Full opinion text
ORDER ROSZKOWSKI, District Judge. Before the court are defendants, Wayne W. Olson’s and James J. Costello’s, joint motion to suppress the government’s Title III surveillance, and defendant, James J. Costello’s, motion for relief with respect to certain consensual recordings. As set forth in this court’s August 31, 1984 order, the instant fifty-five count indictment charges the defendants with violations of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982), the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982). For the reasons set forth herein, the defendants’ motions are denied. I. BACKGROUND The instant indictment arose from a joint state and federal investigation of judicial corruption in the Chicago metropolitan area. On November 26, 1980, the United States Attorney applied for authorization to intercept the oral communications of Judge Wayne Olson, Attorney James J. Costello, another named attorney and “others as yet unknown” occurring in the judge’s chambers at Branch 57 of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. The application sought to intercept communications concerning the solicitation and payment of bribes to influence the referral of, outcome of and eventual disposition of, criminal cases pending before Judge Olson. The sole affidavit supplied in support of the application for the Title III surveillance was executed by Randall L. Jordan, a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. For the two and one-half years preceding the application, Jordan had been primarily assigned to the investigation of the judiciary in the Chicago metropolitan area (code named operation “Grey-lord”). The information provided in Jordan’s affidavit was derived from three principal sources: (1) Jordan’s general experience as an F.B.I. agent, (2) consensual recordings and observations provided by Terry Hake, an undercover agent posing as an Assistant Cook County State’s Attorney assigned to Judge Olson’s courtroom, and (3) information provided by a Confidential Source, an attorney who had practiced in the criminal courts of Cook County for many years. On the same day the application was made, former Chief Judge James Parsons issued an order authorizing the surveillance for a period of thirty days. The surveillance commenced on December 1, 1980. On December 19, 1980, the government requested and was granted a thirty day extension. On January 20, 1981, the surveillance was discontinued. Defendants jointly move to suppress the Title III surveillance contending: (1) the November 26,1980 authorization was invalid because it was unsupported by probable cause; (2) the November 26, 1980 authorization was invalid because it was based upon false information which Agent Jordan knew was false, or, at the very least, presented with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity; (3) the November 26, 1980 authorization was invalid because the government failed to adequately explain the necessity for electronic surveillance; (4) the November 26, 1980 and December 19, 1980 authorizations were invalid because they were overly broad and the conduct of the surveillance was too intrusive; and (5) the December 19, 1980 application was invalid because it was based upon illegally obtained evidence and the intentional misrepresentation of a material fact. In addition, defendant, Costello, moves to quash the consensual recordings of his conversations with Terry Hake on the grounds that the scope and duration of those recordings violated the Fourth Amendment, and moves to bar Hake from testifying on the grounds that Hake's testimony would violate his attorney-client privilege. On April 25 and 26, 1985, this court heard testimony concerning the adequacy of the measures taken by the government with respect to minimization. On April 29, 1985 the court heard oral arguments on the issues of minimization, the necessity for electronic surveillance and the need to hold a Franks hearing. No further briefing was deemed necessary. II. DISCUSSION A. Probable Cause for the November 26, 1980 Authorization Even assuming the allegations set forth in Agent Jordan’s original affidavit are true, defendants initially contend there was no probable cause for the November 26, 1980 authorization. Specifically, defendants contend Costello’s consensually recorded remarks were mere “rainmaking”, manifestly unreliable and not adequately corroborated by the remaining facts set forth in Jordan’s affidavit. Moreover, defendants contend the information supplied by the government’s Confidential Source was stale. Finally, the defendants contend the Confidential Source's reliability was not adequately demonstrated by Jordan’s affidavit. In examining an affidavit to determine whether or not the issuing court had probable cause to issue a warrant or authorize the interception of oral communications, this court does not make a de novo probable cause determination. See Massachusetts v. Upton, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2088, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984) (The making of a de novo determination “is inconsistent both with the desire to encourage use of the warrant process by police officers and with the recognition that once a warrant has been obtained, intrusion on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the case.”); see also United States v. Ramirez, 602 F.Supp. 783, 789 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (A Court “must give substantial deference to a prior judicial determination that probable cause existed ... and should resolve any doubts as to the existence of probable cause in favor of upholding the authorization.”) Instead, the task of this court is to determine whether or not there was a “substantial basis” for Judge Parsons’ finding of probable cause. Id. In testing the existence of probable cause, this court must examine the affidavit submitted in support of the government’s application for electronic survelliance as a whole, in a realistic and non-technical manner. United States v. Dorfman, 542 F.Supp. 345, 360 (N.D.Ill.1982) affd. sub nom. United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.1984). Viewing Agent Jordan’s affidavit in light of the considerations set forth above, this court finds that former Chief Judge Parsons had a more than adequate basis for determining that probable cause existed to initiate a Title III search. Jordan’s lengthy affidavit devoted twenty-three pages to the facts and circumstances upon which probable cause was believed to exist. It is unnecessary to recite all of the facts set forth in Jordan’s affidavit. A relatively brief overview, however, is instructive. Jordan’s affidavit begins by reciting the activities of James Costello, a criminal defense attorney regularly practicing in Judge Olson’s courtroom. Costello unknowingly provided Terry Hake with a detailed description of corrupt activities in Judge Olson’s Courtroom. Specifically, on at least sixteen occasions, Costello admitted to having bribed Judge Olson in return for case referrals and favorable dispositions of cases. In addition, on numerous other occasions, Costello identified other attorneys who he indicated were also bribing Judge Olson. Jordan’s affidavit also sets forth the observations of an undisclosed Confidential Source, an attorney practicing for many years in the Cook County criminal courts. (H 35) In October, 1975, the Confidential Source told the F.B.I. that on three separate occasions he had paid a total of $2,500 to Judge Olson’s clerk in order to secure favorable dispositions on cases that he had pending before Judge Olson; on each occasion, the Confidential Source indicated Judge Olson did, in fact, render favorable treatment to his clients. ($ 36) On May 21, 1980, the Confidential Source told Agent Jordan that other defense attorneys had informed him that Judge Olson was still accepting bribes in return for favorable treatment in Branch 57. (H 37) If a lawyer was not known to Judge Olson, the Confidential Source was told the lawyer could go to the Judge’s clerk. On June 18, 1980, the Confidential Source advised Jordan that he had recently had a conversation with Judge Olson’s former clerk, the one he had paid in 1975. (j| 380 The Confidential Source asked Judge Olson’s former clerk who an attorney should see about making a bribe in a case pending before Judge Olson. Judge Olson’s former clerk allegedly told the Confidential Source to “see [him] first” because he was still very close to Judge Olson. Finally, on September 15, 1980, based upon information received from other defense lawyers, the Confidential Source informed Jordan that Judge Olson no longer had a regular “bag-man” and was accepting bribes directly from defense lawyers. (1f 39) Apart from the information provided by Costello and the Confidential Source, the affidavit contains Hake’s own direct observations. On June 3, 1980, Hake observed an attorney attempting to give money to Judge Olson’s clerk; the clerk noticed that Hake had seen the offer and declined the money at that time. (If 43) Hake was also able to observe Costello entering and exiting Judge Olson’s chambers, able to observe Judge Olson actually referring cases to Costello, and, on numerous occasions, was himself actually the recipient of Costello’s bribes. In addition, Hake was able to observe the actions of numerous other attorneys, which, in light of the other facts known to him, were consistent with criminal behavior. For example, Hake was informed by two police officers that one attorney, Attorney # 10, attempted to bribe them in a particular case. ([) 46) Despite the officers’ refusal to accept the bribe, the attorney’s motion to suppress was granted by Judge Olson. (Id.) Costello later informed Hake that Judge Olson had received the money the police officers refused. (Id.) Subsequently, Judge Olson called Hake into his chambers on two occasions to discuss Hake’s intentions with respect to an appeal. flf 47) Costello advised Hake that Judge Olson was worried about an appeal and that the defense attorney handling the case was willing to pay Hake $100 not to appeal (If 48); Hake eventually accepted the bribe and the bribe was subsequently acknowledged by Attorney # 10. flflf 51 and 52) Finally, Jordan’s sources corroborated one another’s information with respect to numerous details. For example, the Confidential Source’s information coincided with the information provided by Costello concerning the way in which he originally began bribing Judge Olson; Costello told Hake that he began bribing Judge Olson by approaching Judge Olson’s clerk (who’s first name corresponded with that given by the Confidential Source) and asking him to give money to the Judge. (1f 17) Moreover, the Confidential Source’s information concerning the transfer of Judge Olson’s clerk and Judge Olson’s subsequent direct acceptance of bribes was corroborated by Costello. On August 8, 1980, Costello told Hake that about two months earlier Judge Olson’s clerk was transferred out of Branch 57; after the transfer, Costello told Hake he went directly to Judge Olson to make his payments. flf 17) In addition, Jordan’s sources’ information was corroborated by one another with respect to other details. For example, the Confidential Source identified another defense attorney, Attorney # 2, as the individual who introduced him to the system of fixing cases and as one of several attorneys who were bribing Judge Olson in 1975. (1f 36) In April, 1980, Hake was informed by the assistant state’s attorney preceding him at Branch 57 that, on a day that Judge Olson was not presiding at Branch 57, Attorney # 2 had offered to split the bond money on one of his client’s cases if the assistant state’s attorney would dismiss the case; the assistant state’s attorney informed Hake that the offer surprised him because Attorney # 2 regularly practiced before Judge Olson and seemed to do well when Judge Olson was presiding. 42) In addition, Hake observed that Attorney # 2 frequented Branch 57 and had seen the attorney with Judge Olson in his chambers. (jj 53). Finally, Costello informed Hake that Attorney # 2 bribed him for cooperative testimony when Costello was a police officer and strongly inferred that Attorney # 2 was presently bribing Judge Olson, (jf 45) Taken as a whole, this court concludes that the information described above, in addition to the othér information set forth in Jordan’s affidavit, provided Judge Parsons with a more than adequate basis for determining there was probable cause to believe illegal payments were taking place in Judge Olson’s chambers at Branch 57. The defendants contend, however, that the information provided in the affidavit was insufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause. As noted previously, defendants contend Costello’s statements constituted manifestly unreliable “rainmaking” aimed at intimidating or demoralizing Hake, that the Confidential Source’s information was stale, and that the facts contained in Jordan’s affidavit regarding the Confidential Source’s “track record” were insufficient to demonstrate his credibility. This court is unpersuaded by the defendants’ contention that Judge Parsons was bound to conclude Costello’s statements constituted manifestly unreliable “rainmaking”. In support of their position, defendants urge this court to apply the two prong test set forth in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 412-13, 89 S.Ct. 584, 586-87, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) and Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-15, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); those decisions require an affidavit based upon information provided by someone other than the affiant to set forth facts demonstrating: (1) the basis of the hearsay declarant’s knowledge concerning the subject criminal activity and (2) the veracity, credibility and reliability of the declarant. Id. The separate two prong test set forth in Spinelli and Aguilar, however, no longer controls. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Supreme Court held that while “an informant’s ‘veracity’, ‘reliability’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report ... these elements should [not] be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case.” 103 S.Ct. at 2327-28. Rather, the Court recognized that a totality of the circumstances approach was proper “where a deficiency in one [of the these elements] may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of the tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability”. 103 S.Ct. at 2329. Whether applying Spinelli and Aguilar or Gates to the facts of the present case, this court finds Costello’s statements to Hake were not manifestly unreliable “rainmaking”. Whether considered as a separate factor or simply as a relevant consideration, there cannot be any genuine disagreement that Costello’s remarks demonstrated a basis of knowledge concerning the subject of the Title III surveillance. Costello admitted to having directly bribed Judge Olson. Thus, he certainly had a basis of knowledge regarding the nature and scope of the asserted corruption. The only real issue, therefore, is Costello’s credibility and the reliability of his statements, In the view of this court, the reliability of Costello’s statements is adequately established in the affidavit. First, Costello’s numerous detailed statements tend to make his information reliable. United States v. Unger, 469 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1972) cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920, 93 S.Ct. 1546, 36 L.Ed.2d 313 (1973) and United States v. Roman, 451 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir.1971) cert. denied 405 U.S. 963, 92 S.Ct. 1171, 31 L.Ed.2d 239 (1972). See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329-30, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) ("even if we entertain some doubt as to an informant’s motives, his explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed first hand entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.”) In the present case, Costello provided the history and details of his illegal relationship with Judge Olson, the times, places and amounts of his various bribes, and even attributed specific quotes and remarks to Judge Olson. Thus, the content of his remarks alone strengthen his credibility and the reliability of his information. Second, the fact that many of Costello’s statements were directly against his penal interest added to his credibility. United States v. Hams, 403 U.S. 573, 583-85, 91 5. Ct. 2075, 2081-82, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971) Despite the defendants’ contention to the contrary, the fact that Costello was unaware that he was making the statements to an undercover agent does not alter the penal nature of his remarks. United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 97 (2nd Cir.1978) Thus, the nature of Costello’s statements and the circumstances under which he made the statements further support their reliability. Third, as has been noted previously, many of Costello’s statements were corroborated by the Confidential Source’s information and Hake’s observations. Costello’s description of the formation of his corrupt relationship with Judge Olson corresponded to the Confidential Source’s description of Judge Olson’s method of operation. Similarly, Hake’s observations concerning Costello’s contact with Judge Olson and receipt of referrals corroborated Costello’s remarks. Finally, the mere fact that the defendants can construct an “innocent” explanation for many of Costello’s remarks does not prohibit a finding of probable cause. United States v. Anton, 633 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir.1980); see also United States v. Dorfman, 542 F.Supp. 345, 359 (N.D.Ill.1982) affd.. Sub. nom. United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.1984) (“Even if there is an innocent explanation, as long as there is a reasonable probability that there is criminal activity afoot ... probable cause is present.”) While the possibility existed that Costello’s statements to Hake consisted of “mere rainmaking”, this court cannot conclude Judge Parsons was required to adopt such an innocent construction. The defendants’ contention that Costello’s statements were manifestly unreliable is, therefore, rejected. Similarly, this court rejects the notion that the Confidential Source’s information was stale. The material information provided by the Confidential Source was provided in May, June and September of 1980. The information provided from 1975 was of very limited importance. And finally, this court rejects the defendants’ contention that the Confidential Source’s reliability was not adequately shown. Jordan’s affidavit disclosed that the Confidential Source had provided information to the F.B.I. on twenty occasions, that the information he provided had been corroborated on at least eight occasions by tape recorded conversations, that other information had been corroborated by independent investigations or other reliable sources, and that his information had never been found to be erroneous or inaccurate. Moreover, as was previously noted, much of the information he provided was “cross corroborated” in the affidavit by Costello and Hake. United States v. Fina, 405 F.Supp. 267, 271 (E.D.Pa.1975). Under the totality of the circumstances approach adopted in Gates, this information was adequate to establish the reliability of the Confidential Source. In sum, examining the affidavit as a whole and affording Judge Parsons the deference due to him under the case law, this court cannot conclude his determination that probable cause existed to issue the Title III authorization was erroneous. Jordan’s affidavit provided Judge Parsons with adequate information to make a determination concerning probable cause. Under these circumstances, this court cannot hold that decision was improper. B. The Need for a Franks Hearing with Respect to the November 26, 1980 Application In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the Supreme Court held that: ... Where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the alleged false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment, requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. Id. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676. Consistent with these requirements, the Court made clear that an affidavit supporting an application for a search warrant is presumed to be valid. Id. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684. In order to overcome Franks’ presumption of validity and make the requisite preliminary showing, a defendant must provide substantial evidence that the affiant knew his allegations to be false, that he actually entertained substantial doubts as to the truth of the information, or that he had obvious reasons to doubt its veracity. United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 339, 342 (7th Cir.1984) Moreover, a mere assertion that a Franks violation has occurred is not enough; competent evidence, not self serving statements, is required. Untied States v. Barrienta, No. 84-147 (7th Cir. March 28, 1985), Slip. op. at 12-13; United States v. Askins, 351 F.Supp. 408, 413 (D.Md.1972) Finally, mere mistakes are not necessarily evidence of knowing, intentional or reckless conduct. United States v. Dorfman, 542 F.Supp. 345, 369 (N.D.Ill.1982) affd sub. nom., United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.1984). While the Supreme Court’s decision in Franks dealt only with affirmative misrepresentations, Franks has been logically extended to material omissions as well. Id. at 367-70 affd sub. nom. 737 F.2d at 604. In order for an omission to be material, the defendant must prove that if the fact were included in the affidavit, the affidavit would not support a finding of probable cause. Id. Franks requirement of knowing, intentional or reckless conduct is also present. Id.; United States v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 329 (5th Cir.1980) In the instant case, defendants cite numerous misrepresentations and omissions which they contend either were, or would have been, material to Judge Parsons in deciding upon the question of probable cause. Defendants cite two specific misrepresentations: (1) the statement in (121 that on September 9,1980 Costello had paid $400 to Judge Olson in the Judge’s chambers at Branch 57, and (2) the statement in f 36, attributed to the government’s Confidential Source, that in approximately 1974 Judge Olson began hearing gambling cases and that gambling cases could be “fixed” in Judge Olson’s court. Defendants also assert the existence of several material omissions including: (1) the omission of any reference to a serious public fight occuring between Costello and Judge Olson on October 30, 1980, (2) the omission of numerous additional “rainmaking” statements by Costello which would have undercut his credibility, (3) the omission of the fact that Costello was intoxicated on many of the occasions he spoke to Hake, and (4) the omission of the fact that Hake coerced a criminal defendant into hiring Costello. 1. The Statement Contained in Paragraph 21 Defendants point out that the transcript of the September 9, 1980 conversation between Hake and Costello does not support the statement in % 21 that Costello bribed Judge Olson in the Judge’s chambers. Moreover, defendants contend the transcript of that conversation reveals that all future payments between Costello and Judge Olson were going to take place at a restaurant (Jean’s) rather than in the Judge’s chambers. Indeed, in their memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motion, the government admits: This transcript indicates that Olson wanted Costello to pay him at Jean’s on Fridays. It also indicates that Costello disagreed with that arrangement and would ‘rather go back there [chambers].’ This transcript confirms that past payments took place in chambers and establishes some uncertainty as to where future payments will take place. Id. at 54-55 (emphasis added) In the view of this court, the alleged misrepresentation in paragraph twenty-one was not material to the finding of probable cause. Even without the “misrepresentation” in 21, there were numerous examples of bribes to Judge Olson in chambers reported to Hake by Costello. Thus, the inclusion of one additional incident was not dispositive. Moreover, the substitution of the accurate information concerning the site of future payments would not have prevented the authorization from being issued. Even if paragraph twenty-one would have accurately reflected Hake and Costello’s actual conversation, this court has no doubt the authorization would still have been issued. As the government points out, the transcript substantiates that past payments occurred in chambers; in addition, the remainder of the affidavit reflects at least four subsequent payments by Costello to Judge Olson in Chambers after September 9, 1980. (([[[ 23, 28, 30 and 33) Thus, there is no reason to believe the “misrepresentation” or “omission” contained in ([ 21 affected Judge Parsons’ ruling. Finally, the defendants have not made a substantial preliminary showing that Jordan’s “misrepresentation” of the September 9, 1980 conversation between Hake and Costello was done knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth. Although the September 9, 1980 conversation was inaccurately described in the affidavit, an accurate transcript of the conversation was attached as an appendix to the affidavit. If Jordan had intended to misrepresent the facts surrounding that conversation to Judge Parsons, it is highly unlikely that he would have attached an accurate transcript of the conversation. Thus, this court cannot find the statements contained in, or omitted from, paragraph twenty-one aid the defendants in making the substantial preliminary showing necessary to warrant a Franks hearing. 2. The Statement Contained in Paragraph 36 Paragraph thirty-six quotes the government’s Confidential Source as stating, “that in approximately 1974, Judge Wayne W. Olson began hearing gambling cases.” The affidavit then goes on to explain that the Confidential Source paid Judge Olson’s clerk and, as a result, that Judge Olson “gave favorable treatment to [the] Confidential Source’s clients.” During oral arguments, however, the defendants indicated that they could show Judge Olson never sat in gambling court. As has been noted previously, the burden of establishing that a substantial basis exists for holding a Franks hearing rests upon the defendant; that burden cannot be satisfied by mere self-serving statements. United States v. Reed, 726 F.2d 339, 342 (7th Cir.1984) Here, the defendants have failed to provide any evidence that Judge Olson did not sit in gambling court. Thus, the defendants’ mere assertion that the statement to the contrary in Agent Jordan’s affidavit was false cannot form the basis for a Franks hearing. Moreover, even if the defendants could show Judge Olson never presided in gambling court, it would not be material. The Confidential Source’s statement that he paid Judge Olson’s clerk to influence the disposition of cases pending before Judge Olson appears in a completely separate paragraph than the remark concerning gambling court. Thus, it is not clear that a demonstration that Judge Olson never sat in gambling court would be impeaching. In addition, the information provided from 1975 was of slight importance. The more current information provided in May, June and September, 1980, was far more vital to the issuance of the authorization. Consequently, this court cannot find the asserted misrepresentation was material. 3. The October 30, 1980 Fight Between Costello and Judge Olson On October 30, 1980, a Federal Bureau of Investigation report indicates that Costello and Judge Olson had a loud argument in a public restaurant. According to the report, “Costello grabbed Judge Olson by the wrist and shoved him slightly.” The report further indicates that Judge Olson “exploded” and screamed at Costello “[y]ou are thrown out of 26th and California” (the Cook County criminal court building). Judge Olson purportedly threw Costello’s glasses and ring across the room, breaking Costello’s glasses. In addition, the report reveals that “[Judge] Olson poured a glass of wine over Costello’s shirt and Costello threw a whole gallon bottle of wine across the room.” Defendants contend including some reference to the October 30, 1980 fight between Costello and Judge Olson in the affidavit would have revealed to Judge Parsons that Costello’s statements concerning his relationship with Judge Olson were merely “rainmaking”. Moreover, even if probable cause existed to believe there was a criminal relationship between Costello and Judge Olson prior to October 30, 1980, the defendants contend that including some reference to that evening’s events would have eliminated any probable cause to believe there would be any future relationship between them. The government responds that Costello paid Judge Olson $1,000 in chambers the day after the fight (Jordan affidavit, ([ 53) and that the fight had no significance after that evening. In the view of this court, the defendants have not made a substantial preliminary showing that Agent Jordan knowingly, intentionally or recklessly omitted any reference to the October 30, 1980 fight. The F.B.I. report of the fight indicates that “it was evident that Judge Wayne Olson and James Costello were both intoxicated”. Under these circumstances, there is no indication that Agent Jordan was knowingly, or intentionally attempting to mislead Judge Parsons. Agent Jordan could quite reasonably have concluded that the fight was a one time occurrence brought about by the parties’ intoxication. With Costello’s appearance in Judge Olson’s chambers the very next day, there was no reason for Jordan (or Judge Parsons) to conclude that the parties would fail to put the incident behind them. Thus, in the present case, this court cannot conclude the defendants have made a substantial preliminary showing that Agent Jordan acted improperly or that the subject omission was material. 4. Additional “Rainmaking” Statements The defendants also challenge Jordan’s failure to include various other “rainmaking” statements allegedly uttered by Costello which they contend would have further undermined Costello’s credibility. Specifically, defendants point to Costello’s claims that he had bribed eleven other judges and the first assistant state’s attorney during his first year in private practice. In addition, the defendants contend the government omitted any reference to two occasions on which Costello recanted prior statements regarding bribes. The government responds that Jordan did not omit any recantation or contradiction of any bribe alleged in his affidavit and challenges the accuracy of the defendants’ argument that Costello claimed to have bribed eleven judges. There is no merit to the defendants’ argument. A thorough review of the transcripts relied upon by the defendants reveals that Costello claimed to have bribed two, or at the most three, judges other than Judge Olson. This figure is hardly so large as to automatically generate doubt concerning Costello’s veracity. Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that Jordan was aware of any fact which would have lead him to doubt Costello’s representations. Finally, the fact that Costello recanted some, but not other, bribery claims only serves to support his credibility. Thus, Costello’s other “rainmaking” statements do not support the defendants’ request for a Franks evidentiary hearing. 5. Costello’s Intoxication Defendants contend Agent Jordan also failed to inform Judge Parsons that James Costello was intoxicated on many of the occasions his statements were recorded by Hake. Specifically, defendants make reference to an October 21, 1980 Federal Bureau of Investigation report indicating that Costello was “obviously intoxicated” on that date. Moreover, at oral argument, citing the tone of Costello’s voice on the consensual recordings, Costello’s attorneys represented that Costello was intoxicated on at least seven other occasions on which he uttered statements relied upon in Jordan’s affidavit. Defendants’ position is again without merit. The fact that Costello was “obviously intoxicated” on October 20, 1980 is immaterial; nothing Costello said on that date is recited in the affidavit. In addition, Costello’s counsels’ mere representation that Costello was intoxicated on six or seven other occasions is insufficient to constitute the competent evidence necessary to trigger an evidentiary hearing; no observer’s affidavit or other competent evidence is supplied. Finally, even if Costello was intoxicated, it is not clear his statements would be any less believable; there is no reason to believe Costello would have been any less candid while imbibing alcoholic beverages than while sober in the courthouse. Thus,- the asserted omissions concerning Costello’s sobriety do not warrant the holding of a Franks hearing. 6. Hake’s Coercion of George Jordan Finally, defendants contend that Agent Jordan failed to disclose the fact that Terry Hake coerced George Jordan into accepting Costello as his court appointed counsel. The November 7, 1980 F.B.I. report indicates that Hake “complained to Costello that he was the one who intimidated [George Jordan] and forced him to seek representation by Costello.” This fact is also reflected in the F.B.I.’s October 31, 1980 report. Agent Jordan’s affidavit, however, merely reflects that “Costello owed Judge Olson one half of $1,125 in bond money received on the George Jordan case of October 30, 1980 as well as money on some other cases Olson had referred to Costello over the past several days.” (U 53j) Agent Jordan’s omission of the fact that Hake coerced the subject defendant into accepting Judge Olson’s appointment of Costello as his attorney is completely immaterial. Whether the defendant accepted Costello’s appointment on his own or on the basis of Hake’s actions does not alter the material fact that Costello paid Judge Olson one-half of the defendant’s bond in accordance with the terms of their purported arrangement. If Agent Jordan had included the fact that the defendant had been reluctant to accept Costello’s appointment until Hake intervened, it is difficult to envision how the significance of the payment would have changed. Thus, Agent Jordan’s omission of the fact that Tery Hake coerced George Jordan into accepting Costello as his court appointed attorney cannot serve as a basis for holding a Franks hearing. 7. Conclusion In the view of this court, the misrepresentations and omissions relied upon by the defendants are insufficient, both individually and cumulatively, to warrant the holding of a Franks hearing. Even assuming all of the facts allegedly “misrepresented” by Agent Jordan had been properly reflected in his affidavit and all of the alleged “omissions” had been included, there is no reason to believe Judge Parsons’ decision would have been altered. Moreover, the defendants have fallen far short of making a substantial preliminary showing that Agent Jordan knowingly, intentionally or recklessly misrepresented or omitted facts in his affidavit. The defendants’ request for a Franks hearing with respect to the issue of probable cause is, therefore, denied. C. Necessity for Electronic Surveillance Defendants’ next contention concerns the necessity for the subject electronic surveillance. Defendants contend that, on its face, the application failed to establish that alternative investigative techniques would not have been successful in obtaining evidence against them. Moreover, defendants contend the applications contained various misrepresentations and omissions which would have materially altered Judge Parsons’ decision with respect to the necessity of the electronic surveillance. 1. History of the Necessity of Requirement The statutory necessity requirement has its constitutional origin in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 1884, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967). In Berger, the Supreme Court held New York’s electronic surveillance statute was unconstitutional on its face. The Court cited eight different constitutional deficiencies in the statute Id. at 58-60, 87 S.Ct. at 1883-1884. Among the deficiencies was the fact that the statute failed to require law enforcement officials to make a showing of “special facts” or “exigent circumstances” before obtaining authorization. Such a showing was necessary in order to overcome the problem of not giving the interceptee prior notice of the electronic search and seizure. A year after Berger was decided, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, P.L. 90-351 (1968) (Codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et at (1982)). Among the provisions of that Act is 18 U.S.C. 2518(l)(c), which requires that each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire or oral communication include: a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. A closely related provision of the Act permits a judge to enter an ex parte order approving the interception of wire or oral communications only if he or she determines “on the basis of the facts submitted by the application” that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1982). The legislative history of these provisions make it abundantly clear that 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(c) and (3)(c) were enacted to satisfy the “special facts” or “exigent circumstances” requirement of Berger. U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News 2112, 2113, 2161-63, 2190-91 (1968); see also Blakey and Hancock, “A Proposed Electronic Surveillance Control Act”, 43 N.D.Law 657, 673-74 f.n. 35 (1968) Moreover, subsequent lower court decisions have linked the requirements of Berger with those provisions. United States v. Forlano, 358 F.Supp. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y.1973) and United States v. Beta, 332 F.Supp. 1357, 1361 f.n. 5 (M.D.Pa.1971); see also United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C.Cir.1977). Thus, the “necessity” requirement of § 2518(l)(c) and (3)(c) has both a constitutional and statutory basis. The legislative history of § 2518(l)(c) and (3)(c) reveals that Congress intended electronic surveillance applications to contain “a full and complete statement as to whether or not normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or why these are unlikely to succeed if tried, or to be too dangerous.” U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 2112, 2190 (1968) Congress envisioned normal investigative procedures as including: ... [1] standard visual or aural surveillance techniques by law enforcement officers, [2] general questioning or interrogation under an immunity grant, [3] use of regular search warrants, and [4] the infiltration of conspiratorial groups by undercover agents or informants. Id. Congress cautioned, however, that “[m]erely because a normal investigative technique is theoretically possible, it does not follow that it is likely.” Id. Moreover, in determining whether or not a particular application satisfies the necessity requirement, the legislative history reveals that Congress intended that “the showing be tested in a practical and common sense fashion” with “consideration of all the facts and circumstances.” Id. In commenting upon the purpose of these provisions, the Supreme Court has noted that § 2518 was enacted in order “to make doubly sure that the statutory authority be used only with restraint and only where circumstances warrant the surreptitious interception of wire and oral communications. These procedures [are] not to be routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation.” United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1826-1827, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) Moreover, the Court has noted that “wiretapping is not [to be] resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to explore the crime.” United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 f.n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 977, 983 f.n. 12, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974). Finally, the Court has stated that “[t]he plain effect of the detailed restrictions of § 2518 is to guarantee that wiretapping or bugging occurs only when there is a genuine need for it and only to the extent that it is needed.” Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 250, 99 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 60 L.Ed.2d 177 (1979). Despite having commented on § 2518 in a general fashion, the Supreme Court has yet to decide a case resting on the issue of “necessity”. The federal circuit courts, however, have frequently addressed the issue of “necessity”. The vast majority of those cases have dealt with the necessity of utilizing electronic surveillance to obtain evidence concerning drug and gambling conspiracies. Although the greater number of those decision are not factually analogous to the present case, several general principles recognized in those decisions are applicable here. First, as in other areas of warrant construction, reviewing courts give substantial deference to the determination of the issuing judge. In United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.1985), for example, the court held that “we review conclusions that the wiretaps were necessary in each situation only for an abuse of discretion.” See also United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 438 (8th Cir.1976) and United States v. Smith, 519 F.2d 516, 518 (9th Cir.1975). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has recently stated that the issuing court “is clothed with broad discretion in its consideration of the application.” United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862, 868 (11th Cir.1984) cert. denied, - U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 928, 83 L.Ed.2d 939 (1985) Finally, so long as a “factual predicate” exists in the affidavit, this circuit has recognized that, the authorizing court’s decision will not be reversed. In re DeMonte, 674 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir.1982); United States v. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428, 431 (7th Cir.1976). Second, it is generally recognized that “courts will not invalidate a wiretap order simply because defense lawyers are able to suggest post factum some investigative technique that might have been used and was not.” United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 867 (5th Cir.1978) Instead, courts have consistently adhered to Congress’ admonition that they take a “pragmatic” approach, United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 849 (3rd Cir.1976), and view applications “as a whole” in a “practical and commonsense fashion.” In re DeMonte, 674 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir.1982) and United States v. Anderson, 542 F.2d 428, 431 (7th Cir.1976). Consistent with this, the Seventh Circuit has also recognized that the government’s burden of establishing its compliance with § 2518(l)(c) and (3)(c) is not great. Id. See also United States v. Landmesser, 553 F.2d 17, 20 (6th Cir.1977) Third, courts have recognized that the application must contain a full and complete statement of the facts upon which necessity is asserted to exist; mere conclusory allegations based upon the general experience of an agent are not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of § 2518(l)(c) and (3)(c). United States v. Lilia, 699 F.2d 99, 104 (2nd Cir.1983); In re DeMonte, 674 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir.1982); and United States v. Kalustian, 529 F.2d 585, 590 (9th Cir.1975) The application must demonstate why normal investigative procedures are insufficient in that particular case. Id. See also United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448, 453 (D.C.Cir.1983) (“[w]e must be careful not to permit the government merely to characterize a case as a ‘drug conspiracy’ or a ‘fencing conspiracy’ that is therefore inherently difficult to investigate. The affidavit must show with specificity why in this particular investigation ordinary means of investigation will fail.”) Finally, courts have not required that every normal investigative technique be addressed in the government’s application for electronic surveillance. In United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862, 868 (11th Cir.1984) cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 928, 83 L.Ed.2d 939 (1985), for example, the court held “[t]here need not be an exhaustive recitation of the progress of the investigation, excluding every possible line of inquiry.” Similarly, the court in United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 850 (3rd Cir.1976) did not find it controlling that the government’s application failed to mention the use of undercover agents. Finally, the Ninth Circuit did not find an application deficient because it failed to discuss the use of a government informant making consensual recordings. United States v. Pezzino, 535 F.2d 483, 484 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 429 U.S. 839, 97 S.Ct. 111, 50 L.Ed.2d 106 (1976) 2. Sufficiency of the Application on its Face Paragraph fifty-four of Jordan’s affidavit, captioned “use of other investigative techniques”, purports to specifically address the necessity of electronic surveillance. Lines five through nine list certain normal investigative techniques utilized in the investigation of public corruption cases. Lines nine through eleven continue that “[a]ll of these techniques, as described more fully herein, either have been tried or failed, or reasonably appear unlikely to succeed.” The remainder of that paragraph then goes on to describe which normal investigative techniques have been tried and failed, and why certain others would be unlikely to succeed. a. Development of Informants or Witnesses Jordan’s affidavit initially discusses the development and use of informants or witnesses. Jordan mentions Hake, but concludes he “has not and will not be in a position to make contact with [Judge] Olson when [Judge] Olson is soliciting and accepting bribes.” In the view of this court, this conclusion is supported by the remainder of the affidavit. Paragraph twenty reveals that Costello requested Hake to excuse himself at lunch so that Costello could be alone with Judge Olson “to give Wayne his bread.” Paragraph forty-three reveals that Judge Olson’s clerk, perhaps at the Judge’s urging, was quite cautious around Hake and refused to accept a bribe in his presence. Paragraphs forty-six through fifty-two reveal that Judge Olson was quite careful in discussing cases with Hake. Finally, in his capacity as assistant state’s attorney, Hake lacked any motive for bribing Judge Olson or any interest in being present while a payment was actually occurring. Apparently recognizing the inconsistency between Hake’s official capacity and his developing a corrupt relationship with Judge Olson, the defendants suggest that Hake could have left the State’s Attorney’s office, entered private practice and begun a criminal relationship with Judge Olson. Defendants point out that, in fact, Hake actually did eventually leave the state’s attorney’s office and develop such a corrupt relationship with another judge. As previously noted, however, “courts will not invalidate a wiretap order simply because defense lawyers are able to suggest post factum some investigative technique that might have been used and was not.” United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856, 867 (5th Cir.1978). In the present case, this court does not find it was at all likely that Hake could have left the state’s attorney’s office and developed a criminal relationship with Judge Olson within a reasonable time period. The government was not required to give up an inside informer for the speculative possibility of developing more direct evidence months or years later. Moreover, even if Hake was able to develop a corrupt relationship with Judge Olson and record a single criminal transaction, there is no indication that Judge Olson would have disclosed the extent of his criminal activities to Hake. See United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 850 (3rd Cir.1976) (“Defendants ... take an unreasonably narrow view of the scope of this investigation. Although normal investigative techniques might have been sufficient to implicate Gregorio in thefts from interstate shipments, such approaches could not show the scope of the conspiracy or the nature of Gregorio’s on-going criminal activity.”) Thus, defendants suggestion that the government could have made further use of Terry Hake as an undercover agent is without merit. Jordan also discussed the development and use of other informants and witnesses. With respect to other attorneys practicing in Cook County, Jordan’s affidavit provides: from my experience and from the experience of other Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, lawyers are reluctant to discuss or testify ... because of fear of the effect it will have on their ability to continue to practice law ... specifically, attorneys are reluctant to testify about occasions on which they have bribed or been extorted by judges and their bagmen because such testimony may well result in the disbarment of the attorney-witnesses. Similarly, with respect to the development and use of Cook County court personnel, Jordan’s affidavit sets forth: from my experience and the experience of other special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, employees of the City of Chicago and Cook County are for the most part, patronage employees, and because of loyalty and/or fear for their jobs, will not testify even under a grant of immunity. Finally Jordan’s affidavit provides that such individuals could not provide “the precise nature and scope of the illegal activities and the identity of all the offenders involved, due mainly to the secretive and private nature of the criminal transactions.” Defendants attack these allegations as conclusory, contending they do not relate to the facts of this particular case. Specifically, defendants contend the affidavit’s conclusory statements regarding attorney’s unwillingness to testify are contradicted by the existence of the government’s Confidential Source as well as the government’s own experience in other “Greylord” investigations. Similarly, defendants point out that court personnel have been successfully utilized in other similar prosecutions. Finally, defendants contend Jordan’s affidavit does not adequately explain why these particular alternative sources could not have been employed. Apart from Costello and the Confidential Source, Jordan’s affidavit lists thirteen additional attorneys either having directly bribed Judge Olson or as having at least suggested an ability to do so. In addition, Jordan’s affidavit specifically describes two former clerks having previously acted as “bagmen” for Judge Olson. In his affidavit, however, Jordan does not indicate whether any of the fifteen attorneys, including Costello and the government’s Confidential Source, or court personnel had been requested to cooperate, testify or wear a consensual monitor. With respect to all of the attorneys and court personnel except the government’s Confidential Source, however, this court has little difficulty in concluding Jordan’s affidavit was sufficient to satisfy the necessity requirement. There was no requirement that Agent Jordan or the F.B.I. actually approach those individuals. Here, as in United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862 (11th Cir.1984) cert. denied — U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 928, 83 L.Ed.2d 939 (1985), (where the object of the investigation was a group of corrupt Dade County detectives), “[t]he use of subpoenas or opening questioning ... certainly would [have] jeopardize^] the investigation.” Id. at 868. The government was clearly not required to place the entire investigation in jeopardy on the slim hope that an attorney or clerk could be coerced into testifying; indeed, with the exception of Costello, there is nothing to indicate the government had sufficient evidence to threaten any of these individuals with prosecution. Moreover, it is not clear that any of these individuals were aware of, or could have become aware of, the entire scope of Judge Olson’s activities. Finally, as an attorney himself, Judge Parsons was in a position to evaluate the likelihood that attorneys would cooperate and testify and, as has previously been noted, his conclusion is entitled to deference by this court. United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 438 (8th Cir.1976). Jordan’s failure to indicate whether the government’s Confidential Source was willing to testify is somewhat more troublesome. Unlike the other attorneys and court personnel, the Confidential Source could be approached without risking the investigation. Once again, however, it is unclear that Judge Olson would have disclosed the full extent of his activities to the Confidential Source. Moreover, Judge Parsons could have concluded from Agent Jordan’s general comments that the Confidential Source was unwilling to testify. An affidavit need not specifically exclude every possible line of inquiry. United States v. Alonso, 740 F.2d 862, 868 (11th Cir.1984) cert. denied, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 928, 83 L.Ed.2d 939 (1985) Thus, this court concludes that there was substantial evi-. dence in Jordan’s affidavit from which Judge Parsons could conclude that the use of informants or witnesses would be unlikely to succeed in revealing the scope of the defendants’ alleged criminal transactions. b. Use of Grand Jury Subpoenas for Records In his affidavit, Jordan next discusses the inadequacy of public records. Specifically, Jordan notes that “given the vast degree of discretion with which a judge is imbued, these records would not provide direct evidence of money being solicited or paid or of the identities of those who pay.” Defendants do not contend that such evidence, coupled with the information contained in the affidavit, would be sufficient to successfully prosecute Judge Olson. Clearly recognizing the discretion vested in judge’s deciding factual issues on motions to suppress, Judge Parsons was entitled to conclude that subpoenaed records would be insufficient to convict Judge Olson. In addition, the subpoenaing of court or bank records would clearly have raised the suspicions of the defendants. Id. Thus, this court cannot find the use of Grand Jury subpoenas would have negated the necessity for electronic surveillance. c. Physical Surveillance Jordan’s affidavit also touches upon the adequacy of physical surveillance. In his affidavit, Jordan notes that “physical surveillance in this investigation has been tried and has not succeeded, because ... meetings and unlawful payments are accomplished in a judge’s chambers not accessible to the public.” In addition, Jordan notes that further sustained surveillance could not be undertaken, “because of security measures in that building.” Finally, the affidavit contains a diagram of the courtroom and chambers which indicates that any exterior viewing of the chambers would be difficult and could be easily frustrated. Based upon the August 29, 1980 incident at a Chicago restaurant during which Costello purportedly asked Hake to excuse himself so that Costello could “give Wayne his bread”, defendants contend the government could have positioned agents at the restaurant to observe other payments. Defendants argument, however, overlooks the fact that the August 29, 1980 incident was apparently a one time occurrence. Moreover, defendants’ argument ignores the fact that Hake would probably not have had enough advance notice to arrange such surveillance; on August 29, 1980, for example, the affidavit reveals that Costello did not tell Hake that he intended to pay Judge Olson until they were on their way to the restaurant. Jordan’s remaining statements regarding the usefulness of physical surveillance are plainly supported by facts set forth in the affidavit. Consequently, this court cannot find Judge Parsons was incorrect in concluding physical surveillance was inadequate. d. Use of an Undercover Agent Finally, Jordan discounted the likelihood of successfully utilizing an undercover agent. The affidavit points out that “[Judge] Olson appears to be very careful not to take bribes from a lawyer if a third party is present.” In addition, the affidavit provides that “[n]ew lawyers would have great difficulty gaining [Judge] Olson’s confidence. An undercover agent is unlikely to be able to gain [Judge] Olson’s confidence such that [Judge] Olson would engage in criminal transactions in his presence.” Defendants contend these conclusions are not substantiated by the factual statements in Jordan’s affidavit. Defendants point to the government’s Confidential Source’s statements that attorneys “unknown to Judge Olson” could bribe him through Clerk # 1 (([ 37), that “any lawyer” who needed help on a case in Judge Olson’s courtroom could see Clerk # 2 (K 38), and that Judge Olson was “accepting bribes directly from defense attorneys.” (([ 39) In addition, defendants note the ease and speed with which Costello purported to develop a corrupt relationship with Judge Olson (([ 17) and the large number of attorneys the government intimates were paying Judge Olson. Finally, defendants contend that Hake could have (and later did) introduce an attorney to Judge Olson for corrupt purposes. In the view of this court, the possibility that an undercover attorney could have been introduced to Judge Olson and successfully engaged him in criminal conduct does not defeat the necessity of electronic surveillance. Once again, for the reasons previously noted, in all likelihood an undercover agent could not have uncovered the entire scope of Judge Olson’s activities. Moreover, the likelihood of an unknown attorney successfully engaging in criminal conduct with Judge Olson was by no means certain. The facts contained in Jordan’s affidavit suggest that Olson had long standing relationships with individuals purporting to bribe him, or that those individuals were “regulars” around the criminal courts. Costello, for example, informed Hake that he had accepted bribes for cooperative testimony while he was a Chicago police officer (U 45) and had accepted bribes from defense attorneys while assigned to another court as an assistant state’s attorney (([([ 19 and 50) Similarly, the affidavit reveals that Attorney # 2 was “fixing cases” since at least 1971 and had paid Costello for cooperative testimony when the latter was a police officer, ((j 45) It is not difficult to see why Judge Olson would “trust” such individuals. It is not entirely clear, however, that an unknown undercover agent could be successfully introduced to Judge Olson. The mere possibility that such a scheme would have succeeded, therefore, does not provide a basis for overruling Judge Parsons’ determination of necessity. 3. The Need for a Franks hearing with Respect to Necessity Defendants contend there are various misrepresented and omitted facts which would have materially altered Judge Parsons’ conclusion with respect to the necessity of the electronic surveillance. Specifically, defendants contend the statement set forth in paragraph 3(c) that “[n] or mal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed to gather evidence sufficient to sustain prosecution of violations of these offenses and appear unlikely to succeed if tried further, or to be too dangerous” is false because many normal investigative techniques were never actually tried. In addition, defendants contend Agent Jordan’s statements regarding the difficulty in obtaining official case dispositions (M| 53c, 53d, 53g and 53h) are false because such information is a matter of public record and can be looked up by anyone without suspicion. Finally, defendants contend the government failed to disclose that Terry Hake