Full opinion text
OPINION LATCHUM, Chief Judge. On July 14, 1980, a Grand Jury of this District returned an Eleven Count Indictment in this criminal action naming Eugene Boffa, Sr., Francis Sheeran, Louis Kalmar, Sr., Robert Boffa, Sr., Chandler Lemon, David Mishler, and Robert Rispo as defendants. In Count I, all defendants are charged with conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (“RICO”) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and in Count II, all are charged with a substantive violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); defendant Sheeran is charged in Counts III and IV with violating certain criminal provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(b)(1) and (d); and defendants Eugene Boffa, Sr., Sheeran, and Lemon are charged in Counts V through XI of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2. Defendants have responded to the Indictment with a volley of 28 separate motions and memoranda in support thereof. All defendants, except Lemon, have joined in the motions of all other defendants. The Government responded to those motions by complying with some requests, by certifying by affidavit Government compliance with other requests, and by filing memoranda in opposition to all other motions. Although they were given the opportunity to file reply briefs, none of the defendants did so. The Court held oral argument on defendants’ motions on November 3, 1980 and upon subsequently determining that evidentiary hearings would be necessary for the resolution of the issues raised in certain motions, ordered that such hearings be held. Presently before the Court are . all the remaining motions of the defendants relating to those unresolved issues which do not require evidentiary hearings. Because the issues raised in the motions often overlap, the Court will discuss the various issues separately, referencing all relevant motions as it discusses the issues raised by those motions. I. THE FACTS ALLEGED The Court will first briefly summarize the allegations contained in the Indictment. If for the purpose of disposing of any motion or portion thereof a more particularized statement of the relevant allegations is necessary, it will be provided at that time. From on or about January 1, 1969 up to and including the date of the filing of the Indictment, all defendants were employed by and associated with an association (“the Enterprise”) which consisted of a group of individuals associated in fact for the purposes of making money and obtaining other financial benefits through the interstate business of labor leasing and motor vehicle leasing. The Enterprise carried out the business of labor leasing through the instrumentality of eight separate corporations named in the Indictment and the business of motor vehicle leasing was carried out by a ninth corporation named in the Indictment. Defendants Eugene Boffa, Sr., Kalmar, Robert Boffa, Sr., Lemon, Mishler, and Rispo were employed by and associated with the Enterprise in that each controlled and participated in the operation of one or more of the named corporations. Because the Enterprise was in the business of leasing labor, it had dealings with a number of unions, including International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”) Locals 326 and 908. In 1970, defendant Sheeran was elected president of Local 326, assuming the post at the beginning of 1971 and remaining president up to and including the date that the Indictment was returned. Sheeran was made eligible for this union post as a result of the efforts of Eugene Boffa, Sr., who, through his own and the Enterprise’s control of one of the labor leasing corporations which had in effect a collective bargaining agreement between itself and Local 326, arranged to have Sheeran hired as a truck driver by the corporation and thus made a member of Local 326 and made eligible to hold union office. In his post as union president Sheeran was associated with and employed by the Enterprise in that he would enter into collective bargaining agreements on behalf of Local 326 with corporations controlled by the Enterprise, he would operate the labor leasing business of the Enterprise in the State of Delaware, he would inform Eugene Boffa, Sr., of companies, as a result of information gained by Sheeran by virtue of his union post, which Sheeran believed might be interested in leasing labor, and he would, in concert with Eugene Boffa, Sr., and Lemon, defraud Local 326 members employed by corporations controlled by the Enterprise. In return for these activities, the Enterprise rewarded Sheeran by providing him with the free use of automobiles, the purchase of an automobile at less than market price, and a portion of the profits of the labor leasing business. Starting on or about January 1,1969 and continuing up to and including the date that the Indictment was returned, all defendants conspired to and did in fact knowingly conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of the Enterprise through a “pattern of racketeering activity.” Sixty-two separate “racketeering acts” are charged. The bulk of these acts relate to transactions occurring among the corporations controlled by the Enterprise, Locals 326 and 908 and members of those Locals who were also employed by the Enterprise corporations involved, and three corporations, Crown Zellerbach Corp. and Inland Container Corp., both in Delaware, and Continental Can Co., Inc. in Ohio, who leased labor from corporations controlled by the Enterprise. Although the Enterprise-controlled corporations, the individual defendants, the affected employees and the unions differed, a common pattern was followed in the Enterprise’s dealings with Crown Zellerbach Corp., Inland Container Corp. and Continental Can Co., Inc. (the “lessee corporations”). In each case, initially a lessee corporation leased labor from Universal Coordinators, Inc. (“UCI”), a corporation controlled by the Enterprise. In each case a collective bargaining agreement was in effect between UCI and an IBT Local, and UCI’s employees who were leased to the corporation were members of that Local. In each case, several defendants devised and carried out a scheme to deprive the employees, who were truck drivers, of economic benefits they enjoyed through rights guaranteed them under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, economic benefits they enjoyed through rights they had under the relevant collective bargaining agreement then in effect between UCI and the relevant IBT Local, and in the case of the two lessee corporations located in Delaware, the loyal, faithful and honest services of defendant Sheeran in the performance of his duties as the elected and salaried president of Local 326. The object of this scheme was, in each case, to enable the Enterprise to continue to do business with each lessee corporation through one of the corporate entities the Enterprise controlled and thus to continue receiving revenues from each lessee corporation in the form of labor leasing fees. In each ease, for various reasons, UCI would terminate its contract with the relevant lessee corporation and recommend that the lessee corporation employ a second corporation controlled by the Enterprise, without revealing the common control to either the lessee corporation or the affected employees. UCI would consequently terminate the employment of the drivers it had leased to the lessee corporation and the new Enterprise controlled corporation then either would employ different drivers altogether or would employ the same drivers but at a rate of pay lower than that required by the previous collective bargaining agreement, thus assuring the Enterprise continuous business and continuous revenue. Defendant Sheeran participated in this scheme, using his post as president of Local 326 to assure its success, and, in return, other defendants arranged that Sheer-an receive and share in the profits and other rewards mentioned earlier. The specific racketeering acts which are charged by the Indictment consist of (1) violations of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 2, which occurred when letters, employment termination notices and a false affidavit were placed in the mails for the purpose of carrying out the fraudulent scheme described above, (2) violations of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 186(aX4) and 186(b)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, which occurred both when certain defendants delivered, and Sheeran accepted benefits, with the intent that Sheeran be influenced in respect to his actions, decisions, and duties as president of Local 326, and (3) obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 which occurred when Eugene Boffa, Sr., falsified corporate records subpoenaed by a Federal Grand Jury in order to cover up certain of the racketeering activities. II. RICO Because of the centrality of RICO to this case, it is necessary at this point, as a preliminary matter, to describe briefly the purpose and structure of RICO. RICO was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. In adopting the Act Congress found that organized crime in the United States was a highly sophisticated, diversified and widespread activity which increasingly was using the power and money which it obtained from a variety of illegal and socially exploitative endeavors “to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes.” Congress further found that these activities of organized crime “weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens” but that organized crime continued to grow, in part because “the .. . sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.” For these reasons, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 “to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States ... by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.” Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. 91-452, 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 1073 (1970). Thus, RICO was Congress’ response to the particular problems posed by the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime. Congress was presented with evidence showing that: Once it invades a legitimate field of endeavor, the mob quickly brings with it a full range of corrupt practices... . Labor unions are infiltrated, and then labor peace is sold to businesses... [etc.]... Through the violence used in its operations and its rigidly enforced code of silence, as well as exploitation of nonmembers in its schemes, the mob seeks to gain immunity from the rules of our society governing .business and labor practices. McClellan, J.L., The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 Notre Dame Law. 55, 141 (1970). RICO was aimed to attack those problems “by providing a means of wholesale removal of organized crime from our organizations, prevention of their return, and, where possible, forfeiture of their ill-gotten gains.” Id. Section 1962 of RICO is the proscriptive section of the Act. Four offenses are there defined, of which only the offenses defined in subsections (c) and (d) are charged in the present Indictment. Subsection 1962(d) simply makes it unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of the other subsections of § 1962. In this case, defendants are charged with both violating, and conspiring to violate, § 1962(c). Section 1962(c) provides in relevant part: It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity .... The terms used in the statute are explicitly defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961. That section defines the term “person” to include any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). “Enterprise” is defined to include “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). “Pattern of racketeering activity” is defined to require “at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last. of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Finally “racketeering activity” is defined to mean any of a number of acts constituting state and federal crimes which are specifically enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Included in that list of crimes which constitute racketeering activity are 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud) and 1503 (obstruction of justice), and 29 U.S.C. § 186 (Taft-Hartley). Section 1963, RICO’s penalty provision and the only other section implicated in this action allows the imposition of a maximum fine of $25,000, a maximum prison term of 20 years or both and further provides for the forfeiture to the United States of any interest in an enterprise acquired or maintained in violation of § 1962 and any interest in or any right giving the defendant a source of influence over any enterprise which he has “established, operated, controlled, or participated in the conduct of” in violation of § 1962. III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS Defendant Eugene Boffa, Sr., joined by all defendants except Chandler Lemon, has moved to dismiss Counts I and II, the RICO counts, on the grounds that RICO was not meant to apply to a purely illegitimate organization, business or enterprise such as that alleged by the Indictment, that RICO is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the facts of this action, and that the indictment is defective in numerous respects. The Court will first address the issue of whether or not RICO was intended to apply to an enterprise of the type alleged in Counts I and II of the Indictment. A. Enterprise With respect to the issue of whether a purely illegitimate criminal organization may be considered an “enterprise” under RICO, there exists a clear split in the Circuits. The Second Circuit, United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (C.A.2, 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039, 97 S.Ct. 736, 50 L.Ed.2d 750 (1977), the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523 (C.A.4, 1980), the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (C.A.5), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S.Ct. 349, 58 L.Ed.2d 344 (1978); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (C.A.5, 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 743, 54 L.Ed.2d 767 (1978); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (C.A.5, 1976), the Seventh Circuit, United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298 (C.A.7,1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 780 (1980); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (C.A.7, 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925, 95 S.Ct. 1121, 43 L.Ed.2d 395 (1975), the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (C.A.9, 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 780 (1980), and the District of Columbia Circuit, United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (C.A.D.C.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct. 2056, 60 L.Ed.2d 662 (1979), as well as the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in this Circuit, United States v. Fineman, 434 F.Supp. 189 (E.D.Pa.1977), have all embraced what may be safely characterized as the majority view that an organization whose sole purpose and function is the commission of criminal activities (“a purely illegitimate enterprise”) may satisfy the enterprise element of a RICO offense. Recently, however, both the First Circuit, United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (C.A.1, 1980), and the Eighth Circuit, United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (C.A.8, 1980), after having undertaken an exhaustive examination of the statute and the relevant legislative history, concluded that the term enterprise does not encompass purely illegitimate organizations, but “encompass[es] only an association . .. which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the ‘pattern of racketeering activity.’ ” United States v. Anderson, supra, 626 F.2d at 1372. A Sixth Circuit panel opinion with one judge dissenting also adopted the latter view in United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260 (C.A.6, 1979) but that opinion has been withdrawn pending a resolution en banc. The majority of commentators concur in the latter view that RICO was not intended to extend to a purely illegitimate enterprise. Schmidt, W. L., The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: An Analysis of the Confusion in its Application and a Proposal for Reform, 33 Vanderbilt L.Rev. 441 (1980); Bradley, C. M., Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 Iowa L.Rev. 837 (1980); Novotny, D. J., Comment: Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues Arising in its Interpretation, 27 DePaul L.Rev. 89 (1977). While the Third Circuit has never taken a position on this issue, it was, however, raised in that Court in United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985 (C.A.3,1980). Although the Court in that case found it unnecessary “to adopt generally either the narrow or the broad definition of ‘enterprise,’ ” it did hold that where the enterprise alleged in an indictment is a wholly illegitimate organization whose operations were carried out with the intention of, and did in fact succeed in, subverting “legitimate unions and business,” the enterprise requirement of RICO was satisfied. United States v. Provenzano, supra, 620 F.2d at 993. Consequently, even if this Court were to assume, contrary to the express allegations of the Indictment, that the activities of the Enterprise charged in this action were limited to purely criminal endeavors, under the holding in Provenzano, the Indictment would still charge a proper RICO enterprise because the purely illegitimate activities of the Enterprise charged had the principal goal and effect of subverting the two legitimate union locals and the nine legitimate labor leasing and vehicle leasing corporations mentioned in the Indictment. Thus, even assuming that the charged Enterprise in this action were illegitimate, here, as. in the Provenzano case, the Indictment seeks to vindicate what all concede is the primary purpose of RICO — prevention of the infiltration of legitimate businesses by racketeers. The Court, however, need not rest its decision solely upon the holding in Provenzano because the Enterprise described in the present Indictment is “an association ... which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the ‘pattern of racketeering activity,’ ” United States v. Anderson, supra, 626 F.2d at 1372, and thus falls squarely within the definition of enterprise adopted by the “legitimate enterprise” courts. The Indictment describes the Enterprise as “a group of individuals associated in fact for the purposes of making money and obtaining other financial benefits through the business of labor leasing and motor vehicle leasing.” Hence, the Indictment alleges an association, and alleges that it has economic goals which it pursued through the businesses of labor and vehicle leasing, both legitimate businesses which do not constitute racketeering activities. Furthermore, the Indictment alleges that the Enterprise conducted its activities through the instrumentality of a number of legitimate corporations controlled by the Enterprise and alleges a number of legitimate activities, common in the labor leasing business, that the Enterprise performed, including the seeking out and making of contracts and the actual leasing of labor. The fact that in many, if not in most cases, the Enterprise’s business activity was intertwined with, and carried out by means of, racketeering acts does not make the Enterprise “purely illegitimate.” Indeed, so to hold would make RICO inapplicable to the very situation which Congress was most interested in reaching — the legitimate business taken over by racketeers who begin to manage the business using corrupt practices they learned and utilized in their other purely illegitimate endeavors. B. Constitutionality of RICO Defendants have also moved to dismiss Counts I and II of the Indictment because RICO is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. Defendants’ attack is sweeping and eclectic. Defendants’ motion and supporting brief are “less than pellucid” in specifying the exact grounds upon which defendants rely in challenging RICO’s constitutionality. However, upon scrutinizing the arguments presented and the cases cited by defendants, the Court has determined that defendants challenge RICO’s constitutionality on the basis of the following contentions: (1) RICO is impermissively vague in violation of the due process clause because it fails to give adequate warning of the behavior which it proscribes. Defendants contend that this vagueness is due to the failure of the statute to define adequately the terms “enterprise” and “pattern of racketeering activity” and to the statute’s failure to define the exact nature of the relationships between (a) the person and the enterprise, (b) the person and the pattern of racketeering, and (c) the pattern of racketeering and the enterprise. (2) RICO impinges upon protected associational activity and therefore should be declared void for vagueness and overbreadth under the First Amendment. (3) RICO fails to require criminal intent (mens rea) and/or criminal knowledge (scienter) and therefore is unconstitutional. (4) RICO violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. (5) RICO is so broad that it invades areas traditionally relegated to the states and therefore violates the constitutional principles of Federalism protected by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. These contentions will be addressed seriatim. 1. Due Process Vagueness First, the Court has concluded that although the terms and the relationships which defendants challenge are, in fact, broad, the statute is “sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties” and is not “so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516 (1921). The Third Circuit has already rejected as meritless a contention that 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) is vague. United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1198 (C.A.3,1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 2014, 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979). Indeed, even though the vagueness challenges to RICO have been multitudinous, every court which has considered the question has found the statute, including the specific provisions which the defendants challenge here, not to be vague. See United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 305 (C.A.7, 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 780 (1980) (“enterprise” broad but not vague); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct. 2056, 60 L.Ed.2d 662 (1979) (§ 1962(c) not vague and, in particular, terms, “enterprise,” “employed by or associated with,” “directly and indirectly in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,” and “pattern of racketeering activity,” not vague); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 478-79 (C.A.5, 1976); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (C.A.9, 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S.Ct. 777, 46 L.Ed.2d 638 (1976) (§ 1962(c) as a whole not vague and terms, “enterprise,” and “person” not vague, in particular); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (C.A.7, 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925, 95 S.Ct. 1121, 43 L.Ed.2d 395 (1975); United States v. Thevis, 474 F.Supp. 134, 139 (N.D.Ga.1979) (“employed by or associated with . . . any enterprise,” “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of enterprise’s affairs,” “through a pattern of racketeering activity” not vague); United States v. Field, 432 F.Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.1977), aff’d. without opinion, 578 F.2d 1371 (C.A.2), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801, 99 S.Ct. 43, 58 L.Ed.2d 94 (1978); United States v. Castellano, 416 F.Supp. 125, 128 (E.D.N.Y.1975); United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F.Supp. 1014 (W.D.Pa.1975), appeal dismissed without opinion, 556 F.2d 569 (C.A.3, 1977) (“conduct of affairs” language of § 1962(c) not vague); United States v. White, 386 F.Supp. 882 (E.D.Wis.1974) (“pattern of racketeering activity” not vague); United States v. Stofsky, 409 F.Supp. 609, 612-14 (S.D.N.Y.1973) (“conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity” not vague). Defendants attempt to distinguish this extensive authority on the grounds that the other courts which have considered the issue have not focused on the statute’s ambiguity regarding the nature and degree of relationship required among the elements “person,” “enterprise,” and “racketeering activity” and because they have not adopted the “as applied” approach taken by defendants. This Court finds these contentions spurious. First, many of the opinions cited above explicitly found that the relationships challenged by defendants here are defined with constitutionally sufficient clarity. United States v. Swiderski, supra; United States v. Thevis, supra; United States v. Scalzitti, supra; United States v. White, supra; United States v. Stofsky, supra. Secondly, the Court finds that the offense described by the Indictment is patently within the core of the statute’s prohibitions and thus independently finds the statute neither facially vague nor vague as applied. Under the due process vagueness doctrine, in most cases, where a statute is not so utterly vague as to be completely devoid of meaning, but where the scope of the statute may be open to question, the nature of the inquiry that must be made to determine facial ambiguity is not significantly different from that which must be made to determine ambiguity as applied. The relevant inquiry is whether the statute is so vague that a person could not reasonably understand that the contemplated conduct, as charged in the Indictment, would be proscribed by the statute. This doctrine was explained as follows by the Supreme Court in United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 83 S.Ct. 594, 597-598, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963): It is true that a statute attacked as vague must initially be examined “on its face,” but it does not follow that a readily discernible dividing line can always be drawn, with statutes falling neatly into one of the two categories of “valid” or “invalid” solely on the basis of such an examination. We do not evaluate § 3 in the abstract. “The delicate power of pronouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases .... [A] limiting construction could be given to the statute by the court responsible for its construction if an application of doubtful constitutionality were ... presented. We might add that application of this rule frees the Court not only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy.” United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, [80 S.Ct. 519, 523, 4 L.Ed.2d 524] (1960). The strong presumptive validity that attaches to an Act of Congress has led this Court to hold many times that statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language. E. g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 [71 S.Ct. 703, 707, 95 L.Ed. 886] (1951), and United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 [67 S.Ct. 1538, 1541, 91 L.Ed. 1877] (1947). Indeed, we have consistently sought an interpretation which supports the constitutionality of legislation. E. g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 47 [73 S.Ct. 543, 546, 97 L.Ed. 770] (1953); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 [52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598] (1932); see Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 [65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495] (1945). Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 [74 S.Ct. 808, 811, 98 L.Ed. 989] (1954). In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged. Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282 [65 S.Ct. 666, 89 L.Ed. 944] (1945). Accord, Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752-61, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2559-64, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974); Aiello v. The City of Wilmington, Delaware, 623 F.2d 845, 850 (C.A.3, 1980). Examination of the Indictment in the present action leads inexorably to the conclusion that RICO afforded defendants adequate notice that their behavior was proscribed. First, as noted earlier, the “Enterprise” charged by the Indictment falls within even the narrow definition which has been adopted by the courts. A group of individuals in fact associated for the purpose of making money in the legitimate businesses of labor leasing and motor vehicle leasing by means of a number of corporations, as charged in the Indictment, clearly falls within the definition of “enterprise” which appears in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). It is also clear from the Indictment that all defendants were “employed by or associated with” the Enterprise. All defendants except Sheeran either were employees of one or more of the corporations through which the Enterprise carried out its business, controlled one or more of those corporations, or both were employees of and controlled one or more corporations. Thus, their relationship with the Enterprise unambiguously falls within the term “employed by or associated with.” Sheeran had dealings with the Enterprise’s corporations in his role as the president of Local 326 whose members were employees of those corporations; he made the Enterprise aware of business opportunities; he facilitated the Enterprise’s schemes to defraud members of Local 326; and he received valuable consideration from the Enterprise. Consequently, Sheeran was clearly “associated with” the Enterprise. Finally, it is clear that any reasonable person would realize that if he pursued the course of activity attributed to defendants by the Indictment that he would be conducting or participating in the conduct of the Enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Each of the sixty-two separate crimes charged by the Indictment as racketeering acts are explicitly defined to be such by 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Secondly, it is clear beyond doubt that any person contemplating the commission of any one of those acts, under the circumstances described by the Indictment, would realize that he was “conducting] or participating] ... in the conduct of .. . [the] Enterprise’s affairs through” that racketeering act. Each of the racketeering acts was committed for the Enterprise’s benefit and many in fact constituted routine business activities, such as contract solicitation, firing employees and communications with employees and their union representatives. Thus, it is clear that the business of the Enterprise was carried on and its financial interests were advanced “through” or by means of the charged pattern of the racketeering acts. See United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 851 (C.A.7,1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951, 98 S.Ct. 1577, 55 L.Ed.2d 801 (1978); United States v. Gibson, 486 F.Supp. 1230, 1244 (S.D.Ohio 1980). Finally, it would also be clear to any person contemplating the commission of the charged racketeering acts that the contemplated acts would constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity” as that term is defined by RICO and that he would thus be conducting the affairs of the Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1961(5) of RICO clearly provides that the commission of at least two such racketeering acts will constitute a pattern and because the Indictment charges at least two racketeering acts and each act with which it charges defendants was in some way connected to the affairs of the Enterprise, it would be clear to anyone that the activity charged by the Indictment would fall within RICO’s definition of the term “pattern.” United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 204 (C.A.3, 1980); United States v. Elliott, supra, 571 F.2d at 899; United States v. DePalma, 461 F.Supp. 778, 782-83 (S.D.N.Y.1978). Indeed, it is clear that the racketeering acts charged in the Indictment would constitute a pattern even under the very narrow definition of the term “pattern” which has been adopted by some courts. United States v. White, supra, 386 F.Supp. at 883-84; United States v. Stofsky, supra, 409 F.Supp. at 613-14. Those courts have required “that the racketeering acts ... [be] connected with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern and not simply a series of disconnected acts.” 409 F.Supp. at 614. All of the racketeering acts charged in the Indictment were committed in furtherance of a plan, repeated on three separate occasions, to manipulate the Enterprise’s control of several labor leasing corporations and its association with labor leaders in such a way as to enable the Enterprise to do business and earn revenues continuously through one of the corporations controlled and to deprive the employees of the Enterprise controlled labor leasing corporations of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act. There is so clearly a commonality of scheme, plan and motive, that it is hard to conceive of a case that more clearly could be a “pattern.” In light of the above considerations, the Court finds that the prohibitions contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) are neither vague on their face nor vague as applied and will deny defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I and II for vagueness on that ground. 2. First Amendment Vagueness and Over-breadth Defendants nevertheless contend that because RICO allegedly punishes “associations” and activities relating to association, the stricter First Amendment standard for vagueness and the First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth must be applied, and when analyzed under these standards, RICO is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S.Ct. 419, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S.Ct. 275, 7 L.Ed.2d 285 (1961); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665, 92 L.Ed.2d 840 (1948); United States v. Baranski, 484 F.2d 556 (C.A.7, 1973). The First Amendment vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are closely related but differ in application. Both are spawned by the great solicitude which must be shown to the basic freedoms protected by the First Amendment, and when considered together will strike down any statute which is sufficiently vague and/or broad that it could conceivably be used to proscribe speech, association or any other behavior protected by the First Amendment or could cast a “chill” upon protected activity such that it might deter some individuals from exercising their First Amendment rights. The First Amendment vagueness doctrine, while stricter than the simple due process vagueness standard, is similar to that standard in that it cannot be invoked by a party who is within the “hard-core” prohibitions of an otherwise valid statute whose outer limits may be vague. Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 623 F.2d 845 (C.A.3, 1980). The Court has already found that the activity charged by the Indictment in this case is clearly within RICO’s “hardcore.” This activity is so clearly prohibited that even assuming the First Amendment is implicated, defendants’ First Amendment vagueness challenge must also fall. Under the overbreadth doctrine, however, defendants may challenge a statute even though it clearly could be applied constitutionally to them if the statute is so overbroad or its scope is so unclear that it could be applied to other activity which is protected by the First Amendment. Aiello v. City of Wilmington, supra. That doctrine is clearly inapplicable here because RICO does not affect any association protected by the First Amendment. RICO, unlike the statutes in any of the cases cited above does not and could not punish association or speech alone, but could only be applied if the individual who associates, also commits two of the criminal acts specifically enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). It is inconceivable that “pure” association protected by the First Amendment could be punished under or even be deterred by RICO. 3. RICO’s Alleged Failure to Require Mens Rea Defendants’ third challenge to RICO, which is based upon the statute’s allegedly unconstitutional failure to require criminal intent and/or criminal knowledge must also fall. This challenge apparently is based primarily upon the holding in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959) where the Supreme Court struck down a law imposing strict liability for the possession of an obscene book in a place of business on the ground that to impose strict liability upon a bookseller in such circumstances would encourage over-extensive self-censorship and would have the effect of restricting the public’s access to even constitutionally protected matter. Thus, the law was essentially struck down under the First Amendment chilling doctrine. The principle enunciated in that case is simply inapposite to RICO which requires behavior entirely outside of the ambit of the First Amendment — viz., racketeering acts — in order to obtain a conviction. As noted above, no one could possibly be deterred from pursuing protected associational behavior or be punished for doing so under RICO. In any case, it is clearly within Congressional power to create a strict liability offense which dispenses with any element of “intent,” United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943), and the failure to require mens rea, standing alone, does not violate due process. United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437 (C.A.3, 1943). 4. Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Defendants’ fourth constitutional contention that RICO violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment is also without merit. Both the forfeiture provision of RICO’s penalty section, 18 U.S.C. § 1963, and the section as a whole have previously withstood such challenges. United States v. Aleman, supra, 609 F.2d at 306; United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396-97 (C.A.2, 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980); United States v. Thevis, supra. Indeed, it is clear that RICO’s fairly traditional penalties of fine, imprisonment, and forfeiture of contraband and property used in the perpetration of the felony are not so grossly disproportionate to the crime charged as to fall afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). Defendants’ arguments, however, seem to indicate that they are not arguing that RICO’s penalties are disproportionate so much as they are arguing that RICO offends the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against making certain activities illegal and punishing them as such at all. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962); see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1410, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). Defendants attempt to recast their vagueness and First Amendment arguments into Eighth Amendment arguments by contending that to punish associative behavior on the basis of a vague statute would be prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. This argument must be rejected for the reasons stated earlier. 5. Federalism The Court finds the defendants’ final constitutional argument, that RICO oversteps the constitutional limits imposed upon Federal power by principles of federalism contained in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, to be wholly meritless. Because RICO reaches only activities affecting enterprises engaged in or affecting interstate commerce, it is clearly a valid exercise of Congressional power under the commerce clause. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1355-57 (C.A.7,1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925, 95 S.Ct. 1121, 43 L.Ed.2d 395 (1975). Indeed, the profound detrimental effect of the types of activities which RICO seeks to prohibit upon interstate commerce was, as noted above, well documented in Congressional findings and hearings. C. The Indictment In the motion and lengthy supporting memorandum, defendant Eugene Boffa, Sr., has also moved to dismiss the Indictment on a plethora of grounds ranging from claims that the Indictment is “vague,” “overbroad,” “conclusory,” and “ambiguous” to allegations that the Grand Jury was not correctly instructed on, or failed to comprehend, the law governing the charges in this case. In several passages, the comprehensive memorandum is woefully unfocused and imprecise, making it difficult for the Court to discern the exact factual and legal basis for the 26 items of complaint. To this chorus of charges, defendants Lemon and Kalmar have added their own voices through the submission of six additional, albeit concise, pretrial motions. Pared to their essentials, the seven motions offer the following grounds for dismissal of the Indictment: (1) The Indictment fails to allege all elements of the offenses charged with sufficient specificity and thus violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and Rule 7(c), F.R.Cr.P. In this regard, the Indictment purportedly either fails to allege or inadequately defines: (a) the composition and character of the “Enterprise” around which the RICO counts revolve; (b) the nexus between each individual defendant and the Enterprise, including the extent to which, each defendant actually participated in the conduct of the Enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; (c) the criminal intent (mens rea) possessed by each defendant; and (d) the requisite jurisdictional element required by RICO, i. e., that the Enterprise was engaged in, or its activities affected, interstate commerce. (2) Counts I and II of the Indictment allege multiple conspiracies instead of one single conspiracy and therefore the counts violate the Multiple Conspiracy Doctrine articulated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). (3) Counts I, II, and V-XI each contain charges of two or more distinct and separate violations of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and are thus prejudically duplicitous. (4) The Indictment is multiplicitous: (a) the predicate crimes underlying the RICO counts, which are independently charged in Counts III-XI of the Indictment, are lesser included offenses of the RICO charges, in violation of the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment, and the doctrine of multiplicity; and (b) Racketeering Acts 37-43 and 51 essentially constitute a single violation of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186, and are multiplicitous. (5) Counts I and II, the RICO conspiracy and substantive offenses, each requires the participation of two or more persons for its commission, and under Wharton’s Rule both counts cannot be maintained. (6) Racketeering Acts 1-4,15-40,44 — 47 and 54-57 are barred by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed or stricken from the Indictment. (7) Racketeering Act 53 allegedly involved only defendant Eugene Boffa, Sr., and its inclusion within Count I will impermissibly prejudice the remaining defendants. (8) The Delaware grand jury which returned the Indictment in this case failed to conduct a meaningful, independent investigation of defendants and relied upon selectively presented hearsay evidence obtained, without court order, through the investigations of two previous Grand Juries sitting in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The grounds presented for dismissal of the Indictment will be addressed in turn. 1. Sufficiency of the Indictment An indictment must contain the essential elements of the offense charged so as to satisfy three distinct constitutional commands. First, it must be sufficiently precise to apprise the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation, as required by the Sixth Amendment. Second, it must enable the defendant to determine to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction as a bar to a future prosecution, in accordance with the Fifth Amendment. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); see Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932); United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 58 (C.A.3, 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936, 92 S.Ct. 949, 30 L.Ed.2d 812 (1972); United States v. Silverman, 430 F.2d 106 (C.A.2), modified, 439 F.2d 1198 (C.A.2, 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953, 91 S.Ct. 1619, 29 L.Ed.2d 123 (1971); United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F.Supp. 1308, 1317 (D.Del.1976); United States v. Shaffer, 383 F.Supp. 339, 341 (D.Del.1974). A third, less recognized but equally important, purpose of an indictment is to shield a defendant in a federal felony case from unfounded prosecutorial charges and to require him to defend in court only those allegations returned by an independent grand jury, as provided by the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526, 528 (C.A.3, 1974). By sufficiently articulating the critical elements of the underlying offense, an indictment insures that the accused has been duly charged by the grand jury upon a proper finding of probable cause, and will be convicted only on the basis of facts found by that body. Id. at 529; see United States v. Shoup, 608 F.2d 950, 960 (C.A.3, 1979). These constitutional criteria have been implemented through Rule 7(c), F.R. Cr.P., which requires an indictment to contain a “plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Whether an indictment complies with Rule 7(c) is measured by practical considerations and minor or technical flaws which do not prejudice the accused will not invalidate an otherwise sufficient indictment. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); United States v. Little, 317 F.Supp. 1308, 1309-10 (D.Del. 1970). Accordingly, the Court’s task is not to determine whether the Indictment could have been more artfully or exactly written, but solely to insure that the constitutional notice requirements imposed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments have been fulfilled. United States v. Little, supra, 317 F.Supp. at 1310; United States v. Bergdoll, 412 F.Supp. 1308, 1317 (D.Del.1976). Defendants argue that the Indictment is bereft of any substantive content and wholly fails to satisfy the requisites of Rule 7(c). Focusing primarily on Counts I and II, defendants claim that the Indictment does not specify the essential facts concerning the Enterprise, including identification of the members of the Enterprise, its structure and operations, and the factors giving rise to its formation. Similarly, defendants argue that Counts I and II fail to establish any nexus between the defendants, the purported predicate acts listed in the Indictment, and the Enterprise, thus omitting the essential criminal conduct of a RICO violation. Finally, defendants assail both the failure of Counts I and II to identify adequately the interstate commerce element of the RICO violations, and the insufficient mens rea allegation contained in Count II. Defendants’ objections have superficial appeal. Upon closer examination, however, the seeming logic of these arguments fades and leaves a residue of charges which are without merit. Count I of the Indictment charges that the defendants, “together with persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with others to violate Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c), to wit, to knowingly conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise engaged in and the activities of which affected interstate and foreign commerce, through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Count II of the Indictment charges a substantive violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) alleging that defendants, “together with persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury, being persons employed by and associated with an enterprise engaged in, and the activities of which affected, interstate and foreign commerce, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did conduct and participate, directly and indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” Generally, an indictment which tracks the language of the statute itself is legally sufficient to satisfy Rule 7(c) if it contains “a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense.” Hamling v. United States, supra, 418 U.S. at 117-18, quoting, United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 487, 8 S.Ct. 571, 573, 31 L.Ed. 516 (1888). The instant Indictment clearly meets this requirement. The Enterprise alleged in the Indictment is defined as “a group of individuals associated in fact for the purposes of making money and obtaining other financial benefits through the business of labor leasing and motor vehicle leasing.” As described earlier in this opinion, the business of labor leasing was conducted through eight corporations listed in the Indictment, while the Enterprise’s business of motor vehicle leasing was conducted by one designated corporation. All defendants, with the exception of Sheeran, were employed by and associated with the Enterprise by virtue of their participation in, or control over, the operations of these nine corporations. Defendant Sheeran was employed by or associated with the Enterprise through his position as president of Local 326 and through the several acts performed by him on behalf of the Enterprise as described earlier in this opinion. The Indictment charges that all defendants further participated in the Enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity encompassing 62 predicate acts of mail fraud, TaftHartley violations and obstruction of justice. These predicate acts and the requisite nexus between them and the defendants and the Enterprise are laid bare in great detail throughout the Indictment. The pattern of racketeering activity typically was accomplished through the following means: employees of UCI would be leased as truck drivers to a corporation by one or more of the defendants, sometimes at wages below those specified in a collective bargaining agreement in force between UCI and the local union. The contract between UCI and the corporation would be indiscriminately terminated at the behest of one of the defendants, resulting in a loss of employment for the leased truck drivers. At that time, another of the labor leasing companies controlled by the Enterprise would contract with the corporation to provide the requisite labor. Disclosure of the common control of the operations of these labor leasing companies was not made either to the contracting corporations or to the employee truck drivers. The consequences of this scheme were to deprive all the employees of economic benefits they were entitled to under the National Labor Relations Act and the pertinent collective bargaining agreement, to deprive members of Local 326 of the loyal, faithful and honest services of Sheeran as president of the union, and to allow the Enterprise to continue to do business with the contracting corporation through one of the labor leasing entities operated by the defendants. The Indictment charges that this labor leasing scheme was implemented at three separate locations and that different combinations of defendants were involved in executing the particulars, as follows: (a) The Crown Zellerbach Facility In 1966, defendants Eugene Boffa, Sr., and Kalmar negotiated and signed a contract with Crown Zellerbach Corporation to lease employees of UCI as truck drivers to service Crown Zellerbach’s Newark, Delaware facility. The contract could be terminated by either party on 30 days notice. The rate of pay negotiated for the truck drivers was lower than that provided by the collective bargaining agreement in effect between UCI and Local 326, the local union representing UCI employees. In 1971, Sheeran began his tenure as president of Local 326, and in that capacity he was a member of one of the committees which negotiated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement covering UCI employees and Local 326, which was in effect during the period 1973-1979. In late 1973, the members of Local 326 who were leased by UCI to Crown Zellerbach met with Eugene Boffa, Sr., and demanded that UCI pay them the wage rate specified in the collective bargaining agreement. Eugene Boffa, Sr., purportedly agreed to pay this wage provided that Crown Zellerbach consented to reimburse UCI for the additional cost. Within the next month, however, Eugene Boffa, Sr., advised Crown Zellerbach that he was terminating the labor leasing contract because the operation was no longer profitable for UCI, and further recommended that Crown Zellerbach lease its truck drivers from CWP of California, another labor leasing company controlled by the Enterprise and operated by some of the defendants. In January 1974, Eugene Boffa, Sr. and Sheeran notified the UCI drivers of the termination of employment. Later that month, Eugene Boffa, Sr., allegedly caused CWP of California to solicit applications for employment as truck drivers at the Crown Zellerbach plant from members of Local 326, including those members that UCI had previously leased to Crown Zellerbach. The wage rate specified for the potential employees was again different from that stipulated in the collective bargaining agreement. (b) The Inland Container Facility In 1970, defendants Eugene Boffa, Sr. and Kalmar negotiated and signed a contract with the Inland Container Corporation to lease employees of UCI as truck drivers to service Inland Container’s Newark, Delaware facility. Again, the contract included a 30-day termination provision. Eugene Boffa, Sr., allegedly caused UCI to employ and lease as a truck driver to Inland Container defendant Sheeran so that Sheeran would qualify to hold a union office of Local 326. Subsequently, Sheeran in fact was elected president of Local 326 and held that position commencing in 1971 and at all times pertinent thereafter. About early November, 1971, defendants Eugene Boffa, Sr., Kalmar, and Sheeran purportedly caused Local 326 to call off an effort to organize the in-plant employees of Inland Container at the Newark facility, so that UCI’s contract with Inland Container would not be jeopardized. In August, 1976, defendants Eugene Boffa, Sr., and Sheeran purportedly agreed that after the election of officers of Local 326, scheduled for November, 1976, Eugene Boffa, Sr., would terminate the leasing contract between UCI and Inland Container Corp. and substitute a second leasing company controlled by the Enterprise for UCI. In April 1977, Eugene Boffa, Sr., and Lemon incorporated Preferred Personnel, and shortly thereafter, on June 2, 1977, Eugene Boffa, Sr., terminated the leasing contract between UCI and Inland Container Corp. and Lemon negotiated a contract between Preferred Personnel and Inland Container. In the course of these negotiations, Lemon represented that neither he nor Preferred Personnel were in any way associated with Eugene Boffa, Sr., or UCI. Both Lemon and Eugene Boffa, Sr., separately made this same representation, moreover, to an agent of the National Labor Relations Board who was investigating the circumstances surrounding the termination of the leasing contract between UCI and Inland Container. (c) The Continental Can Facility In 1972, defendant Kalmar signed a contract with Continental Can Company, Inc., to lease employees of UCI as truck drivers to service Continental Can’s Van Wert, Ohio facility, which contract included a 30-day termination provision. Prior to July 1, 1975, Continental Can purportedly demanded better service from UCI which UCI agreed to provide if Continental Can would increase by 25% the fee it paid UCI. Continental Can refused and UCI terminated the labor leasing contract. On or about July 1, 1975, defendant Robert Boffa, Sr., represented that CWP of Chicago was a totally separate company from UCI. Shortly thereafter, defendant Mishler caused a letter to be sent to each person leased by UCI as a truck driver to Continental Can, inviting them to attend one of two meetings for the purpose of discussing the possibility of employment with CWP of Chicago. At a meeting on July 12, 1975, defendants Rispo and Mishler met with approximately half of these employees and advised them that there was no connection between CWP of Chicago and UCI. At a second meeting on July 13,1975, attended by about half of the UCI drivers and a business agent of Local 908, defendants Rispo and Mishler advised the employees that CWP of Chicago would receive the contract to lease drivers to Continental Can at its Van Wert facility, and that the wage CWP of Chicago would pay its employees was approximately $.80 per hour and $.01 per mile less than the rate UCI was then paying its employees. The employees in attendance stated that they would not work for that low a rate of pay. At a subsequent meeting later that month, defendants Mishler and Rispo again offered the UCI drivers in attendance employment with CWP of Chicago, this time at a rate approximately $.50 per hour and $.0088 per mile less than the rate paid by UCI. Mishler stated he .already had received 90 applications for trucker jobs and the offer was made on a take it or leave it basis. The UCI employees accepted the driver positions, and Local 908 entered into a collective bargaining agreement with CWP of Chicago. Subsequently, CWP of Chicago entered into a contract with Continental Can to lease employees to service the Van Wert facility at a rate 25% higher than that previously charged by UCI. During this time period, Robert Boffa, Mishler and Rispo formally notified the UCI drivers and Local 908 of the termination of employment. Besides stating in great detail the foregoing operations, Counts I and II of the Indictment also allege 38 racketeering acts involving violations of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186, and one act involving obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1503. The § 186 acts generally state that Eugene Boffa, Sr., jo