Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WILLIAM K. THOMAS, Senior District Judge. In separate but related motions filed on April 15, 1982, defendants Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company (B & 0), Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company (C & 0), CSX Corporation, Chessie Systems, Inc. (sometimes collectively referred to as Chessie), Norfolk & Western Railway Company (N & W), and Bessemer & Lake Erie Railroad Company (B & LE) move to dismiss plaintiff Pinney Dock & Transport Company’s (Pinney) complaint seeking damages for alleged injuries to plaintiffs business and property caused by defendants’ violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 ... and Ohio’s Valentine Act. Each defendant argues that the alleged activities underlying plaintiffs claims are expressly and impliedly immunized from the antitrust laws by the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), and that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) has exclusive jurisdiction over the substance of plaintiff’s claims. Each defendant additionally asserts that plaintiff’s treble damage claims are barred by the doctrine of Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 260 U.S. .156, 43 S.Ct. 47, 67 L.Ed. 183 (1922). Defendant B & LE further contends that certain of plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed either for lack of standing or “because they could not as a matter of law have caused direct or cognizable injury to plaintiffs.” Finally, each defendant asserts that if this court does not dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, “the case should be referred to the ICC under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.” Since each of the parties has submitted factual exhibits in arguing the various issues, the court will apply Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s summary judgment standards. Defendants’ motions will be granted only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [defendants are] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Before analyzing the various branches of defendants’ motions, it is essential to review the principal allegations in this antitrust case. Plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, provides dock and terminal services in Ashtabula, Ohio for goods moving over the Great Lakes. In its first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that “from at least the mid-1950’s” the defendants conspired and acted to monopolize “the business of providing dock services for iron ore and other goods moving over docks on the lower Great Lakes, and the business of providing land transportation for iron ore and other goods moving over such docks.” Plaintiff further alleges that defendants concomitantly conspired and acted to “restrain trade in the business of providing water carriage for iron ore and other goods moving over docks on the lower Great Lakes, and in the business of building ships for such carriage.” Plaintiff asserts that defendants advanced the ends of the alleged conspiracy through a series of overt acts and practices, some of which are specifically set forth in the first amended complaint. The alleged overt acts include refusing to grant a competitive rail rate for the carriage of iron ore from Pinney Dock, arbitrarily placing Pinney Dock in a switching district where it was ineligible for competitive rail rates, and imposing unjustifiably high switching charges on the cars of a railroad competitor which sought to carry iron ore from Pinney Dock at competitive rail rates. Defendants are additionally accused of “deliberately and purposefully foreclosing Pinney Dock’s development as an iron ore handling facility by ... preventing and postponing the construction and use of the self-unloading vessels which Pinney Dock was designed to serve.” Plaintiff maintains that the above alleged overt acts and practices (and others) were planned and carried out through a series of unauthorized secret meetings and discussions and that coercion and intimidation were used to (1) [force] railroads to forego their right of independent action with respect to rail rates and services and other matters; (2) [force] railroads not to serve self-unloading vessels at railroad-owned docks; and (3) [force] railroads not to lower their dock handling charges on iron ore. Plaintiff charges that defendants’ alleged antitrust violations have effectively stifled technological progress and development in the construction and use of efficient dock facilities and vessels and impeded and prevented the development of non-rail modes of land transportation. Additional effects allegedly resulting from the charged conspiracy are: (1) that shippers were subjected to artificially and unjustifiably high rates and charges for dock and land transport services; and (2) that needed improvements in the efficiency, economy and competitiveness of dock and transport facilities were subverted. Plaintiff further states that [a]s a direct and proximate result of the foregoing acts and violations, [plaintiff] has been greatly injured in its business and property because it was forestalled and excluded from participating in the business of providing dock services for various commodities, including iron ore, coal, and coke. Plaintiff seeks treble damages under the federal antitrust laws and an order enjoining defendants from further violations of the federal and state antitrust laws. I. The court first addresses defendants’ separate but parallel contentions that “the complaint should be dismissed because the matters at issue are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” Defendants argue that the Interstate Commerce Commission’s pervasive regulation of railroad ratemaking activities supersedes the federal antitrust laws as to all “matters concerning the establishment of railroad rates.” More precisely, defendants contend that the existence of the Interstate Commerce Act impliedly immunizes them from plaintiff’s present antitrust action. In support of their argument, defendants point out that the Interstate Commerce Act seeks to substitute collective action among the railroads under the supervision of the Interstate Commerce Commission for unrestrained competition between the railroads. Without question, the nature of the railroad industry necessitates collective action among competing carriers. For example, it is frequently necessary for one railroad to deliver freight to a destination located on the tracks of a competitor. Thus, under 49 U.S.C. § 1(4), the railroads are required to “provide and furnish transportation upon reasonable request therefore, and to establish reasonable through routes with other such carriers, and just and reasonable rates, fares, charges, and classifications applicable thereto____” Similarly, 49 U.S.C. § 1(10) and (11) mandate that the railroads establish reasonable rules with respect to the interchange of locomotives, rail cars, and other railroad property. However, despite the need for cooperation between the railroads and notwithstanding the ICC’s oversight of that cooperation, the Interstate Commerce Act does not necessarily provide an impermeable shield of implied immunity from the antitrust laws for the railroad industry. In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 682-83, 95 S.Ct. 2598, 2611, 45 L.Ed.2d 463 (1975), the Supreme Court quoted language which has been oft repeated in the context of antitrust cases involving regulated industries: Certain axioms of construction are now clearly established. Repeal of the antitrust laws by implication is not favored and not casually to be allowed. Only where there is a ‘plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions’ will repeal be implied____ With that language in mind, the court turns to the relevant case law. In Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 65 S.Ct. 716, 89 L.Ed. 1051 (1945), the state of Georgia filed an antitrust suit against approximately 20 railroad companies alleging that the defendants conspired to fix railroad rates so as to discriminate against the state of Georgia and that the defendants used coercion in the fixing of discriminatory joint through rates. After examining selected provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, including 49 U.S.C. §§ 1(4) and 6, the Court addressed the defendants’ contention that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over railroad rate cases. Unequivocally emphasizing that the railroads were “subject to the antitrust laws,” id. at 456, 65 S.Ct. at 725, the Court observed that “conspiracies among carriers to fix rates were included in the broad sweep of the Sherman Act” and that Congress had never adopted legislation legalizing rate-fixing combinations. Failing to find a “clear repugnancy” between the Sherman Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, the Court left it to Congress to statutorily create any antitrust immunity which the railroad industry needed to function efficiently. Similarly, in Carnation Co. v. Pacific Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 86 S.Ct. 781, 15 L.Ed.2d 709 (1966), defendant shipping conferences argued that the Shipping Act “repealed all antitrust regulation of the rate-making activities of the shipping industry.” Finding that the defendant associations of shipping companies’ unlawful rate-making activities were not expressly immunized from Sherman and Clayton Act coverage by section 15 of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 814, the Court continued: We do not believe that the remaining provisions of the Shipping Act can reasonably be construed as an implied repeal of all antitrust regulation of the shipping industry’s rate-making activities ... we have long recognized that the antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic policy and have therefore concluded that we cannot lightly assume that the enactment of a special regulatory scheme for particular aspects of an industry was intended to render the more general provisions of the antitrust laws wholly inapplicable to that industry. We have, therefore, declined to construe special industry regulations as an implied repeal of the antitrust laws even when the regulatory statute did not contain an accomodation provision such as the exemption provisions of the Shipping and Agricultural Acts. Id. at 217-18, 86 S.Ct. at 784. The Court further observed that the express immunity language inserted into the Shipping Act by Congress must have been selected as a matter of deliberate choice in order to indicate the extent to which the industry’s rate-making activities remain subject to the antitrust laws as well as the extent to which those activities are exempted from antitrust regulation. Id. at 219-20, 86 S.Ct. at 785. As with the Shipping Act, Congress has written an express immunity provision into the Interstate Commerce Act. Recognizing the need for cooperative activity among the railroads and responding in part to the Court’s decision in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, Congress in 1948 amended the Interstate Commerce Act by adding 49 U.S.C. § 5b. See H.R.Rep. No. 1100, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1845-1848, reprinted in 1948-2 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 1844. Under section 5b, rail carriers are permitted to reach agreements as to rates, fares, classifications and a number of other railroad matters. 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) provides that the railroads are “relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws with respect to the making of such [an] agreement and with respect to the carrying out of such agreement in conformity with its provisions and in conformity with the terms and conditions prescribed by the [Interstate Commerce] Commission.” This court concludes that the “pervasive regulation of railroad ratemaking activities by the Interstate Commerce Commission” does not impliedly immunize all railroad ratemaking activities from the antitrust laws. Any immunity which the defendants can invoke in this case must be found in the Interstate Commerce Act’s express grant of antitrust immunity. To the scope and breadth of that immunity, attention is now turned. II. A. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s antitrust allegations are based upon coordinated ratemaking activities which were conducted in accordance with a joint ratemaking agreement expressly approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Defendants contend that their joint ratemaking activities are expressly immunized from the antitrust laws by section 5a of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1948). 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) expressly authorizes certain agreements between competing railroads relating to rates, classifications, and other transportation matters. The section also allows the participating railroads to establish rules, regulations, and procedures for the joint consideration and implementation of rate schedules and classification systems, etc. When an agreement under this section is approved by the ICC, the participating railroads are expressly immunized from the operation of the antitrust laws with respect to the making of such agreement, and with respect to the carrying out of such agreement in conformity with its provisions and in conformity with the terms and conditions prescribed by the Commission. Defendants in this case have jointly participated in a formal ICC approved eastern railroads rate bureau agreement since 1950. See Section 5a Application No. 3, Eastern Railroads-Agreements, 277 I.C.C. 279 (1950). Since the ICC approved agreement has (with minor modifications not relevant to this case) been in effect throughout the period of the alleged conspiracy, defendants argue that any rate actions they took which affected either Pinney Dock or iron ore traffic in general fell within the scope of section 5b(9)’s express grant of antitrust immunity. In response, plaintiff Pinney contends that defendants’ conduct is not expressly immune under the Reed-Bulwinkle Act. Plaintiff urges that [t]he group boycott charged in this case is not protected by the Reed-Bulwinkle Act and is unapprovable by the ICC. Section 5a [49 U.S.C. § 5b] does not immunize conspiracies which have the purpose and effect of eliminating a competitor. In determining whether the activities of defendants alleged by the plaintiff fall within the scope of section 5b(9)’s express grant of antitrust immunity, this court’s analysis must commence with a study of the statute itself. B. Defendants maintain that their argument is supported by the “statutory language.” This court, however, reads that statute’s language differently than defendants. Certainly, the making of the Eastern Railroads Agreement approved by the ICC in 1950 is immunized from the reach of the antitrust laws by 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9). Nonetheless, the issue confronting this court is whether the ICC’s approval of the defendants’ basic 5a agreement operates as either an express or implied approval of a later “agreement” to eliminate a competitor and monopolize a market. Nothing in the actual language of section 5b(9) set forth earlier either suggests that it does or permits that implication. Nonetheless, defendants argue that apart from the language of section 5b(9), “the structure of section 5a suggests that there is no need to create a predatory intent exception because such complaints are covered by the ICC’s regulation.” In support of this argument, defendants correctly observe that under 49 U.S.C. § 5b(2) the ICC only approves those “agreements” which are “in furtherance of the national transportation policy.” However, nothing in the present record indicates that the ICC ever “approved” or even was aware of defendants’ alleged predatory conspiracy to boycott and eliminate plaintiff as a competitor. The 1950 Eastern Railroads Agreement, which merely establishes the procedures for discussing rate matters and reaching rate agreements, cannot be read as impliedly or expressly “approving” such a predatory conspiracy. In an attempt to bolster their “structure” argument, defendants note that under 49 U.S.C. § 5b(7) the ICC is authorized to investigate and determine whether any agreement it has approved conforms with the terms and conditions upon which its approval was earlier granted. Moreover, the ICC can modify or terminate an existing agreement where necessary. But the conformance of the Eastern Railroads Agreement of 1950 to the ICC’s requirements is not an issue in this case. The issue is whether defendants illegally conspired to boycott and eliminate a direct competitor so as to monopolize a market. Nothing in the structure of the Interstate Commerce Act suggests that the ICC can approve such a conspiratorial agreement, or provide a remedy under the antitrust laws for the damages resulting from one. See Carnation Co. v. Pacific Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 224, 86 S.Ct. 781, 787, 15 L.Ed.2d 709 (1966). Defendants additionally point to 49 U.S.C. § 15a(3) and argue that its language is “inconsistent” with applying the antitrust laws to rail carriers. Defendants cite the portion of section 15a(3) which states: Rates of a carrier shall not be held up to a particular level to protect the traffic of ainy other mode of transportation, giving due consideration to the objectives of the national transportation policy---- Section 15a(3) only ensures that the ICC will not disallow a reduced rail rate merely because it could potentially divert traffic away from competing modes of transportation such as trucks or airplanes. See ICC v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 372 U.S. 744, 83 S.Ct. 1038, 10 L.Ed.2d 108 (1963). Section 15a(3) cannot in any way be read as stating that the ICC’s approval of a 5a agreement shields a subsequent conspiracy to eliminate a direct competitor from the antitrust laws. The court therefore concludes that neither the actual language of 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) nor the structure of section 5a as a whole can be read as shielding the conspiracy alleged by plaintiff from the antitrust laws. C. Defendants argue that the legislative history of the Reed-Bulwinkle Act illustrates “that Congress did not contemplate a predatory intent exception to section 5a because plenary and exclusive regulation of collective ratemaking, including control of any predatory conspiracies, was vested with the ICC.” By way of background, joint railroad bureaus, associations, committees and conferences existed in large numbers before the passage of section 5b, the Reed-Bulwinkle Amendment. See H.R.Rep. No. 1100, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1948 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News, 1844-1845. Cooperative action among the railroads was recognized by Congress as critical for integrating the country’s railroad into a single efficient shipping network. For instance, “carriers could not be expected to adjust their rates intelligently so as to fulfill the requirements of the [Interstate Commerce Act] unless they were permitted to organize----” Id. at 1849. As the House Report states: The carriers cannot effectively meet the requirements of the law, or provide the type of transportation that the public has come to expect and demand of them, if each is to be compelled to go it alone without a reasonable degree of consultation and agreement with other carriers ____ Id. at 1851. The Reed-Bulwinkle Amendment was seen as necessary to ensure that the railroads could engage in cooperative ratemaking without fear that their activities might be subject to prosecution under the antitrust laws. To reach a proper accomodation between the antitrust laws and the national transportation policy, Congress provided that rate conferences, when approved by the ICC, and whose rate decisions are under final control of the ICC, shall not be subject to the antitrust laws with respect to the making and carrying out of such agreement in conformity with the Commission’s requirements. Remarks of Representative Bulwinkle, 94 Cong.Rec.Append. 4032 (1948). Defendants contend that the congressional debates “leave no doubt that I.C.C. approval of a 5a agreement was intended to confer absolute antitrust immunity.” Defendants point to colloquies such as the following to support their argument: MR. WHITE: Is it not true that for many years the Congress has over and over again directed that the procedure should be through the regulatory body and by means of the regulatory process, rather than through indictment in the courts for violation of the antitrust statutes? MR. REED: Yes; the whole procedure has been through the strengthening of regulations, rather than to use the severe and sometimes arbitrary methods of proceeding under the antitrust act. 43 Cong.Rec. 6594 (June 9, 1947). Although such colloquies lend support to defendants’ position, the legislative history must be read in its full context. At no point in time did either Senatory Reed or Representative Bulwinkle say that the bill would blanket the railroads with absolute antitrust immunity. Indeed, their consistent remarks suggest the opposite. Throughout the Senate hearings, opponents of the amendment, including Senator Russell of Georgia and others, argued that its passage would completely immunize the railroads from the reach of the antitrust laws. Senator Reed steadfastly rejected this position. The following exchanges are illustrative: [Referring to a report of the Senate Small Business Committee, co-authorized by one of its employees, Mr. Childe] Mr. SPARKMAN. I know Mr. Childe, and have a very high regard for him. I am particularly interested in seeing his testimony in the volume before us. I should like to read a little further from the testimony, where he says this: However, I do not believe there is any necessity or reason for relieving carriers from liability under the antitrust laws. That is Mr. Childe’s testimony, and if I understand correctly, the pending bill, does that very thing. Mr. RUSSELL. That is the purpose of it. Mr. SPARKMAN. That is Mr. Childe’s testimony. Mr. REED. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield? I should like to submit a little more of the testimony. Mr. RUSSELL. I want to get along; but I yield. Continuing with Mr. Childe’s testimony, Senator Reed read: I believe that the rate committees and other conferences of the carriers should be regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission to make them more effective in the public interest and to guard against abuses, and that the antitrust laws should remain in full force and effect, as a protection against any combinations or conspiracies for unlawful purposes. The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you there — in one breath you say they should be under the supervision or regulatory power of the Interstate Commerce Commission; and in the next you say they should be subject to prosecution under the Sherman antitrust law. Of course, these two things are inconsistent for the simple reason that if you say they can make an agreement, regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Government could not prosecute them under the Sherman antitrust law unless coercion could be shown. Mr. CHILDE. That is true. I think prosecution under the antitrust law should be against collusive practices for unlawful purposes. Senator Reed then added: “With that I agree.” 93 Cong.Rec. 6613-14 (1947). Senator Reed later continued: Mr. President, the merits of this bill require consideration by the Congress, regardless of the pending antitrust litigation against the railroads. This bill is prospective in its operation and does not have the effect of giving the railroads immunity for anything illegal that they may have done in the past. Georgia’s suit in the Supreme Court against the railroads is a suit that charges the railroads with having combined and conspired to fix rates, by coercion, that discriminate against Georgia. He then emphasized: This bill does not give any immunity to any coercive combination. Paragraph 6 leaves such a combination subject to the antitrust laws, just as it is today. 93 Cong.Rec. 7204 (1947). A somewhat similar colloquy occurred during the course of an argument over whether the case of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 65 S.Ct. 716, 89 L.Ed. 1051 (1945) (see p. 864, supra) would be mooted by passage of the amendment: Mr. McPARLAND. The Department of Justice informed the Senator from Arizona that so far as the rate part of that case is concerned it will do away with it. Where does the Senator get his information? Is it the result of his own analysis, or is it from the attorneys for the defendants in those cases? Mr. REED. Mr. President, the case of the State of Georgia rests upon the allegation of a conspiracy between the railroads to establish rates which were illegal because discriminatory. The bill has no relation at all to any case that rests upon conspiracy. The bill, if enacted into law as I firmly believe it will be today, will not affect the Georgia case or the Lincoln case in the slightest degree. Additional portions of the legislative history further reveal that the authors of the amendment never intended it to put conspiracies to drive competitors out of business beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. For example, after the final bill was passed in both Houses over the veto of President Truman, Representative Bulwinkle addressed the House with the “desire to state what the law will do and what it will not do.” 94 Cong.Rec.Append. 4032 (1948). Firmly stating that the amendment would not moot the charge in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, that certain railroads had violated the antitrust laws, Representative Bulwinkle stated: The charge made against the railroads in the Georgia case is that they combined and conspired to fix rates by coercion and to discriminate against Georgia. A combination or conspiracy of that kind would not be protected or immunized by S. 110. [Emphasis added.] Moreover, the final House and Senate Reports observed: The bill leaves the antitrust laws to apply with full force and effect to carriers, so far as they are now applicable, except as to such agreements or arrangements between them as may have been submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission and approved by that body upon a finding that, by reason of furtherance of the national transportation policy as declared in the Interstate Commerce Act, relief from the antitrust laws should be granted. H.R.Rep. No. 1100, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1948 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 1848. These excerpts from the legislative history contradict defendants’ contention that the Reed-Bulwinkle Amendment was enacted with the intent of conferring absolute antitrust immunity upon railroads who are signatories to a 5a agreement. The legislative history, read as a whole, strongly suggests that the Reed-Bulwinkle Amendment’s authors never envisioned its grant of antitrust immunity as being absolute. As a result, this court is unable to embrace defendants’ assertion that the legislative history “leaves no doubt” that approval of a section 5a agreement by the ICC necessarily confers antitrust immunity upon signatories who conspire to eliminate a competitor. D. The court now turns to the relevant case law cited by each side to support their respective positions. In support of its argument against defendants’ motions, plaintiff cites several cases. Plaintiff’s lead case is Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Aircoach Transportation Association, 253 F.2d 877 (D.C.Cir.1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 930, 80 S.Ct. 372, 4 L.Ed.2d 354 (1960). In Aircoach, four supplemental air carriers and the transportation association to which they belonged sued forty railroads and two rate committees for treble antitrust damages and an injunction. Plaintiffs alleged that two specific practices of the railroads in connection with their charges for United States military traffic violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The practices included the railroads’ concerted quotations of “variable spot bids” for military traffic at rates below their published schedules, and the making of “package bids” in which the railroads agreed to carry military personnel only on an “all or nothing” or “package” basis. The defendants argued that their rate quotations “were made pursuant to section • 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act and [were] immunized from the operation of the antitrust laws by an agreement approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to section 5a of that Act.” Id. at 880. The district court ruled that section 22 rate quotations were excluded from section 5a agreements and, therefore, left unprotected from the antitrust laws. The D.C. Circuit reversed the ruling and held that section 22 rate activities, like other commercial railroad rate activities, were in certain circumstances entitled to express antitrust immunity protection under 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9). The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to initially submit the case to the ICC to determine whether the activities at issue were carried out pursuant to the railroads’ section 5a agreements. In instructing the district court to initially submit the case to the ICC, the circuit court attached a critical condition to its order. The court stated: One further substantive legal question must be considered. Even though it should be found in the end that the practices as such have been validly immunized by section 5a approved agreements, nevertheless, if they are part of an effort by Railroads in combination or conspiracy to eliminate the competition of Air-coach, rather than used merely to meet that competition, the practices would be removed from the protection of section 5a(9). We do not think the Act or any agreement which has been approved under it can be construed as authorizing the use of such practices for the purpose of eliminating the competition of Air-coach for the section 22 transportation involved. Id. at 887. The court further stated that “this aspect of the case need not be submitted for consideration or initial decision by the Commission as to either questions of fact or law.” Id. If Aircoach prevailed on this aspect of the case, defendants “would be liable in damages, and an appropriate injunction also could be granted.” Id. Aircoach was immediately followed by Riss & Company v. Association of American Railroads, 170 F.Supp. 354 (D.D.C.1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 804, 80 S.Ct. 108, 4 L.Ed.2d 57 (1959). Riss involved a suit by a trucking company against first class railroads for allegedly conspiring to destroy the trucking company’s business and to acquire a monopoly of land transportation of property in the United States. The railroads argued that the case involved ratemaking over which the ICC had primary jurisdiction. Defendants argued that their rates had been approved by the ICC, and were immune from the antitrust laws under 49 U.S.C. § 5(b)(9). The Riss court pursued the path laid down in Aircoach: It is clear from the ... language in the ACTA case that a court need not refer to the Commission the issue of whether a rate quotation was made as a part of a combination or conspiracy to eliminate a competitor. This follows logically because such a joint act if combined with the unlawful intent of eliminating a competitor would fall outside of the immunity granted by 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) regardless of a possible I.C.C. ruling that the methods of arriving at the new rate conformed to prior procedural agreements filed with and sanctioned by the Commission. 170 F.Supp. at 362. Summarizing, the court stated: ... if it should develop at trial that the plaintiff can prove that the rate reduction ... was one of several overt acts alleged, and prove that this rate reduction was made for the purpose of effectuating one of the principal objects of the conspiracy charged therein; that is, the elimination of plaintiff as a competitor with the railroads for explosives traffic, then under ACTA no amount of coverage by approved agreements and no degree of immunity under 49 U.S.C.A. § 5b(9) could remove the rate reduction from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act ... it would seem that the antitrust immunity that defendants invoke was designed to protect ordinary rate-making in the course of regular business so as to adjust to changing costs and to meet the challenges of outside competition ... Even if a given joint act of reducing rates were to be considered as lawful standing by itself, it may still be properly alleged as one of the means used to effectuate a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful object. Id. at 366. Thus, Aircoach and Riss do not attack regulated rates in and of themselves; they assail predatory conspiracies to eliminate competition within regulated industries. Nevertheless, defendants launch a direct assault on Aircoach. They argue that the D.C. Circuit cited no direct authority for its “remarkable revision of the clear language of the [Interstate Commerce] Act.” As seen, however, the actual language of the Reed-Bulwinkle Amendment cannot be read as shielding conspiracies to eliminate competitors from the antitrust laws. Moreover, the citation of authority in Air-coach confirms that the decision stands upon solid ground. The court in Aircoach cited Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 65 S.Ct. 716, 89 L.Ed. 1051 (1945) as a leading authority for its proposition that neither the Interstate Commerce Act nor any agreement approved under it can be construed as shielding from the antitrust laws conspiratorial conduct undertaken to eliminate a competitor. 253 F.2d at 887. In Georgia, the Supreme Court grappled with defendants’ contention that a discriminatory conspiracy carried out through the coercive fixing of rates was shielded from the antitrust laws by an immunity provision similar to 49 U.S.C. § 5(b)(9). In a footnote, the Court observed: We have considered the argument that Certificate No. 44, issued March 20, 1943 under § 12 of the Act of June 11, 1942 (56 Stat. 357) by the Chairman of the War Production board (8 Fed.Reg. 3804) protects this alleged combination from the charges contained in the bill. That certificate approves joint action by common carriers through rate bureaus and the like in the initiation and establishment of rates. We do not stop to analyze it beyond observing that in no respect would it be a bar to the present action. It does not purport to be retroactive. It does not sanction the use of coercion. It does not authorize any combination to discriminate against a region in the establishment of rates. Moreover, legal means may be employed for an illegal end. 324 U.S. 459, n. 7, 65 S.Ct. at 727, n. 7. The Aireoach court’s reliance on Georgia was correct because as previously shown, Georgia continued to represent binding precedent after the passage of the Reed-Bulwinkle Amendment. See p. 871, supra. The Aircoach court also relied on the persuasive legal analysis in Slick Airways v. American Airlines, 107 F.Supp. 199 (D.N.J.1952), appeal dismissed sub nom., American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806, 74 S.Ct. 54, 98 L.Ed. 336 (1953). In Slick, plaintiff alleged that defendant American conspired with other airlines to drive it out of business in order to monopolize the business of air freight transportation. Plaintiff maintained that as part of a conspiratorial campaign, defendants engaged in a series of predatory rate activities. Similar to the Interstate Commerce Act, the Civil Aeronautics Act provides express antitrust immunity for air carriers carrying out any acts authorized, approved, or required under an agreement filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board. As in this case, defendants contended that the alleged combination and conspiracy was immunized by an agreement which had been approved by the CAB. But the court did not “concur with the suggestion that a conspiracy to drive a competitor out of business ... is the type of agreement encompassed within the statute and subject to the primary jurisdiction of the CAB for approval or disapproval and for possible immunity from the antitrust laws.” Id. at 207. The court explained: The defendants misconceive the nature of the complaint by confusing the means allegedly used with the result to be achieved. They view the complaint as alleging combinations or conspiracies to waste the resources of the plaintiff through predatory rate policies, to abuse the privilege of intervention in CAB proceedings, and to conduct a campaign of unfair competitive practices which amount to contracts and agreements within the purview of § 492. It is in this that they fall into error for these alleged acts rather constituted the means and methods by which the defendants conspired to drive the plaintiff out of business in violation of the anti-trust laws. As the Supreme Court said in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 1139, 90 L.Ed. 1575: “It is not the form of the combination or the particular means used but the result to be achieved that the statute condemns. It is not of importance whether the means used to accomplish the unlawful objective are in themselves lawful or unlawful. Acts done to give effect to the conspiracy may be in themselves wholly innocent acts. Yet, if they are part of the sum of the acts which are relied upon to effectuate the conspiracy which the statute forbids, they come within its prohibition.” Id. Several recent cases have applied an Air-coach type analysis in regulated industry antitrust suits. For example, BBD Transportation Co. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 1976-2 Tr.C. (CCH) ¶ 61,079 (N.D.Col.1976), held that a plaintiff motor carrier’s allegations that defendant steel companies and railroads conspired to reduce railroad rates in order to force the trucking industry to lower its rates could not be eliminated on a motion for summary judgment. The allegations, the court stated, “[i]f eventually proven to be true ... would strip away immunity otherwise conferred by 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9).” Id. at p. 69,873. Similarly, United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 538 F.Supp. 200 (D.D.C.1982), the criminal analogue of the present case, adopted Air-coach ’s holding that “section 5a immunizes the collusive making of rates but does not immunize the collusive making of rates which are intended to eliminate competition.” Id. at 207-08. The court now turns to defendants’ contention that “the better reasoned cases hold that lawsuits charging railroads with predatory ratemaking are precluded by § 5a.” As their lead case, defendants cite Asbury Graphite, Inc. of California v. Dehyco Co., 1981-1 Tr.C. (CCH) ¶ 63,980 (N.D.Cal.1980). In Asbury, the court confronted a claim by a processor of furfural residue that another processor had conspired with ten railroads to monopolize the market in the Pacific Northwest by means of a railroad tariff allegedly favoring the competitor. The court ruled that 49 U.S.C. § 10706, which now replaces section 5(b) (see n. 2, supra), “on its face” immunized the defendants from the antitrust laws: Even if the ratemaking were actually ‘conspiratorial’ and ‘monopolistic,’ as alleged, since it unquestionably took place within the context of amending an approved freight bureau rate, the antitrust laws are inapplicable. Id. at p. 76,072. The Asbury court based its decision upon its finding that the enactment of 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) resulted from an adverse congressional reaction to Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra. As previously seen, this court does not read the legislative history or the words of 49 U.S.C. § 5(b)(9) as nullifying the impact of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra. Nor does this court find persuasive the Asbury court’s citation of McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 64 S.Ct. 370, 88 L.Ed. 544 (1944). In McLean, a trucking company challenged under the antitrust laws an ICC approved merger of seven motor carrier companies. Since 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) expressly immunizes ICC approved mergers from the antitrust laws, the Court in McLean held that the Commission had the power to approve and thereby immunize a merger which might otherwise violate the antitrust laws. Consequently, the holding in McLean has little if any bearing on the issue of whether the ICC’s approval of a section 5a railroad agreement completely shields from the antitrust laws signatory railroads that conspire to eliminate a competitor. Therefore, this court finds the reasoning in Asbury to be unpersuasive. Calling attention to antitrust cases raised in the context of other regulated industries, defendants argue that they are inconsistent with the holding in Aircoach. In Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.1981), plaintiff owner of a ship devanning facility in Los Angeles alleged that a rival devanner and three shipping companies conspired to boycott his company’s services. Pursuant to a section 15 agreement, the defendant carriers had agreed to exclusively use the devanning services of one of plaintiff Dreisbach’s competitors. The court held that the joint choice of an exclusive devanning company was the type of “routine operating practice” within the scope of the carriers’ FMC approved section 15 agreement. Id. at 729. It was, therefore, outside the reach of the antitrust laws. Because the Ninth Circuit found it “unnecessary to determine whether there was a conspiracy,” id. at 729, n. 9, defendants argue that Dreisbach is inconsistent with the Aircoach ruling that “a purpose to destroy competition ... would have the legal result of removing [the] railroads from any possible protection from the antitrust laws.” 253 F.2d at 887. However, the anticompetitive activities and conspiracy which Pinney alleges in this ease involve far more than the established industry-wide practice which the Dreisbach court evaluated. As additional support for their position, defendants cite U.S. v. Rock Royal Co-op., 307 U.S. 533, 59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446 (1939). The issue in the case concerned “the validity of Order No. 27 of the Secretary of Agriculture, issued under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, regulating the handling of milk in the New York metropolitan area.” 307 U.S. at 541, 59 S.Ct. at 997. Certain milk dealers refused to comply with the provisions of the order. When the United States sought an order requiring them to comply, the dealers argued that the order was invalid because its adoption was secured by misrepresentations and because certain private organizations had sought to obtain a monopoly by means of the order. The district court concluded that the order was not enforceable because coercive tactics were used to secure the drafting, acceptance and adoption of the order so as to obtain a monopoly- Under the Agricultural Marketing Act, the Secretary was authorized to issue orders applying to milk to establish and ensure orderly conditions in its marketing. On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the initial adoption of the order met with the required statutory standards. After then noting that efforts to compel dealer support of the order by the threat of diverting milk sales were “ineffective upon these defendants,” the Court stated: These associations of producers of milk have a vital interest in the establishment of an efficient marketing system. This adequately explains, their interest in securing the adoption of an order believed by them to be favorable for this purpose. If ulterior motives of corporate aggrandizement stimulated their activities, their efforts were not thereby rendered unlawful. If the Act and Order are otherwise valid, the fact that their effect would be to give cooperatives a monopoly of the market would not violate the Sherman Act or justify the refusal of the injunction. 307 U.S. at 560, 59 S.Ct. at 1006. Although the defendants correctly argue that the Court minimized the importance of the “influences which caused the producers to favor” the order issued by the regulatory agency, the issue in this case is not whether any order of the ICC is constitutional or enforceable. The issue is whether the defendants acted outside the scope of 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9)’s limited grant of antitrust immunity by conspiring to exclude plaintiff as a competitor. Therefore, this court does not read Rock Royal as a mandate to hold that the activities alleged by plaintiff in this case are beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. Defendant B & LE, in a supplemental letter, calls to the court’s attention National Association of Recycling Industries v. American Mail Line, Ltd., No. CV82-895-LTL (D.C.Cal. 12/3/82) (NARI). NARI involved an antitrust suit by a trade association for the paper recycling industry and three of its member firms against a number of ocean carriers and their rate conference. Plaintiffs alleged “that the rates charged by defendants for transporting plaintiffs’ wastepaper to the Far East [were] so ‘exceedingly high and unjustly discriminatory’ that plaintiffs [could] not successfully compete against shippers of processed woodpulp and virgin wood chips, raw materials in direct competition with wastepaper.” The court dismissed the complaint, holding that defendants’ rate-making activities were immunized from the antitrust laws by the Shipping Act “regardless of whether those rates [were] later found to be violative of substantive provisions of the Shipping Act.” This court finds NARI to be “analytically distinguishable” from Aircoach, and not inconsistent with it. E. Having examined the actual language of the Interstate Commerce Act, the pertinent legislative history, and the relevant case law, the court concludes that it should apply an analysis similar to that employed in Aircoach and its progeny. Since a conspiracy to eliminate a competitor cannot fall within 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9)’s limited grant of express antitrust immunity, plaintiff is entitled to prove its allegations that the defendants conspired to eliminate it as a competitor in order to monopolize the business of providing dock services for the unloading of ex-lake iron ore. III. As a separate ground for dismissal, defendants contend that “this case falls squarely within the Keogh doctrine, which bars plaintiff's claim for damages.” The Keogh doctrine was developed in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156, 43 S.Ct. 47, 67 L.Ed. 183 (1922). Plaintiff Keogh, a manufacturer of excelsior and flax tow, sued eight railroad companies under the antitrust laws arguing that the uniform rates they set by agreement were arbitrary and unreasonable. As a defense, the railroads contended that the rates at issue had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Court held that “Keogh, a private shipper, [could not] recover damages under [the antitrust laws] because he lost the benefit of rates still lower which, but for the conspiracy, he would have enjoyed.” Id. at 162, 43 S.Ct. at 49. The Court explained: “The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper. The rights as defined by the tariff, cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier (citations omitted). This stringent rule prevails, because otherwise the paramount purpose of Congress — prevention of unjust discrimination — might be defeated. If a shipper could recover under section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act for damages resulting from the exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have prevailed, the amount recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give him a preference over his trade competitors ____” Id. at 163, 43 S.Ct. at 49. The Court reaffirmed Keogh in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 65 S.Ct. 716, 89 L.Ed. 1051 (1945). See p. 864, supra. The Court held that “it [was] clear from the Keogh case alone that Georgia [could] not recover damages even if the conspiracy alleged were shown to exist.” Id. at 453, 65 S.Ct. at 724. The Court reiterated that under Keogh, “a rate was not necessarily illegal because it was the result of a conspiracy in restraint of trade.” Id. This court does not read either Keogh or Georgia as precluding plaintiff Pinney from recovering damages under the antitrust laws if it is able to prove the allegations in its first amended complaint. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired to monopolize the business of providing dock services for iron ore and other goods moving over docks on the lower Great Lakes. In order to carry out the ends of the conspiracy, it is alleged that the railroads actively plotted to eliminate plaintiff as a competitor. To accomplish their alleged predatory ends, it is asserted that defendants committed various overt acts including refusing to grant shippers a competitive rate for the carriage of iron ore from Pinney Dock. Unlike the plaintiff in Keogh, plaintiff Pinney does not bring its antitrust suit simply to recover an alleged discriminatory overcharge. Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for the loss of business it allegedly suffered as a direct competitor of defendants. Plaintiff alleges that defendants plotted and carried out a conspiracy to eliminate it as a direct competitor. Unlike in Keogh, plaintiff Pinney competed with defendant railroads for the same customers, and plaintiff could serve those customers only if it in turn was served by defendants. Thus, plaintiff asserts that discriminatory rail rates were merely “a symptom or an incident” of a conspiracy to eliminate it as a competitor. See Terminal Warehouse v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 297 U.S. 500, 510, 56 S.Ct. 546, 549, 80 L.Ed. 827 (1936). As Terminal Warehouse points out, antitrust damages may be recovered against rail carriers when they result from “an enveloping conspiracy with its own illegal ends ... the damages being measured not merely by the consequences flowing from the preference, but by those flowing from the conspiracy in all its comprehensive unity.” 297 U.S. at 511, 516, 56 S.Ct. at 550, 552. Defendants correctly point out that in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., supra, the state of Georgia sued not only in its parens patriae capacity, but in its “capacity as a proprietor to redress wrongs suffered by the State as the owner of a railroad ...”, 324 U.S. at 439, 65 S.Ct. at 716; the Court nonetheless held that Keogh blocked its claims for monetary damages. However, the Supreme Court in its decision never treated the state as a direct competitor of the defendants. The Court based its holding on the statement in Keogh that a recovery by a shipper under the antitrust laws for a rate higher than that which otherwise would have prevailed would operate as a rebate to give the shipper a preference over his trade competitors. In the present case it cannot be said that plaintiff will unfairly benefit in its. status as a competitor of the railroads if it is permitted to recover damages resulting from a conspiracy by those very same competitors to drive it out of business and monopolize the industry. Approaching the issue from another angle, defendants argue that this case lies within Keogh’s bounds because “Pinney’s claimed injury derives solely from alleged unreasonably high or discriminatory rail rates and charges.” As support, defendants submit the various ICC approved iron ore rail tariffs in effect during the period of the alleged conspiracy. For example, Freight Tariff 93-K of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company issued on July 29, 1961 sets “commodity” rates for the transportation of iron ore from railroad docks to various destinations. Defendants argue that the following 93-K tariff section expressly limited iron ore “commodity rates” to iron ore that was transported from railroad owned docks: CHARGES FOR UNLOADING ORE FROM VESSELS.. On Iron Ore arriving by vessel at the ports of Ashtabula Harbor, Ohio, Buffalo, N.Y. and Cleveland, Ohio, and unloaded by means of the machinery and other facilities owned and furnished by the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, the charge against the vessel for taking the Ore from the hold of the vessel to the rail of the vessel will be 28 cents per ton of 2240 pounds. Service will be performed only where said machinery and facilities are able to unload the vessel. DOCK ORE RATES FROM ASHTABULA HARBOR, OHIO.. The rates published in this tariff, as applying on Dock Ore from The Pennsylvania Railroad Docks at Ashtabula Harbor, Ohio, will also apply on Dock Ore from the Dock of the New York Central Railroad Company (Western District) at Ashtabula Harbor, Ohio, BUT ONLY WHEN SUCH ORE IS DELIVERED TO THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY AT ASHTABULA, OHIO. Similarly, supplement 3 to Freight Tariff 2152-K of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company read: Item Subject RULES AND OTHER GOVERNING No. PROVISIONS Special Rules and Regulations-Unlimited 125-A Charge for unloading Ore from Vessel On ore arriving by vessel at the port of Toledo Dock, Ohio, and unloaded by means of the machinery and other facilities owned and furnished by The Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, the charge against the vessel for taking the ore from the hold of the vessel to the rail of the vessel will be twenty-eight (28) cents per ton of 2,240 pounds. Defendant Note. — This service will be performed only where said machinery and facilities are able to unload the vessel. Defendants contend that these rates, by their express terms, did not apply to shipments of iron ore from Pinney Dock, so that iron ore shipments from Pinney were relegated to the higher “class rate” system in effect. For example, defendant B & LE states that “[f]rom February 1958 until April 1978 Pinney enjoyed class rates on any iron ore shipments tendered.” Several exhibits submitted as part of defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations show that class freight rates applied off Pinney Dock. For example, G.B. Weir, Pinney’s traffic manager, observed in an August 24, 1970 file memorandum: The freight rate from Pinney Dock to Youngstown Sheet & Tube is roughly $5.00. The freight rate from public ports and certain private docks for iron ore pellets (a commodity rate) is $2.08. Similarly, in a June 9, 1971 memorandum, R.T. Beeghly, president of the Standard Slag Company, noted: Shipment of ore can now be made from other Ashtabula docks to the steel mills at a $2.60 rate, whereas the established rate from Pinney Dock is $5.25. Additionally, in June 1975, J.A. Del Priore, Pinney Dock’s director of sales, informed J. Hagen, vice president-operations and facilities planning, United States Railway Association: Our present rate on iron ore is $15.90 per gross ton to Pittsburgh and $11.42 per gross ton to the Youngstown area versus $4.83 per gross ton to Pittsburgh and $3.62 per gross ton to Youngstown for the other facilities. Nevertheless, it is disingenuous for B & LE to suggest that Pinney “enjoyed” ICC prescribed iron ore rates because “class rates” applied to Pinney Dock. As previously illustrated, railroad rates for ex-lake iron ore historically have been regarded as separate and distinct from the rates on all other commodities. In Iron Ore Rate Cases, 41 I.C.C. 181 (1916), the Commission carefully set maximum rates for ex-lake iron ore from Ashtabula Harbor, Ohio to various destinations. The Commission stated: The maximum rates herein found reasonable as set forth in the foregoing table include, as heretofore explained, only the rail-line service from the line-haul carriers’ tracks at the lake ports, after the ore has been loaded into the cars, to the points at destination where the carriers’ tracks connect with the private industry tracks that serve the furnace plants. They do not include the dock service and the service of placing carload shipments of ore at the point of unloading on private industry tracks at destination, for which services separate charges should be established. [Emphasis added.] Id. at 219. Since the transportation of ex-lake iron ore has historically been treated under a distinct commodity rate scheme, defendants cannot realistically argue that under the ICC’s approved rate schedules, ore shipments from Pinney Dock were automatically covered by published and ICC approved “class rate” tariffs. Moreover, defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s claims are barred by Keogh because the injury resulted from discriminatory rail rates misses the heart of plaintiff’s claim. It is the alleged conspiracy itself, rather than the implements used to carry the conspiracy out, which makes this more than a “simple ICC rate case.” As the Supreme Court observed in Continental Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 707, 82 S.Ct. 1404, 1414, 8 L.Ed.2d 777 (1962): [I]t is well settled that acts which are in themselves legal lose that character when they become constituent elements of an unlawful scheme. A conspiracy to eliminate a competitor and monopolize an industry falls outside the bounds of day-to-day railroad ratemaking. For this reason, such a conspiracy is subject to the harsh consequences of the antitrust laws. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to prove its allegations that defendants used the iron ore rate system to further a conspiracy to eliminate the direct competition of plaintiff in providing dock services for ex-lake iron ore. Should plaintiff prove its allegations, it will not be barred by Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., supra, from recovering damages. IV. Defendant B & LE separately argues that “certain of plaintiffs claims should be dismissed for lack of standing to assert them or because [the anticompetitive acts alleged] could not as a matter of law have caused direct or cognizable injury to plaintiffs.” Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, provides a treble-damages remedy to “[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.” As the Court recently observed in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 471, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2545, 73 L.Ed.2d 149, 156 (1982): ... the lack of restrictive language reflects Congress’ “expansive remedial purpose” in enacting § 4: Congress sought to create a private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations. [Citations omitted] “The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated.” [Citations omitted.] Although section 4 of the Clayton Act’s language is broad, the Court in Associated General Contractors v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 103 S.Ct. 897, 907, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983), emphasized that questions of antitrust standing “cannot be answered simply by reference to the broad language of § 4. Instead, ... the question require[s] the [court] to evaluate the plaintiff’s harm, the alleged wrongdoing by the defendants, and the relationship between them.” The Court in Associated set forth several factors to be analyzed by district courts in deciding antitrust standing questions. In addition to the threshold requirement that “the claim be encompassed by the Clayton Act,” these include (1) “the nature of plaintiff’s alleged injury;” (2) “the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury;” (3) whether the damage claims are “highly speculative;” and (4) the need to keep “the scope of complex antitrust trials within judicially manageable limits.” Id. at 911. Plaintiff’s claims meet the Court’s threshold requirement of being “encompassed by the Clayton Act.” The thrust of plaintiffs complaint is that it was injured in its business and property by a conspiracy among the defendants to monopolize the business of providing dock services for iron ore and other goods moving over docks on the lower Great Lakes. Plaintiff contends that the alleged conspiracy was carried out through a series of anticompetitive activities: monopolizing ownership of docks on the lower Great Lakes used for the handling of iron ore; boycotting private docks; effectively tying the use of railroad-owned docks to t