Full opinion text
HALL, District Judge. Preliminary Statement. This is a denaturalization proceeding brought under 8 U.S.C.A. § 738, formerly Section IS of the Naturalization Act of 1906. It is one of a series of cases prosecuted by the Government in different District Courts throughout the country. They have become known as the “Bund” cases, because the grounds of cancellation are based upon the defendants’ alleged membership in the “German-American Bund.” In this District there were 27 such cases. Twenty-six of them were consolidated by stipulation, and one (Schultz) by order over the objection of the defendant, for the sole purpose of receiving testimony on one issue, only, viz., the nature and character of the “Bund”, which was to be, and was, done first; thereafter each case was to, and did, proceed individually. Since the conclusion of the evidence, four have been dismissed by the Government and one defendant has died, leaving 22 pending for decision. At the time set for the commencement of the trial, various defendants, by appropriate and timely objections, and motions, raised the question as to the sufficiency of the complaint, the admissibility of any evidence relating to the nature and character of the “Bund,” the admissibility of any evidence concerning the defendant’s membership in and connection with and activities in and about the “Bund” and the general admissibility of evidence under the complaint. All of these ordinarily would be settled before or at the commencement of the trial. But they were not in this instance, for several reasons; a number of the Government’s witnesses were brought here in custody from Penitentiaries in the east; they, as well as several of the other Government witnesses were scheduled to appear at other trials of similar cases in other districts in the country; several of the defendants having been previously excluded from this area by order of the military authorities, were brought here as Government witnesses at considerable Government expense, to say nothing of the formalities necessary to permit their return by the Army; other defendants who were here at their own expense which they claimed they could ill afford, and with no less formalities, were willing to proceed on the basis hereinafter mentioned; and the Assistant United' States Attorney, who with the Naturalization Department had done a tremendous task of preparation was anxious to conclude the trial so that he could commence the service of his enlistment in the Navy, and it would have delayed beyond good sense the entire proceeding, had some 'other lawyer been compelled to examine, to the point of understanding, the vast amount of material for purposes of the trial. So the cases proceeded to trial, and were tried on all issues; but all objections to the sufficiency of the complaint, the general admissibility of the evidence and other objections which went to the general legal issues involved were overruled, with the distinct understanding and consent of all parties that their rights under such objections would be preserved to them to be ruled on at the conclusion of the case. Appropriate and timely motions to strike, motions for judgment, and other proper expressions to the record were made by the defendants for the preservation of these rights. In addition to that, by express consent in all the cases (except the Specht case) all legal issues raised in all cases were to be considered as having been raised in each case. At the conclusion of the evidence both the Government and the defendants were permitted to and did, without objection, amend the pleadings to conform to their conceptions and contentions. While this memorandum is addressed to the within entitled case many of the questions herein considered are nevertheless common to most, if not all the cases. So much has been written and so many cases reported on the subject that I have hesitated to reduce my views to writing. But the complexity of the subject will permit neither presentation nor solution except by comprehensive statement. Before doing so, I f.eel that I should say that I cannot escape the consciousness that we are here dealing with people who were born and raised as Germans, and that twice within my generation the German nation has precipitated the unspeakable horrors of modern war upon the world. These things must not, indeed they cannot, be permitted to shade in the slightest the rules of law and reason applicable to these controversies. I make these statements, not with the idea that they have any bearing on the law of the case, but because they are present in the minds of every one connected with these cases, and it is simply much better that they be said than unsaid. The opening comment of Mr. Justice Holmes in his first dissent in the Supreme Court is helpful by way of introduction to the treatment of the questions here, Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 at page 400, 24 S.Ct. 436, at page 468, 48 L.Ed. 679: “I am unable to agree with the judgment of the majority of the court, and although I think it useless and undesirable, as a rule, to express dissent, I feel bound to do so in this case and to give my reasons for it. "Great cases, like hard cases, make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law wili bend. What we have to do in this case is to find the meaning of some not very difficult words. We must try, — I have tried,— to do it with the same freedom of natural and spontaneous interpretation that one would be sure of if the same question arose upon an indictment for a similar act which excited no public attention, and was of importance only to a prisoner before the court. Furthermore, while at times judges need for their work the training of economists or statesmen, and must act in view of their foresight of consequences, yet, when their task is to interpret and apply the words of a statute, their function is merely academic to begin with, — to read English intelligently, — and a consideration of consequences comes into play, if at all, only when the meaning of the words used is open to reasonable doubt.” The Complaint. In substance, the complaint as finally amended, first recites (a) defendant’s arrival in the United States on November 1, 1923; (b) the filing of his petition for citizenship on November 2, 1929, containing the customary statement of attachment and intentions of allegiance and residence; (c) the taking of his oath of allegiance, in the form required, and the making of the order of admission and the issuance of the certificate thereon on the 9th day of May, 1930; and (d) his previous nativity and citizenship in Germany. The complaint then asserts that the defendant induced the plaintiff by the representations of attachment to the principles of the Constitution in his petition for naturalization and his oath of allegiance to rely thereon and to issue him the certificate of naturalization on May 9, 1930, and that the certificate was issued in reliance upon these representations. It then alleges: (1) That between July 1, 1934, and about July 1, 1941, the defendant was a member of the “Bund,” “which (a) advocated and demanded of each of their adherents, regardless of his status as a citizen of the United States, a lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and an ill-disposition on his part to the good order and happiness of the United States; (b) encouraged, fostered and demanded in their adherents supreme and unswerving allegiance and fidelity to Germany; (c) engaged in the furtherance of the totalitarian principles of German National Socialism, said principles being inconsistent with and opposed to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, all to the end that their adherents would fail to support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic; ” (2) that defendant during his period of membership in the Bund knew that such were the purposes and functions of the Bund and that the defendant approved of and believed in, both at the time he took the oath of citizenship and subsequent thereto, the principles, policies, and purposes of the said Bund as above set forth; (3) that “during said period” of his membership in the Bund the defendant “by statement and conduct indicated” that he did not intend to reside permanently in the United States, that he was not attached to the principles of the Constitution, and that he reserved allegiance to the German Reich. No statement of the defendant, either in substance or otherwise, is set forth in the complaint, and ¡no conduct except his joinder of the Bund four years after admission. • , Upon the basis of these allegations it is asserted that his statements of (1) attachment to the principles of the Constitution; (2) his intention to swear allegiance to the United States and renounce allegiance to Germany; (3) his intention to reside permanently in the United States contained in his petition for citizenship, were false, as well as the same or similar -representations and facts contained in his oat-h, and that the certificate of naturalization was hence procured by the defendant “fraudulently and, illegally.” In short: The gravamen of the complaint is that the defendant did not intend to reside permanently in the United States; that he did. not. become attached to the principles of the Constitution -and did not forswear-allegiance,, to Germany, but that he falsely swore that he did; that the proof of such false swearing and lack of intention to reside- here permanently is his membership in and activities about the “Bund” and that thus the order of admission and certificate were “fraudulently and illegally”, procured and should be vacated and cancelled. Defendant’s Objections. The objections which the defendants urge, may be broadly and briefly stated as follows: First, that the Government is .guilty of laches; . . - Second, that the, Nazi Government of Hitler did not come into, power in Germany until 1933; that this form of Government in Germany was hence a new “State,” and that thus the defendant could not have had allegiance in 1930, when he took his oath, to a “State” which did not then exist, either in Germany or anywhere else in the world, and which did-not come into existence until three years later; Third, that evidence of any act or any conduct of. the defendant subsequent to the judgment of naturalization is not admissible; Fourth, that the judgment of admission is res judicata as to the petitioner’s attachment and allegiance, and is not subject to attack under Section 15 of Act June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 601, 8 U.S.C.A. § 405, for “illegal procurement,” but only for extrinsic fraud, and that the complaint does not state any facts to support a charge of extrinsic fraud; and hence does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Fifth, that the conduct ascribed to the defendant was an exercise of the right of freedom of thought and freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Each of these objections goes to the sufficiency of the complaint, and the right to introduce any evidence. Where proper and timely objection is made, as here, these are the first questions which must be settled in every law suit. . They will now be examined, and the objections will be considered in the order stated. First Objection. 'As a general proposition laches will hot lie against the Government. There are some instances where it will. As said in State of Iowa v. Carr, 8 Cir., 1911, 191 F. 257, at page 266: “The equitable claims of a state or of the United States appeal to the conscience of a chancellor with the same, but with no greater or less force than would those of an individual under like circumstances” (citing United States v. Stinson, 197 U.S. 200, 25 S.Ct. 426, 49 L.Ed. 724, and other cases). Ordinarily it is a matter of defense, but, if its elements are apparent on the face of, the complaint, it is available to the defendant in objecting to the sufficiency of the complaint. Sullivan v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 1876, 94 U.S. 806, 24 L.Ed. 324. - One of the essential elements of laches is that the defendaiU in reliance upon the delay of the plaintiff, has changed his position so that' he cannot be restored to his former state, if-relief is-granted to the plaintiff. This element is lacking on the face of the complaint, and the defendant’s objection to the introduction of any evidence, and to the sufficiency of- the complaint on that ground must be and is overruled. Second Objection. The second objection of the defendant involves a proposition which is common knowledge, and of which the court can take judicial notice, viz., that when Hitler came to power in 1933 he suspended the personal liberty provisions of the Wei-mar Constitution of 1919 claiming to act' under the power of another provision of that Constitution and thereupon and thereafter he established an absolute dictatorship based upon the tenets of national socialism. That was a new Government, and was, so the contention goes, in fact a new “State,” as that term is used in the oath o f allegiance and Naturalization Laws of the United States; and that hence at the time defendant took his oath of allegiance to the United States in 1930 he could not have reserved allegiance to a government, which not only did not then exist in Germany or anywhere else in the world, but which no one had any way of knowing would ever come into power and which did not come into existence for three years. The pertinent language of the oath follows : “I hereby declare on oath that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure any allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to the German Reich, of which I have heretofore been a citizen.” In 1930 Germany was not governed by either a prince, or a potentate; nor was it governed by a sovereignty in the sense of an individual ruler. The question then remains whether or not the word “State” as used in the renunciation is intended to describe merely a form of government, or has a more comprehensive meaning. “Reich” is the German word for “State” so that the question is not changed by specific renunciation to the “German State.” The word “State” as used in the oath of allegiance, of course conveys a different meaning or conception than the word when used to describe one of the “states” of the Union, and is used in the international sense. It is thus necessary to have recourse to International Law to ascertain what is meant by “State.” “Nation” has a more limited meaning than state; for instance the American Indian tribes were referred to as “Nations,” viz., “Creek Nation,” etc., “Iriquois Nation,” “Cherokee Nation.” It is significant that the oath does not use the word “nation.” Moore’s Digest of International Law printed in the Government printing office at Washington in 1906 defines “state” as follows: “For all purposes of International law, a state (onuos, civitas, volk) may be defined to be a people permanently occupying a fixed territory (certam sedem), bound together by common laws, habits, and customs into one body politic, exercising, through the medium of an organized government, independent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its boundaries, capable of making war and peace, and of entering into all. international relations with the other communities of the globe. - It is a sound general principle, and one to be laid down at the threshold of the science of which we are treating, that international law has no concern with the form, character, or power of the Constitution or government of a state, with the religion of its inhabitants, the extent of its domain, or the importance of its position and influence in the commonwealth of nations. * * * Provided that the state possesses a government capable of securing at home the observance of rightful relations with other states, the demands of international law are satisfied. (Phillimore, Int. Law 3rd ed., I, 81.) * * * The legal idea of a state necessarily implies that of the habitual obedience of its members to those persons in whom the superiority is vested, and of a fixed abode, and definite territory belonging to the people by whom it is occupied. *** “Rivier, in his treatise on international law, enumerates, as ‘the essential elements of the state’ which he defines as ‘an independent community, organized in a permanent manner on a certain territory,’ the following: Territory and population, collective will and government, independence and permanence.” Hackworth in his Digest of International Law (Official Publication of Department of State, 1940), Vol. 1, Chap. 2, p. 47, defines “state” as follows: “The terms state and nation are frequently used interchangeably. The term nation, strictly speaking, as evidenced by its etymology (Nasci to be born) indicates relation of birth or origin and implies a common race, usually characterized by community of languages and customs. The term state — a more specific term — connotes, in the international sense, a people permanently occupying a fixed territory, bound together by common laws and customs into a body politic, possessing an organized government, and capable of conducting relations with other states. The term thus refers to an organization or institution — a relation between people. States, generally speaking, may be broadly classified as sovereign or independent states and as dependent or semi-sovereign states.” Webster, 2nd Ed., 1942, defines it among other things as “a political body or body politic; any body of people occupying a definite territory and politically organized under one government, especially one that is a sovereign or not subject to external control,” and gives as obsolete the definition that, a state is “a form of government.” The Oxford Dictionary, 1933 Ed., has two definitions in relation to the subject matter: Definition No. 29. “The state: a body politic as organized for supreme civil rule and government; the political organization which is the basis of civil government either generally and abstractly or in a particular country; hence the supreme civil power and government vested in a country or nation.”' 30. “A body of people occupying a defined territory and organized under a sovereign government.” The authority on international law extant at the time of the Constitutional Convention and adoption of the first Naturalization Law, was that published , by M. De Vattel. It Was originally translated from the French in 1773. I do not have that edition available, but in the edition of 1792, published in Dublin the same definition of “state” is found as that contained in the subsequent. American edition published in 1879, translated from the French by Joseph Chitty. That definition is, “Nations or states are bodies politic, societies of men united together to procure their mutual safety and advantage by means of their union. “Such a society has its affairs and interest, it deliberates and takes resolutions in common, and thus becomes a moral person, having an understanding and a will peculiar to itself, and is susceptible of obligations and laws.” * * * * * “The authority of all over each member, therefore, essentially belongs to the body politic, or to the states; but the exercise of that authority may be placed in different hands according as the society shall ordain. “If the body of the nation keeps in its own hands the empire, or the right of command, it is a popular government, a democracy; if it refers to a certain number of citizens, to a senate, it establishes a republic, an aristocracy, in short, if it confides the government to a single person, the state becomes a monarchy.” * * * * * “Every nation that governs itself, under what form so ever, without any dependence on a foreign power, is a sovereign state.” There was thus at that early date in the history of this country a sharp distinction made between a “state” and its government which has continued to the present day. Except for the definition which Webster states is obsolete that “state” means a form of government, and except for the quoted definition No. 29 of the Oxford Dictionary, the uniformly accepted definition seems to be the one given by Hackworth. It is that a “State” comprehends a body of people living in a territory who are not subject to any external rule, but who have the power within themselves to have any form of government which they choose and have the power to deal with other states. Hitler refers to Germany at present as the “Third” Reich, and as having begun when he assumed power; the first Reich apparently was the government which existed up to the Weimar Constitution of 1919; the Second Reich was that of the Weimar Constitution. But even so I must follow the accepted international definition of “State”; and conclude that the German “State” when defendant took his oath in 1930, was the same German “State” which has existed since. The defendant’s point is not well taken. If the evidence,,were otherwise admissible this objection would not preclude it, and the objection to the introduction of any evidence and the sufficiency of the complaint on th^t ground is overruled. Third and Fourth Objection. The Third objection, that evidence of any act or conduct of the defendant subsequent to naturalization is not admissible, merges with and is treated as part of the fourth objection, that the judgment of naturalization is res judicata as to attachment and allegiance, and is not subject to attack on the ground of “illegal procurement” but only on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and that the complaint does not make out a case of extrinsic fraud. These objections break into several questions, the first of which is whether or not the term “fraud” as used in Section 15, is synonymous with the term “illegally procured” as used in Section 15. The Section in the pertinent provisions reads as follows: “(a) It shall be the duty of the United States district attorneys for the respective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any court specified in subsection (a) of section 701 in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 738. This Section has remained substantially unchanged since the Act of 1906. Certainly, not all of the issues existing in this case and its companions are encompassed by an interpretation of that Section. But a decision on that question will determine the boundaries within which the dispute shall remain. While in these cases the Government relies only upon so-called lack of attachment to the principles of the Constitution, and lack of forswearance of allegiance to a foreign sovereign, which is described as “fraud and illegal procurement,” it will be seen as the discussion proceeds that in order to have a comprehensive understanding of what Congress meant by this Section and the language used it is necessary to know what is not included within the terms, as well as what is. Recourse to the reported cases, for precedent to assist in interpreting and applying the Section to the problems here, discloses that there has been much litigation under the Section, with confusing and contradictory results. In 1913 Judge Amidon in the Lenore case, D.C., 1913, 207 F. 865, 867: suggested that Section would produce a “babel of conflicting judgments.” And in 1918 in Kamm, D.C., 247 F. 968, 972, Judge Geiger commented upon the confusion which then existed among the decisions concerning the “scope and true application of this section.” The four opinions written by the Supreme Court recently in the Schnciderman case, infra, which was twice argued, attest the present perplexity concerning matters arising under this Section. In a serious effort, made in spite of these warnings, to find out what the correct rules of law are in connection with these matters, so as to be able to apply them, an examination was undertaken of the cases involving Section 15 which have been decided since the Act of 1906, so far as their reports could be found. They are compiled in the following table, which takes up to the commencement of the present war, but does not include any case decided since this war began except the. Schnciderman case, Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796. The table shows the impossibility of reconciliation of the decisions of the Courts, other than the Supreme Court. The classification made in the table is a broad one, as of necessity it must be, because as in all legal classifications, sharp lines cannot be drawn. In addition to the book and page, the name of the Court and the date of the decision is given. A classification by Circuit, with the District Courts within each Circuit, was attempted, as well as a classification of the decisions with relation to the various amendments to the law as they were made from time to time. A classification was also made by attempting to group the elements declared to be either fraud or illegal procurement. But these classifications produced neither reconciliation nor approximate uniformity with regard to any feature involved in the instant case. Nor could any view be said to be “supported by the weight of authority,” except as one might choose to follow one line of decisions or another. In fact almost any conclusion which might be reached could be buttressed by an imposing array of authorities to support it. But the gravity of the matters which press for decision, indeed the very confusion which exists, will not permit that kind of any easy escape from the questions here involved. The table follows: I. Noncontinuous Residence in the United States for Five Years Preceding Naturalization : (a) Amounts to Fraud and/or Illegal Procurement Without Distinction: Simon 5/25/09 COD MASS 170 F. 680 7 months absence. Johannessen 5/27/12 US SC 225 U.S. 227, 32 S.Ct. 613 Perjury re absence. Di Giovine 5/7/17 DC WD NY 242 F. 741 18 months absence. De Tolna 6/28/28 DC ED NY 27 F.2d 984 Returned to Austria. Moskowitz 5/2/41 DC RI 39 F.Supp. 989 2 witnesses swore falsely as to knowing him. (b) Amounts to Fraud Alone: Mansour 8/18/08 DC SD NY 170 F. 671 Intermittent absences. Spohrer 1/14/10 CC DNJ 175 F. 440 Length not stated. Schwinn 5/10/40 CCA 9th 112 F.2d 74 2 witnesses had not kndwn petitioner for 5 years. (c) Amounts to Illegal Procurement Alone: Cantini 4/21/14 CCA 3rd 212 F. 925 2 years absence. Mulvey 4/18/16 CCA 2nd 232 F. 513 Absent two years. Griminger 10/12/16 DC ND OHIO 236 F. 285 2% years absence. Ginsberg 4/9/17 US SC 243 U.S. 472, 37 S.Ct. 422 4 years 9 months absence. Rummer 5/29/24 DC ED NY 300 F. 106 2 years absence. Martin 12/10/25 DC ED WIS 10 F.2d 585 4 years absence. Schwinn 10/28/40 US SC 311 U.S. 616, 61 S.Ct. 70 False witnesses to 5 years residence. (d) Does Not Amount to Fraud: Yatsevitch 6/6/29 DC MASS 33 F.2d 342 Almost 5 years absence. (e) Does Not Amount to Illegal Procurement: Deans 2/16/16 CCA 8th 230 F. 957 2 and 4 months absence. Shanahan 4/8/16 DC ED PA 232 F. 169 Absent several months. Jorgenson 12/2/16 DC WD MICH 241 F. 412 Absent two years. Srednik 4/27/27 CCA 3rd 19 F.2d 71 Length not stated. Zilver 1/26/32 DC ED NY 55 F.2d 250 1 year absence. (f) Does Not Amount to Fraud or Illegal Procurement: Aakervik 6/20/10 t ■ DC OR 180 F. 137 4% years absence. Rockteschell 10/31/13 CCA 9th 208 F. 530 Intermittent absences. II. Noncontiguous Residence in the United States for Five Years Subsequent to Naturalization : (a) Amounts to Fraud and/or Illegal Procurement Without Distinction: Luria 1/27/11 DC SD NY 184 F. 643 Almost 5 years absence. Luria 10/20/13 US SC 231 U.S. 9, 34 S.Ct. 10 Almost 5 years absence. Perrone 6/17/27 DC WD PA 21 F.2d 583 Absent 3 of 5 years. (b) Amounts to Fraud Alone: Ellis 3/3/11 CC ED LA 185 F. 546 Absent 4 years 9 months. Rothman 4/11/27 CCA 6th 18 F.2d 577 Absent 4 years 9 months. (c) Amounts to Illegal Procurement Alone: No cases. (d) Does Not Amount to Fraud: Knight 8/1/23 DC MONT 291 F. 129 4 years 1 month absence. Perrone 4/30/28 CCA 3rd 26 F.2d 213 Absent 3 of 5 years. Grenfeld 8/10/29 DC SD TEX 34 F.2d 349 Length of absence not stated. Cohen 3/27/40 DC NJ 32 F.Supp. 419 Absent 3 years. (e) Does Not Amount to Illegal Procurement: No cases (f) Does Not Amount to Fraud or Illegal Procurement: Jurick 6/20/36 DC ED NY 16 F.Supp. 32 Absent 2 years. III. Lack of Good Moral Character: (a) Amounts to Fraud and/or Illegal Procurement Without Distinction: Zaltzman 4/27/37 DC WD NY 19 F.Supp. 305 Adultery during preceding 5 years before naturalization. Rutman 6/8/39 DC SD NY 27 F.Supp. 891 Falsely swore was single in petition. Brass 3/18/41 DC ED NY 37 F.Supp. 698 Falsely stated not criminal during preceding 5 year period. (b) Amounts to Fraud Alone: Raverat 3/22/15 DC MONT 222 F. 1018 Defendant a pimp. Turlej 2/21/29 CCA 8th 31 F.2d 696 Viol. 18th Amendment before and after 5 year period. De Francis 5/4/31 CT APP DC 50 F.2d 497 Nondisclosure of liquor violation. Villaneuva 11/30/36 DC NEV 17 F.Supp. 485 Liquor violation before naturalization. (c) Amounts to Illegal Procurement Alone: Wexler 10/15/25 DC F,D NY 8 F.2d 880 Adultery during preceding 5 year period. Mirsky 5/12/26 DC SD NY Violation 18th Amendment during 17 F.2d 275 preceding 5 years. Unger 5/9/28 DC SD NY Adultery during preceding 5 year 26 F.2d 114 period. IV. Class “Ineligibility” Under Section 2169 R. S.: Title 8, Sec. 703, U.S.C.A.: (a) Amounts to Fraud and/or Illegal Procurement Without Distinction: Thind 2/19/23 US SC 261 U.S. 204, 43 S.Ct. 338 Hindu. Toyota 5/28/23 DC MASS 290 F. 971 Japanese. Gokhale 5/21/28 CCA 2nd 26 F.2d 360 Hindu. (b) Amounts to Fraud Alone: No Cases (c) Amounts to Illegal' Procurement Alone: Mozumdar 11/30/23 DC SD CAL 296 F. 173 Hindu. Khan 2/25/24 DC WD PA 1 F.2d 1006 Hindu. Mozumdar 6/16/24 CCA 9th 299 F. 240 Hindu. Toyota 5/25/25 US SC 268 U.S. 402, 45 S.Cf. 563 Japanese. Ali 8/3/25 DC ED MICH 7 F.2d 728 Hindu. Javier 11/7/27 CT APP DC 22 F.2d 879 Filipino. (d) Does Not Amount to Fraud or Illegal Procurement: Pandit 11/1/26 CCA 9th 15 F.2d 285 Hindu. Pandit 3/14/27 US SC 273 U.S. 759, 47 S.Ct. 473 Hindu. Gokhale 11/19/28 US SC 278 U.S. 662, 49 S.Ct. 79 Hindu. (e) Class Ineligibility: Miscellaneous: Amounts to Illegal Procurement: Kamm 1/3/18 DC ED WIS 247 F. 968 Enemy alien. Grahl 1/3/18 DC ED WIS 247 F. 968 Enemy alien. Thomas 1/3/18 DC ED WIS 247 F. 968 Enemy alien; Grahl 10/7/19 CCA 7th 261 F. 487 Enemy alien. Harbanuk 1/9/33 CCA 2nd 62 F.2d 759 Not within class of aliens entitled to citizenship by virtue of military service. V. Violation in Apparent 'Good Faith of Status or Procedural Matters Not Otherwise Classified: (a) Amounts to Fraud and/or Illegal Procurement Without Distinction: Nopoulos 9/15/15 DC SD IOWA 225 F. 656 Did not file declaration of intention before petition. Vujnovic 10/9/35 DC WD NY 12 F.Supp. 208 No certificate of arrival filed with petition for naturalization. Kazarian 8/2/39 DC MONT 34 F.Supp. 260 Not resident of county of naturalization court. (b) Amounts to Fraud Alone:' Stranack 2/18/25 DC WD WASH 6 F.2d 334 No certificate of arrival. Rosenberg 7/19/32 . CCA 3rd 60 F.2d 475 Not resident of state where court granted naturalization. (c) Amounts to Illegal Procurement Alone: Schurr 8/4/08 DC WD MICH 163 F. 648 Admitted by Court other than that of residence. Wayer 8/7/08 DC WD MICH 163 F. 650 Admitted by Court other than that of residence. Van Der Molen 8/10/08 DC WD MICH 163 F. 650 Admitted by Court other than that of residence. Nisbet 3/31/09 DC WD WASH 168 F. 1005 Evidence taken out of Court’s presence. Meyer 5/27/09 DC ED WASH 170 F. 983 No declaration of intention. Plaistow 8/2/10 DC WD NY 189 F. 1006 Certificate granted when alien had not served full term in the Marines. Leles 11/1/15 DC ND CAL 227 F. 189 Witnesses’ testimony not in open court. Gulliksen 6/9/17 CCA 8th 244 F. 727 Use of ineligible witness. Mueller 10/29/17 CCA 8th 246 F. 679 Petition filed more than 7 years after declaration of intention. Ness 12/10/17 US SC 245 U.S. 319, 38 S.Ct. 118 Did not file certificate of arrival. Milder 10/21/22 CCA 8th 284 F. 571 Court denied Government right to introduce evidence. Koopmans 5/14/23 DC ED NY 290 F. 545 Not resident of proper district at time of filing declaration of intention. Olaechea 10/8/23 DC NEV 293 F. 819 Did not appear before appropriate naturalization official. Lecka 3/17/24 DC TENN 7 F.2d 380 Filed petition more than 7 years after declaration of intention. Ovens 6/8/26 CCA 4th 13 F.2d 376 Application for citizenship filed too long after declaration of intention. Maney 6/16/27 CCA 7th 21 F.2d 28 Certificate of arrival not presented with petition for naturalization. Manzi 4/9/28 US SC 276 U.S. 463, 48 S.Ct. 328 Petition filed more than 7 years after declaration of intention. Maney 10/22/28 US SC 278 U.S. 17, 49 S.Ct. 15 Did not secure certificate of arrival before obtaining citizenship. (d) Does Not Amount to Fraud or Illegal Procurement: Andersen 4/1/09 DC IDAHO 169 F.-201 Admitted by Court other than that of residence. Erickson 9/28/10 DC WD MICH 188 F. 747 No declaration of intention. Ness 10/17/14 DC ND IOWA 217 F. 169 No certificate of arrival. Salomon 5/20/16 CCA 5th 231 F. 928 Certificate granted same day petition filed. Hodgman 3/27/15 DC MONT 221 F. 1018 Canadian naturalization granted to defendant after had made declaration of intention to become U. S. Citizen. Butikofer 1/13/16 . DC IDAHO 228 F. 918 Lacked 2 months of attaining majority. Richmond 1/13/27 CCA 3rd 17 F.2d 28 Judge left room during naturalization. Patterson . 9/18/33 DC MONT 4 F.Supp. 693 Stated intent to return to Nova Scotia. Bukis 12/3/36 DC ED PA 17 .F.Supp. 77 Lutheran church record insufficient evidence of place of birth. (e) Does Not Amount to Fraud Alone: Tedesco 1/15/40 DC SD NY 31 F.Supp. 322 Crimes committed 8 years after naturalization. Der Manelian 5/13/41 DC RI ' 39 F.Supp. 959 Defendant falsely stated in Petition that he had children. Grabina 5/19/41 CCA 2nd 119 F.2d 863 False name. (f) Does Not Amount to Illegal Procurement Alone: Nechman 5/12/10 DC ED MICH 183 F. 788 Did not make declaration of intention. Lenore 10/1/13 DC N DAK 207 F. 865 Petition for naturalization signed by mark only. Lengyel 2/10/15 DC WD PA 220 F. 720, Delay in applying for citizenship. Morris 2/10/15 DC WD PA 220 F. 720 Delay in applying for citizenship. Glantz 2/10/15 DC WD PA 220 F. 720 Delay in applying for citizenship. Viaropulos 3/13/15 DC WD PA' 221 F. 485 Clerical error in declaration of intention. Orend 3/13/15 DC WD PA 221 F. 777 Clerical error in declaration of intention. Salomon 1/29/16 DC ED LA 231 F. 461 Failed to post application for citizenship within 90 days. Ness 2/16/16 CCA 8th 230 F. 950 No certificate of arrival. Hirschhorn 10/4/27 DC SD NY 21 F.2d 758 Declaration of intention filed in county other than that of applicant’s residence. Bialoglowski 12/20/37 DC SD CAL 21 F.Supp. 613 Immigration visa different from certificate of arrival. VI. Violation (in Apparent Bad Faith) of Status or Procedural Matters Not Otherwise Classified: (a) Amounts to Fraud and/or Illegal Procurement Without Distinction: 196 F. 562 Entertained beliefs of common ownership of property. Olsson 5/11/12 DC WD WASH 86 F.2d 309 Falsely stated marital status to naturalization court. Sourino 11/17/36 CCA 5th 19 F.Supp. 305 Zaltzman 4/27/37 DC WD NY Failure to state name of undivorced wife. Marino 4/3/39 DC SD NY 27 F.Supp. 155 False statement in petition as to former residence. Goldstein 12/15/39 DC ED NY 30 F.Supp. 771 Never established lawful residence since entered country on cousin’s passport. (b) Amounts to Fraud Alone: Albertini 5/28/13 DC MONT 206 F. 133 Falsely stated he was single. Glaser 4/18/23 CCA 7th 289 F. 255 Deceived court with respect to belief in organized Government. Etheridge 5/3/30 DC OR 41 F.2d 762 Misstated date of entry into U. S. Saracino 9/8/30 CCA 3rd 43 F.2d 76 Concealed from naturalization examiner prior arrest for assault and battery with intent to kill. (c) Amounts to Illegal Procurement Alone: Parisi 8/11/38 DC MD 24 F.Supp. 414 Did not disclose to naturalization examiner first entry into U. S. was unlawful. (d) Does Not Amount to Fraud or Illegal Procurement: Siem 6/30/24 CCA 9th 299 F. 582 Claimed military exemption because of alienage. Marini 11/4/36 DC SD NY 16 F.Supp. 963 Forgery of Immigration papers. (e) Does Not Amount to Fraud Alone: No cases (f) Does Not Amount to Illegal Procurement Alone: Bialoglowski 2/23/39 CCA 9th 101 F.2d 928 Conflict in contents in certificate of arrival and immigration visa. VII. Mental Reservation of Allegiance to Foreign Nation: (a) Amounts to Fraud and/or Illegal Procurement Without Distinction: Wursterbarth 5/13/18 DC NJ 249 F. 908 Pro-German statements during World War 1. Schurmann 5/3/20 CCA 9th 264 F. 917 Wrote Pro-German book. (b) Amounts to Fraud Alone: Darmer 5/10/18 DC WD WASH 249 F. 989 Refused to buy Liberty Bonds. Kramer 12/23/19 CCA 5 262 F. 395 Spy information for Germany. Herberger 4/2/21 DC WD WASH 272 F. 278 Wrote unpatriotic letter to sister. (c) . Does Not Amount to Fraud: Woerndle 4/2/23 CCA 9th 288 F. 47 To criticize enemies of Germany-before U. S. entered war. VIII. Mental Reservation is Lack of Attachment (Miscellaneous): Stuppiello 9/10/19 DC WD NY 260 F. 483 Amounts to fraud to reserve belief in anarchy. Olsen 4/26/21 DC WD WASH 272 F. 706 Being a member of and attached to principles of I.W. W. amounts to illegal procurement. Swelgin 5/22/18 DC OR 254 F. 884 Member of I.W.W. during 5 year period preceding citizenship sufficient to show lack of attachment and amounts to fraud. Tapolcsanyi 4/17/30 CCA 3rd 40 F.2d 255 Fraud to entertain belief in communism during preceding 5 years. Is Not Fraud or Illegal Procurement: Siem 6/30/24 CCA 9th 299 F. 582 Exemption claimed from Selective Service Act on ground of alienage. Rowan 3/28/27 CCA 9th 18 F.2d 246 Being member of I.W.W. and instigating strikes in war time 10 years after naturalization not evidence of fraud. In view of the confusion, any effort to find the law applicable to the.questions involved, .so far as Section 15 is concerned, makes it necessary “to begin at the beginning” by examining the test of the Statute, Browder v. United States, 1940, 312 U.S. 335-338, 61 S.Ct. 599, 85 L.Ed. 862, is authority for the proposition that no single argument has more weight in statutory construction than the plain meaning of the words of the Act. The Text of the Law. Disregarding, for the moment, the holdings and decisions of the various courts under Section 15, and examining it solely from the viewpoint of its text (heretofore quoted),, it seems to me that there should be no confusing results. It is couched in plain and simple terms. In reading it, nothing mysterious, technical, or difficult makes itself apparent in the language. In fact the language seems clearly to express the intent of Congress to do several things: First, to grant specific power and authority to designated officers of the Government, viz., the U. S. Attorneys, to commence suits to cancel citizenship; second, to confer jurisdiction on specific courts to hear and determine such suits; and third, to clearly state two different grounds upon which such suits will lie, (a) fraud, or (b) illegal procurement. The word “fraud” as used in the .Section relates to the grounds for setting aside an order of a Court — a judgment. As so used the word “fraud” had a well understood, a common and accepted meaning in 1906. It had been clearly defined many times and the question was re-examined and stated again without change in 1878 in the Throckmorton case, infra, which definition has been and still is regarded as the classic statement of the minimums required to constitute that fraud which will vitiate a judgment, as well as a statement of the minimums which must be pleaded in order for a complaint to state a cause of action to set aside a judgment for fraud. In United States v. Throckmorton, 1878, 98 U.S. 61, 65, 25 L.Ed. 93, the Court said: “If the court has been mistaken in the law, there is a remedy by writ of error. If the jury has been mistaken in the facts, the remedy is by motion for new trial. If there has been evidence discovered since the trial, a motion for a new trial will give appropriate relief. But all these are parts of the same proceeding, relief is given in the same suit, and the party is not vexed by another suit for the same matter. So in a suit in chancery, on proper showing a rehearing is granted. If the injury complained of is an erroneous decision, an appeal to a higher court gives opportunity to correct the error. If new evidence is discovered after the decree has become final, a bill of review on that ground may be filed within the rules prescribed by law on that subject. Here, again, these proceedings are all part of the same suit, and the rule framed for the repose of society is not violated. “But there is an admitted exception to this general rule in cases where, by reason of something done by the successful party to a suit, there was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the issue in the case. “Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practised on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumed to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side, — these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case, are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree, and open the case for a new and fair hearing. See Wells, Res Adjudicata, sec. 499; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Wierich v. De Zoya, 7 Ill. 385; Kent v. Ricards, 3 Md. Ch. 392; Smith v. Lowry, 1 Johns. Ch., N.Y., 320; De Louis et al. v. Meek et al., 2 [G. Greene], Iowa, 55. “In all these cases, and many others which have been examined, relief has been granted, on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, that party has been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court. “On the other hand, the doctrine is equally well settled that the court will not set aside a judgment because it was founded on a fraudulent instrument, or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was actually presented and considered in the judgment assailed. Mr. Wells, in his very useful work on Res Adjudicata, says, sec. 499: ‘Fraud vitiates everything, and a judgment equally with a contract; that is, a judgment obtained directly by fraud, and not merely a judgment founded on a fraudulent instrument; for, in general, the court will not go again into the merits of an action for the purpose of detecting and annulling the fraud.’ * * * ‘Likewise, there are few exceptions to the rule that equity will not go behind the judgment to interpose in the cause itself, but only when there was some hindrance besides the negligence of the defendant in presenting the defence in the legal action.’ * * * “ ‘The maxim that fraud vitiates every proceeding must be taken, like other general maxims, to apply to cases where proof of fraud is admissible. But where the same matter has been actually triad, or so in issue that it might have been tried, it is not again admissible; the party is estopped to set up such fraud, becanise the judgment is the highest evidence, and cannot be contradicted.’ It is otherwise, he says, with a stranger to the judgment. This is said in a case where the bill was brought for the purpose of impeaching the decree directly, and not where it was offered in evidence collaterally. We think these decisions establish the doctrine on which we decide the present case; namely, that the acts for which a court of equity will on account of fraud set aside or annul a judgment or decree, between the same parties, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, have relation to frauds, extrinsic or collateral, to the matter tried by the first court, and not to a fraud in the matter on which the decree was rendered. “That the mischief of retrying every casé in which the judgment or decree rendered on false testimony, given by perjured witnesses, or on contracts or documents whose genuineness or validity was in issue, and which are afterwards ascertained to be forged or fraudulent, would be greater, by reason of the endless nature of the strife, than any compensation arising from doing justice in individual cases.” The C.C.A. of the 2nd Circuit in the Gleeson case, United States v. Gleeson, 1898, 90 F. 778, had explicitly held that the doctrine of the Throckmorton case, supra, applied when alleging fraud in a denaturalization case. The Circuit Court of the Eastern District of Missouri in the Norsch case, United States v. Norsch, 1890, 42 F. 417; had previously held to the same effect. While an Act of Congress was not needed to create fraud as a ground for vitiating judgments, it did require an Act of Congress to vest the power in a particular official to bring suit, and to vest jurisdiction in the courts specified to cancel the judgment of another court for fraud. Abstractly, fraud is one of those words which it is difficult, if not impossible, to define, because' no one can contemplate the ingenuity or cunning of the human mind. It is a comprehensive term. The smallest varient of purpose, coupled with, an otherwise legitimate act, may change a good deed or situation to an evil one. But there must be some “outward state of a man” — some objective thing— some act done, which reflects this inward purpose of fraud. Howsoever evil or wicked one’s purpose might be, so long as it is kept within that incontestable realm of one’s own mind it is not fraud. It is the result accomplished or attempted which makes an act a fraudulent one. If coupled with intent, the fraud is actual; if the same bad result is achieved without intent, then the fraud is constructive; if it is apparent on the face of the judicial record it is patent; if fraud existed but is not apparent, it is latent;, and whether latent or patent it may be either intrinsic or extrinsic. It is intrinsic if it was in issue or if the facts, or the acts, or the words, or the intent was not a matter in the nature of procedure, but a matter actually or of necessity in issue, i.e., if that was one of the things which the trial was about. It is extrinsic if it defeated the jurisdiction of the Court by “meeting and artfully disarming the prudence” of the adversary or the Judge. In short, fraud as the word was used in the Act as being a ground for vitiating judgments, was the traditional fraud as the term was known. It included either actual or constructive fraud, whether patent or latent, so long as it was extrinsic. There is not one word in the whole Act of 1906 which indicates that Congress intended the word “fraud” in Section 15 to mean anything different than extrinsic fraud, nor to change the procedure or the requirements of pleadings with relation to it. “Illegal procurement” was the new thvng introduced in the law. On the ground of fraud or on the ground such order and certificate were “illegally procured” runs the Statute. Obviously, the term “illegal procurement” meant to convey something different than fraud; something which would give a wider scope than fraud to this new weapon of cancellation; something less than actual, fraud, because that was difficult of proof, something more inclusive than constructive fraud because that relates only to the actual proceedings in court, such as the failure to abide thfe law in the service of process, etc., whereas they were creating a procedure which was partly before a Court and partly before an executive or administrative department of the Government. And constructive fraud, as a ground for vitiating judgments was. a term well understood to mean just that thing — the failure to abide some procedure or rule of court, failure to serve the summons, the notice of trial, or service improperly, suit in the wrong county, and the like, regardless of the intent or even knowledge of the plaintiff. Now, Section 15 was a part of the whole act, which contained a complete scheme and system for naturalization. Section 4 of the Act, 34 Stat. 596, provides that citizenship could be procured, “in the following manner and not otherwise.” That and succeeding sections then outlined numerous requirements and prohibitions, which may roughly be divided into three classes, viz., procedure, status, and attitudes. Whether or not the petitioner followed the requirements and prohibitions as to procedure appears from the face of the record; such as whether or not the oath was taken before the Clerk of the court, or the appropriate time passed between the filing of the Petition and the final proceedings, or the correct forms were used or two witnesses were used when required and the like. But as to status and attitudes, the Act permits, on the one hand, some things within each class to be established by the naked statement of the petitioner, and requires, on the other hand, that some things in each class shall be established by the testimony of “two credible witnesses, citizens of the United States.” To illustraate as to status: the Act requires that the petitioner disclose among other things whether or not he is a “white person,” whether or not he is or has been married, his occupation, his residence, his birthplace and date, whether or not he is an ex-convict and where he has lived during the previous five years; as to the latter (his residence during the previous five years) he must have the testimony of the two witnesses, but as to all the other requirements concerning status, the bare word of the petitioner is accepted. To illustrate as to attitudes: Both negative and positive attitudes are required. On the negative side the Act prohibits the naturalization of any one who believes in or advocates or practices anarchy, political assassination, overthrow of the Government by force and violence, or polygamy; on the positive side the Act prescribes qualifications as to good moral character, attachment to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and intentions of permanent residence: The bare word of the petitioner is all that is required by the Act to establish the petitioner’s attitude on those things which are specifically prohibited, viz., anarchy, polygamy, political assassination and overthrow of the Government by force and violence, as well as the petitioner’s intention to reside permanently in the United States. Two witnesses, however, are required to prove the attitudes which the petitioner must affirmatively possess, viz., his good moral character and attachment to the principles of the Constitution which are not specifically defined in the Act and cannot be compressed into a definitive word or phrase. As to these the requirement of proof is more exacting. The petitioner’s attitude as to them cannot be established by his own statements and representations, but must be proved by the testimony of at least two witnesses who must have certain qualifications, viz., they must be “credible” and they must be “citizens” of the United States and they must in fact have known the petitioner for the requisite period, and the measure of their testimony is not their Opinion on those matters, but testimony of his “behavior” — his conduct— for each place of residence during the previous five continuous years. If compliance with the statute is thus had as to the manner and time of proceeding, if on the face of the proceedings the petitioner is eligible and qualified, if the witnesses are in fact qualified, and in fact have known the petitioner for the requisite period, and if those things which depend upon the petitioner’s naked assertion for their establishment are true, then the law is followed by the petitioner, that is, the proceedings are “legal”, and citizenship is “legally” procured. If not, then the citizenship is “illegally procured.” By these requirements and prohibitions, Congress enlarged the things upon which a judgment of admission would not be res judicata by placing them in a category similar to the preliminary jurisdictional requirements in an ordinary law suit. The only difference being that in this Act Congress, having thus enlarged the field of preliminary requirements, designated noncompliance with them as “illegal procurement” instead of leaving them to the courts to be classified or not as “constructive fraud.” A familiar illustration will serve the point; in an ordinary law suit where a default trial is had, it is necessary to the jurisdiction of the court, not only that the record show proper service of the summons by a qualified person, but it is also necessary that the statement contained in the affidavit of service be true, all as required by the specific commands of the law; no inquiry in such a default trial is made by the court into such things, and no evidence is adduced as to them, but the act of the plaintiff in proceeding with the case is accepted as assurance of “legal” service of the summons. However, if the statements in the affidavit of service are not true, that is if (as required by California law) the summons was not served by a person over the age of 18 years, or was not delivered to and left with the defendant personally, or was not served upon the proper officer of a corporation, or if it should happen on subsequent examination that these things appeared on the face of the record to have been improperly done, then a suit will lie to set aside the judgment on the ground that they were not “legally” done, regardless of -whether or not there was any actual fraud on the part of the plaintiff, or any knowledge of their truth , or falsity. Such a judgment would be “illegally procured” although called “constructive fraud.” These are, and in 1906 were, familiar principles of law. There was nothing that prevented Congress from enlarging the field of preliminary requirements in a naturalization suit, any more than there is to prevent the legislature from changing the manner or method of service of summons where a plaintiff seeks the process of the law to adjudicate his rights as against another person or the State. Applying the analogy to a natm ralization proceeding, it is apparent that a judgment of naturalization to be “legally •procured” must (1) show on the face of the proceedings as to matters of procedure; that the petitioner not only has not omitted any of the steps required, but that all of them have been taken in the manner and at the time and places specified, and that the requisite number of witnesses were used when more than one is required; (2) and nmst show on the face of the proceedings as to matters of status and attitudes; that the petitioner is not possessed of any status or attitude which is prohibited, and is possessed of the status and attitudes which are required. To be “legally procured,” it is also required that back of the face of the record the witnesses must be qualified in fact, and likewise matters which depend for their establishment and proof upon the assertions and representations of the petitioner alone, must be true, whether appertaining to procedure, or status or attitude. Lacking these things, either in procedure or in fact the naturalization proceedings would not be “legal,” that is they would be “illegal,” and the citizenship would be “illegally procured,” regardless of whether there was any actual fraud on the part of the petitioner or not, or even knowledge of the truth or falsity of any statement. The law gives a different effect to the facts established solely by the representations of the petitioner than it does to the facts which it requires to be established by the testimony of two qualified witnesses. - Falsity or non-existence of the facts established solely by the representa tions of the petitioner permits cancellation on the ground of “illegal procurement,”' but falsity or non-existence of the facts established by the testimony of two qualified witnesses will permit cancellation only on the ground of fraud — extrinsic fraud. Further discussion of the text of the law will be had when considering the question of res judicata. History. The history and circumstances surround-the origin of this Section of the Statute are revealing. The revision of the Naturalization Laws in 1906, 34 Stat. 596, was the first general overhauling of the Statutes on that subject which had occurred in 100 years,. The Constitution committed to Congress the power to pass laws for a uniform rule on naturalization. But Congress, in the use of that power had exercised a very limited authority. It had prescribed a very loose procedure, and designated only the Courts which had power to grant judgments of naturalization. No courts were vested with jurisdiction to cancel citizenship judgments. The subject of cancellation simply was not mentioned, and I am unable to find any record of the consideration of the subject by Congress before 1906. The loose procedure induced not only carelessness, but venality, so that from time to time scandals arose in connection with naturalization. President Grant made these scandals a topic in three of his annual messages to Congress (Dec. 7, 1874, Dec. 7, 1875, and Dec. 5, 1876). It was likewise only natural that the scandals would induce efforts to correct them, even though no action was taken by Congress until 1906. These efforts took the form of suits to cancel citizenship (the first of which seems to have been filed by private citizens in 1868), but with various and inconclusive results, inasmuch as there was ho special law on the subject. Under designation by Congress as Naturalization Courts, many courts, such as Probate Courts, City Courts and the like had power to naturalize citizens, but were wholly without any equity powers to set aside one of. their own judgments where it had been obtained by extrinsic fraud, which had always been recognized as a ground for setting aside a judgment. Thus, while there was a recognized ground for a judgment of cancellation, the matter of what court had jurisdiction, so far as the State Courts were concerned was subject to a vast and contradictory multitude of various state laws. So far as the Federal Courts were concerned, it had been held in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit in the Gleeson case, supra, that notwithstanding the absence of a specific statute conferring jurisdiction so to do, the Federal Courts had jurisdiction to set aside a naturalization judgment of a State Court on the ground of extrinsic fraud as defined in the Throckmorton case, supra (but not on the ground of intrinsic fraud.) To the same effect was the Norsch case, 1890, 42 F. 417; which went further and held that F