Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER JAMES R. MILLER, Jr., District Judge. On January 24, 1983, the plaintiffs, Esther V. Reigh, Ivery Mae Simpkins, David Michael Simpkins, and Lenora C. Dannie, filed this suit against Charles L. Schleigh, in his official capacity as Principal Clerk of the District Court for Washington County; Nancy E. Mueller, in her official capacity as Clerk of the District Court for Howard County; and William A. Dorsey, in his official capacity as Administrative Clerk of the District Court of Baltimore City. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants, in issuing orders of attachment pursuant to the post judgment procedures in Rules FI through F5 of the Maryland District Rules, have deprived the plaintiffs of property without due process of law by failing (a) to cause a timely notice to be served upon the judgment debtor prior to, or immediately subsequent to, service of the Order of Attachment upon the garnishee; (b) to serve notice which would inform the judgment debt- or of the available state and federal exemptions and the procedure whereby he or she can obtain a hearing to contest the attachment; and (c) to require a hearing within a specified number of days to resolve a contested attachment when requested by the judgment debtor. The plaintiffs prayed for a judgment declaring the then current Maryland District Rules governing post judgment attachment unconstitutional; the permanent enjoining of the issuance of post judgment orders for attachments by defendants until the Maryland District Rules are revised to require timely, adequate notice and timely opportunity for a hearing; an award of reasonable costs and attorney’s fees; and such other and further relief as this court deems just and proper (Paper No. 2). The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting that (1) no case or controversy existed, and (2) the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted (Paper No. 9). Thereafter, with the consent of counsel for defendants, plaintiffs amended their complaint asserting as an additional cause of action, based on the same acts underlying the original complaint, a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution (Paper No. 12). On May 6, 1983, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, incorporating their memorandum in support of their Opposition to the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and submitting affidavits of the plaintiffs (Paper Nos. 13-15, 22). The defendants filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and a response to the plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on July 1, 1983 (Paper No. 18), in which they reasserted contentions made in their Motion to Dismiss and also asserted that (1) the rule changes sought by the plaintiffs were then under consideration for adoption by the Maryland Court of Appeals, mooting this case, and (2) that the Maryland District Rules, as then currently codified, did not violate the plaintiffs’ due process rights or the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs filed a response to defendants’ Cross Motion (Paper No. 19). A hearing was held on the motions on December 2, 1983. I. Factual Background A. Plaintiff Reigh Plaintiff Esther Reigh is a seventy-year-old woman whose monthly income consists of $380.00 in Social Security and $43.14 from a pension from Fairchild Republic. Both checks are directly deposited into her account with the First National Bank of Maryland (FNB). On September 23, 1981, the C & P Telephone Company obtained a judgment against plaintiff Reigh in the District Court for Washington County. On July 6, 1982, an Order of Attachment on Judgment was issued by an agent of the defendant Schleigh and, on July 7, 1982, was served on FNB. FNB immediately froze the plaintiff’s bank account on the same day and also mailed her notice informing her that it had been served with a writ of attachment and enclosing a copy of the Order for Attachment. On July 13, 1982, FNB mailed the plaintiff a copy of the garnishee’s Confession of Assets. On or about July 15, 1982, plaintiff Reigh, acting pro se, asked the District Court in Washington County to exempt her account at FNB from attachment. Her request was granted on July 29, 1982. Plaintiff Reigh continues to be a judgment debtor to the C & P Telephone Company (Paper No. 2, ¶¶ 11-15; Paper No. 15, Reigh Affidavit). B. Plaintiffs Ivery Mae and David Simpkins Plaintiffs Ivery Mae and David Simpkins are mother and son. Ivery Mae Simpkins is 52 years old and disabled. Her sole source of monthly income is $421.50 from Social Security. Although married to a member of the merchant marine, she seldom receives any support from him and has received none from him since her bank account was attached in May of 1982. David Simpkins is 21 years old and attends Towson State University on a grant. His sole source of monthly income is $162.00 from Social Security. On August 11, 1982, a judgment was entered in the District Court for Howard County against these plaintiffs in favor of the American Express Company. On October 7, 1982, an agent of the defendant Mueller issued an Order for Attachment on the plaintiffs’ checking and savings accounts at Union Trust Company of Maryland (UT). The plaintiffs learned of the attachment on or about October 21, 1982 when they received copies of two letters from UT to the attorneys for UT which revealed that the plaintiffs had four bank accounts, two checking and two savings, containing $426.20 with UT. A Garnishee’s Confession of Assets was served on the plaintiffs on October 27, 1982 by UT. On November 5, 1982, through counsel, Ivery Mae and David Simpkins filed a claim of exemption with the District Court for Howard County. On December 6, 1982, the exemption was granted. These plaintiffs continue to be judgment debtors to the American Express Company (Paper No. 2, ¶¶ 17-23; Paper No. 13, Simpkins Affidavit). C. Lenora C. Dannie Plaintiff Lenora C. Dannie is 26 years old and lives with three dependent children. Her sole source of income is $355.00 a month from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. On November 3, 1979, the Equitable Trust Bank obtained a judgment against the plaintiff and on December 13, 1982, an Order for Attachment was issued. On December 13, 1982, her cheeking account containing $24.11 from AFDC at FNB was frozen. On December 14, 1982, FNB mailed a letter to the plaintiff, informing her that they had received the Order for Attachment. On December 17, 1982, a claim of exemption was filed with the District Court of Baltimore City. The exemption was granted on December 29, 1982. Dannie continues to be a judgment debt- or to the Equitable Trust Bank (Paper No. 2, ¶¶ 25-30; Paper No. 13, Dannie Affidavit). II. Existence of a Case of Controversy The defendants assert that each plaintiff, who was subjected to the garnishment procedures outlined in Maryland District Rules, F1-F5, has since had the attachments quashed pursuant to Rule G51, Maryland District Rules. Therefore, since none of these plaintiffs have funds currently frozen under the Maryland Post Judgment Attachment statute, defendants contend there is no case or controversy in existence as required by Article III of the United States Constitution and that the case must be dismissed. Those who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III of the Constitution by alleging a case or controversy, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-1953, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-25, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1848-51, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969), for the courts are precluded from issuing advisory opinions, Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911), and may only decide questions that can affect the rights of litigants in the case before them. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 404, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971). Plaintiffs must demonstrate a “personal stake in the outcome” in order to ensure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentations of the eonstitutional issues to be resolved. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). A plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct, policy or statute and that the injury or threat thereof is real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 91 S.Ct. 758, 27 L.Ed.2d 696 (1971); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10, 89 S.Ct. 956, 960, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). An actual controversy must exist at all stages of review. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950). The law, however, is not so rigid as to deny review in those instances in which the conclusion of the adjudication of the claims cannot occur before the facts underlying the claim must necessarily change. See, e.g., Super Tire Engineering v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 94 S.Ct. 1694, 40 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (strikes); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n. 8, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1282 n. 8, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (state election laws); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 712, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) (pregnancy). In Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir.1980) (en banc), the Third Circuit considered a motion to dismiss a lawsuit brought by plaintiff Finberg contesting the validity of Pennsylvania’s post judgment garnishment proceedings. During the pendency of the state court garnishment proceedings, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of the Due Process and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution. Prior to the completion of the federal proceedings, and five months after initiating her claims of exemption in the state courts, the plaintiff recovered all of the money which had been attached. The defendants asserted that, because the plaintiff had had her money returned, she no longer had a personal stake in the outcome, and the case should be dismissed as moot. Judge Seitz, writing for the court, concluded that the case was one challenging “short term orders, capable of repetition, yet evading review,” Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911), and, therefore, was not moot. He reasoned that the plaintiff had demonstrated a reasonable expectation that she would experience the reoccurrence of the activity: “In the present case, Mrs. Finberg does have some reason to fear that she will suffer another attachment of her bank accounts. She remains a judgment debtor. As the record indicates that she is an elderly widow with a modest income, this judgment could remain unsatisfied for some time. Future efforts to execute the judgment are therefore likely. Sterling might repeat its attempt to garnish the accounts. For example, when new funds accumulate in the accounts, Sterling might find that the garnishment process is the most efficient way of determining whether any of the new funds are exempt. We also cannot disregard the possibility that a successor to Sterling’s interest, such as a collection agency, could make such an attempt. Furthermore, Mrs. Finberg’s modest income and the difficulties that she had demonstrated in this case in meeting the demands of a creditor indicate that she may incur another money judgment and suffer an attempted garnishment to execute it.” Finberg, 634 F.2d at 55-56. More recently, the Fourth Circuit has considered a similar challenge and concluded that the case was not moot. Harris v. Bailey, 675 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.1982). In Harris, the plaintiff, a Social Security recipient, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Virginia garnishment procedure violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 407, exempting paid Social Security benefits from garnishment procedures. The district court dismissed her suit when her monies were returned prior to its adjudication. The Fourth Circuit reversed. Judge Ervin, speaking for the panel, found the Harris facts to be similar to those of a previous case before the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Hammond v. Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972). In Hammond, the plaintiff had challenged a South Carolina repossession statute on due process and equal protection grounds. Although the state repossession action was concluded before the federal case had been tried, the Fourth Circuit, after noting that “due to her poverty, appellant will likely again be subjected to the challenged statutory procedure,” id. at 1055, and that the public interest was substantial, concluded that the case was not moot. In Harris, after concluding that the procedure there involved, like that of Hammond, was of brief duration but one that is capable of repetition, yet evading review, and finding the reasoning in Finberg to be persuasive, the Fourth Circuit held that the general rule, which denies judicial review when the principal cause becomes moot, did not apply. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147; Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). In the present case, the defendants point out that each of the above-discussed cases involved federal suits filed before the controversy had been settled and that the “capable of repetition” exception was used by those courts to conclude that the prior controversy was not mooted by the change in the plaintiffs’ circumstances. In contrast, this case involves plaintiffs who filed suit after the Orders for Attachment had been quashed in state proceedings, a situation which defendants contend means that there has never existed a case or controversy in this suit. The plaintiffs contend that the “capable of repetition” exception should apply to cases in which the plaintiffs reasonably expect to be subject to the challenged procedures in the future, regardless of whether they are suffering actual injury at the time they file suit in federal court. In the Supreme Court’s most recent case on the subject, it concluded that the district court was without jurisdiction to entertain a plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief due to the failure to satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675. The Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff had no standing to challenge the Los Angeles police department’s chokehold policy was based on the Court’s determination that the nature of his claim was speculative in that it was unlikely that the plaintiff would suffer future injury from the use of chokeholds by police officers. For the same reason, the “capable of repetition” doctrine was held not to apply. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court reiterated the observations it had made in earlier cases. In O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), particular members of the plaintiff class alleging the discriminatory enforcement of criminal law by state officials had actually suffered from the alleged unconstitutional practices. The Court observed that “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing present adverse effects,” although past wrongs were evidence bearing on “whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” Id. at 495-96, 94 S.Ct. at 676. Since it was to be assumed that the plaintiffs in O’Shea would conduct themselves in a lawful manner, the possibility of threatened injury from the practice sought to be stopped was remote and a case or controversy did not therefore exist. See also Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 97 S.Ct. 1739, 52 L.Ed.2d 219 (1977); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); Golden, 394 U.S. 103, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113. In an earlier case, Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977), although the issue was not raised by either party, the Supreme Court examined the standing of all appellees to determine whether the case or controversy requirement associated with Article III of the United States Constitution had been met, thereby entitling the appellees to an opportunity to seek the injunction requested. The appellees sought to challenge the constitutionality of New York statutes authorizing a finding of contempt against judgment debtors. All but two of the appellees had, at the time the lawsuit commenced, already been imprisoned and released after payment of the court imposed fine. Id. at 331-32. Because the periods of incarceration had been served, the underlying judgment satisfied, or the fines paid by some of the appellees, the effect of the orders imposing those fines no longer existed. The Supreme Court concluded that no case or controversy existed as to those appellees. In reviewing the facts as to each of the appellees in Juidice v. Vail, the Court indicated that “the prospect of further contempt orders in the underlying action could have given Vail [the one appellee who had not satisfied the underlying judgment in addition to the court imposed fine for contempt] the requisite constitutional standing to seek to enjoin the contempt processes as unconstitutional.” Id. at 333 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. at 1216 n. 9. Although the claims of this appellee were also dismissed because the complaint did “not allege the likelihood, or even the possibility, of future contempt orders,” id., the Supreme Court indicated that standing may be present, under a pleading making appropriate allegations, despite the absence of pending state proceedings at the time the suit in federal court is commenced challenging those proceedings. Article Ill’s requirement of the existence of a case or controversy is met by a demonstration of an injury or the threat of injury. Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663. The question of standing, whether at the outset or after litigation has begun, is the same: is there an injury or a threat of injury? The “capable of repetition” exception to the mootness doctrine is the label applied to a court’s determination that there continues to be a threat of injury so that standing still exists. As the Supreme Court opinions in Vail v. O’Shea, Lyons, and Baker reveal, a threat of injury, if real, is sufficient to fulfill Article Ill’s requirement of the existence of a case or controversy at the outset of the federal litigation. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983). The threat of injury was not present in O’Shea, Lyons, and Golden because the facts of those cases revealed that future injuries from challenged conduct were possibilities which were too speculative to ensure the “concrete adverseness” necessary for proper resolution of constitutional issues. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675. In Vail, the appellee’s complaint did not even allege a future injury. The facts which gave rise to those determinations of speculative injury are vastly different from the situation in the present case. Although no longer suffering present injury from the challenged conduct, the plaintiffs in the case sub judice, like the one appellee in Vail, continue to be indebted on the underlying debts and have no assurance or indication that their present creditors will not again attempt collection of the debts. The plaintiffs in this case, in contrast to the Vail appellee, have alleged in their complaint and affidavits that their underlying judgment debts continue. They further alleged that, because of their poverty, all may be subjected to repeated attachment of their bank accounts. As the Supreme Court in Vail indicated, and the Fourth and Third Circuits in Harris and Finberg recognized, a plaintiffs poverty and continued status as a judgment debtor make very real the threat of injury from procedures designed to permit collection of a debt. Unlike the Lyons, O’Shea, or Ashcroft cases, where the facts indicated reoccurrence of the injury was unlikely, here the plaintiffs, because of their poverty, will probably be injured again by the challenged procedures due to the actions of present or future creditors. For these reasons, the court concludes that these plaintiffs have standing to challenge Maryland’s District Rules permitting post judgment orders of attachment to be issued. See Grimes v. Miller, 429 F.Supp. 1350, 1354 (M.D.N.C.1977). III. The Maryland District Rules In Maryland, the procedural rules for the governance of the District Courts of Maryland at the time this suit was filed were separately codified as the Maryland District Rules, Chapters 1, 100-700, 1100-1300. Chapter 100, Subtitles G & F contained the herein challenged procedures to be followed by a judgment creditor seeking to obtain an attachment on a judgment. Under the challenged Maryland District Court garnishment rules in existence at the time this suit was instituted, in order for a writ of attachment by way of garnishment to issue the judgment creditor filed instructions to the sheriff as to the description and location of the debtor’s property to be attached. M.D.R. FI, G42d. The writ was then served on the garnishee, the person having property or credits belonging to the defendant. M.D.R. FI, G47a. The writ of attachment was required to notify each person upon whom it was served, i.e., the garnishee(s), to file in writing a defense, G52, within thirty days after service of the writ. If a claim of total exemption was filed by the garnishee, the creditor, within thirty days, must have either dismissed or requested a hearing. If a hearing was requested, the matter was set for trial. M.D.R. F2. If some other initial pleading by the garnishee or the debtor was filed, the case was also set for trial. M.D.R. F2b. Alternatively, the judgment debtor could obtain the dissolution of the writ by giving a bond in an amount equal to the attached property. M.D.R. FI, G57. A final alternative under the former rules was for the garnishee or the debtor to file a motion to quash the writ. Such a motion must have been filed within thirty days of the service of the writ on the garnishee. M.D.R. FI, G51a. The court then, upon notice to the creditor, was required to hear the motion to quash “forthwith.” M.D.R. FI, G51(b). The writ of attachment by way of garnishment remained in effect until it was quashed. M.D.R. FI, G51c. If no defense was filed within the thirty-day period after service of the writ, the judgment creditor could prove the amount of the debtor’s assets in the hands of the garnishee, and a Judgment of Condemnation Absolute would thereupon be entered against the garnishee. M.D.R. F3. If the garnishee filed a Confession of Assets, the court could enter a Judgment of Condemnation Absolute. M.D.R. F4. Execution of Judgments of Condemnation Absolute could be awarded by the court at any time. M.D.R. F5. At the December 2, 1983 hearing, this court observed that on October 21, 1983, the Maryland Court of Appeals had ordered the adoption of amendments to the Maryland District Rules, Chapter 1100, Subtitle G and Subtitle F. These changes were subsequently printed in the Maryland Register. Md.Admin.Reg. Vol. 10, Issue 23 (Nov. 11, 1983). The majority of these changes dealt with amendments to the G Rules, the statutory procedures governing attachment before judgment. Because, however, the post judgment garnishment procedures contained in Subtitle F incorporate by reference some of the G Rule procedures, Rule FI was amended to incorporate the changes in the G Rule references. The only substantive change, as of October 21, 1983, in the post judgment garnishment procedures which are challenged in this suit is the change in Rule G51. The former Rule G51, providing the procedure for filing a motion to quash the writ, was deleted to accommodate the adoption of a new Rule G51, a comprehensive rule covering release of property and dissolution of attachment. The specific change in the procedures challenged by the plaintiffs and contained in the new Rule G51, as of October 21, 1983, was that now a hearing on a motion to release property or to dissolve the attachment pursuant to Rule G51 must be requested by a party, and once requested, the hearing shall be held “promptly,” rather than “forthwith,” as required by the former Rule G51(b). The remaining procedures or lack thereof challenged by the plaintiffs remained unchanged in the October 21, 1983 change in the rules. IV. Latest Changes in the Maryland District Rules In their motions before this court, the defendants asserted that the changes in the Maryland District Rules that the plaintiffs sought were then currently under consideration and were expected to be put into effect in the next several months after the December, 1983 hearing. The defendants referred to the Tentative Draft of the Revised Maryland Rules of Procedure, published in November, 1982, by the Rules Committee of the Judiciary of Maryland. (Preface, Tentative Draft). As the plaintiffs accurately pointed out, the proposed rules contained in the Tentative Draft revised only the procedures of the Circuit Courts of Maryland and did not affect or attempt to alter the District Rules which contain the procedures challenged in the present case. At the December 2, 1983 hearing, however, the defendants submitted to the court a copy of the proposed Eighty-Eighth Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure. In that report, which was later submitted to the Court of Appeals on December 9, 1983, the Rules Committee proposed amendments to the Maryland District Rules. (Defendants’ Exhibit No. 4). Md.Admin.Reg.Vol. 10, Issue 25 (Dec. 9, 1983). Three specific proposed rules were called to the court’s attention, 3-311, 3-643, and 3-645. These proposed changes to the Maryland District Rules were later adopted by the Maryland Court of Appeals on April 6, 1984, effective July 1, 1984. Md.Admin. Reg.Vol. 11, Issue 9 (Apr. 27, 1984). The new Maryland District Rules provide that the judgment debtor will be mailed a copy of the writ at his last known address by the party serving that writ on the garnishee. The writ shall contain notice to the judgment debtor that federal and state exemptions may be available, and of his right to contest the garnishment by filing a motion asserting a defense or objection. M.D.R. 3-645. A motion for exemption filed by the judgment debtor must be filed within thirty days of service of the writ. M.D.R. 3-643. Finally, the new rules provide that a party desiring a hearing on a filed motion must file a timely request within five days of service of the motion. M.D.R. 3-311(d). Y. The Due Process Claims The plaintiffs assert that they have a property interest in their bank accounts, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719, 42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1975); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969), which were attached by the defendants under procedures set forth in former M.D.R. F1-F5. The defendants do not dispute the existence of the property interest. The issue is whether due process is provided by the Maryland District Rules as they now exist, and, if not, what process is due. Almost sixty years ago, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of the process which is due in post judgment proceedings in Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285, 45 S.Ct. 61, 69 L.Ed. 288 (1924). The judgment creditor, Endicott Johnson, brought suit to compel the judgment debtor’s employer, the Encyclopedia Press, Inc., to pay over 10% of the debtor’s wages each week to the creditor pursuant to a duly awarded execution by the Supreme Court of New York. The employer asserted that the New York Code authorizing such garnishment violated the debtor’s right of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment because the execution was authorized without notice to the judgment debtor or without affording him an opportunity to be heard. Justice Sanford, writing for the Court, upheld the ex parte application of the judgment creditor reasoning that, “in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is not essential that he [the debtor] be given notice before the issuance of an execution against his tangible property; after the judgment he must take ‘notice of what will follow,’ no further notice being necessary to advance justice..” Id. at 288, 45 S.Ct. at 62. Subsequent federal decisions applied the holding in Endicott Johnson and concluded that post garnishment statutes that did not provide notice to the debtor were constitutional and did not deprive the debtor of due process. See, e.g., Halpern v. Austin, 385 F.Supp. 1009 (N.D.Ga.1974); Katz v. Ke Nam Kim, 379 F.Supp. 65, 68-69 (D.Haw. 1974); Langford v. State of Tennessee, 356 F.Supp. 1163 (W.D.Tenn.1973) (per curiam)’, Moya v. DeBaca, 286 F.Supp. 606, 607-08 (D.N.M.1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825, 89 S.Ct. 2136, 23 L.Ed.2d 740 (1969). See also Wanex v. Provident State Bank of Preston, 53 Md.App. 409, 454 A.2d 381 (1983) [per curiam) (citing Endicott Johnson with approval, but simply holding that the Maryland rules as then currently codified did not require notice to the debtor before garnishment). The continuing applicability of Endicott Johnson to the more recent cases, which involve the garnishment of bank accounts which may contain exempt property, is questionable in light of the fact that the Court in Endicott Johnson did not consider any possibility that the judgment debtor might be deprived of exempt property. This issue, which does not arise until the judgment creditor seeks to subject specific assets of the judgment debtor to satisfaction of the judgment, cannot be resolved in the underlying action. Furthermore, the New York statute, which was upheld in Endicott Johnson, authorized garnishment of only ten percent of a judgment debtor’s wages and only that percentage was sought by the judgment creditor. In contrast, the garnishment of bank accounts may deprive the judgment debtor of his sole source of income when retirement or welfare benefits are directly deposited into those accounts. See M. Greenfield, A Constitutional Limitation on the Enforcement of Judgments — Due Process and Exemptions, Wash.Univ.L.Q. 877, 887-88, 896-98 (1975). Moreover, other courts have questioned the continuing validity of the Endicott Johnson holding in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 635 (1946). In Griffin, the plaintiff wife sought to enforce in the District of Columbia a 1938 New York judgment for support arrearages based on a 1926 New York alimony decree. The 1938 judgment was obtained in an ex parte proceeding without notice to the husband. A 1936 judgment for arrearages, the court proceedings having been attended by the husband, was also unsatisfied. Id. at 223, 66 S.Ct. at 558. The Supreme Court held the 1938 judgment to be invalid to the extent it cut off any defenses the husband debtor might have raised with respect to arrearages accruing after 1936. The Court recognized the argument that the 1926 decree gave the husband notice that further proceedings might be taken which might result in a judgment on the obligation, but reasoned that there was “no ground for saying that due process does not require further notice of the time and place of such further proceedings, inasmuch as they undertook substantially to affect his rights in ways in which the 1926 decree did not.” Id. at 229, 66 S.Ct. at 561. While this rationale conflicts with that in Endicott Johnson, the fact that the Supreme Court did not refer in Griffin to that former decision has caused difficulty in determining what impact Griffin had. Courts have alternately refused to conclude that Griffin undercuts Endicott Johnson, Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of Duval, 539 F.2d 1355, 1363-65 (5th Cir.1976), questioned the continuing validity of the Endicott Johnson decision, First Nat’l Bank v. Hasty, 410 F.Supp. 482, 489 n. 8 (E.D.Mich. 1976); Betts v. Tom, 431 F.Supp. 1369, 1373 (D.Haw.1977), or have noted the contradiction but not relied on it in reaching their decision. Phillips v. Robinson Jewelers, No. 81-190-BT (W.D.Okla., Feb. 15, 1982). In a later dissent on the dismissal of a writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, at least some of the justices on the Supreme Court indicated that they believed that the Endicott Johnson rationale was no longer viable in light of Griffin. Hanner v. DeMarcus, 390 U.S. 736, 88 S.Ct. 1437, 20 L.Ed.2d 270 (1968). A series of recent Supreme Court cases-concerning prejudgment deprivations reveal a shift in the Court’s view of due process from that of the Court during the period when Endicott Johnson was decided. In 1969, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969), a Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment statute, which allowed a creditor to freeze the wages of a debtor in the hands of an employer pending the outcome of the action on the creditor’s claim of indebtedness. The Court said that the garnishment of wages is such a severe deprivation that due process requires that it be preceded by notice to the debtor and an opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 340, 89 S.Ct. at 1822. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), the Supreme Court struck down Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes which did not require advance showing by the applicants that the chattels in question were wrongfully detained. The Court concluded that the failure to provide the debtor with prior notice and an opportunity to dispute the creditor’s claim deprived the debtor of due process in that “a hearing must take place when deprivation can still be prevented.” Id. at 81, 92 S.Ct. at 1994. In the third recent prejudgment case before the Court, Justice White, writing for the majority, after balancing the interests of the parties, concluded that a Louisiana sequestration statute, which failed to provide prior notice and a hearing, was constitutional where other measures, such as a required creditor affidavit and the issuance of the writ by a judge, minimized the risk that the ex parte procedure would lead to a wrongful taking. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant & Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616-17, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 1904-05, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974). In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719, 42 L.Ed.2d 751 (1975), Justice White, again writing for the majority, invalidated a Georgia prejudgment garnishment procedure which allowed the freezing of a corporation’s bank account without either notice and a hearing before the freeze, or the alternate safeguards similar to those in Mitchell. Following the prejudgment deprivation cases, the Supreme Court reviewed the concept of due process in an analogous context. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), when examining the process due a Social Security recipient prior to termination of her benefits, the Court observed that its former cases, including Di-Chem, Sniadach, and Fuentes, “ ‘underscore the truism that “due process,” unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’ Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 [81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230] (1961). ‘Due Process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 [92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484] (1972)____ Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, [416 U.S. 134], at 167-168 [94 S.Ct. 1633, 1650-1651, 40 L.Ed.2d 15] (Powell, J., concurring in part); Goldberg v. Kelly, supra [397 U.S. 254], at 263-266 [90 S.Ct. 1011, 1018-1019, 25 L.Ed.2d 287]; Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra [367 U.S.], at 895 [81 S.Ct. at 1748]. More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors; first, the private interest that will be affected by the official actions; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, [367 U.S.] at 263-271. [90 S.Ct. at 1018-1022].” Mathews, at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. at 902-03. In contrast to the categorical analysis of Endicott Johnson, the balancing of interest approach to due process, first recognized in the creditor-debtor situation in Mitchell, and distilled in Mathews, has been applied by courts and commentators analyzing post judgment garnishment and execution procedures. See Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50 (3d Cir.1980) (en banc); Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of Duval, 539 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 949, 97 S.Ct. 1588, 51 L.Ed.2d 797 (1977); Deary v. Guardian Loan Co., Inc., 534 F.Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y.1982); Betts v. Tom, 431 F.Supp. 1369 (D.Haw.1977); First Nat’l Bank v. Hasty, 410 F.Supp. 482 (E.D.Mi.1976); Harris v. Bailey, 574 F.Supp. 966 (W.D.Va.1983); Phillips v. Robinson Jewelers, No. 81-190-BT (W.D. Okla., Feb. 16, 1982); Simler v. Jennings, 23 O.Op.3d 554 (S.D.Ohio 1982). In Finberg, 634 F.2d 50, the Third Circuit concluded that the Pennsylvania restraint and enforcement procedures, which resulted in freezing the plaintiff’s bank account, failed to provide notice and a prompt post seizure hearing, denied the judgment debt- or due process of law, and violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 59-63. Notice was insufficient because it failed to inform the judgment debtor of the exemptions which might have been available or the procedures by which to assert an exemption. A prompt hearing was not available where the creditor had fifteen days to respond to an exemption petition before the debtor could request a hearing. By contrast, in Brown, 539 F.2d 1355, the Fifth Circuit, after balancing the interests of the parties, concluded that a Florida post judgment wage garnishment statute, which did not provide for prior notice or a hearing, satisfied due process. This decision was reached in part because the plaintiff was provided with an expeditious review of his claim. A. Identification of the Interests Involved and Risk of Erroneous Deprivation The post judgment creditor has a strong interest in prompt and inexpensive satisfaction of the debt owed by the judgment debtor. Deary, 534 F.Supp. at 1186. More weight is to be accorded this interest in a post judgment context than in prejudgment situations, because there is no question as to the debtor’s liability. Delay or added expense to the creditor will only diminish the ultimate value of the recovery on the debt. Finberg, 634 F.2d at 58; Brown, 539 F.2d at 1365; Betts, 431 F.Supp. at 1376. The ability to seize swiftly monetary assets, such as bank accounts, which are easily liquidated, is in the creditor’s interest since it is faster and less expensive than enforcement against other types of personal property. Finberg, 634 F.2d at 58; Brown, 539 F.2d at 1366; Deary, 534 F.Supp. at 1186. The creditor’s fear that liquid assets held in bank accounts can quickly disappear if notice is given is real and further suggests the need for the ability to attach these funds without advance notice to the judgment debtor. Phillips, slip op. at 13 (Paper No. 22, Exh. A). The debtor’s interest in the uninterrupted use of his bank accounts is not insubstantial. “A bank account may well contain the money that a person needs for food, shelter, health care, and other basic requirements of life.” Finberg, 634 F.2d at 58. Freezing a bank account may deprive a debtor of all his income when those funds represent the total monthly benefits of the disabled, the elderly or the mother with dependent children. In contrast to situations involving the garnishment of wages where, as in Brown, a statute usually imposes a limit on the portion of the wages which may be frozen and obtained, the garnishment of a debtor’s bank account, which may contain most of his money, can be catastrophic. The attachment of bank accounts, therefore, increases the probability that the judgment creditor may deprive debtors of all means for providing for themselves. The legitimacy of the debtor’s need for at least a portion of the funds in these accounts is underscored by the.legislatures’ determinations that an exemption is necessary to safeguard the debtor’s ability to purchase the basic necessities. Finberg, 634 F.2d at 58; Deary, 534 F.Supp. at 1186; Betts, 431 F.Supp. at 1375. For the most part, the interests of the government coincide with the interests of the debtor and the creditor. The government’s interests include insuring the enforcement of judgments and the use of efficient procedures to do so, maintenance of the integrity of the judicial process by preventing asset dissipation which would frustrate judicial decisions, and the provision to judgment debtors of the means to subsist and to obtain the basic necessities of life. In addition, the government’s concern with minimizing the burden on its courts and other agencies must also be considered. In the present case, the interests of the judgment creditors and judgment debtors are those recognized by courts which have previously examined these issues. The American Express Company, the C & P Telephone Company, and the Equitable Bank all had an interest in recovering efficiently and quickly the debt owed them by the judgment debtors. The plaintiffs had their sole sources of income placed beyond their reach for the period of time between the issuance of the writ until their claims of exemptions were resolved by the district courts. Plaintiff Dannie, a mother of three, had her sole source of income, AFDC benefits, deposited directly in her bank account, frozen. Plaintiff Reigh had her pension and Social Security retirement benefits, directly deposited in her bank account, frozen. The Simpkins had their disability and dependent’s disability funds from Social Security frozen. Each plaintiff, relying solely for sustenance on benefits which are statutorily exempt from garnishment, was deprived of those benefits until the district courts ruled on the respective motions to quash. B. Notice The Maryland District Rules in effect when this suit was filed and as amended on October 21, 1983 contained no assurance that the judgment debtor would ever receive notice that his bank account had been attached and the funds therein frozen. M.D.R. FI provided for service of the writ only on the garnishee, not on the debtor. While the back of the Order for Attachment, which was served on the garnishees holding the property of these plaintiffs, stated that the garnishee should notify the debtor, there was no requirement that the garnishee do so (Paper No. 13, Dannie Affidavit, Order for Attachment attached thereto; Paper No. 15, Reigh Affidavit, Order of Attachment attached thereto). At the December 2, 1983 hearing, the defendants submitted to the court for its consideration copies of two types of forms then being used by the District Courts of Maryland in post judgment garnishment cases. Defendants’ Hearing Exhibit No. 2 is the. Petition for Attachment on Judgment containing also the Writ of Attachment (hereinafter referred to as Petition/Writ). This Petition/Writ replaced the Order for Attachment form used by the Maryland District Courts to notify the garnishees of the plaintiffs’ property. The Petition/Writ was printed in June of 1983. Although the new Petition/Writ stated that the debtor may claim a cumulative $3,000 exemption of any judgment as set forth in Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 11-504, the Petition/Writ no longer informed the garnishee that it should mail a copy of the order to the debtor. Thus, there was still no requirement by statute or rule nor any longer a suggestion in the forms used that the garnishee inform the judgment debtor of the attachment of his or her bank account, in order to provide the judgment debtor with notice of his right to assert a claim of exemption. Defendants’ Hearing Exhibit No. 1 is a copy of the Garnishee’s Confession of Assets form. This form is completed by the garnishee and it indicates the property of the judgment debtor that is held by the garnishee. Once a Confession of Assets was filed by the garnishee, the district court could enter a judgment of condemnation absolute for the assets confessed, provided that no claimant filed a pleading within thirty days after service of the writ on the garnishee. M.D.R. F4. This form, which went into use in September, 1983, contains on it a certification, to be completed by the garnishee, that a copy of the confession of assets form has been mailed to, among others, the defendant, judgment-debtor. The reverse side of the confession of assets form lists those items which are exempt from execution on judgment as provided for in Md. Cts. & Jud.Proc. Code Ann. § 11-504(b) & (c), and informs the judgment debtor that if he or she wishes to claim the $3,000 exemption set forth in § 11 — 504(b)(5), the judgment debtor may fill out and return a Motion to Elect Exemption form set forth below. While the new M.D.R. 3-645(d) seems to require that the answer of the garnishee be served on the judgment debtor as well as the creditor, there is no requirement in the post judgment garnishment rules that a copy be received by the debtor or filed by the garnishee within the thirty-day period the judgment debtor has to assert his claim of exemptions. M.D.R. 3-645(e) and (i). With the old form, which also contained a certificate of service to the judgment debt- or, (Paper No. 13, Simpkins Affidavit, Garnishee’s Confession of Assets form), the Simpkins did not receive a copy of the Confession of Assets form until almost three weeks after their bank account had been frozen and the writ had been served. Thus, the possibility exists that judgment debtors will not receive a copy of the Confession of Assets form until after their time to file their defenses to the attachment has run. Although, as the plaintiffs rightly pointed out, the law prior to July 1, 1984 did not require that the judgment debtor be given notice of anything, the new M.D.R. 3-645(d) requires that the judgment debtors be mailed a copy of the writ “[p]romptly after service upon the garnishee.” The old procedure, under the rules as they existed when this suit was filed, and as the rules were amended on October 21, 1983, was a violation of due process in that a judgment debtor was not guaranteed notice of an attachment sufficient to allow him to obtain a meaningful judicial determination of his right to an exemption of property under state and federal law. The new rule, however, appears to the court to provide for the timing of notice to the judgment debtor in a manner sufficient to satisfy the concepts of fairness inherent in the Due Process Clause. While the timing of the notice under the new M.D.R. 3-645(d) is somewhat ambiguous in that it is required “promptly” after service upon the garnishee, this court is reluctant to conclude, in the absence of state court rulings on the meaning of that term in this context, that the notice would be deemed to be “prompt” if not sent at the first possible opportunity after service upon the garnishee was achieved. Only if the notice is sent immediately to the judgment debtor after service upon the garnishee will the debtor have a reasonable opportunity to take action to obtain a meaningful judicial determination of his rights to an exemption of the seized property. C. Content of Notice The second result of a lack of notice from the District Courts of Maryland to the debtors, alleged by the plaintiffs, is the likelihood of ignorance on the part of judgment debtors of the exemptions which are available and the process by which a claim of exemption can be made. The notice requirement by due process must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to ... afford [interested parties] an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950); Green v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 72 L.Ed.2d 249 (1982). See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13-15, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1562-1564, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978) (public utilities notice to its customers of the termination of their gas and electric services failed to satisfy due process because the notices did not inform the customers of the process for contesting terminations); Banks v. Trainor, 525 F.2d 837 (7th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 978, 96 S.Ct. 1484, 47 L.Ed.2d 748 (1976) (because notices did not inform recipients of factors relevant in determining net food stamp income, the plaintiff class could not inform caseworker of expenditures properly considered); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1281 (7th Cir.1981) (notice to housing project tenants of their right to receive retroactive housing benefits required); Nunez v. Boldin, 537 F.Supp. 578 (S.D.Tex.1982) (notice of the opportunity to apply for asylum must be given). See also Hanner, 390 U.S. at 741, 88 S.Ct. at 1440-41 (and cases cited therein); Nelson v. Regan, 560 F.Supp. 1101 (D.Conn.1983); Hill v. O’Bannon, 554 F.Supp. 190, 195 (E.D.Pa.1982). In Finberg, the Third Circuit reasoned that providing notice to the debtors of the exemptions available would “provide substantial protection to the debtor’s interest in having funds available for basic necessities.” Finberg, 634 F.2d at 62. Since knowledge of the exemptions is not widespread and the debtor’s inability to consult an attorney before the freeze could cause serious problems, the court concluded that the balance of interests required that the debtor be furnished with this information and that failure to provide such information was a violation of due process. Id. at 62. Accord Deary, 534 F.Supp. at 1187. “The purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending ‘hearing.’ ” Craft, 436 U.S. at 14, 98 S.Ct. at 1563. Notice in a case such as this, where an individual’s ability to obtain basic necessities is endangered, does not comport with due process when it does not advise the debtor of the procedure for protesting the attachment of his bank accounts or the grounds on which such an attachment could be challenged. Such information can be incorporated into the writ of attachment form from the district court with little burden on the courts. This information is not required to be supplied by the new rules nor is it, in fact, presently supplied, the court having already determined that the Confession of Assets form to be sent to the debtor by the garnishee affords notice of only one type of exemption without a full explanation of how to obtain a hearing. The Maryland District Rules presently, as they have in the past, deprive judgment debtors of their constitutional rights of due process as a result of the deficiency in the required content of the notice. D. Opportunity for a Timely Hearing The third defect in the Maryland District Rules, which the plaintiffs allege existed and continues to exist, is the absence of an opportunity for a timely hearing. The plaintiffs seek to have this court determine that a hearing on the judgment debtor’s motion to assert an exemption must be held within a finite number of days, a time period which will not deprive the judgment debtor of his exempt property for longer than is absolutely necessary. The defendants contend that hearings were held on such motions in an expeditious manner under the law as it existed when this suit was filed and as the rules were amended on October 21, 1983. Rule G51, which used to require that a hearing be held on a motion to quash “forthwith,” was amended on October 21, 1983 to provide that when a debtor files a motion to release property and then requests a hearing, the district court shall hold a hearing “promptly.” M.D.R. G51. The new rules contain the provision that a hearing, if requested, shall be held “promptly.” M.D.R. 3-643(f). The new rules do not require that a claim for exemption, if no hearing is requested, be ruled upon “promptly” or at any particular time. The court in Phillips required that the hearing on the exemption application be held within ten days or less. In Betts, the hearing was required to take place in two working days. In Finberg, the court held that fifteen days’ delay in holding a hearing was too long. In Deary and Simler, it was held that a hearing was required to be held as soon as possible so as not to deprive the judgment debtor of funds for longer than was necessary. As noted earlier, the probability that an erroneous deprivation will occur when a judgment debtor’s entire bank account is garnished is high, and the debtor’s interest in the continued use of these funds is self-evident. Just as the withholding of utility services of water and electricity may threaten health and safety, Craft, 436 U.S. at 18, 98 S.Ct. at 1565, so too will the withholding of funds necessary to pay for those services and the additional basic necessities of shelter, food, and medicine. A hearing resolving the judgment debtor’s claim of exemption must be quickly provided to limit the period an individual judgment debtor can be restrained from using the frozen funds, attached by an order of court. As all the courts examining this question have concluded, a prompt judicial hearing on this question in these circumstances is one which will take place within two weeks or less from the time the claim of exemption is filed. A delay longer than that period could seriously threaten the health and safety of the judgment debtor and those who depend on him for support. While the Maryland District Rules now provide that the hearing, when requested, be held promptly, the Maryland District Rules provided that motions be heard “forthwith” when the plaintiffs in this suit filed their motions in which they asserted their claims of exemption. Under the “forthwith” standard, arguably a more demanding standard than “promptly,” the claim of plaintiff Dannie was resolved in twelve days, the claim of plaintiff Reigh was resolved in two weeks, and the claim of the Simpkins was resolved in one month. As illustrated by the facts relating to the cases of these particular plaintiffs, a rule which does not provide a particular period of time within which the motion asserting an exemption must be heard is too easily-abused and provides the opportunity for constitutional deprivation. As demonstrated by the reasoning of this court and others which have considered the meaning of “reasonableness” in the context of a claimed exemption by judgment debtors, a reasonable period of time in these circumstances is a short one. Accordingly, this court concludes that when a hearing is requested in Maryland post judgment garnishment proceedings, that hearing must take place within two weeks of that request. If a hearing is not requested by any of the parties, then the claim of exemption must be resolved within two weeks of the date of its filing. In the present case, the delay in adjudicating plaintiffs Simpkins’ claim of exemption unconstitutionally deprived the Simpkins of their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because the process due to judgment debtors, particularly the period of time within which the hearing on a claim of exemption is required to be held, was not firmly established in this district at the time the Simpkins filed their exemption claim, this court concludes that the Clerk of the Court of Howard County is immune from any claim of damages by the Simpkins. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). For the reasons stated above, it is this 29th day of October, 1984, by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED: 1. That the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants be, and the same is hereby, DENIED. 2. That the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the defendants be, and the same is hereby, DENIED. 3. That the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the plaintiffs be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED. 4. That the Maryland District Rules regarding post judgment garnishment procedure be, and the same are hereby, DECLARED to be unconstitutional in that they do not provide for adequate notice to a judgment debtor of the claims of exemption which are available, nor do they assure resolution of a claim of exemption within a reasonable time. 5. That a permanent injunction restraining the Clerks of the Maryland District Courts from issuing said writs of attachment without the above-required notice will be entered in a form to be determined at a later date. Counsel are directed to confer immediately and furnish to this court within ten (10) days an agreed form of injunction. 6. That the Clerk of this Court shall mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to counsel for the defendants and counsel for the plaintiffs. . In Kolender, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of a criminal statute which required persons who loiter or wander on the street to provide a "credible and reliable” identification and to account for their presence when so requested by a peace officer. Although the appellee, Lawson, had been detained or arrested on approximately 15 occasions, he was not being detained at the time he brought his civil action challenging the validity of the statute. The Court noted that the appellants had never challenged Lawson’s standing to seek relief hut went on to conclude that, in view of the number of previous stops, there was “a ‘credible threat' that Lawson might be detained again” and, therefore, found the existence of a case or controversy. 461 U.S. 352, -, n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1857 n. 3, 75 L.Ed.2d 903. . See Paper Nos. 13 (Simpkins and Dannie Affidavits), 15 (Reigh Affidavit). . The Second Amended Complaint of the plaintiffs reads in pertinent part: “a. Because of the fact that they are judgment debtors and because of their poverty, all Plaintiffs may again be subjected to an attachment of their bank accounts or other personal property under the procedures in question, b. The Plaintiffs’ federal constitutional claims could not have been fully litigated in federal court before the state court proceedings ended and their bank accounts were released.” Paper No. 20. . In Grimes, the District Court concluded that a case or controversy existed when the plaintiff did not file suit challenging the constitutionality of the North Carolina postjudgment body execution statute until after he had been released from imprisonment. . The challenged rules provided as follows: Rule FI. Service — Subsequent Procedure. Where an attachment on a judgment shall have been issued pursuant to this Subtitle, it shall be served pursuant to M.D.R. (G47) (Service of Writ — Garnishment) but no trial date shall be assigned at the time of is