Full opinion text
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FINDINGS OF FACT The Pleadings WOODS, District Judge. 1. Charlotte McDowell, the Plaintiff herein, filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on April 9, 1979 alleging that Safeway had discriminated against her on the basis of her race. McDowell did not file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC against the Retail Clerks Union Local 1583. Before the EEOC had an opportunity to make a determination of McDowell’s charge, McDowell asked for and received a Right-to-Sue Notice. 2. On January 30, 1980 Plaintiff McDowell filed the instant lawsuit against Safeway alleging that Safeway had illegally discriminated against her individually because of her race, and against all blacks as a class, all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Title VII), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (§ 1981). This suit was filed only against Safeway. The Retail Clerks Union was not named as a defendant. McDowell was a member of the Retail Clerks Bargaining Unit at all relevant times. 3. The complaint alleged disparate treatment of McDowell individually and disparate treatment of blacks as a class. There are no specifically identified or identifiable allegations of disparate impact in the complaint, nor were any raised at any time during the pendency or trial of this lawsuit. 4. The relevant time period for finding of liability under Title VII would be from October 10, 1978 (180 days prior to the filing of McDowell’s EEOC charge) to the present. The relevant time period for finding of liability under § 1981 is from January 30, 1977 (3 years prior to the filing of this lawsuit). 5. McDowell is the only original Plaintiff in this lawsuit. Her individual allegations of race discrimination are that she was discharged because of her race and that she was denied entry into Safeway’s Store Management Training Program (SMTP) because of her race. 6. On May 23, 1980 James King filed a Petition for Intervention into this lawsuit. King was allowed to intervene by Order of Court on June 17, 1980. King alleged in his petition for intervention that Safeway had illegally discriminated against him in that he was denied a transfer to a truck driving position because of his race, and that he was denied a promotion to heavy duty mechanic because of his race. King is employed in Safeway’s Distribution Center and at all relevant times has been a member of the Teamsters Local 878 Bargaining Unit. King did file an EEOC charge against Safeway but did not file an EEOC charge against the Teamsters Union. 7. On May 23, 1980 Carmen Smith filed a Petition for Intervention into this lawsuit. Smith was allowed to intervene by Order of Court on July 14, 1980. Smith alleged in her Petition for Intervention that Safeway had illegally discriminated against her in that she was not properly trained because of her race and that she was discharged because of her race. 8. On July 15,1980 John Nimmer filed a petition for intervention into this lawsuit. Nimmer was allowed to intervene by Order of Court on August 18, 1980. Nimmer alleged in his Petition for Intervention that Safeway had illegally discriminated against him in that he was not properly trained as a Store Management Trainee because of his race, and that he was demoted from Store Management Training Program because of his race. Nimmer is employed in Safeway’s retail stores and at all relevant times has been a member of the Retail Clerks Bargaining Unit. Nimmer filed an EEOC charge against Safeway but did not file an EEOC charge against the Retail Clerks Union. 9. On July 2, 1981 Gwendolyn Doby filed a Petition for Intervention into this lawsuit. Doby was allowed to intervene by Order of Court on October 8, 1981. Doby alleged in hér Petition for Intervention that Safeway had illegally discriminated against her in that she was reprimanded because of her race, was given more difficult job assignments because of her race, was not transferred because of her race, and was assigned fewer working hours because of her race. Doby was employed in one of Safeway’s retail stores and was a member of the Retail Clerks Bargaining Unit. Doby filed an EEOC charge against Safeway but did not file an EEOC charge against the Retail Clerks Union. 10. On July 2, 1981 Linda Nowden filed a Petition for Intervention into this lawsuit. Nowden was allowed to intervene by Order of the Court on October 8, 1981. Nowden alleged in her Petition for Intervention that Safeway had illegally discriminated against her in that she was denied full-time status because of her race and that she was reduced from full-time status because of her race. Nowden is employed in Safeway’s retail stores and has been, at all relevant times, a member of the Retail Clerks Bargaining Unit. Nowden filed an EEOC charge against Safeway and the Retail Clerks Union. However, prior to filing her Petition to Intervene, she dropped her charge against the Union. 11. On July 2, 1981 Cheryl Russ filed a Petition for Intervention into this lawsuit. Russ was allowed to intervene by Order of Court on October 8, 1981. Russ alleged in her petition for intervention that Safeway had illegally discriminated against her in that she was denied promotions because of her race and that she was denied certain hours of work because of her race. Russ was employed in one of Safeway’s retail stores and was a member of the Retail Clerks Bargaining Unit. Russ filed an EEOC charge against Safeway but did not file an EEOC charge against the Retail Clerks Union. 12. On November 10, 1981 Marion King filed a petition for intervention into this lawsuit. King alleged in his petition for intervention that Safeway had illegally discriminated against him in that he was discharged as a Store Manager for Safeway because of his race. King was employed as a Store Manager in Safeway’s retail stores but was not a member of the Retail Clerks Bargaining Unit. King filed an EEOC charge against Safeway, but did not file a charge against the Retail Clerks Union. On January 5, 1982 King was denied intervention into this lawsuit on the grounds that the intervention of a store manager would unduly delay the trial of this matter and unduly broaden the scope of this lawsuit. King subsequently filed a separate lawsuit against Safeway. 13. On February 23, 1982 the Court approved a Stipulated Order agreed upon by the parties setting forth the definition of a class and the delineation of the class issues. (Hereinafter, Stipulated Order). 14. The stipulated class was defined as “all black employees of Defendant, Safeway Stores, Inc., whether full-time or part-time, employed in Defendant Safeway’s Pulaski County stores at any time since January 30, 1977, who were members of the bargaining unit represented by the Defendant’s Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 1583 and who may-have been subjected to racially discriminatory treatment by Defendant Safeway in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 15. The class issues involved in this lawsuit were delineated as follows: (a) Black employees being denied promotions or the opportunity to be promoted because of their race. A promotion is defined as the movement from one job classification within a bargaining unit to a different job classification within the bargaining unit with a higher rate of pay. (b) Black employees being denied full-time employment status because of their race, specifically involving, (1) white part-time employees being given full-time status before black part-time employees with greater seniority; (2) white employees being given full-time status when initially hired while black part-time employees were denied full-time status; and (3) black full-time employees being reduced from full-time to part-time status before white full-time employees with less seniority. (c) Black part-time employees being assigned fewer hours to work per week than white part-time employees with less seniority. (d) Black employees being denied promotion, reclassification to full-time status and more hours of work because of their race in that such promotion, reclassifications and hours of work are given to white persons who have less seniority and are relatives of white officials, managers and other employees of Safeway. (e) Black employees being discharged because of their race. (f) Black employees being subjected to discriminatory treatment with regard to Safeway Store Management Training Program, specifically involving, (1) being denied proper training and being subjected to adverse treatment on the basis of race; (3) after entry into the program, being demoted or discharged from the program on the basis of race. (g) Black employees subjected to discriminatory working conditions which can be remedied only through injunctive and declaratory relief including, (1) being assigned the least desirable shifts; (2) being subjected to racial harassment, racial epithets and racial jokes; (3) being given more onerous and difficult work assignments than white employees.” (Stipulated Order). 16. The parties stipulated that Intervenor James King was not a class representative, but that King would continue to prosecute and try his individual claims of racial discrimination at the Safeway Distribution Center. (Stipulated Order). 17. The parties stipulated that the Stipulated Order constituted the complete certification of all class issues in this lawsuit except for the issue of whether the Plaintiff and Intervenors, all of whom had been hired by Safeway, could adequately represent a class of applicants who had not been hired by Safeway. This issue was submitted to the Court on the briefs of the parties. By order dated March 11,1982 the Court denied the Plaintiff and Intervenor’s request to represent a class of applicants because of failure to satisfy the typicality, commonality and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 18. The Retail Clerks Union, Local 1583, was not named as a defendant when the instant suit was filed on January 30, 1980. 19. Defendant, Retail Clerks Union, Local 1583, has been the exclusive bargaining representative for all nonsalaried employees, excluding meatcutters, employed in the retail stores throughout the Little Rock Division, since approximately 1959. The meatcutters are covered by a separate contract with a separate union and are not included in this litigation. The Retail Clerks Union and Safeway have negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements covering the various bargaining units within the Little Rock Division. The employees and all of the retail stores in Pulaski County constitute one bargaining unit. The terms and conditions of employment of the employees in the Pulaski County Bargaining Unit have been set forth in a series of collective bargaining agreements between Safeway and the Retail Clerks Union. (Jt.Exh. 1, Stip. 12). 20. The Retail Clerks Contract contains certain provisions governing the following employment practices: (a) Reclassification from part-time to full-time status; (b) Reclassification from full-time to part-time status; (c) Employees hired into full-time status; (d) Scheduling of hours and shifts of part-time employees; (e) Promotions; (f) Rates of pay for any given classification in the bargaining unit; and (g) Discharges. (Jt.Exh. 1, Stip. 16, 26, 27; Def.Exh. 11, 12, 13). 21. If any employee believes that he or she has been wrongfully denied any right granted to the employee under the Retail Clerks Contract with regard to part-time and full-time status, scheduling of hours or shifts, promotions, rates of pay, or discharge, the employee may file a grievance with the Retail Clerks Union. The Retail Clerks contract provides for binding arbitration of such grievances. (Jt.Exh. 1, Stip. 26; Def.Exh. 11, 12, 13). However, probationary employees do not have any access to the grievance provisions of the Union contract. 22. Although the Retail Clerks Union was not named as a defendant when the instant lawsuit was filed on January 30, 1980, Plaintiff, McDowell and Intervenors, James King, Carmen Smith and John Nimmer filed a Motion with the Court to join the Retail Clerks Union as an indispensable party, alleging that there could not be adequate adjudication of the issues without the Retail Clerks Union as a party defendant. 23. By Order of the Court on July 2, 1981, the Court found the Union to be a necessary party. The Court further found that the Retail Clerks Union could not be joined in the Plaintiffs Title VII action because of the failure of any Plaintiff or Intervenor to file an EEOC charge against the Retail Clerks Union. The Court then found the Union to be an indispensable party, particularly for remedy purposes, and thus dismissed the Title VII claims of the Plaintiff for failure to join an indispensable party. However, the Court then ordered the Retail Clerks Union to be joined as a Defendant in the Plaintiff and Intervenor’s § 1981 cause of action. On October 8, 1981 Intervenors Doby, Nowden and Russ were permitted to intervene in the § 1981 case against both Defendants. 24. On a joint motion of all parties, the Court ordered the bifurcation of the trial into a liability phase and a remedy phase. The Retail Clerks Union did not participate in the liability phase of the trial. 25. Defendant Safeway is a Maryland corporation duly licensed to do business in the State of Arkansas. (Jt.Exh. 1, Stip. 6). 26. The Little Rock Division of Safeway encompasses all of the State of Arkansas, and portions of Texas, Louisiana, Mississip: pi, Tennessee and Missouri. (Jt.Exh. 1, Stip. 7). 27. The Little Rock Division office is located in Little Rock, Arkansas. The Little Rock Division is responsible for all retail grocery stores located throughout the Division and for the Distribution Center located in Little Rock, Arkansas. (Jt.Exh. 1, Stip. 8). 28. The Little Rock Division Manager is in charge of the entire Little Rock Division. The Retail Operations Manager is responsible for all retail grocery stores in the Little Rock Division and reports directly to the Division Manager. The Distribution Center Manager is in charge of the Distribution Center and reports directly to the Division Manager. (Jt.Exh. 1, Stip. 9). 29. The retail grocery stores under the supervision of the Retail Operations Manager are divided into districts. Each district has a District Manager that reports directly to the Retail Operations Manager. The Store Manager within each district reports directly to the District Manager. (Jt. Exh. 1, Stip. 10). The Little Rock Division is divided into five districts of 12 to 13 stores per district. Four of the five districts are pie shaped out of the City of Little Rock. The four District Managers for those districts are officed in Little Rock. One district is located away from Little Rock, in northern Louisiana. The District Manager for that district is officed in Monroe; Louisiana. Districts have been drawn in a pie shape out of Little Rock so that as many District Managers as possible could be officed in the Little Rock Division office. Also, the travel time for the District Managers is equalized by having each of the four District Managers officed in Little Rock having some stores in the Little Rock area (including Benton) and out of the Little Rock area. (Mauldin, T. 4343-44). 30. The retail stores in Pulaski County are in three different districts. There is no correlation whatsoever between the district lines and the scope of the class involved in this lawsuit. (Mauldin, T. 4344). 31. Safeway has operated approximately 22 retail grocery stores in Pulaski County, Arkansas since January 30, 1977. These Pulaski County stores constitute portions of a number of different districts. The stores are identified by the following numbers: STORE NO. ADDRESS 129 1724 Main Street 131 2100 Pike 144 614 North Beechwood 152 5501Kavanaugh 153 2400 South High 167 4110 West 12th 168 7507 Cantrell 172 8001 Geyer Springs 174 3000 South University 175 901 West Third 178/4011 4100 Asher 179 1919 West 12th 182 165 North Rodney Parham 198 4701 JFK Boulevard 199/266 4109 East Broadway 212 7511 Baseline 217/4006 3930 McCain '220 10901 Rodney Parham 243 6800 Asher 258 8900 Geyer Springs 180/2038 Jacksonville 274 Sherwood (Jt. Exh. 1, Stip. 11). Class Issues 32. I find that the most pertinent credible and definitive testimony as to the class issues came from Safeway’s expert, Dr. Finis Welch. -Plaintiff-intervenors’ counsel engaged a total of three expert witnesses, none of whom personally testified in this case. Dr. Alda Moore’s testimony was never presented. Dr. Richard Goldstein, plaintiff-intervenors’ expert, was deposed by Safeway. Neither he nor his deposition was offered by plaintiff but was introduced by Safeway. Mr. Martin Mador testified by deposition as plaintiff-intervenors’ only expert witness. 33. Mr. Mador has a B.A. degree in psychology from Yale (Plf.Exh. 20A, p. 12). He is currently employed as a computer analyst by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (Plf.Exh. 20A, pp. 8-12). 34. Mr. Mador stated that he would not be testifying as an expert statistician; his role was, according to him, limited to that of a computer analyst. (Plf.Exh. 20A, p. 7). Moreover, in numerous instances in his deposition, Mr. Mador stated that he would not be offering to the Court his opinion as to the meaning or significance of the material which he developed. (Plf.Exh. 20A, p. 8, 17, 49, 50-51, 83). Explicitly, he stated that he would not be asked at trial to draw any conclusions from the data. (Plf.Exh. 20A, p. 36). 35. Mr. Mador’s deposition and work product was offered into evidence as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 20. (Welch, T. 2122). His work product was composed of a series of computer printouts which were labeled for purposes of discussion in his deposition and in court as Exhibits 3A through 3J. Mr. Mador stated that he would offer no conclusions as to the bottom line meaning of any of these exhibits. (Plf.Exh. 20A, p. 17, 36, 49-51, 83). Additionally, the exhibits contained numerous errors and over-inclusions, according to the uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Welch. (Welch, T. 2225-97). 36. During his deposition Mr. Mador admitted that his Exhibit 3A was in error and that he could not rely upon it. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 61, 63). Mr. Mador agreed to correct the errors and resubmit it. However, this was never done. (Welch, T. 2249). 37. Many of Mr. Mador’s exhibits depend on the ranking scheme which he developed. The ranking scheme he used was introduced as Defendant’s Exhibit 16. (Welch, T. 2228). Based on the salary of a particular job contained in the EPIC database, Mr. Mador ranked the jobs, with the highest paid job receiving a rank of 1. (Welch, T. 2229). 38. In doing so, Mr. Mador developed ranks for 63 job categories. An inspection by Dr. Welch revealed that 32 of the job categories in the 63 categories were for jobs which were not included in the Stipulated Order. (Welch, T. 2235). Additionally, Dr. Welch noted that the ranks were not equidistant in the sense that the difference between ranks were not constant. (Welch, •T. 2235). Dr. Welch extensively examined the first 25 job categories included in Mr. Mador’s ranks. He found that of the first 25' job categories, there were 14 which were irrelevant in that they represented job categories which were not a part of the Stipulated Order. (Welch, T. 2239). He further noted that the job category “Head Produce Clerk” and “Produce Manager” were the same job but that the former had a rank of 3 and the latter a rank of 12. (Welch, T. 2236). Indeed, Dr. Goldstein stated in his deposition that the rankings appeared strange to him. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 116-17). 39. Mr. Mador’s exhibits are also flawed since they include all persons who were ever in a relevant Safeway Store. That is, all of his printouts include all information for all employees who ever worked in a Safeway Store in Pulaski County regardless of whether they were in Pulaski County during the relevant time period and includes all changes in employment without regard to where the employee happened to be at the time. (Welch, T. 2249). 40. Dr. Welch stated that the data presented in Mr. Mador’s printouts were the type which is commonly developed as a beginning point in statistical analysis — it did not represent a finished product. (Welch, T. 2260). Dr. Goldstein had read a copy of the transcript of Dr. Welch’s deposition and was familiar with Dr. Welch’s criticisms of Mr. Mador’s exhibits. (Def. ' Exh. 55, p. 123). Based on this reading and a review of Mr. Mador’s printouts, Dr. Goldstein stated that he did not have any reason to dispute Dr. Welch’s criticisms of Mr. Mador’s exhibits. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 123). 41. Finally, Dr. Welch stated that- the data as offered by Mr. Mador were not in a form that was amenable to statistical analysis. (Welch, T. 2260). Specifically, he observed that the printouts did not contain any dispersion statistics which would be required to perform statistical tests of the data. (Welch, T. 2276). Concurring with Dr. Welch, Dr. Goldstein, when asked if there were any valid statistical analyses which could be derived from this data, responded, “No, I don’t see how.” (Def.Exh. 55, p. 124). 42. Dr. Goldstein was initially contacted for work on this case by Mr. Mador in late October or early November of 1982. (Def. Exh. 55, p. 11). His initial instructions were to review the report of Safeway’s expert witness, Dr. Finis Welch, and to observe strict cost limits in doing so. (Def. Exh. 55, pp. 96-97). When contacting him for work on this case, Mr. Mador stated that there were problems with Plaintiff’s case. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 108). Mador also stated that he would not testify since there were no clear answers contained in his (Mador’s) material. (Def.Exh. 55, P. 109). Further, Mr. Mador indicated to Dr. Gold-stein that there were errors contained in his (Mador’s) materials. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 109). 43. Dr. Goldstein’s original role in the case was to provide questions to serve as a basis for the cross-examination of Finis Welch. (Def.Exh. 55, pp. 97-98). He agreed to testify for Plaintiff and Intervenors in January of 1983 after the testimony of Dr. Welch had concluded. (Def.Exh. 55, pp. 105-106). Subsequent to this time and the taking of his deposition on August 9, 1983, Dr. Goldstein essentially performed no work on this case. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 106). 44. Dr. Goldstein’s presumed role in testifying was to be extremely limited. He planned to introduce no exhibits. (Def. Exh. 55, p. 10). He was unaware of the relevant time period for the case (Def.Exh. 55, pp. 128-29), and he never received a copy of the Stipulated Order. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 125). He stated that he was not familiar with the union contract. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 137). Moreover, he never reviewed the data base used by Dr. Welch. (Def. Exh. 55, pp. 93-94), and, because of this, stated that he planned no recalculations (Def.Exh. 55, p. 113). He had reviewed Dr. Welch’s Volume II (Def.Exh. 1C) where the methods for creating the database were described. Based on his review, he stated in his deposition that he had no objections to the manner in which Dr. Welch created the data base used in his analysis of the statistical issues in this case. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 129). Goldstein explicitly stated that he would offer no evidence of whether discrimination exists. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 126). 45. As he understood it, his role in testifying was to describe potentially biasing factors in Dr. Welch’s study and factors which might limit its ability to show that the data are consistent with no discrimination. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 93). He was asked by Plaintiff and Intervenors’ counsel to testify that his problems or reservations dealing with Dr. Welch’s analysis implied that the data showed discrimination. He stated that he was unable to do this. (Def. Exh. 55, pp. 112-13). He was also asked by Plaintiff and Intervenors’ counsel to provide testimony on the question of nepotism and stores in ghetto neighborhoods. Goldstein stated that he could do nothing statistical with either of these issues since he had no access to primary data. (Def. Exh. 55, pp. 110, 112-13). 46. In short, Dr. Goldstein’s analysis of the statistical issues in this case was sharply limited. As he stated it, he could not disagree with Dr. Welch’s conclusions without data. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 133). Goldstein stated that the reason he did not analyze the data base in the time period of his employment from November, 1982 to his deposition on August 9, 1983 was that Mr. Walker was unwilling to authorize him to do the analysis. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 165). He further stated that the constraints imposed on him by counsel for Plaintiff and Intervenors made him uncomfortable in providing expert testimony in the case. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 166). Dr. Goldstein did review Dr. Welch’s report and, as his deposition reflects, had no serious disagreements with the report. (Def.Exh. 55). 47. Dr. Goldstein did not testify at trial, though his deposition was introduced by Safeway as part of its case-in-chief. (Def. Exh. 55, T. 4742-4746). 48. Dr. Finis Welch served as the statistical expert for Safeway. He brought an impressive array of credentials to this task as can readily be seen from a review of his resume. (Def.Exh. 1A, pp. 114-24). He is currently Professor of Economics at the University of California at Los Angeles. Additionally, he serves as President of Welch Associates and of UNICORN Research Corporation, both of which do contract research. (Welch, T. 2127). 49. Dr. Welch has an undergraduate degree in mathematics and agricultural economics from the University of Houston. In 1966, he received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Chicago. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 114). He testified that, while in attendance at the University of Chicago, approximately one half of all of his courses were in statistics, mathematics, or econometrics. Also, he had a qualifying field in econometrics at the University of Chicago. (Welch, T. 2132). 50. Subsequent to his graduation, he pursued a number of learned activities. Initially, he served as a professor of economics at Southern Methodist University. In 1969 he was appointed a faculty fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research. From 1971-1973 he served as Professor and Executive Officer of the Ph.D. program in economics at the City University of New York. From 1973 to the present, he has served as Professor of Economics at the University of California at Los Angeles. (Def.Exh. 1A, pp. 114-15). During the Spring of 1974, he founded and directed a program in labor and population studies for the Rand Corporation. (Welch, T. 2130). Finally, he has conducted a graduate seminar on labor economics and labor-related research for the past ten years. (Welch, T. 2129). 51. Dr. Welch either has been or currently is a member of several editorial boards responsible for the publication of scholarly journals in the field of economics. Among the editorial boards on which Dr. Welch currently serves are the Economics of Education Review, Journal of Economic Literature, and the Journal of Labor Research. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 116). 52. Among Dr. Welch’s other professional activities are a number of distinguished committees on which he has served. In addition, he has served as a consultant to a wide range of organizations, including the Department of Labor. (Def.Exh. 1A, pp. 116-17). Dr. Welch stated that he was a member of a number of professional organizations; these included the American Economic Association and the Econometric Society. (Welch, T. 2129). Among his honors is that of currently serving as a Fellow of the Econometric Society. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 117). 53. His publications are numerous and generally relate to topics in the field of labor economics. Finally, he has previously offered expert testimony in cases such as that before the Court. (Def.Exh. 1A, pp. 118-24). 54. Dr. Welch was offered for certification as an expert witness in statistics, labor economics, and computer programming and operations. Plaintiff and Intervenors’ counsel, John Walker, stated, “... I think his qualifications are sufficiently impressive for him to be certified.” (Welch, T. 2139). The Court agreed and accepted Dr. Welch as an expert in the fields of statistics, labor economics, and computer programming and operations. 55. Safeway introduced as Exhibits 1-A, 1-B, 1 — C and 2-A, 2-B and 2-C several volumes of information produced by Dr. Welch. Defendant’s Exhibit 1-A is titled by Dr. Welch “Volume I Statistical Analysis of Employment Practices: February 1, 1977 to December 31, 1981.” Dr. Welch’s Volume 1-A is titled “Volume 1-A Statistical Analysis of Employment Practices: Supplement for period February 1, 1977 to January 29, 1980” and was submitted as Defendant’s Exhibit 1-B. Defendant’s Exhibit 1 — C was titled by Dr. Welch “Volume II: Data and Data Processing.” Dr. Welch’s Volume III appeared as three separate bound copies and has been introduced as Defendant’s Exhibit 2-A, B, and C. These Exhibits contain a copy of the employment data used by Dr. Welch as the main source of data in his analysis. (Welch, T. 2126-2127).. 56. Dr. Welch’s main analysis of the statistical issues posed in this case is contained in Defendant’s Exhibit 1A. The analysis in this exhibit covers the complete time period from February 1, 1977 through December 31, 1981 for which data was available. Dr. Welch also completed an analysis of the statistical issues for a shortened time period; this time period was from February 1,1977 through January 29, 1980. He stated that he followed this procedure in order to assure himself that the patterns he determined for the longer time period also held prior to the filing of the case. That is, he attempted to determine whether there had been any significant changes in the employment patterns between the two segments of the liability period. (Welch, T. 2127). 57. The results of Dr. Welch’s statistical analysis are presented, along with detailed written explanations of the analysis, including Tables and Figures, in Defendant’s Exhibits 1A and IB. 58. Dr. Welch’s report is voluminous. I have carefully examined it and have heard his testimony in explication. I find that Dr. Welch has properly analyzed the Safeway employment data and that his conclusions are correct. (DX 1A, IB, 1C, 2A, 2B, 2C). I find that his data base is proper and his methodology is correct. I observed Dr. Welch’s demeanor on the witness stand for several days of direct and cross examination. In short, he convinced the Court beyond any reasonable doubt that he was an eminently qualified Labor Economist who had taken all appropriate precautions to see that the data was accurately presented and analyzed. The Court has also read the depositions of the Plaintiff and Intervenors’ experts and finds that they did absolutely nothing to discredit Dr. Welch’s methodology or his conclusions. As a matter of fact, Dr. Goldstein supports Dr. Welch. Even if Dr. Goldstein had not supported Dr. Welch, the Court would have credited his testimony. The only statistical exhibits produced by Plaintiff and Intervenors were those of Mr. Mador. Dr. Welch discredited these exhibits and Dr. Goldstein seems to agree. The Court having listened to Dr. Welch’s critique and having personally examined the multitude of errors concludes that they contribute nothing to Plaintiff’s case. Given the fact that Plaintiff and Intervenors were given to November 22, 1981 to find Mr. Mador after the trial had begun in March and then were allowed over Safeway’s strong objections to call a rebuttal expert (Dr. Goldstein) who had from November, 1982 to August, 1983 to carefully analyze Dr. Welch’s findings, conclusions and methodologies, the decision to credit Dr. Welch’s testimony is the only one to make which would not be clearly erroneous. 59. Dr. Welch provided an extensive analysis of promotion activity of Safeway from February 1, 1977 to December 31, 1981. This analysis is pertinent to the charges specified in section (a) and to one of the charges in section (d) of the Stipulated Order. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 31). Dr. Welch divided his promotion analysis into two components. The first analyzed promotional activities of Safeway between specific job groups, while the second component investigated the statistical evidence for the aggregate of all promotions. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 31). 60. Based on the total evidence offered by Dr. Welch relating to his analysis of the promotion practices of Safeway in the time period between February 1, 1977 to December 31, 1981, I find that there is no statistically significant evidence that Safeway’s promotion practices have a differential effect on blacks. There is no statistically significant evidence that blacks are either more or less likely to be promoted than whites. (Welch, T. 2182). 61. The parties stipulated to the following class issue regarding movement from part-time to full-time status: “Black employees being denied full-time employment status because of their race, specifically involving (1) white part-time employees being given full-time status before black part-time employees with greater seniority.” (Stipulated Order). 62. In Chapter 5 of Defendant’s Exhibit 1A, Dr. Welch initially addresses the question of whether there is a differential impact on blacks in movement from part-time status. The methodology used is similar to that used in his analysis of promotions. That is, pools of employees eligible for transition from part-time to full-time status were formed for each calendar date such a transition took place. Next, the race distribution of the persons moving from part-time to full-time status was compared to the race distribution of the pools from which they were drawn. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 41). 63. The evidence offered by Dr. Welch, proves that there is no merit in the allegation that blacks are differentially treated in their reclassification from part-time to full-time status. The Court accepts Dr. Welch’s findings and it finds no merit to the claim that blacks are less likely than whites to be reclassified from part-time to full-time status. 64. The parties stipulated to the following class issue regarding full-time new hires: Black employees being denied full-time employment status because of their race, specifically involving, ... (2) white employees being given full-time status when initially hired while black part-time employees were denied full-time status. (Stipulated Order). 65. Safeway did not offer any statistical analysis of its practice of hiring employees into full-time positions. Dr. Welch stated that the reason for not offering any such evidence was that the EPIC data base does not contain information on pre-Safeway work histories. In Dr. Welch’s opinion, this information would have been essential to the evaluation of the initial assignments. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 5). This is precisely the information provided in Defendants Exhibits 41 and 54. Further, Dr. Welch cited the fact that of more than 700 new hires during a liability period, only 16 persons were hired initially as full-time employees. (Def. Exh. 1A, p. 6). 66. The parties stipulated to the following class issue regarding reclassifications from full-time to part-time status: “Black employees being denied full-time employment status because of their race, specifically involving, ... (3) black employees being reduced from full-time to part-time status before white full-time employees with less seniority.” (Stipulated Order). 67. On March 1, 1981, due to poor economic conditions, Safeway laid off a number of part-time employees and reclassified a number of full-time employees to part-time status. Both Intervenor Nowden and class member witness Norris were among those reclassified to part-time status. Intervenor Nowden claims that the reclassification was discriminatory while class member witness Norris concedes that the reclassification was due to economic conditions. In any event, when Nowden and Norris were reclassified to part-time status, there were no other food clerks with less full-time seniority, either black or white, who remained in full-time status. (Def.Exh. 40; Mauldin, T. 4410-12). 68. Dr. Welch noted that there have been only 22 movements from full-time to part-time status and that one employee accounted for two of these changes. (Def. Exh. 1A, p. 51). Dr. Welch did not perform a test of the statistical significance of these transitions since he considered the change too infrequent. Rather, he concentrated on full-time seniority and identified cases where he knew that the person moving to part-time status had less seniority than other employees, and cases where it could not be determined whether the person had more or less seniority than the person being reduced to part-time status. (Def.Exh. 1A, pp. 51-52). The ambiguity was caused by the fact that the EPIC data base was introduced in 1976 and pre-1976 work history which would show the length of service in part-time and full-time status was not entered into the data base. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 53). 69. On the particular day a reduction in status to part-time took place, Dr. Welch placed the candidates in the pool of employees according to their full-time seniority. He then calculated two numbers for each person in the pool; their known tenure in full-time status and their known tenure in full-time status plus the period of indeterminate tenure. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 54). As described by Dr. Welch, The first is the least amount of time someone could have been full-time while the second is an upper limit for full-time seniority. If the upper limit for the person actually reduced to. part-time status falls short of the lower limit for everyone else in the pool, we know for sure that the affected employee had the least full-time seniority. Similarly, if the minimum for the affected party exceeds the maximum for anyone else, we know that the affected party did not have the least full-time seniority. (Def-Exh. 1A, p. 54). 70.- Of the 22 status changes, 11 were such that Dr. Welch determined that the person receiving a reduction to part-time status was the person with the least full-time seniority. In two of the cases, Dr. Welch determined that the person who was reduced to part-time status did not have the least full-time seniority. The remaining nine cases were considered ambiguous; however, Dr. Welch considered three cases to be so extreme that he thought it likely that the person with the least full-time seniority was the one demoted. (Def.Exh. 1A, pp. 54-55). Because of the infrequency of movement from full-time to part-time status, an alternative assumption designed to reduce the number of indeterminate cases was introduced by Dr. Welch. The alternative assumption was to formulate a rule that if someone was a part-time employee at the beginning of the EPIC tracing to consider the entire indeterminate period as being spent in part-time status. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 56). Given this assumption, there remained only three indeterminate cases. In 15 of the remaining cases, the employee reduced to part-time status had the least full-time seniority. In four of the cases, the employee reduced to part-time status did not have the least full-time seniority. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 57; Table 5.5, Appendix I). Of these four employees, one was black and three were white. 71. Dr. Welch made two general observations concerning this data. First, as a general rule the person being reduced to part-time status did have the least full-time seniority. Second, there were obvious but infrequent exceptions (1 black, 3 whites) to this rule; however, the exceptions were so infrequent as to make it impossible to conduct any statistically valid test for the differential impact on blacks. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 57). 72. The parties stipulated to the following class issue regarding the assignment of part-time hours: “Black part-time employees being assigned fewer hours to work per week than white part-time employees with less seniority.” (Stipulated Order). 73. Dr. Welch failed to find any statistical evidence of discrimination in the average number of part-time hours assigned to blacks based on a test of the means, the Chi-square test of the full distribution of part-time hours, or on the regression models run on either the complete time period or on the individual years for which data were available. Whatever statistical evidence is available suggests that blacks work more part-time hours than whites; however, this evidence is not statistically significant. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 59). Based on this careful and complete statistical analysis, there is no significant evidence of a differential between the average number of hours worked by part-time employees who are black or who are white. 74. The parties stipulated to the following class issue regarding relatives: “Black employees being denied promotions, reclassifications to full-time status and more hours of work because of their race in that such promotions, reclassifications and hours of work are given to white persons who have less seniority and are relatives of white officials, managers and other white employees of Safeway.” (Stipulated Order). 75. The Plaintiff and Intervenors’ evidence on the issue consisted of general allegations of preferential treatment, generally lacking any proof of qualifications or seniority standing of either the black employee or the white relative that allegedly received preferential treatment. In addition to these general allegations, Plaintiff and Intervenors introduced a list of white relatives who work for Safeway in Pulaski County. (Plf.Exh. 48). 76. Employment Relations Manager Mauldin explained that there was no prohibition against hiring relatives of current employees. Mauldin explained that relatives of current employees are an excellent source of new employees for Safeway. (Mauldin, T. 4430). 77. Employment Relations Manager Mauldin responded to the general allegations of favoritism toward white employees by responding that relatives of white employees and relatives of black employees were treated no differently. Mauldin cited examples of black employees being given preferential treatment because of their relatives who were working for Safeway. One such employee was class member Gloria King who was reclassified from part-time to full-time and transferred to Little Rock when her husband, then Store Manager, Marion King, was transferred from Pine Bluff to Little Rock. (Mauldin, T. 4430-33). 78. Safeway also presented an exhibit listing black employees who had relatives working at Safeway in Pulaski County. (Def.Exh. 48). Plaintiff McDowell had several relatives working for Safeway and other Intervenors and witnesses had numerous relatives working for Safeway in various positions. 79. While neither the Plaintiff and Intervenors nor Safeway presented any statistical analysis limited solely to relatives, the statistical analysis presented by Defendant Safeway and prepared by Dr. Welch showed that there was no significantly statistical difference between the treatment of blacks and whites in the areas of promotion, reclassifications from part-time to full-time status, and assignment of hours to part-time employees. (Def.Exh. 1A, IB). Further, even class witness Miles Henderson stated that there was no discrimination in hiring. (Henderson, T. 1025). 80. The parties stipulated to the following issue regarding discharges: “Black employees being discharged because of their race.” (Stipulated Order). 81. Given the definition of the termination reasons which implied discharge, Dr. Welch proceeded to analyze the statistical evidence of discharge activity by dividing his analysis into two components: post-probationary discharges and probationary discharges. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 70). Plaintiff and Intervenors’ expert, Dr. Goldstein, stated that he had no reservations with the separation of the analysis into the two components used by Dr. Welch. (Def.Exh. 55, pp. 140-41). 82. With regard to post-probationary discharges, Dr. Welch concluded that the statistical evidence did not offer proof of a statistically significant differential treatment of blacks who are discharged in the post-probationary period. 83. With regard to probationary discharges and in support of their claim that blacks are disproportionately discharged, the Plaintiff and Intervenors presented anecdotal evidence through Intervenor Carmen Smith and class member witnesses Betty Amos, Viveca Wilson, Olivia White, Pervis Lloyd, and Shirley Starks, all of whom claimed that they were discharged during their 30-day probationary period because of their race. 84. Plaintiff and Intervenors presented no statistical analysis concerning Safeway’s probationary discharge practices. 85. Safeway responded to these allegations by presenting admissible testimonial and documentary evidence, not only concerning the discharges of the class member witnesses who testified, but also for all of the sixty probationary discharges in Pulaski County from January, 1977 through 1981. (Goens, T. 4025-28, 4030-34; L. Hill, T. 3472-79; S. Hill, T. 4246-62; Marcussen, T. 4308-10; Marks, T. 4690-92; Clark, T. 4699-4701; Maurice, T. 4710-13; B. Smith, T. 4719-21; Harms, T. 4733-34; Def.Exh. 46, 47, 52). 86. In addition to the evidence concerning the reasons for each of the sixty probationary discharges, Defendant Safeway provided a statistical analysis of its probationary discharges. 87. A summary of Dr. Welch’s analysis of probationary discharges is contained in Table 7.1 of his report. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 73; Table 7.1, Appendix I). In this table the total number of new hires in the Courtesy Clerk, Apprentice Clerk and Journey Clerk categories is reported together with the number of persons who were discharged from these categories during their first 30 days of employment. Dr. Welch also displayed in this table the actual and expected number of blacks discharged during the probationary period. Based on this data he computed a measure of the statists cal significance of the difference between the actual and expected number of blacks. This calculation was performed by calculating the expected proportion of black representation among discharges and the actual proportion of black representation among discharges. The statistical significance of the difference between the two proportions was then calculated by using the normal approximation to the binomial distribution. (Def.Exh. 1A, pp. 71-72, 84). 88. The outcome of Dr. Welch’s statistical test is listed under the column labeled “Number of Standard Deviation Units” in his Table 1. Since the number of reported standard deviations is, except for one “small number case” in the Journey Clerk category, greater than two, Dr. Welch concluded that the data supported the inference that newly hired blacks were statistically more likely than whites to be discharged during probation. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 72). 89. However, Dr. Welch also noted that 20.6% of the new hires during the 02/01/77 to 12/31/81 period were black. Of the persons hired during this time period, 83.8% eventually passed probation, and, of these persons, blacks represented 18.14% of the total. (Def.Exh. 1A, pp. 72-74). The relevant labor market for total black representation in Little Rock/North Little Rock Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) is 18.0%. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 72). Dr. Welch used these observations to conclude that the data were about what one would expect from an affirmative action policy to recruit blacks. Based on these data, the fact that after the probationary period 18.14% of Safeway’s work force is black and that this corresponded to black representation in the relevant labor market, Dr. Welch observed that the fact that blacks are not underrepresented among persons surviving probation is consistent with employment patterns he has studied where the employer has an affirmative hiring policy. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 8). 90. While a statistically significant disparity between black and white discharge rates during probation was revealed by the analysis of the data, a full consideration of the data suggests that they are not unlike those which would be expected from an effective affirmative action policy. Standing alone this evidence would be entitled to little weight, but it serves to buttress the other evidence including the chart explaining the whole range of employment decisions analyzed and the individual reasons for each discharge. 91. Moreover, Dr. Welch stated that it is statistically unsurprising to find one employment practice which shows a differential in favor of whites given' the large number of employment practices analyzed in this case. (Welch, T. 2296-99). 92. Dr. Welch calculated the exact probability of finding one statistically significant result favoring whites (probationary discharges) out of the 17 employment practices which he investigated. The chance or probability that when 17 comparisons between blacks and whites are made that one would find one practice favoring whites in a race-blind or neutral environment was computed by Dr. Welch to be 58 percent. (Welch, T. 2298). Thus, finding one statistically significant result favoring whites is unsurprising. (Welch, T. 2299). After reviewing this table, Dr. Goldstein agreed with Dr. Welch that finding one of the tests showing whites were favored was a statistically unsurprising result. (Def.Exh. 55, p. 165). 93. Additionally, Dr. Welch cautioned that he knew of no accurate way of testing for class-wide disparate treatment in termination without detailed case-by-case records of individual decisions. These data were not available to him. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 8). 94. Safeway heeded Dr. Welch’s caution and provided a detailed case-by-case analysis of each and every probationary discharge. (Def.Exh. 46, 47, 51, 52). Not only do these Exhibits, buttressed by live testimony, reflect a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for each discharge, but also one observes the same and/or similar reasons listed for discharged probationary employees who were black and white. 95. The parties stipulated to the following class issue regarding the Store Management Training Program: “Black employees being subjected to discriminatory treatment with regard to the Safeway Store Management Training Program, specifically involving: (1) being denied entry into the program on the basis of race; (2) after entry into the program, being denied proper training and being subjected to adverse treatment on the basis of race; and (3) after entry into the program, being demoted or discharged from the program on the basis of race.” (Stipulated Order). 96. In addition to this anecdotal, rebuttal evidence, Safeway produced a statistical analysis of its practices concerning the entry into and the completion of the Store Management Training Program by its employees. 97. Dr. Welch’s analysis of Safeway’s Store Management Program is contained in Chapter 8 of Defendant’s Exhibit 1A. He divided his analysis into 3 components: analysis of entry into the program, analysis of successful completion of the program, and analysis of promotion to the managerial level. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 79). Dr. Welch’s analysis of these issues paralleled the charges in Section (f) of the Stipulated Order. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 79). 98. After analyzing the likelihood of entry into the SMTP, of completion of the program, and of promotion to a management position, Dr. Welch found no statistical evidence of an adverse differential effect on blacks. (Def.Exh. 1A, p. 84). However, the almost 2 to 1 overrepresentation of blacks among persons entering the program suggested to him an effort to increase the representation of blacks in management. The higher entry rate for blacks, coupled with the somewhat lower completion success of blacks and the higher likelihood that blacks who successfully complete the program would attain a management position, were very similar to Dr. Welch’s findings for probationary discharges. Both of these findings are consistent with an attempt to increase black representation at all levels of the work force. (Def. Exh. 1A, p. 84). 99. The parties stipulated to the following class issue concerning shift assignments: “Blacks subjected to discriminatory working conditions which can be remedied only through injunctive and declaratory relief including, (1) being assigned the least desirable shifts.” (Stipulated Order). 100. Plaintiff and Intervenors presented no statistical analysis concerning Safeway’s assigning of shifts to employees. 101. Defendant Safeway did present a statistical analysis concerning Safeway’s practice of scheduling shifts. 102. Based on the total analysis of premium, overtime, and Sunday and holiday hours, Dr. Welch concluded that the assignment of these hours to blacks and whites occurs in a race-neutral fashion and that there is no statistical evidence that blacks receive more or less hours of any type than whites. Consequently, it is illogical to conclude that blacks are assigned to the least desirable shift, presuming any constant definition of “least desirable”. 103. The Court credits Dr. Welch’s analysis and was impressed with its thoroughness. Plaintiff and intervenors failed to controvert any portion of Dr. Welch’s findings regarding this issue and the Court accepts Dr. Welch’s conclusions after hearing the testimony and evaluating. all the evidence. 104. The parties stipulated to the following class issue concerning work assignments: “Blacks subjected to discriminatory working conditions which can be remedied only through injunctive and declaratory relief including, ... (3) being given more onerous and difficult work assignments than white employees.” (Stipulated Order). 105. In support of their allegation that blacks as a class are assigned to more onerous working conditions, Plaintiff and Intervenors were unable to produce any evidence other than anecdotal testimony that a. few witnesses had to do cleanup work and other work which they considered to be menial. Defendant Safeway provided evidence that all employees, white and black, in the store, up to and including managers, do cleanup work and other menial tasks, (e.g., Mahaffey, T. 3189; Martin, T. 3304; Hanle, T. 3964). 106. After hearing all the evidence, the Court finds that such work assignments were not made on the basis of race. Individual Claims of Plaintiffs and Intervenors 107. In addition to the statistical testimony developed in this case, there was a mass of other testimony concerning the class allegations. In consideration of these allegations, it is proper to examine the Safeway affirmative action plan. Safeway is required by Executive Order 11246 to have an Affirmative Action Plan. The language and format of Safeway’s Affirmative Action Plan were developed on a national level at Safeway headquarters in Oakland. This national plan was adopted and implemented on a divisional level throughout the country. Only the goals and timetables of the Affirmative Action Plan are unique to the Little Rock Division. (Mauldin, T. 4356-57). 108. The Division Manager in the Little Rock Division is ultimately responsible for the implementation of the Affirmative Action Plan. The Division Manager delegates the functional responsibility of implementing the Affirmative Action Plan to the Employment Relations Manager. The Division Manager and the Employment Relations Manager are the two persons in the Little Rock Division who are actually responsible for the implementation of the Affirmative Action Plan. (Mauldin, T. 4357). 109. Goals and timetables within the Little Rock Division are set on a district-by-district basis within the Division. This is the way in which goals and timetables are set within divisions in Safeway all .over the country. (Mauldin, T. 4357). 110. In setting goals and timetables for bargaining unit positions, Safeway utilizes the general population percentage of minorities in the various Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA’s) in which the stores in the district are located. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), the governmental body charged with responsibility for overseeing Executive Order 11246, accepts Safeway’s method of setting goals and determining underutilization by comparison to general population statistics. However, the OFCCP would rather Safeway use the full eight factor availability analysis to determine underutilization. The effect of adopting the eight factor analysis would be to decrease the goals that Safeway sets in its affirmative action plan. Safeway has consistently rejected the efforts of the OFCCP in this regard. (Mauldin, T. 4357-58). ■ 111. Within the Little Rock Division, goals and timetables are separately set for each of the five districts comprising the Little Rock Division. As discussed earlier, the geographic areas of these districts do not in any manner correspond to the geographic area covered by the scope of this lawsuit since this lawsuit involves stores in Little Rock, North Little Rock and Jacksonville which are in parts of three different districts within the Little Rock Division. (Mauldin, T. 4344, 4357). 112. Within the Little Rock. Division, the persons who make the personnel decisions are the District Managers, the Employee Relations Supervisor, and the Employment Relations Manager. The District Managers make decisions, with input from the Employment Relations Manager, on promotions and discharges of bargaining unit personnel. The Employee Relations Supervisor is responsible for the hiring and initial placement of bargaining unit personnel and reports directly to the Employment Relations Manager. The Employment Relations Manager is responsible for making personnel decisions concerning the administration of the Union contracts in areas such as reclassifications from part-time to full-time, promotions, discharges, etc. (Maul-din, T. 4364). 113. The Affirmative Action Representative reports directly to the Employment Relations Manager. This is not a decision-making position. The Affirmative Action Representative is responsible for reporting and record keeping requirements under Executive Order 11246, and for providing the persons who make personnel decisions with reports on information concerning affirmative action efforts. (Mauldin, T. 4364-65). 114. The Affirmative Action Representative prepares a quarterly affirmative action report which is submitted to Safeway’s headquarters in Oakland which monitors the Little Rock Division’s progress. The Affirmative Action Representative also prepares quarterly reports for the five District Managers within the Little Rock Division, itemizing underutilization by job groupings in each store. In addition to the District Managers, this report is given to the Division Manager, the Employment Relations Manager, and the Retail Operations Manager. Further, the Affirmative Action Representative prepares a monthly report on underutilization which shows total underutilization by each store. This report is also distributed to the Division Manager, the Retail Operations Manager, the Employment Relations Manager, the Employee Relations Supervisor, and the District Managers. In addition, the Affirmative Action Representative and the Employment Relations Manager monitor weekly and monthly computer reports on promotions and terminations and new hires. (Mauldin, T. 4356-66). 115. .. The Little Rock Division also has quarterly district managers meetings which are attended by the District Managers, the Division Manager, the Retail Operations Manager, the Employment Relations Manager, and the Employee Relations Supervisor. The sole topic of these meetings is affirmative action and Safeway’s efforts to meet its affirmative action goals. In addition, there are semi-annual store managers meetings where