Full opinion text
INDEX I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516,2518 ...........-pg. 1047 II. ALLEGED INVALIDITY OF ORDER UPON BASIS THAT AUTHORIZATION TO APPLY THEREFOR WAS NOT PERSONALLY DELEGATED ............. -pg. 1048 III. AUTHORIZATION OF F.B.I. AGENTS TO INVESTIGATE DRUG-RELATED OFFENSES................-...........pg. 1049 IV. MARIJUANA-RELATED DRUG OFFENSES MAY BE PREDICATE RACKETEERING ACTS UNDER RICO .....- - -........pg. 1050 V. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE OCTOBER 20,1980 ORDER------pg. 1050 1. Sufficiency of probable cause in the Affidavit itself.----------pg. 1050 2. Scope of RICO. ------------------------ pg. 1053 3. Continuation of future conversations about past bribes, homicides, etc.-------------------------------------------------pg, 1053 4. Staleness of the probable cause. --------------------------pg. 1054 5. Necessity showing for the order was inadequate (use of alternative investigative techniques. ----------------------------pg. 1055 VL SEALING REQUIREMENTS ..............................pg. 1057 VII. THE ORDER OF NOVEMBER 20, 1980 WAS ALLEGEDLY INVALID .....---.........................................pg. 1058 1. Carry-Over Objections. ---------------------------------pg. 1058 2. Insufficient probable cause for an extension.----------------pg. 1058 3. Was the district judge without authority to execute an extension order outside his territorial jurisdiction but operative within his territorial jurisdiction?----------------------------------pg. 1058 VIII. THE ORDER OF DECEMBER 19, 1980 WAS ALLEGEDLY INVALID .....--------------------------------------------pg. 1058 1. Carry-Over Objections. ---------------------------------pg. 1058 2. Prior failure to name Defendant Kay as a target. ------------pg. 1058 IX. ALLEGED § 2517(5) VIOLATION (DISCLOSURE OF TITLE III INTERCEPT AS TO A § 848 OFFENSE) ----------------------pg. 1060 1. Section 848 was not an offense “other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval” under § 2517(5). ----------pg. 1063 2. The requirement of § 2517(5) was met.---------------------pg. 1066 X. THE EFFECT OF MISSING PAGE 21C -.....----------------pg. 1067 1. Alleged violations of Title III.----------------------------pg. 1070 2. The allegation of intentional omission and the effect of missing page 21C on the showing of probable cause.-----------------pg. 1073 XI. MINIMIZATION-----------------------------------------pg. 1075 XII. FLORIDA STATE CHAPTER 934 INTERCEPT ---------------pg. 1076 1. Probable Cause.---------------------------------------pg. 1077 2. Lack of Necessity. -------------------------------------pg. 1078 3. Improper Authorization.--------------------------------pg. 1078 4. First and Second Extension Orders unlawful.----------------pg. 1078 5. No authorization in Florida Statutes to wiretap for marijuana offenses.---------------------------------------------pg. 1079 6. Whether § 2517(5) was violated regarding the state wiretap.----pg. 1079 ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS TITLE III ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND EVIDENCE DERIVED THEREFROM AND INCLUDING DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATE TITLE III WIRE INTERCEPT AND EVIDENCE DERIVED THEREFROM ARONOVITZ, District Judge. Defendants WILLIAM JOSEPH HARVEY, THOMAS SIKES and DENNIS KAY addressed Motions to Suppress electronic surveillance and any evidence derived therefrom to a Title III oral intercept of communications of William Joseph Harvey, John Dennis Cason, Robert Jernigan, Bruce Emory Griffin, Wesley Simkins, Mike McCrary, Skip Hope, Arthur Michael Sakell, Joseph William Campbell, Jr., Gary Balough and Parker Peak, at the office of William Joseph Harvey, Defendant, located at 1945 South Dixie Highway, Delray Beach, Florida, a towing business conducted by Delray Towing Service, Inc., of which Harvey was alleged to be president. The Honorable Eugene P. Spellman, U.S. District Judge, Southern District of Florida, entered the original order authorizing interception on October 20, 1980, for thirty (30) days (Defendant’s Exhibit No. 4); an amended order on October 22, 1980 (Defendant’s Exhibit No. 5); an order authorizing continued interception of oral communications for an additional thirty (30) days on November 20, 1980 (Defendant’s Exhibit No. 16); and an order continuing interception for an additional thirty (30) days signed on December 19, 1980 (Defendant’s Exhibit No. 26). The oral intercept commenced functioning on October 24, 1980, and remained in position and functioning until January 19, 1981. A multitudinous attack has been made upon this Title III intercept. After reviewing extensively the original motions, all supplements thereto then pending, and the Government’s omnibus response, this Court heard testimony and received evidence basically addressed to three (3) evidentiary issues, to-wit: (1) The adequacy and sufficiency of minimization procedures and implementation; (2) The effect of missing page 21C of the original affidavit of Harold Copus, Special Agent, F.B.I., not found among the unsealed original documents in this Title III intercept, as it related to the sufficiency of the affidavit itself to establish probable cause and as it related on a Delaware v. Franks [438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667], infra, basis and all issues arising from the omission of Page 21C from the original affidavit; and (3) The adequacy of disclosure pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 2517(3) and (5) in terms of a prior Florida state Title III wiretap and the federal Title III wiretap sub judice. Evidence was received with respect to the State Title III disclosure issue. All other matters raised by the Defendants in these Motions to Suppress were legal issues and were heard extensively in oral arguments. The evidentiary hearings were conducted over a period of four days and oral argument thereon lasted one full day. Thereupon, having now considered the original Motion of William Joseph Harvey, five (5) Supplements thereto, the Motions of Thomas Sikes and Dennis Kay and all Supplements thereto, and considering the joinder therein of all co-defendants who are “aggrieved” persons, the Government’s omnibus response, the testimony and evidence adduced and oral arguments, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is thereupon ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that each and every Motion to Suppress the Title III oral intercept and the evidence derived therefrom, and including Motions to Suppress the Florida Chapter 934 wire intercept and evidence derived therefrom, addressed by each and every Defendant entitled to do so by law is hereby DENIED, each respectively, for the reasons hereinafter set forth. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are made herein when applicable and required for those matters as to which testimony and evidence were received at an evidentiary hearing. I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 In its memorandum in support of the Motion to Suppress (p. 23) Defendant Harvey “candidly concedes that most federal and state courts faced with the issue have found Title III (18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.) constitutional on its face.... For the purpose of appeal, this issue is once again here raised.... ” In United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874, 96 S.Ct. 142, 46 L.Ed.2d 105 (1975), the Fifth Circuit joined in the holdings of other circuits that Title III meets the constitutional tests for electronic surveillance set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1966). See also United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 63, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 2622, 41 L.Ed.2d 223 (1974). The statute in question is constitutional. II. ALLEGED INVALIDITY OF ORDER UPON BASIS THAT AUTHORIZATION TO APPLY THEREFOR WAS NOT PERSONALLY DELEGATED 18 U.S.C. § 2516 provides that the Attorney General or any Assistant Attorney General specifically designated by the Attorney General may authorize an application for a wiretap. Here, authorization was given by Assistant Attorney General Philip B. Heymann (in charge of the Criminal Division) pursuant to Order No. 799-78 entered by Attorney General Griffin Bell on August 15, 1978 (Defendant’s Exhibit No. 21). In August, 1979, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti succeeded the Honorable Griffin Bell as Attorney General, although no new Order was issued prior to the wiretap authorization nor was the August 15, 1978 Order revoked. Two courts have specifically addressed the contention of Defendants which attempts to narrowly construe wiretap authorization from being exercised by any individuals other than the Attorney General or Assistant Attorney General and the issue of whether a general order of delegation survives the resignation of Attorney General Griffin Bell. United States v. Wyder, 674 F.2d 224, 226-27 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 2944, 73 L.Ed.2d 1340 (1982) and United States v. Mallory, 507 F.Supp. 99 (D.Md. 1981), both hold that the general rule that acts of administrative officials continue in effect after the end of their tenure until revoked or altered by their successors in office applies in the circumstances sub judice. The correspondence of October 16, 1980, from Philip B. Heymann, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division, to Philip Wilens, Director of the Office of Enforcement Operations, clearly demonstrates that the surveillance was properly authorized within the meaning of United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). The specific designation was lawful because it delegated authority to the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, not a specific named individual. United States v. Wyder, supra, and United States v. Mallory, supra; United States v. Todisco, 667 F.2d 255 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 906, 102 S.Ct. 1250, 71 L.Ed.2d 444 (1982). Some Defendants (not Harvey) also argue that paragraph 2 of the authorization order (Defendant’s Exhibit No. 4) limits the Assistant Attorney General’s authorized power to those situations under § 2518(7) dealing with emergencies. The plain reading of the statute demonstrates that the authority is contained in the conjunctive and does not limit the power of the Assistant Attorney General to the specific emergency situations but instead permits the Assistant Attorney General to have additional authority to act specifically in emergency situations. This wiretap was not authorized under the § 2518 emergency provision and the language in paragraph 2 of the authorization order is not applicable. Section 2516 sets up a procedure for authorization to submit an application to a judge. It does not set forth the criteria for making application to a judge; rather, it defines the requirement of obtaining the Attorney General’s authorization. Therefore, Defendant’s argument that it was improper for the Assistant Attorney General to authorize U.S. Attorney Atlee Wampler, who in turn allegedly improperly authorized Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen Gillman, is without merit. United States v. Bowdach, 366 F.Supp. 1368 (S.D.Fla.1973), aff’d 501 F.2d 220 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948, 95 S.Ct. 1331, 43 L.Ed.2d 426 (1975). Therefore, the authorization to apply for the subject order and its extensions was validly in force and exercised. III. AUTHORIZATION OF F.B.I. AGENTS TO INVESTIGATE DRUG-RELATED OFFENSES 18 U.S.C. § 2516 provides that applications may be made for authority by the FBI, or a federal agency having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to which the application is made, to conduct the wiretap surveillance. Defendants argue that since § 2518(4)(d) requires that the identity of the agency authorizing the intercept of the communication be set out in the order of authorization and since § 2510(7) defines an investigative or law enforcement officer to mean an officer empowered by law to conduct investigations for offenses under § 2516, the Court’s order was invalid. Defendants argue that the order purported to authorize FBI personnel to conduct drug-related surveillance when responsibility for investigating those offenses lies with the DEA and not the FBI. Defendants argue that the FBI does not have jurisdiction over drug investigations and therefore the wiretap order was invalid since it authorized the FBI to conduct drug-related surveillance. The Government argues that neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history support the Defendants’ contention that the Act restricted the FBI’s wiretap authority to only those offenses which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the FBI. First, it should be noted that among the offenses to be investigated by the Order (Defendant’s Exhibit No. 4 and amended Order, Defendant’s Exhibit No. 5) is RICO, which Defendants do not argue is outside the FBI’s jurisdiction. The basic offenses involved a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 and 1962 (RICO) which clearly entail a series of drug-related crimes. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir.1981). Moreover, the RICO allegation in this investigation was not limited to strictly drug-related offenses. It also allegedly involved bribery of public officials, murder, stolen car engines and conspiracy to commit murders, each constituting a separate violation of Florida Statutes. (Defendant’s Exhibits Nos. 2 & 3). The investigation of these offenses provided a jurisdictional basis within 28 U.S.C. § 501, et seq. and 28 C.F.R. § 0.85. A review of the legislative history to § 2516(1) supports a “plain meaning” interpretation as to the responsibilities envisioned for the FBI in the investigation of such offenses. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report, S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 97 (1968), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1968, pp. 2112, 2186 explains § 2516(1) as follows: The order of authorization may permit the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Federal agency having responsibility for the investigation of the offense involved to intercept the wire or oral communication. The Department of Justice under the leadership of the Attorney General must be the central focal point of any drive against organized crime, particularly in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information. It is appropriate that no limitation be placed on the investigations in which the investigative arm of the Department may participate. Organized crime has not limited itself to the commission of any particular offense. No limitation should be placed on the Department of Justice. This passage speaks of possible judicial authorization of interceptions by “the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Federal agency having responsibility for the investigation of the offense.... ” It does not indicate that the FBI must have general investigative responsibility for a given offense before it may be authorized under § 2516(1) to participate in an interception directed at such an offense. Section 2516 and the legislative history demonstrate that it was not necessary for the FBI to have specific investigative responsibilities for specific offenses before it could participate in court-approved interceptions directed at those offenses involved herein. The Defendant’s argument does not find support in either the statute or the history of the Act. IV. MARIJUANA-RELATED DRUG OFFENSES MAY BE PREDICATE RACKETEERING ACTS UNDER RICO Defendant candidly concedes (p. 1060) that decisions in this circuit have found marijuana-related drug offenses to fall within RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (“any offense involving ... the felonious ... importation ... or otherwise dealing in narcotics or other dangerous drugs ... ”) See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1039-40 (5th Cir.1981) (“Marijuana may be the subject matter of a RICO charge.”) Decisions in this circuit have held that marijuana-related drug offenses fall within RICO. United States v. Phillips, supra. While Defendant goes on to detail the basis for his contention that such decisions are in error, this Court is nevertheless bound by them until an en bane Eleventh Circuit holds otherwise. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Alabama, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). V. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE OCTOBER 20, 1980 ORDER 1. Sufficiency of probable cause in the Affidavit itself. This subsection will treat Defendants’ attack upon the sufficiency of the affidavit to establish probable cause within its four corners; except that there is excluded, at this point, all matters relating to the sufficiency of missing page 21C and its context within the affidavit and under Franks v. Delaware, infra. This latter exception will be discussed later in this Opinion. Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684-2685, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), there is a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting a search warrant or court order for electronic surveillance. To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger’s attack must be supported by more than conclusory allegations, and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine. A defendant seeking an evidentiary hearing on the probable cause shown by affidavits presented to the court must make “a substantial preliminary showing that the statements in the affidavits concerning facts material to the finding of probable cause are deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 621 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935, 100 S.Ct. 2151, 64 L.Ed.2d 787. The allegations of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth must be accompanied by an offer of proof which points out specifically the portion of the warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false and should be accompanied by a statement of supporting reasons. Franks, supra. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished or their absence satisfactorily explained— allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. The deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is permitted by Franks is only that of the affiant, not of any non-governmental informant. And, finally, if the above requirements are met and if when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side there remains sufficient content in the application to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required. See also, United States v. Jeffers, 621 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir.1980). Here, no basis for an evidentiary hearing was established and, in fact, no evidentiary hearing was requested as to the sufficiency of probable cause within the boundaries of the affidavit, except as to the attack founded upon missing page 21C. The same probable cause standard which exists for search warrants is applicable to wiretaps: probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense is being committed, has been committed or is about to be committed. 18 U.S.C. § 2518; Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 1881, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). There need only be a probability of criminal activity rather than a prima facie showing. In issuing the order the judge must exercise his own judgment, gleaned from a common-sense reading of the entire affidavit, as to whether the facts alleged constitute probable cause. When the judge or magistrate acts in this manner, his determination as to probable cause is conclusive in the absence of arbitrariness— i.e., a judge’s determination of probable cause should be accorded great deference by reviewing courts as long as he performed his independent function and did not merely serve as a rubber stamp for the police. Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860, 863 (5th Cir.1973); United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 862 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Marcello, 508 F.Supp. 586, 602-603 (E.D.La. 1981). However, when, as here, much of the information in the affidavit comes from confidential informants, the magistrate’s or judge’s search must be guided by and measured against the standards set forth in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Squella-Avendano, 447 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985, 92 S.Ct. 450, 30 L.Ed.2d 369 (1971). Aguilar requires that the affidavit set forth: (1) the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that criminal activity was afoot and, (2) the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant was credible or the information reliable. The first prong of the Aguilar test concerning reliability can be established if the informant’s past reliability is known. This enables the court to judge the reliability of the current information already obtained. If information from an informant produces fines, savings, recoveries and arrests, they will be attributed to the source as his past record. Thereafter, law enforcement officers can be fairly certain they will have future information from a source with an already proven record of accomplishment. In the instant case, both sources # 1 and # 2 contained in the affidavit have built a track record of reliable information which culminated in numerous law enforcement statistics. (¶¶27, 28.) Based on their past records, it was possible for Judge Spellman to estimate that their reliability would be no less in this case. The second prong of the Aguilar test, namely, whether an informant’s tip contains the underlying circumstances from which he arrived at his information, is equally important to establishing probable cause. The affidavit in support of the order delves into great detail as to how source # 1 came into possession of his information. (¶¶ 29-36.) It is replete with instances of personal knowledge including eyewitness accounts of criminal wrongdoing by certain Defendants. (¶¶ 34-37.) Other inputs by source # 1 as to underlying circumstances relate personal contacts with Defendants in which they admit criminal conduct, such as when one of the Defendants advised source # 1 of the details as to how offload personnel are paid for their services. (¶ 33.) Moreover, source # 2 also has personal knowledge of the information contained in the affidavit. Any observances which were less than actual criminal conduct on the part of the Defendants were minimal. Even those instances are bottomed on occasions when defendants told the source about their narcotics activity or showed the source evidence of narcotics activity (see ¶ 74, where source # 2 was shown from 3 to 4 million dollars by William Joseph Harvey and told it was from his narcotics transaction). In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the Aguilar test of reliability could be enhanced by law enforcement corroboration of limited aspects of the informant’s report through the use of independent sources. See also United States v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 927, 99 S.Ct. 2041, 60 L.Ed.2d 402 (1979). That this very tool was employed on numerous occasions is evidenced by the instant affidavit which indicates many surveillances by the FBI and attempts at corroboration of source information through independent investigation. Such examples of independent evaluators taken by themselves do not purport to suggest criminal wrongdoing, but, when added to source information, have the corroborative effect of supporting that information. Spinelli, supra, 393 U.S. at 418, 89 S.Ct. at 590; United States v. Hirschhorn, 649 F.2d 360 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Escandar, 319 F.Supp. 295, 304 (S.D.Fla. 1970). In most cases it is the detail provided by the information in combination with the corroboration by independent investigation that satisfies the court's concern with credibility and reliability. United States v. Cummings, 507 F.2d 324 (8th Cir.1974); United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied 417 U.S. 908, 94 S.Ct. 2604, 41 L.Ed.2d 212 (1974). Both sources # 1 and # 2 had furnished information to the FBI over a protracted period of time which, when taken by itself, displayed intimate detail that could come only from persons who were integrally situated within the circle of Defendants’ activities. This information, when combined with the FBI’s independent corroboration of much of the information through verification of non-incriminating facts, would lead a man of reasonable prudence to believe that an offense has been committed based upon the facts and circumstances contained in the affidavit. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). Defendant Sikes attempts to discredit the affidavit by taking issue with isolated instances within the probable cause summary. His allegation that paragraphs 20,21 and 23 are not specific enough is unwarranted, however, as those items are merely part of the “BACKGROUND” section. Defendant Harvey’s attacks on probable cause take place in the statement of facts where certain items are branded as nebulous and other substantial items are simply glossed over. In fact, the only specific attack by either Harvey or Sikes’ motion is on paragraph 74c where source # 2 heard several people in a bar talking about offloads. Sikes, however, omits the specificity contained in the paragraph which described the amount of marijuana, the two locations, the three individuals in charge, and the corroborative source information that Harvey had “a business deal in Miami.” (¶ 74.) In any event, source # 2 as well as source # 1 and the “concerned citizen” each provide specific, detailed, corroborated and reliable information throughout the affidavit. The description of each source’s reliability (see ¶¶ 27-28) provides a textbook example of vouching for an informational source. This is in strong contrast with the case of United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th Cir.1978), wherein the court upheld an affidavit in which the sole verification of the confidential informants was that they were “believed to be reliable.” It also is clear, from a thorough reading of the affidavit, that the source information comes not from “double hearsay”, as Sikes contends, but in the form of first person observations of, and conversations with, the principal subjects. The affidavit is replete with direct evidence supplied not only by the unnamed witness but also by such named individuals as Cheryl Campbell, Demetria Leiman, Robin Sorrentino, Janet Harris, Michael Sorrentino, Frank Wilt and Jerry Siciliani. As the Fifth Circuit has stated in assessing defense attempts to scrutinize a surveillance affidavit: We must also be mindful that probable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what police have heard, what they know, and what they observed as trained officers. We weigh not individual layers, but the laminated total. United States v. Weinrich, supra [586 F.2d 481] at 490; quoting United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 895 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc). Even when no particular source is found to be reliable, the fact that a number of informants come forward will supply probable cause. See United States v. Hyde, supra, 574 F.2d at 863. It is also clear that an individual who is a bystander or victim-eyewitness to criminal activity does not have to meet the Aguilar-Spinelli requirements. United States v. Cifarelli, 589 F.2d 180 (5th Cir.1979). The volume of reliable information within the 43-page affidavit of Agent Copus simply cannot be overcome by the Defendants’ arguments. It is adequate in every sense to meet the tests and requirements necessary to support the electronic surveillance orders, with or without missing page 21C. 2. Scope of RICO. Defendant Harvey argues that to warrant the surveillance under RICO the Government had to show that each named subject agreed personally to commit two or more predicate offenses and that an enterprise existed which was composed of a group of persons associated together for the common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. Harvey asserts that there has not been the requisite showing in the affidavits that the persons to be the subject of the electronic surveillance agreed to commit personally two predicate offenses. However, the Government need not prove a prima facie case of RICO conspiracy in the application but need only show the probable cause standard of probability that there was, is, or will be a RICO violation. Similarly, if applied to Harvey’s assertion that the Government did not show the existence of an enterprise, here again, the Government is not required to prove that such an enterprise existed, rather, the Government need establish only that there was probable cause to believe that RICO violations existed. A warrant will not be invalidated by interpreting an affidavit in a hypertechnical sense inasmuch as the affidavit should be viewed in a common sense manner. Considering the affidavit in its entirety, there was probable cause to believe that the persons to be electronically surveilled were part of an enterprise which was engaging in the commission of the predicate offenses and also probable cause to believe that Harvey had agreed to participate in the enterprise through commission of two or more predicate offenses. Other Defendants argue that there was an insufficient showing of probable cause as to that particular defendant. Although § 2518(l)(b) requires inclusion in the application of the identity of persons, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted, this provision is interpreted to place a limit on the Government’s right to obtain a wiretap and information about someone whom they knew in advance was committing the crimes charged and would probably be intercepted. It seeks to prevent the Government from failing to disclose the names of individuals who would probably be intercepted. Defendants argue that the affidavit must set forth sufficient facts for the issuing judge to conclude that there is probable cause to believe that each person named as a person whose conversations would probably be intercepted committed the offenses. This argument was rejected in United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 884-85 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 2408, 60 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1979), wherein the court rejected this restrictive approach by holding that an order can issue upon a probable cause showing with respect to an individual (here, Harvey), but the statute does not require a similar showing as to each person named in the application. 3. Continuation of future conversations about past bribes, homicides, etc. Defendant Harvey argues that there was no showing in the affidavit that there would be future conversations in the Delray Towing office about past bribes or homicides, but rather only a showing that there may be future conversations about marijuana ventures. In addition to the narcotics offenses, the affidavit names other offenses such as murder, bribery, the corruption of a Coast Guard officer and stolen race car engines. The offenses are part and parcel of Harvey’s criminal enterprise, the foundation of which was drug smuggling. The Defendant’s contention that the Government’s proof was only that such events had taken place in the past and would not provide future evidence is a distinction without a difference. Probable cause exists where the affiant’s evidence would support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed. United States v. Flynn, 664 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir.1982). The affidavit, taken in its entirety, shows a criminal enterprise that committed crimes in the past and would do so in the future. It is inherent in such an enterprise that other crimes would be necessary and plans to commit them as well as measures to cover them up would be forthcoming. Courts will not invalidate a warrant by interpreting an affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than common-sense manner. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). That such conversations would occur in the office of William Joseph Harvey at Delray Towing is amply demonstrated throughout the affidavit. Source # 2, (¶¶ 62, 63, 64, 66, 68 and 74B), Cheryl Campbell (¶ 75a), Demetria Leiman through Arthur Sakell (¶ 76), and Janet Harris through John Harris (¶ 124), each described the office as the meeting place for Harvey’s criminal activity discussions. That fact was reinforced by FBI surveillance and the many details provided by Source # 2. Evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). This probable cause attack is without merit. 4. Staleness of the probable cause. Defendant Harvey next argues that the initial probable cause, if it existed, became stale during the first 30-day period of the electronic surveillance because the first three 5-day progress reports did not show any progress. The electronic surveillance was in place on October 24, 1980. The first report on October 29, the second report on November 4, and the third report on November 11, 1980 (at 5-day intervals), each showed no significant conversations. However, the progress report of November 20, showed significant conversations, commencing November 18, 1980. Harvey claims that even if there was initial probable cause, it became stale since no relevant conversations were intercepted until November 18, 1980. Section 2518(6) provides that a judge may require progress reports to be made. United States v. Iannelli, 477 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir.1973), aff’d 420 U.S. 770, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975), held that the sufficiency of progress reports was a matter for the supervising judge and his discretion to permit the continuation of the surveillance when reports are sketchy, must be viewed in light of the fact that there is no requirement for such reports by the statute. Also, the activities in which Harvey was alleged to be engaged were part of an ongoing narcotics operation, not merely a one-time incident. Therefore, since the very conduct which the surveillance seeks to disclose is of a protracted or continuing nature, the time element is of less significance. See United States v. Weinrich, supra; United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 865 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Tucker, 638 F.2d 1292, 1299 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833, 102 S.Ct. 132, 70 L.Ed.2d 111 (1981). The facts of this case indicate an ongoing narcotics conspiracy. Aside from speculation or strong suspicion on the part of agents from the FBI, the evidence in the affidavit shows a conspiracy dating back to May, 1979 (¶¶ 39-43), and continuing through September 23, 1980. (¶ 74C.) Actually, the last information was the arrest of Robert Gainer Jernigan and the departure of William Joseph Harvey which was learned of on October 14, 1980. The initial wire interception order was forwarded to Judge Spellman October 17, 1980, and signed October 20, 1980. In United States v. Weinrich, supra, the court stated the basic rule in determining staleness: In general, the basic criterion as to the duration of probable cause is the inherent nature of the crime.... [wjhere an affidavit recites a mere isolated violation then it is not unreasonable to believe that probable cause quickly dwindles with the passage of time. On the other hand, if an affidavit recites activity indicating protracted or continuous conduct, time is of less significance, (emphasis supplied). 586 F.2d at 491. This reasoning was followed by the Second Circuit in a similar case, United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860 (1981); see also, Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860, 864 (5th Cir.1973). Probable cause is not determined by a ritualistic counting of the number of days since the last information and the warrant’s issuance. United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262, 1274 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 2971, 53 L.Ed.2d 1091 (1977). Each case must be determined on its own facts. United States v. Martino, supra; United States v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535, 560 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946, 100 S.Ct. 1345, 63 L.Ed.2d 781 (1980). It must be noted, however, that the number of days in the instant case (27) is comfortably within the time factors courts have mentioned in determining staleness. [See Hyde, supra, 20-46 days; Weinrich, supra, 20 days; United States v. Barfield, 507 F.2d 53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950, 95 S.Ct. 1684, 44 L.Ed.2d 105 (1975), 40 days; Martino, supra, 22 days.] This holding applies even in the absence of the instant added factor of protracted and continuous criminal conduct, a factor which renders time of less significance. Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860, 864 (5th Cir.1973). The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 865 (1978), considered the above doctrine in relation to a wiretap application used in an investigation of ongoing narcotics trafficking: The upshot of this rule in practical application has been to allow a fairly long period of time to elapse between information and search warrant in cases where the evidence clearly shows a longstanding, ongoing pattern of criminal activity. This result is even more defensible in wiretap cases than in ordinary search warrant eases, since no tangible objects which can be quickly carried off are sought. The court then had no trouble finding that, in a conspiracy that had lasted over two years, information that was less than two months old was not stale. There is no merit to the argument with regard to staleness. 5. Necessity showing for the order was inadequate (use of alternative investigative techniques). Harvey alleges that the statements of FBI Agent Copus on the need for interception in ¶¶ 130-144 do not meet the statutory requirements of § 2518(3), that less intrusive/normal investigative techniques have failed, probably would fail, or are too dangerous. Harvey alleges that Copus was not an expert in drug investigations so his statements cannot be viewed as expert testimony on the subject and that the reasons given are inadequate: informants are afraid and unwilling to testify; the defendants have evaded detection and surveillance; difficulty of conducting physical surveillance; not able to place an agent in the operation; grand jury immunity techniques would be unfruitful; and a search warrant would be ineffective. The purpose of § 2518(3) is to inform the issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of commonplace techniques. United States v. Robertson, 504 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913, 95 S.Ct. 1568, 43 L.Ed.2d 778 (1975). The more traditional techniques need not be exhausted if they are impractical or costly and inconvenient. Id. It is also true that the determination that other investigative techniques will not succeed may not be based upon affidavits that include only bare conclusory statements. United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir.1978). The affidavit clearly meets the tests set out in the statute and case law. Agent Copus is an FBI agent who has been assigned for the two previous years to other narcotics investigations. Additionally, the affidavit is not merely conclusory but states the reasons why traditional methods have failed and would fail. There is a sufficient basis for the Order’s conclusion that the traditional methods would not be successful, and since the government’s burden of establishing compliance with this section is not great and considerable discretion rests with the issuing judge in deciding whether other investigative techniques might be successfully employed, there has been an adequate showing by the government that other methods have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or would be too dangerous. See United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 20 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855, 98 S.Ct. 174, 54 L.Ed.2d 126 (1977); United States v. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428, 431 (7th Cir.1976). As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out, § 2518(l)(c) and (3)(c) must be read in a common sense fashion. They are “simply designed to assure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.” United States v. De La Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 537-38 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932, 97 S.Ct. 2640, 53 L.Ed.2d 249 (1977), quoting United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 977, 983 n. 12, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974). The statute does not require that all possible techniques be tried before a wiretap may be authorized. See United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d at 868, and eases cited therein. Rather, its purpose is simply to inform the issuing judge of the difficulties involved in the use of conventional techniques. United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909, 95 S.Ct. 1558, 43 L.Ed.2d 774 (1975). The provision contemplates that the showing be tested in practical and common sense fashion. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 100 U.S.Code Cong, and Admin.News (1968), pp. 2112, 3290; United States v. Robertson, supra. The Fifth Circuit also has stated in United States v. McCoy, 539 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919, 97 S.Ct. 2185, 53 L.Ed.2d 230 (1977), that in order to uphold the wiretap order the affidavit need only supply a “factual predicate” adequate to support the judge’s implicit finding that investigative procedures appear unlikely to succeed. Both Sikes and Harvey have filed motions which state that there was insufficient necessity to utilize electronic surveillance. Both fail to supply a reasonable alternative upon which the government could have proceeded. An item by item breakdown of the Defendants’ argument, in concert with the respective responses by the Government, reveals a lawful basis for the surveillance pursuant to § 2518(1)(c) and (3)(c). As numerous courts have stated, it is a difficult proposition to be very specific when one endeavors to prove a negative such as the Defendants suggest. Courts will not set unduly burdensome standards on the Government’s demonstration that no reasonable alternative existed. See United States v. Steinberg, 525 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971, 96 S.Ct. 2167, 48 L.Ed.2d 794 (1976). Considerable discretion rests with the issuing judge in deciding whether other investigative methods might have been successfully employed. United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855, 98 S.Ct. 174, 54 L.Ed.2d 126 (1977); United States v. Smith, 519 F.2d 516 (9th Cir.1975); United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434 (8th Cir.1976). Also, as stated in United States v. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428, 431 (7th Cir.1976): “the government’s burden of establishing its compliance with [subsection 2518(l)(c)] is not great.” See also, United States v. Askins, 351 F.Supp. 408, 414 (D.Md.1972). Defendant Harvey alleges that the qualifications of FBI Agent Copus in the area of drug-related investigations somehow render his evaluation of alternative procedures insufficient. His allegation that Copus lacks the expert abilities necessary in this case ignores the affidavit which states Copus’ qualifications to investigate RICO violations and apply for the instant order under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7). Further, the affidavit documents Copus’ two years of experience in the area of complex narcotics importation and distribution conspiracies. (¶¶ 1-2.) Harvey’s allegation concerning Copus’ lack of drug related training does not stand up in light of the affidavit and the further explanation that Copus was stationed at the Drug Enforcement Agency for two years working on solely drug-related offenses. Additionally, the Defendant cites no legal basis for his theory that an affidavit by an individual with even no training in the drug-related field (assuming this was a totally drug-related case) would render an otherwise proper affidavit insufficient. Normal investigative techniques have been amply demonstrated by the Government to be inadequate for the circumstances which necessitated and gave probable cause for issuance of the electronic surveillance here. VI. SEALING REQUIREMENTS Defendants Harvey, Sikes and co-defendants contend that the sealing requirements of § 2518(8) were not fulfilled in that no directions were contained in the order as to the care, custody or sealing of tapes and because the original intercepted tapes from the October 20, 1980 initial 30-day period were not sealed until January 23, 1981. Some defendants also maintain that they did not receive an inventory following the termination of the wiretaps. Section 2518(8) provides that “immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings should be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed under his direction. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders.” Here, the tapes were sealed on January 23, 1981, three (3) days after the termination of the last intercept order (Defendant’s Exhibits 59(b) and 42). Case law clearly holds that the tapes do not have to be sealed until the end of the extension orders, i.e., at the termination of the entire surveillance. United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 2231, 56 L.Ed.2d 401 (1978); United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1275-76 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979). A delay of three (3) days after termination is reasonable and acceptable under the statute. United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874, 96 S.Ct. 142, 46 L.Ed.2d 105 (1975) (delay of fourteen (14) days with no showing of prejudice to the defendants). Defendants also contend that the initial authorization order must specify the procedures for sealing, care and custody of the tapes. The Act does not so state. Such a procedure may be prudent but there is no requirement that it be followed or included. United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 507 (2d Cir.1976). The Government contends, and there appears nothing to contradict it, that the tapes were preserved and maintained in a manner equivalent to that in United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 624 (6th Cir.1976). The tapes were locked in an FBI evidence vault until January 23, 1981, when they were sealed in the presence of the Honorable Eugene P. Spellman (Defendant’s Exhibit 59-B.) The propriety of the sealing of the tapes was demonstrated in open court on June 30, 1982, when, after notice to all Defendants, two of the five boxes of the tapes were opened. All seals which bore the signature of Judge Spellman were intact. This complies with the standard set forth in § 2518(8). The Congressional purposes in the sealing requirements were to safeguard recordings from editing or alteration and to maintain the confidentiality of the recordings. United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988, 99 S.Ct. 584, 58 L.Ed.2d 661 (1978). The real determination therefore is merely whether the tapes were properly and expeditiously sealed, the seals kept intact and the cartons kept in a secure area. There has been no evidence adduced which would taint any of the foregoing requirements nor furnish a basis to suppress for improper sealing requirements. Time for service of notice of inventory under § 2518(8)(d) was extended by court order to July 18,1981. The statute requires no more than reasonable efforts to reach persons within the Act’s inventory group. Suppression is mandated only if the defendants receive notice on the eve of trial and were able to show prejudice resulting from the delay or non-compliance. United v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 564 (7 Cir.1975). No prejudice has been shown from failure to receive a notice by any defendant. According to the government, the deadline for service of inventory was July 18, 1981 (Defendant’s Exhibit 45-B.) On July 13,1981, a letter post-marked July 15,1981, was sent to Joseph William Campbell who raises this issue of failure to furnish notice of inventory at his last known address by certified mail. The letter was returned “unclaimed”. (See Exhibit AS submitted by the government with Omnibus Response.) Defendant Campbell received notice some time between July 15, 1981, and September 9, 1981 (See Exhibit AT as submitted by government with Omnibus Response.) There is no basis upon which to suppress on this ground raised by Campbell. VII. THE ORDER OF NOVEMBER 20, 1980 WAS ALLEGEDLY INVALID 1. Carry-Over Objections. By reference thereto, the Defendants carry over their objections raised to the October 20, 1980 order relating to the various issues above-discussed. For the reasons previously enumerated the same rulings apply here and the carry-over objections are deemed to be inadequate and insubstantial. 2. Insufficient probable cause for an extension. Defendant Harvey claims that there was no showing of a RICO enterprise or an agreement involving Defendant Harvey in the initial 30-day intercept. However, the government can rely on the conversations intercepted during the initial surveillance to provide probable cause for renewal as well as relying upon the probable cause supplied in the initial application. The issue is whether the progress reports, initial application and application for extension and the affidavits of the initial and extension orders support a finding of probable cause. Since the progress reports during the first 30-day period from November 18,1980 onward indicate conversations dealing with drug transactions, there is an even stronger showing of probable cause as to those offenses in support of the first extension order. United States v. Fury, 554 F.2d 522 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 931, 98 S.Ct. 2831, 56 L.Ed.2d 776 (1978). Further, it is permissible that a wiretap continue until the government accumulates enough evidence to determine the scope of the conspiracy and the identity of the individuals involved. See United States v. McCoy, 539 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919, 97 S.Ct. 2185, 53 L.Ed.2d 230 (1977). 3. Was the district judge without authority to execute an extension order outside his territorial jurisdiction but operative within his territorial jurisdiction? In the instant case, Judge Spellman signed the original surveillance order of October 20, 1980, in Miami, Florida. (Defendant’s Exhibit 4.) During the week of November 20, 1980, Judge Spellman, along with other judges of the Southern District of Florida, was in Sarasota, Florida (Middle District of Florida), attending a judicial seminar. FBI Agents Harold Copus and Stephen Conger, along with Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen Gillman, went to Sarasota where the order of November 20 was presented. Judge Spellman called the Administrative Office and was apprised that he had authority to entertain the extension application in Sarasota, Florida (Defendant’s Exhibit 54A), dated November 21, 1980. When reviewing judicial authority under 18 U.S.C. § 2518, an examination of the authority provided to judges/magistrates to issue search warrants under Rule 41, Fed.R. Crim.P., is relevant. The similarity between the wiretap statute and the rule governing search warrants is obvious. Both provisions require that government applications be made to judicial officers and be supported by sworn testimony or affidavits. Compare, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) and Rule 41(c)(1), Fed.R.Crim.P. Likewise, an order or search warrant must meet the constitutional mandates of probable cause and particularity as reflected in United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 427-28, 97 S.Ct. 658, 667-668, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977); see also, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) and (4) and Rule 41(c), Fed.R.Crim.P. Finally, Congress intended that 18 U.S.C. § 2518 be interpreted in light of existing law under Rule 41. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2189. This analogous treatment of wiretap applications and search warrants provides the basis for allowing federal judges while physically outside their territorial jurisdiction to authorize wiretap extensions which will be executed within the territorial district of the judge. The specific issue of a federal magistrate’s authority to sign a search warrant outside his territorial jurisdiction was addressed in United States v. Strother, 578 F.2d 397 (D.C.Cir.1978). The court noted that “[j]udges have proverbially signed papers'or done other acts outside their territorial jurisdiction which have effect — and can only have effect — within those respective jurisdictions.” Id. at 400. In interpreting the language of Rule 41(a), the court focused its attention not on the physical location of the judge when signing an order but on the judge’s authority where the order will be executed. The court stated that “.. . the search warrant can only be operative in the territory in respect of which the issuing officer is clothed with judicial authority. It is not intended, we believe, to require that under all circumstances the physical acts involved in the issuance of a warrant be performed in that territory.” Id. at 399 (footnote omitted); See also United States v. Gomez, 495 F.Supp. 992, 1012 (S.D.N.Y.1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 1695, 68 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981). It is the place of execution, not the location of the judge, which determines the authority of a judge to issue a court order. In the instant case, Judge Spellman authorized, on November 20, 1980, the extension of a surveillance order for an office located within his judicial district, the Southern District of Florida. Moreover, this same district judge had previously authorized the initial order of October 20, 1980. The Court takes judicial notice that for many years past and including the calendar year 1980, there was in effect a blanket order issued by the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Fifth Circuit) cross-designating each district judge in each district of Florida with judicial authority to sijt in every other district in Florida without further order. Here, Judge Spellman did even less by executing an order operative within his own district, although executed in another district of Florida. Judge Spellman’s extension order of November 20, 1980 was valid. VIII. THE ORDER OF DECEMBER 19, 1980 WAS ALLEGEDLY INVALID 1. Carry-Over Objections. Here again, the Defendants readopt their arguments that the October 20, 1980 order and the November 20 extension were invalid on the basis of grounds previously enumerated. The same rulings of this Court are applied and the order and extension are deemed to be valid. 2. Prior failure to name Defendant Kay as a target. Defendant Kay was not listed in the initial October 20 application and order nor in the November 20 extension application and order as a person known to be committing the offenses for which the surveillance is sought and whose communications are to be intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(a). However, in the December 4, 1980 progress report the Government informed the judge that they had identified Kay as a person whose oral communications may be intercepted. Accordingly, in the December 4 progress report and in the December 17,1980 application for an extension of the court’s surveillance authorization the Government sought authorization to intercept Kay’s conversations. This authorization was subsequently granted by Judge Spellman in his December 19, 1980 order authorizing the continued interception. The Court finds from the evidence introduced at the suppression hearing that the FBI only identified Kay as a person known to be committing the offense and whose conversations are likely to be intercepted on or about December 2, 1980. The Court also finds that the December 17 extension application and December 19 order continuing interception comported with § 2518(l)(a). United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 94 S.Ct. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974). Accordingly, there is no basis for suppression for failure to include Defendant Kay in earlier applications and orders as a “target” of the surveillance and the evidence obtained by the surveillance both before and after the December 19, 1980 order can be used against him. United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.1977). IX. ALLEGED § 2517(5) VIOLATION (DISCLOSURE OF TITLE III INTERCEPT AS TO A § 848 OFFENSE) Defendant Harvey argues that because 21 U.S.C. § 848 was not specifically cited in the application, incorporated affidavit, and/or the order authorizing the interception, an order granting authorization to disclose the intercepted communications to the grand jury and at trial in relation to a § 848 offense was necessary under § 2517(5). For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that no violation of § 2517(5) occurred. Although some of the relevant facts have been set out supra, a further brief review of the pertinent facts is helpful. On October 17, 1980, application was made to United States District Judge Eugene P. Spellman by Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen B. Gillman for an order authorizing the interception of oral communications of Defendant Harvey and other named individuals, as well as other persons then unknown. Said application was supported by an extensive and detailed affidavit by FBI Agent Harold Copus setting forth probable cause to believe that Defendant Harvey and ten (10) other persons had been and were then operating a large-scale marijuana smuggling enterprise. The situs of the intercepted communications was to be Defendant Harvey’s office at Delray Towing Service, Inc. in Delray, Florida. The application stated that the subject communications described therein concerned violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (possession with intent to distribute and distribution of narcotics); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute narcotics); and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d) (conducting and conspiring to conduct the affairs of an enterprise, the activities of which affected interstate and foreign commerce, through a pattern of racketeering activity). The predicate offenses relating to 18 U.S.C. § 1962 were enumerated as violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and § 846; bribery in violation of Chapter 838 of the Florida Statutes; dealing in narcotics or dangerous drugs in violation of § 893.13 of the Florida Statutes; and murder and conspiracy to commit murder in violation of §§ 782.04 and 777.04 of the Florida Statutes. On October 20, 1980, based on the application and accompanying affidavit of Agent Copus, Judge Spellman entered an order authorizing the interception of oral communications of the subject individuals relating to the named offenses, and in particular, concerning narcotics transactions, past and future bribery arrangements, narcotics-related murders, the identities of confederates, the subjects’ places of operation, and the full nature and scope of the conspiracy described in the application and affidavit. At five (5) day intervals between October 20, 1980 and November 20, 1980, Judge Spellman received progress reports describing the results of the electronic surveillance. On November 20, 1980, an application was submitted to Judge Spellman for