Full opinion text
OWENS, Chief Judge: I. History of the Case On May 28, 1969, twenty black employees of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation’s Athens, Georgia, plant signed a petition alleging that Westinghouse discriminated against them because of their race. Plaintiffs Major D. Calloway and James Moses were among those signing the petition. The petition was mailed to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which treated the petition as an EEOC charge. The claimants wrote that: “We have been denied the right to advance from our present positions to other higher ones for which we are well qualified for. We have been told that we are qualified, but due to discriminatory practices in this plant we are yet denied these advancements.” Calloway and Moses also submitted individual charges to the EEOC. On April 13, 1973, the EEOC issued a five-page determination letter finding that Westinghouse did in fact discriminate against blacks. On April 27, 1977 — eight years after the charge was filed — the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue. The notice of right to sue stated that “[t]he Commission has found reasonable cause to believe your charge of employment discrimination is true but has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which you would have been a party because attempts to achieve such a voluntary settlement with the respondent(s) have been unsuccessful.” On July 6, 1977, Major D. Calloway and James Moses filed this lawsuit against Westinghouse and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 2109, alleging that the defendants discriminated against them because of their race. The court subsequently allowed the plaintiffs to add the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers as a defendant. However, the plaintiffs withdrew all claims against the union prior to trial. The two named plaintiffs have sought from the beginning to have the complaint certified as a class action. A hearing on class certification was held on June 9, 1978. At the hearing, Walter M. Culbreath, Sr., William Goss, Jimmy Byrd, and Robert Freeman filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs. On October 11, 1978, the court granted the motion to intervene and preliminarily certified the case as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2), whose class members are: all black persons who have been employed by Westinghouse Electric Corp. at its Newton Bridge Road, Athens, Georgia facility since November 20, 1968; all black persons in the Athens metropolitan area or otherwise within the labor pool area from which the above named facility draws employment applications from prospective employees willing to commute who have unsuccessfully applied for employment with Westinghouse Electric Corp. since November 20, 1968; and all black persons who will apply for work or will be employed by Westinghouse Electric Corporations’s Newton Bridge Road facility in the future. However, as contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court agreed to reexamine the question and scope of class certification following the presentation of evidence at trial. The nonjury trial on the issue of liability was held in Macon on February 5-8, 1985, during which both sides presented expert statistical testimony, testimony by employees and former employees of Westinghouse, and voluminous documents. The plaintiffs contend that the defendant engaged in the widespread practice of racial discrimination with regard to (1) initial job assignment, (2) upgrading and transferring within the hourly bargaining unit, (3) promotion to supervisor and other salaried positions, (4) acceptance into skilled trades apprentice programs, and (5) employee discipline. Plaintiffs’ proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law at 2-3. Each side has submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the court has considered along with the trial transcript and all other documents in the record. II. Statute of Limitations for § 1981 Claim Westinghouse contends that the plaintiffs’ section 1981 claim is barred by the statute of limitations. In Georgia, employment discrimination actions under section 1981 are governed by O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22. Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir.1984); Stafford v. Muscogee County Board of Education, 688 F.2d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir.1982). That code section provides: All actions for the enforcement of rights accruing to individuals under statutes or acts of incorporation or by operation of law shall be brought within 20 years after the right of action has accrued; provided, however, that all actions for the recovery of wages, overtime, or damages and penalties accruing under laws respecting the payment of wages and overtime shall be brought within two years after the right of action has accrued. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-22 (1982). It contains two limitations periods: a two-year period for suits for the recovery of wages, overtime, or damages, and a twenty-year statute for suits seeking equitable relief. Stafford, 688 F.2d at 1389. The limitations periods are not tolled by the pendency of a Title VII charge. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1723, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975); Jeffer son v. H.K. Porter Co., 648 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B). Section 9-3-22 “must be applied in a bifurcated manner so that an action for equitable relief is barred only after 20 years, but an action for back pay is barred after only 2 years.” Howard, 726 F.2d at 1532. In the present case, the plaintiffs seek both back pay and injunctive relief. The complaint was filed in this court on July 6, 1977. As to plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the complaint is not barred under the controlling twenty-year statute of limitations. However, as to the plaintiffs’ claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the two-year statute of limitations bars all damage claims for discrimination that occurred pri- or to July 6, 1975. III. Dismissal of Discipline Claim and Constructive Discharge Claim The rule in this circuit is that: the allegations in a judicial complaint filed pursuant to Title VII “may encompass any kind of discrimination like or related to allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such allegation during the pendency of the case before the Commission.” In other words, the “scope” of the judicial complaint is limited to the “scope” of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir.1970) (citation omitted). Therefore, the starting point for determining the permissible scope of the complaint in this case is the EEOC charge and investigation. Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir.1985); Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 714 F.2d 1066, 1067 (11th Cir.1983); Evans v. U.S. Pipe and Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 929 (11th Cir.1983). The original EEOC charge was filed by named plaintiff Calloway in February, 1969. Plaintiffs’ exhibit E. He stated in his charge that “I have been discriminated against by Westinghouse, because I have been denied promotion, on account of my race, while Caucasians with less seniority and qualifications have been promoted ahead of me.” Id. (He also alleged discrimination by the union, but because the union has been dismissed as a defendant, all claims against it are no longer relevant.) He further contended in his supporting affidavit that, among other things, Westinghouse requires all blacks to take the job qualification test, but does not require all whites to do so; that most blacks are hired as sweepers and janitors and are very seldom promoted above labor grade six; that there are no blacks in the salaried unit and there are no black foremen; and that blacks are excluded from all training programs. An amended charge was filed in June, 1969, by Calloway and nineteen other Westinghouse employees (including named plaintiff Moses). The letter signed by all twenty employees stated that “[w]e have been denied the right to advance from our present positions to other higher ones for which we are well qualified for.” Named plaintiff Moses filed an amended charge on October 7, 1969, which alleged the same discriminatory practices. The resulting investigation by the EEOC led to the issuance of a determination that there was reasonable cause to believe the charge is true. In its five-page determination letter, the EEOC found that more blacks than whites were placed in labor grades five and below because of the use of an invalidated test; that only whites were employed in technical and clerical positions and salaried and supervisory positions; that there were no blacks in the apprenticeship programs; and that none of the skilled workers were black. Plaintiffs’ exhibit E. Plaintiffs’ claims of racial discrimination in initial job assignment, upgrading within the hourly bargaining unit, promotions to supervisor and other salaried-unit positions, and acceptance in the skilled trades apprentice programs are “like or related to” the allegations in the EEOC charge and investigation. However, in this court’s judgment, the claim of racial discrimination in discipline and Calloway’s and Moses’ claims of constructive discharge are not “like or related” and are thus not properly before the court. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim of discrimination in discipline and Moses’ and Calloway’s constructive discharge claims are hereby DISMISSED. IV. Failure to Prosecute Westinghouse asks the court to dismiss this action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute. A district court is authorized, on defendant’s motion, to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or to obey a court order or federal rule. The court’s power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its orders and insure prompt disposition of lawsuits. The legal standard to be applied under Rule 41(b) is whether there is a “clear record of delay or willful contempt and a finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Dismissal of a case with prejudice is considered a sanction of last resort, applicable only in extreme circumstances. Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir.1985) (citations omitted). “A finding of such extreme circumstances necessary to support the sanction of dismissal must, at a minimum, be based on evidence of willful delay; simple negligence does not warrant dismissal.” McKelvey v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 789 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir.1986). Westinghouse’s motion is based in large part on the eight-year period during which the plaintiffs’ charge of discrimination was investigated by the EEOC. Westinghouse contends that the plaintiffs should have requested a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC so that the judicial complaint could have been filed earlier. The Eleventh Circuit has squarely held otherwise. Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir.1984). Westinghouse also bases its motion on two periods during which discovery was not ongoing. These delays were not willful and thus cannot cause dismissal. Accordingly, the court declines to dismiss the case under Rule 41(b). V. Class Action Certification After holding an evidentiary hearing, the court preliminarily certified a class defined as: all black persons who have been employed by Westinghouse Electric Corp. at its Newton Bridge Road, Athens, Georgia facility since November 20, 1968; all black persons in the Athens metropolitan area or otherwise within the labor pool area from which the above named facility draws employment applications from prospective employees willing to commute who have unsuccessfully applied for employment with Westinghouse Electric Corp. since November 20, 1968; and all black persons who will apply for work or will be employed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation’s Newton Bridge Road facility in the future, with the understanding of the parties that this determination may be altered in whole or in part at the conclusion of discovery. The court agreed to reconsider the class certification issue after hearing the evidence at trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1); Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir.1986); Perryman v. Johnson Products Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1147-48 (11th Cir.1983). This court recently discussed class certification in Title VII lawsuits in Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 106 F.R.D. 592, 593-94 (M.D.Ga.1985) (Owens, J.): This court is mindful that in determining whether a class action may be maintained it has no “authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.” Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2152, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). “In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.” Id. at 178, 94 S.Ct. at 2153 (quoting Miller v. Mackey International, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir.1971)). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has made it clear that before a suit can go forward as a class action under Rule 23, a plaintiff who wishes to represent the class must demonstrate that his claim has some connection with the claims of the would-be class members. General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157-59, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 2370-71, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). The plaintiff in the Falcon case alleged that he was denied a promotion because he is a Mexican-American. He sought to maintain a class action on behalf of Mexican-American applicants who were not hired by Falcon’s employer. The issue before the Supreme Court was the propriety of the class action. Deciding that issue, the Court held: Without any specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact that were common to the claims of respondent and of the members of the class he sought to represent, it was error for the District Court to presume that respondent’s claim was typical of other claims against petitioner by Mexican-American employees and applicants. If one allegation of specific discriminatory treatment were sufficient to support an across-the-board attack, every Title VII case would be a potential companywide class action. We find nothing in the statute to indicate that Congress intended to authorize such a wholesale expansion of class-action litigation. Id. at 158-59, 102 S.Ct. at 2371. The Court further stated that “[t]he mere fact that an aggrieved private plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class of persons of the same race or national origin is insufficient to establish his standing to litigate on their behalf all possible claims of discrimination against a common employer.” Id. at 159 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. at 2371 n. 15. The Court advised district courts to carefully evaluate a plaintiff’s claim that he is a proper class representative under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 160, 102 S.Ct. at 2372. The same language from Falcon was relied upon by the Court last term in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, [467] U.S. [867], [876-77], 104 S.Ct. 2794, 2800, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984). The Eleventh Circuit recently had occasion to review a district court order denying class certification in a Title VII lawsuit. See Morrison v. Booth, 763 F.2d 1366 (11th Cir.1985). In that case the court stated: It [the district court] correctly concluded ... that while plaintiffs need not prove the merits of their claims at this [class certification] stage, they must provide more than bare allegations that they satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 for class certification. Plaintiffs must show some nexus with the alleged class. See Waller [sic] v. The Jim Dandy Co., 638 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir.1981)____ Plaintiffs simply leap from the premise that they were the victims of discrimination to the position that others must also have been. Id. at 1371. See generally Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir.1985); Walker v. Jim Dandy Co., 747 F.2d 1360 (11th Cir.1984); Giles v. Ireland, 742 F.2d 1366 (11th Cir.1984). With this background in mind, the court can address the question of whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met in the present case. This decision is committed to the discretion of the district court. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2558-59, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1531 (11th Cir.1985); Perryman, 698 F.2d at 1147. The first four questions to be decided are (1) whether the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) whether there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) whether the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). In addition, the plaintiffs must satisfy one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Gilchrist v. Bolger, 89 F.R.D. 402, 404 (S.D.Ga.1981). Here, the plaintiffs are proceeding under Rule 23(b)(2), and thus must show that Westinghouse “has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). A. Numerosity In considering whether the numerosity requirement is satisfied, courts should examine the specific facts of each case. General Telephone Co. of the Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 1706, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). The issue is whether joinder is impracticable. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267 (5th Cir.1980). “Practicability of joinder depends on many factors, including, for example, the size of the class, ease of identifying its numbers and determining their addresses, facility of making service on them if joined and their geographic dispersion.” Kilgo v. Bowman Transportation, Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 878 (11th Cir.1986). With regard to the size of the class, a plaintiff must do more than merely allege that numerosity is satisfied, but need not show the precise number of class members. Evans v. U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 696 F.2d 925, 930 (11th Cir.1983). The class here is composed of a minimum of 774 persons (the number of black employees hired from 1968 to 1977). See Affidavit of Shapiro at exhibit A-l. The class would also include all black persons employed at Westinghouse as of November 20, 1968. It should be possible to identify each class member from Westinghouse’s personnel records. The class members who are still employed at Westinghouse can be easily contacted. Contacting the former employees will be more difficult. Hopefully, some of them can be contacted at the forwarding address on file at Westinghouse. However, it is unrealistic to assume that all former employees can be contacted this way. The current employees reside near Athens, Georgia, but it is impossible to know at this juncture where the former employees are located geographically. Considering all these factors and especially the size of the class, in this court’s judgment the numerosity requirement is satisfied. B. Commonality and Typicality The Supreme Court has noted that: [t]he commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for determining whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence. General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 2370-71 n. 13, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). The plaintiffs are thus “required to link [their] claim with those of the putative class by showing that the discrimination [they] allegedly suffered was typical or, relatedly, that a policy of race discrimination pervaded [Westinghouse’s] practices.” Nelson v. United States Steel Corp., 709 F.2d 675, 679 (11th Cir.1983). As to plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim concerning the use of the General Aptitude Test Battery, the court notes that “[i]f [Westinghouse] used a biased testing procedure to evaluate both applicants for employment and incumbent employees, a class action on behalf of every applicant or employee who might have been prejudiced by the test clearly would satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a).” Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. at 2371 n. 15. There is hardly a dispute that Westinghouse used such a test here. Thus, the commonality and typicality requirements are satisfied as to the disparate impact claim concerning the use of the GATB. As to the disparate treatment claims of discrimination in initial assignments and promotions, the court must examine the named plaintiffs’ and intervenors’ situations to determine whether there is a class of employees that share common questions of law or fact and whether the individual’s claims are typical of the class claims. The two named plaintiffs are Major D. Calloway and James Moses. Mr. Calloway claims that Westinghouse refused to promote him to a position in the maintenance department and to several other positions because of his test scores. Mr. Moses also contends that he was discriminatorily denied promotions in the hourly bargaining unit and that he received inadequate training because of his race. Both Calloway and Moses are no longer employed at Westinghouse. The four employees allowed to intervene as plaintiffs are Walter M. Culbreath, Sr., William Goss, Jimmy Byrd, and Robert Freeman. Mr. Culbreath claims he was discriminated against by being initially denied a position in the coil winding section of the hourly bargaining unit. He also complains because he was denied a promotion to dispatcher and because he was asked to fill in as a substitute foreman on only one occasion. Mr. Goss complains that he was denied a promotion to a moldmaker position in the hourly bargaining unit and to two salaried unit positions for which he had submitted a bid. Mr. Byrd believes he was discriminated against in his initial job assignment and again when he was denied participation in the maintenance training program. Mr. Freeman also complains that he should have been initially assigned to a higher labor grade. Intervenors Culbreath, Goss, and Byrd are current employees of Westinghouse; Freeman was laid-off. These six individuals’ claims are typical of the class claims. Furthermore, the anecdotal testimony by other employees and the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence shows that there is a class of persons who were discriminated against in the same manner as the individuals, so that there are common questions of law or fact. C. Adequacy of Representation Westinghouse’s primary attack on class certification is its claim that the individual plaintiffs and intervenors are not adequately representing the class members. The test of adequate representation in class action litigation brought under Rule 23, Fed.R.Civ.P. is whether the plaintiff’s counsel is competent, and whether the interests of the named plaintiffs are not adverse to those of the class. A trial court has the continuing duty to undertake a stringent examination of the adequacy of representation by the named class representatives and their counsel at all stages of the litigation. The class action rule imposes on the trial judge the duty to assure that the interests of the class, including absentee class members, are adequately protected. The requirement of adequate representation, as applied to class action counsel is qualitative and not quantitative; in determining whether class counsel would afford absent class members adequate representation, it is proper to consider resources, and other demanding obligations of class counsel. When a potential conflict arises between the named plaintiffs and the rest of the class, the class attorney must not allow decisions on behalf of the class to rest exclusively with the named plaintiffs; in such a situation the attorney’s duty to the class requires him to point out conflicts to the court. The common thread running through the above cases is the federal judiciary’s overriding concern that each member of the class — named and absentee — is accorded adequate protection. Howard v. McLucas, 87 F.R.D. 704, 705 (M.D.Ga.1980) (Owens, J.) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). See also Griffin, 755 F.2d at 1533 (“The adequate representation requirement [of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) ] involves questions of whether plaintiffs’ counsel are qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the proposed litigation, and of whether plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of the rest of the class.”). Plaintiffs’ lead counsel in this case are partners David R. Sweat and Joseph P. Nelson of Athens, Georgia. They have tried several lawsuits before this judge, and to some extent they specialize in employment law. In this court’s judgment, they have done an excellent job of representing the plaintiffs. The court is especially mindful of their thorough knowledge at trial of the facts of the case and their understanding of the statistical evidence. However, Mr. Sweat and Mr. Nelson were not counsel of record until 1978. See transcript of pretrial conference held May 9, 1978, at 5. The earliest pleading in the file that contains one of their names is the motion for a class action order filed on June 8, 1978. The complaint was filed by attorney J. Hue Henry, and the amended complaint was filed by Mr. Henry and Mr. Kenneth Dious. On October 18, 1979, Jack Greenberg, 0. Peter Sherwood, Clyde E. Murphy, and Patrick 0. Patterson, who are on the staff of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., filed a notice of appearance as additional counsel for plaintiffs. The Legal Defense Fund has an excellent nationwide reputation as experts in the representation of plaintiffs in employment discrimination lawsuits. On June 25, 1982, Mr. Patterson’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel was granted by the court. The proposed pretrial order filed on October 21, 1983, listed five attorneys for the plaintiffs: Mr. Nelson, Mr. Sweat, Mr. Henry, Mr. Dious, and Mr. Murphy. Only Mr. Sweat and Mr. Nelson participated in the trial. Westinghouse contends that the “inordinate” delay in the prosecution of the case shows that the class members are not receiving adequate representation. The EEOC retained jurisdiction over the charge for eight years — from 1969 to 1977 — prior to finding that there was reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred. This delay is attributable solely to the EEOC. The lawsuit was filed in 1977 but was not tried until 1985. This delay was caused by a number of factors, including the complexity of the case, the large volume of personnel files that had to be examined, and the extremely heavy caseload of the court. Although the case may have been tried sooner if Mr. Henry and Mr. Dious had been more aggressive in their discovery in the early stages of the lawsuit, any such delay is not so egregious as to constitute inadequate representation. In addition, the named plaintiffs’ and intervenors’ interests are not antagonistic to the interests of the other class members. D. Rule 23(b)(2) The final hurdle to class certification is the requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) that: “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.” The Eleventh Circuit has noted that subsection (b)(2) is particularly applicable to employment discrimination class actions, Giles v. Ireland, 742 F.2d 1366, 1372 (11th Cir.1984); accord Penson v. Terminal Transport Co., 634 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B). In this court’s judgment, Westinghouse’s actions cause Rule 23(b)(2) to be applicable here. E. Final Class Action Status As explained above, all the prerequisites to class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) are present. Accordingly, this lawsuit may be maintained as a class action whose members are all current and former black employees at Westinghouse’s Newton Bridge Road, Athens, Georgia, facility who were employed at any time after November 20, 1968. VI. Findings of Fact Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the court to “find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon.” The court has divided its findings and conclusions into different categories for easier and clearer reading; however, the court considered all the evidence in determining the “ultimate factual issue” — whether Westinghouse intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs on account of their race. United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1481-82, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). “Ideally findings of fact should be clear, specific, and complete, without unrealistic and uninformative generality on the one hand, and on the other without an unnecessary and unhelpful recital of nonessential details of evidence.” Curtis v. Commissioner, 623 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir.1980) (quoting 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2579 at p. 711 (1971)). The court has thus tried to make a finding on all the important facts. However, the court has not made a finding on every fact that it took into consideration in deciding whether there was a violation of Title VII and section 1981. Accordingly, the parties should keep in mind that the court has considered all the evidence in the case in making its ruling. A. Initial Job Assignment 1. Westinghouse’s Athens facility was built in 1958 to manufacture overhead electrical transformers. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 119. 2. The overhead transformer market is closely related to the economic conditions of the home building industry. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 121. For this reason, demand for the product fluctuates widely and the number of employees working at the Athens facility depends upon market conditions. Peak employment at the Athens facility occurred in 1974. Id. Since 1974, there has been a steady decline in employment. See plaintiffs’ exhibit A-l. 3. The employee work force at the Athens facility is divided into four general categories: hourly bargaining unit, salaried non-exempt unit, professional-technical, and management. 4. The hourly bargaining unit is divided into both occupational groups and labor grades. The labor grades are from one to seventeen, with labor grade one being the lowest paid labor grade and labor grade seventeen being the highest. 5. There are seventeen occupational groups. Each occupational group contains several labor grades. For example, occupational group one contains positions with labor grades of one through five. Defendant’s exhibit 4. 6. The primary author of the job descriptions at Westinghouse was William S. Weber. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 58-59. Mr. Weber was a supervisor in the industrial relations department from 1958 to 1979. Id. at vol. II, p. 57. Mr. Weber’s job descriptions constitute plaintiffs’ exhibit J. 7. Jack E. McClary transferred to Westinghouse’s Athens facility as Personnel Relations Manager in 1965. He has held that position continuously to the present. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 118. 8. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, James Davis, Clay Jennings, or Gerry Flynn had the responsibility of hiring and initial job assignment. 9. The deposition of Mr. Davis was introduced at trial. Mr. Davis was supervisor of industrial relations from 1965 until his departure in 1971. Deposition of Davis at 3-4. 10. Davis testified that while he was in charge of hiring new employees, applicants were required to take the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB). Deposition of Davis at 13. The test was administered by Georgia’s State Employment Service, which later reported the applicants’ scores or a narrative of the score to Westinghouse. Id. at 41. 11. The GATB score was a factor on which Davis relied in making employment decisions. Deposition of Davis at 39. 12. Davis selected the applicants to be interviewed. As a result of the interview with Davis, some applicants were then referred by Davis to the first-shift supervisor of the department in which the vacancy existed. Deposition of Davis at 134. 13. Davis described labor grades one through six as requiring only “generic” qualifications. Deposition of Davis at 8-9 and 13. 14. When more than one applicant possessed the skills necessary for a vacant position, Davis decided who would be hired and where he or she would be placed based on his perception of the person’s attitude during the interviewing process towards the kinds of questions that may be asked that would give me input about his attitude, about previous work that he had done, whatever, to get a feel for is this a person that’s interested in learning and doing the job, being at work regularly, and those kinds of things both we find out through the interview process and where we could find out as much information from prior employment, and you can read some of that in the application itself. Deposition of Davis at 138-39. 15. Clayton D. Jennings replaced Davis in 1971 as supervisor of industrial relations. Trial transcript at vol. Ill, pp. 40 and 48. 16. Jennings was in charge of hiring and initial job assignment of employees from 1971 until late 1973. Trial transcript at 40-41, 48. 17. Jennings’ description of the hiring and initial job assignment process was essentially the same as the one given by Davis. 18. Westinghouse continued to use the GATB scores during the time that Jennings was in charge of hiring and initial job assignment. Trial transcript at vol. Ill, p. 44. Jennings testified that the test scores were used as only one part of the employment process because of the attention throughout the country on the invalidity of the use of test scores. Id. 19. James Gerry Flynn succeeded Jennings in late 1973 as head of interviewing applicants and hiring. It was also his responsibility to assign new employees to vacant positions. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 95. 20. In general, the same procedure for interviewing and initial job assignment was used during Flynn’s tenure. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 116-17. 21. However, Flynn testified that he also devised a scale of one to ten to evaluate applicants. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 92. He indicated the applicant’s rating on the application by, for example, the notation “R-7” if the applicant’s rating was a 7. Id. at vol. II, pp. 91-92. 22. Flynn testified that an applicant’s rating was a subjective decision. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 92. 23. No black employee of Westinghouse had ever taken part in an initial job assignment decision until Conolus Scott became a first-shift supervisor in 1972. Trial transcript at vol. Ill, pp. 14 and 17. 24. Plaintiffs’ revised statistics are set forth in the affidavit of Martin M. Shapiro, the plaintiffs’ statistical expert. 25. Dr. Shapiro compared the initial assignment of employees into labor grades one through four with the initial assignment of employees into labor grades five and above. Affidavit of Shapiro at plaintiffs’ exhibit A-l. 26. That analysis shows that for each of the years 1968 through 1973 there was a statistically significant overrepresentation of blacks in the lower labor grades and, conversely, there was a statistically significant overrepresentation of whites in the higher labor grades. Affidavit of Shapiro at 2 and &t exhibit A-l. 27. In 1974, the comparison of initial assignment of blacks and whites was not statistically significant. Affidavit of Shapiro at 2 and at exhibit A-l. 28. In 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979, and 1980 no blacks were hired, making a statistical analysis impossible. Affidavit of Shapiro at exhibit A-l. 29. In 1977, the initial assignments of black and white employees were exactly proportional. Affidavit of Shapiro at 2 and at exhibit A-l. 30. Westinghouse contended at trial that certain “edge factors,” which were held in greater numbers by white applicants than black applicants, accounted for the disparity in initial job assignments. Trial transcript at vol. Ill, pp. 197-98; defendant’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law at p. 46, 1f 130. 31. To contradict Westinghouse’s contention regarding the edge factors, the plaintiffs introduced the personnel files of various employees to show that the alleged edge factors were not applied uniformly. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 98-99; plaintiffs’ exhibits B and C. 32. The defendant objected to the admission of plaintiffs’ exhibits B and C on the ground that they are judgment samples. 33. Plaintiffs’ exhibits B and C compare the initial job assignment by labor grade of black and white employees hired at the same or approximately the same time. The personnel file for each of those employees is included in the exhibits. It is thus possible to determine whether the white employees possessed any such edge factor to possibly account for his or her higher labor grade assignment. 34. After carefully reviewing plaintiffs’ exhibits B and C, it is clear that white employees were assigned to higher labor grades than black employees hired the same or nearly the same time, even though the white employees’ personnel files revealed no edge factor that could possibly account for the difference in initial assignments. 35. In addition, the plaintiffs established that previous industrial experience or further education (which defendant claims are edge factors) were not required for positions in many of the labor grades. 36. Westinghouse’s reliance on these edge factors — which it claims are held in greater numbers by white applicants than black applicants — knowing that the alleged edge factors were not necessary or even helpful for the labor grade jobs in question, shows that the edge-factor explanation is merely a pretext for discrimination. 37. Westinghouse also contends the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence regarding initial job assignment is flawed because the analysis included craft, nonfungible positions that require skills not possessed or readily acquired by applicants. See defendant’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law at pp. 123-24, 1165. 38. Mr. Weber, the author of the job descriptions for all the hourly employee positions, testified that only a few of the positions with a labor grade of ten or below required prior specific work experience or specific vocational training. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 58-68. 39. Furthermore, Westinghouse’s own data shows that there are statistically significant differences in initial labor grade assignments between black and white employees. Contrary to Dr. Siskin’s testimony at trial, these results are not restricted to janitors and sweepers in labor grade one. Dr. Siskin’s computer printout labeled J458 shows that initial labor grade assignments into labor grades two through six (excluding labor grade one and all labor grades above six) have a statistically significant impact upon black employees. Affidavit of Shapiro at 17-18. 40. Dr. Siskin conceded at trial that the statistics established that black employees were discriminatorily assigned to the janitor position in occupational group one. Trial transcript at vol. IV, pp. 19-20. 41. A number of Dr. Siskin’s documents are misleading, distorted, or incomplete. 42. The court had the opportunity to observe Dr. Siskin testify over a two-day period. In particular, the court has observed his demeanor on the stand. Based on these observations, the court must conclude that Dr. Siskin is not a credible witness. 43. The court was so disturbed by Dr. Siskin’s testimony that it directed him (as well as plaintiffs’ expert witness, Dr. Shapiro) to submit all studies he had done that were in any way unfavorable to his client. Trial transcript at vol. IY, pp. 57-58. Computer printout number J458 was among the studies submitted at the request of the court. See finding of fact number 39. 44. The court also asked both expert witnesses to submit affidavits setting forth the amount of money they charged their respective clients. 45. Dr. Shapiro stated in his affidavit that he intended to bill the plaintiffs $9,875.00 total. Affidavit of Shapiro at 18. By comparison, Westinghouse paid Dr. Sis-kin $253,416.58. Affidavit of Siskin. 46. Of course, expert witnesses are almost always paid for their testimony. However, because Dr. Siskin’s fee was so high in comparison to Dr. Shapiro’s, it is obvious that Dr. Siskin has a greater financial interest in this litigation and, correspondingly, is less credible as a witness. 47. In addition to their statistical evidence, plaintiffs presented credible direct evidence of discrimination in initial job assignments. 48. Plaintiffs, showed that from 1969 until 1974 the applications for hourly and nonexempt salaried positions were racially coded by placing a circle in the lower left-hand corner of the front page of the applications of black applicants. 49. McClary maintained that the practice of racial coding was instituted solely to obtain information for EEO purposes. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 8-9. In the court’s best judgment, his testimony on racial coding is not credible. 50. Annie Louise Smith, a black female, filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC against Westinghouse. McClary, who handled the investigation for Westinghouse, had no explanation as to why the racial coding on her application had been whited out. Plaintiffs’ exhibit D at § I, pp. 6-8 (personnel file of Ms. Smith); trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 9-11. 51. Flynn was also unable to explain why the circle on Smith’s application had been covered over. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 77-78. 52. If the racial coding had been done for legitimate EEO purposes, Westinghouse would have had no reason to cover up the circle on Smith’s application. 53. By simply looking at the front of an application, the hiring supervisor could determine the applicant’s race. In the court’s judgment, Westinghouse used the racially coded information in a discriminatory fashion with regard to initial job assignment. 54. Someone wrote the word “white” on the upper lefthand corner of the employment application of Tommy Huff. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 79-80. Although someone has attempted to erase the word “white,” it is still legible. Id. at 79; plaintiffs' exhibit D at § I, p. 10 (application of Mr. Huff). 55. The plaintiffs also produced direct evidence of discrimination in the form of written comments by Flynn on several employment applications. See infra findings of fact numbers 56-64. 56. Flynn wrote the following comment on Irene Perrin’s application: “very impressive for a black clerical applicant.” Plaintiffs’ exhibit D at § I, p. 23. He also noted that Ms. Perrin “finished school in 11 years — ‘A’ student throughout school — ‘B’ [student] senior year (integrated with white school) but among top 25 of class.” Id. at 22. 57. Flynn testified that he was unsure as to whether the remarks written on Ms. Perrin’s personnel file were volunteered by Ms. Perrin or whether it was his own explanation of the decline in her grades. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 86. 58. Irene Perrin Fortson testified more credibly that she did not discuss the information contained in the note with her interviewer. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 23-24. The conclusion that the integration of the high school she attended affected her grades must have been Flynn’s own conclusion. 59. Flynn had no explanation for the note in his handwriting on the back of the application of Robert Willingham, whom he interviewed on March 13, 1974, which said “appearances O.K.; manner — conducts himself better than most blacks, refers to elders as ‘Mr.’ and those in authority as ‘Mr.’; has been very persistent. Per chief, no record.” Plaintiffs’ exhibit D at § I, p. 33 (personnel file of Mr. Willingham); trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 90-91. 60. There was also no explanation as to why the personnel file of Willie Beck contained a copy of an EEOC charge that Beck had filed against a subsequent employer after his employment relationship with Westinghouse had terminated. Plaintiffs’ exhibit D at § I, pp. 17-18. 61. Beck’s personnel file also contained an unprocessed application for reemployment dated April 22, 1974, as well as a newspaper article from the Athens Observer, dated February 14, 1974, concerning Beck’s charge against the Georgia Power Company. Plaintiffs’ exhibit D at § I, pp. 19-20. 62. Flynn conceded that he wrote on the personnel file of Willie Randolph, “seems like a practical person, mature attitude, concerned about his future, seems to have higher than average standards for black man.” Plaintiffs’ exhibit D at § I, p. 27; trial transcript at vol. II, p. 86-87. 63. When asked what he meant by his comment “seems to have higher than average standards for black man,” Flynn replied: Well, I think here again, I was impressed with him. I think he impressed me as being a probably more suitable candidate for employment than most of the blacks who came in to apply. ... I think it indicates that I had made an observation that among the applicants who came in to apply, that there weren’t a lot of blacks who seemed to be good candidates for employment. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 87-88. 64. Flynn was similarly unable to explain precisely what he meant by the phrase “impressive for black candidate” written by him on the back of the personnel application of George C. Bell. Plaintiffs’ exhibit D at § I, p. 30; trial transcript at vol. II, p. 90. 65. The court must conclude that these notations were indicative of racially stereotypical views held by Flynn at the time they were written. 65a. The plaintiffs have proved the ultimate issue — that Westinghouse intentionally discriminated against blacks in making initial job assignments. B. Upgrading within the Hourly Unit 66. The employees in the hourly bargaining unit are represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 123. 67. The upgrading of employees within the hourly bargaining unit was governed by Article XX of the collective bargaining agreements in effect during the years in question. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 123; defendant’s exhibit 5 at Article XX; defendant’s exhibit 6. 68. The procedure to fill vacancies within the hourly workforce was changed in 1973, so there are two different procedures (one in effect prior to 1973 and one in effect in 1973 and afterwards) relevant to this claim. 69. Prior to 1973, persons within the occupational group in which a vacancy occurred were considered automatically in order of seniority. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 124-25. 70. At that time the employees were not required to submit a bid for the particular job. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 124. 71. Instead, prior to 1973, employees in the occupational group where the vacancy occurred were automatically considered if they were in a lower labor grade than the labor grade of the vacant position. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 124-25. 72. Employees in other occupational groups would be considered for the opening only after eligible employees in the same group were disqualified or declined the job. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 125. 73. Beginning in 1973, all employees were required to have a current bid on file to be considered for an opening. Defendant’s exhibits 5 and 6; trial transcript at vol. II, p. 125. 74. To submit a bid for a promotion or transfer, the employee had to obtain a bid slip from his own foreman, complete the form, and return it to the foreman for comments. It was then the foreman’s duty to see that the bid slip was submitted to the personnel office. Deposition of Flynn at 42. 75. The bidding procedure is referred to as “prevacancy bidding.” Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 127. 76. In 1973 and afterwards, the only employees considered for a particular opening were those whose bid for that position had been received by the personnel office prior to the personnel office’s receipt of a requisition for an employee to fill an opening. Defendant’s exhibits 5 and 6. 77. Employees could file new bids beginning on November 1 of each year and those bids were valid until December of the following year. 78. Thus, the personnel office had to have an employee’s current bid on file as a prerequisite to considering that employee for an opening. 79. However, an employee could not file a valid bid until he or she had reached standard rate on their present job. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 126; vol. Ill, p. 45. 80. After receiving a requisition for an opening, the supervisor of personnel sent to the supervisor of the section in which the vacant position occurred a list of employees that could be considered for the opening. Trial transcript at vol. Ill, p. 47. 81. Even after 1973, employees in the occupational group where the vacancy occurred were listed ahead of other employees. Defendant’s exhibits 4 and 5. 82. There is no dispute that the seniority system did not have its genesis in racial discrimination and was not designed with any intent to discriminate against blacks. Trial transcript at vol. Ill, p. 64. 83. In addition, the system has not been maintained for a discriminatory purpose. C. Promotions from Hourly to Salaried 84. Plaintiffs contend that Westinghouse discriminated against blacks in promotions from the hourly bargaining unit into the salaried non-exempt unit. 85. The salariéd non-exempt employees at the Athens plant are represented by an affiliate of the Federation of Westinghouse Independent Salaried Unions and have been covered by collective bargaining agreements. Trial transcript at vol. II, p. 122. However, Westinghouse does not contend that these agreements are seniority systems. 86. When an opening occurs in the salaried unit, employees already in the salaried unit are considered first. Trial transcript at vol. I, p. 206. 87. If the opening is filled by someone already in the salaried unit, the position formerly held by the promoted employee then becomes open. 88. So, eventually, an hourly employee can fill the other opening in the salaried unit. Trial transcript at vol. I, pp. 206-07. Mr. McClary (the personnel relations manager) testified that openings in the salaried unit were usually filled in this manner. Id. at vol. I, p. 207. 89. Hourly employees could bid on jobs in the salaried unit; however, those bids are different than the bids submitted for positions in the hourly unit. 90. Bids for positions in the salaried unit are simply an indication of the employee’s interest in a position; they have no contractual significance. Trial transcript at vol. I, p. 208 and vol. II, pp. 3-4. 91. Having a bid on file is not a prerequisite to being considered for an opening. Trial transcript at vol. I, p. 208. 92. The supervisor of the department where the vacancy occurs has the primary responsibility for the selection decision. Trial transcript at vol. I, p. 208; deposition of McClary dated November 9, 1979, at 61. 93. Until 1972, none of the supervisors were black. Plaintiffs’ exhibit E. Thus, the decision of who would be promoted was made by whites. 94. The supervisors relied in part on a confidential rating sheet in making their decisions. Trial transcript at vol. I, pp. 209-10. The rating sheet was completed by the employee's immediate foreman. Id. The employee’s test scores were included on the rating sheet. Id. 95. In 1972, Westinghouse discontinued administering the test to applicants; however, the test scores were not removed from the files of employees who had previously been required to take the test. Trial transcript at vol. I, p. 212. 96. The plaintiffs’ statistical evidence consists of plaintiffs’ exhibits A-5 through A-8 (as amended), which are attached to the affidavit of Dr. Shapiro. 97. All four of these exhibits compare the progress of black and white hourly employees who were initially assigned to the same labor grade. Plaintiffs’ exhibit A-5 compares white and black employees hired in 1970 and initially assigned to labor grades four, five, and six. Plaintiffs’ exhibit A-6 makes the same comparison for the year 1971; plaintiffs’ exhibit A-7 is for 1972; and plaintiffs’ exhibit A-8 is for 1973. 98. Plaintiffs’ exhibit A-5 shows that for these cohort groups whites advanced more rapidly during the period 1971 through 1980. See Affidavit of Shapiro at 6-7. Plaintiffs’ exhibits A-6, A-7, and A-8 show the same pattern as A-5. See Affidavit of Shapiro at 7-9. 99. The plaintiffs also presented anecdotal testimony by eight employees or former employees of Westinghouse. See findings of fact numbers 111-18 (testimony of Goss); 119-24 (testimony of Ellison); 125-29 (testimony of James); 136-44 (testimony of Stevens); 145-50 (testimony of Stephens); 151-56 (testimony of Calloway); 183-86 (testimony of Butler); 187-92 (testimony of Fortson). 100. In this court’s judgment the plaintiff class has proved that Westinghouse intentionally discriminated against blacks in promoting employees from the hourly unit to the salaried unit. D. Promotions to Supervisor 101. Next, the plaintiffs contend that Westinghouse discriminated against blacks in the selection of supervisors. 102. Supervisors were selected by the manager of the area in which the vacancy occurred. Deposition of McClary dated Mar. 7, 1979, at 37-39; deposition of McClary dated Nov. 9, 1979, at 73-76. 103. If the employee had acted as a substitute or fill-in supervisor in the past, the manager took into consideration the employee’s performance while serving in that capacity. Trial transcript at vol. II, pp. 5-6. 104. The GATB test scores were also considered. Trial transcript at vol. I, pp. 211-12. 105. The plaintiffs’ evidence consists primarily of Westinghouse’s EEO-1 reports. See plaintiffs’ exhibit E. 106. Those reports show that there were no black supervisors or managers at Westinghouse until 1972. Plaintiffs’ exhibit E. 107. In 1972, Conolus Scott and Joseph Hester were made supervisors in the same week. Trial transcript at vol. Ill, p. 12. 107a. Westinghouse’s expert witness, Dr. Siskin, conceded that race did play a role in the selection of supervisors up until 1972. Trial transcript at vol. Ill, pp. 172-73. He testified that until 1972, the probability that a black would be promoted to supervisor was zero. Id. at 173. 108. All the managers who decided who would receive the supervisory positions were white. 109. The decision was a totally subjective one. Deposition of McClary dated Nov. 9, 1979, at 74-77. 110. The plaintiffs also presented anecdotal testimony about promotions to supervisor. See findings of fact numbers 119-24 (testimony of Ellison), 136-44 (testimony of Stevens), 145-50 (testimony of Stephens), and 171-82 (testimony of Culbreath). E-. Anecdotal Testimony on Promotions William Goss 111. William Goss testified that he was hired in 1965 as a sweeper/janitor in labor grade one. Trial transcript at vol. I, p. 84. 112. He is still employed by Westinghouse, now as an insulation cutter in labor grade seven. Id. 113. In 1970, he was disqualified for a moldmaker position (labor grade ten) because he could not read a blueprint. Id. at 84-85. He says the white supervisor did not give him enough time to be able to read the blueprint. Id. at vol. I, p. 85. 114. He testified that a white employee (Howard Minish) was placed in the mold-maker opening. Id. at vol. I, p. 86. However, Minish held that position for only a short time and was then succeeded by a black (Willie Gatlin). Id. at vol. I, p. 92. 115. Goss testified that at the time the moldmaker opening occurred, when a position within an occupational group became open, Westinghouse had to first look within that occupational group for a replacement. Id. at vol. I, pp. 91-92. He further testified that that was how he was approached about the moldmaker opening. Id. at vol. I, p. 92. 116. In the early 1970s, Goss bid on two salaried positions (dispatcher and quality control). Id. at vol. I, pp. 86-87. White employees received both those promotions. Id. at vol. I, p. 88. 117. Goss stated that he had been offered a position as a maintenance mechanic, which required participation in a training program. Id. at vol. I, pp. 88, 98-99. He declined the offer because he could not afford the temporary cut in pay. Id. 118. He does not think Westinghouse’s bid system is unfair. Id. at vol. I, p. 95. Isaiah Ellison 119. Plaintiff-intervenor Isaiah Ellison was hired in 1971 as a tank line helper in labor grade one. Trial transcript at vol. I, pp. 104, 110. He is no longer employed at Westinghouse. Id. at vol. I, p. 104. 120. He testified that he bid for positions in quality control, traffic control, the salvage department as an accounting clerk, and as an inspector, but did not receive those positions. Id. at vol. I, p. 105. 121. He did receive four other promotions for which he submitted bids. Id. at vol. I, pp. 110-11. 122. He also voiced a desire to be a foreman. Id. at vol. I, p. 105. 123. He was acting foreman in the preliminary assembly section, but when a foreman opening occurred, a white employee (Don Pittard) was promoted instead. Id. at vol. I, p. 106. 124. He testified that Gerry Flynn offered him a foreman position on third shift, but he declined the offer because the third shift conflicted with his class schedule at the University of Georgia. Id. at vol. I, pp. 108, 112. Willie James 125. Willie James, who is presently employed by Westinghouse in tool and die setup at labor grade ten, testified about his experience in bidding for salaried positions. 126. James was initially assigned the position of punch press operator (labor grade six). Trial transcript at vol. I, p. 118. . 127. He bid on several salaried-unit jobs, including production dispatcher and inspector. Id. at vol. I, p. 127. 128. He says that whites with less seniority received most of the promotions he applied for. Id. at vol. I, p. 120. 129. He testified that he acted as fill-in supervisor and trained some of the whites who received the promotions. Id. at vol. I, pp. 120-22. Jimmy Byrd 130. Plaintiff-intervenor Jimmy Byrd is presently employed at Westinghouse as a maintenance mechanic in labor grade fifteen. Trial transcript at vol. I, p. 132. 131. He was hired in 1969 and initially assigned the position of tank line machine operator in labor grade six. Id. 132. Byrd testified that he believes he was discriminated against in his initial job assignment; he contends he should have started in labor grade seven instead of labor grade six. Id. at vol. I, pp. 132, 136. 133. He also testified that he was discriminated against in 1972 when he was denied participation in the maintenance training program. Id. at vol. I, pp. 134-35. White employees received that upgrading. Id. 134. The next year (1973) he applied again — this time successfully — for an opening in the maintenance training program. Id. 135. Byrd testified that he eventually received every position that he sought at Westinghouse. Id. at vol. I, p. 141. Captain Dozier Stevens 136. Captain Dozier Stevens was hired by Westinghouse in 1970. Trial transcript at vol. I, p. 144, 149. He is still employed there. Id. at vol. I, p. 151. 137. He was initially assigned to a building job in core coil assembly at labor grade six. Id. at vol. I, pp. 144, 149. 138. In 1974, he submitted a bid to his supervisor for an inspector’s position in the salaried unit. Id. at vol. I, pp. 144-45. However, his supervisor threw the bid into the trash can. Id. 139. As to his super