Full opinion text
JENKINS, District Judge. The Ute Indian Tribe filed a complaint with this Court on October 15,1975, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief establishing the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, defining the force and effect of the Tribe’s Law and Order Code within those boundaries, and restraining the defendants from interfering with the enforcement of that Code. The Tribe, a federally recognized, sovereign Indian tribe, operates under a constitution and by-laws adopted in 1936 and approved by the Secretary of the Interior in 1937. Artiele I of the tribal constitution defines the territory claimed by the Tribe for jurisdictional purposes: The jurisdiction of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall extend to the territory within the original confines of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation as set forth by Executive Orders of October 3, 1861 and January 5, 1882, and by the Acts of Congress approved May 27, 1902, and June 19, 1902, and to such other lands without such boundaries as may hereafter be added thereto under any law of the United States, except as otherwise provided by law. [Emphasis added.] Among the powers vested in the Tribal Business Committee, the Tribe’s elected governing body, are the following: Article VI — Powers of the Tribal Business Committee Section 1. Enumerated powers. — The Tribal Business Committee of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation shall exercise the following powers, subject to any limitations imposed by the statutes or the Constitution of the United States, and subject further to all express restrictions upon such powers contained in this Constitution and By-laws, and subject to review by the Ute Bands themselves at any annual or special meeting: ****** (h) To levy taxes upon members of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Our-ay Reservation, and to require the performance of community labor in lieu thereof, and to levy taxes and license fees, subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior, upon non-members doing business within the Reservation. (i) To exclude from the territory of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation persons not legally entitled to reside therein, under ordinances which shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior. ****** (j) To enact resolutions or ordinances, not inconsistent with Article II of this Constitution governing adoption and abandonment of members, and to keep at all times a correct roll of the members of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Our-ay Reservation. (k) To promulgate and enforce ordinances, which shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior, governing the conduct of members of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, and providing for the maintenance of law and order and the administration of justice by establishing a Reservation Indian Court and defining its duties and powers. (/) To safeguard and promote the peace, safety, morals and general welfare of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Our-ay Reservation by regulating the conduct of trade and the use and disposition of property upon the Reservation, provided that any ordinance directly affecting nonmembers of the Reservation shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior. (m) To charter subordinate organizations for economic purposes, and to regulate the activities of co-operative associations of members of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation by ordinance, provided that any such ordinance shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior. (n) To regulate the inheritance of property, real and personal, other than allotted lands, within the territory of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior. (o) To regulate the domestic relations of members of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation by ordinances which shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior. (p) To provide for the appointment of guardians for minors and mental incompetents by ordinances or resolutions which shall be subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior. ****** For many years, it seemed to the Ute’s non-Indian neighbors that these powers, as well as others, lay dormant as far as non-Indian affairs were concerned. To many, the concept of Indian tribal government seemed wholly irrelevant to their businesses and daily lives. Over those same years, however, the Ute Indian Tribe did not remain passive. The Utes, with the support and encouragement of their trustee, the United States government, have made continuous efforts to improve the sophistication and effectiveness of their tribal institutions in response to changing times and circumstances. Naturally, as the Utes have gained the economic wherewithal to do so, they have sought a greater share of autonomy and control over their own lives and community affairs. It was inevitable that this quest for tribal autonomy would find expression in the promulgation of tribal law. The Tribe operated a tribal government and an Indian court for many years prior to 1975. As tribal operations expanded and the demand on tribal institutions increased, the Tribe sought to recodify and expand its growing body of ordinances, resulting in the enactment and publication of the Law and Order Code of the Ute Indian Tribe (hereinafter “Ute Law and Order Code”) which was approved by the Secretary of the Interior through the Phoenix Area Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Trial Transcript at 55 (Testimony of Wm. F. Streitz), and became effective on September 15, 1975. Promulgation of the Ute Law and Order Code raised immediate protest from the defendant municipalities, Duchesne and Roosevelt, and defendant Duchesne County, all of which are within the original boundaries of the Uintah Indian Reservation. The defendants complained that they were wrongfully included within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ute Tribe under the Ute Law and Order Code and officials of the defendants urged their constituents to resist the enforcement of the new code. The State of Utah complained that its authority was likewise impaired. The Tribe, faced with mounting opposition to the exercise of its jurisdiction, commenced the above-entitled action in this Court against the named governmental defendants. The State of Utah intervened as a defendant and the United States of America and Paradox Production Corporation have subsequently entered these proceedings as a mid curiae. By stipulation of the parties in the Pretrial Order, Uintah County, another political subdivision of the State of Utah, was joined as a defendant. I. CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES To paraphrase the Pretrial Order, the plaintiff Ute Indian Tribe asserts that the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation was created by the Executive Order of October 3, 1861, as confirmed by the Act of May 5, 1864, 13 Stat. 63, by the Executive Order of January 5, 1882, and by the Act of March 11, 1948, 62 Stat. 72, and that the original exterior boundaries as thus established continue to exist undiminished for purposes of defining the present boundary of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation. Plaintiff further asserts that all of the lands encompassed by that boundary are “Indian country” as defined by federal statute and that the defendants may not exercise jurisdiction over members of the plaintiff Tribe for any criminal offense committed therein as that jurisdiction is reserved to the United States, or to the Tribe itself, and that the Tribe may exercise the full panoply of its governing powers within those same boundaries free from interference by the defendants. In defense, all defendants assert that “Indian country” in the Uintah basin is confined to lands held in trust for individual Indians or for the Ute Indian Tribe, and beyond that, the area defined by the Act of March 11, 1948, 62 Stat. 72, more commonly known as the Hill Creek Extension. The State of Utah asserts alternatively that the original Uintah Valley Indian Reservation described in the Executive Order of October 3,1861, is diminished by national forest and reclamation withdrawals and that diminished area combined with the Hill Creek Extension comprises “Indian country” under tribal and federal jurisdiction. See State’s Post-Trial Brief at 55. All defendants assert that the Uncompahgre Reservation, delineated by the Executive Order of January 5, 1882, no longer exists. Implicit in the defense is the issue of the enforceability of the Ute Law and Order Code as against non-Indians, particularly on lands held in fee simple — “fee lands” — rather than on lands held in federal trust for use and occupancy by the Indians — “trust lands”. While plaintiffs seek both declaratory and injunctive relief, no claims for damages have been asserted by any party. II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION This Court has already granted preliminary equitable relief to a limited extent in the above-entitled action. In an action arising in state court among persons who are not parties to these proceedings, some of the same jurisdictional questions were presented to the state court as are presented here. In a broadly worded opinion in Brough v. Appawora, 553 P.2d 934 (Utah 1976), a majority of the Utah Supreme Court held that a state district court had jurisdiction of a tort claim against a member of the Ute Indian Tribe arising from an automobile accident occurring within the original exterior boundaries of the Uintah Valley Reservation as defined by the Executive Order of October 3, 1861. The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction forbidding the defendants or their officers, employees, etc. from (1) proceeding to enforce the judgment in Brough v. Appawora, or (2) relying on that decision to justify interference with the Tribe’s asserted jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order was entered on September 6, 1976, and the preliminary injunction on October 14, 1976. By its preliminary injunction this Court did not seek to enjoin the state proceedings in Brough v. Appawora or otherwise overrule that decision by the Utah Supreme Court, recalling that “lower federal courts possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions.” Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 296, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 1747, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970). Rather the preliminary injunction was issued to maintain the status quo in this litigation, avoiding potentially destructive conflicts among the parties hereto until this Court was able to conclusively resolve these jurisdictional questions upon the merits. Of course, this Court is in no way bound to follow the rule of Brough v. Appawora ; the parties herein were not parties to that case, eliminating any question of res judicata or collateral estoppel, see Kline v. Burke Const. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230, 43 S.Ct. 79, 81, 67 L.Ed. 226 (1922), nor is this Court bound by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow state court interpretations of federal law, Kansas City Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U.S. 148, 46 S.Ct. 59, 70 L.Ed. 204 (1925). Any persuasive effect the opinion in Brough v. Appawora may have had was effectively negated by the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the opinion and remanded “for further consideration in light of Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977).” 431 U.S. 901, 97 S.Ct. 1690, 52 L.Ed.2d 384 (1977). The threat of injury addressed by the preliminary injunction arguably became moot following the Supreme Court’s action, and the preliminary injunction shall therefore be dissolved upon entry of final judgment in this action. III. TRIAL The above-entitled action came before this Court for the purpose of trial without a jury on August 1 and 2, 1979. Testimony was taken from 18 witnesses and more than 800 documentary exhibits were admitted, totaling more than 3,000 pages of text, plus photographs and dozens of maps. Besides giving careful scrutiny to these documents and the record at trial, this Court has studied the extensive pretrial memoranda and post-trial briefs submitted by the parties and the United States as amicus, and has examined numerous historical documents authenticated in the discovery process but not included in the compilation of joint exhibits offered at trial, and other learned treaties and historical works that are relevant to this Court’s determinations. IV. HISTORICAL INQUIRY In large part, the questions to be decided by this Court turn on the discovery of the intent of the United States Congress in the course of its dealings with the Ute Indians and their non-Indian neighbors, particularly as that intent has found expression in numerous statutes. As Chief Justice Marshall announced long ago, “Where the mind labors to discover the design of the Legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived...” United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386, 2 L.Ed. 304 (1905). In this case, this Court has been compelled to assemble and synthesize multiple fragments of a complex era of history in an attempt to reinfuse the words of the old documents we are considering with the weight and meaning they once carried and to do so “courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed.” United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 91 U.S. 72, 79, 23 L.Ed. 224 (1875). Courts in cases such as this one must of necessity refer to that history to resolve the issues before them. See Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. v. Early, 641 F.2d 856, 857 (10th Cir. 1981). As one distinguished commentator warned years ago: “Federal Indian law is a subject that cannot be understood if the historical dimension of existing law is ignored.” N. Margold, Introduction, in F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law at xxxvii (U.N.M. ed. 1971). In a very real sense history controls the meaning of law in this case. At the same time, however, neither history nor the law that it creates remain static, fixing words with a particular meaning assigned by the thinking of a particular era. Notions of jurisdiction, sovereignty, of enlightened governmental policy evolve in a state of flux generated by the changing perceptions and experiences of the people by whom these ideas are defined. Justice requires that courts temper the meaning of the fundamental documents with interpretations that serve the needs of people in circumstances beyond the imagination of those who framed the statutory language decades ago. The architects of the policy of allotting Indian reservation lands in severalty to tribal members in no way foresaw the stubborn survival of American Indians as distinct, cultural and political communities who “cling so tenaciously to their lands and traditional tribal way of life.” Federal Power Comm. v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142, 80 S.Ct. 543, 567, 4 L.Ed.2d 584 (1962) (J. Black, dissenting). Their concerns over matters of policy seem to have been much more immediate than dictating what would be the precise boundaries of an Indian reservation 80 years later. As Justice Marshall observed in a recent case raising similar issues, Ultimately, what the legislative history demonstrates, as co-counsel for the state has aptly concluded, is that Congress manifested an “almost complete lack of . . . concern with the boundary issue.” The issue was of no great importance in the early 1900’s as it was commonly assumed that all reservations would be abolished when the trust period on allotted lands expired. There was no pressure on Congress to accelerate this time table, so long as settlers could acquire unused land. Accordingly, Congress did not focus on the boundary question. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 629, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 1384, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977) (J. Marshall, dissenting). The task facing this Court is plagued by a similar lack of definitive expression by Congress on the specific boundary issues. The Court must make its own reasoned construction of the relevant statutory language based upon a careful evaluation of multiple factors, namely history, legal doctrine and precedent, public policy, past and contemporary circumstances of people, and common sense. Legal analysis of the evidence and issues in this case is further complicated by the fact that over the years, Congress has changed the rules defining the territorial limits of federal, state and tribal jurisdiction in a reservation context. Historical events that are now material to the question of jurisdiction were not material to the question of jurisdiction at the time those events occurred. For example, “Indian Country” as a jurisdictional concept was first defined in general terms by Congress in the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834: Be it enacted, that all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and also that part of the United States east of the Mississippi River, and not within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purpose of this Act, be taken and deemed Indian country. This statutory definition remained in force until it was repealed by the failure to include it in the U.S. Revised Statutes in 1874. However, a number of other federal statutes were retained in the Revised Statutes which still made reference to transactions in “Indian country.” See e. g., R.S. §§ 2127-2148, 2150, 2152-2154 (1878). Notwithstanding the repeal of the statutory definition in the 1834 Act, the courts continued to apply the general thrust of that definition in cases arising under statutes which were retained. In Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 24 L.Ed. 471 (1877), the Supreme Court first dealt with the problem of defining “Indian country” under the Revised Statutes. Justice Miller, writing for the Court, reviewed the 1834 Act’s definition and commented: The simple criterion is that as to all the lands thus described it was Indian country whenever the Indian title had not been extinguished, and it continued to be Indian country so long as the Indians had title to it, and no longer. As soon as they parted with the title, it ceased to be Indian country, without any further act of Congress, unless by the treaty by which the Indians parted with their title, or by some act of Congress, a different rule was made applicable to the case. 95 U.S. at 208. In Bates the Court found the 1834 definition to be easily applied to the case before it: Notwithstanding the immense changes which have since taken place in the vast region covered by the act of 1834, by the extinguishment of Indian titles, the creation of states and the formation of territorial governments, Congress has not thought it necessary to make any new definition of Indian country. Yet during all this time a large body of laws has been in existence, whose operation was confined to the Indian country, whatever that may be. And men have been punished by death, by fines, and by imprisonment, of which the courts who so punished them had no jurisdiction, if the offenses were not committed in the Indian country as established by law. These facts afford the strongest presumption that the Congress of the United States, and the judges who administered those laws, must have found in the definition of Indian country, in the Act of 1834, such an adaptability to the altered circumstances of what was then Indian country as to enable them to ascertain what it was at any time since then. 95 U.S. at 207. Thus it was that the 1834 definition of “Indian country” became a matter of federal common law. The Court continued to apply the title-dependent definition of Indian country set forth in Bates v. Clark for a number of years, as in the case of Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030 (1883), in which Justice Matthews wrote: In our opinion, that definition now applies to all the country to which the Indian title has not been extinguished within the limits of the United States, even when not within a reservation expressly set apart for the exclusive occupancy of the Indians, ... This definition though not now expressed in the Revised Statutes, is implied in all those provisions, most of which were originally connected with it when first enacted, and which still refer to it. It would be otherwise impossible to explain these references, or give effect to many of the most important provisions of existing legislation for the government of Indian country. 109 U.S. at 561-62, 3 S.Ct. at 399. In Crow-Dog, the court held Sioux lands within the Dakota Territory to be “Indian country” for jurisdictional purposes. United States v. LeBris, 121 U.S. 278, 280, 7 S.Ct. 894, 895, 30 L.Ed. 946 (1887), extended “Indian country” to include lands held under Indian title within the boundaries of a state. This title-dependent conception of what for jurisdictional purposes comprised “Indian country” governed, or should have governed, the perceptions of persons contemporaneous to the “opening” of the Uncompahgre Indian Reservation in the 1890’s and the Uintah Valley Reservation in 1905. Indian title, rather than reservation boundaries, was the material jurisdictional fact, This distinction between “Indian country” and lands within the boundary of a reservation was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 30 S.Ct. 93, 54 L.Ed. 195, decided in 1909, four years after the Uintah Valley Reservation was “opened” by Congress to settlement. In that case, the Court, referring to the 1834 statute defining Indian country, observed: Construing this section, it was decided, in Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 209, [24 L.Ed. 471] that all the country described in the act as “Indian country” remains such “so long as the Indians retain their original title to the soil, and ceases to be Indian country whenever they lose that title, in the absence of any different provision by treaty or by act of Congress.” The section was repealed by Rev.Stat., § 5596. Still, it was held that it might be referred to for the purpose of determining what was meant by the term “Indian country” when found in sections of the Revised Statutes which were reenactments of other sections of prior legislation. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, [3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030]; United States v. Le Bris, 121 U.S. 278, [7 S.Ct. 894, 30 L.Ed. 946]. But the word “reservation” has a different meaning, for while the body of land described in the section quoted as “Indian country” was a reservation yet a reservation is not necessarily “Indian country.” The word is used in the land law to describe any body of land, large or small, which Congress has reserved from sale for any purpose. It may be a military reservation, or an Indian reservation, or, indeed, one for any purpose for which Congress has authority to provide, and when Congress has once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress. 215 U.S. at 285, 30 S.Ct. at 94 (emphasis added). Support for any inference on the question of reservation boundaries cannot be drawn blindly from evidence of jurisdictional practice at the time the reservations were opened. Evidentiary exhibits that express contemporaneous opinions on jurisdiction are properly considered only within the context of the governing law as perceived at that time. A few years later, the Supreme Court expanded the judicial definition of Indian country to include lands once a part of the public domain which have been reserved and set apart as an Indian reservation by Executive Order, Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 269, 33 S.Ct. 449, 458, 57 L.Ed. 820 (1913). After Donnelly, reservation boundaries rather than unextinguished Indian title became the material jurisdictional facts, at least in some cases. The courts continued to expand the definition of Indian country until 1948, when Congress codified these judicial expressions into statutory law as 18 U.S.C. § 1151. That definition is the one currently in force, defining “Indian country” in terms of the boundaries of an Indian reservation, regardless of title. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1976). It must be recalled that during this whole dynamic chain of events, federal, state and tribal officials were attempting to administer policies in light of the then-governing law. To be sure, as a practical matter, the subtle distinctions described above were sometimes lost upon those who actually lived and worked in the areas on or near the Indian reservations; the remote offices of an Indian agent or county prosecutor were not the likely repositories of complete sets of United States Reports. Conflicting jurisdictional practices of federal and state authorities in 1897, or 1905, or for decades thereafter may have institutionalized the erroneous exercise of jurisdiction as well as the valid exercise of jurisdiction. The extensive “jurisdictional history” offered at trial by the parties is far more probative of the existence of an ongoing boundary conflict which requires resolution than it is evidence that one asserted boundary line prevails over another. V. GOVERNING PRINCIPLES Litigation of the unique complexity of an Indian reservation disestablishment suit demands the application of specially adapted rules of statutory construction. Over the years, courts adjudicating such cases have formulated such principles. This Court has carefully reviewed the bulk of existing case law on reservation diminishment in an effort to distill an analytical approach to the legal and historical materials in this case that would seem to make sense. It is recognized as fundamental that Congress has primary authority over and bears overall responsibility for Indian affairs. Decades ago, the Supreme Court recognized that such power governs the results of reservation boundary litigation. In United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 30 S.Ct. 93, 54 L.Ed. 195 (1909), Justice Brewer, writing for a unanimous Court, declared that, “[Wjhen Congress has once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.” Id. 215 U.S. at 285, 30 S.Ct. at 94. This basic precept forms the foundation of the body of case law dealing with reservation disestablishment. In Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962), the Supreme Court, quoting the passage from Celestine, supra, held that the boundaries of the southern half of the Colville Indian Reservation remain intact notwithstanding the opening of the reservation to non-Indian settlement by Act of Congress in 1906, and the prior disestablishment of the northern half of the reservation. Unlike the 1892 Act, which provided that the north half be “vacated and restored to the public domain,” the 1906 Act and the 1916 Presidential Proclamation implementing the Act did not “purport to affect the status of the remaining part of the reservation. ..” Id., 368 U.S. at 354, 82 S.Ct. at 426. Rather, the 1906 Act merely “opened” the Colville Reservation to non-Indian homesteading, consistent with the purposes of the allotment policy: Consequently, it seems clear that the purpose of the 1906 Act was neither to destroy the existence of the diminished Colville Indian Reservation nor to lessen federal responsibility for and jurisdiction over the Indians having tribal rights on that reservation. The Act did no more than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the reservation in a manner which the Federal Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development of its wards. Id. 368 U.S. at 356, 82 S.Ct. at 427. Even townsites within the opened reservation were held to remain a part of the reservation, and therefore, “Indian country” under 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Id. 368 U.S. at 358-59, 82 S.Ct. at 428-429. Important to the Court’s determination of whether the Colville Reservation had been disestablished by the entry of non-Indians were several factors: (1) the express language of legislation effecting the reservation; (2) the deposit of proceeds from the sale of reservation lands to non-Indians into tribal funds rather than the general funds of the United States; (3) subsequent legislation acknowledging by reference the continuing existence of the reservation; and (4) subsequent administrative determinations by the Department of the Interior and the Department of Justice recognizing continuation of reservation status. The Supreme Court did not again decide a controversy involving reservation disestablishment until 1973 in the case of Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 37 L.Ed.2d 92 (1973). In Mattz, a unanimous Court held that the Klamath River Indian Reservation continued to exist within its defined boundaries despite a number of attempts to end the reservation. Reaffirming the fundamental policy expressed in Celestine and Seymour, the Court in Mattz set forth this standard: A congressional determination to terminate [a reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351[, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346] (1962); United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591[, 36 S.Ct. 696, 60 L.Ed. 1192] (1916). Id. 412 U.S. at 505, 93 S.Ct. at 2258 (footnote omitted). The Mattz opinion adds the factors of legislative history and “surrounding circumstances” to the criteria expressed in Seymour. The court may thus look behind the written words of statutory law to determine their meaning and purpose within the spirit of their time, but that historical inquiry is to be carefully channeled. Repeated unsuccessful efforts by members of Congress to terminate a reservation cannot persuade a court that the ultimate legislation opening a reservation was intended to diminish its boundaries without an additional showing of consistent intent. In Mattz, for example, the House had tried repeatedly to terminate the Klamath River Reservation but had failed at every attempt. In 1892, the House passed a bill ending the reservation. H.R. 38, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. See 23 Cong.Rec. 125, 1598-99 (1892). That bill was struck out by the Senate which substituted a more moderate bill mandating allotment of the reservation under the General Allotment Act of 1887, 23 Cong.Rec. 3918-19 (1892), a bill supported by the Interior Department. At conference, the Senate version as agreed to, with amendments, and then passed, becoming the operative legislation opening the reservation. The Mattz Court cautioned against reliance on the legislative history of the unsuccessful House bills: [T]he respondent’s reliance on the House Report and on comments made on the floor of the House is not well placed; although the primary impetus for termination of the Klamath River Reservation had been with the House since 1871, this effort consistently had failed to accomplish the very objectives the respondent now seeks to achieve. . .. The legislative history relied upon by the respondent does not support the view that the reservation was terminated; rather, by contrast with the bill as finally enacted, it compels the conclusion that efforts to terminate the reservation by denying allotments to the Indians failed completely. Id. 412 U.S. at 503-504, 93 S.Ct. at 2257. The Court further refused to draw a negative inference as to the effect of the actual allotment statute: A second conclusion is also inescapable. The presence of allotment provisions in the 1892 Act cannot be interpreted to mean that the reservation was to be terminated. ... More significantly, throughout the period from 1871-1892 numerous bills were introduced which expressly provided for the termination of the reservation and did so in unequivocal terms. Congress was fully aware of the means by which termination could be affected. But clear termination language was not employed in the 1892 Act. This being so, we are not inclined to infer an intent to terminate the reservation.22 22 Congress has used clear language of express termination when that result is desired. ... [Examples omitted.] Id. 412 U.S. at 504, 93 S.Ct. at 2257. The Mattz opinion also treats with great care the subsequent legislative and administrative references to the Klamath River Reservation. Noting that “[although subsequent legislation usually is not entitled to much weight in construing earlier statutes, United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 179, 88 S.Ct. 1994, 2006, 20 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1968), it is not always without significance,” id., 412 U.S. at 505 n.25, 93 S.Ct. at 2258, the Court found support in legislation by which Congress extended the trust status of allotments within the reservation and restored undisposed-of lands within the boundaries to tribal ownership. At the same time, the Court discounted past-tense references to the reservation (e. g., to “what was the Klamath River Reservation”) in legislation as indicating disestablishment, noting that Klamath River had been annexed at that time to the larger Hoopa Valley Reservation and concluding that the past-tense reference “is not to be read as a clear indication of congressional purpose to terminate.” Id., 412 U.S. at 498, 93 S.Ct. at 2254. Mattz, like Seymour, found additional support for continuing reservation status in federal administrative treatment of the reservation. Mattz elaborated upon the criteria set forth in Seymour setting the stage for decisions that followed. In 1975 the Supreme Court decided DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975), dealing with the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in South Dakota. In 1891, Congress passed a law ratifying an 1889 agreement with the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of the Sioux Nation which provided for the allotment of Lake Traverse Reservation lands to the Indians and the unqualified cession of the unallotted “surplus” lands to the United States in return for a sum-certain payment. Those lands were subsequently opened to white settlement with disastrous consequences for the Indians. See D. McNickle, They Came Here First 220-224 (2d ed. 1975). In DeCoteau, a majority of the Court led by Justice Stewart found a number of factors that militated against a finding of continued reservation status: contemporaneous views of white and Indians alike tended strongly .towards the conclusion that ratification of the 1889 Agreement would end the reservation. The Agreement recited cession language that was “precisely suited” to disestablishment by cession. The 1889 Agreement was ratified in the same bill with similar agreements, the sponsors of the bill acknowledging that the agreements would return the ceded lands to the public domain. The “jurisdictional history” of the reservation offered little support for a finding of continuing reservation status. Id. 420 U.S. at 431-449, 95 S.Ct. at 1086-1095. This Court does not lightly conclude that an Indian reservation has been terminated. “[W]hen Congress has once established a reservation all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.” United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285[, 30 S.Ct. 93, 94, 54 L.Ed. 195]. The congressional intent must be clear, to overcome “the general rule that ‘[doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.’ ” McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n., 411 U.S. 164, 174, [93 S.Ct. 1257, 1263, 36 L.Ed.2d 129], quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367[, 50 S.Ct. 121, 122, 74 L.Ed. 478]. Accordingly, the Court requires that the “congressional determination to terminate ... be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.” Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. at 505[, 93 S.Ct. at 2258], See also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, [82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346], and United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591[, 36 S.Ct. 696, 60 L.Ed. 1192]. In particular, we have stressed that reservation status may survive the mere opening of a reservation to settlement, even when the moneys paid for the land by the settlers are placed in trust by the Government for the Indians’ benefit. Mattz v. Arnett, supra, and Seymour v. Superintendent, supra. But in this case, “the face of the Act,” and its “surrounding circumstances” and “legislative history,” all point unmistakably to the conclusion that the Lake Traverse Reservation was terminated in 1891. The negotiations leading to the 1889 Agreement show plainly that the Indians were willing to convey to the Government, for a sum certain, all of their interest in all of their unallotted lands. Id. 420 U.S. at 444-445, 95 S.Ct. at 1092-1093. The DeCoteau majority was not deterred by the fact that a finding of disestablishment left the Indians with only their allotments: It is true that the Sisseton-Wahpeton Agreement was unique in providing for cession of all, rather than simply a major portion of, the affected tribe’s unallotted lands. But, as the historical circumstances make clear, this was not because the tribe wished to retain its former reservation, undiminished, but rather because the tribe and the Government were satisfied that retention of allotments would provide an adequate fulcrum for tribal affairs. In such a situation, exclusive tribal and federal jurisdiction is limited to the retained allotments. Id. 420 U.S. at 446, 95 S.Ct. at 1094 (citations omitted). Two years following DeCoteau, the Court decided Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977). Rosebud presented the most complex factual situation considered by the Court so far, and required the construction of three separate Acts of Congress. In 1904, 1907 and 1910 Congress opened portions of the Rosebud Indian Reservation to non-Indian entry and settlement. In determining whether the three acts diminished the boundaries of the Rosebud Indian Reservation, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, synthesized the following guiding principles: In determining whether or not the 1889 Reservation boundaries were subsequently diminished by congressional enactments, we are guided by well-established legal principles. The underlying premise is that congressional intent will control. DeCoteau v. District County Court, supra, [420 U.S.] at 444, 449 [95 S.Ct. at 1092, 1095]; United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 [, 30 S.Ct. 93, 94, 54 L.Ed. 195] (1909). In determining this intent, we are cautioned to follow “the general rule that ‘[d]oubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.’ ” McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n., 411 U.S. 164, 174 [, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1263, 36 L.Ed.2d 129] (1973), quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 [, 50 S.Ct. 121, 122, 74 L.Ed. 478] (1930); see also Mattz v. Arnett, supra, [412 U.S.] at 505 [, 93 S.Ct. at 2258]. The mere fact that a reservation has been opened to settlement does not necessarily mean that the opened area has lost its reservation status. Mattz v. Arnett, supra; see also Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 [, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346] (1962). But the “general rule” does not command a determination that reservation status survives in the face of congressionally manifested intent to the contrary. DeCoteau v. District County Court, supra. In all cases, “the face of the Act,” the “surrounding circumstances,” and the “legislative history,” are to be examined with an eye toward determining what congressional intent was. Mattz v. Arnett, supra, [412 U.S.] at 505 [93 S.Ct. at 2258]. Id., 430 U.S. at 586-587, 97 S.Ct. at 1362-1363. Applying those principles to the facts of that case, the majority in Rosebud found that “the Acts of 1904, 1907 and 1910 did clearly evidence congressional intent to diminish the boundaries of the Rosebud Sioux Reservation.” Id. at 587, 97 S.Ct. at 1363. In 1901 the Indians had consented to a cession of a portion of their reservation on terms similar to those in DeCoteau. That Agreement failed of ratification in the Congress because of disagreement over the “sum-certain” method of payment. From this unratified Agreement, Justice Rehnquist discerned “an unmistakable baseline purpose of disestablishment.” Id. at 592, 97 S.Ct. at 1366. A modified version of the Agreement was submitted to the Sioux in 1903 gamering only a simple majority of the Indians’ approval. Though lacking the three-fourths majority previously understood to be required, Congress enacted the 1903 “Agreement” into the 1904 Act, relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 23 S.Ct. 216, 47 L.Ed. 299 (1903) for authority. Noting that the 1904 Act contained cession language that seemed “precisely suited to disestablishment” under DeCoteau, the Rosebud majority found requisite congressional intent to diminish the reservation. The opinion buttresses this finding by observing that Congress provided that state school sections be selected in the opened area and by noting the “long-standing assumption of jurisdiction by the State” over the opened area. Id. 430 U.S., at 599-601, 603-605, 97 S.Ct. at 1369-1370, 13711372. The majority further found that the same intent to diminish was embodied in the 1907 and 1910 Acts. Reading all of these cases together, this Court has sought to evaluate the record in this case pursuant to the following ladder of priorities: (1) the express language of Congress as found in the relevant statutes and its legal effect; (2) the legislative history of a statute, particularly where the language of the statute is ambiguous; (3) contemporaneous interpretations by the President and the executive branch; subsequent congressional and administrative actions and interpretations; other “surrounding circumstances,” including school lands selections, “jurisdictional history” (disputed as it is), the intent and understanding of the Indians; and other factors, all weighed against the unique historical context in which they arise. At all times, the effort of this Court has been to harmonize its analysis herein with the principles expressed in Rosebud, DeCoteau, Mattz and Seymour, and by other courts in other cases, see note 32, supra, to the extent that an analogy can be drawn from each case based upon its particular facts. All of the factors considered in this case have been measured by the principle mandated by the Supreme Court as recently as Rosebud, supra, that “ ‘[djoubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.’ ” Id., 430 U.S. at 586, 97 S.Ct. at 1362, quoting Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367, 50 S.Ct. 121, 122, 74 L.Ed. 478 (1930). Rosebud requires that “a congressional determination to terminate [an Indian reservation] must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.” Id., 430 U.S. at 586, 97 S.Ct., at 1362, quoting Mattz, supra, 412 U.S., at 505, 93 S.Ct., at 2258. Other cases generate a presumption that Congress does not intend the impractical result of “checkerboard jurisdiction” over trust and fee lands absent specific language to that effect. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478, 96 S.Ct. 1634, 1643, 48 L.Ed.2d 96 (1976); Seymour v. Superintendent, supra, 368 U.S. at 358, 82 S.Ct. at 428; United States v. Long Elk, 565 F.2d 1032, 1039 & n.12 (8th Cir. 1977). This Court’s task has been to apply in a reasoned manner the principles described above to the historical record herein and to determine whether that record provides “the hard evidence necessary to overcome the general presumption against an intent to disestablish a reservation,” United States v. Long Elk, 565 F.2d 1032, 1040 (8th Cir. 1977). The pages that follow report this Court’s findings and conclusions. IV. EARLY HISTORY OF THE UTE RESERVATIONS At the time that Europeans made their first significant contact with the Ute Indians, the Utes dwelled within a territory that included large portions of Colorado, Utah and Northern New Mexico. The Ute economy was based largely upon hunting and gathering of food. As hunters, the Utes used areas far beyond their borders, especially in the plains area around the eastern area of their residing area. The game which formed their principal subsistanee included large game such as elk, deer, bear, antelope and buffalo. A wide variety of smaller animals were also a part of their diet, as well as trout, berries, and a variety of seeds. F. O’Neil, “A History of the Ute Indians of Utah Until 1890,” at 1 (unpub. Ph.D. dissert., Univ. of Utah 1973). The Ute people were generally organized into several bands, which included (ca. 1830): Tumpanuwac, Pahvant (now Uintah), Yamparka (White Rivers), Wiminuc (now Ute Mountain), Taviwac (or Tabeguache, now Uncompahgre), Kapote (now Capote), and Muwac (Muache). The plaintiff Ute Indian Tribe is comprised of the present Uintah, White River and Uncompahgre Bands. While the Utes maintained significant contact with the Spanish settlements to the south, Spanish activities had negligible effect on the extent of the Ute territory. Trade and commerce dominated the relationship. The arrival thereafter of Anglo-American fur trappers and explorers heralded a different course of events. The early decades of the nineteenth century saw a scattering of white explorers, adventurers and mountain men burgeon into a steady flow of white intruders into Ute country. Conflicts developed between Indian and white, and relations decayed until the economic collapse of the fur trade in the 1840’s. The mountain men were followed by the Mormons, who sought to settle upon lands in Ute country and make them their home. The struggle for possession of the most fertile lands, those in Utah Valley and other locations commenced soon thereafter: The arrival of white settlers was not particularly disturbing to Utah’s Indians since the Great Salt Lake was a border area between the Utes and the Shoshoni bands which ranged over the Great Basin west of there. As the Mormons moved south, however, taking up new land, the Indians were crowded off their central settlements, in Utah Valley and elsewhere. This southern thrust prompted Ute resistance — first at Battle Creek in 1850 — and then the so-called “Walker War” of 1853-54. O’Neil, “The Reluctant Suzerainty: The Uintah and Ouray Reservation,” 39 Utah Historical Quarterly 129, 130 (Spring 1971). Fort Utah, which became Provo, Utah, for example, was founded upon the central campsite of the Tumpanuwac Band of Utes. The lands were of considerable value to the Utes, being abundant in fish, game, forage for horses and fresh water. The Utes resisted and were either killed, or captured and removed from their homelands. For a time, the federal Indian Agent for Utah, Dr. Garland Hurt, established a small system of three Indian farm reserves which were intended to provide support and sustenance for the Utes, Paiutes and others. However, the farms were plagued by disorganization and funding problems and became entangled in the conflict between the Mormons and the federal government that surged in the late 1850’s. Many Ute people died of starvation and exposure during the bitter winters of 1859-60 and 1860-61. When a new federal Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Benjamin Davies, arrived in Utah in early 1861, the Utes were, according to Davies, in a “state of nakedness and starvation, destitute and dying of want.” Davies was forced to close the farms, selling the implements to buy food for the Indians. By 1860, the traditional solution of Indian removal could no longer be delayed. The Mormon towns and villages had been generous in supplying food, but this could not serve as a permanent arrangement. After an experience of general disagreement, the federal officials and the Mormon settlers finally agreed that the Indians must be moved. F. O’Neil, “A History of the Ute Indians of Utah ...,” supra, at 51. The valley of the Uintah Basin had already been proposed as a possible reservation for the Indians of Utah by Superintendent Davies’ predecessor. At the suggestion, Governor Brigham Young delegated a survey team to the basin to see whether the lands were suitable for settlement by the Mormons. Receiving a negative report, the Governor did not oppose the federal officials’ request to Washington that the basin be set aside as an Indian reservation. Less than a month after the survey team’s return President Lincoln approved the Secretary of the Interior’s proposal and designated the Uintah Basin as a reservation by the Executive Order of October 3, 1861. The federal government initially made little effort to provide a viable agency establishment on the Uintah Valley Reservation or to afford the Utes any incentive for moving there. Combined with the closing of the Indian farms, the Indian Bureau’s neglect at Uintah left the Utes to their own devices. The bands scattered into loose associations of families which hunted, gathered and raided for food. A number of Utes prosecuted a series of raids upon white livestock and settlements. Acting pursuant to congressional directive, O. H. Irish, new Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Utah, succeeded in securing the presence of many of the Utes at a treaty council at the old Indian farm at Spanish Fork, Utah, which was held in June, and included the presence of ex-Governor Brigham Young. On June 8, 1865, the assembled Utes concurred in a draft of a treaty by which they ceded all right, title and interest in their lands in Utah in return for the guarantee of possession of the Uintah Valley Reservation, to which they agreed to remove. The treaty also made detailed provision for the staffing and operation of the Uintah Agency, and provided that the 291,480 acres of Indian farm reservations be sold, proceeds to be applied to improvements at the Uintah Reservation. Superintendent Irish held a similar council with the Weber Utes, securing their agreement to the terms of the Spanish Fork Treaty under Article I of an abbreviated treaty of October 30, 1865. While Irish and Young were adamant in their insistance that the Indians sign the treaty, they apparently failed to indicate to the Indians that there was doubt as to ratification of the treaties by the Senate. After all, Congress on February 23, 1865 had authorized a budget of $25,000 to finance the negotiation of these treaties. A year earlier, Congress had mandated the sale of the small “farm” reservations and had confirmed the establishment of the Uintah Valley Reservation. Yet when submitted, the treaties failed of ratification. The uneasy peace generated by the Spanish Fork Council and agreement to the treaty by the Indians soon decayed again into armed conflict. Rejection of the treaty left the Utes without the promised economic support and with a strong sense of betrayal. The brush fire war that continued in the territory for the next four years came to be known by the name of its leader: the Black Hawk War. The war was costly. Bancroft wrote that “more than fifty of the Mormon settlers were massacred, and an immense quantity of livestock captured, and so widespread was the alarm that many of the southern settlements were for the time abandoned, the loss to the community exceeding $1,000,000.” [H. Bancroft, History of Utah 632-33 (1889).] The war dragged on until the Indians were forced into defeat by the superior power of the territorial militia. Under the leadership of Chief Tabby, who favored peace, the reluctant natives were removed to the Uintah Valley... O’Neil, “The Reluctant Suzerainty: the Uintah and Ouray Reservation,” 39 Utah Historical Quarterly 129, 131 (Spring 1971), JX 475. Even those Indians who had removed to the Uintah Valley Reservation in 1866 were compelled by conditions there to venture on raids into the Heber Valley in search of food needed for bare survival. Even after ■hostilities had largely ceased, the early farming efforts at the parsimoniously funded Uintah Agency were largely a failure, leaving the Utes to hunt and forage for food, or continue» raiding on a sporadic basis. On January 3, 1871"the Deseret Evening News published an’editorial, '“Brethren, Don’t Kill the -Deer,” urging non-Indians to leave the available wild;game for hunting by the Utes. A new agent, J. J. Critchlow, was sent to the Uintah Agency in February, 1871. Over the next dozen years, Critchlow struggled to develop a viable' agricultural economy on the reservation, constantly entreating the Utes to stay on the reservation long enough to farm so that they need not leave in search of food. He also engaged in an unending effort to secure adequate federal funding for agency operations. Critchlow’s efforts soon began to bear fruit as some of the Utes made Uintah Valley their permanent residence. In 1875, a federal survey- or, went to the Uintah Valley Reservation to delineate its boundaries. Though the survey did no more ■ than define those boundaries to a great extent, it added credibility to rumors circulating at the Uintah Agency that the reservation would soon be “opened” to white settlement. Agent Critchlow stiffly rebuffed any such effort: One Great source of discouragement and uneasiness [among the Utes] is the constant apprehension that some radical change, either in their location or in the administration of their affairs, will take place, and thus interfere with all their industrial pursuits. They are afraid that this reservation will be thrown open to white settlers, they be removed to some other place, and thus lose all their labor. .. My own opinion is that any such change would work great injury and injustice to these Indians, yet I know that many in this Territory would do anything to bring it about... . Report of J. J. Critchlow to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 15, 1878, in the Rept. of Comm, of Ind. Aff., 1878, at 624. By 1880 the Utes were already feeling pressure upon their boundaries; trespassing was becoming a problem on the western end of the reservation, and the rise of non-Indian towns such as Ashley (now Vernal) presaged a growing white presence near the ■Utes. At that same time, pressure on the Utes of Colorado at their large reservation created by the Treaty of March 2, 1868, 15 Stat. 619, II Kapp. 990 (2d ed. 1904), LD No. 7, was growing to firestorm proportions. The battle-cry “The Utes Must Go!” echoed across that state, fired by a combination of outrage over the 1879 killing of Nathan Meeker, the utopian Agent to the Colorado Utes, and his family by the White River Utes, and persistent rumors of mineral wealth underlying the Colorado Ute Reservation. In the view of Colorado’s Governor Pitkin the Utes should either be removed or killed: My idea is that, unless removed by the government, they must necessarily be exterminated .... The state would be willing to settle the Indian trouble at its own expense. The advantages that-would accrue from the throwing open of 12,000,-000 acres of land to miners and settlers would more than compensate all the expenses incurred. Quoted in D. Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee 366 (1970). Custer’s defeat at the Battle of the Little Big Horn having happened a mere three years before, sympathy for the Indians was still scarce among influential politicians. The “Meeker Massacre” joined “Custer’s Last Stand” as a popular pretext for coercing the cession of vast expanses of Indian real estate previously guaranteed by treaty. Besides securing the removal of the White River Utes from Colorado and placing them upon the Uintah Valley Reservation over the protests of Agent J. J. Critchlow, the government also secured the “consent” of the Uncompahgre Utes to a removal agreement signed March 6, 1880 and ratified by Congress on June 15. See Act of June 15, 1880, 21 Stat. 199, LD 11. The text of that agreement provided for a new home for the Uncompahgres and White Rivers: The Uncompahgres Utes agree to remove to and settle upon agricultural lands on Grand River near the mouth of the Gunnison River in Colorado, and such other unoccupied agricultural lands as may be found in that vicinity and in the territory of Utah. The White River Utes agree to remove to and settle upon agricultural lands on the Uintah Reservation in Utah. While the Uncompahgres Utes were originally intended to be resettled near the present location of Grand Junction, Colorado, a federal commission selected a rectangular area of land in eastern Utah bordering on Colorado’s western boundary. The reservation selected for the Uncompahgres was largely comprised of arid lands barren of fertile soil, a sharp contrast to the rich forests, meadows and ranges that the Utes left behind in Colorado. The Ute Commission, which selected the lands for the Uncompahgres, made an important recommendation: Until the Indians can be made somewhat familiar with their new relations, it is ... of vital importance to maintain the exterior boundary limits of the lands upon which they dwell as a reservation, and within which white men may not be allowed to locate. This protection may be secured by legislation or possibly by executive order. For years to come these Indians should certainly have the aid of the government in protecting them from collision with white men. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1881, at 383. An agency was established at Ouray in 1881 as well as a military post, Fort Thornburg. Non-Indians living in the region were paid the value of their improvements and removed. By an Executive Order dated January 5,1882 President Chester A. Arthur set apart the Uncompahgre lands as an Indian reservation. I Kapp. 901 (2d ed. 1904), LD 12 (see Appendix A for text). The removal of the Uncompahgre Band to their new home in eastern Utah was plagued with a number of difficulties. In spite of the fact that the Uncompahgres were expected to found an agricultural economy upon lands that were “a wild and ragged desolation,” Ouray Agent J. F. Minniss in his first report described the Uncompaghres as “orderly, quiet and peacefully disposed with a disposition to their welfare.” The reservation would not support them, their attitude notwithstanding; a number of Uncompahgre Utes ventured back into Colorado to hunt, giving rise to no small amount of excitement among the white settlers. See, e. g., O’Neil, “The Reluctant Suzerainty ..., supra, JX 475 at 136-137; Annual Rept. of the Secretary of the Interior, 1887, JX 14, at 283-286. In 1886, the military post of Fort Duchesne was established and the Uintah Agency and the Ouray Agency were consolidated under its roof. The move was made partly for administrative efficiency but also to enable the federal officials to exercise greater direct control — even military control — over all the bands. The Utes had barely begun to settle down on their reservation homes and farms when they began to feel the pressure of white encroachment upon their remaining lands. As in Colorado, it was the discovery of mineral deposits in Utah which forced the Utes to lose more land. The mineral was gilsonite. Although the presence of gilsonite was well known in the 1860 — 1870’s, it was not until the 1880’s that two promoters, Sam Gilson and Bert Seabolt, publicized the materials and found uses for it. In January, 1886 Seabolt filed the first recorded gilsonite claims — all of them in the Carbon Vein, which was located on the Uintah Indian Reservation. He organized a group to begin commercial mining. O’Neil and MacKay, “A History of the Uintah-Ouray Ute Lands,” supra, JX 483 at 15 (footnote omitted). The go