Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER PETTINE, Chief Judge. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution begins, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” By incorporation through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-16, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1567-68, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1967), this prohibition against official support of, and affiliation with, religious philosophies and institutions applies as well to the actions of state and local governments. In this case, the Court must decide whether the City of Pawtucket’s ownership and erection of a nativity scene as part of its annual Christmas display violates this fundamental restriction on governmental power. The plaintiffs are the Rhode Island affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Daniel Donnelly, George Kriebel, Robert Goodwin and A. Gregory Frazier. George Kriebel is and has been a real estate tax paying resident of the City of Pawtucket since February 1980. Robert Goodwin is and has been a personal property tax paying resident of said city since 1976. A. Gregory Frazier is and has been a personal property tax paying resident of Pawtucket since 1980. Daniel Donnelly, the original plaintiff, has resided in Pawtucket for four years and is a registered voter there. (I, 7) Although he is liable to Pawtucket for personal property taxes, he has failed to pay them. At all times pertinent to this case the plaintiffs have been members of the Rhode Island affiliate of the ACLU. The defendants are Dennis Lynch, mayor of Pawtucket at the inception of this case and during the Christmas, 1980, display; Richard Mumford, the City’s Finance Director and chief fiscal officer (II, 1-2); Guy Du-fault, Director of Parks and Recreation and Supervisor of the planning and implementation of the Christmas display (I, 64-66); and the City itself. This action was filed one week before Christmas, 1980. Plaintiffs initially sought a temporary restraining order requiring immediate removal of the creche from the City’s holiday display. At a conference with the Court, the defendants stated their firm intention to continue to include the nativity scene in future Christmas displays. Assured by this representation that the issue would not become moot, plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their request for emergency relief in order to permit the Court sufficient time to receive evidence and afford the case the deliberate consideration which the issues deserved. The case proceeded to trial on an accelerated schedule, with the parties agreeing that the Court would then render a final decision on the merits. In the course of trial, however, a serious question arose as to Mr. Donnelly’s standing as a taxpayer. On August 31, 1981, the Court issued a “Tentative Opinion” holding that Mr. Donnelly lacked standing to litigate this case as a taxpayer. Counsel were advised that the Court was prepared to hear argument on this point. On October 15, 1981 the Court granted plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to add the other present plaintiffs as parties. Through this motion the original plaintiff sought to remedy the absence of standing. The filing and litigation of this case have generated an extraordinary outpouring of public comment in Pawtucket and surrounding communities. The facts are as follows: Hodgson Park, the location of the Christmas display, is a privately owned open space area of approximately 40,000 square feet. (II, 81-82). Bounded by Roosevelt Avenue, Main Street, and Broadway, the Park lies in the heart of the downtown shopping district. (I, 90-91). The City’s two largest retail establishments are within walking distance of the Park, as is City Hall. With the private owner’s permission, the City enters Hodgson Park each year in November and erects a lighted Christmas display. (I, 65-66, 75). City employees, or city-paid contractors, perform the setup work. (I, 66, 70). The City owns the lights, figures, and buildings that make up the display, (I, 85-90); it reimburses the private owner for all the electricity used by the display. (I, 72). Subject to the final approval of the Director of Parks and Recreation, a City maintenance supervisor designs the layout of the display. (I, 66). The Mayor may make changes in the layout. (II, 52). The 1980-81 display contained the following: —a “talking” wishing well —Santa’s House, inhabited by a live Santa who distributed candy —a grouping of caroler/musician figures in old-fashioned dress, standing on a low platform surrounded by six large artificial candles —a small “village” composed of four houses and a church —four large, five-pointed stars covered with small white electric lights —three painted wooden Christmas tree cutouts —a live, 40' Christmas tree strung with lights —a spray of reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, set on an elevated runway —a long garland hung from candy-striped poles —cutout letters, colored in fluorescent paint, that spell “SEASON’S GREETINGS” —21 cutout figures representing such varied characters as a clown, a dancing elephant, a robot and a teddy bear —the nativity scene at issue in this case Also, small colored lights festooned the trees growing in and near the Park. A schematic of the display, prepared by the City, has been filed with the Court. To visualize the layout of the display, some physical description of the Park is necessary. The Park is roughly bisected by the Blackstone River. (I, 90). The East half rises in a moderate slope to Broadway Street. The West half is bounded by Roosevelt Avenue, a main thoroughfare, and Main Street; it is on this half that most of the display is placed. On this perimeter of the Park, there are four bus stops, two of which have shelters. Two sets of stairs lead down into the Park from the Roosevelt Avenue sidewalk. Persons standing at the bus stops and walking along that sidewalk would have the best view of the display. (I, 114-15). The nativity scene occupies the foreground of the display. The stable opens towards Roosevelt Avenue and all the figures are visible from that side. Looking down into the Park from the bus stops, the wishing well and Santa’s House appear on the extreme left of the nativity scene. Behind and above the creche loom Santa’s sleigh and reindeer. To the right of the creche are the live Christmas tree, the small “village,” and the carolers, which face Roosevelt Avenue. (I, 94). The figures in the nativity scene are approximately life sized. (I, 101-02). They include kings bearing gifts, shepherds, animals, angels, and Mary and Joseph kneeling near the manger in which the baby lies with arms spread in apparent benediction. All of the figures face the manger in which the baby lies; several have their hands folded and/or are kneeling. The figures’ poses, coupled with their facial expressions, connote an atmosphere of devotion, worship, and awe. The stable is, inexplicably, shored up with two hockey sticks. Some of the figures are chipped, and the paint on several is peeling. The nativity scene was purchased by the City in 1973 for $1,365. (I, 71-72). No money has since been expended on its maintenance. (Id.) This amount was comparable to that expended to purchase the three other large groupings — the carolers, the “village”, and Santa’s sleigh — that are part of the current display. The creche is assembled, removed, and stored by City workers; these tasks take a total of two worker-hours. (I, 67-68). Some additional time is spent by the City electrician in hooking up two spotlights to shine on the nativity scene. (I, 69). The Parks Director estimated that of the $4,500 spent for these employee services, about $20 was attributable to the creche. (I, 85). The City also spent a small amount, probably under $20, for spotlights, bulbs and holders to light the creche, (I, 78-79) and Pl.Ex. 7, and some unspecified sum for the electricity these use. (I, 72). When the Hodgson Park display is opened, ceremonies at the Park are held in conjunction with those at City Hall, 300 feet away. Santa arrives at the Park in a City fire truck. He and the Mayor throw a switch, illuminating the lights at the Park and City Hall. Santa then goes to his House in the Park and distributes candy to the children. The “talking” wishing well also begins operation. The sound system that broadcasts Christmas carols through the Park is the same one used at City Hall (I, 102, 104). During the trial of this case the Court received testimony from several individuals. This testimony bore on the purpose and the effect on viewers of Pawtucket’s nativity scene and also on any political divisiveness that erection of the creche has caused. The Court will now summarize this testimony. Plaintiff Donnelly testified that he first saw the Hodgson Park display, including the nativity scene in December, 1980. (I, 8, 10, 20). He stated that he viewed the creche as a religious display depicting the birth of Christ, and that he knew that it was sponsored by the City. (I, 11-14, 29). Perceiving this as a demonstration of official support for a particular religious viewpoint, which ran contrary to his strong belief in the separation of church and state, Mr. Donnelly testified that his reaction was one of fear. (I, 11-13). He explained that he regarded the City’s use of the nativity scene as exemplifying an increasing tendency of various religious groups to become more political and thereby to impose their views on the larger society. (I, 11). In response to questioning by the City’s attorney, Mr. Donnelly stated that he does not consider Santa Claus and the Christmas tree to be religious symbols because, unlike the nativity scene, they are not referred to or described in religious documents such as the Bible. (I, 28). He further testified that he did not regard the nativity scene as merely a component of the entire Hodgson Park display. He distinguished it from the other decorations on grounds that the creche “attempted to tell a complete story in itself — the story of the birth of Christ.” (I, 28-29). The other plaintiffs, George Kriebel, Robert Goodwin, and A. Gregory Frazier, have all stated that Pawtucket’s nativity scene represents to them a religious display depicting the birth of Christ. Furthermore, they view the City’s erection of the creche as demonstrating the City’s support for the Christian religion. Finally, these plaintiffs have stated that the City’s erection of the nativity scene has offended their interest in the separation of church and state. Steven Brown, Executive Director of the ACLU, saw the creche twice in December, 1980. (I, 43). Like Mr. Donnelly, he regarded it as a religious symbol which, by its inclusion within the City’s display, represented official sponsorship of a particular religious viewpoint. (I, 43-44). He explained that he viewed the nativity scene as a clearly religious symbol despite being surrounded by non-religious figures. (I, 56, 63). Mr. Brown also noted that certain components of the nativity scene, such as the angels, the Madonna, the figures kneeling in adoration, had independent religious significance. (I, 53, 62). Although he agreed that the birth of Christ was a historical fact, he testified that the nativity scene signified to him more than merely historical fact. (I, 63). Mr. Brown was raised and educated in the Jewish faith. (I, 53). Mr. Brown also testified about public reaction to the ACLU’s prosecution of this lawsuit. His impression of this reaction was based on phone calls received by the ACLU at its office, see, e. g., (I, 41) and in response to a three hour call-in “talk show” in which Mr. Brown subsequently participated. It was also derived from Letters to the Editor published in the Providence and Pawtucket newspapers. (I, 49). Mr. Brown stated that some of the callers felt that the ACLU was “making a mountain out of a molehill” and that some regarded the display as secular in nature. (I, 52). However, he felt that most people did not regard the religious element as incidental or minor. (I, 52-53). Rather, his impression was that the issue was not regarded as trivial (I, 61-62), and that many people — perhaps the clear majority — felt that the City had a right to sponsor and support the religious views of the majority. (I, 48-49, 64). Former Mayor Lynch, testifying about the purpose of the Hodgson Park display in general, stated that community morale was one of the principal reasons for the City’s sponsorship of the Christmas display. (II, 76). He likened it to the City’s Fourth of July, Memorial Day, and Veterans Day festivities, the other main “cultural and traditional” events that the City sponsors. (II, 83-84). He also emphasized the importance of the Hodgson Park display to the downtown merchants, who rely heavily upon it as a draw for holiday shoppers. (II, 78-82). In furthering this commercial function of the display, Lynch testified, the City works with the downtown merchants’ association in planning the size and timing of the display. (II, 78 — 79, 85-86). The utilization of Hodgson Park in this fashion is part of the downtown redevelopment effort. (II, 84-86). When asked specifically about the role of the nativity scene, the Mayor initially stated that the creche was “central” to the City’s Christmas experience for “three basic reasons”: cultural and traditional, aesthetic, and economic. (II, 54-55). Later in his testimony, Mayor Lynch stoutly maintained that the creche was “incidental to” and “not the primary reason” for the overall display. (II, 77, 91). After some initial equivocation when questioned by plaintiffs on the point, (II, 53-54, 63-65), the Mayor responded to defense counsel’s inquiry by stating that he would erect the display without the creche if necessary. (II, 76-77). He said that he “would assume and hope” that, even without the nativity scene, the display would still promote morale. (II, 91). The Mayor concluded, however, that “most people” would be “upset” if the City had to remove the nativity scene. (II, 54). Noting that a creche has been displayed as part of Pawtucket’s Christmas decorations for at least 40 years, (II, 62, 75), the Mayor stated that he had never received or heard of a complaint about it prior to this lawsuit. (II, 57, 62, 75). Since the lawsuit, he has received over a hundred phone calls and numerous letters. (II, 57). It is the Mayor’s impression that people were shocked and outraged over the suit because it questioned what had been an accepted community tradition for 40 years. (II, 58, 60, 67-68). In the Mayor’s view, people “had made the simple assumption that this would always be there because it was a good thing, and they’re outraged again over the questioning of what is good for all.” (II, 60). Criticizing the lawsuit for bringing into the community a divisiveness that “had never been seen” before in Pawtucket, (II, 65), the Mayor explained the public reaction by suggesting that people “thought it was very small of anybody to question what had been accepted by the community” for so many years “as a good thing.” (II, 67-68). After the lawsuit was filed, the Mayor held a “press conference” at Hodgson Park. (II, 55). A podium was set up specifically for the event in front of the nativity scene. (I, 117-18; II, 55-56). There had never before been a press conference at the display. (II, 75). The subject of the gathering was this lawsuit. (Id.). The Mayor led the crowd of municipal workers and school children in caroling. According to newspaper accounts that were part of the Mayor’s file and were introduced into evidence by plaintiffs without objection from the City, the press conference was more in the nature of a rally, with the Mayor talking emotionally about patriotism, freedom and the Pawtucket tradition of a nativity scene, and vowing to fight vigorously the ACLU’s attempt to take Christ out of Christmas. At some point after filing of the suit, the Mayor announced his intention to include a menorah in next year’s display. (II, 73). He explained at trial that he regards the menorah as “a very important thing to have as part of” the display, (II, 73), not only as a symbol of Judaism but also as “part of our culture, tradition, and an historical fact.” (II, 74). He denied having said at the press conference, as reported, that this addition would be made “in honor of our Jewish brethren who have supported us in this.” (II, 73). The Mayor noted that at least one segment of the Jewish community in Pawtucket has called him to express support and to state that they regard the inclusion of the nativity scene as “a thing of joy and not a religious service or observance of any kind.” (II, 76). He stated that he does not know of anyone ever having visited the Christmas display for the purpose of worship. (II, 77-78). Two Pawtucket businessmen, active in promoting the commercial development of the downtown area, reiterated the Mayor’s assessment of the importance of the Hodgson Park display to the Christmas shopping trade. Myron Stoller, a downtown retail merchant, noted that 25% of his annual business is done between Thanksgiving and Christmas and emphasized the importance of promotions such as the Hodgson Park display. (Ill, 1-7). He thought that the nativity scene added “absolutely nothing” to the impact of the display for commercial purposes. (Ill, 4, 7). Mr. Stoller, who is Jewish, does not object to the inclusion of the creche and has never heard any complaints about it. (Ill, 4-5). Dennis Moore, another local businessman and executive director of Downtown Pawtucket Revitalization, Inc., characterized the Hodgson Park display as “a key link in bringing commerce into the City.” (Ill, 12). He agreed that the display’s business impact would not be affected by removal of the nativity scene. (Ill, 14-15). Each side presented expert testimony on the nature and effect of the nativity scene. Michael Werle, a licensed clinical psychologist about 40% of whose patients are children, (II, 19-24), testified about the important role that symbols play in a child’s development of a self-image. (II, 25). He regarded the nativity scene as a very powerful symbol of worship, different from such secularized elements of the display as Santa Claus, Christmas trees and gift-giving. (II, 26-28). He felt that the symbol’s impact on a child would be heightened by the magical quality of the display’s bright lights and gifts of candy from Santa. In his opinion, a child of a non-Christian family, upon seeing the creche as part of a public display, would wonder whether he and his parents were normal. (II, 27-28, 39). He agreed that such self-doubt would arise only in children who understood the difference between public and private settings. (II, 31, 40-42, 44). Furthermore, Dr. Werle felt that Pawtucket’s inclusion of the creche in its Christmas display “reinforces [in Christian adults] an already prevalent attitude in our country that we are a Christian country.” (II, 28). Dr. Werle believed that, by “encourag[ing] people who already confuse being American with being Christian,” the City’s practice breeds religious chauvinism and leads to the view that non-Christians are “somewhat less important and have less merit.” (II, 28-29). Finally, he felt that nonbelieving adults would be insulted by the City-sponsored creche, but not “profoundly affected” by it. (II, 29). Thomas Ramsbey, an ordained United Methodist minister and a college professor with a Ph.D. in the sociology of religion and religious ethics, (II, 93-94), testified as to the religious symbolism of the nativity scene. Dr. Ramsbey noted that, although there is no bright line between religious and non-religious symbols, an approach commonly used in the analysis of symbols defines “sacred” symbols as those which are clearly associated with a particular group. (II, 95-96). By contrast, “profane” (or secularized) symbols are not closely tied to particular groups; rather, they “belong” to everyone. (Id.). In contrast to the other elements of the Hodgson Park display, which he does not consider “sacred,” (II, 105-06, 108-09), Dr. Ramsbey regards the creche as a very sacred religious symbol of Christianity. (II, 97, 114). He noted that the nativity scene depicts the birth of Christ as recounted in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke. The figures — including the animals — are in a worshipful pose; angels, regarded as messengers from heaven, are present. In his view, “the whole setting of the creche is a statement about the divinity, if you will, or the extraordinariness of the birth of this baby.” (II, 98). Tying this to the theory that it is group affiliation which makes a symbol “sacred,” Dr. Ramsbey pointed out that this belief about the special nature of Jesus Christ distinguishes Christians from other groups. (II, 114). He explained that the representation of the birth of Christ in the creche is a combination of historical fact and “the faith of the early church.” (II, 98). Dr. Ramsbey stated that the Methodist Church uses the creche as part of its worship and expressed dismay that the City had demeaned this Christian religious symbol by setting it in the midst of other, non-religious symbols. (II, 97, 104, 113). On cross-examination, Dr. Ramsbey agreed that Christmas is in part a secular celebration belonging to the whole American culture. He insisted, however, that parts remained deeply religious and associated only with Christianity. (II, 109 — 12). Defendants’ expert, David Freeman, is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rhode Island and has done scholarly work in the fields of religious philosophy and religious symbolism. (Ill, 15-17). The essence of Dr. Freeman’s testimony was that symbols “function contextually.” (Ill, 33). Dr. Freeman testified that symbols have both objective and subjective dimensions. (Ill, 17-18). He emphasized that a religious symbol “doesn’t occur in a vacuum, it occurs in a context.” (Ill, 18). Defining a religious symbol as one that evokes “a religious response, an attitude of worship, of awe, a respect for the holy, a respect for the sacred,” (Id.), Dr. Freeman stated that whether a symbol evokes a religious response “depends upon the attitude of the person viewing that symbol and where it’s found.” (Ill, 18). In Dr. Freeman’s view, the purpose of the creche in the Hodgson Park display is “to help celebrate Christmas.” (II, 27). He regards the nativity scene as “essential” in a Christmas display because otherwise “it would be like having a birthday party without knowing whose birthday it was.” (Ill, 22-23). He likened the significance of Christ’s birth to that of George Washington’s. (Ill, 22). Furthermore, Dr. Freeman thought that the creche “put [people] into a Christmas mood where they would, in that context of the scene as it occurs, be more inclined to spend money in shopping.” (Ill, 27). He summarized: “A symbol in a religious context would be a religious symbol and have a religious impact. A symbol in a nonreligious context will not be a religious symbol and will not have a religious impact.” (Ill, 27-28). In Professor Freeman’s view, a creche displayed in a church “would definitely be making a religious statement.” (Ill, 32). In Hodgson Park, it is merely part of the whole: “[People] are not going there to worship or to pray, they’re going there to shop, and the function the display would have for most people at least — the great majority, if not all— would seem to be to participate in the Christmas spirit, brotherhood, peace, and let loose with their money.” (Ill, 19). Personally, Dr. Freeman does not attach any religious significance to the creche; indeed, he finds the Hodgson Park display aesthetically displeasing, He perceives a discord in lumping together Santa Clause, Christmas trees and “something which is obviously still in many peoples’ minds of a religious origin.” (Ill, 23). Of the exhibits introduced by the parties, only three require separate discussion. These are the packet of Letters to the Editor collected by Steven Brown, the file of cards and letters received by former Mayor Lynch in connection with this suit, and the file of newspaper clippings kept by Lynch and containing many of the same Letters to the Editor that appeared in Brown’s collection. Approximately 70 letters relating to the creche and/or the lawsuit are included in these exhibits. Only three do not endorse the position taken by the City or more particularly, by Mayor Lynch, in this case. The letters expressing support vary greatly in style and content, but certain generalizations can be made. The most recurrent comments appearing in over half the letters are that the birth of Christ is the essence of Christmas, and that the presence of the creche, as a symbol of this spiritual core, is necessary to preserve the true meaning of the holiday. Although about 10% of the letters expressed the view that the nativity scene represented simply the general moral and ethical aspirations of goodwill, peace, and love, the clear majority of writers regarded the dispute over the nativity scene as implicating religious beliefs and values. The Mayor’s insistence on preserving the creche was lauded by many as a determination to “keep Christ in Christmas” and, more broadly, to keep God in American life. Several letters decrying the loss of a City “tradition” indicated that their writers viewed the creche’s central role as portraying the religious aspect of Christmas. Some writers perceived the lawsuit as a confrontation between believers, whose right to express their faith was being threatened, and nonbelievers. In several letters, the writer expressed abhorrence for “the minority’s” attempt to dictate to the “majority” what symbols could be displayed and revered. Some advocated allowing taxpayers or voters to decide how the City should spend their money. A few vigorously contested the desirability or even the possibility, of separating the religious and political spheres. It would be inappropriate to quote portions of any of these letters because of the difficulty of selecting a truly representative cross-section. After reviewing them, however, the Court is firmly convinced that they evidence a deep concern about and resentment for what most of the correspondents regarded as an attack on a cherished religious symbol. Although many letters criticized the ACLU as “petty,” most writers did not mean that the creche was an insignificant part of the display. Indeed, the intensity of feelings evident in the letters belies any suggestion that the writers regarded this lawsuit as involving a trivial matter. As Mayor Lynch himself said, “I’ve never seen people as mad as they are over this issue.” (II, 66). The asserted “pettiness” lay in the ACLU’s decision to challenge what most regarded as the central symbol of Christmas rather than avoid the Hodgson Park area if the creche offended members of the ACLU. Overall the tenor of the correspondence is that the lawsuit represents an attack on the presence of religion as part of the community’s life, an attempt to deny the majority the ability to express publically its beliefs in a desired and traditionally accepted way. In the Mayor’s words, “The people absolutely resent somebody trying to impose another kind of religion on them .... I think the denigration, trying to eliminate these kinds of things, is a step towards establishing another religion, non-religion that it may be.” (II, 66-67). I At the outset; this Court finds that the plaintiffs Kriebel, Goodwin and Frazier have standing to litigate this case. Even before Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), recognized the standing of federal taxpayers to challenge governmental expenditures on establishment clause grounds, municipal taxpayer standing had been permitted in this area. See e. g. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 206, 68 S.Ct. 461, 462, 92 L.Ed. 649 (1948), citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1938). Cf. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87, 43 S.Ct. 597, 600-01, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) (contrasting stake of federal taxpayer with that of municipal taxpayer for standing purposes). Thus, there is little doubt that Kriebel, Goodwin and Frazier, who pay taxes to Pawtucket, can challenge the City’s maintenance of the creche. II The Supreme Court, in one of its major Establishment Clause opinions, noted wearily that “cases arising under the [Religion] Clauses have presented some of the most perplexing questions to come before this Court.” Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 2958, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (1973). The difficult problem is to define “the [elusive] line which separates the secular from the sectarian ...” Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 231, 83 S.Ct. at 1576 (Brennan, J., concurring). Before applying the familiar three-prong test prescribed by the Supreme Court for analysis of Establishment Clause problems, it is necessary to address two arguments made by the City which call into question whether this case presents an Establishment Clause problem at all. Specifically, the defendants contend first that the erection of the creche has not involved the City in religious activity to any significant degree. They claim that the presence of the creche in the Christmas display merely acknowledges a religious component of an important secular holiday that is celebrated by all Americans. Second, the City also argues that the nativity scene has become largely “secularized” so that its nature or function within the Hodgson Park display is not primarily religious. Each argument is considered in turn. A. Christmas as a Secular and Religious Holiday The City argues first that “the dominant purpose and effect of the Christmas display and each component of that display (including the nativity scene) is to celebrate a national holiday in keeping with its raison d’etre ...” (Memo at 8). It continues, “The function of the nativity scene in the celebration of Christmas is really no different from the' function of religion in the celebration of Christmas as a national holiday.” (Id. at 9-10). It reasons, “Since the religious character of [Christmas] does not invalidate its observance because of an independent secular justification, a celebration of that holiday which includes a religious component ought not to constitute an establishment as long as the religious component is placed in its appropriate secular context.” (Id. at 11). In the Court’s view, this reasoning is born of a fundamental misperception of the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Although no case to the Court’s knowledge has specifically considered the legitimacy of designating Christmas as a national holiday, the courts that have considered the propriety of governmental participation in various displays and practices connected with Christmas have recognized the obvious fact that Christmas, as celebrated in 20th century America, has a decidedly secular dimension. See, e, g., Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 619 F.2d 1311, 1316 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987, 101 S.Ct. 409, 66 L.Ed.2d 251 (1980); id. at 1325 (McMillan, J., dissenting); Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 948 (D.C.Cir.1970); Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. Denver, 508 F.Supp. 823 (D.Colo.1981). This is the Christmas whose central figure is Santa Claus and whose themes are the nontheological ones of goodwill, generosity, peace, and less exaltedly, commercialism. Yet it is equally obvious that for the many 20th century Americans who practice Christianity, there is another Christmas. This is the “original” Christmas whose central figure is Christ, the Son of God, and whose themes are the essentially theological ones of salvation and spiritual peace, renewal, and fulfillment. The City argues that the emergence of a secular dimension to Christmas has rendered the holiday’s meaning merely vestigial. The Court does not agree. Christmas remains a major spiritual feast day for most sects of Christians. It has not lost its religious significance; rather, it has gained a secular significance. Janus-like, it is one holiday with two distinct and very different faces. If government can, consistent with the Establishment Clause, declare and celebrate Christmas as a national holiday, it is precisely because of this dichotomous nature — that is, because the religious elements of Christmas can be separated out and the secular elements presented more or less in isolation. This is not an uncommon situation in the Establishment Clause area. Recognizing that religion is a real and pervasive component in American life, the Supreme Court has never held that the presence of a religious element in an activity automatically places it beyond the purview of government involvement. As long as there are also strong secular elements, the government may involve itself with the activity if it limits itself to promoting only those elements. For example, although recognizing that “the place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid,” Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224, 83 S.Ct. at 1572, the Court has held that the Bible possesses an independent literary and anthropological value that makes it a permissible object of study in the public schools in the course of a curriculum designed to emphasize those elements. In an analogous area, the Court has held that sectarian colleges and universities have sufficiently separable elements that government can, with care, structure its programs to aid the latter without impermissibly advancing the former. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-82, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 2096-97, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971). In involving itself with one of these activities that possesses a dual significance, government must, however, be exceedingly careful that it indeed acts to advance only the secular elements. A case in point is Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (per curiam). There the Court held that a Kentucky law that required the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments on the walls of public school classrooms was constitutionally infirm. Although accepting the possibility that the Ten Commandments could have a place in a properly oriented public school curriculum, the Court refused to accept a proffered secular purpose when the state merely posted the Commandments without making any real attempt to distill the secular significance of the Decalogue from its religious elements. Thus, the more dominant and widely recognized the religious element, the more fastidious must the government be in isolating and emphasizing its concern for only the nonreligious elements. Indeed, government has an obligation, if it would not contravene the Establishment Clause, to dissect the secular from the religious even in circumstances where private persons and organizations would perceive and treat the two as an amalgam. See Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 73 n. 14 (D.C.Cir.1973) (opinion of Tamm, J.). Applying these principles to the case of Christmas, it is this Court’s view that a high standard of care is demanded of government when it seeks to “celebrate” this holiday. The secular and religious dimensions share a common origin and many people, whose holiday observance includes both aspects, may not perceive them as clearly demarcated. It is too late in Establishment Clause jurisprudence to suggest that the Government may endorse the Christian view of Christmas as a celebration of the birthday of the Son of God. The fact that a majority of citizens may not consciously draw a line between the Christian and the secular dimensions of Christmas requires that the government be all the more careful to draw a line, and a bright one, between the two, and remain on the clearly secular side. The City apparently regards this construction of government’s permissible role in dealing with an event having both significant secular and religious meaning as artificial and too restrictive. It seeks to avoid it by an argument that reduces in essence to this: (1) the secular dimension of Christmas is sufficiently developed to justify its observance as a national holiday; (2) because the City is permitted to celebrate the holiday, it must be permitted to celebrate all its component parts; (3) Christmas still has some religious component; (4) therefore, the City must be able to include that religious component, via the creche, in its Christmas display as long as it also includes the “justifying” secular elements. In the Court’s view, this argument is merely a bootstrap. The City relies on the presence of a secular dimension to give government a toehold and then argues that government, once there on the strength of the secular, has carte blanche to enter the allied religious dimension. This argument would permit government to teach the religious message of the Bible because that document also has literary, social and historical value. Cf. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (school authorities could not read Bible verses without comment despite the secular value such verses might have). It would permit government to aid the sectarian instructional parts of church-affiliated colleges because those same institutions also teach secular subjects. Cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 682-84, 91 S.Ct. at 2097-98 (striking down provision that would have permitted federally-financed buildings to some day be used for religious purposes). It would permit government to declare Sunday a legal day of rest for religious reasons because there are also social welfare reasons for establishing a uniform day of rest. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1119, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) (upholding Maryland Sunday closing law but warning that there might be a different result if it were shown that the purpose of a given Sunday law “is to use the state’s coercive power to aid religion”). In the end, it would render the Establishment Clause a mere formula, for it is difficult to imagine any religious activity or object that would not have some saving secular qualities on which government could base its participation. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 467, 81 S.Ct. at 1157 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting that endowment of a church might be defended on theory that church inculcates moral concepts that make people better citizens). The identification of a secular dimension is not a license for government to range throughout the entire field with no thought for the secular or religious character of the area in which it moves. Rather, it is a delimitation of the bounds within which government must remain if it is not to trespass on forbidden ground. In short, the Court finds that the mere fact that the Christmas holiday has an important secular element does not insulate government involvement in the religious aspects of the holiday from further review under the Establishment Clause. B. The Creche as a Religious Symbol In contending that it has not violated the Establishment Clause, the City also argues that the inclusion of the creche in the Hodgson Park display is not primarily religious because the nativity scene in essence has become “secularized.” As the Court understands this argument, the City is suggesting that most or all of the religious meaning that originally inhered in the nativity scene has been lost over time in the same way that other Christmas symbols, such as Santa Claus, have shed their religious meaning, or become “secularized.” This argument requires the Court to examine the symbolism and meaning that attaches to the creche. The nativity scene owned by the City of Pawtucket is not in any respect extraordinary. It depicts Mary and Joseph with the Christ Child lying in the manger, adoring shepherds, reverential kings bearing gifts, and angels announcing and rejoicing in the birth. Like other nativity scenes, it portrays the story of the birth of Christ as described in the gospels. It attempts to capture, through the poses and facial expressions of the figures, a sense of awe and worship. Although the birth of Christ is a part of history in the sense that a real person named Jesus Christ was born in Judea approximately 1981 years ago, it borders on the frivolous to suggest that the creche is merely a rendering of that historical fact. As Dr. Ramsbey explained, the object we know as a nativity scene or creche combines history and faith. It not only recognizes the fact that a child named Jesus was born, but also makes a statement about the extraordinary nature of that child by presenting his birth as attended by angels, revered by shepherds, and sought out? by kings. The City nevertheless argues that the creche has lost much of its religious meaning in the same way that Santa Claus, Christmas trees, stars, bells, and other Christmas symbols have become secular. The Court finds these comparisons unpersuasive. It is generally accepted that the concept of Santa Claus can be traced to St. Nicholas, a bishop of the early Catholic Church. However, as one of plaintiffs’ witnesses aptly observed, the modern day Santa Claus owes more to Clement Moore (and, one suspects, to present day television specials) than to the Fourth Century bishop. Santa Claus of today is a figure endowed with mythic trappings having no conceivable connection to his real-world progenitor — he is a jolly bearded figure who lives at the North Pole and emerges on Christmas Eve in a flying sleigh pulled by eight reindeer to distribute toys manufactured by elves by climbing down chimneys. No such drastic mutation can be found in the case of the nativity scene. The modern day creche retains its faithfulness to the biblical accounts which first inspired renderings of what Christians believe took place at Christ’s birth. As for other Christmas symbols — stars, (whose use presumably originated as a reference to the Star of Bethlehem), bells, (presumably a reference to church bells), and the Christmas tree, (whose pagan origins make its Christian significance especially murky) — it must be recognized that these are different kinds of symbols than the creche. To discern a religious import in the use of such common objects as stars, bells and trees, one must be able to associate them with the object or event that is of primary religious significance. The viewer must be able to recognize that the star represents the Star of Bethlehem which, according to the Bible, appeared on the night of Christ’s birth and shone over the stable in which he lay; or that the bell represents the church bells that peal out on Christmas morning to call the faithful to worship; or that the lights on an evergreen tree represent the spiritual and everlasting light that Christianity believes Christ brought to a world in darkness. It may well be that, in view of the secular dimension that the celebration of Christmas has attained in modern life, most people no longer do, or even can, make the associations necessary to give these symbols a religious meaning. However, unlike stars, or bells, or trees, the creche is not a common, ordinary object that attains a religious dimension only if the viewer understands that it is intended to connote something more than its facial significance, and possesses the key to unlock that secondary meaning. The creche is more immediately connected to the religious import of Christmas because it is a direct representation of the full Biblical account of the birth of Christ. That collection of figures does not have an everyday meaning that must be transcended to reach the religious meaning. For anyone with the most rudimentary knowledge of the religious beliefs and history of Western civilization, the religious message of the creche is immediately and unenigmatically conveyed. In sum, the Court does not understand what meaning the creche, as a symbol, can have other than a religious meaning. It depicts the birth of Christ in a way that is not merely historical. It has not been so altered over the years as to relegate its religious connection to a matter of historical curiosity. It is the embodiment of the Christian view of the birth and nature of Christ. Unless that view has itself lost its religious significance, an artifact that portrays that view simply and unambiguously cannot be other than religious. The City suggests that the creche represents the nonsectarian ethical aspirations of peace and goodwill. Even assuming that this is an independent, secular meaning, the Court finds that it is subordinate to, and indeed flows from the fundamentally religious significance of the creche. The Court does not consider Dr. Freeman’s testimony to undermine the conclusion that the creche is indeed a religious symbol for purposes of the Establishment Clause. Dr. Freeman appeared to regard the ability to evoke a response of worship as critical to a religious symbol. His view of symbols was primarily a functional one. If the symbol or artifact elicited a worshipful response in those who viewed it, it was “religious”; if that same symbol, in a different setting, did not prompt viewers to worship, it was not “religious” in that setting. Thus, Dr. Freeman regarded the creche as a religious symbol in a church, but maintained that it was not a religious symbol in the Hodgson Park display because it would not induce viewers to engage in worship. While the Court does not question that this may be a valid approach in the context of a sociological or anthropological study of symbols, the Court believes that this mode of definition is too restrictive for purposes of First Amendment analysis. Cf. Crowley v. Smithsonian Institution, 636 F.2d 738, 742 (D.C.Cir.1980) (court disagrees with expert’s definition of “religion” in Establishment Clause inquiry). “Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind.” West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1182, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943). One may understand the symbol’s message — so that the symbol has performed its job of communicating — without agreeing with it or responding to it. So long as the viewer possesses the background knowledge necessary to comprehend what the symbol is meant to stand for, the symbol does not lose its power as a communicative device simply by being taken out of its original, or optimal, context. The American flag flying on top of the Capitol represents our country; that meaning does not disappear for people when the flag is displayed in a baseball stadium or even in a museum exhibit of flags of the world. Similarly, for anyone familiar with modern history, the swastika represents naziism whether it appears on the armband of a World War II German uniform or is scrawled by vandals in 1981 on the side of an American building. The fact that the viewer may not feel a patriotic response on seeing the American flag or be moved to practice the tenets of naziism on seeing the swastika does not mean that he has not understood the message these symbols convey. By the same token, the creche does not lose its power to make a theological statement simply because it is removed from a Christian church, nor is it any less a religious symbol because it does not necessarily invoke a response of worship. Ill The findings that the Christmas holiday has a significant religious aspect and that the creche is a religious symbol does not, of course, resolve the constitutional question. Government may involve itself in activities with a religious content as long as it does so carefully, in ways that avoid the harm that the Establishment Clause was intended to forestall. The Supreme Court has not yet given plenary consideration to a case challenging the use of religious symbolism. Perhaps the closest it has come is the recent case of Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 101 S.Ct. 192, 66 L.Ed.2d 199 (1980) (per curiam), in which the placard of the Ten Commandments posted in Kentucky’s public classrooms had some aspect of a religious symbol. Cases involving state aid to religiously-affiliated schools and religious exercises within public schools, although not very helpful on their facts, do provide the basic method of analysis. To pass muster under the Establishment Clause, a statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion, and the statute must not foster an excessive government intanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d (1971). Recognizing that these factors are only guidelines to assist in ascertaining when the objectives of the First Amendment have been impaired, Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 359, 95 S.Ct. 1753, 1760, 44 L.Ed.2d 217 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 678, 91 S.Ct. at 2095, this Court must look to the purpose and effect of the City’s inclusion of the creche in its Christmas display, and to whether this practice breeds administrative entanglement or political divisiveness. A. Purpose The fundamentals of the purpose test are easily stated. The government action must “reflect a clearly secular . . . purpose.” Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773, 93 S.Ct. at 2965. While the rationale offered by the governmental entity is entitled to deference, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.Ct. at 2111, the Court must closely scrutinize the stated purpose, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 449, 81 S.Ct. at 1117, and ensure that the action was indeed motivated by legitimate secular aims. E. g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. at 41, 101 S.Ct. at 193; Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741, 93 S.Ct. 2868, 2873, 37 L.Ed.2d 923 (1973) (recognizing that “a legislature’s declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its true intent,” but noting that the plaintiff had not suggested that the purpose was other than stated). In addressing the purpose test, the City first argues that the nativity scene has no purpose that can be considered apart from the purpose of the Hodgson Park display as a whole. It asserts that “[i]n applying the tripartite test to a government activity which contains a religious element, the appropriate focus is not on the religious element but on the activity of which it is a part.” (Memo at 17 — 18). In the Court’s view, this overstates the role that the context in which the religious component appears plays in the search for purpose. Surely, a court should look to the rationale underlying the entire program or activity of which the religious element is a part in order better to ascertain the reasons for inclusion of the religious element. The nature and relationship of the nonreligious components may go a long way toward verifying the purported secular purpose. E. g., Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 672-73, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1413, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970) (in considering purpose of a tax exemption for churches, Court found evidence of secular purpose in fact that the charitable exemption included a broad range of educational, ideological, and service organizations). See also id. at 696-97, 90 S.Ct. at 1425-27 (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus, if a 16th century Italian hand-carved nativity scene is included in a City-sponsored museum display of Renaissance objets d’art, the context lends credence to an assertion that the purpose of including the creche was a secular one. Recognizing this admittedly important role of context is not the equivalent, however, of suggesting that the only relevant purpose is that of the overall activity or program of which the religious element is a part. See Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 567-68 (8th Cir. 1981), prob. juris. noted, --- U.S. ---, 101 S.Ct. 3028, 69 L.Ed.2d 404 (1981). Whenever the government employs a religious object or involves itself with a religious practice, the Establishment Clause demands that it account for its reasons in stepping beyond the secular sphere to accomplish its goals. Cf. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 231, 83 S.Ct. at 1576 (Brennan, J., concurring) (government may not use religious means to accomplish its.ends where secular means would suffice). Those reasons may indeed be the same as its reasons for employing secular objects or engaging in secular practices — as in the museum example above — but they must nevertheless be ascertained and scrutinized. The government cannot insulate its motives for using an object with religious significance from scrutiny merely by commingling it with a plethora of nonreligious objects. “Indeed,, on any other view, the constitutional prohibition could always be brought to naught by adding a modicum of the secular.” Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 at 47, 67 S.Ct. 504 at 526, 91 L.Ed. 711 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Although the purpose of the Hodgson Park display as a whole is relevant to the constitutional inquiry, the City may not gloss over the fact that the creche occupies a. unique position in the display. Unlike every other element, the nativity scene “appears neither to have been divorced from [its] religious origins nor deprived of [its] centrally religious character by the passage of time.” Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 278, 83 S.Ct. at 1601 (Brennan, J., concurring). See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 431, 81 S.Ct. at 1108 (using similar standard to evaluate Sunday Closing Law). Accordingly, it is necessary to establish why this religious symbol was included with all the secular symbols of Christmas. In his testimony, Mayor Lynch stated that the purposes for including the creche, like the purposes for the display as a whole, were both economic and cultural or traditional. (II, 54-55). The first reason can be readily disposed of. The businessmen who testified on behalf of the downtown merchants readily agreed that the creche contributed nothing to the value of the display as a commercial draw. Cf. Lowe v. Eugene, 254 Ore. 518, 543, 463 P.2d 360 (1969) (cross erected in part to “enhance the commercial exploitation of the principal Christian holidays”). This leaves the purpose of “culture and tradition.” The City argues that the presence of the creche in the display merely acknowledges the religious heritage of the holiday. (Memo at 15, 20). The City characterizes the creche as “part of the cultural symbolism of Christmas” and asserts that its inclusion in the display is simply “a straightforward recognition of a religious tradition.” (Id. at 26). The Court is aware that at least two courts, with little hesitation, have accepted as a valid secular purpose for the inclusion of a nativity scene in a public Christmas display the intention to “show how the American people celebrate the holiday season surrounding Christmas.” Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 949 (D.C.Cir.1970); Citizens Concerned For Separation of Church and State v. Denver, 508 F.Supp. 823 (D.Colo. 1981). With due respect for the learned judges involved in those decisions, this Court finds that rationale extremely troubling, both in the way it places an apparently neutral, secular characterization on something that may well be far more religious than the label implies, and in the ease with which such a justification can be asserted by the sponsoring government. Particularly when a belief or practice has been common to the majority for a long time, it becomes easy to regard the belief or practice as a matter of culture or tradition and thereby imply that they have somehow attained a neutral, objective status. “Culture,” “religion,” “history,” “heritage,” and “tradition” are not mutually exclusive categories. The values, beliefs, and practices of groups in our society over time become our culture and traditions. However, the fact that a belief is held by sufficient members of society to render it part of our culture as a whole, or that a practice is observed for a sufficient length of time to give it the status of one of our traditions does not mean that the belief or practice ceases to be religious or to be identified with one group. Recitation of the Lord’s Prayer has been a practice of many, if not most, Americans for generations. However, even though its time-honored and widespread observance may make it a tradition, and indeed even an element of our culture, it remains essentially religious and Christian. We cannot permit the labels “cultural” or “traditional,” even when validly applied, to blind us to the nature of the object so described. The Court perceives this danger in characterizing publically sponsored Christmas displays containing nativity scenes as mere depictions of how the “American people” celebrate the holiday. Santa Claus and Christmas trees have outgrown their religious beginnings and today are part of a nontheological ethos that can perhaps accurately be described as the “American” celebration of Christmas. In contrast, the nativity scene remains firmly tied to its religious origins and continues to express a fundamentally theological message about the nature of the child whose birth is there depicted. It represents the way Christians celebrate Christmas. Even though the majority of people in our country may be Christian and Christian beliefs and practices by their very pervasiveness have become an important part of our culture and tradition, it must be acknowledged that not every American is a Christian. The Court is not suggesting that government may never take cognizance of a cultural or traditional element that is religious in character. It is suggesting that, in considering the constitutionality of government displays that include a nativity scene, we must at least be frank in recognizing that that part of the display represents “culture” and “tradition” only in the sense that it represents a religious belief held by a substantial segment of our society for a long period of time. The City effectively concedes that the role of the creche in the Hodgson Park display is to evoke the religious aspect of Christmas. It states that the function of the creche is “really no different than the function of religion in the celebration of Christmas,” and characterizes it as representing the “religious heritage” or “religious tradition” of the holiday. It contends, however, that it is merely acknowledging the presence of the religious element, rather than promoting it. The line between “acknowledgment” and “promotion” is a fine one, especially when the religious beliefs or practices that the government would acknowledge are those held by the majority of its citizens. Moreover, although the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Establishment Clause does not require government to ignore the existence of religion in American life, it is equally clear that there are limits on the ability of government affirmatively to employ religious practices and objects to acknowledge religion’s role. The opening of the school day with a prayer is forbidden even when the prayer is “based on our spiritual heritage,” Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 425, 82 S.Ct. at 1264, and even though the practice might readily be explained as a “recognition” that many people and organizations traditionally begin their day with an invocation. Similarly, the government may not “acknowledge” the fact that the Bible is part of our religious heritage and has traditionally been regarded as inspirational by large portions of our society by reading verses, even without comment, in public schools. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224, 83 S.Ct. at 1572. Most recently, the Supreme Court has held that a state may not acknowledge the Ten Commandments as “the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States,” by requiring