Full opinion text
OPINION CHARLES R. SCOTT, Senior District Judge. This is an action challenging the constitutionality of Florida Statutes § 812.049 and § 812.051 (1981), effective October 1, 1981. These statutes are aimed at regulating Florida’s secondhand precious metal businesses. They impose numerous restrictions and prohibitions upon persons transacting purchases or sales of secondhand precious metals, including: (1) a requirement that dealers keep detailed records of each purchase transaction, including a photograph or fingerprint of the seller; (2) a requirement that purchased goods be retained within the county in an unaltered condition by the dealer for a period of 15 days following the transaction; (3) a requirement that the dealer submit all records of purchase transactions to the county sheriff and municipal police department within 24 hours of the transactions; (4) a provision that the dealers’ records shall be subject to inspection by all law enforcement officers and shall be preserved for a period of three years; (5) a provision prohibiting a dealer from purchasing any item of precious metal from a person under the age of 18 years. Failure to comply with the provisions of the statutes constitutes a first degree misdemeanor. Plaintiffs are engaged in the interstate and intrastate business of buying and selling precious metals, junk, coins, scrap metal and jewelry. Defendants are the Florida Attorney General and various sheriffs and deputy sheriffs charged with enforcing the laws of the state of Florida in the geographic area surrounding plaintiffs’ businesses. In Count I of the complaint, plaintiffs seek a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction and declaratory relief. Count II is a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants Ronald K. Graffis, a deputy sheriff of Lake County, Florida, and G. W. Simpson, a deputy sheriff of Citrus County, Florida. The Section 1983 claim is grounded in the allegation that the defendants Graffis. and Simpson have informed plaintiffs that the challenged statutes will be enforced against them. ABSTENTION By order entered October 20, 1981, plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order was denied. A hearing on the application for preliminary injunction was held November 6, 1981, at which time the Court raised the threshold question of whether the Pullman abstention doctrine is properly applicable to this case. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). The parties had been directed in the order denying plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order to arrive at the preliminary injunction hearing prepared to argue the applicability or non-applicability of the Pullman doctrine. Having considered the matter thoroughly, the Court is convinced that it should not abstain from hearing and deciding this matter. The law is clear that a federal court should abstain from deciding a case in which a state statute is challenged as unconstitutional where resolution of an unsettled question of state law would eliminate or materially alter the federal constitutional question. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 402, 94 S.Ct. 1800,1806, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1181, 14 L.Ed.2d 50 (1965); see generally 17 A. Wright & C. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4242 (1978). The essential prerequisite to the applicability of Pullman abstention is the existence of “an unsettled question of state law” that, if resolved, would avoid the need for a federal constitutional adjudication. Procunier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U.S. at 402, 94 S.Ct. at 1806. Where this essential element is absent, abstention is not a proper course to adopt. As the Supreme Court stated in Harman v. Forssenius, supra: The doctrine, however, contemplates that deference to state court adjudication only be made where the issue of state law is uncertain, [citing eases] If the state statute in question, although never interpreted by a state tribunal, is not fairly subject to an interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional question, it is the duty of the federal court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction, [citing case] Thus, ‘recognition of the role of state courts as the final expositors of state law implies no disregard for the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal law.’ 380 U.S. at 534-35, 85 S.Ct. at 1181-82, quoting England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16, 84 S.Ct. 461, 464-65, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964). In the case sub judice, the challenged statutes, copies of which are attached hereto as Appendix A, are attacked on several grounds as being violative of the federal constitution. It is alleged that the statutes violate, inter alia, the interstate commerce clause, the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination, and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is not a case that turns upon the construction or clarification of a particular question of state law, the resolution of which would obviate the need for a federal constitutional adjudication. The defendants have not pointed to any provision in the legislation which leaves “reasonable room for a construction by the . . . [Florida] courts which might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem.” Harman v. Forssenius, supra, 380 U.S. at 536, 85 S.Ct. at 1182, quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177, 79 S.Ct. 1025, 1030, 3 L.Ed.2d 1152 (1959). The plaintiffs have raised manifold doubts as to the constitutionality of the challenged statutes. The alleged infirmities, which pervade the entire content of the legislation, strike at the very heart of the Constitution. It would be impossible, in the Court’s opinion, to construe the statutes in a way that would avoid the necessity of ruling upon the constitutional questions raised in the plaintiffs’ complaint. Defendants contend that abstention is mandatory simply because one prong of the constitutional attack on the statutes is that they are void for vagueness under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Apparently, defendants construe Harman v. Forssenius, supra, as mandating abstention whenever there is a vagueness challenge to a state statute. That case does not stand for any such proposition. The question of whether or not Pullman abstention is appropriate in actions attacking a state statute on vagueness grounds was discussed in Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377 (1964). In Baggett, the Supreme Court distinguished two types of vagueness challenges. Where the question is whether the statute is applicable to a particular person or a well defined course of conduct, abstention may be appropriate because a single state decision could possibly resolve the ambiguity. Where, however, the statute is challenged on the basis that persons to whom it clearly applies cannot understand what is required of them and do not wish to refrain from all activity arguably within the purview of the vague terms, abstention is not required. 377 U.S. at 378, 84 S.Ct. at 1326. It is unnecessary, however, to decide into which of these categories the instant vagueness challenge fits, for the Supreme Court has made it clear that where the challenged statute is constitutionally deficient for some reason other than, or in addition to, vagueness, the fact that it may also be vague does not require that a district court abstain from hearing the case. Procunier v. Martinez, supra, was a class action challenging state regulations relating to the censorship of prisoners’ incoming and outgoing mail. One of the grounds raised by plaintiffs was that the regulations were void for vagueness. The defendants contended that whenever there is a vagueness challenge to an uninterpreted state statute or regulation, the case is a proper one for abstention. After noting that not every vagueness attack upon a state statute or regulation warrants abstention (discussing Baggett v. Bullitt, supra), the court went on to state: But we need not decide whether appellants’ contention is controlled by the analysis in Baggett, where the short answer to their argument is that these regulations were neither challenged nor invalidated solely on the ground of vagueness. Appellees also asserted, and the District Court found, that the rules relating to prisoner mail permitted censorship of constitutionally protected expression without adequate justification. In light of the successful First Amendment attack on these regulations, the District Court’s conclusion that they were also unconstitutionally vague hardly ‘constitutes a compelling reason for abstention.’ Id. at 402, 94 S.Ct. at 1806. Thus, the fact that certain provisions of a challenged statute may be unconstitutionally vague is not an adequate justification for a federal court to abstain from ruling upon the matter where other provisions of the statute are violative of the federal constitution on grounds independent of vagueness. As will be discussed in greater detail infra, this is precisely the situation presented by Florida Statutes § 812.049 and § 812.051. Consequently, the Pullman abstention doctrine is not applicable. The Pullman doctrine was founded upon notions of federalism. Federal courts, observed the Supreme Court, should refrain from exercising their authority in constitutional cases involving unsettled questions of state law, out of “scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments.” Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Company, supra, 312 U.S. at 501, 61 S.Ct. at 645. A variation of the Pullman abstention doctrine, also growing out of concern for the proper working relationship between federal and state governments, is the rule precluding federal courts from enjoining state criminal prosecutions. This rule, first enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), holds that, unless bad faith enforcement or other special circumstances are present, principles of equity, comity and federalism operate to preclude a federal court from entering an injunction restraining enforcement of a state criminal statute when a state prosecution is pending. 401 U.S. at 54, 91 S.Ct. at 755; Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69, 91 S.Ct. 764, 766, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1213, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). Subsequent cases have made it clear, however, that in the absence of a pending state criminal proceeding, the considerations stressed in Younger v. Harris carry little force. In Steffel v. Thompson, supra, the Supreme Court held that federal declaratory relief was properly granted to plaintiffs challenging a state criminal statute as unconstitutional where no state prosecutions were pending against them. All that is required is that the federal plaintiff estab- lish a genuine threat that the statute will be enforced against him. 415 U.S. at 475, 94 S.Ct. at 1223. The Court did not decide whether preliminary injunctive relief would have been appropriate under the facts in Steffel, although it did discuss the distinctions between declaratory and injunctive relief, concluding that it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to demonstrate irreparable injury prior to obtaining declaratory relief. 415 U.S. at 471, 94 S.Ct. at 1221. While the Court expressed its opinion that declaratory relief will generally have a less intrusive effect upon the administration of state criminal law than injunctive relief, it has previously observed that “[ojrdinarily . . . the practical effect of the two forms of relief will be virtually identical . .. . ” Samuels v. Mackell, supra, 401 U.S. at 73, 91 S.Ct. at 768. The question reserved in Steffel was resolved in Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975), an action challenging an ordinance making it unlawful for bar owners to permit topless dancing in their establishments. Each of the three plaintiffs in Doran operated bars that provided topless dancing as entertainment. Upon enactment of the ordinance, all three plaintiffs ceased the topless dancing activities at their respective establishments and instituted suit in federal court, challenging the ordinance on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. One of the plaintiffs, however, resumed its presentation of topless dancing the day after the complaint was filed. Criminal proceedings were immediately instituted against the offending plaintiff. A few days after those criminal proceedings were commenced, the federal district court entered an injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the ordinance against any of the plaintiffs, finding that the ordinance was facially invalid under the First Amendment. That order was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision approving the granting of injunctive relief to the plaintiff against whom criminal proceedings had been instituted, relying upon Younger v. Harris, su pra, but affirmed as to the other two plaintiffs. With respect to these latter two plaintiffs, that is, those who were not subject to state criminal prosecutions, the Court commenced its analysis by concluding that under the holding in Steffel, supra, they were clearly entitled to declaratory relief. 422 U.S. at 930, 95 S.Ct. at 2567. The Court then proceeded to consider the question left open in Steffel, i.e., whether injunctive relief is available to plaintiffs challenging a state criminal statute when criminal prosecution has been threatened, but has not yet been instituted. The Court answered the question affirmatively, determining that “. . . unless preliminary relief is available upon a proper showing, plaintiffs in some situations may suffer unnecessary and substantial irreparable harm.” 422 U.S. at 931, 95 S.Ct. at 2567. In Doran, the Court found the allegation of plaintiffs that they would suffer substantial loss of business and possible bankruptcy if forced to comply with the ordinance to be sufficient showing of irreparable harm, thereby justifying preliminary injunctive relief. 422 U.S. at 931, 95 S.Ct. at 2567. Applying the law emanating from Younger v. Harris, supra, and the line of cases succeeding it, to the case at bar, the Court is of the opinion that plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief, provided they satisfy the four requisites set forth in Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974). There is no dispute that a genuine threat of prosecution under the challenged statutes exists with respect to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Deputy Sheriffs Ronald K. Graffis and G. W. Simpson, defendants herein, have informed them that the statutes will be enforced against them. Defendants Graffis and Simpson, in their motion to dismiss Count II of the complaint, do not deny the allegation that they told plaintiffs that the statutes would be enforced against them, but argue only that they have not yet taken any action against plaintiffs. Accordingly, having found that abstention is not an appropriate avenue to pursue in this case under the principles set forth in either Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, supra, or Younger v. Harris, supra, the Court will proceed to consider the merits of the motion to dismiss Count II of the complaint, filed on behalf of the defendants Graffis and Simpson, and the application of plaintiffs for preliminary injunctive relief. MOTION TO DISMISS SECTION 1983 CLAIM Count II of the plaintiffs’ complaint is a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants Graffis and Simpson, deputy sheriffs for Lake County and Citrus County, respectively. The sole support for this claim is the allegation that Graffis and Simpson have indicated that they will enforce the challenged statutes against the plaintiffs. It is not alleged that either Graffis or Simpson have actually taken any action against plaintiffs pursuant to the statutes. In fact, Graffis and Simpson, in their motion to dismiss Count II, expressly state that they will not attempt to enforce the statutes against plaintiffs herein unless and until this Court enters an order declaring the statutes to be constitutional. Thus, as of yet defendants Graffis and Simpson have not taken any action under color of state law with respect to plaintiffs, much less any action that would operate to deprive plaintiffs of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States. Consequently, there is no immediate basis for the Section 1983 claim and it will be dismissed. The dismissal, however, will be without prejudice. Should Graffis or Simpson attempt to enforce the statutes against plaintiffs subsequent to entry of the Court’s preliminary injunction, see text infra, they could very well be liable under Section 1983 inasmuch as they would be on notice as to the constitutional defects inhering in the statutes. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy designed to protect a plaintiff from sustaining irreparable injury and to preserve the power of the district court to render a meaningful decision following a trial on the merits. Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). The decision whether or not injunctive relief is appropriate in a particular case lies within the discretion of the district court. 489 F.2d at 572; Johnson v. Radford, 449 F.2d 115, 116 (5th Cir. 1971). In exercising that discretion, the district court must find that four prerequisites have been satisfied prior to granting preliminary injunctive relief: (1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the harm the injunction may cause to defendant; and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Call-away, supra, at 572. The Court will consider these four prerequisites seriatim: (1) Likelihood of success on the merits. It is very likely indeed that plaintiffs will succeed on the merits in their challenge to the constitutionality of Florida Statutes § 812.049 and § 812.051 (1981). Plaintiffs raise no less than seven constitutional issues with respect to Sections 812.-049 and 812.051. The Court finds it unnecessary to discuss each of these issues in great detail. Rather the Court will focus upon three of the major issues, resolution of which will be sufficient to support the finding that it is likely plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. The Court’s determination regarding the likelihood of success on the merits is, of course, preliminary in nature,based upon the limited evidence that has been presented thus far. The defendants will have the opportunity to persuade the Court otherwise should this cause proceed to a trial on the merits. It is important to note as a threshold matter that all of the factual allegations set forth in plaintiffs’ memorandum supporting their application for preliminary injunctive relief stand unrebutted at this point, in light of the failure of defendants to file any response opposing such factual allegations. Florida Statutes § 812.049 and § 812.051 were undoubtedly enacted as a crime-fighting mechanism designed to stem the recent tide of burglaries involving items containing precious metals. Precious metals, of course, have been prime fare for thieves since long before the conquistadors plundered the Aztecs and the Incas in the 16th Century. The recent spiraling of precious metal prices, however, and the concomitant flourishing of businesses engaging in secondhand precious metal transactions have apparently heightened the appealability of gold and silver as targets for thieves. The secondhand precious metal dealers offer thieves a means of easily disposing of stolen items containing precious metals. These dealers remain far from inconspicuous. In the true spirit of capitalism, they employ blaring newspaper advertisements that proclaim in no uncertain terms: “We Pay CASH for Gold and Silver!” The Florida Legislature, in enacting Florida Statutes § 812.049 and § 812.051, was understandably concerned with curtailing these readily accessible outlets for purloined precious metals. Undoubtedly, many of the secondhand precious metal dealers serve as little more than fences for stolen merchandise, either knowingly or unwittingly. Nevertheless, the statutes strike the Court as a classic example of a legislative over-reaction to a problem which, although real, is not of sufficient magnitude to justify the drastic and sweeping means employed to control it. Commerce Clause — It would appear that certain provisions of the challenged statutes, particularly the 15-day holding requirement, violate the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution. U.S.Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Section 812.051(5) directs that persons dealing in secondhand goods retain any purchased item of precious metal within the county in an unaltered condition for a period of 15 days following submission of the records of purchase to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. A state undoubtedly has the authority, pursuant to its police power, to regulate matters of local concern in order to protect the health, well-being and safety of its citizens. Specifically as regards the Commerce Clause, the law is clear that, in the absence of federal legislation in the area, a state has the authority to regulate a matter of local concern where the regulation is local in character and effect, even though the regulation has some incidental impact upon the national economy. Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186, 71 S.Ct. 215, 219, 95 L.Ed. 190 (1950); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 1519, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359-60, 63 S.Ct. 307, 317-18, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943); Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346, 351, 59 S.Ct. 528, 530, 83 L.Ed. 752 (1939). The governing principle, as it has emerged from a long line of Supreme Court cases beginning with Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1851), is that states are free to regulate those aspects of interstate commerce so local in character as to require diverse treatment, while only Congress can regulate those aspects of interstate commerce so national in character as to demand uniform treatment by a single authority. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-4 (1978). The focus is upon the subject matter of the challenged state regulation. If the regulated activity is of predominantly local interest, the state action will be sustained. If the activity implicates interests of a national scope, the state action must fail. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728, 69 S.Ct. 841, 842, 93 L.Ed. 1005 (1949). Thus, the Supreme Court recognized in Cooley the existence of concurrent jurisdiction between Congress and the states in some areas affecting interstate commerce. The Cooley doctrine has generally been limited, however, to situations in which Congress has failed to indicate, through the enactment of federal legislation, that the subject area is not one demanding uniform treatment on a national level. In other words, Congress has the power to redefine the dimensions of local and national interests as they relate to interstate commerce. California v. Zook, supra, 336 U.S. at 728, 69 S.Ct. at 842; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 66 S.Ct. 1142, 90 L.Ed. 1342 (1946). Congress can, through legislation, decide for itself that an area is a proper one for the exercise of exclusive federal jurisdiction. See Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U.S. 352, 399, 33 S.Ct. 729, 739, 57 L.Ed. 1511 (1913). Where Congress has chosen to exercise its paramount power over commerce, state regulation that would otherwise be valid must fail. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349, 353, 71 S.Ct. 295, 297, 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, 325 U.S. at 769, 65 S.Ct. at 1520; Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, supra, 306 U.S. at 351-52, 59 S.Ct. at 530-31. This is true even though the challenged state action falls within the state’s police power. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, supra, 340 U.S. at 353, 71 S.Ct. at 297; Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, supra, 306 U.S. at 351-52, 59 S.Ct. at 530-31. In deciding whether Congress has expressed an intention to “occupy” a particular field through the enactment of federal legislation, the proper inquiry in evaluating the relative status of the federal and state action is; Does the state action conflict with national policy? California v. Zook, supra, 336 U.S. at 728, 69 S.Ct. at 842. As will be discussed in detail infra, the answer to this question in connection with the case sub judice would appear to be affirmative. Of course, if a state statute or regulation operates to directly burden, or disrupt the flow of, interstate commerce, it must fail even in the absence of competing federal legislation. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, 325 U.S. at 767— 69, 65 S.Ct. at 1519-20 (and the cases cited therein); Simpson v. Shepard, supra, 230 U.S. at 396, 33 S.Ct. at 738. The Cooley doctrine holds merely that, in the absence of federal legislation, a state enactment aimed at regulating matters of local concern is not invalid simply because it has an incidental impact upon the operation of the national economy. The doctrine does not, however, accord free rein to the states to regulate all matters of local interest, regardless of the effect of the regulation upon interstate commerce; for it has been accepted constitutional doctrine for a hundred years that “the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, . . . affords some protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce . . . . ” Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, 325 U.S. at 769, 65 S.Ct. at 1520. The proper approach, in any case, is to balance the relative weights of the respective state and national interests involved. California v. Zook, supra, 336 U.S. at 728, 69 S.Ct. at 842; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, 325 U.S. at 770 — 71, 65 S.Ct. at 1521. If the state legislation operates to significantly obstruct the free flow of commerce among the several states it must fail. In the instant case, the challenged legislation would appear to be invalid under either strand of the Commerce Clause analysis discussed above, i.e., either on the ground that it interferes in an area requiring uniform national regulation or on the ground that it directly burdens or disrupts the flow of interstate commerce. The regulation of gold in this country is a power that has been exercised exclusively by either Congress or the President or both. Congressional power of regulation of gold has been held to be virtually absolute, extending to every facet of gold acquisition, ownership and transfer. See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S.Ct. 407, 79 L.Ed. 885 (1935); Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 933, 80 S.Ct. 373, 4 L.Ed.2d 355 (1960). The power derives from several constitutional sources: the power to coin and regulate the value of money, the power to lay and collect taxes, the power to borrow, the power to fix the standards of weights and measures, the power to regulate commerce among the several states, and the power to make all laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into execution these enumerated powers. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., supra, 294 U.S. at 303, 55 S.Ct. at 414; Laycock v. Kenney, supra, at 590. Following several piecemeal steps on the part of the President and Congress designed to restrict the use and transfer of gold among private citizens, Congress enacted the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 31 U.S.C. § 440 et seq. (hereinafter ‘the Act’). The Act wa? passed as part of the nation’s response to the Great Depression. Its purpose was to stabilize the value of the dollar, which had theretofore been steadily increasing in purchasing power, resulting in an overall depression of general price levels. Laycock v. Kenney, supra, at 585. The legislation operated to vest in the United States Treasury possession of all monetary gold stock within the United States. Section 3 of the Act, 31 U.S.C. § 442, delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to prescribe, by regulation, the conditions under which gold could be acquired, held, transported, exported or earmarked for private use. Acquisition and use of gold by private citizens was restricted to industrial, professional and artistic purposes. Purchasing, holding, selling or otherwise dealing in gold for investment or speculative purposes was specifically forbidden by the regulations promulgated under the Act. 31 C.F.R. §§ 54.14(b), 54.15 (1974); see Feldman v. Great Northern Railway Co., 428 F.Supp. 979, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Section 4 of the Act, 31 U.S.C. § 443, provided for the forfeiture of any gold acquired or used in violation of the Act. The legislative history of the Act indicated that Congress intended to place “complete control over this metal” in the hands of the United States government. “In order to protect the Government’s power over gold, the bill gives it the right to regulate the acquisition, transportation, etc., of the metal . . . . ” H.R.Rep.No.292, 73 Cong., 2d Sess.-(1934). In Laycock v. Kenney, supra, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the Act in the face of a challenge that, inter alia, the legislation was beyond the power of Congress to enact. In so doing, the Court endorsed the broad powers of Congress over the nation’s monetary system, concluding that such power extended to “gold in any form,” and not merely to “monetary gold.” 270 F.2d at 591-92. In September 1973, Congress passed legislation repealing Sections 3 and 4 of the Gold Reserve Act. Act of September 21, 1973, Pub.L.93-110, 87 Stat. 352, Tit. I (hereinafter ‘Public Law 93-110’). Public Law 93-110, as amended by Act of August 14, 1974, Pub.L.93-373, 88 Stat. 445 (hereinafter ‘Public Law 93-373’), eliminated all prohibitions upon private ownership of gold, providing in pertinent part: (b) No provision of any law in effect on the date of enactment of this Act, and no rule, regulation or order in effect on the date subsections (a) and (b) become effective may be construed to prohibit any person from purchasing, holding, selling, or otherwise dealing with gold in the United States or abroad. Section 3(e) of Public Law 93-110 had provided that the lifting of prohibitions relating to private ownership of gold would become effective when the President reported to Congress that international monetary reform had proceeded to the point where elimination of the restrictions on private ownership would not adversely affect the international monetary position of the United States. Section 2(c) of Public Law 93-373 amended Section 3(c) of Public Law 93-110 to provide that the restrictions would automatically be lifted on December 31, 1974 if the President failed to act by then. The President did not act by December 31, 1974. Consequently, the elimination of the regulations pertaining to private ownership of gold became effective on that date. See Feldman v. Great Northern Railway Co., supra. It is apparent from the above discussion that the regulation of activities pertaining to the buying, selling and holding of gold by private citizens has always been a matter of national, rather than local, concern. The need for uniform regulation of matters relating to gold makes it one of those areas “of such a nature as to demand that, if regulated at all, .. . [its] regulation should be prescribed by a single authority.” Simpson v. Shepard, supra, 230 U.S. at 399, 33 S.Ct. at 739. In fact, the Court would be hard pressed to single out any other commodity having a greater impact upon not simply the national economy, but upon the economy of the entire world. Surely, the regulation of private dealings in gold is not an- area demanding diverse treatment in accordance with the special requirements of local conditions. That gold regulation is a matter of national interest is evident from the fact that Congress has historically regulated the area and continues to do so. Indeed, plaintiffs make a strong argument that Section 3(b) of Public Law 93-110, as amended by Section 2(b) of Public Law 93-373, has totally preempted the area relating to private ownership and dealing in gold so as to preclude, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, any attempt by the states to regulate gold. Public Law 93-110 recites that “no provision of any law . . . may be construed to prohibit any person from purchasing, holding, or otherwise dealing with gold in the United States or abroad.” (Emphasis added). Although Florida Statutes § 812.049 and § 812.051 do not expressly prohibit dealing in gold, they impose such. burdensome restrictions upon the secondhand precious metal market as to make it impossible, or at least impractical, for dealers to carry on their business. These restrictions, particularly the 15-day holding requirement, interfere with the broad national authority over the subjects of revenue, finance, and currency to an impermissible extent. See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., supra, 294 U.S. at 303, 55 S.Ct. at 414. Specifically, the Florida Statutes contravene the national policy reflected in Public Law 93-110 that private persons be free to buy, sell and otherwise deal in gold without restriction. As such, the challenged legislation is violative of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. As discussed supra, there are two alternative bases for finding state legislation to be constitutionally defective under the Commerce Clause. In addition to being invalid because it interferes in areas requiring uniform national regulation, the Florida legislation would appear to be defective for the additional reason that it directly burdens or disrupts the flow of interstate commerce. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, supra, 325 U.S. at 767-69, 65 S.Ct. at 1519-20 (and the cases cited therein); Simpson v. Shepard, supra, 230 U.S. at 399, 33 S.Ct. at 739. Plaintiffs allege that a substantial portion of the precious metals they deal in move in interstate commerce. The 15-day holding requirement found in Section-812.-051(5) will, according to plaintiffs, disrupt their interstate precious metal businesses in at least three respects: (1) the requirement will operate to virtually eliminate Florida’s numerous coin shows and all other precious metal transactions between Florida sellers and out-of-state buyers because an out-of-state buyer would not be able to remove any item of precious metal from the county in which it was purchased for a period of 15 days following the transaction; (2) the requirement will disrupt the practice of plaintiffs, and dealers similarly situated, whereby they typically relinquish their precious metal inventory to out-of-state wholesalers pursuant to a pre-arranged agreement; (3) the requirement will interfere with the practice of plaintiffs, and dealers similarly situated, of utilizing the FACTS teletype service to buy and sell coins and other items of precious metals in interstate channels. The severity of these disruptions will be accentuated, according to plaintiffs, by the fact that the price of gold and other precious metals fluctuates widely and rapidly on a day to day basis. The Court can take judicial notice of the instability of the world gold market, where a single political or economic event can cause the price of an ounce of gold to either soar or plummet. Fed.R.Evid. 201. Thus, a forced delay of even a few days in the transfer of precious metals could cause substantial losses to persons who deal in such goods. These allegations, if true, would appear to support a finding that the challenged legislation will operate to directly burden or disrupt the flow of interstate commerce. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing analysis, it appears likely that plaintiffs will succeed on the merits in their claim that Florida Statutes § 812.049 and § 812.051 are unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Fourth Amendment — Sections 812.051(1), (l)(a) and (l)(d) require that every junk dealer, scrap-metal processor, secondhand precious metal dealer and foundry keep a record of every purchase of metal, as defined in Section 812.049(3), which record shall contain the date of purchase and the name, address, signature and driver’s license number or some other identifying number of the person selling the item of metal. Sections 812.051(1) and (l)(b) require every junk dealer, scrap-metal, processor, secondhand precious metal dealer and foundry to keep a record of every purchase of precious metal, as defined in Section 812.049(4), which record shall contain the full name, residence address, home phone number, business phone number, place of employment, age, race, sex, signature, driver’s license number, an additional identifying number, and a photograph or thumb print of the person selling the item of precious metal. The record must also reflect the date of purchase and the quantity of the precious metal purchased. Sections 812.051(l)(d), (l)(e). Additionally, all purchase records must contain a general description of the type of any utility copper wire purchased and a specific description of any item of precious metal purchased. Section 812.051(l)(c). Section 812.051(2) provides that “[t]he records shall at all times be subject to inspection by all law enforcement officers and shall be preserved for a period of 3 years after purchase.” Section 812.051(3) provides that the records “shall be submitted to the sheriff of the county and the municipal police of the municipality in which the business is operated within 24 hours after purchase.” Section 812.051(5), which contains the 15 day holding requirement, provides that all items of precious metals “shall be made available for inspection by any law enforcement officer upon request.” Plaintiffs contend that Sections 812.051(2), (3) and (5) violate their rights under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court agrees. The Fourth Amendment issues raised by Sections 812.051(2), (3) and (5) present a hybrid of two distinct lines of case law that have emanated from the Supreme Court. On the one hand, there are the “administrative search” cases, the bottom line of which is that a search warrant must be obtained prior to conducting a regulatory inspection of either a dwelling or a business establishment. On the other hand, there are the “subpoena” cases, the bottom line of which is that, although they do not require a search warrant or a strict showing of probáble cause, subpoenas do implicate Fourth Amendment interests and are subject to a test of reasonableness. As will be developed more fully below, the statutory provisions enumerated above combine aspects of both of these law enforcement mechanisms without incorporating the protections afforded by either. It is appropriate to commence the analysis with a recognition of the basic purpose underlying the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment was designed “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials,” thereby giving “concrete expression to a right of the people which ‘is basic to a free society.’ ” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). Of course, it has long been established that corporations, as well as individuals, enjoy the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76, 26 S.Ct. 370, 379, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906); Peel v. United States, 316 F.2d 907, 910 (5th Cir. 1963). The guiding principle in effectuating the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment is that, except under certain narrowly defined circumstances, a search of private property without proper consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant. See, e. g., Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S. at 528-29, 87 S.Ct. at 1730-31; Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486, 84 S.Ct. 889, 891, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 1257, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, 72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951). Of all types of searches, perhaps the least intrusive is the so-called “administrative search.” These searches are generally conducted by persons charged with enforcing the code or regulations of a particular administrative agency. The purpose of the administrative search is to monitor and enforce compliance with regulatory schemes designed to promote the health and safety of various groups of persons. • Thus, the immediate object of such searches is unrelated to the furtherance of criminal investigations. Initially, this characterization of administrative searches as non-criminal in nature was employed to justify the rule that it was not necessary to obtain a search warrant in advance of such a search. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S.Ct. 804, 3 L.Ed.2d 877 (1959). In Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, the Supreme Court overruled the Frank decision to the extent it authorized regulatory searches of private dwellings without a search warrant. 387 U.S. at 534, 87 S.Ct. at 1733. The appellant in Camara had been charged with a criminal violation of the San Francisco Housing Code for refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence. Section 503 of the Code authorized such inspections, providing: Sec. 503 Right to Enter Building. Authorized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to perform any duty imposed upon them by the Municipal Code. 387 U.S. at 526, 87 S.Ct. at 1729. The Court, in holding that regulatory inspections of private dwellings are prohibited in the absence of a validly obtained search warrant, rejected the conclusion in Frank that administrative searches touch only peripherally upon Fourth Amendment interests because they are not part of a criminal investigation. While acknowledging that administrative searches constitute a “less hostile intrusion” then the typical search for evidence in a criminal case, the Court declined to accept the premise in Frank that such searches entail only de minimis adverse consequences for the subject of the search. [Ejven accepting Frank’s rather remarkable premise, inspections of the kind we are here considering do in fact jeopardize ‘self-protection’ interests of the. property owner. Like most regulatory laws, fire, health, and housing codes are enforced by criminal processes. In some cities, discovery of a violation by the inspector leads to a criminal complaint. Even in cities where discovery of a violation produces an administrative compliance order, refusal to comply is a criminal offense, and the fact of compliance is verified by a second inspection, again without a warrant. Finally, as this case demonstrates, refusal to permit inspection is itself a crime, punishable by fine or even jail sentence. 387 U.S. at 531, 87 S.Ct. at 1732. The crux of the Court’s concern in Camara was that, in the absence of a warrant requirement, persons subject to the inspecting agency’s jurisdiction would be left to the mercy of the field agent. The agent would be free to exercise unrestricted discretion in determining where, when and how he would conduct a search. The Court observed that, in the absence of a warrant requirement: [w]hen the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspector’s power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization. These are questions which may be reviewed by a neutral magistrate without any reassessment of the basic agency decision to canvass an area. Yet, only by refusing entry and risking a criminal conviction can the occupant at present challenge the inspector’s decision to search. And even if the occupant possesses sufficient fortitude to take the risk, as appellant did here, he may never learn any more about the reason for the inspection than that the law generally allows housing inspectors to gain entry. The practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. 387 U.S. at 532-33, 87 S.Ct. at 1732-33. The ultimate test in any search and seizure case is one of “reasonableness.” Probable cause, said the Court, is the standard by which a decision to search is measured against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. 387 U.S. at 534, 87 S.Ct. at 1733. However, while the Court rejected the criminal non-criminal distinction as it related to the necessity of obtaining a warrant prior to conducting an administrative search, it retained and relied upon such a distinction in setting a less stringent standard of probable cause in the context of administrative searches. In seeking a warrant to conduct an administrative search, it is not necessary to demonstrate specific knowledge of a violation within the particular dwelling to be searched. Rather, probable cause in this setting contemplates a showing that specific standards have been established to govern the process of selecting which premises will be searched and that those standards have been followed. 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S.Ct. at 1735. In the context of municipal housing code inspections, such standards may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building, or the condition of the area. 387 U.S. at 538, 87 S.Ct. at 1735. Only through this process — establishment of concrete standards and individualized review by a neutral magistrate to ensure that those standards have been followed — can we be sure that individuals will be protected from arbitrary intrusions onto their property by governmental officials. In See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed. 943 (1967), the companion case to Camara, the Supreme Court emphasized that the search warrant requirement applies not only to private dwellings, but to business establishments as well. The appellant in See had been convicted in state court for refusing to allow a city official to inspect his commercial warehouse for violations of the city’s fire code. The code authorized routine, periodic inspections of all buildings, except private dwellings, providing: Inspection of Buildings and Premises. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and any other ordinance concerning fire hazards. 387 U.S. at 541, 87 S.Ct. at 1738. The only question before the Court was whether the holding of Camara applied with equal force to inspections of commercial structures. The Court answered the question affirmatively, concluding that a search warrant was a necessary prerequisite to an administrative search of business premises. As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries onto his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant. 387 U.S. at 543, 87 S.Ct. at 1739. The Court has subsequently carved out an exception to the warrant requirement relating to administrative searches of so-called “pervasively regulated businesses.” In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970), the Court upheld the statutory authority granted to agents of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service to inspect facilities of licensed liquor dealers without a warrant, but held that the $500 fine provided for in the legislation constituted the sole penalty the government could impose for refusing to permit an agent to conduct an inspection. In other words, the Court held that the government agents were not permitted to forcibly enter appellant’s premises in the absence of a search warrant. 397 U.S. at 77, 90 S.Ct. at 777. In creating this limited exception to the warrant requirement, the Court relied upon the long history of pervasive governmental regulation of the liquor industry. The Court pointed out that a precursor of modern-day liquor legislation was enacted in England in 1660 and that in 1791, the year in which the Fourth Amendment was ratified, Congress passed legislation granting broad powers to federal officers to inspect the premises of liquor importers. The history of pervasive regulation of the liquor industry was found to be sufficient to support the power' of Congress to authorize warrantless inspections of premises where liquor is stored. The reasoning of Colonnade was carried over and applied to another pervasively regulated industry in United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972). In Biswell, the Court upheld the validity of a warrantless search conducted pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. Title 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) authorizes official entry during business hours of “the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition ... dealer ... for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be kept . .. and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such . . . dealer . . . . ” 406 U.S. at 311, 92 S.Ct. at 1594. Respondent, a pawn shop operator and a federally-licensed firearm dealer, was convicted of federal firearms violations after an inspection of his business premises turned up two sawed-off shotguns. In upholding the warrantless search, the Court focused upon the nature of respondent’s business and the fact that he was federally licensed to engage in such business. While acknowledging that regulation of the firearm industry is not as deeply rooted in history as is the regulation of the liquor industry, the Court noted the “central importance” of “close scrutiny” of firearm traffic in the federal campaign against violent crime. 406 U.S. at 315, 92 S.Ct. at 1596. Moreover, by seeking and obtaining a federal license to engage in firearm transactions, a dealer impliedly consents to be governed by the restrictions appertaining to such a business. Since each licensee is furnished annually with a revised compilation of regulations defining his obligations as a licensed dealer, he has only a limited expectation of privacy in matters relating to his firearm business. Thus, concluded the Court, warrantless inspections of a firearm dealer’s premises do not violate the Fourth Amendment. 406 U.S. at 316, 92 S.Ct. at 1596. In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed. 305 (1978), the Supreme Court made it clear that its decisions in Colonnade and Biswell constitute the exception, rather than the rule, regarding the search warrant requirement. Respondent was president and general manager of Barlow’s Inc., a business engaged in installing electrical and plumbing systems. Pursuant to Section 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 657(a), of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (hereinafter ‘OSHA’), an agent of the Secretary of Labor (hereinafter ‘Secretary’) sought to enter respondent’s premises to conduct a safety inspection. Respondent refused to admit the OSHA inspector, stating that he was relying upon his rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment. The Secretary sought and obtained an order in federal court compelling respondent to admit the inspector. Respondent again refused to permit the inspection and petitioned the federal court for his own injunctive relief. The case was heard by a three-judge court which entered an order declaring the statutory authorization for warrantless searches to be unconstitutional. 436 U.S. at 310, 98 S.Ct. at 1819. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the Secretary’s argument that the case was controlled by the decisions in Colonnade and Biswell. Certain industries have such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy [citing case] could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise. Liquor (Colonnade) and firearms (Biswell) are industries of this type; when an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulations. Industries such as these fall within the ‘certain carefully defined classes of cases’ referenced in Camara, supra, 387 U.S., at 528, 87 S.Ct. at 1731, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 [1727]. The element that distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close government supervision, of which any person who choses to enter such a business must already be aware. ‘A central difference between those cases [Colonnade and Bis-well] and this one is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade, where the petitioner here was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business. The businessman in a regulated industry in effect consents to the restrictions placed upon him.’ Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2538, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated industry of the type involved in Colonnade and Biswell is the exception. The Secretary would make it the rule. 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S.Ct. at 1820 (Emphasis added). The Secretary had argued that, pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Act of 1936, 41 U.S.C. § 35 et seq., all employers involved in interstate commerce have long been subject to close scrutiny and supervision regarding their health and safety practices. The Court dismissed this broad-brush attempt to sweep all businesses engaged in interstate commerce within the narrow exception to the warrant requirement created in the “pervasively regulated businesses” cases. Once again, the Court emphasized that a search warrant requirement was necessary to protect citizens from the “almost unbridled discretion” of executive and administrative officers, particularly those agents in the field, in determining when and where to search. 436 U.S. at 323, 98 S.Ct. at 1825. Prior to reaching the merits of the Fourth Amendment challenge to the relevant provisions of Section 812.051, it is necessary to explore another line of cases that touches upon the Fourth Amendment issues raised herein. The relevance of these cases, involving the relationship of the Fourth Amendment to subpoenas for the production of tangible objects, arises from the fact that the “search and seizure” provisions of Section 812.051 do not present a true “administrative search” situation. Rather, they combine features of an administrative search with features of a forced production of tangible objects akin to a subpoena duces tecum. It was established long ago that subpoenas, while not subject to a literal test of probable cause, are nevertheless controlled by the Fourth Amendment. Hale v. Henkel, supra, 201 U.S. at 76, 26 S.Ct. at 376; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 14 S.Ct. 1125, 38 L.Ed. 1047 (1894); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886). The test, as in all Fourth Amendment cases, is one of “reasonableness,” and, although the precise standard varies as between corporations and individuals, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable subpoenas extend to corporations as well as to individuals. See v. City of Seattle, supra, 387 U.S. at 544, 87 S.Ct. at 1739; Siverthorne Lumber Co. Inc. v. United States, supra, 251 U.S. at 392, 40 S.Ct. at 182; Hale v. Henkel, supra, 201 U.S. at 76, 26 S.Ct. at 379; Peel v. United States, supra, 316 F.2d at 910. A subpoena ordering the production of corporate books and records or other tangible objects that is not sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See v. City of Seattle, supra, 387 U.S. at 544, 87 S.Ct. at 1739; see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652, 70 S.Ct. 357, 368, 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209, 66 S.Ct. 494, 505, 90 L.Ed. 614 (1946); Hale v. Henkel, supra, 201 U.S. at 76, 26 S.Ct. at 379. Two features of a subpoena for the production of books and records or other tangible objects operate to protect against arbitrary governmental intrusions into otherwise private corporate or individual domains. First, while the standard of probable cause required to support a subpoena is extremely minimal as compared with that required to support a search warrant in a criminal investigation, some protection is afforded by the directive that subpoenas be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive. The primary protection afforded by the subpoena process, however, is the fact that it cannot be enforced by the agent in the field, but only upon order of court following judicial review. See v. City of Seattle, supra, 387 U.S. at 544, 87 S.Ct. at 1739; see generally 1 W. Ringel Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 14.2 (1980). The right to a hearing on a motion to quash prior to complying with a subpoena affords an individual or a corporation the same basic protection afforded by the warrant requirement, i.e., review of the agency action by a neutral, independent judicial officer. In the typical on-site search situation, subsequent judicial review would be futile, coming at a time when the damage has already been done. On the other hand, because there is no immediate intrusion in the typical subpoena case, subsequent judicial review provides an adequate safeguard against unlawful intrusions. This essential distinction between on-premises searches and subpoenas for the production of tangible objects justifies the fundamental “trade-off” in the respective showings that must be made prior to obtaining a search warrant and a subpoena. Turning to the specifics of the instant case, it is apparent, as already noted, that the challenged provisions of Section 812.051 do not precisely fit the