. Toia, 565 F.2d at 1261; Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984, 97 S.Ct. 1681, 52 L.Ed.2d 378 (1977). Accordingly, in view of the substantiality of the constitutional claims, this Court has jurisdiction under § 1343 over this action, and thus over the plaintiffs’ pendent claims. See Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125, 132 & n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 957, 963, 59 L.Ed.2d 194 (1979) ; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 543, 94 S.Ct. at 1382; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724-28, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1137-1140, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); Holley v. Lavine, 605 F.2d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. Blum v. Holley, 446 U.S. 913, 100 S.Ct. 1843, 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980) . Since jurisdiction exists under § 1343, it is unnecessary to consider the plaintiffs’ allegation of jurisdiction under § 1331. The county defendants urge dismissal of the complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) for want of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, on the ground that they are immune under the Eleventh Amendment and under § 1983 from claims from retroactive monetary relief. Relying on Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 47 (1977); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). To the extent, however, that the plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, in addition to monetary relief; that the county defendants are being sued in both their individual and official capacities; and that these objections thus actually challenge the scope of any relief which might be awarded the plaintiffs, dismissal of the complaint under 12(b) seems unwarranted. C. Several defendants allege, as a further ground for dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim, that the plaintiffs, in asserting a claim under § 1983, have failed to allege that the defendants acted in bad faith, or to deprive the plaintiffs of any rights. Relying on Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). In this regard, it is now settled that a plaintiff need only allege two elements for recovery under § 1983: (1) that the defendant deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the defendant deprived him of this right while acting under “color of state law.” See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1732-33, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978); Adickes v. Kress & Company, 398 U.S. 144, 150, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1604, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1275 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962, 100 S.Ct. 1648, 64 L.Ed.2d 237 (1980); Coffy v. Multi-County Narcotics Bureau, 600 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir. 1979). See also, Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171, 183-87, 81 S.Ct. 473, 481-84, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled in part and on other grounds, Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 61 (1978). Thus, in § 1983 actions for damages against public officers, the plaintiffs need not allege bad faith. Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S.Ct. at 1924. Here the plaintiffs have averred that the defendants have “refusefd] to determine the eligibility for and amount of medical assistance” for the SSI and AFDC medically needy in accordance with federal requirements, and have “refuse[d] to advise persons who are both SSI and AFDC medically needy of their alleged right to have their medicaid eligibility computed under the category of their choice, all in violation of various alleged constitutional and statutory rights enjoyed by the plaintiffs. Examining these challenges to the personal actions of the defendants, and accepting as true these claims that the defendants, in effect, knowingly and intentionally disregarded certain asserted federal rights of the plaintiffs, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief under § 1983. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir. 1974). See also, Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979); Heimbach v. Village of Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1979). If, by their reliance upon Rizzo, the county defendants are alluding to the rule that the doctrine of respondeat superior cannot create liability under § 1983, or if, by their assertion that the plaintiffs must plead “bad faith”, the defendants are claiming a defense of “good faith” or a qualified immunity, an inquiry into these contentions appears inappropriate at this time, in view of the limited nature here of an inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint. D. The defense is also raised that the plaintiffs Gerald and Helen Makin are time-barred under N.Y. CPLR § 217 from maintaining this § 1983 action on behalf of themselves and of an alleged class, inasmuch as they failed to commence their suit within four months after their October 5, 1977 decision after fair hearing became final and binding upon them. Because a New York State court would have dismissed the Makins’ claims as time-barred in an Article 78 review proceeding of the agency’s actions, the defendants argue, this Court, in the interests of federalism, should also dismiss their claims. Citing Guaranty Trust Company v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945). In making this argument, however, the defendants have plainly ignored the rule in this Circuit that the three year statute of limitations contained in N.Y. CPLR § 214(2), which applies to liabilities “created by statute”, generally governs suits brought in federal courts under § 1983. See, e. g., Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, at 615-16 (2d Cir. 1980) and cases cited therein. Accordingly, in the absence of any applicable exception to this general rule, and because the Makins commenced their action on April 7, 1978, well before the end of the three year statute of limitations period, the suit is not time-barred. Finally, the defendants contend that this Court should invoke the doctrine of abstention, and refuse to entertain the action. In order to address properly the arguments raised by the defendants, it is useful to consider initially the Supreme Court’s decision in Colorado River Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1975), a case that furnishes an analytical framework for the evaluation of abstention claims. See Naylor v. Case and McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 557, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1978). After admonishing federal tribunals at the outset of its opinion in Colorado River that “[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule,” 424 U.S. at 813, the Court identified three categories of circumstances that would be appropriate for abstention. Firstly, abstention may be proper “ ‘in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law.’ ” Id. 424 U.S. at 814, 96 S.Ct. at 1244 (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Company, 360 U.S. 185, 189, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1939) (citing Lake Carriers Association v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 32 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972)); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941)). See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 306, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2313, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979); Goldberg v. Carey, 601 F.2d 653, 658-59 (2d Cir. 1979); Winter v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 69 (2d Cir. 1978); McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 760-64 (2d Cir. 1976). See also, Naylor v. Case and McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d at 564-65. Construing this Pullman abstention rule, the Second Circuit has set forth three “essential conditions” that must be satisfied before a Court can decline jurisdiction: [1] the state statute [must] be unclear or the issue of state law [must] be uncertain . . .; [2] the resolution of the federal issue [must] depend upon the interpretation to be given to the state law, . . . and ... [3] the state law [must] be susceptible of an interpretation that would avoid or modify the federal constitutional issue. McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d at 761, cited in Winter v. Lavine, 574 F.2d at 69. In this regard, the Second Circuit has also ruled that “when state and federal laws overlap .. ., plaintiffs are not precluded from choosing the federal forum.” Id. at 763. See Connecticut State Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education Members, 538 F.2d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 1976). With respect to the pre-August 29, 1980 period, these three conditions have not been met. First, here there is no state law claim, separate and distinct from the federal claims, that, “if resolved in favor of [these plaintiffs], ‘would make it wholly unnecessary to consider the [constitutional] claim[s].’ ” Id. at 484-85 (citation omitted). As the plaintiffs note, the State, as well as federal, statutory schemes mandate that state and county officials follow federal requirements in determining what income and resources to consider in the computation of medicaid eligibility. See N.Y.Soc. Serv.Law § 366(2)(b). Thus, the issues in this action rest upon federal statutory and regulatory law and the defendants’ interpretation thereof. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 427-29, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 2379-80, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979); McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 674, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 1437, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963). Accordingly, inasmuch as the controlling nature of the pre-August 29, 1980 claims does not turn solely upon state policies and law, these claims do not appear to fall within the scope of the Pullman doctrine. With respect to the post-conversion claims of the AFDC medically needy plaintiffs who reside with SSI medically needy persons, the implementation of the “209(b)” plan has not completely displaced the paramount role of federal law in this area. Specifically, the conversion to a “209(b)” plan does not diminish the supremacy of federal law in the computation of medicaid eligibility for AFDC recipients. See 42 C.R.F. § 435.1(d). Cf: 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.401, 435.-520, 435.812 (1980), 435.814 (1980), 435.831 (1980). Secondly, abstention may be proper in cases that present “difficult questions of state law bearing policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814, 96 S.Ct. at 1244 (citing Louisiana Power & Light Company v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 79 S.Ct. 1070, 3 L.Ed.2d 1058 (1959)). See Burford v. Sun Oil Company, 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943). With respect to this Burford category, the Court has noted that “[i]t is enough that exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.” Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814, 96 S.Ct. at 1244 (citing Alabama Public Services Commission v. Southern Rail Company, 341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 762, 95 L.Ed. 1002 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Company, supra). See Naylor v. Case and McGrath, 585 F.2d at 564-65; Mathias v. Lennon, 474 F.Supp. 949, 954-55 (S.D.N.Y.1979); Grossman v. Axelrod, 466 F.Supp. 770, 779 (S.D.N.Y.1979). In the instant action, although the State has certainly adopted a regulatory scheme of incalculable importance to its people, the difficult questions of law involve primarily federal statutes and regulations, as interpreted by the defendants. Application of the Burford rule thus seems unwarranted. Thirdly, abstention may be appropriate if there is a pending state action. Colorado River, 424 U.S. 816, 96 S.Ct. at 1245 (citing Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971)). See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. at 423-24, 99 S.Ct. at 2377-78 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1977); Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977). The defendants Richardson and Lascaris invoke this Younger-Judice doctrine on the ground that the plaintiffs Toomey and Calkins commenced this action at a time when proceedings were pending before the State Department of Social Services. Inasmuch as these plaintiffs have, by now, received decisions after fair hearing, however, abstention on this basis appears inappropriate. The defendants forcefully argue, however, that this Court should dismiss this action because the plaintiffs have not availed themselves of state judicial remedies. While not argued by the plaintiffs, clearly there is no exhaustion of state judicial remedies requirement under § 1983. See, e. g., Meyer v. Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830, 98 S.Ct. 112, 54 L.Ed.2d 90 (1977). “[Rjelief under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state law which provided a remedy.” McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. at 671, 83 S.Ct. at 1435. In short, “abstention should not be ordered merely to await an attempt to vindicate [claims] in a state court.” Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439, 91 S.Ct. 507, 511, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971) (citing Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250-51, 88 S.Ct. 391, 396-97, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967)). Accordingly, this Court shall not dismiss any of the plaintiffs’ claims under the doctrine of abstention. III. The plaintiffs Kenneth and Yvonne Cal-kins, Gerald and Helen Makin, Martin and Mary Toomey, Sr., Curtis and Addie Williams, and Isahiah and Louise Floyd, individually and on behalf of their minor children residing with them, have moved to certify this suit as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) on behalf of the following persons: All persons who are now or may in the future be recipients of or eligible for medicaid benefits for the medically needy in the State of New York who reside with their spouses and/or minor children and are aged, blind, or disabled; their spouses who reside with them; and their minor children who reside with them. The plaintiffs Alexander and Jane Kliss, and David and Connie Hodeker, seek to represent a subclass of this larger class: All persons who have been, are now or may in the future be recipients of medicaid benefits for the medically needy in the State of New York who are aged, blind, or disabled and reside with their spouses who have earned income, and their spouses. In order to proceed as class actions, the plaintiffs must first establish that their proposed classes satisfy the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Pursuant to Rule 23(a)(1), the class must be so numerous that joinder of all persons comprising the class would be impractical. In their complaint, the plaintiffs Calkins et al. aver upon information and belief that their proposed class, which represents both aged, blind, or disabled, SSI medically needy persons and AFDC medically needy persons, comprises “a large percentage” of the more than 150,000 medically needy persons who receive medicaid in New York each month. In an attorney’s affidavit, moreover, it is alleged that the number of persons that would be affected by a decision to order the extension of SSI income disregards to ineligible spouses of aged, blind, or disabled medically needy persons is approximately 25,000. Given these allegations, this Court concludes that the plaintiffs Calkins et al. have met their burden of showing the impracticability of joinder. See Frost v. Weinberger, 515 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Frost v. Mathews, 424 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1435, 47 L.Ed.2d 364 (1976); Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968). See also, Lloyd v. Industrial Bio-Test-Laboratories, 454 F.Supp. 807, 812 (S.D.N.Y.1978). Turning to the commonality requirement of Rule 23, the plaintiffs must also establish the existence of a question of law or fact that is common to the alleged classes. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(aX2). Here, the plaintiffs Calkins et al. contend that the following question is common to the class: Whether federal law and regulations and the Constitution require the defendants to apply to aged, blind, or disabled, SSI medically needy persons and AFDC medically needy persons living with them at least as beneficial a methodology for computing income as is applied for other medicaid recipients actually receiving SSI or AFDC. In view of the facts and issues presented by both the plaintiffs Calkins et al. and the defendants, commonality appears to exist. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3) the plaintiffs Calkins et al. have also averred that their claims are typical of the class that they seek to represent. In this regard, although each individual of the proposed class would probably present a unique factual situation, inasmuch as the actual' levels of income necessarily vary from person to person, the claims raised by the named parties seemingly typify the claims of the absent class members. Hence, this Court concluded that typicality of claims exists. As a final requirement of Rule 23(a), the representative parties must fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). In the instant action, no antagonistic conflict of interest appears to exist between the plaintiffs Calkins et al. and the absent class members. Indeed, absent class members would probably benefit from any determination favorable to the named plaintiffs. Moreover, this Court acknowledges that the plaintiffs’ attorneys, employed by grantees of the Legal Services Corporation, are experienced in federal court class action litigation concerning the medicaid program. In view of the foregoing factors, the plaintiffs Calkins et al. seemingly can protect adequately and fairly the interests of their proposed class. Having satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a), the plaintiffs Calkins et al. must additionally meet one of the three criteria of Rule 23(b). In this regard, these plaintiffs maintain that certification falls under Rule 23(b)(2), alleging that the [defendants have acted or refuse to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, namely, they have refused to conform to federal requirements for computing plaintiffs’ eligibility for and amount of medicaid benefits, thereby making appropriate final injunctive or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole. Cf: Greklek v. Toia, 565 F.2d at 1260-61. Certainly, civil rights actions can be regarded as the “paradigmatic 23(b)(2) class suits, for they seek classwide structural relief that would redound equally to the benefit of each class member.” Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231, 1240 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915, 99 S.Ct. 2833, 61 L.Ed.2d 281 (1959). In this circuit, however, “one seeking class action status under Rule 23(b)(2) ... must present additional reasons for obtaining certification of the class under 23(b).” Davis v. Smith, 607 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1979). Hence, “where retroactive monetary relief is not at issue, and the prospective benefits of declaratory and injunctive relief will benefit all members of a proposed class to such an extent that the certification of a class would not further the implementation of the judgment, a district court may decline certification.” Id. Noting that retroactive monetary relief is in fact at issue in this action, the plaintiffs Calkins et al. go on to assert, as “additional reasons”, that class certification is necessary to avoid problems of mootness, enforcement, and class identification, and to effect a suggested mechanism for providing relief to persons affected by a judgment in favor of the named plaintiffs, namely, notice to class members. With respect to the particular concern for mootness, the aged, blind, or disabled status of many of these plaintiffs indisputably creates problems of mootness. Thus, in order to “avert the substantial possibility” of mootness, Greklek v. Toia, 565 F.2d at 1261; see Franks v. Bowman Transportation Company, Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 752-57 & n.6, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1258-61, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402, 95 S.Ct. 553, 558, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975); Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d at 1237 n.9; Lasky v. Quinlan, 558 F.2d 1133, 1136 (2d Cir. 1977); see generally United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980); Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 100 S.Ct. 1166, 63 L.Ed.2d 427 (1980), and for the other reasons presented by the plaintiffs, this suit should proceed as a class action. The defendants maintain, however, that class action certification is nonetheless superfluous because this Court should assume that the defendants would apply any determination in favor of the plaintiffs to all individuals similarly situated, and because any judgment entered by this Court would fall within the scope of the doctrine of res judicata. Relying on Domingo v. Toia and Fahey, 77-CV-217 (N.D.N.Y. August 24, 1977) (Foley, J.) (citing Wells v. Malloy, 510 F.2d 74, 76 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975); Feld v. Berger, 424 F.Supp. 1356, 1363 [S.D.N.Y.1976]). In regard to these arguments by the defendants, plainly neither the doctrine of res judicata, nor the doctrine of collateral estoppel can, by themselves, defeat class action certification; to hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of Rule 23. Moreover, the clear weight of judicial authority has not chosen to assume, in cases like this, that officials would fully apply any relief to all persons similarly situated, and instead has reserved this instance of noncertification for those situations where the defendants have given affirmative assurances that they would, in fact, extend such relief. For example, in Wells v. Malloy, 510 F.2d at 76 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975), the Court noted that the parties had stipulated that the Commissioner would apply any court determination favoring the plaintiffs to all persons similarly situated. In Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 936, 94 S.Ct. 2652, 41 L.Ed.2d 240 (1974), the Court upheld the denial of class certification where the State had “made it clear that it [understood] the judgment to bind it with respect to all claimants. ... ” (emphasis supplied). In Bacon v. Toia, 437 F.Supp. 1371, 1383 n.11 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff’d without opinion, 580 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), the Court chose not to deny class certification, finding that “there ha[d] been no assurances by the State that its welfare officials [would] apply the Court’s judgment to all similarly situated persons.” (Emphasis supplied). Here, the defendants have given no definite assurances that they would apply a determination of this Court in favor of the named plaintiffs to all individuals similarly situated. See Lucas v. Wasser, 73 F.R.D. 361, 363 (S.D.N.Y.1976); Echevarria v. Carey, 402 F.Supp. 183, 189 (S.D.N.Y.1975), aff’d without opinion, 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 429 U.S. 808, 97 S.Ct. 44, 50 L.Ed.2d 68 (1976) and 556 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Rodriquez v. Pencil, 391 F.Supp. 38, 41 (S.D.N.Y.1975). In the absence of such assurances, this Court is not inclined to indulge in the assumption urged by the defendants. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the plaintiffs Calkins et al. have established the propriety of class action certification, and hereby certifies a class consisting of all persons who are, as of the date of the commencement of this action, or who may in the future be recipients of or eligible for medicaid benefits for the medically needy in the State of New York who reside with their spouses and/or minor children and are aged, blind or disabled, and hereby certifies a class consisting of: 1. All persons who are, as of the date of the commencement of this action, or who may in the future be recipients of or eligible for medicaid benefits for the medically needy in the State of New York who reside with their spouses and/or minor children and are aged, blind or disabled. 2. Their spouses who reside with them. 3. Their children who reside with them. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs Alexander and Jane Kliss, David and Connie Hodeker, and their proposed class fall within this class definition, it is unnecessary to address their motions for class action certification. IV. Because the papers reflect no genuine triable issue as to any material fact, this Court shall now consider the substantive claims urged by the parties in their motions for summary judgment and for cross-summary judgment. In this regard, the Court is mindful of its duty to address any “dis-positive issues of statutory . .. law . . . before reaching constitutional issues.” Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 160-61 n.2, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 2704, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979). See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 692, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2553, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 543, 94 S.Ct. at 1382. A. The threshold inquiry here concerns the general requirements of the federal statutes and regulations with respect to the treatment of the medically and categorically needy. The plaintiffs contend that two provisions of the Social Security Act, namely, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(C) and 1396a(a)(17), establish a, principle of comparability which mandates that medically needy persons receive treatment comparable to that received by categorically needy persons in the determination of eligibility for, and amount of, medical assistance, so that medically needy persons not be left worse off than if they were actual recipients of cash assistance benefits. It is alleged, further, that these statutory provisions create two aspects of comparability. On the one hand, in ascertaining income available to the medically needy, administrators must disregard that income which would be disregarded under the categorical cash assistance programs. Citing H.R.Rep.No.213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1965); S.Rep.No.404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1965 U.S.Code Cong, and Admin.News 1943, 2018; 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.-831(a), .822(b); Greklek v. Toia, supra; Dumbleton v. Reed, 40 N.Y.2d 586, 357 N.E.2d 363, 388 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1976); Martin v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 72, 346 N.E.2d 794, 382 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1976); Newborn v. Toia, 89 Misc.2d 409, 391 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup.Ct. Kings Co.1976). On the other hand, and as a corollary to the above, medically needy persons are entitled to retain at least as much income for their non-medical maintenance needs as categorically needy persons, in order that the income of medically needy persons not be reduced below the State standard of need. Citing H.R.Rep.No.213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1965); S.Rep.No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. Code Cong, and Admin.News at 2019; 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.814, .816; Aitchison v. Berger, 404 F.Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y.1975), aff’d, 538 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890, 97 S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976); Dominquez v. Milliken, CCH Medicare & Medicaid Guide ¶ 26,633 (W.D.Mich.1973); Schlemowitz v. Lavine, 75 Misc.2d 529, 347 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Sup.Ct. Monroe Co.1973). Turning to the language of the statutory provisions relied upon by the plaintiffs, see, e. g., Consumer Product Safety Commission v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980), Section 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) provides that State must use “comparable standards” in determining the medicaid eligibility of the medically needy: (a) A State plan for medical assistance must— (10) provide— (C) if medical assistance is included for any group of individuals who are [not recipients of, e. g., AFDC or SSI] and who do not meet the income and resources requirements of the appropriate State plan, or the supplemental security income program, . .. (i) for making medical assistance available to all individuals who would, except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or assistance under any such State plan or to have paid with respect to them [SSI], and who have insufficient (as determined in accordance with comparable standards) income and resources to meet the costs of necessary medical and remedial care and services, ... (emphasis supplied). Certainly the regulations promulgated by HHS, as interpreted by the Second Circuit, have contemplated that this provision mandates comparable eligibility requirements as between the categorically and medically needy. See Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.), application for stay denied, 441 U.S. 153, 100 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (Marshall, Circuit Justice), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3005, docket number 79-2034 (U.S. July 8, 1980). Title 42 C.F.R. § 435.401(c) provides that a State medicaid agency must not use requirements for determining eligibility for optional coverage groups [e. g., the medically needy] that are— (1) For families and children, more restrictive than those used under the State’s AFDC plan; and (2) For aged, blind and disabled individuals, more restrictive than those used under SSI.. . (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, various decisions of federal courts have held that § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) requires states to prescribe standards for the computation of medical assistance for medically needy persons that are no more restrictive than those standards governing the eligibility of categorically needy persons. See, e. g., Caldwell v. Blum, supra, 621 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1980) (upholding preliminary injunction against enforcement of New York transfer-of-assets prohibition that applied only to the medically needy); Fabula v. Buck, 598 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1979) (Md. transfer-of-assets prohibition that applied only to -the medically needy held invalid); Greklek v. Toia, supra, 565 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1977) (N.Y. standard for deduction of work expenses that was more restrictive for medically needy persons than for categorically needy persons held invalid). But see Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d 1304, 1310 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, —U.S. —, 101 S.Ct. 353, 66 L.Ed.2d 214 (1980). Section 1396a(a)(17)(B) supplements § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i), providing that a State plan for the determination of medicaid benefits must (17) include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all groups .. .) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which ... (B) provide for taking into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in accordanee with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the applicant or recipient and (in the case of an applicant who would, except for income and resources, be eligible [to receive AFDC or SSI money payments]) as would not be disregarded ... in determining his eligibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (emphasis supplied). See 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.831(a)(1) & (2). Plainly the language of this section does not distinguish groups: “all groups” appears to mean all groups. Indeed, in construing this provision, courts have concluded that State agencies must apply comparable income disregards to both medically and categorically needy persons. See, e. g., Greklek v. Toia, 565 F.2d at 1261; Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984, 97 S.Ct. 1681, 52 L.Ed.2d 378 (1977); Martin v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d at 73-74, 346 N.E.2d at 795, 382 N.Y.S.2d at 957. In view of this statutory and judicial authority, it seems clear that the medicaid federal scheme, in general, mandates comparable treatment between categorically and medically needy individuals. Moreover, as this Court has recently held, the State’s conversion to a “209(b)” plan has no preemptory effect upon the applicability of the principle of comparability to the determination of medicaid eligibility for aged, blind, disabled, or AFDC medically needy persons. See Caldwell v. Blum, 78-CV-569 (N.D.N.Y. November 4, 1980). B. Relying upon this federal scheme, the aged, blind, or disabled medically needy plaintiffs and their ineligible spouses raise the question of whether, during the preconversion period, the principle of comparability, and the regulations that embody this principle, require medicaid agencies to apply to aged, blind, or disabled medically needy persons the SSI budgeting methodology applied to categorically needy individuals who receive SSI. For example, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants should apply the SSI income disregards to the earned income of ineligible spouses of aged, blind, or disabled medically needy persons. Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants should apply the SSI eligibility scheme set forth in 42 C.F.R. § 435.721 to aged, blind, or disabled medically needy persons. In response to these arguments, the defendants contend that the principle of comparability set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) requires only that the SSI income disregards be applied to any actual income of SSI medically needy persons, not to any income of the ineligible spouses of SSI medically needy persons. Furthermore, the defendants note that, although the regulations that preceded the provisions contained in 42 C.F.R: § 435 et seq. contained the phrase “budgeting methodology”, see 42 C.F.R. §§ 448.3(b)(2)(iii) & (iv), recodified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.721(c), .811, .822(b)(1), .831(a)(2), the present regulations have no such reference, see, e. g., 42 C.F.R. § 435.831(a)(2), thus allegedly signifying that state agencies need not apply the SSI budgeting methodology to SSI medically needy individuals. Also, the defendants urge that application of the SSI income disregards only to the income of SSI medically needy persons comports fully with the requirements of the federal medicaid scheme. The medicaid program, as well as the AFDC program, it is alleged, rests upon a family household concept designed to reflect the economies of scale as family size increases. Citing 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.-811, .812(b); 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602. New York’s scheme of public and medical assistance, the defendants observe, also rest upon a “household” plan, see N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law §§ 131 — a(l), (3), 366.2(a); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 352.1, .2, 360.25, .5, which is designed to insure that actual income to all households of the same size approximates the state determined level of need for a household of that size. Because the SSI program, which is geared toward the individual, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1381a, 1382, recognizes economies of scale through its allocation, deeming, and comparison of household size provisions, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.1163 (1980), to apply the SSI allocation and deeming budgeting methodology to SSI medically needy persons would be to afford to medically needy individuals a double income exemption. Such a generous exemption, the defendants contend, is not mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B). Finally, the defendants aver that HHS has approved New York’s method of determining the medicaid eligibility of SSI medically needy persons. Notwithstanding the force of the defendants’ arguments, this Court concludes, for the following reasons, that the principle of comparability contemplates application of the SSI budgeting methodology in the determination of eligibility of SSI medically needy persons during the pre-conversion period. It is of some interest that the defendants have relied only upon one provision of the Social Security Act, namely, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B), in making their arguments. To be sure, by its language this section refers only to income disregards. The plain language of § 1396a(a)(10)(C), and of 42 C.F.R. § 401(c), however, refer to “comparable standards”, and not merely to comparable income disregards. Also, 42 C.F.R. § 435.831 refers to income deductions, and not disregards. In this regard, the administrator of the medicaid scheme, unlike the defendants in this action, has apparently recognized that, in the area of public assistance, budgeting methodologies actually amount to eligibility rules. Thus, HHS has interpreted the principle of comparability embodied in § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(l) as mandating, and has intended the regulations to require the application of the SSI financial standards to SSI medically needy persons: [Wjhile a state might use more generous maintenance amounts in determining financial eligibility (i. e. — medically needy level. .., disregards, or asset exemptions) all other SSI eligibility criteria are to be used. .. . [A]ll aged, blind and disabled persons ... must have their eligibility determined using all SSI eligibility rules except or — and only except for — higher dollar amounts for income and resource eligibility levels ... 42 Fed.Reg. 2685 (1977) (emphasis supplied). See Fabula v. Buck, 598 F.2d at 872. See also 43 Fed.Reg. 45176 (1978) (no substantive changes made in the recodified regulations to the medicaid statute). This position by the agency responsible for the enforcement of the medicaid program comports fully with the plain language of the statute. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2369, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 556 n. 20 (1979). The reasonableness of HHS’s interpretation is buttressed by the observation that, contrary to the allegations of the defendants, the medicaid program recognizes not only households, but also individuals. As set forth in its opening section, the Medicaid Act provides medical assistance to “families with dependent children” and to “aged, blind or disabled individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396(1). The regulations also refer to individuals, as well as to families. See, e. g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.800, .811, .822, .831. Other arguments by the defendants are similarly without merit. Clearly, for example, if an agency deems the income of an ineligible spouse to an SSI medically needy person, then that income becomes the income of the medically needy person. Hence, in applying the SSI income disregards, the agency indeed exempts income of the SSI medically needy individual, and not of the ineligible spouse. Furthermore, with respect to the defendants’ comparative construction of the former agency regulations and of the recodified CFR provisions, HHS has emphasized that “[n]o substantive changes have been made” in the recodified sections of the regulations. 43 Fed.Reg. 45176 (1978). Finally, HHS’s approval of New York’s medicaid plan surely does not obviate the need for a judicial determination of the legality of that plan. Accordingly, inasmuch as the medically needy budgeting procedures used by the defendants during the pre-conversion period failed to include relevant SSI eligibility rules, as required by the principle of comparability, the defendants have violated the Social Security Act and the applicable federal regulations. The plaintiff AFDC medically needy individuals raise the further question of whether the federal principle of comparability requires New York medicaid administrators, in determining the medicaid eligibility of AFDC medically needy persons, to regard as invisible the income and presence of any SSI medically needy spouse or parent who resides with the AFDC medically needy persons. Inasmuch as the conversion to a “209(b)” plan appears to have no direct effect upon the determination of an AFDC medically needy person’s eligibility, as evidenced by the absence of any reference to the AFDC medically needy subprogram in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) and by the distinctions drawn in the regulations between “209(b)” plans and AFDC medically needy subprograms, see 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.401, .520, .812, .814, this discussion applies to both the pre- and post-conversion periods. Hence, no mootness problem exists. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24), an agency must ignore the presence and income of any SSI recipient in determining the eligibility of a family for AFDC: (a) A State Plan for aid and services to needy families with children must .. . (24) provide that if an individual is receiving benefits under [the SSI program], then, for the period for which such benefits are received, such individuals shall not be regarded as a member of a family for purposes of determining the amount of the benefits of the family under this subchapter and his income and resources shall not be counted as income and resources of a family under this subchapter. Cases certainly follow the literal language of this provision. See Martinez v. Maher, 485 F.Supp. 1264 (D.Conn.), aff’d, 631 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Nelson v. Likins, 389 F.Supp. 1234 (D.Minn.1974), aff’d, 510 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1975); Genin v. Toia, 47 N.Y.2d 959, 393 N.E.2d 1026, 419 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1979); Reeves v. Fahey, 65 A.D.2d 633, 409 N.Y.S.2d 277 (3d Dep’t 1976); Barton v. Lavine, 54 A.D.2d 350, 389 N.Y.S.2d 416 (3d Dep’t 1976); Schimmel v. Reed, 50 A.D.2d 1085, 377 N.Y.S.2d 313 (4th Dep’t 1975), aff’d, 40 N.Y.2d 887, 357 N.E.2d 1016, 389 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1976). Moreover, the implementing regulation tracks closely this same language. See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(l)(ii). The plaintiffs contend that the requirement of comparable treatment between categorically and medically needy persons requires that this invisibility feature of the AFDC budgeting methodology be applied to the AFDC medically needy person who resides with an SSI medically needy spouse or parent. For example, the plaintiffs assert that it