Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION POLITZ, Circuit Judge: Individually and on behalf of all black persons residing and registered to vote in Louisiana, plaintiffs Barbara Major, Michael Darnell, Bernadine St. Cyr, Brenda Quant and Annie A. Smart brought suit under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief restraining use of the recent realignment of the state’s congressional districts, Act 20 of the 1981 First Extraordinary Session of the Louisiana Legislature. Jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and 42 U.S.C. § 1973j. The gravamen of plaintiffs’ claims is that Act 20 was designed and has the effect of cancelling, minimizing or diluting minority voting strength by dispersing a black population majority in Orleans Parish into two congressional districts. The question posited is whether legislation dividing a highly concentrated black population existing in one geographic and political unit, a parish, into two districts, rather than placing them in a single district in which blacks would constitute a majority, deprives Louisiana’s black voters of the right to effective participation in the electoral process. Facts and Procedural History In November 1981, Act 20 of the Louisiana Legislature’s First Extraordinary Session of 1981 apportioned the state into eight single-member congressional districts. Act 1 of that session established new state representative districts. Both enactments were submitted to the Attorney General of the United States for preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Prior to action by the Attorney General, plaintiffs filed the instant suit attacking both plans on statutory and constitutional grounds. The case was assigned to the docket of Judge Robert F. Collins. On June 1, 1982, the Justice Department interposed a § 5 objection to Act 1, rendering that legislation unenforceable. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Judge Collins denied as moot plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate their complaint with one filed by a prospective congressional candidate which was later dismissed for want of a justiciable case or controversy. Robert E. Couhig, Jr. v. James L. Brown, Secretary of State, 538 F.Supp. 1086 (E.D. La.). Defendants’ motion seeking a separate trial of the claims of malapportionment of congressional and state representative districts was granted. Acting on plaintiffs’ uncontested motion for partial summary judgment, Judge Collins declared the 1976 congressional districting plan, Act 697 of the 1976 Louisiana Legislature, unconstitutional because of large population variances among districts when viewed in light of data developed in the 1980 census. This three-judge court was designated by Chief Judge Charles Clark of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on June 10, 1982. On June 18, 1982, Act 20 was precleared by the Attorney General. After Act 1, as subsequently modified by the Louisiana Legislature, was approved by the Attorney General, plaintiffs amended their complaint to withdraw their challenge to the reapportionment of the Louisiana House of Representatives. In addition, plaintiffs amended their complaint to assert a cause of action under the 1982 amendments to § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973. By order dated March 7, 1983, this court reaffirmed Judge Collins’ invalidation of Act 697. We granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2), designating a class of persons consisting of all black registered voters residing in the State of Louisiana. Finally, we determined that 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) vested in this court jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs’ statutory and constitutional claims. Trial was held from March 7 through March 10, 1983. Decision was deferred pending briefing and oral argument. Having considered the evidence adduced at trial, together with the pleadings, briefs, and oral argument of counsel, the court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in conformity with Fed.R. Civ.P. 52(a). Findings of Fact Every ten years a reapportionment of existing congressional districts is compelled by Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution and by Article 3, § 1 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. In 1972, Louisiana’s eight congressional districts were realigned based on data developed in the 1970 census. At that time the ideal district population was 455,580 persons. While the state remains entitled to eight representatives following the 1980 census, the ideal district population has increased to 525,497 persons. The issue before us principally involves the New Orleans metropolitan area, which encompasses the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, St. Tammany, Plaquemines and St. Bernard. The 1980 census figures reveal pronounced demographic changes in this area. During the decade of the 1970s, Orleans Parish (coterminous with the City of New Orleans) experienced a marked change and a slight decline in population. While overall population declined, the black population increased. The city/parish now has a black population of 308,039 persons, which constitutes 55% of the total population, 48.93% of the voting age population, and 44.89% of the registered voters. With the exception of affluent white neighborhoods located in the city’s Garden District and French Quarter, along the lakefront, and near Tulane and Loyola Universities, the black populace is largely concentrated in one contiguous expanse of the inner city. By contrast, the predominantly white, suburban parishes of Jefferson and St. Tammany, which flank the central city, have undergone explosive population growth. According to the 1980 census, Jefferson Parish, with a 13.9% black population, a 13.75% black voting age population, and a 10.45% black voter registration, is nearly 87% the size of the ideal congressional district. Unlike Orleans Parish, Jefferson Parish’s black population is diffused throughout the parish. Prior to the recent demographic shifts, New Orleans had enough people to form the dominant majority in two congressional districts. Now only 1.06 times the size of the ideal district, as defined by the 1980 census, New Orleans’ traditional dominance of two congressional districts is no longer supported by its population. Under the 1972 redistricting plan, the First Congressional District, presently represented by Robert Livingston, encompassed St. Bernard, Plaquemines and St. Tammany Parishes, together with the lakefront, eastern Mid-City, Algiers and New Orleans east sections of Orleans Parish. An overlay of the 1980 census data to that district, as configured under the 1972 plan, reflects a 36.5% black population and 28.4% black voter registration. The Second Congressional District, presently represented by Lindy Boggs, covers those portions of Jefferson Parish to the south (West Bank) and immediately north (East Bank) of the Mississippi River, as well as New Orleans’ central business district, French Quarter, Uptown or Garden District and western Mid-City, all situated within the boundaries of Orleans Parish. Application of the 1980 census data to the 1972 boundaries of the Second District shows that 49.7% of the population and 34% of the registered voters are black. See Exhibit “A” attached. Legislative History of Act 20 Early in 1981, members of the Louisiana House and Senate research staffs were instructed to collate the 1980 population data compiled by the United States Bureau of the Census, and to ascertain the extent of malapportionment, if any, under the 1972 plan. With the assistance of the Louisiana State University’s Division of Research Services, House and Senate research staffs converted the data thus obtained from a census tract to a political subdivision, or precinct, basis. These validated data, referred to as the Weber data, included population and voter registration figures, and provided the exclusive data base for congressional redistricting in both houses. Recognizing the need for realignment of the state’s congressional districts, the legislature established the Louisiana House and Senate Joint Congressional Reapportionment Committee. In July, at the close of the regular 1981 session, each house appointed legislators to ad hoc congressional reapportionment subcommittees functioning under the jurisdiction of two standing committees, the Senate Committee on Senate and Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on House and Governmental Affairs. Senator Thomas H. Hudson chaired the Senate Congressional Reapportionment Subcommittee; Representative John W. Scott chaired its House counterpart. There were four black legislators on the joint committee. No black legislator was appointed to either subcommittee. State-wide public hearings soliciting citizen input were conducted by the subcommittees from July through October 1981. One of the principal issues debated in the various fora concerned the possibility of fashioning a district centered in Orleans Parish, which, as the 1980 census data reflected, had a black population of 55%. Representative Richard Turnley, in his capacity as Chairman of the Louisiana Legislative Black Caucus, testified before the joint reapportionment committee in support' of the proposition that the state’s minority constituency would be best served by the structuring of an Orleans Parish-based district which maintained the cohesiveness of the metropolitan black community. Minutes of several public hearings held in August 1981 reveal that other legislators, both white and black, shared this view. Other considerations identified as important to the reapportionment process were compactness, contiguity, respect for parish lines, and a recognition of ethnic, cultural and geographic differences. Based on the recommendations of legislative counsel, the House subcommittee promulgated several rules for the designing of congressional districts. Embodied in these rules were the principles of strict compliance with the “one-person, one-vote” axiom, allowing for a maximum deviation of only .5%, and the unacceptability of any proposal shown to have either the goal or the effect of diluting minority voting strength. Identical criteria were endorsed by the Senate subcommittee. During the first joint meeting on August 21, 1981, these guidelines were formally adopted. Several groups submitted proposals to the joint committee or the two subcommittees, among them Governor Dave Treen and the Louisiana congressional delegation. None of the Governor’s three proposed plans, denominated Treen A, B, and C, contemplated a majority black district. During this period the Governor publicly expressed his opposition to the concept of a majority black district, stating that districting schemes motivated by racial considerations, however benign, smacked of racism, and in any case were not constitutionally required. Guided by the joint committee’s reapportionment criteria and the views articulated at the public hearings held throughout the summer and fall of 1981, the Senate research staff prepared more than 50 plans. The staff was directed to formulate a plan containing an Orleans Parish-dominated district. Such a district would necessarily have a black majority population. Michael Baer, Secretary of the Senate and the official charged with supervising legislative drafting procedures, ensured compliance with such well-established reapportionment guidelines as one-person, one-vote, compactness, respect for the integrity of geographic boundaries, preservation of communities of interest, and non-retrogression. Partisan political concerns also figured prominently in the confection of the various plans, among them the desires of Jefferson Parish political leaders, including Tax Assessor Lawrence C. Chehardy, for the creation of a district composed primarily of that parish. To achieve these goals, the Senate staff developed a plan which, as the result of the sponsorship of Senator Samuel B. Nunez, Jr. of St. Bernard Parish, would subsequently be referred to as the “Nunez Plan.” See Exhibit “B” attached. As drafted, this plan envisaged one black and seven white population majority districts. Nunez’s proposed First Congressional District, 72% of which was made up of Jefferson Parish, combined that area of the parish lying west of the Mississippi River with Orleans Parish’s Ward 15, and the parishes of Plaquemines and St. Bernard. The proposed Second Congressional District consisted almost entirely of Orleans Parish (94.9%), together with 25 contiguous precincts drawn from east Jefferson Parish. St. Tammany was restored to the Sixth Congressional District, from which it had been excised during the 1960s. By allocating separate districts to majority black, urban Orleans Parish and virtually all-white residential Jefferson Parish, Nunez took into account the divergent, frequently antithetical, concerns of city and suburban dwellers, as well as parish lines and the natural geographic barrier erected by the Mississippi River. Utilizing 1980 census figures, Nunez’s Second District would be 54% black in population and 43% black in voter registration. The First District would have a black population of 17.9% and a black voter registration of 12%. On the House side, the legislative staff devised a plan which largely adhered to parish lines and left intact the concentration of blacks residing in Orleans Parish. Named for its sponsor, Representative Scott, this plan envisioned a 50.2% black population majority and 44% black registered voter population in the Second Congressional District, and a 22.5% black population and 17% black registered voter population in the First District. Governor Treen summoned the legislature into extraordinary session on November 2, 1981 for the purpose, inter alia, of legislative and congressional reapportionment. Various bills to reapportion the eight congressional districts were filed on the first day of the session, among them the Nunez Plan, introduced in the Senate by Senators Nunez and Tiemann as S.B. 5, and the Scott Plan, introduced in the House by Representative Scott as H.B. 2. Of all bills referred to the standing Senate and House committees on governmental affairs, only S.B. 5 and H.B. 2 received favorable committee action. Members of the Louisiana Black Caucus united with the Jefferson Parish forces, led by Nunez and Chehardy, in urging passage of the Nunez Plan. That Nunez and Che-hardy were principally concerned with establishing a district controlled by predominantly white Jefferson Parish was of little import to black legislators, who advocated the plan’s concomitant formation of a majority black district in Orleans Parish. On November 4, 1981, S.B. 5 was reported out of committee with minor substantive amendments and onto the Senate floor, where it was passed by a vote of 31 to 6. A move to amend S.B. 5 to substitute Governor Treen’s Plan A was defeated, and S.B. 5 was sent to the House for further action. H.B. 2 was simultaneously reported out of House committee and placed on the House calendar on November 4, 1981, along with an amendment to substitute Governor Treen’s Plan B for the Scott Plan. The House Committee on House and Governmental Affairs received S.B. 5 on November 5, 1981, but declined to amend H.B. 2 to adopt the Senate bill. Representative Charles Bruneau, a member of the committee, testified that his vote in committee against S.B. 5 resulted from the plan’s abandonment of urban New Orleans’ 130-year tradition of electing two congressmen. In proceedings before the full House on Friday, November 6, the representatives declined to amend H.B. 2 to substitute Treen Plan B. Despite the Committee on House and Governmental Affairs’ previous rejection of S.B. 5, the House then voted 61 to 38 to adopt the Nunez Plan by engrafting it on H.B. 2 and dispatched the newly-amended H.B. 2 to the Senate. Some of the 38 negative votes stemmed from the perception that New Orleans would “lose” control of a seat under the Nunez Plan. Also cited was the antagonism of a number of legislators toward the drawing of a district whose racial composition would facilitate the election of a black congressman. Representative Mary Landrieu testified: There were people that supported that plan [Nunez Plan], like myself, because we wanted to be aggressive and pushing for a black district or a district where minority voting strength would be encouraged. And so there were people on the opposite side who didn’t feel they wanted to have a district that would be able to elect a black representative. Record, Vol. Ill at 49. Both houses of the Louisiana Legislature had thus approved reapportionment bills incorporating the Nunez Plan in its entirety, although the House Bill inadvertently left out one precinct. Upon learning of the action of the legislature, Governor Treen announced his intention to veto the Nunez Plan if finally passed. Proponents of the Nunez Plan were keenly aware of the implications of the Governor’s promised veto. Louisiana’s chief executive has considerable power and influence, both de jure and de facto. Testimony reflects that the Louisiana Legislature has never overridden a gubernatorial veto. A sufficient number of legislators changed their position in response to the threatened veto to assure the demise of the Nunez Plan. Because of his decisive role in the defeat of the Nunez Plan after it had received the overwhelming support of both houses of the legislature, Governor Treen’s stated reasons for acting are relevant. At trial, the Governor outlined the considerations which prompted his objection to the Nunez Plan. He described as unfair the submergence of St. Bernard and Plaquemines Parishes under Jefferson Parish, albeit acknowledging that the populations of these two coastal parishes would constitute only a minor portion of any district. The Governor also wished to maintain existing district configurations where possible, protect the incumbent, Livingston, and retain Orleans’ traditional influence in the selection of two representatives. Another concern of the Governor related to racial polarization, which he perceived to be an inevitable consequence of the deliberate sculpting of districts along racial lines. He denounced any legislative scheme which intentionally drew boundary lines so as to consolidate a majority of one race within a single district. He specifically rejected the Nunez Plan, which would create a 55% black district, for this reason. In the state’s § 5 submission to the Justice Department, prepared by counsel and approved by the Governor, this plan was characterized as an attempt by the Louisiana Legislature to enact into law the discredited idea of proportional representation. These concerns were restricted to the aggregation of blacks within one district; the coalescence of whites was not regarded as ominous so long as Congressman Livingston’s chances for re-election were maximized. An Orleans-based district with a 55% black population was not acceptable to the Governor. As later noted, an Orleans-based district with a 55% white population encountered no objection. The court finds that the Governor’s opposition to the Nunez Plan was predicated in significant part on its delineation of a majority black district centered in Orleans Parish. On the morning of November 9,1981, the Governor announced his Reconciliation Plan, cognomened Treen Plan X. Substantially similar to the alternatives previously rejected by the legislature, Plan X provided for eight majority white districts. That afternoon the House reversed its position on the Nunez Plan and, by a vote of 79 to 22, substituted the Reconciliation Plan as the text of S.B. 5. As thus amended, S.B. 5 was returned to the Senate and was there soundly rejected, throwing the matter into conference committee. Appointment of a conference committee was deferred until a compromise acceptable to the Governor could be fashioned. Senate President Michael O’Keefe of New Orleans summoned “interested” parties to a private meeting in the Senate Computer Room, situated in the sub-basement of the State Capitol. Present at varying times were Senators Nunez, O’Keefe and “Hank” Lauricella of Jefferson Parish, Assessor Chehardy, Jefferson Parish Representative John Alario, Louisiana A.F.L.-C.I.O. President Victor Bussie, Congressman Gillis Long, congressional aides to Boggs, Long and Tauzin, and members of the Senate administrative staff. Black legislators were not invited, those responsible for calling the gathering having decided that the goal of crafting a district with a high minority profile would have to be abandoned. A plethora of factors was considered at the meeting. Nunez and Chehardy vigorously urged a district dominated by Jefferson Parish. Treen Plan X, which split the parish three ways, was discarded at the outset of discussions. Also stressed was the necessity of fulfilling the Governor’s objective of guaranteeing the re-election of Congressman Livingston by adding enough white suburban voters to the First District to offset the impact of inner city blacks votes, as well as the desire of several congressmen and state representatives to solidify incumbent Boggs’ electoral base by drawing a district as favorable as possible for her. An obvious consideration was the concentration of blacks in New Orleans and the racial composition of the Second District. Albeit resolved to avert any retrogression of the approximately 40% black population in this district, as configured under the 1972 plan, the goal of fashioning a district which was at least 55% Jefferson Parish militated against raising substantially the black population percentage of that district. Hence the participants determined that the minority’s interest in obtaining a predominantly black district would have to be sacrificed in order to satisfy both the Governor and the Jefferson Parish group. As Chehardy candidly explained: ... the feeling in the meeting was that the one group, the one contingency group that was not going to come out of the session satisfied was going to be the blacks. The reason for that was that with all of the competing interests ... there was probably going to be virtually no way to satisfy the black members of the Legislature ... insofar as creating a majority black district [was concerned]____ They [minority legislators] didn’t have enough votes. Record, Vol. Ill at 28. Working late into the evening, the subbasement conferees ultimately arrived at that synthesis of conflicting interests incorporated into Act 20. See Exhibit “C” attached. Jefferson Parish constitutes approximately 55% of the Second District under the Act; portions of Orleans Parish make up the remainder. St. Tammany, St. Bernard and Plaquemines parishes, together with the lakefront, New Orleans east, and Algiers sections of Orleans Parish, are placed within the First District. The jagged line dividing the First and Second Districts commences in the east below the west bank of the Mississippi River, easting Ward 15 and Plaquemines Parish into District One. Traversing the Mississippi, the line runs north for approximately 15 blocks and juts sharply to the east to sever the southern extremities of Wards 8 and 9, gathering predominantly white neighborhoods within District One. Veering north through the midsection of Ward 9, then west through Wards 9, 7, and 8, the line sweeps the densely-populated black community of central New Orleans into District Two, and the adjoining white neighborhoods which border Lake Ponchartrain into District One. Moving south and west, the line fractures Wards 5, 4, 3, and 2 to separate white and black areas into Districts One and Two, respectively. Ward 14, which is 90% white, is aligned within District One. Tracing a northwesterly path along the east bank of the Mississippi, the line extends north to dissect a discrete black concentration on Carrolton, joining one part with an expanse of white population in Jefferson Parish. The total population, percent deviation from the ideal population, percent black population and percent black registered voters for each district created by Act 20 are as follows: District boundaries fixed by Act 20 are clearly racial in character, selectively segregating white and black residents of New Orleans into the majority white First District and the more heterogeneous Second District. When traced on a map of the city, that portion of the Second District which cuts into Orleans Parish resembles the head of a duck, with the bill splintering Ward 9, a contiguous black community of approximately 94,000 people. Ward 8, which also contains a high concentration of blacks, was sliced three ways, with the extreme northern (lakefront) and southern segments assigned to District One and the midsection to District Two. Although other black wards are fragmented, the integrity of predominantly white wards is assured. Of the 31 metropolitan precincts with a black population of 95% or higher, most of which are situated precisely on the duck bill, 17 were placed in District One and 14 were placed in District Two. Act 20’s racial boundary line separates cohesive black neighborhoods in the inner city which share common political and socio-economic interests premised on income, transportation, education and housing. Similar disruption of white neighborhoods is minimal. Senate Secretary Baer, who with Senate staff member Nancy Barringer was charged with producing a plan reconciling the disparate interests of the sub-basement conferees, candidly testified that neutral apportionment guidelines heretofore applied in drafting the Nunez Plan were jettisoned in the effort to attain a compromise. Districts One and Two of Act 20, with their distorted shapes and irregular, indented perimeters, are not geographically compact. These unusual configurations are not necessary to ensure adherence to the one-person, one-vote rubric. In contrast to the Nunez Plan, Act 20 deviates from the natural geographic barrier formed by the Mississippi River, which separates an enclave of inner city blacks from whites residing in suburban areas. New Orleans’ traditional political subunit, the ward, has been selectively fragmented by Act 20. Black population concentrations within most of the nine Orleans Parish wards split by the Act have been disrupted, whereas white concentrations remain essentially inviolate. Not a single ward is divided under the Nunez Plan. By disregarding parish lines and uniting populated segments of Orleans and Jefferson Parishes with mutually exclusive, often discordant needs and concerns, Act 20 effectively ignores both historic boundaries and obvious communities of interest. Since Jefferson Parish comprises the majority of Act 20’s Second District, the interests of the more conservative, suburban white populace have effectively eclipsed those of the less conservative, urban blacks who make up only 17.9% of the district’s population. Once completed, the new plan was submitted to Governor Treen for review. After the Governor accepted the plan on November 11, 1981, Senators Hudson, Nunez and O’Keefe, and Representatives Scott, Bruneau and Alario were appointed to a formal conference committee. None of these individuals is black. A public meeting was convened by the committee for the purpose of preparing a conference report on proposed Act 20. Representatives Diana Bajoie, John Jackson, Alphonse Jackson and Henry Braden, members of the Legislative Black Caucus, voiced strenuous objection to the compromise plan, all arguing that a majority black district encompassing Orleans Parish was necessary to enable minority voters to elect a representative of their choice. The testimony of Representative Turnley and New Orleans Mayor Ernest N. Morial, both black, illustrates that the consensus of opinion among the state’s minority leaders was that Act 20 was inimical to the interests of Louisiana’s black constituency. Following an abortive attempt by Representative Scott to amend S.B. 5 to expand the Second District’s black population to 50.2%, the compromise provision was adopted by the committee by a vote of 4 to 2, with Representatives Scott and Alario dissenting. On November 12, 1981, the House and Senate adopted the conference committee report. Governor Treen signed this bill into law on November 19, 1981, and it became Act 20 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1981. Voting Patterns and Polarization There is a substantial degree of racial polarization exhibited in the voting patterns of Orleans Parish. By inserting the 1980 census data in a computerized, stepwise regression program, Dr. Gordon Henderson, plaintiffs’ expert, empirically measured the extent of racial bloc voting in 39 Orleans Parish elections between the years 1976-82. This program first employed a regression equation to predict the number of votes cast for a black candidate by registered black voters in a specific precinct. Another statistical tool, a Pearson correlation coefficient, was then used to examine all conceivable relationships between a single dependent variable, votes in favor of a black candidate, and several independent variables, inter alia, the number of black registered voters and total population per precinct, in order to isolate the one variable which most accurately explained why those votes were received. 'The coefficients derived by plaintiffs’ expert demonstrate an almost perfect correlation between a candidate’s race and that of the voters who manifested a preference for his or her candidacy at the ballot box. Plaintiffs’ quantitative showing of polarization was buttressed by the testimony of trained political observers. Mayor Morial, now in his second term, has been actively involved in politics at the state and local levels since his election to the legislature in 1967. He has been elected to positions in all three branches of government. Mayor Morial opined that racial bloc voting is prevalent in Orleans Parish. On the basis of a study of the literature relative to 18 elections conducted in Orleans Parish from 1960 to 1976, Dr. Richard Engstrom, a professor of political science at the University of New Orleans, found substantial evidence of voting along racial lines. With reference to the 1977 mayoral contest in which Mayor Morial prevailed, Dr. Engstrom opined that the New Orleans metropolitan area was gradually becoming more polarized. Defense expert Dr. John Wildgen postulated, in a published study, that racial polarization determined the outcome in New Orleans school board elections. One explanation for the perceptible growth of racial polarization over the last 15 years, proffered by plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Ralph Cassimere, a professor of history at the University of New Orleans, is that as blacks have begun to gain access to elective office, white voters have rallied in increasing numbers to vote for candidates of their race. A lower margin of victory for black incumbents evinces a greater reluctance on the part of white voters to vote for a black. As Dr. Cassimere observed: ... polarity is much more pronounced among whites in voting for black candidates. Black [voters] ... traditionally have voted for white candidates. I think there is some feeling of illegitimacy about black candidates. Record, Yol. II at 119. In an effort to rebut plaintiffs’ evidence of polarization, defendants introduced a statistical analysis of white cross-over voting in three recent New Orleans elections.. This analysis, prepared by demographics expert Kenneth Selle, sampled returns from 37 all-white or black precincts and purported to demonstrate that race had no effect on the results of city-wide elections. Mr. Selle’s use of an arbitrary, rather than the preferred random method to select test precincts severely biases the results of his analysis. The units chosen are not representative of the 400 or more precincts in New Orleans, and hence are not sufficiently predictive of voting patterns in the city at large. Some of the precincts culled were racially heterogeneous. Since it is impossible to ascertain, solely from the returns of a mixed precinct, whether individuals who voted for a particular candidate are black or white, data drawn from such precincts are of scant probative value. For these reasons, the court attaches little weight to defendants’ cross-over analysis. Assuming, arguendo, that defendants had established the existence of a significant white cross-over vote in Orleans Parish, the court remains persuaded that racial polarization plays a significant role in the electoral process. The evidence shows that only those affluent, better-educated whites residing in the city’s French Quarter and university districts are inclined to vote for a black candidate. This liberal, white constituency is unique to Orleans Parish. Similarly eclectic voting preferences cannot be anticipated in the adjacent suburban parishes, whose recently enhanced populations ean be partially ascribed to the exodus from New Orleans of white families seeking to avoid court-ordered desegregation of the city’s public schools. Nor does the fact that several blacks have gained elective office in Orleans Parish detract from plaintiffs’ showing of an overall pattern of polarization. To the contrary, Mayor Morial attributes his victory in the 1982 mayoral race to his success in marshalling the black vote. Of the approximately 70 Orleans Parish officials elected throughout the parish, only 15% are black. A greater number of minority officeholders would be expected in a parish with a black population of 55%. According to the expert testimony, Louisiana’s majority vote requirement, which ordains that a winning candidate must receive more than half the votes cast in an election, inhibits political participation by black candidates and voters in a racially polarized environment. Racial bloc voting, in the context of an electoral structure wherein the number of votes needed for election exceeds the number of black voters, substantially diminishes the opportunity for black voters to elect the candidate of their choice. Mr. Selle testified that in Louisiana a threshold black/white population ratio of 62/38 is a prerequisite to the creation of a “safe” minority district, or one in which the election of the candidate preferred by black voters is guaranteed. Conversely, a 50/50 ratio of black to white population gives rise to a safe white district. Discrimination: Past and Present Louisiana’s history of racial discrimination, both de jure and de facto, continues to have an adverse effect on the ability of its black residents to participate fully in the electoral process. Dr. Ralph Cassimere traced that history to its genesis during the era of slavery, when the franchise was conferred exclusively upon white males. With the advent of post-Civil War Reconstruction, black males were permitted to register. Between 1868 and 1896 many black state legislators were elected. Two blacks were elected Lieutenant Governor and one, P.B.S. Pinchback, was selected by the state Senate to fill a vacancy in that position and later served as Acting Governor. Pinchback subsequently was selected to serve in the United States Senate but was not seated. Three blacks claimed seats in the United States House of Representatives but only one, Charles E. Nash, was seated. Charles Vincent, Black Legislators in Louisiana During Reconstruction. Although black suffrage flourished from 1867 to 1898, a gradual return to white supremacy culminated in the Louisiana Constitution of 1898. At that time, the state succeeded in imposing a “grandfather” clause, as well as educational and property qualifications for registration. These requirements combined to reduce black voter registration from approximately 135,000 in 1896 to less than 1,000 in 1907. Following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the grandfather clause in 1915, Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 1340 (1915), voters were subject to an “understanding” clause which hindered black registration. Poll taxes were levied, and registration rolls purged. In 1923, the state authorized an all-white Democratic primary which functioned to deny blacks access to the determinative elections, inasmuch as Republican opposition to the Democratic party in the general elections was nonexistent. This strategem persisted until its condemnation in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944). Citizenship tests and a prohibition against anti-single shot voting were instituted in the 1950s. As a further obstacle to minority access, the legislature established a majority-vote requirement for election to party committees in 1959. For a quarter of a century, from 1940 to 1964, the States Rights Party spearheaded a strong movement against black enfranchisement and judicially-directed desegregation. But for those declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the various disenfranchisement techniques implemented by the state and its white majority parties suppressed black political involvement until banned by Congress in 1965. Like other southern states, Louisiana enforced a policy of racial segregation in public education, transportation and accommodations. Despite the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), local school boards refused to desegregate in the absence of a federal court order. Even today, the federal courts are compelled to monitor schools around the state for compliance with Brown’s teachings. A dual university system was operated by the state until 1981, when it was dismantled pursuant to a consent decree. Public facilities were not open to members of both races until the late 1960s. As a consequence of this history, separate white and black societies developed in Orleans Parish. Segregation was the norm in the private sector, as reflected in the parish’s monochromatic neighborhoods, churches, businesses and clubs. Discrimination in employment was widespread. While direct impediments to black registration and voting have been eradicated, the residual effects of past discrimination still impede blacks from registering, voting or seeking elective office in Orleans Parish. No black has been elected to statewide office in Louisiana in this century, nor has any served in Congress since the days of Reconstruction. Notwithstanding a black population of 29.4%, only 7% of Louisiana’s elected officials are black. Current census figures disclose that blacks on the average earn less than whites; 95% of all persons with an income of less than $5,000 are black. Blacks in contemporary Louisiana have less education, subsist under poorer living conditions and in general occupy a lower socio-economic status than whites. Though frequently more subtle, employment discrimination endures. These factors are the legacy of historical discrimination in the areas of education, employment and housing. Such influences, in conjunction with past election practices excluding blacks from the political process, account for the present disparity between black voter registration and black population in Orleans Parish. From the evidence adduced, we are persuaded that they account for the lower black turnout at election time. A sense of futility engendered by the pervasiveness of prior discrimination, both public and private, is perceived as discouraging blacks from entering into the governmental process. Conclusions of Law Invoking its authority to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Congress recently amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982). Specifically designed to reach claims of voting dilution heretofore deemed beyond the ambit of § 2, Report on S.1992 of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S.Rep. No. 97-417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1982); Rybicki v. State Board of Elec tions, 574 F.Supp. 1082 (N.D.Ill.1983) (three-judge court), the 1982 amendment dispenses with the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate intentional discrimination in the imposition or maintenance of the disputed electoral structure. S.Rep. No. 97-417 at 16. See Buchanan v. City of Jackson, 708 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir.1983); Campbell v. Gadsen County School Board, 691 F.2d 978 (11th Cir.1982); McMillan v. Escambia County, 688 F.2d 960 (5th Cir.1982), jurisd. postponed, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 1766, 76 L.Ed.2d 341 (1983). Guided by the axiom that cases should be resolved, where possible, on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, we shall analyze plaintiffs’ dilution claim under the amended § 2. A. Constitutionality of Amended Section 2. Before proceeding to the merits of plaintiffs’ dilution claim, we must address defendants’ challenge to the 1982 amendment to § 2. Defendants take the position that in codifying a test which relieves complainants of the burden of proving invidious intent, Congress has sought to overrule the Supreme Court’s holding that such intent must be established as a prerequisite to recovery under either the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980). Given the congruence of § 2 and the Fifteenth Amendment, defendants argue, the separation of powers doctrine precludes Congress from expanding the statute to reach claims founded on discriminatory impact alone. By amending § 2 to accomplish this impermissible aim, the legislature has, in defendants’ estimation, usurped the judiciary’s exclusive prerogative to define the limits of the Constitution. In amending § 2, Congress reaffirmed “the right of minority voters to be free from election practices, procedures or methods that deny them the same opportunity to participate in the political processes other citizens enjoy.” S.Rep. No. 97-417 at 28, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 206. Two principal objectives of the statutory “results” test were posited: to reach discriminatory conduct which might otherwise evade liability under the more stringent intent assay, and to eradicate the contemporary effects of past discrimination. Id. at 40; H.R.Rep. No. 97-227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981). To this end, amended § 2 resurrected the principles applied in voting registration cases prior to Bolden. According to the Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: In pre-Bolden cases plaintiffs could prevail by showing that a challenged election law or procedure, in the context of the total circumstances of the local electoral process, had the result of denying a racial or language minority an equal chance to participate in the electoral process. Under this results test, it was not necessary to demonstrate that the challenged election law or procedure was designed or maintained for a discriminatory purpose. In Bolden, a plurality of the Supreme Court broke with precedent and substantially increased the burden on plaintiffs in voting discrimination cases by requiring proof of discriminatory purpose. The Committee has concluded that this intent test places an unacceptably difficult burden on plaintiffs. It diverts the judicial inquiry from the crucial question of whether minorities have equal access to the electoral process to a [sic] historical question of individual motives. S.Rep. No. 97-417 at 16, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 193. Regardless of whether former § 2 purported to track the Fifteenth Amendment, and thus mandated proof of invidious intent, Congress has since elected to broaden the statutory proscription to embrace conduct which is discriminatory in either purpose or effect. Assuming that amended § 2 constitutes a valid exercise of legislative power, therefore, the Bolden court’s interpretation of the original § 2 is no longer controlling. Accordingly, we turn for guidance to a long line of Supreme Court cases wherein other key provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act have passed constitutional muster, such provisions having been deemed to fall within the purview of Congress’ enforcement authority. Section 4(a) of Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a), abolishing literacy tests in any jurisdiction where less than 50% of the voting age residents had voted in prior elections, was considered a necessary and proper means of implementing the Fifteenth Amendment in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 86 S.Ct. 803, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). Addressing the state’s contention that Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Katzenbach court proclaimed that “Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination in voting.” Id. at 326, 86 S.Ct. at 817. The Court has since cited Katzenbach for the proposition “that congressional authority [embodied in § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment] extends beyond the prohibition of purposeful discrimination to encompass state action that has discriminatory impact perpetuating the effects of past discrimination.” Fullilove v. Klutz nick, 448 U.S. 448, 477, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2774, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (dicta). Later in the 1966 term, in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), the Supreme Court sustained § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e), against an attack founded on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 4(e) forbade the use of English literacy tests to deny the right to vote to any person who had attained a sixth grade education in an “American Flag” school, in which the language of instruction was other than English. This provision was aimed at New York’s disenfranchisement of Puerto Rican residents. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan analogized Congress’ § 5 authority to, inter alia, the plenary grant of the necessary and proper clause, Article I, § 8, cl. 18. Thus, the critical question was “whether § 4(e) may be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, ... whether it is ‘plainly adapted to that end,’ and whether it is not prohibited by but is consistent with ‘the letter and spirit of the constitution.’ ” Id. at 651, 86 S.Ct. at 1723 (quoting from McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)). Notwithstanding the absence of a record of actual discrimination, the Court endorsed Congress’ passage of a measure which remedied historical discrimination, and enabled the Puerto Rican community to combat prospective state violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Chief Justice Burger subsequently observed, in discussing the import of Morgan: To uphold this exercise of congressional authority, the Court found no prerequisite that application of a literacy requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause____ It was enough that the Court could perceive a basis upon which Congress could reasonably predicate a judgment that application of literacy qualifications within the compass of § 4(e) would discriminate in terms of access to the ballot and consequently in terms of access to the provision or administration of governmental programs. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 477, 100 S.Ct. at 2774 (dicta) (citations omitted). Congress’ enactment of a five-year national ban on the utilization of qualification tests and devices in federal, state and local elections, which took the form of § 2(d) of the Voting Rights Act amendments of 1970, current version codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b, was sanctioned by the Court in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970). Although the Justices authored five separate opinions, all nine stressed that Congress is endowed with substantial discretion in enforcing the Reconstruction amendments. Once again, the Fullilove court’s commentary is instructive: The [.Mitchell ] Court was unanimous, albeit in separate opinions, in concluding that Congress was within its authority to prohibit the use of such voter qualifications; Congress could reasonably determine that its legislation was an appropriate method of [foreclosing the possibility that purposefully discriminatory administration of literacy tests would escape undetected and] attacking the perpetuation of prior purposeful discrimination, even though the use of these tests or devices might have discriminatory effects only. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. at 477, 100 S.Ct. at 2774 (dicta) (citation omitted). In an opinion issued contemporaneously with Bolden, City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980), the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional assault on § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Under § 5, any change in voting or election laws proposed by a covered jurisdiction will not be approved, or “precleared,” by the United States Attorney General unless it “does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color____” Though fully cognizant that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination, the Court stated that § 2 of that amendment permitted Congress to interdict election procedures which were not in and of themselves motivated by racial animus, but which created the risk of purposeful discrimination or perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. Id. at 176, 177, 100 S.Ct. at 1561. At the heart of the decision lies this finding: Congress could rationally have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact____ We find no reason, then, to disturb Congress’ considered judgment that banning electoral changes that have a discriminatory impact is an effective method of preventing States from “ ‘undopng] or defeating] the rights recently won’ by Negroes.” Id. at 177-78, 100 S.Ct. at 1561-62 (quoting from Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 140, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 1363, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976)) (citations and footnotes omitted). Such remedial measures need only be “appropriate,” within the meaning of McCulloch v. Maryland, in order to effectuate substantive rights secured by § 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Similarly, Congress here determined, after extensive hearings and the taking of expert and lay testimony, that the intent test inordinately burdened plaintiffs in vote dilution cases, was unnecessarily divisive due to the charges of racism which must inevitably be leveled against individual officials or entire communities, and, most importantly, compelled protracted, often futile inquiries into the motives of officials who acted many years ago. S.Rep. No. 97-417 at 36-37. Ultimately, the state defendants could all too easily advance racially neutral justifications in rebuttal. In Congress’ judgment, the danger that a defendant official would seek to rebut the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence of purposeful discrimination “by planting a false trail of direct evidence in the form of official resolutions, sponsorship statements and other legislative history eschewing any racial motive ... seriously clouds the prospects of eradicating the remaining instances of racial discrimination.” Id. at 37. See Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1189 (1982) (testimony of Joaquin Avila, counsel for the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund) (contemporary official discrimination more subtle; smoking gun evidence of racial animus can no longer be discerned in the public record). Congress thus sought to enact a legislative prophylaxis, calculated to forestall the institution of potentially discriminatory electoral systems and extirpate facially neutral devices or procedures which continue to expose minority voters to harmful consequences rooted in historical discrimination. S.Rep. No. 97-417 at 40. Summarizing the bases for their conclusions that proper enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments required a ban on election procedures and practices which culminate in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote, the drafters found: (1) that the difficulties faced by plaintiffs forced to prove discriminatory intent through case-by-case adjudication create a substantial risk that intentional discrimination barred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments go undetected, uncorrected and undeterred unless the results test proposed for section 2 is adopted; and (2) that voting practices and procedures that have discriminatory results perpetuate the effects of past purposeful discrimination. Id. We concur in Professor Archibald Cox’s interpretation of Supreme Court precedent as vesting Congress with broad discretion, under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, ... to outlaw all voting arrangements that result in denial or abridgement of the right to vote even though not all such arrangements are unconstitutional, because this is a means of preventing their use as engines of purposive and therefore unconstitutional racial discrimination. Hearings on the Voting Rights Extension Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 25,1982) (prepared statement of Professor Archibald Cox at 14). Empirical findings by Congress of persistent abuses of the electoral process, and the apparent failure of the intent test to rectify those abuses, were meticulously documented and borne out by ample testimony. Based on these findings, the legislators reasonably concluded that substantial amelioration of a dilution plaintiff’s statutory burden of proof was warranted. Although ostensibly contradictory of the Supreme Court’s holding in Bolden, we perceive § 2 as merely prescribing a potion to remove the vestiges of past official discrimination and to ward off such discrimination in the future. Congress has not expanded the Constitution’s substantive guarantees but has simply redefined and strengthened the statutory protections around core constitutional values, thus exercising its authority within the confines of the Constitution. Or, as the president of the American Bar Association opined before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Under’ this Amendment, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the proper constitutional standard ... [is] left intact. Only the section 2 statutory standard [is] changed____ Hearings on the Voting Rights Act Extension Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 25, 1982) (prepared statement of David R. Brink at 7). Senate critics of § 2, led by Senator Orrin Hatch, raised the specter of over-breadth, arguing that the exceptional conditions justifying unequal application of § 5 to jurisdictions with a history of intentional discrimination did not support the extension of a nationwide ban encompassing noncovered jurisdictions. Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., Voting Rights Act, Report on S.1992, reprinted in S.Rep. No. 97-417 at 170-71. Absent a record suggesting that voting discrimination permeates the entire nation, the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution maintained that the sweeping reforms contemplated by § 2 could not be described as remedial in character, and were consequently beyond the scope of congressional enforcement powers. Id. at 171. Accord, Note, Amending Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 32 Case W.Res.L.Rev. 500 (1982). Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, 102 S.Ct. at 3283 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (“Nor, in my opinion, could there be any doubt about the constitutionality of an amendment to the Voting Rights Act that would require ... covered jurisdictions to abandon the specific kinds of at-large voting schemes that perpetuate past discrimination.”). As the Senate Judiciary Committee pointed out, however, the § 5 analogy “overlooks the fundamental difference in the degree of jurisdiction needed to sustain the extraordinary nature of preclearance, on the one hand, and the use of a particular legal standard to prove discrimination in court suits on the other.” S.Rep. No. 97-417 at 42. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265-66, 100 S.Ct. 540, 547-48, 62 L.Ed.2d 540 (1980). Nor do the critics take into consideration the Mitchell court’s declaration of the constitutionality of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act amendments of 1970, striking down literacy tests and devices in both covered and noncovered jurisdictions. Whatever their disagreement on other issues, the members of the Court unanimously endorsed the literacy test provision. In the final analysis, the self-limiting character of § 2 effectively refutes the overbreadth argument. Since this statute does not impose an absolute ban on specific election practices, or allow liability to attach without a finding of dilution under the totality of circumstances in a given case, the fear that § 2 will precipitate a nationwide revision of state election laws is groundless. Only a state law shown to discriminatorily impact against minority voters will run afoul of § 2. Federalism concerns expounded by § 2 opponents, see, e.g., 128 Cong.Rec. S.6786 (daily ed., June 15, 1982, remarks of Senator Harry Byrd); id. at S.6517 (daily ed., June 9, 1982) (remarks of Senator Hatch), and reiterated by defendants herein, are closely related to the separation of powers question. Defendants suggest that § 2 contravenes the principle of state sovereignty enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, which precludes Congress from wielding its legislative power to impair the States’ freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976) (Fair Labor Standards Act, a Commerce Clause enactment, held unconstitutional as applied to state employees). Usery explicitly declined to entertain the question of whether different results might obtain were Congress to encroach upon integral operations of state governments through the exercise of authority conferred by § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. at 178-79, 100 S.Ct. at 1562. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court ruled that Congress may, as against the reserved powers of the state, utilize any rational means to implement the Fifteenth Amendment. Justice Marshall subsequently rejected a federalism argument predicated on Usery, explaining that: ... principles of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to enforce the Civil War Amendments “by appropriate legislation.” Those Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty. Applying this principle, we hold that Congress had the authority to regulate state and local voting through the provisions of the Voting Rights Act. National League of Cities, then, provides no reason to depart from our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach that “the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exertions of state power,” ... and that the Act is an appropriate means for carrying out Congress’ constitutional responsibilities____ City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. at 179-80, 100 S.Ct. at 1562-63 (citations and footnotes omitted). Accord, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976) (§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment overcomes state Eleventh Amendment immunity). City of Rome therefore teaches that the Tenth Amendment does not constrict congressional power to enforce the Reconstruction amendments by appropriate legislation. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452