Full opinion text
TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction page 927 I. Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction page 928 II. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint page 930 III. Jurisdiction Over Claims of Amended Complaint page 931 A. Allegations of Complaint, as Amended, and Claims for Relief page 931 1. Part VII of Amended Complaint page 931 2. Part VIII of Amended Complaint page 932 B. Jurisdictional Bases Offered by Plaintiff Class page 933 C. Structure of Jurisdiction Discussion page 934 D. Are the Claims in the Amendments to the Complaint Cognizable Under the Convention and Protocol? page 934 E. Judicial Review of Final Exclusion Orders page 935 1. Finality page 935 2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies page 936 3. Conclusion page 939 F, Claim of Entitlement to Remand to INS for Classwide Hearing Based on New, Material Evidence page 939 1. Corblan page 939 2. Plaintiffs’ Claim page 939 3. The Government’s Response page 941 4. Futility of Exhausting Individual Administrative Remedies page 941 5. Merits of Plaintiffs’ Claim page 943 6. Lack of Jurisdiction page 943 G. Propriety of Classwide Review of Final, Exhausted Exclusion Orders page 945 IV. Proceedings Contemplated After Appeal page 947 V. The Injunction page 947 VI. Certification for Interlocutory Appeal page 948 Conclusion page 948 SHOOB, District Judge. INTRODUCTION The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has remanded these complex consolidated cases with this instruction: Since we find it imperative for the district court to resolve the question of its jurisdiction, we remand this case with the direction that it conduct forthwith only such hearing as is necessary to a determination of whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Such hearing should be conducted without any discovery as to issues other than that of jurisdiction. Upon the conclusion of such hearing, the district court shall enter an opinion setting forth the reasons for its decision. To the extent, if any, that the appellees have altered the nature of the relief sought in their amended complaint, the district court shall specify the exact nature of the claim or claims as to which jurisdiction is now alleged to reside in the district court. The question of subject matter jurisdiction shall then be certified to this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), upon request by any party. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 431 (11th Cir. 1982). The mandate of the Eleventh Circuit was made the judgment of this Court on March 10,1982. On the same day, a separate order was filed establishing a briefing schedule and setting a hearing. On March 16, 1982, oral argument. was heard on the question of this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Additional briefs were filed, as requested by the Court, and the question which the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate requires this Court to answer is now ripe for decision. This order and opinion is filed to comply with the mandate. In addition to the Court’s ruling on its subject matter jurisdiction over the class’ refugee and asylum claims in Part III of this order, this order (1) discusses the Court’s jurisdiction over the habeas corpus portion of the action; (2) grants plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint; (3) sets forth the limited proceedings presently envisioned by the Court upon the return of this litigation from the Court of Appeals in the event this Court’s jurisdiction over the second portion of the case is upheld; (4) continues in effect the temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo pending appellate review, and defers ruling on the government’s motion to dissolve the injunction and on plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction; and (5) upon request by the government, certifies this order and opinion for immediate interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit’s mandate. I. Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction Named plaintiff Moisés Garcia Mir filed his original class action complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas on January 8, 1981. Styled a complaint “For Declaratory Judgment, Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions,” the complaint alleged that the continued detention of plaintiff and those similarly situated violated both United States municipal law and international law. Plaintiff Mir further alleged that defendant had not afforded him a procedurally adequate hearing on the question whether he should suffer further detention. Plaintiff and his class prayed for a declaratory judgment that continued incarceration would violate both domestic and international law, and for a preliminary and permanent injunction compelling defendant to (a) release plaintiff and his class or (b) conduct procedurally adequate hearings to determine whether continued detention of plaintiff and his class is warranted, by a finding that the detainee is likely to abscond, is a threat to the security of the United States, or is a serious threat to persons or property in the United States. Thus, the complaint as originally filed in Civil Action No. C81-938A was essentially a habeas corpus petition on behalf of a class. (While the class was not certified until after the case was transferred to Georgia, Judge Rogers of the Kansas district court indicated in his order of transfer that, in his opinion, the requirements of Rule 23 had been met. Order of May 12, 1981, pages 3-12.) After the case was transferred to this district court, the focus of plaintiff class’ habeas claims became whether the Attorney General, acting through Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) District Directors, had abused his discretion on a classwide basis by denying or revoking parole. Very shortly after this Court’s decision in Soroa-Gonzales v. Civiletti, supra, named plaintiff Rafael Fernandez-Roque brought his action on behalf of a class of all Cuban detainees at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary who were excludable solely on the basis of lack of entry papers, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20). Civil Action No. C81-1084A, filed June 5, 1981. Because the FernandezRoque class would have been a subclass of the Garcia-Mir class, the two actions were consolidated. Order of the Court, July 14, 1981. The third of these three lawsuits, Orlando Chao-Estrada v. Smith, Civil Action No. C81-1350A, was filed by an individual detainee on July 17,1981, and consolidated with the two class actions by order dated July 24, 1981. On August 7, 1981, on plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification, this Court conditionally certified a class of all Cuban nationals incarcerated at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary who arrived in this country as part of the “Freedom Flotilla” of 1980. 91 F.R.D. 117, 122-24; modified at 91 F.R.D. 239, 240, n. 1. The Court also certified twelve subclasses, and issued a series of show cause orders to the government. At the first hearing on August 17, 1981, the government failed to show sufficient cause why members of subclasses (1) and (2) should not be released. The Court then issued the writ of habeas corpus to the 226 detainee class members in subclasses (1) and (2). 91 F.R.D. 239, 243. These detainees were to be released on parole as soon as they were approved for sponsorship or resettlement by the United States Catholic Conference, or by any of the other ten agencies within the American Council of Volunteer Agencies. The Court also ordered the release on the same terms of 155 detainees as to whom the government announced on August 17, 1982, in open court, that it had no further objections to release. Subsequently, the Court modified its order to permit the government to perform its own review of the cases of the 226 members of subclasses (1) and (2), under the Attorney General’s “Status Review Plan.” See order of this Court dated August 21, 1981. Since that date, the Court has issued no further orders granting writs of habeas corpus. In effect, litigation of plaintiff class’ habeas corpus petition has been deferred while the Attorney General re-exercised his parole discretion by expeditiously conducting a Status Review of each detainee. The process is now very nearly complete. As of April 5, 1982, the government has determined that of the approximately 1,800 original class members, each detained for a minimum of fifteen months, 1,133 may be released. The government has determined that these 1,133 Cuban nationals are (1) presently non-violent, (2) likely to remain non-violent, and (3) unlikely to commit any criminal offenses after release. See Exhibit 4 to Defendants’ Status Report on the Progress of Implementing the Attorney General’s “Status Review Plan and Procedures,” filed August 17, 1981. Of the 1,133 detainees determined to be releasable, 867 have actually been released to sponsors (arranged, for the most part, by the United States Catholic Conference). 266 detainees are presently at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary awaiting sponsors. The Status Review Plan has also resulted in a government recommendation for continued detention for 636 Cubans. A few dozen detainees have not yet received final decisions. Unfortunately, five Cuban detainees have been killed while in detention at the Penitentiary; the last one murdered a few weeks ago, age 24, had been approved for release and was simply waiting for a sponsor. During the past six months as the government’s Status Review Plan was proceeding, the time and effort of the Court and counsel for both sides has been directed primarily towards resettlement efforts. Now that the Plan has been completed for each detainee class member, counsel for plaintiff class are reviewing the files of the detainees to determine whether or not, after the Attorney General has exercised his parole authority a second time, there may exist new or different classwide bases for challenging the detention of the 636 slated for continued incarceration. Should their search bear fruit, further litigation of the classwide habeas petition will result. If not, it probably will be necessary for the Court to decertify the class as to habeas corpus issues, and to dismiss that portion of the complaint, without prejudice to the right of individual detainees to file their own habeas corpus petitions. In sum, this Court has previously considered its jurisdiction over habeas aspects of this case and has concluded that it has subject matter jurisdiction. II. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend the Complaint As noted above, the Eleventh Circuit asked this Court to “specify the exact nature of the claim or claims as to which jurisdiction is now alleged to reside in the district court,” if plaintiff class has “altered the nature of the relief sought in [the] amended complaint.” Fernandez-Roque, supra, 671 F.2d 426 at 432. Using the remand as a further opportunity to refine their claims, plaintiffs on March 12, 1982 filed a (third) motion to amend their complaint. Defendants responded that they had no objection to the amendment. See Defendants’ Response to Motion to Amend Complaint, filed March 15, 1982. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to amend the complaint is GRANTED. The substance of this amendment and the amendments permitted by the Court’s order of August 7, 1981 are discussed in Part III of this order, below. III. Jurisdiction Over Claims of Amended Complaint A. Allegations of Complaint, as Amended, and Claims for Relief The portions of the complaint at issue here (amendments allowed by this order, Part II, supra, and by order of the Court dated August 7, 1981, 91 F.R.D. 117, 119-20) are Parts VII (¶¶ 30-41 of the amended complaint) and VIII (¶¶ 42-53 of the amended complaint). Part VII of the amended complaint and its exhibits served as a basis for the Court’s temporary restraining order of August 19, 1981. Part VIII of the amended complaint brings plaintiff class’ pleadings into line with the arguments and representations of counsel at oral argument before the Court of Appeals. 1. Part VII of Amended Complaint. In their amendment filed July 8, 1981, plaintiffs alleged for the first time that they are “refugees,” as that term is defined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Convention”), opened for signature July 28, 1951, entered into force April 21,1954,189 U.N.T.S. 137, and incorporated by reference in the 1962 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”), signed January 31, 1967, entered into force October 4,1967,19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268 (entered into force for the United States, November 1, 1968). A refugee under these treaties is any person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” Convention, Article l.A.(2); Protocol, Article I.l. Plaintiffs base their claim that they are refugees on their contention that, as members of a large group of Cubans who left their country voluntarily from Mariel Harbor in the spring and summer of 1980, they would suffer imprisonment, torture and death if returned to Cuba involuntarily by the United States. Plaintiffs support their claim, in part, with the United States Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, at pages 397-408, regarding Cuba (Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 2, 1981); with the affidavits of 14 “Marielitos” who voluntarily returned to Cuba but were badly mistreated there and then east adrift in small boats between Florida and Cuba; and with statements of officials of the government concerning conditions in Cuba. (Plaintiffs contend that additional facts support their claims and have sought to make discovery of those facts.) Plaintiffs contend that the very fact that they are “Marielitos,” that is, members of a social group comprised of members who left Cuba voluntarily in the “Freedom Flotilla” during the spring and summer of 1980, would surely lead to their persecution if they are returned involuntarily to Cuba. They thus claim to be “social group refugees.” In general terms, plaintiffs contend that their status as refugees obliges defendants to accord them their rights under the Convention and Protocol. In particular, plaintiffs contend they are entitled to the protection of Article 31(1), which prohibits the government from imposing “penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.” Plaintiffs claim that their indeterminate, continued incarceration violates Article 31 of the Convention. Finally, Part VII of the amended complaint alleges that there is no administrative remedy under U.S. law to protect refugees from Article 31 violations; thus, exhaustion cannot be required. As relief under Part VII of the complaint, plaintiffs seek their immediate release or, in the alternative, “a procedurally adequate hearing to determine: (1) whether each Cuban national so incarcerated has committed a capital crime or a grave punishable act, and if not, (2) whether each Cuban national so incarcerated would be a national security risk or a risk to the public order,” ¶ 41 of plaintiffs’ amended complaint. 2. Part VIII of Amended Complaint. This portion of the complaint as amended alleges that plaintiffs, as a class, are “refugees” as that term is defined in the Convention and Protocol, and further, that plaintiffs as a class are “asylees” as that term is defined in the Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1101(a)(42). They thus claim the protection of the Convention and Protocol. Part VIII of the amended complaint relies more particularly on Article 33 of the Convention, entitled “Prohibition of expulsion or return” (“Refoulement”), which states: 1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. Plaintiffs claim that their return to Cuba would violate Article 33 of the Convention, as implemented in § 203(e) of the Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1). Plaintiffs claim thát they cannot be deported back to Cuba “unless it is determined, after balancing the degree of persecution with the degree of criminality, that Plaintiffs are exempted from Article 33 relief or 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) relief,” ¶ 50 of the amended complaint. Plaintiffs further allege that each class'^ member has applied with an INS District1 Director for asylum/withholding of deportation, and that each application was de- j nied. Plaintiffs claim that each class mem-1 ber reapplied for asylum/withholding of de-/ portation once exclusion proceedings were commenced, and that each reapplication was denied by an immigration judge after a hearing. Plaintiffs allege that final orders of exclusion were entered for all class members. Finally, plaintiffs claim that no bar to this cause of action is presented by the doctrine that administrative remedies must be exhausted. “Requiring further exhaustion in the form of individual administrative motions to reopen is inadequate,” ¶ 51 of the amended complaint. As relief under this cause of action, plaintiffs “seek judicial review of all final orders of exclusion which have been entered denying class members’ applications for asylum/withholding of deportation, and a remand to the administrative agency with appropriate instructions.” Plaintiffs have not specifically prayed that each final order of exclusion be set aside. Nor have plaintiffs alleged any basis (such as procedural inadequacy or the like; see Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F.Supp. 442 (S.D.Fla.1980) (appeal pending)) for setting aside, under the appropriate standard of review, the final orders of exclusion entered against class members. The primary relief sought by plaintiffs is the opportunity to present their claim that they are refugees and asylees, on a classwide basis. This is discussed in greater detail below. B. Jurisdictional Bases Offered by Plaintiff Class The original Mir class action complaint filed in Kansas alleged that the district court had jurisdiction to hear the claims of Mir and his class pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction), 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (mandamus jurisdiction), and 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (jurisdiction over cases arising under Title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq.). By the amendment to the Mir complaint allowed by the Court’s order of August 7, 1981, 91 F.R.D. at 119-20, habeas corpus was made an additional basis for federal jurisdiction. The FernandezRoque complaint set forth as its bases for jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and 8 U.S.C. § 1329. Finally, plaintiffs’ most recent amendment to their complaint adds for the first time the jurisdictional provision in 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b). Those of the above bases of jurisdiction which pertain to the refugee and asylum claims of the class are discussed at greater length below. C. Structure of Jurisdiction Discussion In the remainder of Part III of this order the Court will first examine the claims of plaintiffs in their amended complaint to determine whether any are made directly under the Convention and Protocol, or whether the claims of the class are made under United States legislation which implemented the provisions of these international agreements. Second, the Court will discuss its jurisdiction over what it regards as plaintiffs’ first claim for relief under the amended complaint, that the Court should review and set aside the final orders of exclusion entered against class members. Included in this discussion will be treatment of finality and the exhaustion requirement. Third, the Court will discuss its jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ second claim for relief under the amended complaint, the claim that plaintiffs are entitled to a remand to the INS for a classwide hearing, based on new and material evidence, on the question of persecution based on plaintiffs’ membership in the Freedom Flotilla social group. Finally, the Court will discuss subject matter jurisdiction, its “power to declare the law,” with reference to the class of plaintiffs. D. Are the Claims in the Amendments to the Complaint Cognizable Under the Convention and Protocol? Plaintiff class makes claims under two provisions of the Convention, Articles 31 and 33. Article 31 of the Convention prevents Contracting States from imposing penalties on refugees on account of their illegal entry or presence in the Contracting State, and from applying unnecessary restrictions to the movements of such refugees. Assuming, for the moment, that plaintiffs have properly made a claim for relief under Article 31, and that Article 31 is “self-executing,” the penalty being imposed, the restriction on plaintiffs’ movement, is incarceration. The legality of plaintiffs’ detention, measured under municipal law or under the Protocol, is not at issue here and is best dealt with as part of the habeas corpus portion of this case. The Court need not determine at this juncture whether plaintiffs have stated a claim under Article 31 not already cognizable under municipal law. As for Article 33 (prohibition against “re-fouler”), its crucial terms are incorporated in 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) in mandatory language. There is no significant difference between the provisions of Article 33 and those of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). Thus plaintiffs have made no claim actionable directly under the provisions of the Convention and Protocol. This makes it unnecessary for the Court to determine whether Articles 31 and 33 are self-executing. All of plaintiffs’ claims for relief at issue here are cognizable under municipal law, and the jurisdictional decisions of this Court shall reflect that determination. E. Judicial Review of Final Exclusion Orders 1. Finality. The most recent figures for the stages at which plaintiffs find themselves in INS exclusion proceedings are found at page 25 of the Brief for Appellants before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Statistics compiled by the INS, see Add. 319, establish that: all 1813 Cuban detainees as of August 24, 1981, at the Atlanta Penitentiary filed claims for asylum, with all applicants being interviewed by the INS; that 97% (1752 of 1813) of those asylum applications have so far been forwarded to the Department of State for an advisory opinion, with 86% of those forwarded (1515 of 1752) being returned with an opinion; that of the 1515 returned by the Department of State the district director has denied asylum in 1408 cases, with decisions pending in the balance of the cases; and the immigration judges have completed 1700 exclusion hearings and rendered 1640 decisions thus far; that the immigration judges have denied asylum and ordered the aliens excluded in 1602 eases while granting 38 class members asylum. Of the 1640 decisions entered by the immigration judges 580, or more than one third, have been appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In contrast, more than 1000 of the petitioners have decided not to appeal their order denying them asylum to the Board. Of the 38 aliens granted asylum by the immigration judges, the INS has appealed 50%, or 19 cases, to the Board, Add. 317 ¶ 12. Of the 580 decisions appealed to the Board, decisions have been issued in 150 cases, with the balance still before the Board. In terms of the finality of their exclusion orders, plaintiffs may be broken down into four groups: (1) those plaintiffs who have not received final orders of exclusion from an immigration judge (“IJ”) after an exclusion hearing; (2) those plaintiffs who have had final orders of exclusion entered against them by an IJ, and who have not appealed that final decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”); (3) those plaintiffs who have had final orders of exclusion entered against them by an IJ, who have appealed to the BIA and whose final orders of exclusion have been affirmed on appeal; and (4) those plaintiffs who have had final orders of exclusion entered against them by an IJ, who have appealed to the BIA and who are waiting for a decision. The first group should by now contain only a few of the plaintiffs. The second group, as of August 24, 1981, contained about 1,022 plaintiffs. They have had final orders of exclusion entered against them and have no administrative remedy other than a motion to reopen. The question whether they have exhausted their administrative remedies is discussed below; however, there is no question that there is a final order of exclusion against these 1,022, enforceable but for this proceeding. As for the third group of approximately 150, they have absolutely final exclusion decisions, enforceable but for this proceeding. Their only remedy within the administrative scheme is a motion to reopen. As for the final group of roughly 430, their individual orders of exclusion are final but will not be “enforceable” until each appeal is decided against the plaintiff by the BIA. 2. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) provides, in pertinent part: (c) Exhaustion of administrative remedies or departure from United States; disclosure of prior judicial proceedings. An order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as of right under the immigration laws and regulations or if he has departed from the United States after the issuance of the order. The remainder of this section of Part III of this order reviews the applicability of this statute and the cases to the four groups of plaintiffs as defined in the preceding section vis a vis the plaintiffs’ prayer that the Court review the exclusion orders of the class. (a) As for the small first group of plaintiffs, there is no exclusion order for the Court to review. These plaintiffs have no cognizable claim at all. Since some plaintiffs might be granted asylum, some plaintiffs in this group may never have final exclusion orders entered against them. (b) The group of roughly 1,022 plaintiffs who have had final orders of exclusion entered against them by the IJ, but did not appeal those orders to the BIA, presents the most troublesome issues. It was in connection with this group that plaintiffs made their “proffer of proof” at the hearing this Court held after remand. Plaintiffs offered to prove the following facts in connection with the failure of these class members to appeal. (1) All class members speak Spanish as their native language; very few have any command of English. (2) No class members were able to afford a lawyer; not even a tenth of them were represented by counsel (on a pro bono basis) at their exclusion hearings. (3) The overwhelming majority of the more than 1,000 plaintiffs who failed to appeal to the BIA actually had no lawyer. (4) The majority of the plaintiffs who failed to appeal to the BIA did not understand the consequences of that failure. (5) The consequences of their failure to appeal was not explained to the plaintiffs who failed to appeal. Another factor in mitigation of this group of plaintiffs’ failure to appeal to the BIA is the extremely abbreviated time frame for the taking of an appeal to the BIA from an order of exclusion, either written or oral, entered by an IJ. Plaintiffs argue that the failure of this second group to appeal to the BIA should not preclude judicial review, despite the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c). They contend that the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before judicial review is undertaken has two elements. The first is jurisdictional and nonwaivable: the petitioner must at a minimum have presented his or her claim to the agency. Plaintiffs maintain that those in this second group have done so, and in fact, have each presented his asylum claim to an INS District Director and to an IJ. The second element, that every administrative remedy must be exhausted, is flexible and waivable, according to plaintiffs, and the statutory exhaustion requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) should not be enforced against these plaintiffs-in light of plaintiffs’ factual proffer. Plaintiffs further argue that they should not be forced to exhaust the “motion to reopen” administrative remedy for a variety of reasons. This argument, however, does not deal directly with the validity of the final orders of exclusion already entered, but rather goes to the question of the Court’s jurisdiction to grant the sort of relief granted in Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977). In Coriolan the Fifth Circuit reversed an INS decision to deny asylum and remanded the case to the INS for reconsideration based on new evidence. Plaintiffs claim here that there is also new evidence, that the case should be remanded, and that exhaustion of the demonstrably inadequate motion to reopen remedy should not be required. However, the Court’s jurisdiction to set aside final orders of exclusion and to remand to the INS based on new and material evidence is not invoked under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b), but is based on the Court’s authority to grant Coriolan type relief, and is discussed in Part III.F. of this order, below. The government’s argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the final orders of exclusion entered against this group is more straightforward, and may be summarized as follows. (1) An appeal from an IJ’s final order of exclusion to the BIA is an “administrative remedy available to ex-cludable aliens as of right under the immigration laws and regulations.” 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c). (2) If an alien has not exhausted his administrative remedies, his order of exclusion “shall not be reviewed by any court." (3) When exhaustion is required by statute, “the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional and the district court must dismiss the action.” Eluska v. Andrus, 587 F.2d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 1978). (4) This principle is particularly applicable in exclusion cases: “[wjhatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry into the United States, it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the government to exclude a given alien.” United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543, 70 S.Ct. 309, 312, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950). (5) Though the law in this area is “not generous,” and though its application to these plaintiffs may be unfair, the remedy lies with Congress. Thus runs the government’s argument. In the face of the clear language of the statute, and the very narrow authority of the courts in this area generally, this Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to review any orders of exclusion except those entered against plaintiffs who appealed the decision of the immigration judge to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and whose final orders of exclusion were affirmed by the BIA. Samala v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 336 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1964); Hernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 539 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus, this second group is not entitled to judicial review of the exclusion orders entered against them. (c) There is no question that the third group of plaintiffs has complied with the 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) exhaustion requirement. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is no bar to this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction to review the final exclusion orders of this group. (d) While the members of the fourth group are under final órders of exclusion, they have not “exhausted” their remedies until an adverse decision is rendered by the BIA. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) prevents this Court from reviewing the orders of exclusion of those plaintiffs awaiting BIA decisions, on their appeals. 3. Conclusion. In sum, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) makes it clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to review any orders of exclusion (which deny asylum claims) other than orders of exclusion entered by immigration judges and affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Whether it is appropriate to review the final orders of exclusion of this group of approximately 150 (group (c), above) on a classwide basis is discussed in Part III.G. of this order, below. F. Claim of Entitlement to Remand to INS for Classwide Hearing Based on New Evidence 1. Coriolan. The primary relief sought by plaintiffs in this part of the case is the type granted by the Fifth Circuit in Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra. In Coriolan, two Haitian nationals petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of final deportation orders entered against them. The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 2342. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals first critically reviewed the decisions of the immigration judges insofar as they denied petitioners’ request to withhold deportation because of the risk of persecution, but then concluded that it was not necessary to decide whether those decisions amounted to abuse of discretion. Coriolan, 559 F.2d at 1002. Noting the Haitians’ proffer of additional material relevant to their claims in the form of an Amnesty International report, the Court of Appeals reversed the INS decisions and remanded “for a reconsideration of the claims of Bonannee and Coriolan in light of the Amnesty International report.” Id. at 1004. The statutory basis for the Court of Appeals’ remand of the case was 28 U.S.C. § 2347(e), which provides: If a party to a proceeding to review applies to the court of appeals in which the proceeding is pending for leave to adduce additional evidence and shows to the satisfaction of the court that— (1) the additional evidence is material; and (2) there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence before the agency; the court may order the additional evidence and any counterevidence the opposite party desires to offer to be taken by the agency. The agency may modify its findings of fact, or make new findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and may modify or set aside its order, and shall file in the court the additional evidence, the modified findings or new findings, and the modified order or the order setting aside the original order. The Court of Appeals was convinced that Amnesty International’s report on the general conditions in Haiti was material to the claims of the two individual Haitians. While the reasonableness of the failure to adduce the report before the INS was “more doubtful,” the appellate court took-note of an affidavit that counsel for the Haitians did not have the report until after the BIA affirmed the immigration judges’ decisions. “In this context, a refusal to accept the petitioners’ excuse as reasonable would virtually read this remand provision out of the statute.” Id. at 1004. As for petitioners’ failure to file an administrative motion to reopen with the INS, the court commented that “[i]f failure to utilize the provisions for reopening is fatal to a claim for relief under § 2347(c), then it would seem that there could never be such relief.” Id. In dictum, the court indicated that it would be “remiss to launch this case on a lengthy procedural voyage” by requiring petitioners to move to reopen proceedings. It did so in light of its determination that the report was so material and so significant that a refusal to reopen would likely be an abuse of discretion, reviewable, and reversable, by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 1004. 2. Plaintiffs’ Claim. Plaintiffs have framed their request for relief under the rationale of Coriolan as follows. First, Plaintiffs suggested that the Court hear evidence and determine for itself on the merits whether Plaintiffs as a class have a well-founded fear of persecution based on membership in the Freedom Flotilla. Plaintiffs suggested that this relief was appropriate because the issue was particularly suited for class relief, class relief was not being made available administratively, and individual administrative relief on this issue was futile and inadequate. In the alternative, Plaintiffs suggested that the Court could remand the issue of class-wide asylum to the INS with instructions to create a fair and workable administrative mechanism to handle a class-wide reopened asylum claim. As a third alternative, Plaintiffs suggested a traditional remand, for individual redeterminations on the issue of asylum based on membership in a social group. Letter of counsel for plaintiffs to the Court, March 15, 1982, page three. It is clear that what plaintiffs seek is not a review of final denials of asylum, but another chance to prove their claim of entitlement to asylum under a procedure which allows it to be proven on a classwide basis. That being the case, jurisdiction over this claim cannot lie under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 2241; rather, jurisdiction lies, if at all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1329. Plaintiffs seek the opportunity to show that they have new and material evidence pertaining to the possible persecution of the Freedom Flotilla social group as a class. If they succeed in that showing, plaintiffs seek (1) a remand to the INS for a reopened, unified asylum proceeding for all plaintiffs, and particularly for those plaintiffs who have had final orders of exclusion entered against them; and (2) an injunction against the return of plaintiffs to Cuba while the remand occurs. An injunction would be authorized, plaintiffs claim, either by plaintiffs’ prevailing on their motion for a preliminary injunction, or by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Plaintiffs also allege that they need not exhaust the administrative remedy appropriate when new and material information is discovered, since (1) the filing of individual motions to reopen would be futile in that such a remedy is wholly inadequate, and (2) “exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required when ‘the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy . .. [is] for all practical purposes identical with the merits of [the plaintiff’s] lawsuit.’ Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 575, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973).” Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63 n.10, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2648 n.10, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979). Plaintiffs also rely on the Coriolan dicta, that the Court would be remiss to send this case on such a long procedural voyage when to deny the motion to reopen would clearly be an abuse of discretion. 3. The Government’s Response. In response, the government contends (1) that Coriolan was wrongly decided and lies outside the lines of established authority dealing with immigration matters; (2) that in any case, the statutory authority for the court of appeals to remand the case, 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c), which came directly from its authority to review a final order of deportation, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a), is not available to a district court in an exclusion case; (3) that there is in fact no jurisdictional basis for the Court to grant the relief sought by plaintiff; (4) that the motion to reopen administrative remedy is available, adequate, and must be exhausted; (5) that a classwide asylum hearing is neither permitted nor prohibited by U. S. legislation or regulations, and thus the classwide motion to reopen should be made in the first instance to the INS to allow the agency to exercise its expertise; and (6) the determinations made by the government require individual factual determinations, not class-wide hearings. That, in sum, is the government’s response to plaintiffs’ admittedly novel Coriolan claim. 4. Futility of Exhausting Individual Administrative Remedies. Plaintiffs’ claim that this Court should exercise subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1329, over the claim that plaintiffs are entitled to a classwide remand and hearing before the INS, is compelling in many respects. The contention that the Court should cut through the administrative forms and go to the substance of the dispute, as in Coriolan, is supported by the futility and impossibility of exhausting the appropriate administrative remedies on an individual basis. It should be noted also that the statutory exhaustion requirement of 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) is not applicable; thus, if subject matter jurisdiction were to lie under 8 U.S.C. § 1329, the ordinary, more flexible principles of the judicial exhaustion requirements would apply. The administrative remedy available here — individual motions to reopen — is hopelessly inadequate. It is Hornbook law that administrative remedies need not be exhausted when the prescribed administrative remedy is plainly inadequate because either no remedy is available, the available remedy will not give relief commensurate with the claim, or the remedy would be so unreasonably delayed as to create a serious risk of irreparable injury. Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. granted,--U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 88, 70 L.Ed.2d 81 (1981). The court in Patsy elaborated on what it meant by “adequate” and “appropriate” remedies in the context of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, an orderly system of review or appeal must be provided by statute or written agency rule. Second, the agency must be able to grant relief more or less commensurate with the claim. Third, relief must be available within a reasonable period of time. Fourth, the procedures must be fair, and not unduly burdensome, and must not be used to harass or otherwise discourage those with legitimate claims. Fifth, interim relief must be available, in appropriate cases, to prevent irreparable injury and to preserve the litigant’s rights under section 1983 until the administrative process has been concluded. Patsy, supra, 634 F.2d at 912-13. The individual motion to reopen remedy clearly fails the second, fourth and fifth tests under Patsy. (a) Second test. While the INS is “able to grant relief more or less commensurate with the claim,” individual motions to reopen could not result in a grant of such relief. Motions to reopen filed by each class member would be tantamount to conceding the issue whether a hearing should be held on a classwide basis in favor of the government. (b) Fourth test. It is obvious that the. administrative procedures presently in use are hopelessly inadequate to deal with the claims of the plaintiffs. Both the Attorney General and Ms. Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, in their statements before Congressional subcommittees, recognized the deficiencies in the system. Attorney General William French Smith, noting the vast increase in asylum applications caused, in large measure, by the influx of Cubans and Haitians, testified that “[i]n the face of these circumstances, our policies and procedures for dealing with asylum applicants, which have been generous and deliberate, have crumbled under the burden of overwhelming numbers.” Administration’s Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, and the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Congress, 1st Session 75 (July 30, 1981). INS Commissioner Doris M. Meissner has likewise stated, “[bjecause we have suddenly become a country of first asylum, our policies and procedures, which have been generous and deliberate, have proved inadequate to deal with these overwhelming numbers.” United States as a Country of Mass First Asylum: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Congress, 1st Session 16 (July 31, 1981). Counsel for the government conceded that there was “some confusion” regarding administrative procedures for motions to reopen. To expect compliance with these confusing regulations by these plaintiffs is unrealistic. Plaintiffs are virtually all (a) incarcerated, (b) indigent, (c) unable to speak or write English, (d) unrepresented by counsel, and (e) unfamiliar with American legal proceedings. It would be difficult to find a group of people less likely to be able to assert their rights, and exhaust their theoretically available administrative motion to reopen remedy, than plaintiffs. Aside from problems not of the government’s making, there are uncertainties in the regulations which might create additional burdens for plaintiffs. It is not clear, for example, whether the INS would give consideration to motions to reopen filed in Spanish. Some plaintiffs would have to file their motions (in duplicate) with “the district director in whose district the proceeding was conducted for transmittal to the officer having jurisdiction. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. That would require plaintiffs to file their motions to reopen with different INS district directors all over the country for transmittal to appropriate IJ’s. Other plaintiffs would have to file their motions to reopen (in triplicate) with the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8. There is the additional question whether the INS would accept the same additional evidence supporting over 1,000 motions to reopen, assuming for the moment the unlikely proposition that each plaintiff could fully marshal the information for presentation. (c) Fifth test. The regulations specifically provide that interim relief is not available to prevent threatened irreparable injury and to preserve plaintiffs’ rights in the meantime. 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.8, 103.5. Further, requiring each plaintiff to exhaust the individual motion to reopen remedy would be wholly counter to plaintiffs’ claim of entitlement to a single classwide hearing on the persecution issue. Since the “question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy,” which does not specifically provide for a classwide hearing, is “for all practical purposes identical with the merits” of plaintiff class’ lawsuit, Gibson v. Berryhill, supra, 411 U.S. at 575, 93 S.Ct. at 1696, the individual motion to reopen remedy should not have to be exhausted. 5. Merits of Plaintiffs’ Claim. A year after plaintiffs arrived here and shortly after this case was transferred to Atlanta from Kansas, counsel for plaintiffs learned of the mistreatment of certain “Freedom Flotilla” or “Marielito” Cubans who returned to Cuba. The returnees were imprisoned without a trial and without notice to family, mistreated, tortured in some cases, and then cast adrift in the Caribbean between Cuba and Florida. Attached as exhibits to plaintiffs’ July 8,1981 motion to amend are the affidavits of some of the survivors of this ordeal. Based on this information and on facts that plaintiffs sought to develop- from government and non-government experts on Cuban internal affairs, plaintiffs sought relief in this Court. Coriolan is authority for the proposition that such information may be regarded as material for each class member. Since the facts to be proved concerning persecution would be the same for each plaintiff, the most sensible, efficient thing to do would be to have a classwide hearing on the persecution issue, followed by individual hearings to determine whether the plaintiff fell into any of the categories of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2). The right to file individual motions to reopen is meaningless here as the present procedures are totally inadequate to vindicate the claims of plaintiffs. There is little doubt that plaintiffs’ affidavits represent information both “new” and material. Further, this information is supported in part by the government’s own Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981, pages 396-406, (Department of State, February, 1982). The facts here demand the type of relief granted by the Court of Appeals in Coriolan. 6. Lack of Jurisdiction. Despite the fundamental merit of plaintiffs’ claim for relief and the inadequacy of the administrative procedures, this Court reluctantly concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to remand to the INS for a classwide hearing. First, in its jurisdictional aspects, Coriolan is entirely distinguishable from this case. In Coriolan, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review petitioners’ final deportation orders under the explicit provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). That jurisdictional provision explains that the procedure prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2341 et seq. shall apply to judicial review of final deportation orders. 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) provides a procedure for a court of appeals to remand a case to the agency when a party to judicial review applies for a remand and shows the court that there is additional, material evidence and that there were reasonable grounds for the party’s failure to produce the evidence before the agency. The Court of Appeals in Coriolan appropriately remanded the case to the agency under a clear grant of jurisdiction. This Court, however, has no jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a). Even if the Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b), there is no remand provision parallel to 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) for district courts reviewing final exclusion orders. Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1329, a very general grant of jurisdiction, will not support the exercise of jurisdiction here. Plaintiffs’ claim does not truly “arise under” Title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act; certainly there is no case law to support that proposition. In addition, the Court is reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over a classwide claim in an area of the law (judicial review of the claims of excludable aliens) where the Court’s jurisdiction is so severely limited. Another point counsels the Court against exercising any jurisdiction over this claim under the provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1329 or any other general grant of jurisdiction. The relief sought by plaintiffs — a classwide hearing — is closely related to their exclusion proceedings, and the denial of the claim for a classwide hearing may fairly be said to “merge” with final orders of exclusion. Louis v. Meissner, 532 F.Supp. 881, 888 (S.D.Fla.1982). Those orders, of course, are reviewable, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(b), as are orders denying motions to reopen. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 539 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1976). There being no final order of exclusion denying plaintiffs’ claim for a classwide hearing, there is nothing for the Court to review. Finally, and most important, it is apparent that (1) no individual plaintiff has yet filed a motion to reopen, whether on his own behalf or on behalf of the class; and (2) no classwide motion to reopen has been attempted. The Court acknowledges the practical problems involved in such an endeavor; however, in a real sense, plaintiffs’ claim that they are entitled to a classwide hearing has never been presented, nor has there been an attempt to present the claim, to the administrative body for a decision. Thus, plaintiffs have not met the nonwaivable, jurisdictional requirement for judicial review of administrative action. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 899, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). Thus, even if jurisdiction over the claim might be properly based on 8 U.S.C. § 1329, the Court would decline to review the matter until the claim had been at least presented to the administrative body. At oral argument before this Court, counsel for the government invited plaintiffs to present their claim to the agency. While such a claim would be difficult if filed according to the regulations, plaintiffs may wish to consider presenting their claim directly to the Attorney General, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or the INS Commissioner, or to all of these entities. The Attorney General has broad authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1103. He shall have control, direction, and supervision of all employees and of all the files and records of the Service. He shall establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers; issue such intructions [instructions]; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this Act. He is authorized, in accordance with the civil-service laws and regulations and the Classification Act of 1949, to appoint such employees of the Service as he deems necessary, and to delegate to them or to any officer or employee of the Department of Justice in his discretion any of the duties and powers imposed upon him in this Act; he may require or authorize any employee of the Service or the Department of Justice to perform or exercise any of the powers, privileges, or duties conferred or imposed by this Act or regulations issued thereunder upon any other employee of the Service. Id. The Attorney General has delegated much authority to the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 8 C.F.R. §§ 2.1, 3.1. The Commissioner has the authority to direct the administration of the INS and to enforce the Act and regulations. Further, the Commissioner “may issue regulations as deemed necessary or appropriate for the exercise of any authority delegated to him by the Attorney General, and may redelegate any such authority to any other officer or employee of the Service.” 8 C.F.R. § 2.1. Plaintiffs may wish to petition the Commissioner for a regulation permitting classwide hearings. The Board of Immigration Appeals has “so much of the Attorney General’s power and authority under the immigration and nationality laws as he may delegate to it.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(1). The BIA performs “the quasi-judicial function of adjudicating cases coming before the Board.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.1.(a)(3). In addition to the BIA’s ordinary appellate jurisdiction, 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) and its jurisdiction by certification, 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(c), the BIA has additional, more general powers to which plaintiffs’ claim might be directed. (d) Powers of the Board — (1) Generally. Subject to any specific limitation prescribed by this chapter, in considering and determining cases before it as provided in this part, the Board shall exercise such discretion and authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d). The Board has the power to “return a case to the Service for such further action as may be appropriate, without entering a final decision on the merits of the case.” 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2). Either the Board itself or the Attorney General may decide that the question, whether a requested classwide persecution hearing before the agency is appropriate, is sufficiently important that the question should be referred to the Attorney General himself for review of the Board’s decision. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h)(1). In any case, until one of these avenues, or some other avenue, has been pursued by plaintiffs in an attempt to present their claim to the agency, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim of entitlement to a classwide hearing. The question must be decided, as an initial matter, by the agency. G. Propriety of Classwide Review of Final, Exhausted Exclusion Orders Since the Court has determined that it has subject matter jurisdiction over final, administratively exhausted orders of exclusion, it is appropriate, in light of the contentions of the government, to treat the issue whether these claims are maintainable as class actions. In doing so, the Court recognizes that Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 “ ‘should be given a liberal rather than a restrictive interpretation’ and that ‘if there is to be an error made, let it be in favor and not against the maintenance of the class action.’ ” 7 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1753, page 541 (1972) (citations omitted). In certifying this action as a class action, see order of the Court dated August 7,1981, 91 F.R.D. 117, the Court carefully reviewed the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and found them to be present. The Court also found that the government “has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). For the most part, the discussion in the August 7, 1981 order also pertains to the issue whether the claims asserted here are maintainable as a class action. As previously noted, there is little precedent for this action. However, Rule 23 has been thought to be a device sufficiently supple for use in a number of cases involving immigration matters. In Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir. 1975), the court of appeals affirmed a preliminary injunction in which the district court exercised jurisdiction over the claims of a class of “babylifted” Vietnamese children and reviewed the Attorney General’s parole decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). In Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1979), the court of appeals reversed and remanded with the direction that the district court implement a visa recapture program granting relief to plaintiff class of certain nonresident Western Hemisphere visa applicants, due to a prior error in the visa program. In other cases, relief has been sought, not under our immigration laws but under other U. S. legislation, on behalf of plaintiff classes defining themselves in terms of their immigration status. See Narenji v. Civiletti, 481 F.Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.1979) (declaratory and injunctive relief granted plaintiff class of Iranian students against special reporting regulation on Fifth Amendment equal protection ground), rev’d on substantive grounds, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C.Cir.1979) (en banc), cert den. sub nom. Confederation of Iranian Students v. Civiletti, 446 U.S. 957, 100 S.Ct. 2928, 64 L.Ed.2d 815 (1980). See also Phan v. Friedes, 91 F.R.D. 408 (N.D.Ill.1981); Moreno v. University of Maryland, 420 F.Supp. 541 (D.Md.1976), aff’d without op., 556 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded for reconsideration sub nom. Toll v. Moreno, 441 U.S. 458, 99 S.Ct. 2044, 60 L.Ed.2d 354 (1979); and In re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F.Supp. 544 (S.D.Tex.1981), cert. granted, 452 U.S., 937, 101 S.Ct. 3078, 69 L.Ed.2d 950 (1981). The most important case involving class certification of claims for relief from immigration decisions is Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F.Supp. 442 (S.D.Fla.1980) (appeal pending). While the lengthy published order of Judge King does not contain his class certification rationale, it is clear that facts similar to those extant in this case, such as plaintiffs’ indigency, incarceration, and inability to speak English, weighed in favor of certification. See also Louis v. Meissner, supra. While it is difficult for a court to review a large number of final orders of exclusion on a classwide basis, whatever the appropriate standard of review, due to the factual inquiry which should be conducted for each class member, such a review proved possible in the Hai