Full opinion text
ORDER I. JUSTICE, Chief Judge. The above-styled civil action was instituted a decade ago, in 1972, by David Ruiz and other inmates of the Texas Department of Corrections (TDC), who sought equitable relief from allegedly unconstitutional conditions prevailing in TDC. After more than six years of discovery, hearings, and pre-trial proceedings, trial commenced on October 2, 1978. After 159 days of trial, including one significant delay, the parties rested on September 20, 1979. On December 12, 1980, a memorandum opinion was entered, which found widespread constitutional violations in the manner that various prison units of TDC were maintained and operated. Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D.Tex.1980) (hereinafter cited by volume and page number only). The memorandum opinion set forth, in considerable detail, the factual and legal analyses upon which the conclusions of unconstitutionality were based. Additionally, it indicated generally the nature of the injunctive relief being considered, and gave the parties an opportunity to agree on a proposed judgment. On March 3, 1981, the court approved a consent decree, submitted jointly by the parties, which resolved a number of the substantive issues upon which plaintiffs had prevailed at trial. On April 20, 1981, a decree granting injunctive relief and declaratory judgment was entered concerning the issues not resolved by the first consent decree. The decree found specific, inherent equitable power to remedy the unconstitutional conditions found to be prevailing in TDC. Defendants appealed from this order. During the pendency of appeal, the parties agreed to a second consent decree, which modified two central portions of the injunctive decree and which, on the bases of such alterations, finally resolved the two issues. Pursuant to Rule 42(b), F.R.App.P., defendants moved for voluntary dismissal of their appeal of those provisions of the injunctive order which were superseded by the second consent decree. The remainder of the injunctive order, and also defendants’ appeal therefrom, were unaffected by the second consent decree. Defendants did not appeal from Section X of the injunctive decree. Ruiz, 679 F.2d 1115,1164 (5th Cir.1982). That portion provides: The class plaintiffs are entitled to recover from defendants their counsel’s reasonable fees and costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiffs’ counsel and defendants’ counsel are directed to endeavor to agree on the amount thereof. If they are unable to agree, plaintiffs may submit an appropriate motion to the court, and the court will fix the amount of fees and costs. Plaintiffs may file later applications for services rendered by their counsel in implementing the relief specified in this decree and the consent decree agreed to by the parties, and for further services in this action. As set forth in my declaration dated December 30, 1981, in support of our motion to compel discovery on counsel fees and costs, which I incorporate herein, I made a settlement offer to defendants and supplied their counsel with voluminous information in support of our offer. Defendants made no response to the settlement offer, made no offer of their own, and never indicated any willingness to pay any specific amount whatever by way of counsel fees and costs.... The most recent in-person conference was on January 27, 1982. [Defendants’ counsel] informed me that he had no authority to offer any fees at all. He said that he or [another attorney] would be in touch with me shortly with an offer. No offer has been forthcoming. I have subsequently informed defendants’ counsel that, though I was willing to discuss settlement at any point, in the absence of any willingness by their clients to pay any fees, I had no alternative but to file this motion. See Ruiz, 666 F.2d at 855, 873 (5th Cir.1982). Despite apparent willingness on the part of plaintiffs’ counsel to enter into discussion concerning a “reasonable” attorneys’ fee, the parties have been unable to reach an agreement on this matter. Accordingly, as provided in Section X of the injunctive decree, plaintiffs submitted a motion for attorneys’ fees, pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. At the time the motion was submitted, defendants’ appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Though defendants did not appeal from Section X, they did challenge on appeal the factual and legal conclusions of the injunctive decree. Plaintiffs’ entitlement to attorneys’ fees under § 1988, as set forth in Section X, was predicated on their having prevailed, at trial, on the claims set forth in their complaint concerning the unconstitutionality of conditions at TDC. As set forth in the memorandum opinion of December 12, 1980, and the accompanying injunctive decree of May 11, 1981, plaintiffs there prevailed on every substantial issue presented at trial. A large portion of the equitable relief secured by the plaintiff class was embodied in consent decrees, and could not be disturbed on appeal. Nonetheless, it was taken into account that, were the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to reverse the findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to the basic unconstitutionality of conditions in the prisons of TDC, plaintiffs’ right to recovery of fees and costs could be compromised. See Laje v. R.E. Thomason General Hospital, 665 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir.1980). In view of this uncertainty, the motion for attorney’s fees was held in abeyance, pending resolution of defendants’ appeal. II. On June 23, 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, issued its opinion in this action. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1982). (cited hereinafter as Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1126). Because plaintiffs’ entitlement to fees and costs, and also the extent of such recovery, is directly implicated in the decision of this action on appeal, the content of the lengthy and complex opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit will be set forth in some detail. (The effect of the various provisions of the appellate decision on the amount of recovery will be analyzed separately.) In its opinion, the Court of Appeals “affirm[ed] the district court’s finding that TDC imposed cruel and unusual punishment on inmates in its custody as a result of the totality of conditions in its prisons.” Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1126. It “also affirm[ed] the district court’s finding that some of TDC’s practices deny inmates due process of law.” Id. Finally, the court “affirm[ed the] conclusion that remedial measures are necessary.” Id. Thus, the Court of Appeals’ decision denoted the plaintiffs’ success on their central claims that the conditions prevailing in the various units of the Texas Department of Corrections deprived inmates of rights secured to them by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The remainder of the appellate decision is devoted to a lengthy and detailed assessment of whether specific injunctive measures ordered in the equitable decree of May 1, 1981, were necessary to ameliorate the unconstitutional conditions of confinement in TDC. In the course of this complicated evaluation, the court affirmed a number of provisions of the injunctive order, 679 F.2d at 1164, concluding that these provisions were properly within the scope of the district court’s power to remedy unconstitutional conditions. E.g., 679 F.2d at 1148 (affirming dormitory space requirements); p. 1152 (affirming administrative segregation exercise requirement); pp. 1155-1156 (requiring taping of disciplinary proceedings); pp. 1153-1155 (access to courts requirements). See also, 679 F.2d 1155, n. 204, and cases cited therein. On other matters, the Court of Appeals “conclude[d] that some of the remedial measures ordered are not demonstrably required to protect constitutional rights and intrude unduly on matters of state concern.” 679 F.2d at 1126. On the basis of this conclusion, the court “narrow[ed] the scope of relief ordered.” Id. The major portion of this tailoring is governed by a self-described “wait and see approach.” For example, with respect to the various measures ordered to ease the chronic overcrowding of TDC units, the Court of Appeals noted: It has not been demonstrated that provision of additional security guards and other measures required by the district court decree and the two consent decrees will not remedy the constitutional deficiency. It appears desirable, therefore, first to undertake measures that will not be both costly and irreversible. If these measures do not work then additional ones may be necessary. This “wait and see” approach ensures that the intrusion into state processes will be no greater than that required to achieve compliance with the Constitution. Id. at 1148. See also 1148-1149 (staff training). The practical effect of this “wait and see” approach is to vacate, without prejudice, certain provisions of the injunctive decree. See 679 F.2d at 1164. The Court of Appeals has, then, explicitly affirmed that the conditions of confinement are violative of the Constitution. Additionally, it has approved the requirement that TDC take certain specific measures to remedy those conditions. If, after implementation of those approved remedies, the conditions of confinement remain in violation of the constitutional standards for confinement of inmates, plaintiffs may seek further relief, either in the form contained in the sections vacated without prejudice or in some alternative manner. Finally, the Court of Appeals vacated a number of specific provisions of the injunctive decree. Id. at 1165. The basis for the vacation of these provisions was, generally, that the specific measures ordered unduly intruded on matters properly within the province of the state’s prison administrators. Also, the court concluded that the district court had improperly resolved certain substantive matters, on the bases of state law claims which were not before it, because neither the plaintiffs nor the plaintiff-intervenor had included pendent state law claims in their complaints. Id. at 1156-1159. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the opinion of the Court of Appeals is intricate and not easily summarized. However, it may safely be said that the major portion of the decision is directed toward the assessment of the proper balance between the equitable power of a district court to remedy existing constitutional violations in prisons, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-407, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807-1808, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), and the need to preserve the discretion properly allocated to prison administrators. See generally, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977). As the opinion of the Court of Appeals indicates, the proper balance in a given case will vary from time to time, as certain remedies implemented pursuant to court order or consent decree alter the prevailing conditions. Remedial measures that at one time may seem unduly intrusive may, at a later date, appear necessary to preserve the constitutional rights of inmates. On the other hand, certain injunctive provisions may be “phased out”, as the totality of conditions obtaining in a prison gradually improves. This entire process, i.e., careful assessment by the district court of the competing concerns involved in prison litigation, is triggered by a clear demonstration that the prevailing conditions do not meet the minimum constitutional standards for confinement of prison inmates. The Court of Appeals’ decision in this action was unequivocal, in affirming that plaintiffs convincingly made the requisite showing, and that they were entitled to equitable relief. Only the precise contours of that relief remain in dispute. As the Court of Appeals pointed out: The first and second consent decrees settled many of the controverted issues, to which much of the trial testimony was devoted. On the matters covered by the consent decrees, their provisions were substantially the same as the remedies outlined by the district judge in his opinion. In addition, TDC does not contest many of the provisions of the district court’s decree [concerning quadruple-celling, triple-celling, use of force, disciplinary practices and procedures, recreation for death row inmates, triple-celling in administrative segregation, vague rules and specific reporting requirements concerning population]. [Emphasis added.] 679 F.2d at 1132. Thus, not only did plaintiffs prevail on their basic claims concerning the unconstitutionality of conditions in TDC, but they also secured equitable relief in a large number of the specific substantive areas as to which they presented evidence. The partial reversal embodied in the decision of the appellate court is limited to remedial measures adopted by the district court, some not necessarily advocated by plaintiffs. As the Court of Appeals stated: The [court below] gave lengthy and careful attention both to the trial of this case and to the fashioning of the reparative injunction. In many instances, the decree he shaped is focused directly on steps to remedy the aspects of confinement that together make it cruel and unusual .... Considering both the constitutional violations to be excised and the scope of the therapy directed, we are left with the conviction that, without the guidance now provided by Rhodes v. Chapman [452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59], the district court adopted some remedies that are not essential for the elimination of unconstitutional prison conditions.... [T]he remedy should begin with what is absolutely necessary. If these measures later prove ineffective, more stringent ones should be considered. Id. at 1145. Giving careful attention to these principles and conclusions, the plaintiffs’ motion for an award of attorneys’ fees will be evaluated accordingly. II. The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, provides, in relevant part: In any action to enforce [42 U.S.C. § 1983], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs. Under this section, a successful plaintiff “should ordinarily recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.” S.Rep. No. 94r-1011, 94th Congress, 2d Session, 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative News 5908, quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). In the absence of any special circumstances, plaintiffs who have prevailed in an action brought pursuant to § 1983 should receive fees as a matter of course. Accord Davis v. Murphy, 587 F.2d 362, 364 (7th Cir.1978). As above indicated, Section X of the amended decree of May 1, 1981, stated that “plaintiffs are entitled to recover from defendants their counsel’s reasonable fees and costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988”, and defendants did not appeal from this provision of the decree. Noting this fact, the Court of Appeals held that defendants thereby waived any objections to that provision, and, consequently, it was affirmed. Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1164. On the basis of this conclusion by the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs’ right to recover fees under § 1988, as provided in Section X, seems secure. Nonetheless, one matter should be discussed in the wake of the appellate ruling. An entitlement to attorney’s fees is based on prevalence by the plaintiffs on their claims. If the ruling of the trial court in favor of plaintiffs is reversed on appeal, the necessary predicate of an award under § 1988 is removed; that is, plaintiffs must legitimately be the prevailing parties, after appeal, in order to recover fees under § 1988. As the foregoing discussion of the ruling of the Court of Appeals makes clear, plaintiffs are plainly prevailing parties, after appeal. The fundamental findings with respect to plaintiffs’ constitutional claims were affirmed, as well as a substantial share of the specific remedial measures ordered by the district court to repair demonstrated constitutional infirmities. Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1164. Moreover, defendants did not appeal from a number of the reparative measures ordered by the court. Id. at 1164. Additionally, “[t]he first and second consent decrees settled many of the controverted issues, to which much of the trial testimony was devoted.” Id. at 1132. Finally, nearly all of the remaining portions of the injunction which were vacated, without prejudice, affect areas in which plaintiffs actually prevailed on their constitutional claims. The action of the Court of Appeals in vacating these measures is a product of the doctrine of equitable prudence; in no wise does it reflect a failure of the plaintiffs’ case on the merits. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has recently ruled that the proper focus for determining whether a party is the “prevailing party” for the purposes of resolving applications for attorneys’ fees is whether that party prevailed on the “central issue” in the case. Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663 (5th Cir.1981); see also Ramos v. Koebig, 638 F.2d 838, 845 (5th Cir.1981). In the present action, there can be no doubt that plaintiffs’ prevailed on the “central issue” in the case — the constitutionality vel non of conditions in the prison facilities of the Texas Department of Corrections. The Fifth Circuit has also suggested that attention be directed toward the relief secured by the plaintiffs. Taylor v. Sterrett, supra, 640 F.2d at 669; Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980). It is beyond question that § 1983 plaintiffs who have won relief through consent decrees, rather than final court judgments, are entitled to fees pursuant to § 1988. Maher v. Gagne, supra, 448 U.S. at 129-130, 100 S.Ct. at 2574-2575, citing S.Rep. N. 94-1011, at p. 5; see also Williams v. Leatherbury, 672 F.2d 549, 550 (5th Cir.1982), and cases cited therein. Plaintiffs are clearly entitled to recover attorneys’ fees in this action. IV. In their submission in this matter, defendants have raised two arguments of a general nature against the plaintiffs’ motion for an award of attorneys’ fees: first, that such an award is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution; second, that “§ 1988 does not provide for recovery for periods prior to its enactment.” Defendants advanced these arguments in prior pleadings in this action, and have incorporated them by reference in their present pleadings. The arguments are entirely futile, and have been foreclosed by numerous controlling decisions. Three decisions of the United States Supreme Court have upheld awards of attorney’s fees, pursuant to § 1988, against state defendants. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S. 719, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). The last named case explicitly held that awards of attorney’s fees are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, on the basis of a lengthy analysis of the common law governing awards of costs, and the statutory history of § 1988, as well. 437 U.S. at 695-700, 98 S.Ct. at 2575-2578. In Maher v. Gagne, the Court noted that petitioner’s argument that attorney’s fee awards are barred by the Eleventh Amendment “is foreclosed by our decision in Hutto v. Finney.” 448 U.S. at 131, 100 S.Ct. at 2575. The holdings of the Court of Appeals are equally clear on this point. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 559 F.2d 241 (5th Cir.1977); Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1298 & n. 17 (5th Cir.1978). The defendants’ argument with respect to the non-retroactivity of § 1988 is no more tenable. In two of the cases cited above, the Supreme Court explicitly held that fees could be recovered for legal services performed prior to enforcement of the Act. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 728 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 1972 n. 7; Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 694-95 n. 23, 98 S.Ct. at 2575 n. 23. In the third of the three cases, the Court did not directly address the issue, but approved an award of attorney’s fees which plainly included compensation for pre-Act services. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. at 124-127, 100 S.Ct. at 2572-2573. The holdings of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on this point are unanimous, and they are abundantly clear. See, e.g, Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1381 (5th Cir.1981) (en banc), and cases cited therein. The House Report accompanying § 1988 explicitly states: “In accordance with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, the bill is intended to apply to all cases pending on the date of enactment.” H.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 4, n. 6. (1976). Indeed, there does not appear to be a single reported case supporting defendants’ argument concerning the supposed non-retroactivity of § 1988. V. The Texas State Legislature, convened in a special session, recently enacted a measure, purporting to limit the amount of state funds that might be expended in payment of attorney’s fees to plaintiffs bringing actions against TDC. In relevant part, the bill states: No state funds shall be expended in excess of $10,000 for plaintiff’s attorney’s or attorneys’ fees, court costs, or other plaintiff’s expenses in any one suit brought against the Texas Department of Corrections or any employee thereof unless the expenditure of said funds is specifically authorized by an appropriations act of the legislature .... H.B. No. 9, Section 5, 67th Legislature, Second Called Session (1982). On its face, the bill seems applicable to the present motion for attorneys’ fees. However, a recent opinion by the Attorney General of Texas, issued at the request of the Honorable Bob Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, states that the above-quoted provision acts only as a limitation on the expenditure of those funds appropriated during the second called session of the legislature. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. MW-498 (1982). Since the funds appropriated in H.B. No. 9 were specifically earmarked for construction of new prison facilities and employment of additional security personnel, it appears unlikely that any attorney’s fees awarded in this action would be drawn from funds appropriated during the 1982 special session. Therefore, H.B. 9 apparently does not affect the present application. Nonetheless, it should be made clear that the provision quoted above may not operate as a limitation on recovery of attorney’s fees awarded pursuant to § 1988. The Court of Appeals for the. Fifth Circuit has held, on three separate occasions, that the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution requires that federal court orders awarding fees under § 1988 prevail over any state statutory limitation on such awards. Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 622 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.1980) (state constitutional provision — Louisiana); Gates v. Collier, 616 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir.1980) (state statute — Mississippi); Collins v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir.1981) (state statute — Texas). As the Court of Appeals noted in Collins v. Thomas, [t]he district court’s authority to award attorney’s fees is established by § 1988 which is a Congressional enactment pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent that § 1988’s authorization of district court orders awarding attorney’s fees conflicts with Texas restrictions on the execution of judgments against counties, the federal statute must prevail over state law. 649 F.2d at 1206. At issue in Collins v. Thomas was the Texas statute forbidding execution of judgments against counties. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 1575 (Vernon 1962). The other two actions involved state law provisions which were substantially identical to the provisions of H.B. 9, in that they purported to require specific legislative authorization for the expenditure of state funds for counsel fees. Thus, to the extent it operates, in any manner, to limit plaintiffs’ recovery of attorneys’ fees pursuant to Section X of the Amended Order of May 1,1981, and this order, H.B. 9 is invalid. VI. Section 1988 specifies that an award of attorney’s fees be “reasonable.” The contours of reasonableness are defined by the twelve factors for evaluating attorney’s fee awards set forth by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974); see also Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-106. Those factors will be considered, seriatim. 1. TIME AND LABOR REQUIRED. As noted, litigation of this action has taken over ten years, and the end is not yet in sight. Accordingly, the amount of time expended by plaintiffs’ counsel in the preparation and litigation of this claim, throughout the various stages of the action, was substantial. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are, of course, not required to reduce or otherwise trim the time they spend on actions such as this, merely because litigation will be protracted, and the total amount of time, when viewed in its entirety, will be sizeable. It has been plainly stated by the Court of Appeals that attorneys in § 1983 actions should be compensated for their work in the same manner as attorneys involved in other types of equally complex federal litigation. Jones v. Diamond, supra, 636 F.2d at 1381. It would be unconscionable, therefore, for an attorney representing a class of § 1983 plaintiffs to spend less time on such actions, simply because a subsequent application for attorney’s fees might involve a large number of hours; moreover, a reviewing court should not shy away from such claims. Rather, the hours claimed should be carefully scrutinized, to insure that they were reasonably spent in the conscientious pursuit of legitimate constitutional claims. Id. at 1382. In the present action, this evaluation involves a number of exceedingly involved matters. First, the resolution of the action on appeal, conjointly with the open-ended nature of the decision of the Court of Appeals, requires that the extent of plaintiffs’ prevalence on the merits be assessed. See, supra, note 7. Second, the duration and sheer magnitude of this action render the task of assessing the hours claimed particularly cumbersome. Third, defendants have lodged a substantial number of generalized objections to the manner in which plaintiffs have supported their claim for fees. These challenges are directed at the sufficiency of the time records submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel, and a variety of other matters which, in the view of defendants, undermine plaintiffs’ claim. A. Extent of prevalence Neither § 1988, nor the criteria set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, supra, provide an answer to an increasingly common difficulty, which is dramatically presented in this action. The statute speaks of the “prevailing party” being entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. In actions in which plaintiffs have asserted a simple cause of action or in which plaintiffs have plainly prevailed on all issues raised in their complaint, assessment of an appropriate award of attorney’s fees may be based on all time reasonably spent on the action. However, problems in this relation have arisen in actions involving several claims, as to which the plaintiffs have prevailed on only a limited number. In such cases, the theory has been advanced that the prevailing party should recover fees only for time spent on the issues on which it has prevailed. In Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391 (5th Cir.1980), the court stated: The amount of attorney’s fees awarded plaintiffs ... should be based upon only the work performed on the issues on which they were successful. 619 F.2d at 406, citing Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278 (1st Cir.1979). The idea of proportional awards for partial success by § 1983 plaintiffs has an alluring aura of mathematical precision. However, application of the principle is difficult, even in the simplest of cases. Even before the particular problem under analysis arose, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had cautioned that the determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee was not a matter of precise calculation. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d at 720. In actions as intricate as the present one, the notion that time spent over the course of eight years may be divided neatly among issues is not worthy of serious consideration. Nor does the prevailing law of the Fifth Circuit require such futile endeavors. The decision in Familias Unidas is the only decision in this circuit which apparently adopts, without equivocation, the doctrine of proportional recovery. In setting forth that principle the court cited a holding of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir.1978). See Familias Unidas, 619 F.2d at 406. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit apparently has adopted a similar rule. See Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046, 100 S.Ct. 734, 62 L.Ed.2d 731 (1980). However, after the decision in Familias Unidas, another panel of the Fifth Circuit reviewed the issue, and concluded that unquestioning reliance on Nadeau and Sethy was not justified, and the holding in the Familias Unidas was modified. In Miller v. Carson, 628 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.1980), the court reviewed a claim for attorney’s fees for time spent seeking compliance with an injunctive decree. The party seeking fees had succeeded in their endeavor to have the decree enforced, though certain of the motions filed toward that end had been denied. Thus, the petition for fees was “mixed.” The defendants, in opposing the fee award, cited Nadeau and Sethy to support their advocacy of the proportional recovery doctrine. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held: Because issues may at times be reasonably related, we reject anything in Nadeau or Sethy which insists that a district court must always sever an attorney’s work into “issue parcels” and then assess that work for purposes of a fee award in terms of the outcome of each issue standing alone. 628 F.2d at 348, citing Panior v. Iberville Parish School Board, 543 F.2d 1117, 1119 & n. 2 (5th Cir.1976) (discussing legislative history); Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1198 n. 53 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861, 97 S.Ct. 163, 50 L.Ed.2d 139 (1976). On several other occasions, panels of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit have implicitly rejected the principle of precise separation of time claimed into “issue parcels” for the purpose of awarding attorney’s fees. In Hardy v. Porter, 613 F.2d 112 (5th Cir.1980), the court held that a plaintiff’s attorney was not entitled to fees for time spent exclusively in pursuing a claim on which plaintiff had not prevailed. However, the court remanded the case to the district court, which had, in its initial award, relied on an artificial division of time spent into time units spent on each issue. The court noted that [although the [district] court correctly stated in its order that the attorneys are not entitled to fees for time spent unsuccessfully pursuing [one of plaintiff’s claims], it is not clear that the court considered the possibility that some of the evidence gathered in preparing the case on that issue also was relevant to the [claim on which plaintiff did prevail]. If there was any overlap, the attorneys should be compensated for the time spent gathering the evidence. 613 F.2d at 114. When faced with intertwined claims, district courts have attempted to discern the presence of an overlap in time spent on successful and unsuccessful claims. As might be expected, this inquiry has typically yielded the common-sense conclusion that, in most instances, the overlap is substantial, and neat separation impossible. See, e.g., United States v. Terminal Transport Co., 653 F.2d 1016, 1020 n. 10 (5th Cir.1981) (“We are persuaded that the district court ... reasonably concluded that ‘where, as here, it is impossible to allocate time among successful and unsuccessful claims and the plaintiffs have prevailed in the greater part of their case, time spent in good faith on the preparation and pursuit of unsuccessful claims should not be excluded in computing the fee award.’ [Allen v. Terminal Transport Co., Inc.] 486 F.Supp. [1195] at 1201.”); Smith v. Fletcher, 559 F.2d 1014, 1018 n. 9 (5th Cir.1977) (“Finally, [defendant] argued ... that the court should apportion [attorney’s] fees as to time spent on the sex discrimination claim and time spent on the physical handicap discrimination claim. We agree with the [district] court that the issues were so intertwined as to make such a division impossible.”) The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, has indicated unequivocally that it does not approve the doctrine of proportional recovery in complex § 1983 actions, especially those involving the assertion of the constitutional rights of prisoners. In Jones v. Diamond, supra, the court noted: In fixing the [attorney’s] fee, the district court should be mindful that in complex civil rights litigation, and particularly in prisoner’s rights cases, issues are overlapping and intertwined. In order to represent their clients adequately, attorneys must explore fully every aspect of the case, develop all of the evidence and present it to the court. Time spent pursuing unsuccessful claims that are clearly without merit should be excluded. However, the mere fact that the litigants did not succeed in obtaining a judgment on all of the claims asserted does not mean that time spent pursuing these claims should automatically be disallowed.... Instead, the court must consider the relationship of the claims that resulted in judgment with the claims that were rejected, and the contribution, if any, made to success by the investigation and prosecution of the entire case. 636 F.2d at 1382 (citations omitted). Accord Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 636 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). As a basis for this holding, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit turned to the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Award Act. In the report accompanying that legislation, the Senate noted: It is intended that the amount of fees awarded under [§ 1988] be governed by the same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex Federal litigation, such as antitrust cases .... In computing the fee, counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, “for all time reasonably expended on a matter.” S.Rep. No. 94-1011, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Congressional and Administrative News, at 5913. See, also, id. at 5912 (“In appropriate circumstances, counsel fees under [§ 1988] may be awarded pendente lite. Such awards are especially appropriate where a party has prevailed on an important matter in the course of litigation, even when he does not prevail on all issues.”). As an example of a case in which the court “correctly applied” the “appropriate standards” (as set forth in Johnson v. Geor gia Highway Express, supra), the Senate Report on § 1988 and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (in Jones v. Diamond, supra, 636 F.2d at 1382) both cite Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D.Cal.1974), aff’d 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir.1977), reversed on other grounds, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978). In view of this approval, in both the legislative history and the controlling opinion in this Circuit, careful attention to the opinion in Zurcher is warranted. In Zurcher, plaintiffs sought an award of attorney’s fees kindled by a successful action for declaratory relief concerning constitutional rights. The court granted plaintiffs’ motion for an award of reasonable fees. 366 F.Supp. 18 (N.D.Cal.1973). In a supplemental opinion, the court addressed several outstanding issues concerning the determination of a “reasonable” fee. Of particular relevance here is defendants’ contention that time expended on a motion for preliminary injunction, on which plaintiffs did not prevail, should not be included in the fee calculation. 64 F.R.D. at 684. The court’s analysis of this argument and its resolution of the issue will be quoted at length, in light of its dispositive force under the prevailing law of this Circuit: Some federal court decisions reason that hours spent on the litigation of unsuccessful claims should be deducted from the number of hours upon which an attorneys’ fee award is computed. However, several recent decisions, adopting a different tack, deny fees for clearly merit-less claims but grant fees for legal work reasonably calculated to advance their client’s interests. These decisions acknowledge that courts should not require attorneys (often working in new or changing areas of the law) to divine the exact parameters of the courts’ willingness to grant relief.... Plaintiffs’ attorneys obviously were not manufacturing legal services in constructing their preliminary injunction motion. They did not secure the full, injunctive relief which they originally requested, but they did obtain a significant concession from defendants as a result of their motion. In the process, they substantially advanced their clients’ interests. The court finds that the attorney time spent on this motion ... should be counted in determining a proper award. 64 F.R.D. at 684. From this survey of the prevailing doctrine in this area, several principles may be distilled. First, parties seeking an award of attorney’s fees should receive compensation in the same manner that an attorney traditionally is compensated, for all time reasonably spent on a matter. S.Rep. No. 94-1011; Jones v. Diamond, supra, 636 F.2d at 1381. Second, in actions involving a number of different claims, some of them successful, others unsuccessful, the court is not required to divide the claims into artificial “issue parcels” for purposes of calculating the fee award. Miller v. Carson, supra, 628 F.2d at 348. Third, time spent on claims which ultimately were rejected should not be automatically discounted. Jones v. Diamond, supra, 636 F.2d at 1382. Fourth, in such actions, the court should consider the relationship of the claims to each other, and the time spent preparing and litigating the “unsuccessful” claims vis-a-vis the effective presentation of the entire case. Id. Hardy v. Porter, supra, 613 F.2d at 114. Fifth, in complex civil rights litigation, issues will typically be intertwined, and the time spent on the issues will substantially overlap. Jones v. Diamond, supra, 636 F.2d at 1382. Sixth, in such actions, it may be impossible to divide the time spent on “successful” issues from time spent on “unsuccessful” issues. Id.; Smith v. Fletcher, supra, 559 F.2d at 1018, n. 9; United States v. Terminal Transport Co., supra, 653 F.2d at 1020, n. 10. Seventh, if such division is impossible, and plaintiffs have prevailed on the greater part of their case, plaintiffs should be awarded fees for all time spent in good faith litigation of the entire action, including those claims on which plaintiffs did not prevail. United States v. Terminal Transport Co., supra, 653 F.2d at 1020, n. 10; Jones v. Diamond, supra, 636 F.2d at 1382. Eighth, in such intricate actions, only time spent pursuing claims which were plainly without merit and frivolous should be excluded from the calculation of the fee award. Jones v. Diamond, supra, 636 F.2d at 1382. At the outset, it should be noted that the present action, beyond question, falls into the category of “complex Federal litigation.” The Texas Department of Corrections is the largest prison system in the United States. More than 33,000 inmates are confined in twenty-two institutions, primarily scattered across the eastern half of the state. The present action was brought as a class action on behalf of all inmates. The action challenged a broad range of TDC policies and practices, as violative of the constitutional rights of inmates secured by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. A survey of the relief secured by the plaintiff class indicates the breadth of the action. Trial consumed 159 days over a nine month period, during which 349 witnesses testified, and 1,565 exhibits were received into evidence. 503 F.Supp. at 1276. Plaintiffs’ entire case was directed at establishing two fundamental claims: that the conditions of confinement in TDC deprive inmates of rights secured by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and that certain practices and procedures of TDC are violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. The vast amount of evidence adduced by plaintiffs related, in a variety of ways, to these two claims. In most instances, the testimony of individual witnesses covered a range of issues concerning life in TDC, to establish the various elements of plaintiffs’ claims. The presentation of evidence by plaintiffs was not neatly divided by issue, for such an approach would have presented a false portrait of life in TDC. Nor was the investigation and preparation of this action susceptible to tidy division. By their nature, actions challenging the conditions of confinement in a state prison system involve a close and searching inquiry into the full range of conditions prevailing therein. In consideration of the vitality of the “totality of conditions” standard in Eighth Amendment litigation, the preparation and litigation of prison cases necessarily involve a thorough examination of all facets of prison life. Only in the light of such a full presentation may the claims of prisoners effectively be evaluated. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explicitly recognized this fact in its opinion in this action. Ruiz, 679 F.2d 1141-1142. (“We now consider TDC’s challenges to [the district court’s] findings that determine the totality of conditions caused by overcrowding in the presence of other conditions discussed, particularly the size of the security staff.”) See also 503 F.Supp. at 1277. (“Each of [the challenged] areas will be considered separately, although many of the relevant factual and legal issues are applicable to several of the categories to be discussed.”) The present action involves a dramatic example of a case in which issues overlap to such a degree as to make it impossible to allocate the time spent by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs prevailed on virtually all issues raised during trial. As noted by the Court of Appeals, “many of the controverted issues, to which much of the trial testimony was devoted” were resolved in consent decrees. Ruiz, 679 F.2d at 1132. Most of the other issues raised in the course of trial were resolved in the injunctive decree, by specific reparative measures which were subsequently upheld on appeal or which were not challenged by defendants. Id., at 1163-1164. Indeed, a careful analysis of the portions of the injunctive decree which were vacated on appeal reveals that none of those provisions may be traced to claims brought by plaintiffs in bad faith or frivolously, since all were well supported in the evidence by expert and lay testimony. Defendants have argued strenuously that plaintiffs should not be awarded attorneys’ fees for time spent on unsuccessful issues. Citations to cases from the Fifth Circuit are absent in this portion of their submission. Instead, they rely on Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir.1979), and Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir.1978). As noted above, these cases have been explicitly rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Miller v. Carson, supra, 628 F.2d at 348. Moreover, the language and logic of the controlling en banc decision of the Fifth Circuit in Jones v. Diamond, supra, 636 F.2d at 1381-82, plainly disapprove the mechanical and superficial allure of the proportional recovery doctrine. Defendants’ legal assertions in this relation are, therefore, without merit. Nor have they advanced, in their brief, any substantive allegations concerning specific issues raised by plaintiffs at trial that might be considered “clearly without merit.” Jones v. Diamond, supra, 636 F.2d at 1382. Defendants’ pleadings present absolutely no basis in law or fact for their contention that this daedal and intertwined action should be artificially divided into “issue parcels.” Indeed, such a division would do violence to the manner in which the case was prepared, litigated, adjudicated, and reviewed on appeal. In the present action, plaintiffs presented a vast amount of evidence, on a wide variety of legal and factual claims. The work done investigating, preparing, and presenting this evidence necessarily must be viewed as a whole, and is not susceptible to tidy separation among discrete issues, which as already stated, were largely affirmed on appeal. To the extent that the reparative injunction was not affirmed, it was narrowed, in an initial attempt to insure that demonstrated constitutional infirmities be remedied in the manner least intrusive into the operations of the state prison system. The fact and extent of plaintiffs’ prevalence on their claims was not disturbed on appeal. It may fairly be said that plaintiffs substantially prevailed on their entire case, as presented at trial. Under the plain law of the Fifth Circuit, as expressed in the controlling en banc decision, and the clear legislative intent as well, plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for all time reasonably spent in preparation and litigation of this action. B. Documentation for time claimed In most instances, plaintiffs have substantiated their time claims with contemporaneous time records, detailing with great specificity the amount of time spent on each day, and, often, the manner in which the time was spent. The accuracy and reliability of these time sheets is great; indeed, defendants have not specifically challenged a single hour claimed by plaintiffs, though they have had ample opportunity to do so. Instead, defendants have lodged a series of general attacks on the time claimed by plaintiffs, which will be addressed. However, it should be noted that plaintiffs have amply carried their primary burden of documenting, with reasonable specificity, the time spent on this action. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has not provided a precise delineation of the standard of documentation which is required in establishing the “time and labor required.” A survey of cases awarding attorney’s fees will provide a framework of reference, if not a precise standard. Infra. In this relation, defendants place great reliance on a recent opinion by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which, in the view of defendants, sets forth a burden of proof which plaintiffs have wholly failed to meet. A review of what that court actually said, in its recent holding on attorney’s fees, reveals that plaintiffs in the instant case have presented an almost paradigmatic example of proper documentation in support of a claim for fees. In National Association of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319 (D.C.Cir.1982), the court undertook to provide “further definition of the obligation of attorney fee applicants in documenting their claims.” 675 F.2d at 1324. Among other matters, the court specifically addressed the degree to which counsel must document the “hours logged and work done.” Id. at 1326. The court stated: Attorneys who anticipate making a fee application must maintain contemporaneous, complete and standardized time records which accurately reflect the work done by each attorney .... [I]t is insufficient to provide the District Court with broad summaries of work done and hours logged. [In another case, we have] recognized that the fee application need not present “the exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to which each hour was devoted .... ” ... The better practice is to prepare detailed summaries based on contemporaneous time records indicating the work performed by each attorney for whom fees are sought. In any event, once the reasonableness of the hours claimed becomes an issue, the applicant should voluntarily make his time charges available for inspection by the District Court or opposing counsel on request. Id., at 1326-27 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have plainly met the criteria set forth in Concerned Veterans. Plaintiffs’ lead attorneys have maintained contemporaneous, standardized time records which specify the amount of time spent, in six minute intervals, and which provide information about the nature of the time spent. Even before the defendants challenged the motion for attorneys’ fees, plaintiffs voluntarily provided defendants with the time slips on which their claim would be based. Defendants have been in possession of those slips for many months and have filed no objections to the hours set forth therein. The court in Concerned Veterans disapproved “[c]asual after-the-fact estimates of time expended on a case”, as a basis for a fee calculation. Id. at 1326. See also In re Hudson & Manhattan R.R. Co., 339 F.2d 114, 115 (2nd Cir.1964) (“There is no excuse for an established law firm to rely on estimates made on the eve of payment and almost entirely unsupported by daily records.”). Defendants have relied heavily on Concerned Veterans and In re Hudson for their general challenge to the adequacy of plaintiffs’ recordkeeping. While cases properly reject the notion that casual time estimates and broad summaries may form the basis for a fee award, the present application relies on neither estimates nor summaries. Rather, it is thoroughly detailed and documented by contemporaneous records. Of the total hours claimed by plaintiffs, 91.3% are documented by contemporaneous time slips or computer records, copies of which were actually submitted with the application for attorneys’ fees. An additional 6.1% of the hours claimed are based on affidavits, in which counsel state that their exhibits supporting the hours claimed are based on contemporaneous time records. Defendants have not requested plaintiffs to provide the supporting records. Finally, only 2.6% of the hours claimed are based on estimates. Nearly all of these estimated hours are claimed by William Bennett Turner, on his own behalf or on behalf of others associated with his firm. His estimates are to be accorded the highest presumption of validity, and will be accepted in the absence of any substantive challenge by defendants. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 453 F.Supp. 905 (S.D.Tex.1977), affirmed 603 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir.1979); Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1097 (5th Cir.1981). Plaintiffs have submitted sufficiently detailed documentation to permit the court to review the time claimed to determine its reasonableness. C. Reasonableness of the time claimed The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in its seminal opinion in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, supra, stated that “[t]he trial judge should weigh the hours claimed against his own knowledge, experience and expertise of the time required to complete similar activities.” 488 F.2d at 717. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, supra, 453 F.Supp. at 906, 908. It seems axiomatic that the familiarity of the court with the particular case in question is the most valuable and probative frame of reference, within which the reasonableness of time claimed by a party seeking an award of attorney’s fees should be analyzed. From its special vantage point, the court can assess the nature of the litigation, the manner in which the factual and legal issues were presented at trial, the written submissions filed by counsel, and other elements of the litigation with which the court is intimately familiar. In the field of prison litigation, the present action is unprecedented in its scope and complexity. Therefore, it may not readily be compared to other actions, to evaluate the reasonableness of the time claimed by plaintiffs. Rather than search for analogies of limited application, a better course would be to compare the amount of time expended by plaintiffs’ counsel with that expended by defendants’ counsel. Plaintiffs have suggested a comparison of this nature, and have provided a substantial amount of information reflecting the amount of time defendants’ myriad lawyers have spent litigating the various phases of this action. Defendants argue strenuously against the suggested comparison. Defendants’ contentions notwithstanding, the value of information concerning time spent by defendants’ counsel seems clear. By definition, the parties involved were litigating the same issues. The time spent by defendants’ attorneys in defending an action necessarily relates to the time spent by plaintiffs, though the relation is obviously imprecise, and may be governed by a variety of factors. Federal courts have repeatedly noted the value of information concerning the defendants’ counsel’s time expenditure, in assessing the reasonableness of time claimed by plaintiffs. See, e.g., Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal Inc., 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir.1981); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 66 F.R.D. 483, 485 (W.D.N.C. 1975). Though an assumption of precise congruity between the amounts of time spent by the two parties would obviously not be warranted, the value of the comparison cannot reasonably be assailed. In litigating this action, defendants have employed the services of fifty-six lawyers, forty-six paralegals, and an untold number of legal assistants. Twenty-four of the lawyers involved have been employed by the Attorney General of Texas; for these attorneys, no accurate time summaries have been kept. However, from answers to interrogatories, it appears that at least seven or eight assistant attorneys general have devoted substantially their entire work time to litigation of this action. If six attorneys work twenty hours per week for fifty weeks, 6,000 total hours would be expended. Thus, using these extremely conservative figures, the amount of time spent by the staff of the Attorney General in one year approaches the total amount of time claimed by plaintiffs’ attorneys for work extending over an eight year period. To assist in prosecuting the appeal of this action, the State of Texas retained outside, private counsel. From July 1981, through January 1982, attorneys employed by this private firm spent 6,268.5 hours on this action; during the same period of time, their paralegals devoted 795.5 hours to the case. Thus, in seven months, private attorneys working in addition to counsel employed by the state, logged nearly as many hours on this action as did plaintiffs’ counsel in eight years. Defendants have raised two arguments against the use of these figures as a basis for comparison in the present matter. First, defendants argue that any comparison of this nature is intrinsically specious. In support of this claim, defendants rely on Mirabel v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 576 F.2d 729 (7th Cir.1978); and Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 80 F.R.D. 293 (W.D.Pa.1978). The matters set forth in Mirabel and reiterated in Samuel are worthy of consideration, but only confute the legitimacy of the comparison, if it is applicable to this particular action. The court in Mirabel noted that a given case might have a greater precedential value for one side than the other; additionally, it stated that: [A] plaintiff’s attorney, by pressing questionable claims and refusing to settle except on outrageous terms, could force a defendant to incur substantial fees which he later uses as a basis for his own fee claim. 576 F.2d at 731; quoted in Samuel, 80 F.R.D. at 294. Were either of these factors applicable here, the value of the comparison between time spent by the two sides would be undermined. However, there is absolutely no indication that this action involved greater precedential value for one side than the other, and it is wholly unwarrantable to argue that plaintiffs’ attorneys have lodged questionable claims or refused to settle on reasonable terms. Indeed, the history of this action has involved a number of occasions on which plaintiffs’ counsel have continually pressed for extra-judicial resolution, only to be rebuffed by defendants. To the extent that it relies on the reasoning set forth in Mirabel, the Samuel decision is reasonable, though not applicable. To the degree the court in Samuel went beyond the Mirabel court in evaluating the merits of the time comparison, its reasoning and conclusion is wholly rejected. Second, defendants argue that the comparison is especially inapposite in the present action, on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ attorneys are more knowledgeable than defendants’ counsel concerning the substantive law of prisoner’s rights, and that defendants’ counsel were, additionally, required to respond to the claim of the plaintiff-intervenor. These claims have facial merit, yet they would only be dispositive if the comparison were being relied on in a formulaic manner. It is a simple fact that the amount of time spent by defendants’ numerous attorneys dwarfs the time spent by plaintiffs’ counsel. Defendants’ point to the participation of the government as a factor to be considered in this matter; yet, this factor supports, rather than undermines, plaintiffs’ claim for fees. As in U.S. v. Terminal Transports, Inc., supra, the court is satisfied that counsel for private plaintiffs have diligently avoided duplication of effort. Thus, the presence of the United States in this action, and the consequent diminution of time required of plaintiffs’ attorneys, actually saves defendants a great deal of money on attorneys’ fees. 653 F.2d at 1021. Defendants have utterly failed to identify any individual hour, or block of time, which should be rejected, whether for alleged overlapping of services, wasteful expenditure of time, inaccurate recordkeeping, pursuit of frivolous issues, or the use of overqualified personnel for relatively menial tasks. Nor have defendants advanced any specific argument in support of their assertion that litigation of this action was comparatively simple for plaintiffs, in relation to their claims against the defendants. (See infra, section VI(2): Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions.) Defendants cannot carry their argument, merely by making the flat assertion that plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof. Indeed, as noted previously, under the standards set forth in Concerned Veterans, plaintiffs have amply carried their burden of presenting specific documentation of the hours claimed. As noted by Judge Tamm in his concurring opinion in Concerned Veterans: The [fee] application meets this burden by submitting an application accompanied by ... sufficiently detailed supporting documentation. The burden of proceeding then shifts to the party opposing the fee award, who must submit facts and detailed affidavits to show why the applicant’s request should be reduced or denied. Just as the applicant cannot submit a conclusory application, an opposing party does not meet his burden merely by asserting broad challenges to the application. It is not enough for an opposing party simply to state, for example, that the hours claimed are excessive.... 675 F.2d at 1338. On the basis of a thorough review of the time records and summaries submitted in support of the application, and also in the light of the court’s deep familiarity with this action, the conclusion is inescapable that the amount of time claimed by plaintiffs is entirely reasonable. In cases of this complexity, involving the efforts of