Full opinion text
DECISION CLAIBORNE, Chief Judge. This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoena ad Testificandum or, in the alternative, for a Protective Order. Charles Agosto, Movant, requests that the subpoena ad testificandum, issued by the Special Grand Jury impaneled May 18, 1982, be quashed or alternatively, that the Court prohibit, by protective order, the Movant being interrogated by the members of the Grand Jury or any representative of the Department of Justice as to any matter, which testimony might be included in evidence presented to the Special Grand Jury for use in any contemplated indictment of Movant’s father, Joseph Agosto. Movant asserts that the Court should allow the requested relief based upon the U.S. Constitution and certain amendments thereto, federal legislation, affidavits, exhibits, and common law principles which Movant argues protect him from being coerced to testify against his father in any proceeding. In addition, Movant takes the position that his religious beliefs compel him to refuse to be coerced into offering testimony which could be used in a prosecution of his father. In a hearing on this motion, Movant offered the testimony of a Rabbi and a Catholic priest to substantiate this claim. Furthermore, Movant argues that should he be forced to offer testimony against his father, irreparable psychological harm will befall him. Movant offered the testimony of several experts in psychology to substantiate this claim as well. By affidavits, Movant has sought to support the instant motion by notifying this Court that this is the third occasion in the past 18 months that federal prosecutors and a Grand Jury in the District of Nevada have subpoenaed children to testify against their parents, who are targets of an investigation, for the purpose of questioning these children about matters pertinent to the investigation of their parents. Both Movant and the Government have filed points and authorities in support of their respective positions. Movant has not only provided an extensive discussion of the law, but has drawn the Court’s attention to numerous policy arguments in regard to this matter. Because the issues presented to the Court are of such an interesting and important nature, and because the law in this area is relatively undeveloped at the present time, this Court will endeavor to examine the requested motion in depth both as to law and policy. The arguments of the parties can be summarized as follows. For analysis, Movant’s argument can be divided into three categories of “harm” which he urges the Government’s subpoena, if enforced, would perpetrate upon him. First, Movant urges that the harm done to him as an individual, both physically and emotionally, renders the Government’s actions an impermissible invasion upon his personal autonomy and religious beliefs. Second, Movant argues that the implications to his family from such a coercion are permanently detrimental. And finally, Movant argues that the damage to society as a whole should such a practice be permitted far outweighs any goal that the government is trying to reach by requiring such testimony by family members against one another. In regard to the first argument, in his Points and Authorities, Movant states that an individual’s happiness and fulfillment within the family unit are valuable goals which should be protected. In this case, Charles Agosto feels that being required to testify against his father, or in the alternative, to face penalties for refusing to do so, would cause him such damage to his mental, physical, and emotional health, in addition to damaging his relationships with the members of his family, that relief by the Court is clearly warranted. Movant feels that as the child of his father, he is and will always remain emotionally indebted to him as long as he lives. To disavow this debt would cause untold suffering to him as an individual, not to mention as a member of his family unit. Movant cites the case of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) for the proposition that the Supreme Court of the United States supports the liberty interest of the individual in pursuing the privileges of marriage, raising a family, and establishing a home. Furthermore, Movant feels that the reciprocal communication inspired within and fostered by the family unit is a quality which is necessary for proper relationships within the family, as well as a proper relationship with society itself. The respect for confidence and the growth of mutual trust are felt by Movant to be qualities which benefit society as a whole. Furthermore, Movant feels that loyalty and confidentiality within the parent-child relationship is just as vital to sustaining that relationship as is the confidentiality within the marital relationship. In both instances, the cohesiveness and harmony of the family is at stake. In this case, Movant urges that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that Movant may freely exercise his religion. Movant is a Roman Catholic, and urges upon this Court that he subscribes to the tenets of the Catholic faith. Specifically, Movant feels that his religious beliefs bind him to the commandment which requires him to “honor thy father and mother.” Thus, he argues that the government cannot infringe upon his free exercise of this right. In keeping with Movant’s religious views, he argues that if a child is forced by the government to disobey this commandment, in effect, this would be an act which would likewise incriminate the child, in addition to the parent. Movant refers to the Canons of the Roman Catholic Church, which prohibit a child’s being forced to testify against its parent in ecclesiastical tribunals. Movant also refers to the Jewish religious tradition as a basic substantiation of this idea. The free exercise clause, Movant argues, has been revered and upheld by the courts of this land, even at the expense of other important interests. Movant cites Wisconsin v. Yoder as providing that only the most important of interests, crucial to society, can outweigh the individual’s right to the free exercise of his religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Movant is careful to note that allowing the free exercise of religion in this case would not undermine the Establishment clause. In analyzing his rights under the Free Exercise clause, Movant asserts that the First Amendment protection is given a supportively broad interpretation in order to prevent the suppression for which it was designed. Movant vigorously asserts that the government’s efforts to coerce him to testify against his father, in contravention to his religious beliefs, is an intrusion of the caliber and magnitude which the Amendment was enacted to prevent. Movant cites the Ninth Circuit case of Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.1972) for the proposition that First Amendment rights are foremost in the rights provided constitutional protection. The Bursey case, as Movant points out to the Court, clearly makes First Amendment rights applicable to grand jury proceedings. Id. at 1082. According to Movant, the government has not carried its burden of proving that the intended violation of Movant’s First Amendment rights is essential and necessary to the achieving of the government’s goals in this matter. Citing Bursey, he urges that the government has not proved that “the means of obtaining the information are not more drastic than necessary to forward the asserted governmental interest.” Id. at 1083. An individual’s right of privacy is also urged as a factor to be strongly considered by this Court. Movant argues that under the principle of natural law, there is a limit to the restrictions which can be placed upon an individual by the government. Citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), he points out that the Supreme Court has recognized certain rights as “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental.” It is seriously urged that the rights of the individual in this matter are to be looked at by the Court as fundamental in nature. Movant next asserts that he is entitled as an individual to have the subpoena quashed if he will suffer mental or physical damage as a result of the coerced testimony. Movant cites In re Loughran, 276 F.Supp. 393 (C.D.Ca.1976) to support this position. Furthermore, Movant cites a decision of this Court, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Witnesses: Robert Stella, et al., CV-LV-82-71, HEC (D.Nev., May 5, 1982). At the evidentiary hearing incident to the instant motion, Movant elicited testimony from a psychiatrist, a research psychologist, and Movant’s treating psychologist, who were all questioned about the effect that coerced testimony would have, not only upon the family unit, but upon the Movant himself. The treating psychologist, Dr. Joan OwenSmits, had performed extensive psychological profile testing on the Movant. The results of these tests are included as exhibits to the motion before the Court. In addition to the harm that Movant asserts he will suffer as an individual, he also states that the coerced testimony would have an extremely deleterious effect upon his family. He stresses that Western civilization considers the family unit to be inviolable and that the parent-child relationship holds a place of sanctity not only in philosophy, but in history, as well. It is urged that the family is the “cradle of civilization” in which the child first learns his own identity through his relationship with the members of his family unit. The stability of those relationships is carried over into the stability of the child’s relationship to society as a whole. In addition, Movant urges that throughout history, society has recognized the human family as an autonomous unit whose sanctity and harmony is revered. Turning to an analogy of the husband and wife relationship, to which courts have provided some degree of protection from coerced testimony, the Movant contrasts this relationship to the parent-child relationship. It is urged that while the husband-wife relationship is voluntary and capable of dissolution, the parent-child relationship is life-long. The Movant urges that society’s interest in protecting this blood relationship is great, perhaps even greater than society’s interest in keeping the spousal relationship free from intrusion by the state. And even in the absence of a blood bond, the sanctity of the tie between parent and child is still worthy of protection. Movant cites Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2110, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) to support this proposition. It is also urged that the parent-child relationship is one which is not limited to the minority of the child. Thé relationship lasts during the entire lifetimes of the individual participants. In addition, the relationship itself is ongoing from generation to generation and, thus, is an inextricable part of the history and fabric of society as a whole, linking the individual both to his past and future. Movant urges that a central aspect of the cohesiveness of the relationship between parent and child in the context of the family is the reciprocal communication between the two, inspired by both confidentiality and loyalty, on which the relationship is based. Movant contends that society is presently experiencing a breakdown in the parent-child relationship, resulting in juvenile delinquency and crime. It is urged that in a cohesive family unit in which the members communicate openly with each other, children of such a family tend to be more well-adjusted, and delinquency is more infrequent. In the modern day, in which it is opined that the family, as a functional unit in society, is becoming obsolete, it is urged that society’s interest in protecting the family unit is especially compelling. Movant argues that the family relationship cannot be protected in the absence of an expectation of privacy in intrafamilial communications in light of the sanctity of the family unit and its component relationships. He urges that in the complexities of life in the modern world, the importance of a cohesive family unit is inestimable. And he points out that the insularity of the family increases in response to the stresses of contemporary life in an ever-burgeoning population. Thus, the relationships within the family unit become more important. Finally, Movant points out that the family unit itself has been afforded the right of privacy by the United States Supreme Court, and thus deserves protection from harmful intrusion by the state which violates that right. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977). This right of privacy is deemed to emanate from the penumbra of constitutional rights, as discussed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). Movant argues that should the rights of privacy which spring from the Constitution not be protected against state intrusion, then a totalitarian or Hitlerian society will result, in which the right of privacy, inherent in the family unit, is completely ignored where it is deemed inconsistent with the state’s purposes. It is urged that both the personal and familial sacrifice is far too great to justify the government’s demand that testimony be given by one family member against another. On the basis of these arguments, Movant urges that this Court grant his Motion to Quash the subpoena ad testificandum, or in the alternative, issue a protective order prohibiting Movant from being interrogated as to any matters which could be included in evidence for a contemplated indictment of Movant’s father. I. The Origin and Scope of Testimonial Privileges: Testimonial privileges protecting communications between two individuals are exceptions to the rule that all relevant evidence is admissible in judicial proceedings. One commentator has suggested that: [tjheir creation represents a judicial or legislative determination that preserving and fostering certain relationships outweighs the potential benefit to the judicial system of compelled disclosure. Typically, the privileged relationship is one which requires confidentiality to function optimally. By protecting communications made in confidence, a privilege both preserves the right of privacy of the instant relationship and encourages open communication between others involved in the same type of beneficial association. Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 Fordham L.Rev. 771 at 772 (1978-79). Testimonial privileges for communications between attorney and client, husband and wife,' priest and penitent, and physician and patient have become a recognized part of American law. In addition, there has been an expansion of the privilege protecting communications between professionals and lay persons in a wide variety of fields. Oddly enough, confidential communications between family members have not yet been afforded the status of a testimonial privilege. This is, perhaps, an anomaly in light of the high regard which the Supreme Court of the United States has placed on the sanctity of the family as an autonomous social unit. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1937, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), the Supreme Court stated: Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition. While the marital privilege has been under attack over the past few years, it remains viable in American courts today. One commentator has noted that: The principle effect of these derogations of the privilege has been legislative and judicial restriction, rather than complete abrogation. Similarly, exceptions to the privilege against adverse testimony are being carved out with increasing frequency, particularly at the federal level. Nevertheless, the marital privileges, in one form or another, remain an integral part of most state evidentiary codes. Their continued vitality indicates a legislative and judicial determination that invading the privacy of the marital relationship is simply too high a price to pay for the possible benefits of compelled disclosure. Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 Fordham L.Rev. 771, 778-79 (1979). The attorney-client privilege seems to enjoy a continued, unquestioned recognition in the law. Likewise, the psychotherapeutic privilege between a professional and his patient seems to command the same viability. The rationale for this continued viability is the idea that confidentiality is a necessary prerequisite to the maintenance of such a relationship. Id. at 779. In regard to the psychotherapeutic privilege between a professional and his patient: Many states have no general psychotherapist-patient privilege, but have specific privileges solely for psychologists. A few states have separate privileges for psychiatrists. Other groups that have either been included under a general psychotherapist-patient privilege or have won privileges of their own include social workers, marriage and family counselors, school psychologists, teachers, and guidance counselors. The same rationale applies to all: a guarantee of confidentiality is necessary in order for the professional to provide satisfactory and socially beneficial care. Id. at 780. The marital and psychotherapeutic relationships have common elements. Both relationships are socially desirable. Confidential communications occur in each. And the expectation that such confidences will remain undisclosed is inherent in both relationships. This element of privacy and confidentiality is essential to the satisfactory maintenance of these relationships. Id. It has been noted that the parent-child relationship is also similar to these two privileged relationships: Upon examination of the relationship between parent and child, certain similarities to both of the above relationships emerge. Ideally, the parent-child relationship encompasses aspects of the marital relationship — mutual love, affection, and intimacy — as well as elements of the relationship between psychotherapist and patient — the parent providing the emotional guidance and the child relying on him for help and support. Because parental influence is probably the most important factor in a child’s development, society has a vital interest in fostering this dual affectional and therapeutic relationship between parent and child. As in the marital and psychotherapeutic relationships, optimal child-parent relationship cannot exist without a great deal of communication between the two. Such a relationship would be characterized by a free flow of highly personal information from child to parent .... Thus, the promise of confidentiality is a necessary prerequisite to the satisfactory maintenance of the child-parent relationship, just as it is to the presently privileged marital and psychotherapeutic relationships. Id. at 781. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the relationship between parent and child. The Court noted in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2109, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) that “the importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in ‘promot[ing] a way of life’ through the instruction of children .... ” In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1541, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), the Court noted that “[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.” While a child’s relationship to society is affected by diverse influences, perhaps the most important influence is the child’s relationship to his family. If the relationship is unsatisfactory, the effect could be that the child is incapable of adjusting to the larger world and society as a whole. The importance of the child’s relationship to his family cannot be underestimated: Whether the familial influence is positive or negative depends to a great extent upon the quality and amount of interaction between parent and child .... Positive family interaction, however, plays a more significant role in the prevention of delinquency and the promotion of a well-adjusted child. It is primarily for this reason that society has such a strong interest in fostering open communication between parent and child. Studies demonstrate that children raised by parents who emphasize two-way communication and who involve the children in family decisions are well-adjusted and have a positive self-image. Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47 Fordham L.Rev. 771 at 782-83. Open communication, then, has a therapeutic value in the relationship between family members. The child’s ability to trust his parents and rely on them for help and advice finds its roots in an atmosphere of open communication and confidentiality. In urging the recognition of a parent-child testimonial privilege, it is argued that: In his home, more than anywhere else, the child should be encouraged to communicate freely and should be made to feel that what he has shared with his parents in confidence will not be disclosed to outsiders. Without the promise of confidentiality, however, child-parent interactions will necessarily be inhibited and the parent will be unable to provide salutary guidance and support. At a time when the demise of the family is being both predicted and decried, it seems anomalous to deny child-parent communications the same protection as is granted to communications arising out of other socially beneficial relationships. Id. at 785-86. In contrasting the marital privilege against adverse spousal testimony to the confidential communications privilege characteristic of psychotherapeutic and other professional relationships, it is noted that the rationale behind these privileges is somewhat different: The rationale of preserving family harmony and preventing dissension is generally applied only to the marital privilege against adverse testimony and not to the confidential communications privilege. Yet, it would seem to be an equally valid justification for both. Although the confidential communications privilege is not primarily designed to exclude adverse testimony, from a practical standpoint such a privilege is most likely to be invoked when the communication sought to be disclosed is in some way incriminating to the communicating party. Id. at 787. A recognition of a parent-child privilege could be based on both of these rationales, in that, it is necessary to protect and preserve family harmony and prevent dissension, and it would prevent disclosure of confidential communications which in some way incriminate the communicator. It is viewed that: Revelations of these intimate communications may have a very negative impact upon a pre-existing family relationship. In fact, the most salient effect of both the marital confidential communications privilege and the child-parent privilege is not so much that they encourage open communication (although this may well be true in some instances), but that they protect the confidentiality of a communication once it has been made. If it is accepted that the state and society in general have a strong interest in preserving and fostering the child-parent relationship, then it must be recognized that compelling disclosure of a child’s confidences runs directly counter to this interest. What the privilege protects is not only the expectation of privacy, that is, the encouragement of confidential communications, but the privacy of the family relationship itself. Id. at 788. It can certainly be argued that compelling disclosures of communications between parent and child could be just as repugnant as compelling disclosure of communications between husband and wife: One of the harshest critics of the adverse testimony privilege has suggested that the repugnancy rationale would make more sense if the privilege encompassed the testimony of parents, children, and siblings, as well as that of husband and wife. Although the repugnancy rationale has been dismissed by critics as sentimental, speculative, and not sufficiently important to overcome the needs of the state and litigants for disclosure of relevant evidence, it is suggested that there is a great deal more than indecorum involved when disclosure of intimate family confidences is compelled. At stake is no less than the right of a family to maintain its inviolability and integrity. At the least, the compelled parental disclosure would result in strained relations, not only between the child and the parent who revealed his secrets, but among the entire family. The extent and duration of the breakdown in intrafamilial interaction will vary from family to family, depending upon such factors as its inherent stability, the age of the child, the subject matter of the communication disclosed, and the type of proceeding in which testimony is given. In almost every case, however, some degree of harm seems inevitable, and in many families, future communication may be deterred. Id. at 788-90. (See footnote 165, page 789, in which it is noted: Family dissension may be even more severe in criminal, delinquency, or grand jury investigations where the child is suspected or accused of involvement in criminal activity and parental disclosure may directly incriminate him. (citations omitted). In a law review article written by Daniel Coburn in 1969, the recognition of a parent-child privilege for confidential communications was also addressed. See Coburn, Parent-Child Communications: Spare the Privilege and Spoil the Child, 74 Dickinson L.Rev. 599, (1969-70). The author discussed the historical justifications for the privilege, as well as offering policy arguments beneficial for a contemporary analysis of the issue. Coburn discussed testimonial privileges in general, and he noted that there was a privilege against self-incrimination in early Jewish law. Some Jewish scholars regarded the prohibition against self-incrimination as linked to the Biblical rule that excluded a kinsman from testifying in a suit involving another kinsman. The rationale for this was that if a person cannot testify against his brother, then he should not testify against himself. See, Mandelbaum, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Anglo-American and Jewish Law, 5 Am.J.Comp.L. 115 (1956). At present, a privilege for confidential communications between parent and child is presently recognized in continental Europe. See Note, The Husband-Wife Privilege of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw.U.L. Rev. 208 (1961). In Bodington’s translation of the French Civil Code, article 268, it is provided that “no one can be summoned as a witness if he is a blood relation, or a relative by marriage in direct line ... of one of the parties .... ” Id. at 211, n. 16. (emphasis added). This privilege not to inform on family members extends, therefore, in criminal matters to “[fjather, mother, grandfather, grandson, granddaughter, brothers, sisters, brothers and sisters-in-law, and the husband and wife of the accused, even if divorced.” Id. See Bodington, French Law of Evidence, 118 (1904); Quick, Self-Incrimination Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 3 Wayne L.Rev. 1 (1956). There are presently three categories of privileges recognized in American law. The word “privilege” itself, a derivative of the Latin phrase “privata lex”, is described as “a prerogative given to a particular person or class of persons.” Coburn, supra, at 601-02. These three categories of privileges are: 1) privileges to protect the rights of individuals, 2) privileges to protect the maintenance of the government, and 3) privileges which express the law’s concern for the security of an individual as a participant in a relationship which is considered by the state to be important and in need of protection. The nature and value of the relationship is considered to be important as an end in itself. Id. at 602. While a privilege is an exception to the general rule that every man must give his evidence in court, as noted supra, certain ancient societies have recognized that this was not always a superior goal. Slovenko notes in his article, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 Wayne L.Rev. 175 (1960): [TJhe early Roman law recognized the rule of testimonium domesticum which provided that parents, children, patrons, freedmen, and slaves were prohibited by the Lex Iulia from being compelled to give testimony against each other. The rationale underlying this privilege was not directly related to self-incrimination but rather against the corruption of the intrafamilial relations which would ensue by making uncertain and suspicious what was instinctively assumed to demand the most unrestricted confidence or uberrima tides, the sanctity of the family based on mutual fidelity. Thus, it is not surprising that the specific policy of uberrima tides was consistently deemed superior to the general policy of the law, i.e., the correct settlement of controversies or the punishment of offenders. Id. at 181. In the realm of the husband-wife privilege, one scholar has noted that testimony of one spouse which incriminates the other would be repugnant to society, as akin to self-incrimination. See, Sutton, Admissibility in Tennessee of Spouses’ Testimony Concerning Their Private Affairs, 3 Vand.L.Rev. 298, at 298-99. The danger of foreclosing the use of privileges is discussed in detail by Louisell in his article, Confidentiality, Conformity, and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 Tul.L.Rev. 101 (1956). He notes: [TJo conceive of the privileges merely as exclusionary rules, is to start out on the wrong road and, except by happy accident, to reach the wrong destination. They are, or rather by chance of litigation may become, exclusionary rules; but this is incidental and secondary. Primarily they are a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships, from the state’s coercive or supervisory powers Id. at 110-11. Thus, the recognition of testimonial privileges should not be deemed as merely a device which frustrates the effective administration of justice. Rather, a broader look at the rationale and policy of the issue should be undertaken. Louisell notes further: It is the historic judgment of the common law, as it apparently is of the European law and is generally in Western society, that whatever handicapping of the adjudicatory process is caused by the recognition of the privileges, it is not too great a price to pay for secrecy in certain communicative relations .... Id. at 110. The attorney-client privilege is presently recognized in all jurisdictions of the United States either as part of the statutory or common law. This privilege assures that clients will receive adequate representation by feeling that they can disclose fully to their attorney all pertinent information, in the milieu of respected confidentiality. The confidential nature of the relationship is that factor which the law deems worthy of protection. Society has recognized that the confidentiality of an effective attorney-client relationship is so important to the administration of justice itself that information which could otherwise be coerced will be permitted to be withheld by a party, if such information is a part of the confidential communications between attorney and client. As noted in Pearse v. Pearse, 1 DeG. & Sm. 28-9, 16 L.J. Ch. 153 (1846): Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely — may be pursued too keenly — may cost too much. And, surely the meanness and the mischief of prying into a man’s confidential consultations with his legal advisor, the general evil of infusing reserve and dissimulation, uneasiness, and suspicion and fear, into those communications which must take place, and which, unless in a condition of perfect security, must take place uselessly or worse, are too great a price to pay for the truth itself. There can be little doubt that there is a balancing process which must be undertaken. Full adjudication of all the issues in a lawsuit, with disclosure of all the relevant facts, is an important goal, to be sure. But likewise, the confidentiality inherent in certain properly functioning human relationships is also an important goal for society to recognize and protect. In another article written by Louisell, he comments upon the rejection of the physician-patient privilege, which he feels is: the function of a philosophy which deems state processes per se valuable and significant and individual interests per se subordinate, a philosophy whose devastating effects on human freedom often have been demonstrated by history ancient and recent, and are being demonstrated today. Louisell, The Psychologist in Today’s Legal World: Part II, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 731, 750 (1957). In Coburn’s article, the efficacy of a parent-child testimonial privilege is discussed in great detail. He considers both the utility and practicality of recognizing such a privilege. Coburn feels that continued and open communication between parent and child is of critical importance in maintaining the parent-child relationship. He argues that, “it reasonably follows that the basis for creating an acceptable child-parent privilege must include the concept of fostering a therapeutic relationship as the desired goal of the privilege. Coburn, supra, at 615. In discussing the relationship between parent and child, he notes: Initially, it should be recognized that the home and family constitute the first social organization into which a child is brought. The sanctity, serenity, freedom, and organization of that unit will have a marked effect upon the personality and development of the child and upon his ability to become an effective and operative part of the community. A child first learns who he is through his relationship with his family. His mental and moral growth thereafter depend upon the stability of personal relationships, which only the family presently appear able to provide. The failure and decay of the family has a corresponding effect on our society as a whole. Id. at 116. See also, Furlough, Youthful Marriage and Parenthood: A Threat to Family Stability, 19 Hast.L.J. 105 (1967). Manley, in his law review article, Patient, Penitent, Client, and Spouse in New York, 21 N.Y.S.B.A.Bull. 288 (1949), supports recognition of a privilege where there is: 1) Instinctive revulsion against the betrayal of a confidence. 2) A sense of compassion even for a transgressor, i.e. a feeling that there should be for every man some sanctuary beyond the reach of society’s law where he may safely confide his guilty secrets in an attempt to ease his troubled spirit. 3) A sense of fair play related to the Norman view of a lawsuit as a species of contest or sporting event wherein it would be too easy, and hence unfair and against the ‘rules of the game,’ to hound a man to doom by convicting him through the lips of his own intimate friends, family, or medical, legal, or spiritual advisors. 4) A desire to preserve the function of certain socially valuable relationships even at the cost of occasional suppression of the truth and injustice in such, presumably few, particular cases. 5) A feeling of individual and professional pride and self-importance in being the inviolable repository of others’ secrets. Id. at 290. Coburn feels that a parent-child privilege would more than adequately satisfy these requirements. Coburn, supra, at 618, n. 121. Some scholars can see no logical distinction between the recognition of a marital privilege and the recognition of a parent-child privilege. In 1934, Connor wrote: The courts seem to have been dominated by a desire to preserve the marital state free from the dangers that might accrue if the law would permit one spouse to give testimony against the other. But if this represented the controlling desire and reason for the [marital privilege], it is strange that the common law did not extend this safeguard to the other family relations so as to disqualify all members of the party’s family. Is not the security and peace of the family just as much jeopardized by the damaging testimony of the son or daughter of the defendant as by that of the spouse? Yet the common law did not extend the disqualification to the son qua son or the daughter qua daughter or the other family relations. In this respect the common law did not receive its inspiration from the civil or ecclesiastical law. Connor, The Qualification of Defendant’s Spouse as a Witness in Criminal Cases, 9 Notre Dame Law. 272 at 274 (1934). Another standard to be applied in determining whether a privilege should be recognized is that propounded by Wigmore. The Wigmore test provided: 1) The communication must originate in a confidence that it will not be disclosed. 2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties. 3) The relation must be one which, in the opinion of the community, ought to be sedulously fostered. 4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis in original). Co-burn discusses the application of the Wig-more test to the proposed parent-child privilege. He notes: It is difficult to imagine a relationship which, by its inherent nature, spawns communications of a confidential nature with a greater degree of frequency. It is reasonable to conclude that, in light of the natural and continuing characteristic of the child-parent relationship, Wig-more’s first requirement that the communication originate in a confidence is satisfied. Coburn, supra, at 623. He thus concludes that the communication between parent and child does originate in the confidence that it will not be disclosed. As to whether this confidentiality is essential to the maintenance of the relationship between parent and child, he concludes: It seems more realistic to believe that a child’s knowledge that his parents will either voluntarily or involuntarily disclose confidential discussions would seriously hinder the child’s willingness to confide in his parents. Where the possibility of disclosure permeates any conversation between a child and his parent, the denial of the benefits of a privilege is not too far removed from the denial of the benefits of parents. Id. at 624-25. Coburn dismisses the third requirement of Wigmore’s test, summarily noting that it can hardly be argued that the parent-child relationship is one which society has a great interest in fostering. The fourth component of Wigmore’s test presents a more difficult problem in analysis, because this component requires a balancing between the benefit to justice which arguably occurs from forced disclosure as opposed to the injury to the parent-child relationship. Discussing this aspect of the test, Coburn notes that the breakdown of the trust between parent and child in their confidential relationship will cause the child to view the entire legal system suspiciously. Id. at 626. Furthermore, the parents themselves might lose respect for the legal system, if forced to testify against the child. Coburn is careful here to note the effect that this would have upon the legal system: There are two other courses of conduct open to the parent upon his being called to testify against his child. Both of these alternatives may be more debilitating to the entire legal system than any of the previously discussed factors. First, the parent may refuse to testify and, therefore, be subject to contempt proceedings. A second alternative is for the parent to deliberately lie and thereby assume the risk of subsequent criminal prosecutions for perjury .... The effect of such perjurous testimony on a child who has already performed antisocial conduct, can only be a feeling that the penalties of the system can be avoided by further unlawful conduct. Thus, a child can conclude that two wrongs do make a right. Instead of rehabilitating the juvenile, the juvenile court system might cause the child to resent the system itself, to resent the fact that a parent might have revealed the child’s incriminating statements, to become prematurely aware that sometimes crime does pay, and finally, to possibly bring about the commission of a perjury by an otherwise innocent person. Id. at 628-29. Quick, in his article, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, has noted that “if you deprive the juvenile of his liberty without ‘due process’ you are also curtailing the constitutional rights of his parents. For under our system the parent’s liberties are inseparable from those of his children. Quick, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, 12 How.L.J. 76 at 77 (1966). It is this Court’s opinion that, indeed, a parent’s liberties are inseparable from those of his children, and furthermore, that a child’s liberties are inseparable from those of his parents. Bridgman has also recognized that coercing testimony from a parent against his child would, in point of fact, place parties in a posture of committing perjury to protect one another: The law’s handling of this huge segment of [social conduct] is beset with anachronisms, inconsistencies, evasions, and meaningless rituals. Perjury is invited. Reconciliations are thwarted. So consuming is its passion for facts that the law neglects the realities of interpersonal adjustments in a [family], Bridgman, The Lawyer and the Marriage Counselor Pari Pass v. Partners in More Effective Service to Ailing Marriages, 4 Kan.L.Rev. 546 at 549 (1956). It would seem, then, that requiring or yet coercing testimony within the realm of the family in all possibility could be a complete exercise in futility. But in addition, it would amount to the perpetration of a great injustice to the sanctity of confidential relationships within the family unit. In considering the possibility of “inviting perjured testimony”, one commentator has suggested that privileges were originally enacted to prevent courts from being subjected to such testimony: Consider that a wife called to testify against her husband is faced with three alternatives: she can refuse to testify and be subject to contempt proceedings; testify, and possibly condemn her husband, or lie and accept the risk of prosecution for perjury. A consideration of this trilemma makes manifest the protection [of the relationship] and [natural] repugnance considerations, and also suggests the possibility that the courts may have drawn the privilege in the interests of protecting themselves from perjured or colored testimony. See Note, The Husband-Wife Privilege of Testimonial Non-Disclosure, 56 Nw.U.L. Rev. 208 at 210 (1961). Louisell substantiates this view, as well. He notes that there is “the gravest temptation to perjury by the holder of the secret. This is apparently why in the legal thought of a number of European countries, emphasis is placed upon the moral importance of refraining from coercion of witnesses as matters of conscience. Such coercion, in the face of conflicting concepts of loyalty and duty, is considered to be productive of perjury.” Louisell, The Psychologist in Today’s Legal World: Part II, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 731 at 750 (1957). Louisell also noted that the benefits in the administration of justice were “overbalanced by: (1) the inducement to perjury inherent in such attempts, and (2) the harm to the human personality, and hence, to freedom, in governmental forcing of a serious conflict of conscience.” Id. Ascertainment of the truth, then, while an important goal, is not the only important goal. And indeed, if a parent-child privilege is foreclosed, the truth may yet remain elusive and even just as unattainable, in light of the perjury which could take place if such testimony is coerced. In examining Wigmore’s fourth criterion for the recognition of a testimonial privilege, then, the expected benefit to justice, used as a rationale for a bar of the privilege, is perhaps illusory. Coburn expresses that Wigmore’s fourth question as to whether forced disclosure causes greater injury to the parent-child relationship than the expected benefit which could accrue to society, should be answered in the affirmative. He states: While compelling parental disclosures may afford the court the opportunity to base its decision on a limited amount of additional facts .... it is submitted that to totally deny a child the opportunity to claim the natural privilege involved in a parent-child relationship is to “win the battle and lose the war.” Coburn, supra, at 632. II. Constitutional Law affording protection for the Family Right of Privacy: The concept of an individual’s right of privacy has developed into an important constitutional doctrine over the last century. See Warren and Brandéis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193 (1890). This right of privacy has been extended to the family unit itself, as well. One of the first sources to recognize privacy as a right in itself was a work by Cooley, which dubbed a violation of privacy as compensable in tort. Cooley, Torts (2d ed. 1888) at 29. , In 1886, the Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States found a right of privacy in both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886). Perhaps the broadest articulation of a right of privacy occurred in Olmstead v. United States in which Justice Brandéis, in his dissent, noted that “[The framers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928). Testimonial privileges have been regarded by courts as important safeguards of the right of privacy. See Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir.1976); Lora v. Board of Education, 74 F.R.D. 565, 574-76 (E.D.N.Y.1977); United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F.Supp. 1038, 1042-44 (E.D.N.Y.1976), aff’d, 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.1977); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d 415, 431-33, 85 Cal.Rptr. 829, 839-40, 467 P.2d 557, 568 (1970). Because of the constitutional stature of the right of privacy, it can be argued that privileges foreclosing the forced disclosure of confidential communications may be viable, even in the absence of a statute. See Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954, 97 S.Ct. 1597, 51 L.Ed.2d 804 (1977); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.3d 415, 431, 85 Cal.Rptr. 829, 839-40, 467 P.2d 557, 567-68 (1970). In the landmark case of Griswold v. Connecticut, the right of privacy attained the status of a constitutional guarantee. In Griswold, the Supreme Court found a violation of a marital “zone of privacy”, and thus held as unconstitutional a statute of the state of Connecticut which legislated that the use of contraceptives was against the law. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-85, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1682, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). The right of marital privacy and privacy within the family setting has been expounded upon in later cases, as well. See, Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977) (rights of minors to purchase contraceptives); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) (right to choose family living arrangements); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (right of single minor to be free to choose abortion in first trimester of pregnancy without state requirement of parental consent); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (right to choose abortion during first trimester of pregnancy without governmental interference); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (individual’s right to freely use contraceptives without governmental control); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969) (right to view pornography in the home). Griswold, then, set the stage for finding certain communications within the family to be private and, therefore, worthy of a privilege. In 1923, in the case of Meyer v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court expressed the view that, under the Constitution, the family is an autonomous unit which should be free of undue state interference. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). There are two types of Supreme Court cases dealing with family autonomy. First, there are those cases which challenge the constitutionality of the intrusion by the state into the family structure or the definition of the family. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) (which held that a pre-removal hearing was not required when foster children living in a foster home for less than 18 months are returned to their natural parents); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, supra, (in which a city housing ordinance was declared unconstitutional because it defined the family unit as confined to certain limited bounds and required that only a single family unit could live in a particular dwelling); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1972) (which held that a state had no right to interfere with the rights of an unwed father in custody matters in the absence of a showing of neglect). The other category of Supreme Court cases dealing with family autonomy concerns the constitutional right to make certain decisions affecting the family unit. The right to marry has received constitutional protection. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 58 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) (statute declared to be an unconstitutional invasion upon the fundamental right of marriage which statute required unmarried individuals charged with the obligation to provide support of children not in their custody to obtain a court order approving a subsequent marriage); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967) (which declared a miscegenation statute an unconstitutional impingement on the fundamental right to freely marry). The right of procreation has received constitutional protection. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, as noted supra; Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974) (mandatory pregnancy leave held as an unconstitutional invasion of the decision to have a family); Roe v. Wade, supra. The right to use contraception has been afforded constitutional protection. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, supra; Eisenstadt v. Baird, supra; and Griswold v. Connecticut, supra. And finally, the right to make certain decisions in the rearing of children has been afforded constitutional protection. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (compulsory education statute held unconstitutional where it was deemed that the parental right of free exercise of religion by choosing to rear and educate their children in a certain manner outweighs the state’s interest in compulsory education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1923) (statute barring private education held an unconstitutional intrusion on the parental right to direct the upbringing of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, supra (statute barring the instruction of children in foreign languages held unconstitutional). These cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has determined that there is a “private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed.2d 645 (1944). The realm of family privacy is not absolute, however. Where the state can show a compelling state interest facilitated by a regulation which arguably encroaches on the realm of family privacy, the statute will be upheld. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905) (which held that a state may enact a compulsory vaccination law). However, if the intrusion by the state into the realm of family privacy is great, then the state is required to make an even greater showing that the regulation facilitates the compelling state interest, and that, by comparison, the state’s interest is the more important. Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. at 153-55, 93 S.Ct. 726-27. The competing interests of family privacy as opposed to the state’s interests must be carefully weighed to determine which has greater value and should be given precedence. Id. III. Cases in which a Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege has been claimed: The parties in this ease have both cited In re Kinoy, 326 F.Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y.1970). In the Kinoy case, an attorney filed a motion to quash a federal grand jury subpoena served upon him to learn the whereabouts of his daughter. Kinoy claimed both an attorney-client privilege, as well as a parent-child privilege. Although the court denied the motion to quash, their decision was clearly limited to the specific facts before them. Kinoy argued that he should not be required to appear before the grand jury. The court countered this argument, noting that “with the rarest of possible exceptions, nobody is immune from such appearances whether or not particular questions put by the grand jury to the witness who has appeared may give rise to valid claims of privilege.” Id. at 401. In advancing this claim of an attorney-client privilege, Kinoy argued that in the past he had provided legal services for groups requesting enforcement of civil rights. Because some of his clients were “politically unorthodox,” requiring his testimony before the grand jury would have a “ ‘chilling effect’ upon First Amendment rights in that ‘it will cause these groups to lose confidence’ in him ‘whether or not [he] is actually forced to betray legal confidences.’ ” Id. While recognizing that Kinoy was required to preserve the confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship, the court discussed the fact that attorneys must appear and give non-privileged testimony, where appropriate: Nothing in the First Amendment and nothing shown here indicates a need for totally immunizing him against grand jury subpoenaes .... [Attorneys] are obliged at the same time, not less than others, to give their non-privileged knowledge to the grand jury. Id. at 402. Thus, even within the bonds of the attorney-client relationship, a witness who is part of that relationship cannot be excused from appearing altogether. Although the court struck down Kinoy’s claim that the attorney-client privilege barred his appearance before the grand jury, the court, in dictum, discussed in cautionary language the possibility of the potential abuse of the grand jury process: It is not to be questioned, of course, that any kind of exertion of governmental power against people or groups exercising First Amendment freedoms could exceed the limits of constitutionality .... and it could undoubtedly turn out to be the case if the powers of grand juries were perverted or carried to excess .... There has been a number of cases where the power of investigatory agencies has been limited because of the effects on First Amendment freedoms, (citations omitted). Id. But returning to the facts before them, the court did entertain an analysis as to the degree of First Amendment infringement that was possible in a situation where such testimony is required, indicating that the issue was important to consider: Giving the fullest possible reading to what Mr. Kinoy says and offers to prove about a “chilling effect” in this case, the relation between grand jury investigation and the infringement of First Amendment rights is so tangential and indirect that it cannot possibly justify forbidding the grand jury from even calling Mr. Kinoy as a witness. The investigation of the grand jury is designed to elicit from this witness narrow and clearly defined information, relating to a specific violation of the law, from a person likely to have the information, and in circumstances where “less drastic” means have failed. Id. Turning to Kinoy’s assertion of a parent-child testimonial privilege, there can be little doubt that the court expressly rejected it. Speaking of the claim of such a privilege, the court noted: [Tjhere is no such thing. All of us, whether as parents or children, may empathize over the imaginable prospect of being asked to incriminate those close to us. However, that is not necessarily the situation here. Id. at 406. In a footnote, the court explained this comment, which was based on facts that can clearly be distinguished from the facts in the case at bar. When the Assistant United States Attorney was questioned by Mr. Kinoy’s counsel, he indicated that Joanne Kinoy, the subject to the proposed grand jury questioning of her father, was not herself a “target” of the overall grand jury inquiry. Id. at footnote 11. The court, in dictum, took a hard-line stance, predicting that even were Ms. Kinoy the “target” of the grand jury inquiry, that this, alone, would not substantiate the claim of a parent-child privilege. But interestingly, the court did leave the issue open, in spite of these statements. In discussing that Ms. Kinoy was not a target of the investigation, the court noted: ... it would not in any event justify enforcement of the novel privilege now asserted .... It may be, of course, that a parent asked about possibly damaging things touching his child could invoke in good faith the privilege against incriminating himself. Id. It could be argued that this djctum indicates that, while the court sees how compelling and worthy the relationship is between parent and child, it is bothersome that the privilege asserted by Kinoy is “novel”. By pointing to a way around such a disturbing conclusion as forced testimony (i.e. — the invocation of a good faith “privilege against incriminating himself”), the Kinoy court minimizes its concern for the unnatural result brought about by such a divisive tactic. And again, the court indicated that in other cases with significantly different facts, the potential of grand jury abuse loomed as a spectre which would warrant close consideration of the facts of each case. Supporting a pre-trial determination of such important issues, the court noted that “[gjrand juries could, to be sure, serve as engines of harassment. There may be cases where facts appear at the threshold sufficient to require advance exploration-of that sort of change.” Id. at 407. It is this Court’s opinion that such a case is here presented to us, and the preliminary exploration referred to by the Kinoy court is most appropriate on the facts before this Court. Although there have been relatively few cases dealing with the constitutional protection of intrafamilial communications, the law has begun to emerge on the issue. While in In re Lifschutz, the Supreme Court of California afforded constitutional protection to physician-patient communications under a privacy rationale, (see In re Lifschutz, supra) oddly enough, the court in In re Ter