Full opinion text
RANDALL, Circuit Judge: In this opinion, we decide whether the State of Texas has violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West Supp.1983), or the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution in drawing the districts to elect members of the Texas House of Representatives from Dallas County. Specifically, we consider the contention of a group of hispanic voters (the “MALDEF Intervenors”) that splitting the Dallas hispanic population into three separate districts cancelled out its voting strength. Only the seventeen House districts in Dallas County created by the State’s 1983 reapportionment plan (the “1983 House plan”), see Act of May 20, 1983, ch. 185, 1983 Tex.Sess.Law Serv. 756 (Vernon), are directly at issue. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. Originally, this action encompassed challenges by a variety of parties to the reapportionment plan (the “LRB House plan”) for the Texas House of Representatives adopted in 1981 by the Legislative Redistricting Board (the “LRB”). On November 6, 1981, the House Plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The complaint named as defendants various Texas public officials — the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Comptroller of Public Accounts and the Commissioner of the General Land Office (collectively, the “State Defendants”) — along with the chairmen of the State Democratic and Republican Parties. Allegedly, certain district lines in the LRB House plan deliberately discriminated against black, hispanic and republican voters. The action was transferred to this Court, and consolidated with two other actions: a parallel suit contesting the Senate reapportionment plan (the “LRB Senate plan”) and a separate attack on the LRB House plan filed by the Mayor and the City of Bay-town, Texas (“Baytown”). This Court also allowed two other groups of Texas voters to intervene. On January 4, 1982, R.A. Deison, Jr. and other individuals, all claiming to reside in Montgomery County, Texas (“Montgomery County”), entered the Senate and House cases to raise constitutional challenges. On January 6, 1982, the MAL-DEF Intervenors joined the Senate and House actions to assert causes of action under the constitution and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The early history of these proceedings and a summary of the claims of each party appear in our earlier opinion, Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F.Supp. 514 (N.D.Tex.), stay denied, 456 U.S. 902, 102 S.Ct. 1745, 72 L.Ed.2d 158 (1982), and will not be repeated here. During the course of these proceedings, the Department of Justice, on January 24, 1982, objected to the LRB Senate and House plans under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (West Supp.1983). The plans were thus rendered unenforceable. Until the Department of Justice precleared the reapportionment plans, the parties’ constitutional and statutory challenges remained nonjusticiable; thus, the progress of this litigation was suspended. When the Department of Justice objected to the LRB Senate and House plans, this Court had already conducted a hearing, on January 18-23, 1982, which addressed the merits of those plans. We conducted a second hearing on March 1-2, 1982, to reconsider those plans, along with other plans submitted by various parties, in order to select acceptable temporary plans under which to conduct the 1982 Texas elections. On March 11, 1982, this Court installed the LRB Senate plan and a modified version of the LRB House plan as temporary court-ordered plans. The 1982 Texas elections were held under the temporary plans. In our opinion explaining the adoption of the temporary plans, this Court urged the Texas Legislature to adopt procedures to resolve the Department of Justice’s objections to the LRB plans. Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F.Supp. at 548. Ultimately, on May 16, 1983, the Texas Senate approved a new Senate plan (the “1983 Senate plan”), and, on May 20, 1983, the Governor signed a bill adopting the 1983 House plan. The State submitted the 1983 plans to the Department of Justice; on August 1, 1983, the Department precleared the 1983 House plan and on September 6, 1983, the Department precleared the 1983 Senate plan, thus freeing this Court to consider whatever issues remained outstanding. On September 21, 1983, this Court directed the parties to file statements identifying the issues still in controversy. The order set out a schedule for submitting briefs and proposed findings. Although we believed that the action could be determined on the basis of the previous record, we also extended an opportunity for an additional hearing, but required proffers of anticipated evidence from any party who believed that the record required further development. The schedule was to culminate in oral argument on November 21, 1983. The response to this order demonstrated that only the MALDEF Intervenors sought an adjudication of constitutional or statutory claims relating to the 1983 House plan. Although the Senate Plaintiffs requested rulings and a hearing on the 1983 Senate plan, the House Plaintiffs filed nothing. Baytown, which had participated in the January, 1982 hearing, likewise failed to file a statement of issues, a brief or proposed findings. Montgomery County not only failed to respond to this Court’s order, but had also failed to appear at any hearing since we permitted intervention. At the request of the Senate Plaintiffs and the MALDEF Intervenors, we scheduled an evidentiary hearing for November 21, 1983, to supplement the record on the 1983 House and Senate plans. The Senate Plaintiffs sought an adjudication of the lawfulness of the entire 1983 Senate plan, and, at least initially, the MALDEF Intervenors asserted that the House districts for West Texas in the vicinity of Del Rio, as well as the Dallas County districts, violated the constitution and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. On the morning of the hearing, the issues narrowed further. The House and Senate Plaintiffs appeared at the hearing and offered a stipulation to dismiss them from the action. We accepted the stipulation and, on December 22, 1983, entered a consent decree establishing the 1983 Senate plan as the permanent plan for Texas Senatorial elections. The MALDEF Intervenors, on the other hand, abandoned their claim concerning the West Texas, districts and supplemented the record only as to the allegedly discriminatory results of the Dallas County House districts. Briefing preceded and followed the November, 1983 hearing. The State Defendants and MALDEF Intervenors have fully addressed the constitutional and statutory arguments. Although certain districts in the House plan have been altered since the LRB originally drew the lines in 1981, the Dallas districts have remained unchanged. Thus, on three occasions — at the January, 1982 hearing on the merits, at the March, 1982 hearing on temporary plans, and at the November, 1983 hearing addressed primarily to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act — we have heard evidence on the purpose and effect of the Dallas districting. II. THE DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICTS. Before we consider the merits, a review of the Dallas County districts will place the parties’ claims in perspective. This review, which will comprise findings of fact, will set forth the following: a description of the county population, a description of the distribution of the hispanic population within the county and a description of the effect of the past, present and proposed districting plans on Dallas County’s hispanics. A. Dallas County and its Hispanic Population. As in the State of Texas generally, the population of Dallas County grew between the 1970 and 1980 censuses. The 1970 county population of 1,327,320 had, by 1980, grown to 1,556,390. The rate of growth in the county of 17.3%, however, lagged behind the 27.1% rate of growth in the State as a whole. Accordingly, whereas the 1970 districting plan had allocated 18 districts to Dallas County, Dallas County’s share of the 1980 State’s House of Representatives districts declined. Thus, a “one-man, one-vote” reapportionment in 1980 would entitle the county to only 16.4 districts. In light of the Texas constitutional requirement of maintaining the integrity of county lines whenever the United States Constitution will permit it, see Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112, 113-15 (Tex.1981), the drafters of the redistricting plans faced the choice of dividing Dallas County into 16 slightly overpopulated districts or 17 slightly underpopulated districts. The 1983 House plan chooses the latter alternative, as have all the plans presently before us. The rate of growth in the county of the anglo, black and hispanic populations was not uniform. The minority populations in Dallas County grew more rapidly than the anglo population. Thus, in 1970, the black population of 220,357 comprised 16.6% of the county population. By 1980, the black population had increased by 30.5% to 287,-541, and comprised 18.5% of the county population. In 1970, the hispanic population of 88,652 comprised 6.7% of the county population. By 1980, the hispanic population had increased by 74.3% to 154,560, and comprised 9.9% of the county population. Parenthetically, we note that the census method of identifying hispanics changed between the 1970 and 1980 censuses, so that the numbers given for 1970 and 1980 are not entirely comparable. See II Trial Transcript 414-15 (testimony of Dudley Poston). Theoretically, the 1980 combined minority population would suffice to form almost five House districts. The black population alone could fill out slightly more than three districts. The hispanic population, on the other hand, could fill out slightly more than one and one half districts. Naturally, these calculations take no account of the geographic distribution of the minority population in the county. The minority population, for the most part, forms communities in the central and southern portions of the City of Dallas. Approximately 48,000 blacks and hispanics, however, live scattered throughout the predominately anglo communities in north Dallas County. Otherwise, the black and his-panic populations are mingled in an area running along the line of the Trinity River, through downtown Dallas and into the southern part of the City of Dallas. Although the black and hispanic populations live in close proximity to each other, the hispanic population in Dallas County, according to testimony adduced by the MALDEF Intervenors, has formed several identifiable neighborhoods. One neighborhood, known as “Little Mexico” consists of an area slightly northwest of downtown Dallas and southeast of Love Field. A second neighborhood, called “New Little Mexico” lies immediately northeast of Downtown Dallas and to the east of “Little Mexico.” Another neighborhood, known as “El Poso,” is located in the vicinity of downtown Dallas. Three additional neighborhoods, called “Los Altos La Vajate,” “Los Santos” and the “Ledbetter” area are located in west Dallas. In addition, the area around Love Field has a substantial hispanic population. Although these neighborhoods may be predominantly and identifiably hispanic, they form separate enclaves of hispanic population rather than one contiguous his-panic community. In most instances, the hispanic neighborhoods abut areas whose populations are a mixture of black and hispanic, predominately black or largely anglo. Generally, black areas are wedged between the three hispanic neighborhoods north of downtown Dallas — Little Mexico, New Little Mexico and the area near Love Field — and the three neighborhoods in west Dallas — Ledbetter, Los Santos and Los Altos La Vajate. Moreover, the three hispanie neighborhoods within west Dallas, as well as the three to the north of downtown Dallas, are not all contiguous to one another. For example, the Ledbetter area is isolated from the other two west Dallas neighborhoods; it adjoins a black area with less than 40% hispanic population on the east, anglo areas with less than 40% his-panic population on the south and northwest, a black area on the northeast, and an anglo area on the west. As the county demographic map illustrates, the hispanic population consists of six scattered areas rather than a cohesive whole. 1983 P-I Exh. 10A. Indeed, the hispanic neighborhoods are sufficiently dispersed such that a serious question exists whether any single district could completely encompass them. B. The Districting Plans. Partially as a consequence of dispersed nature of the hispanic populations, Dallas has never had an hispanic-dominated House district. With one exception, the proposed plans do not draw a district with an hispanic majority. One plan — the “MAY-MAL-DEF” plan — creates a district with only a bare hispanic population majority. The voting age population for that district, however, is only 43.66% hispanic. While the other plans that we have reviewed have in common their lack of a hispanic district, the plans differ substantially in their demographic and political consequences. 1. The Previous Plan. Before the 1980 census was taken, Dallas County was divided into 18 single-member House districts. The Texas Legislature had drawn the districts pursuant to the order of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas after that court struck down a multi-member district plan for the county in 1971. See Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704 (W.D. Tex.1972), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). The Graves plan had divided the predominately minority areas in and around the City of Dallas into six districts: 33C, 33F, 33G, 33K, 33N and 330. These six districts were heavily populated with minorities. District 33C consisted of portions of the black population in west Dallas and included the hispanic population around Love Field. District 33F, which lay to the south of District 33C, took in most of the area where, according to the MALDEF Intervenor’s testimony, the “Los Altos La Vajate” and “Los Santos” neighborhoods are located, together with adjacent black and anglo areas. Three districts, 33G, 33N and 330, ran through the predominately black areas of south Dallas. See 1983 Joint Exh. 2. The Graves plan contained four districts with substantial hispanic populations. These districts varied from one with 19.8% hispanic population to one with 31.3% his-panic population. A more complete breakdown of the minority populations in these districts appears in Table A. In 1980, these district configurations had resulted in the election of three black Representatives. Representative Sam Hudson was the incumbent elected from district 33C in west Dallas. II Trial Transcript 465-66 (testimony of George Dillman); II Trial Transcript 539 (testimony of Lee Jackson). Representative Paul Ragsdale was the incumbent elected from district 33N in south Dallas. II Trial Transcript 539 (testimony of Lee Jackson); IV Trial Transcript 1082 (testimony of Paul Rags-dale). Representative Lanelle Cofer was the incumbent from district 330 in south Dallas. Id. While the Graves plan was in force, one other district, district 33G in west Dallas, had, on two occasions, elected a black Representative. II Trial Transcript 539. 2. The 1983 House Plan. Despite the growth of minority population in Dallas County generally, the 1980 census revealed that the districts in the City of Dallas were substantially underpopulated. Together, the six minority districts in central Dallas listed in Table A, supra, were approximately 160,000 persons short of the population necessary for six “ideal” districts. District 33C alone fell short of an “ideal” district by about 40%, or 38,000 persons. District 330 fell approximately 34% short of an “ideal” district. IV Trial Transcript 1089 (testimony of Paul Ragsdale). The 1983 House plan, like all of the plans submitted to this Court, redrew the minority-dominated areas in central and southern Dallas County into five districts. In essence, the 1983 House plan dismantled one of the Graves districts in the City of Dallas to build up the minority population in adjacent districts. District 100 encompasses most of the population of former district 33C in west Dallas and extends southeast into predominately black areas that formerly comprised a part of district 330. See II Trial Transcript 556 (testimony of Lee Jackson); 1983 Joint Exh. 2; 1983 P-I Exh. 4. District 103 consists in part of former district 33F; the district also extends further west, and includes small portions of former districts 33G and 330 on the south and east. See 1983 Joint Exh. 2; 1983 P-I Exh. 4. District 107, in large measure, includes former district 33K together with a portion of former district 33C. 1983 Joint Exh. 2; 1983 P-I Exh. 4. District 110 includes most of former district 33N, and extends further south. 1983 Joint Exh. 2; 1983 P-I Exh. 4. District 111 includes most of former district 33G, part of former district 330, and an area to the west of Dallas that had not formerly been a part of the central city district. 1983 J. Exh. 2; 1983 P-I Exh. 4. A breakdown of the minority population and voting age population appears for each of the five minority districts under the 1983 House plan in Table B along with the same information for the three MALDEF plans. Like the Graves plan, the 1983 House plan does not unite the six pockets of his-panic population. Two separate districts contain substantial hispanic populations. District 107 — which contains “Little Mexico” and “New Little Mexico” — has an his-panic population comprising 29.01% of the total district population. District 103— which contains the Ledbetter area, and most of the population in the Los Altos La Vajate and Los Santos neighborhoods — has an hispanic population comprising 35.54% of the total district population. In both of these districts, the black and hispanic populations combine to form a majority. In neither district, however, does the combined black and hispanic population make up a majority of the voting age population. The configuration of the 1983 House districts, like the Graves plan, resulted in the election in 1982 of three black Representatives. Representative Sam Hudson, formerly of district 33C, won re-election in district 100. Representative Paul Rags-dale, formerly of district 33N, won re-election in district 110. Although the black incumbent from former district 330 did not run, a black Representative, Jesse Oliver, was elected from district 111. 3. The MALDEF Plans. The MALDEF Intervenors have offered three plans — the “MALDEF I plan,” the “MALDEF II plan” and the “MAY-MAL-DEF plan” — that have a common objective: to create an hispanic-dominated district. Each plan creates five districts in the areas of minority concentration in and around the City of Dallas. In one of the districts in each plan, hispanics would potentially be a politically decisive force. In the MALDEF I and MALDEF II plans, the key districts contain an hispanic population plurality together with a combined black and hispanic population majority. In the MAY-MAL-DEF plan, the hispanic district has a bare hispanic population majority together with a combined black and hispanic population majority. Although each of these plans achieves, at least in theory, an hispanic-dominated district by slightly different means, the line-drawing in each plan dealt with similar obstacles. The most serious problem, of course, arises because only twelve of the census tracts in Dallas County (143 04, 4 03, 30, 31 02, 33, 106, 4 01, 8, 10, 19, 24, 47) contain more than 50% hispanic population. 1983 Joint Exh. 5. Even these twelve census tracts, which cumulatively contain slightly more than 21,000 hispanics, cannot all be placed in a single contiguous district. Only one plan — the MAY-MALDEF plan— includes the four largest of these twelve tracts in one district, and even that plan splits two of these tracts. Still another problem arises from the first. The MALDEF plans all attempt to unite in one district at least part of census tract 106, an 85.06% hispanic area containing about 5600 hispanics, and census tract 4 03, a 60.21% hispanic area containing about 3300 hispanics. 1983 Joint Exh. 5. To accomplish this union, the district must traverse an area that forms a part of 1983 House district 100, and that formerly was a part of district 33C from the Graves plan. Although the area — census tract 100 — itself contains a black population of only 1446 persons, the area either adjoins or gives access to other areas (census tracts 6 01, 71 02, 102 and split tract 105) that have additional black populations totaling approximately 11,200 persons. No district configuration for a black district that excluded census tract 100 could join these other areas with the rest of district 100. In short, the line drawers are compelled to make a choice between uniting black or hispanic populations. Finally, the MALDEF plans all exclude the same predominately anglo areas from their hispanic-dominated districts. Testimony adduced by the MALDEF Intervenors suggested that these affluent anglo neighborhoods, which are a part of one of the most strongly hispanic districts under the 1983 House plan, had a particularly strong propensity to oppose minority candidates. These areas, referred to as “Kessler Park” and “Stevens Park,” adjoin the predominately hispanic areas in west Dallas. VI Trial Transcript 99, 102-03 (testimony of Joe May); id. at 66, 73 (testimony of Trinidad Garza). The three MALDEF plans cut a careful line around these anglo neighborhoods and move them into the predominately black district to the south. The three plans also have in common their effect on the hispanic population. Like the 1983 House plan, the MALDEF plans place parts of each of the six pockets of hispanic population into at least two separate districts. The three plans differ chiefly in their respective percentages of hispanic population in the hispanic-dominated districts and their effect on adjacent black districts. The MAY-MALDEF plan is unique in that it embraces at least part of the identifiable hispanic communities in north Dallas and west Dallas. The plan achieves an hispanic population majority only by creating a district that runs three tentacle-like corridors through west and central Dallas. A more complete breakdown of the minority populations in each district appears in Table B. III. THE PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS. The MALDEF Intervenors urge this Court to strike down the Dallas County districts in the 1983 House plan because they violate section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting hispanic voting strength, and because the plan’s drafters contravened the constitution by purposefully creating that dilution. The configurations of the districts, in the MALDEF Intervenors’ estimation, combine with political conditions in Dallas County to ensure that the hispanic population enjoys less opportunity than others to elect candidates of their choice. Purportedly, the State drafted the plan with the transparent intent to protect incumbents by harming Dallas hispanics. The Dallas districts, the MALDEF Intervenors maintain, fragment a cohesive his-panic community. The plan allegedly joins hispanic neighborhoods to politically hostile anglo neighborhoods with the result that the largest groups of hispanic voters in Dallas County are rendered politically impotent. As the MALDEF Intervenors see the matter, its alternative plans evidence the ease with which the districting authority could have designed at least one district in which hispanics could have turned an undesired incumbent out of office and installed a candidate of their choice. The MALDEF Intervenors assert that the failure to draw such a district must be regarded as discriminatory. Past political discrimination and the lingering effects of general discrimination against hispanics have allegedly rendered them politically inactive. According to the MALDEF Intervenors, political polarization, evidenced by bloc voting, leads to a predictable result for hispanics — virtual disenfranchisement. As one consequence, the MALDEF Intervenors point out, no hispanic has ever served in the Texas Legislature as a Representative of Dallas County. The State, in the MALDEF Intervenors’ view, can muster no policy adequate to justify the impact of the 1983 House plan on hispanics. The sole justification of the plan allegedly derives from incumbency. While the MALDEF Intervenors conceded that the State Defendants may legitimately consider the political effects of redistricting, the 1983 House plan purportedly achieves its political ends by purposefully gerrymandering a natural hispanic population concentration. Naturally, the State Defendants deny the MALDEF Intervenors’ characterization of the plan’s design and result. The geographic dispersion of the hispanic population, the State Defendants contend, contradicts any notion that the plan fragments or “cracks” any community of hispanics that is cohesive. Furthermore, in the view of the State Defendants, the political climate of Dallas is not so inhospitable to hispanics as to oblige the State to construct artificially a district that ensures local hispanic hegemony. The State Defendants also argue that the MALDEF Intervenors misconstrue the plan’s purpose. The plan, as the State Defendants emphasize, aims at maintaining continuity and avoiding retrogression of the voting strength of blacks. According to the State Defendants, the district lines neither deviate from reasonable configurations nor split up hispanic neighborhoods. The hispanic neighborhoods, which are separated by as much as nine miles, have allegedly been consolidated, where possible, in a reasonable manner. In the State Defendants’ view, the MAL-DEF Intervenors cannot, under the evidence, argue that the 1983 House plan gerrymanders. Rather, the State Defendants assert that the MALDEF Intervenors complain only of the plan’s failure to maximize hispanic voting strength by carving up other natural population patterns. Moreover, the State Defendants take the view that the MALDEF Intervenors have failed to demonstrate that the Dallas County electoral system is rigged against his-panics. The evidence, under the State Defendants’ construction, establishes no monolithic polarization in voting among population groups that might transform hispanic status as a population minority into a de facto withdrawal of the right to vote. Nor does the evidence, the State Defendants assert, show hispanic political powerlessness despite the frequent failure of hispanic candidates at the polls. Finally, the State Defendants disagree with the MALDEF Intervenors’ interpretation of State policy. Incumbency, according to the State Defendants, provides only a part of the plan’s rationale. The State’s policy also allegedly advances related interests — continuity with the previous districting plan, and the preservation of Representative-constituent relationships. In addition, the State Defendants point out that the drafters had to consider the effect of the plan on black voters. The State Defendants allege that the MALDEF plans jeopardize black interests; all of the MAL-DEF plans pair an anglo incumbent against the most junior black Representative. One of the plans, the MAY-MALDEF plan, eviscerates the district of yet another black Representative. The State Defendants assert that this Court should defer to the legislative judgment about how best to resolve these conflicting interests fairly. IV. THE APPLICABLE STANDARDS. Since the Supreme Court first forayed into the “political thicket” of reapportionment in the 1960s, courts have struggled with the task of developing manageable standards to determine when the process of line-drawing becomes invidiously discriminatory. On one hand, courts have not tolerated political systems that effectively exclude minority voters from the democratic processes. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 2339-41, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439, 85 S.Ct. 498, 501, 13 L.Ed.2d 401 (1965) (dictum); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1304-07 (5th Cir.1973) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636, 96 S.Ct. 1083, 47 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976). Yet, on the other hand, courts have consistently eschewed the notion that the United States Constitution secures to any group of citizens the right to obtain political representation in proportion to its numbers. E.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124,156-57, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1875-76, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971). In the present ease, we are presented with two variations on this theme of how to draw the line between securing the right to participate politically and avoiding government by quota. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973, as amended in 1982, and the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution offer related remedies for minority groups that have suffered interference with their right to vote as a result of the voting practices or procedures in their electoral system. To obtain either remedy, a plaintiff must show that, in the totality of circumstances, “the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question — that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.” White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766, 93 S.Ct. at 2339; see 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973b. Under neither test does the failure of a minority group to translate its voting strength into proportional representation suffice to establish a lack of access. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 156-60, 91 S.Ct. at 1875-77; 42 U.S.C.A. 1973b'. Both the constitutional jurisprudence and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act have employed a group of objective evidentiary factors to measure the discriminatory effect of a voting practice or procedure on minority voters. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766-69, 93 S.Ct. at 2339-41; Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d at 1305-06; S.Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, reprinted in, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 177, 206-07 (report of Committee on the Judiciary endorsing 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act). The factors include historical inquiries such as the effects of past discrimination, indicia of race or ethnic-conscious politics such as polarized voting, and formal obstacles to minority success at the polls such as anti-single shot voting requirements or majority vote rules. The objective factors aid in distinguishing mere political failure from unlawful deprivation of political participation. Despite the common purpose and evidentiary focus, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act demands a less exacting burden of proof. To find that an electoral system violates the constitution, a court must determine that the discriminatory impact of the system derived from the intent to bring about that result. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-22, 102 S.Ct. 3272, 3275-78, 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66-71, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1499-01, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.); accord id. at 99-101, 100 S.Ct. at 1516-1517 (White, J., dissenting). The objective factors in White and Zimmer may, but do not necessarily, support an inference of intent. Compare City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 72-74, 100 S.Ct. at 1502-1503 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.) (objective factors “far from proof” of discriminatory purpose) with Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 623-27, 102 S.Ct. at 3279-81 (finding evidence, based principally on objective factors, sufficient to support inference of discriminatory intent). Under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, however, a plaintiff can establish a violation by showing the discriminatory result, which in turn can be proven through the aggregate of the objective factors. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b); S.Rep. No. 417 at 29-30 & n. 118, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 206-07 & n. 118. Although the objective factors are relevant to both the constitutional and statutory inquiry, each test relies upon them for different inferences. Accordingly, we must discuss the significance of these factors under the constitutional and statutory tests. This discussion will also consider how the configurations of single-member districts can constitute a discriminatory voting practice or procedure. A. The Section 2 Test. Before Bolden and the lower court cases that anticipated its holding, the law of voting dilution had never expressly required a showing of discriminatory intent. To harmonize the law of voting dilution with the standard prevailing in other equal protection cases, see generally Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), the Supreme Court in Bolden explicitly read an intent requirement into the voting dilution line of cases for the first time. Section 2 represents Congress’ judgment that focusing on intent diverts attention from the crucial issue — equality of access. S.Rep. No. 417 at 16, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News at 193. Originally, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act had merely tracked the wording of the fifteenth amendment, and the Supreme Court read its provisions as coextensive with the constitution. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60-61, 100 S.Ct. at 1495-1496 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). In June of 1982, Congress amended the Act to prohibit electoral systems that had invidious results even though the systems might not clearly have been installed in order to discriminate. The Act presently reads; (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title [which applies the Act’s protection to members of any language minority], as provided in subsection (b) of this section. (b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance that may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973 (West Supp.1983). The language of the Act, which derives from White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766, 93 S.Ct. at 2339, aims at codifying pre-Bolden case law. See H.R.Rep. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (House Committee on the Judiciary recommending “results” amendment to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act); S.Rep. No. 417 at 19-24, 27-28, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 192-202, 204-06. Congress viewed preBolden case law as evaluating the discriminatory nature of the electoral system in question solely on the basis of objective criteria. Id., 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News at 196-202, 204-06. To aid in applying section 2, Congress enumerated typical objective factors derived from White and Zimmer: 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which the members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinders their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. S.Rep. No. 417 at 28-29, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 206-07; H.R.Rep. No. 227 at 30 (footnotes omitted); cf. White, 412 U.S. at 766-70, 93 S.Ct. at 2339-41; Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305. In addition, Congress cited two other factors that might have limited relevance: whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group. whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. S.Rep. No. 417 at 29, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 207 (footnotes omitted); cf. Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305. The factors are not an all-encompassing catalogue of the features that mark a system as discriminatory, but rather guides for discerning whether race or language unduly determine the outcome of political events. The Senate report noted: The courts ordinarily have not used these factors, nor does the Committee intend them to be used, as a mechanical “point-counting” device. The failure of the plaintiffs to establish any particular factor is not rebuttable evidence of nondilution. Rather, the provision requires the court’s overall judgment, based on the totality of circumstances and guided by those relevant factors in the particular case, of whether the voting strength of minority voters is, in the language of Fortson and Burns [v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 86 S.Ct. 1286, 16 L.Ed.2d 376 (1966) ], “minimized or cancelled out.” S.Rep. No. 417 at 29 n. 118, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 207 n. 118. Thus, when a minority group contends that an electoral system disenfranchises them because their race or ethnicity has decisive political significance, the objective factors provide indicia of how great a role race or ethnicity plays, and how severe are the probable effects. The objective factors offer a framework to distinguish an unlawful electoral system in which considerations of race or ethnicity pervade politics to the serious detriment of the minority, from a permissible electoral system in which the racial and ethnic composition of the elected body simply does not mirror that of its constituency. See generally S.Rep. No. 417 at 33, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 211. B. The Constitutional Standard. The constitutional standard also inquires into the extent to which race and ethnicity mobilize the electorate and combine with a voting practice to dilute the minority’s voting strength. The results of a voting practice, however, only begin the analysis. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, only the most severely discriminatory results will suffice to invalidate facially neutral rules. In Arlington Heights, for example, the Court stated: Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of the official action — whether it “bears more heavily on one race than another,” Washington v. Davis, [426 U.S. 229, 242 [96 S.Ct. 2040, 2049, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) ] — may provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 [6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220] (1886); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 [35 S.Ct. 926, 59 L.Ed. 1340] (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 [59 S.Ct. 872, 83 L.Ed. 1281] (1939); Gomillion v. Light-foot, 364 U.S. 339 [81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110] (1960). The evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy. But such cases are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence. 429 U.S. at 266, 97 S.Ct. at 564 (footnotes omitted). This “other evidence” may consist of an indirect showing that the decision-makers contemplated the discriminatory result. Thus, in Arlington Heights, the Court suggested that a plaintiff may demonstrate intent circumstantially through evidence of: (1) the historical background of the decision; (2) the sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision; (3) procedural or substantive departures from normal decision-making; and (4) statements, including legislative or administrative history, reflecting on the purpose of the decision. Id. at 267-68, 97 S.Ct. at 564-65. Clearly, some of the objective factors can perform “double duty,” shedding light on both the result of a voting practice and its purpose. See Cross v. Baxter, 604 F.2d 875, 880 n. 9 (5th Cir.1979) (history of voting discrimination). A tenuous state policy, for example, provides precisely the form of circumstantial showing of intent contemplated by the Arlington Heights evidentiary scheme. Polarized voting likewise elucidates the historical background of the voting practice or procedure; it creates a political climate that “allows those elected to ignore [minority] interests without fear of political consequences.” Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 623, 102 S.Ct. at 3279. Determining whether the objective factors show either a sufficiently “stark” pattern that obviates any inquiry into purpose, or a sufficiently strong circumstantial showing of intent, requires “a blend of history and an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact” of the voting procedure “in light of the past and present reality, political and otherwise." See id. at 622, 102 S.Ct. at 3278 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 769-70, 93 S.Ct. at 2339-41). Occasionally, evidence of the objective factors will warrant relief. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. at 622-627, 102 S.Ct. at 3278-3281. Under the constitutional test, however, a court must go beyond the objective factors to assure itself that the record independently satisfies the general equal protection standard that a facially neutral rule must derive from discriminatory purpose. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 72-74, 100 S.Ct. at 1502-1503 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). C. Special Problems of Single-Member Districts. Much of the “voting dilution” case law, and indeed most of the legislative history of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, addresses the design and impact of at-large or multimember districts. The reasoning of the cases, and the “objective factors,” do not always translate comfortably into the context of single-member districting. Nevertheless, standards for dealing with single-member districts under the “results” test are necessary in light of Congressional intent to apply section 2’s prohibition on discrimination to all voting practices. See S.Rep. No. 417 at 30, 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 207. The Supreme Court has seemingly treated single-member districting plans as distinct from at-large systems. For example, in Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 422-25, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1837-39, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977), the Court intimated that the districting authority must purposefully draw lines to cancel out minority political strength in order to violate the constitution. The Court, however, decided Connor after Arlington Heights, and Congress may not have intended to codify Connor in preference to lower court authority interpreting Regester. Lower courts have found that Regester mandated a “results” test even for single-member districts. E.q., Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 143. Several of the “objective factors” apply readily to single-member districts. For example, a minority that votes in single-member districts will be affected equally by any history of discrimination, and equally susceptible to the effects of depressed socioeconomic circumstances. Likewise, racial bloc voting will support the same inferences of racial politics and may bear the same prospect for ensuring perpetual electoral defeat, whether it occurs in an at-large or a single-member districting plan. The structure of a single-member districting plan, however, does not have the same inherent tendency to submerge the minority that an at-large districting plan does. As the Eighth Circuit has noted: Vote dilution occurs when an at-large election plan is used to cancel out the voting strength of a substantial minority population. Typically, a relatively small geographic area of a municipality will be occupied by a minority group which would constitute a majority or a near majority of a single member district if an election-by-district voting scheme was used instead of an at-large scheme. Perkins v. City of West Helena, 675 F.2d 201, 203 n. 2 (8th Cir.1982). Provided that the districts are equally apportioned, single-member districts do not obviously dilute voting strength. Only reference to the minority composition of the district and the manner in which the district lines are drawn can change such plans into devices with discriminatory results. The minority composition of single-member districts may have the effect of cancel-ling out voting strength in two ways. First, district line-drawing may pack a minority into homogenous districts, thus “wasting” its potential political strength. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57, 84 S.Ct. 603, 605, 11 L.Ed.2d 512 (1964). Alternatively, the district line-drawing might fragment minority groups among sevéral districts, thus preventing the formation of a local majority. See Robinson v. Commissioners Court, 505 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir.1974). While easy to state in the abstract, identifying when “packing” or “fragmenting” deprives a minority of access can present difficult problems. One difficulty stems from the uncertainty about what district configuration best serves the minority political interest. For example, in Wright, the Court noted that there was disagreement between the minority plaintiffs and intervenors not only about whether concentrated or dispersed districts were preferable, but also over whether the concentrated or dispersed districts were constitutionally permissible. 376 U.S. at 57-58, 84 S.Ct. at 605-606. Moreover, the feasibility of concentrated or dispersed districts may vary depending on the pattern in which minority group has settled. Whereas splitting up a cohesive minority population might, under the totality of the circumstances, cancel out minority political strength, Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 149-50, every movement of a cohesive minority population out of a single district does not dilute voting strength. Howard v. Adams County Board of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455, 458-59 (5th Cir. 1972). What will show the requisite dilution? In many cases, the ultimate conclusion has turned on purpose rather than results. E.g., Robinson, 505 F.2d at 679. In Kirksey, the lead pre-Bolden case in which a plaintiff prevailed without a specific finding of purpose, the requisite dilution derived from: (1) the cohesiveness of the community; (2) the fragmentation of the community; (3) deviation from expected district lines; (4) a pattern of racial bloc voting; and (5) a history of discrimination. The result was a “predictable tendency” to cancel out and minimize the minority vote. Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 147-51. V. THE OBJECTIVE FACTORS. We next consider the evidence on the objective factors. The MALDEF Intervenors offered evidence on a history of official discrimination, the socioeconomic effects of general discrimination, polarized voting, a lack of success by hispanic candidates, and a tenuous state policy. The discussion that follows, which will constitute findings of fact, will consider each of these factors. A. History of Official Discrimination and the Lingering Effects of General Discrimination. We first consider two factors together: the history of official discrimination touching on political participation and the lingering socioeconomic effects of general discrimination. In this case, MALDEF offered similar evidence with regard to both of these factors, and the inferences to be drawn from the presence of these factors overlap. Both factors explain reduced political participation by the minority group. Although a history of official discrimination can support an additional inference— that a facially neutral rule continues a state policy of discrimination — we will consider that inference separately. The MALDEF Intervenors have offered evidence of discrimination — both private and official — through several means. Principally, they seek to rely on this Court’s judicial notice of the findings in prior cases. In addition, statistical evidence and live witnesses described the present socioeconomic status of Dallas hispanics and the reduced nature of hispanic political activity. As the MALDEF Intervenors suggest, the State of Texas, in the past, discriminated against its hispanic citizens. In Graves v. Barnes, 343 F.Supp. 704 (W.D.Tex.1972), aff’d in part sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973), for example, the court extensively considered the combined effects of the language barrier, private discrimination, and official discrimination on the hispanics’ exercise of the franchise. Id. at 731 & n. 19. As the court stated: Because of long standing educational, social, legal, economic, political and other widespread and prevalent restrictions, customs, traditions, biases and prejudices, some of a so-called de jure and some of a de facto character, the Mexican-American population of Texas, which amounts to about 20%, has historically suffered from, and continues to suffer from, the results and effects of invidious discrimination and treatment in the fields of education, employment, economics, health, politics and others. There can be no doubt that the lack of political participation by Texas Chicanos is affected by a cultural incompatibility which has been fostered by a deficient education system. This cultural and language impediment, conjoined with the poll tax and the most restrictive voter registration procedures in the nation have operated to effectively deny Mexican-Americans access to the political process in Texas even longer than the Blacks were formally denied access by the white primary. Id. at 728-31. In addition, the MALDEF Intervenors ask us to note that school authorities in parts of Texas have maintained dual school systems that segregated his-panic students from their anglo counterparts. See United States v. Texas, 342 F.Supp. 24 (E.D.Tex.1971); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School System, 324 F.Supp. 599 (S.D.Tex.1970). As the MALDEF Intervenors also suggest, the Dallas County hispanic population has not achieved educational levels comparable to either the anglo or black populations. Thus, whereas only 18.7% of the black population and 9.9% of the anglo population have proceeded no further than elementary school, 46.9% of the hispanic population has not gone beyond elementary school. Although the hispanic population, on the average, has higher income levels than the black population, the hispanic average is nevertheless lower than the anglo average. VI Trial Transcript. 149 (testimony of Frederick Cervantes). The evidence also showed that mean housing values in predominately hispanic areas were significantly lower than the mean housing values for anglo areas. II Trial Transcript 404-06 (testimony of Dudley Poston). On the basis of this record, we conclude that Dallas hispanics suffer serious socioeconomic disadvantage. Several witnesses, both for the MALDEF Intervenors and the State Defendants, testified that discrimination against hispanics has not only occurred in the past, but continues at least in parts of Texas. E.g., IV Trial Transcript 1117 (testimony of Paul Ragsdale). Still other witnesses testified about the feeling among hispanic candidates and voters in Dallas County that political action is futile. VI Trial Transcript 76, 82 (testimony of Trinidad Garza). Moreover, the evidence shows that hispanies participate infrequently in politics as measured both by voter registration and turnout. For example, 1983 P-I Exh. 37 supp. indicates that only about one-half of the hispanic voting age population in Dallas County registers to vote. Accordingly, we conclude that discrimination and its socioeconomic effects have decreased hispanic political participation. Finally, we consider the offer by the MALDEF Intervenors of the findings of the Department of Justice on electoral practices in the November, 1982 elections. According to the findings, Dallas election officials ran short of ballots, and a disproportionately large number of the precincts affected were predominately minority. 1983 P-I exh. 34. In addition, notices warning of the consequences of illegal voting were posted during the election, again largely in minority precincts. The findings allegedly bespeak continued official discrimination. While we might accept these findings to indicate that Dallas election officials were insufficiently solicitous of minority voters, we do not attach great weight to the findings as signifying intentional political discrimination. As the report indicates, the ballot shortage resulted from inaccurate computer forecasts of voter turnout. No discussion appears in the report concerning the prevalance of, or the reasons for, the notices concerning illegal voting. Whether these incidents constituted intentional discrimination within the meaning of the Arlington Heights intent test is a question that could spawn an entire satellite litigation. Neither party offered testimony to explain, rebut or supplement the findings. As a result, we do not accord to the finding significant weight on the issue of official discrimination. Although the State Defendants do not seriously contend that hispanic political participation is free from the effects of past discrimination, the State adduced evidence to show that the State has attempted to improve minority participation. We have heard testimony that voters may now register more easily in Texas than in most other states. II Trial Transcript 392 (testimony of George Pierce). Registration forms are, in addition, readily available in Spanish. Moreover, the State has attempted to improve registration by organizing voter registration drives. IV Trial Transcript 890-91 (testimony of Mark White). Despite these changes, which represent laudable attempts by the State to reverse the effects of the former political alienation of minorities, we find that the combined effect of these two factors point to discrimination-related reductions in hispanic political participation. While the State undoubtedly has had a history of official discrimination against minorities, the evidence adduced in this case strongly suggests that official discrimination against minorities has ended, at least in Dallas County. Further, the entire process by which, following the 1980 census, the State of Texas drafted and adopted redistricting plans, culminating in the 1983 House plan, far from evidencing official discrimination, convincingly evidences full minority access to the redistricting process and a willingness on the part of almost all involved in that process to consider and effectuate minority proposals. This suggests that the 1983 House plan does not continue any past policy of official discrimination. Indeed, it represents a dramatic break with that policy. Detailed fact findings relating to the redistricting process are set forth in our earlier opinion in this case, Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F.Supp. at 528-36, and are hereby incorporated herein. Nevertheless, in spite of the recent history of official concern for minority needs and objectives, the history of discrimination against hispanics is not remote and has resulted in reduced hispanic political participation at the present time. B. Polarized or Bloc Voting. The MALDEF Intervenors attempted to prove polarized voting in Dallas County through three techniques. First, expert witnesses offered studies of polarization in other counties. Second, witnesses familiar with politics in Dallas County related their impressions about polarization between anglos and hispanics. Finally, the MAD DEF Intervenors offered detailed evidence on one electoral race — the 1982 democratic primary in the 1983 House district, district 103, with the greatest hispanic population. At least superficially, this evidence suggested that hispanics and anglos voted in blocs: the voting studies purported to demonstrate that the voting of anglos and his-panics in other parts of Texas polarizes; most lay witnesses agreed that they saw patterns of strong support among anglos and hispanics for candidates of their respective ethnic groups; and the 1982 primary in question resulted in victory for the anglo incumbent with the hispanic candidate garnering support most strongly in predominately hispanic precincts. Close examination of the evidence, however, convinces us that such bloc voting as may exist in Dallas does not operate, as the Dallas districts are structured under the 1983 House plan, to deny hispanics an equal opportunity to participate in the political process or elect candidates of their choice. 1. The Evidence. Cross-examination by the State Defendants revealed serious methodological shortcomings in the polarization studies. Notably, Dr. Brischetto, the principal MALDEF expert, made no effort in his studies to discern the effect on voting patterns of other variables — for example, party affiliation, income, campaign issues or education. Ill Trial Transcript 628-30 (testimony of Robert Brischetto). Moreover, Dr. Brischetto conceded that he selected for study those electoral races that pitted hispanic candidates against “formidable” anglo opposition. In addition, for his most detailed analysis, Dr. Brischetto chose only the most overwhelmingly anglo or hispanic precincts, rather than precincts with a more even population mix or with tri-ethnic populations. Nor are these methodological choices trivial in the circumstances of this case. The testimony, for example, suggested that party affiliation has, to some extent, eclipsed the importance of bloc voting in Texas politics, V Trial Transcript 1253 (testimony of Dave Richards), and Dr. Brischetto’s data revealed at least one race in which party, rather than ethnicity, apparently determined hispanic voting preference. Ill Trial Transcript 635-36 (testimony of Robert Brischetto). Similarly, analyzing ethnically homogeneous precincts in county-wide elections does not reliably measure the extent to which mixed anglo and hispanic populations in single-member districts will vote, nor does it measure the voting patterns in tri-ethnic precincts such as those in Dallas County. In addition, the practice of selecting only those elections in which “formidable” anglo opponents faced hispanic candidates results in the studies containing an unq