Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OBERDORFER, District Judge. The Settlement Agreement On April 9,1986, the parties to this litigation entered into a Settlement Agreement whereby defendant Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (“Lockheed”) paid into the Court Registry the sum of $10,000,000 in purported settlement of all claims arising out of the crash of the Lockheed C-5A aircraft in Saigon in 1975. Settlement Agreement at II2 (filed under seal April 11, 1986, unsealed April 22, 1986). The terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement are subject to approval by the Court after notice and hearing. Id. at ¶ 3. The Settlement Agreement further contemplates that the Court will adopt a distribution plan after considering the applications of all potential participants in the Settlement Fund. Id. at ÍI 7. The Settlement Agreement leaves the distribution of the Settlement Fund to the discretion of the Court with the understanding that any portion of the Settlement Fund not distributed will revert to Lockheed. The contemplated hearing was held on August 4, 1986. No objection was raised to the amount or terms of the Settlement Agreement. Moreover, the Court has independently reviewed the Settlement Agreement and finds it reasonable. This is not a class action. Nevertheless, it is analogous in that it settles numerous similar claims of similarly-situated plaintiffs. Accordingly, the factors relating to approval .of class action settlements provide appropriate criteria for appraisal of this settlement. These factors include the complexity and nature of the litigation, the stage of proceedings when settlement was offered and the degree of completed discovery, the likelihood of plaintiffs’ establishing the requisite elements of liability and damages, the plaintiffs’ reaction to the settlement, the risks attendant to trial, and the ability of defendant to absorb a larger recovery. Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission of the City and County of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217, 103 S.Ct. 1219, 75 L.Ed.2d 456 (1983); In re National Student Marketing Litigation, 68 F.R.D. 151, 155 (D.D.C.1974). In the ordinary class action setting, the court’s primary purpose in reviewing a proposed settlement agreement is to protect the rights of absent class members who were not involved in the negotiations leading to settlement. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 643 F.2d 195, 225 (5th Cir.1981). There is no need for “the court to act in a fiduciary role” to protect the defendant who negotiates a settlement. Id. Nevertheless, in light of the public context of this litigation, the recent concern about the “lawsuit crisis” and the effect of the litigation on defendants and their insurers, this review will address the fairness of the settlement as a whole, as it affects both parties and the public. This litigation has been extraordinarily complex and prolonged. Civil Action No. 75-0874 was filed in 1975 in this Court by Friends For All Children, Inc. (“FFAC”) as Special Administrator and assigned to then Chief Judge William B. Jones. The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages from Lockheed for the estates and next-of-kin of 76 children who were in FFAC’s custody and were killed in the April 4, 1975 crash of a C-5A aircraft, manufactured and designed by Lockheed. Thereafter, Lockheed filed a third-party complaint against the United States. On November 5, 1975, in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Saigon, South Vietnam, on April J, 1975, 404 F.Supp. 478, the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation transferred a number of other civil actions on behalf of a number of United States citizens who were killed and injured in the April 4, 1975 C-5A crash to Judge Jones for consolidated discovery and pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. The United States citizen plaintiffs were represented by a number of attorneys led by the firm of Cole and Groner appointed by Judge Jones. The firm of Lewis, Wilson, Lewis & Jones, Ltd. was counsel for FFAC as the legal representative of the surviving infants and the estates of the deceased. In all of these cases there has been exhaustive discovery. Between 1975 and 1979 discovery focused on the liability and punitive damages issues. By 1979, most of the United States citizen cases were settled. In 1979, there was a stipulation in the survivors’ cases brought by FFAC by which the survivors abandoned their punitive damages claim and defendant agreed not to contest its liability to anyone injured. From 1979 through 1984 almost all of the discovery and litigation related to the survivors’ cases, specifically whether the crash injured the survivors and, if so, to what extent. Before 1979, the decedents’ cases were the subject of a number of appeals and mandamus proceedings before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. By Order entered May 1, 1978, this Court ruled provisionally that District of Columbia law would govern the litigation, and that FFAC was qualified under District of Columbia law to bring this litigation as a “legal representative” of the 76 deceased children. By Order entered February 23, 1979, for reasons stated in a Memorandum filed April 12, 1979, this Court denied Lockheed’s renewed motion for summary judgment, and appointed Charles R. Work, Esq., and his law firm as guardians ad litem for the interests of infant beneficiaries of the decedents’ estates. On March 29,1979, Lockheed filed a petition for writ of mandamus and sought, and on April 9, 1979, obtained, a stay of further proceedings. By ' Order entered August 7, 1979, however, the Court of Appeals denied Lockheed’s petition for mandamus and vacated the April 9, 1979 stay order, but has never finally ruled on the merits of defendant’s challenge to FFAC’s standing as a plaintiff. Thereafter, attention focused on the survivors’ cases and the decedents’ claims lay dormant until the survivors’ claims were resolved. In 1982, after several trials of the cases brought on behalf of surviving plaintiffs adopted by United States parents, defendant paid in settlement $13,500,000 which yielded approximately $125,000 to each of 45 plaintiffs and, upon exhaustion of these and other family resources, an opportunity to draw funds from a trust originally funded with $2,250,000 for a serious medical emergency. In addition, seven individual cases were settled for amounts ranging from $125,000 to $1,000,000 for a total of $4,078,000. After two more trials the cases brought by 76 surviving plaintiffs who had been adopted by parents in foreign countries were settled in 1984 for $17,-800,000. This settlement yielded between $200,000 and $312,000 to each foreign plaintiff whose case had been tried or prepared for trial and $84,673 for each of the other plaintiffs plus access to the proceeds of a trust originally funded with $2,925,000 for supplementary medical and educational services. For their services in the survivors’ cases and the recovery of $31,300,000 for their clients, plaintiffs’ counsel and guardians ad litem received approximately $11,780,000 in fees, and more than $4,111,000 as reimbursement for expenses incurred in the prosecution of the survivors’ cases over the vigorous defenses mounted by Lockheed and the government. Decision on the fee and expense claims of counsel and the guardians ad litem in the survovors’ cases required the services of Harry Huge, Esq., and Duane Vieth, Esq., as Special Masters. In 1984, after the survivors’ cases were settled, discovery reopened in the decedents’ cases. For example, 72 additional discovery depositions were taken (with transcripts totaling more than 3,400 pages). On December 18, 1985, this Court entered judgment in favor of Lockheed with respect to the claims filed by FFAC on behalf of estates of 74 of the deceased children. An accompanying memorandum noted that information gathered by the guardians ad litem “reveals that of the 76 decedents only Giang Thi Ngoc Diep and Hguyen Kim Hoa have any natural relative in the United States.” Memorandum at 4 (filed Dec. 18, 1985) (“December 18 Memorandum”) (citing Report of the Guardian Ad Litem to be Filed Under Seal Pursuant to this Court’s November 19,1985 Order (filed Dec. 6, 1985)). Finding that there was no legal authority for prospective adoptive parents to inherit from a prospective adoptive child, the Court dismissed their claims. Plaintiffs’ counsel then filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals. This appeal on behalf of the 74 deceased infants with no known natural relatives was unresolved at the time that the present Settlement Agreement was reached. At the same time that the Court dismissed the claims on behalf of the 74 deceased children without identified blood relatives, this Court denied Lockheed’s renewed motion for summary judgment with respect to claims regarding the other two deceased children: one filed by FFAC and Willie A. Powell on behalf of the estate of Giang Thi Ngoc Diep, deceased; the other filed by FFAC and Terry Selzer as next friend of Nga Selzer on behalf of the estate of Nguyen Kim Hoa, deceased. The Powell case was scheduled for trial on April 2, 1986. On March 26, 1986, the Court dismissed Lockheed’s third-party complaint against the United States because it more appropriately lies in the United States Claims Court. Order (filed March 26, 1986). Meanwhile, on February 13, 1986, counsel filed a Joint Motion Requesting the Court to Direct the Parties to Confer with a Judge of this Court Designated as a Settlement Judge. The motion requested the designation of Judge Joyce Hens Green who had successfully presided over the settlement of the multiple claims arising out of the Air Florida crash, In re Air Crash Disaster in Washington, D. C. on Jan. 13, 1982, 559 F.Supp. 333 (D.D.C.1983), and had also participated importantly in the settlement of the phase of the Lockheed cases involving the foreign survivors. Counsel suggested that it would be inappropriate for the trial judge to become intimately involved with the offers and demands of the parties on the eve of trial and agreed to treat the settlement discussions confidentially. Judge Green graciously accepted the designation and met with counsel over several weeks. Although she proposed a settlement figure after hearing the views and proposals of the parties, her proposal was not agreed to in the time allotted for negotiation and the case reverted to the trial judge. Settlement negotiations continued as the trial date approached, and during the trial, without disclosure to the trial judge of any of the amounts proposed either by the parties or by Judge Green. On April 2,1986, following completion of discovery, a jury was selected to try the Powell case, and plaintiffs’ counsel presented the testimony of several witnesses. On April 9, 1986, counsel interrupted plaintiff’s affirmative case, completed their negotiations and executed the present Settlement Agreement, all with the active assistance of the trial court. The Agreement, filed on April 11, 1986, was intended to settle all of the decedents’ cases for what the trial court now understands is an amount approaching, but less than, that proposed by Judge Green. Obviously risks attend any trial and, because of the complexity of this one, it is not clear how the jury would have decided. Nevertheless, it was apparent that at the time the trial adjourned the jury appeared sympathetic to plaintiff Powell, and that plaintiffs’ counsel were making good on their proffer of evidence to support the punitive damage claim. For example, according to the pretrial brief, to minimize cost, Lockheed had used an aluminum alloy instead of steel in the bellcrank which operated the door which failed in flight. The pretrial brief proffered, among other things, an outline of the testimony of Dr. Malcolm Newman. The brief identified Dr. Newman as an expert in mechanical engineering who had “served in a wide range of duties in academic university appointments and corporate consulting and management.” Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief at 1-30 (filed Jan. 14, 1986). Dr. Newman was proffered to testify that the C-5A original design was a grossly defective scale-up of a smaller aircraft C-141, that the original designs of the lock systems of the door that failed and the routing of the hydraulic systems were “defective, negligent and extremely hazardous” and were “likely to fail,” and that Lockheed was aware of these problems. Id. at 1-30, 1-32. Dr. Newman was the last witness to testify before the parties joined in a motion to continue the case in order to complete and consummate the settlement. Transcript of Proceedings (Tr.) 4/4 at 586-613 (filed April 30, 1986). Dr. Newman’s testimony, as far as it went, was entirely consistent with the proffer of it in the Pretrial Brief. In addition to evidence to rebut plaintiffs’ evidence of liability and reckless conduct, Lockheed’s pretrial briefs relied on the government contractor defense. See Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1985); In re Aircrash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, Schoenbom v. Boeing Company, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed.2d 891 (1986); Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591 (7th Cir.1985); Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 72, 88 L.Ed.2d 59 (1985); McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043, 104 S.Ct. 711, 79 L.Ed.2d 175 (1984); In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 534 F.Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y.1982). This defense can provide government contractors with total immunity from suit if certain conditions are met. Courts in different circuits have defined the defense with varying degrees of strictness. Compare Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir.1986) with Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740-41 (11th Cir.1985). Our Circuit has not yet defined the defense. To employ the defense, a government contractor must prove that: (1) the government issued specifications for the item at issue or reviewed and approved a reasonably precise set of specifications; (2) the product conformed to the specifications; and (3) the government had knowledge of the product’s hazards equal to or greater than the contractor. Mannheim, supra, 769 F.2d at 121. The third prong of the test imposes a duty on the contractor to warn the government of any dangers or patent defects not known by the government. Koutsoubos, supra, 755 F.2d at 355; McKay, supra, 704 F.2d at 451. As to the first requirement, there is no firm rule as to what constitutes “reasonably precise” specifications and what constitutes government approval. A “continuous series of negotiations” between the contractor and the government, Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 122, or a “continuous back-and-forth” between the contractor and the government, Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355, may be enough. A decision by the Fourth Circuit after settlement of this case embraced the lenient standard, holding that “the defense will be permitted to a participating contractor so long as government approval of design ‘consists of more than a mere rubber stamp.’ ” Tozer, supra, 792 F.2d at 408 (quoting Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 122). The government contractor defense mounted by Lockheed was thus potentially formidable. The Court had denied plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defense and in fact structured trial so that, at the close of plaintiffs’ case, defendant would have first presented its government contractor defense and received a special jury verdict before being required to continue with the remainder of its defense. Despite the applicability of the defense in the abstract, however, Lockheed’s invocation of it was vulnerable to plaintiffs’ proffer of proof of fraud. According to plaintiffs’ proffer: Lockheed is liable to plaintiffs under each of these theories for designing and building a grossly defective fleet of aircraft, the C-5A, and failing to correct the known and obvious defects. Lockheed was aware that this fleet was designed to operate at the order of the President of the United States as an instrument of national policy. Over a span of several years Lockheed consciously and. repeatedly engaged the Air Force in a business relationship in which the Air Force was defrauded. In doing so, Lockheed gained substantial profits. At a time of national need, President Ford ordered a C-5A to airlift out of Vietnam 228 orphan children, many of them the children of American servicemen. Lockheed was aware at the time that the C-5A had had numerous occurrences of door failures and that its design made a crash likely. Numerous documents exist which amply prove Lockheed’s knowledge of the danger to any passenger or crew member flying in the C-5A. Lockheed failed to fulfill its contractual and citizenship obligations to the Air Force and .the American people. Lockheed not only failed to alert the Air Force, it actively concealed from the government the dangers associated with continued operation of the C-5A. Lockheed’s failure of its duties was motivated at all times by conscious self-interest, in conscious disregard of the rights of others. Plaintiffs’ Pretrial Brief at IV-I — IV-2. Even the recent cases applying the government contractor defense liberally have adhered to the view that a contractor must warn the government of known defects in the product. Tozer, supra, 792 F.2d at 408; McKay, supra, 704 F.2d at 451. Thus, plaintiffs’ proffer of evidence of fraud, could, if proven, have defeated Lockheed’s defense. In addition, the situation presented in this case differed from a situation where the government contractor defense is clearly applicable because here the individuals killed were civilian infants, not military personnel or government employees. Thus, some of the justifications for the doctrine would not apply. The government contractor defense grows from the principles established in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), and Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 97 S.Ct. 2054, 52 L.Ed.2d 665 (1977), whereby the government is immune from compensating for injuries incurred by servicemen in the course of their military service. The Court in Tozer noted, as two rationales for its decision to apply the government contractor defense to the situation before it: The disallowance of recovery in these actions will not leave servicemen or their survivors without relief. The Veterans’ Benefits Act “provides a swift, efficient remedy for the injured serviceman.” Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673, 97 S.Ct. at 2058. Thus one classic rationale for tort liability — that of compensation of victims — is less compelling in this context____ Forcing military mishaps into the mold of products liability litigation carries one final drawback. Pilots of the Navy and Air Force, whose service and sacrifice make possible the security of this country, are not the military doubles of civilian motorists. Their lives are led in the company of peril. Tozer, supra, 792 F.2d at 407. In sum, the evidence as it was proffered and as it developed during the first three days of trial indicated that plaintiff Powell had a reasonable likelihood of recovering a substantial sum from Lockheed in compensatory and punitive damages. Moreover, the same evidence adduced by plaintiff Powell would have been available to plaintiff Selzer. Although courts and commentators have struggled with the problem of multiple punitive damage awards against one defendant for the same wrongful act, no clear solution has developed. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir.1967); Fraud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill.App.3d 654, 63 Ill.Dec. 261, 264-65, 437 N.E.2d 910, 913-14 (1982), reversed on other grounds, 98 Ill.2d 324, 74 Ill.Dec. 629, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437, 459-60 (1980); J.D. Ghiardi & J.J. Kircher, Punitive Damages, § 5.40-5.47 (1984); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich.L.Rev. 1257, 1322-25 (1976); Rheingold, The MER/29 Story — An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 Calif.L.Rev. 116, 136 (1968); Comment, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 Hastings L.J. 1797 (1979). Lockheed thus faced the clear threat of substantial compensatory and punitive damages recoveries by both plaintiffs Powell and Selzer. In addition, although the claims on behalf of the other 74 plaintiffs for both compensatory and punitive damages had been dismissed by the December 18 Memorandum, the dismissal was not final in that plaintiffs’ appeal of the dismissal was pending at the time of the settlement. Lockheed thus had no assurance that the Court of Appeals would affirm the summary judgment dismissing the 74 additional claims by putative adoptive parents. Because of the uncertain state of the appeal of the dismissal of those plaintiffs’ damages claims, viewing some fraction of the $10,000,000 payment as in settlement of these claims is also reasonable. Moreover, in dismissing the 74 claims, the Court noted that there was “no presently apparent reason” why any punitive damages awarded in the Powell or Selzer cases could not be shared by the dismissed plaintiffs. December 18 Memorandum at 10. Thus, notwithstanding the dismissal of claims on behalf of the 74 additional plaintiffs, individuals whose claims were dismissed had some expectation of possible future compensatory and/or punitive damage awards, based upon the possibility that the Court of Appeals might reverse this Court’s December 18 ruling and reinstate their claim for compensatory damages, and the possibility that even if the December 18 dismissal remained intact, they would share in a Powell/Selzer punitive damages recovery. Accordingly, the Agreement may fairly be interpreted as offering consideration for the execution of releases by the 74 individuals who had been dismissed, but whose claims still flickered in the Court of Appeals. Another consideration regarding Lockheed’s potential liability is that until shortly before trial, Lockheed’s claim over against the government remained pending. Under an agreement with Lockheed, the government agreed to pay 65 percent of any judgment against Lockheed. Agreement at § 3(1) (filed under seal August 24, 1976, unsealed April 29, 1986). However, the dismissal of Lockheed’s claim over left it exposed to the risk that it might have to pay the entire amount of any possible judgment. Although Lockheed could have appealed the dismissal, or could have pursued, and may still pursue, its contract action in the Claims Court, the outcome of either of these actions was, and is, uncertain. The uncertainty was increased by the fact that the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, does not waive the government’s sovereign immunity regarding punitive damage awards. Consequently, despite the contract terms, the government may not have been obligated to contribute to any punitive damage awards against Lockheed. Lockheed’s corporate liability was further uncertain because its insurance carrier may well have refused to pay any punitive damages award, depending on the terms of the contract between Lockheed and its insurer. J.D. Ghiardi & J.J. Kircher, supra, at § 7.10. In fact, such insurance may be against public policy. See Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Title Guarantee Co., 520 F.2d 1170, 1175 (D.C.Cir.1975); Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.1962); Salus Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 478 A.2d 1067, 1070-71 (D.C.1984). In this regard, the large settlement amount reflects compromise primarily of claims that may not have been covered by insurance, even though the settlement itself may be. Here, both parties were represented by .able counsel with ten years of familiarity with the issues of the litigation. The figure they agreed upon apparently bears a significant relationship to the amount proposed by Judge Green as a settlement figure on the eve of trial when both parties had the fullest opportunity to appraise and state the essence of their claims and defenses. Moreover, these counsel and the sophisticated defendants were well able to assess the risks inherent in going to trial and to judge a fair compromise amount. A settlement “is an exercise of business judgment by the parties.” McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416, 426 (7th Cir.1977). There is no reason to believe that that judgment was clouded in. this case. Certainly, defendant could have absorbed a greater settlement amount, but even a settlement which includes punitive damages must have some limit. “[T]he very essence of settlement is compromise, ‘a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.’ ” Officers for Justice, supra, 688 F.2d at 624 (quoting Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th Cir.1977)). Moreover, defendant insisted that the Agreement which left to the court’s discretion determination of the amounts to be distributed, include a reverter provision. Lockheed, when it agreed to the $10,000,-000 settlement, had an expectation that it might yet recover some part of that amount. Thus given the wide range of potential outcomes of this litigation, the settlement appears to be a fair and equitable compromise of all claims on behalf of the 76 infants killed in the C-5A crash in Saigon. Distribution Plan The Settlement Agreement filed April 11, 1986 contemplates that the Court will distribute the $10,000,000 proceeds of the Settlement among the claimants, FFAC itself and on behalf of the 76 deceased infants, and the plaintiffs’ attorneys, with any balance to revert to defendant Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. The Agreement sets the amounts payable to plaintiffs in the Powell and Selzer cases between $525,000 and $1,000,000, fixes the share payable to Friends for All Children (FFAC) at an amount not to exceed $500,000, and leaves to the Court “absolute unreviewable discretion” with respect to distributions to any other persons including the Special Administrators, Personal Representatives and putative adoptive parents of 74 decedents and to the plaintiffs’ attorneys for fees and expenses. Settlement Agreement at ¶ 7. Defendant Lockheed is precluded from appealing “any matter relating to the fund, or distribution or allowances therefrom____” Settlement Agreement at ¶ 6. As contemplated by the Settlement Agreement, counsel for plaintiffs and counsel for defendant each submitted proposed plans for distribution of the settlement proceeds: Plaintiffs counsel proposed distribution of the entire $10,000,000 (after deduction for attorneys’ fees of $3,333,333 and reimbursement of litigation expenses) among Powell, Selzer and the 74 plaintiffs whose claims had been dismissed by the Order of December 18, 1985. See Submissions of. Plaintiffs’ Counsel dated April 22, 1986 and April 28, 1986. The Settlement Agreement precluded the defendant from commenting on attorneys’ fees. Lockheed’s plan proposed minimal distribution to each of the plaintiffs with a large revert-er to the defendant. See Memorandum of Defendant Lockheed dated April 22, 1986. Plaintiffs’ counsel have sent court-approved notices describing both plans and an alternative outlined by the Court, i.e., distribution of a portion of the proceeds to the plaintiffs and to some charitable organization such as the American Red Cross. Forty-five adoptive and prospective adoptive parents responded to the notice and made no objection to the fee request. Nine made no response. No claimants appeared on behalf of the sixteen children who had not been assigned adoptive parents. The notices invited claimants to attend and participate in a hearing on August 4, 1986. Mr. Selzer and four putative adoptive parents made statements at the hearing. Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a post-hearing statement based on the appealing demonstrations made at the August 4 hearing by Mr. Selzer and by putative adoptive parents. This statement reiterates that the Powell and Selzer plaintiffs should receive the full $1,000,000 authorized to them by the Settlement Agreement, and that after reimbursement of fees and expenses claimed by counsel and FFAC, the full balance of the $10,000,000 should be distributed to the putative adoptive parents. A. Certain factors appear to have been critical in the negotiation of the Settlement Agreement. While those factors are not all apparent on the face of the Settlement Agreement, they must be considered and reflected in any equitable plan for distribution of the Settlement Fund. The Settlement Fund must in part be viewed as being in satisfaction of all of plaintiffs’ compensatory damage claims. But the amount of compensatory damages recoverable by both Powell and Selzer could not alone have reasonably amounted to $10,000,000. Runyon v. District of Columbia, 463 F.2d 1319, 1322 (D.C.Cir.1972); D.C.Code § 12-101; Colo.Rev.Stats. § 13-20-101. The claims of the 74 other plaintiffs were dismissed and, although the dismissal had not yet been affirmed on appeal, the ultimate possibility of recovery for these 74 plaintiffs was speculative at best. The December 18 Memorandum intimated, however, that these plaintiffs might share in a punitive damages recovery. December 18 Memorandum at 10. This suggestion plainly informed the negotiations which produced the Agreement. Lockheed has by no means conceded liability for either compensatory or punitive damages, and has, indeed, vigorously denied it. But the settlement involves a weighing of the risks of litigation. Without determining the merits of the case, it appears that, as a practical matter, plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim posed the more formidable threat to Lockheed and indeed, motivated the settlement and significantly affected its dimension. For example, plaintiffs’ opening statement and early witness presentations in the Powell trial were, in the Court’s opinion, persuasive and may well have had a strong impact on the jury. See, e.g., Tr. 4/4 at 586-612 (testimony of Dr. Malcolm Newman). Most importantly, the amount of punitive damages is not yet limited by state or federal law, although the Executive Branch has recently spoken in favor of such a limit. Thus, the jury could have awarded any amount it felt appropriate to punish defendant for its conduct, Town Center Management Corp. v. Chavez, 373 A.2d 238 (D.C.1977); Bolten v. Gates, 105 Colo. 571, 100 P.2d 145 (1940), and unless unreasonable, the Court could not have disturbed it. Miller v. Carnation Co., 39 Colo.App. 1, 564 P.2d 127 (1977). According to plaintiffs, “The decedent children’s claims were dependent on proof of liability. In reality, in view of the difficult next-of-kin family situation of the children, their damage claims were dependent on proof of punitive liability.” Joint Application of Plaintiffs’ Counsel for Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 24 (filed May 14, 1986). Accordingly, because of the limit on potential compensatory damage recoveries imposed by state law and by the dismissal of the other claims, a substantial proportion of the $10 million settlement payment may be fairly attributed to plaintiffs’ punitive, as opposed to compensatory, damages claims. It must be repeated that Lockheed has not been found liable to plaintiffs for any type of damages. Nevertheless, an understanding of the nature of the claims compromised is essential to the allocation task contemplated by the Settlement Agreement. Under both District of Columbia and Colorado law, the two jurisdictions whose laws are potentially applicable in this litigation, punitive damages are intended to punish the defendant for willful and wanton behavior in disregard of plaintiffs’ rights and to deter the particular defendant and more generally, others in defendant’s position, from such future conduct. Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283 (D.C.1975); Woodard v. City Stores Co., 334 A.2d 189, 191 (D.C.1975); Enright v. Groves, 39 Colo.App. 39, 560 P.2d 851, 854 (1977); Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102. Courts and commentators have noted that punitive damages are analogous to criminal sanctions which benefit society as a whole. K.R. Redden, Punitive Damages § 7.0(A) (1980). Punitive damages are not intended to compensate the plaintiffs for injuries suffered. In this regard, they have been termed “a windfall” to plaintiffs. Bass v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877); K.R. Redden, supra, at § 7.5(E); Abramson, Punitive Damages in Aircraft Accident Cases — A Debate, 11 Forum 50, 53 (1975); W.P. Keeton, P.B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton & David G. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 2 at 11-12 (5th ed. 1984). It has therefore been suggested that courts should exercise greater control over punitive damage awards than over other damage awards. Roginsky supra, 378 F.2d at 840; K.R. Redden, supra, at § 2.4(D); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 517, 530 (1957). The purposes of any punitive damages award that could have been achieved in litigation must be borne in mind in effecting distribution of this settlement which represents a compromise primarily of punitive damages claims. Another important factor that must be considered in this distribution plan is the principle of federalism and the appropriate division of responsibility between the federal courts and state probate courts. In this litigation, FFAC, as Special Administrator and personal representative of the decedents’ estates, has pursued both wrongful death and survival actions. Fourth Amended Complaint at Ml 98, 99 (filed Jan. 21, 1986). The former actions contemplate recovery for those individuals who might have been expected to receive financial support from a decedent if the decedent had continued to live. D.C.Code § 16-2701; Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 13-21-201 — 13-21-203. In contrast, the survival' action produces a recovery for the decedents’ estate, based upon the cause of action that the decedent had at time of death. D.C.Code § 12-101; Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-20-101. The administration and distribution of assets recovered by a decedent’s estate is within the special expertise of the probate courts, and involves a function that the federal courts should not usurp. Turton v. Turton, 644 F.2d 344 (5th Cir.1981); Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966). Of particular importance here, these courts have time tested procedures for furnishing notice to missing heirs and next of kin. A final, but critical, factor to be considered in any equitable distribution plan is the relationship between the awards to be made in the decedents’ cases and the awards previously made in the survivors’ cases. These survivors demonstrated a critical need for funds to cope with defects and problems which they suffered and anticipated as a result of the crash. The survivors whose cases reached the trial stage settled for approximately $250,000 each, with several settling individually for approximately $1,000,000. Most of the foreign survivors realized approximately $84,-000, plus access to a trust fund. The settlements of the other survivors adopted by U.S. parents averaged in excess of $100,-000, plus access to a medical emergency fund. Distributions to claimants on behalf of the decedents would not be equitable if such distributions were disproportionate to the awards that have been made in settlement of the claims of living, breathing, survivors at risk for extraordinary medical and educational expenses. The survivors gave up their punitive damages claims in exchange for what they anticipated (not entirely accurately) would be a more expeditious recognition of their compensatory damage claims. Lockheed agreed not to contest liability, although it then turned and hotly contested causation. The survivors thus made a strategic decision based on the concern that needs of the injured infants for funds for immediate medical and educational treatment outweighed the chance for a large punitive damage award. See Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 567 F.Supp. 790, 796 (D.D.C.1983). FFAC and the other representatives of the estates of the decedents did not relinquish the claims for punitive damages and have actively pursued them. Plaintiffs have opposed the limits imposed by the December 18 Memorandum by arguing that it should not be “cheaper” for a defendant to kill, rather than injure, a person. Id. at 10. The large amount of the settlement of the decedents’ cases puts this challenge to rest. At the same time, where comparing the amounts realized in settlement on behalf the survivors with the amount that should be distributed on behalf of each decedent’s estate, it is apparent that, as a practical matter, the decedents’ settlement compromises primarily a punitive damages claim. B. In light of these general principles, the Court adopts the following plan for distribution of the Settlement Fund. Powell Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Powell is to receive between $525,000 and $1,000,000. Any amount within this range would compensate Powell for the compromise of his compensatory damages claim and award him a substantial sum allocable to settlement of his punitive damages claim. Although any amount within the contemplated range may seem high when compared to the average of $250,000 received by survivors who settled, a number of factors counsel in favor of setting Powell’s award at the upper end of the permissible spectrum. Under the terms of the December 18 Memorandum, Powell is in the strongest position to recover. He is a natural father who was taking steps to formally adopt, had prolonged contact with Diep, provided for her support, and has actively pursued this action. He endured the trial preparation ordeal and came from Saudi Arabia to the United States to be present at the trial. The significant settlements in these cases have only occurred when one or more key cases have been poised for trial. See Joint Application of Plaintiffs’ Counsel for Attorneys’ Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses at 20-22 (filed May 14, 1986). Bringing Powell’s case to trial was the key to settlement of all of the decedents’ cases. In fact, Powell stood in the position to receive a substantial judgment within weeks with no obligation to share it with other plaintiffs. Although the Court could have reduced any excessive award of damages, any reasonable amount would have accrued solely to Powell, because absent this or some other settlement agreement, the Court would have had no authority to allocate the damages award among the plaintiffs. Powell’s consent was required for plaintiffs’ counsel to enter into the Settlement Agreement on behalf of all plaintiffs. Powell in fact signed the Settlement Agreement. Because Powell pursued his action individually and was instrumental in precipitating the settlement, his award from the Settlement Fund will be commensurate to that recovered by several individuals in the survivors’ cases who settled separately, and were similarly forerunners in precipitating a global settlement of those cases. Accordingly, Powell will receive $900,000. Attorneys’ fees, however, will be subtracted from his recovery as contemplated by his contract with his attorneys. In making this award, the Court has endeavored to identify an amount which Mr. Powell could have reasonably anticipated from his compensatory damage claim, and the portion of the settlement which took into account the possibility of a verdict awarding punitive damages. The only guideline suggested by the terms of the Settlement Agreement is the $525,000 amount to which it entitles Mr. Powell in any event. Following this clue, the Court considers no more than $525,000 (less a fee of $175,000 or a net of $350,000) to be generated by the compensatory damage claim. It is also not unreasonable to assume that the balance of any amount available for distribution by Mr. Powell and a substantial portion of the amount available for distribution on account of the 74 other deaths was generated by the punitive damage claim. Selzer Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Selzer is also entitled to a recovery of between $525,000 and $1,000,000. Selzer is the other plaintiff whose claim was preserved under the December 18 Memorandum. For a number of reasons, Selzer’s claim is not as strong as Powell’s and thus his recovery should be lower. Selzer’s claim involves a half-sibling relationship. Although like Powell’s efforts, Selzer’s pretrial efforts inured to the benefit of all participants. in the Settlement Fund, his pretrial efforts were less extensive than were Powell’s. At the time of the settlement, the Selzer case was not yet set for trial. Unlike Powell, who produced documents in discovery and underwent two depositions while his wife endured one, no one in the Selzer family participated in depositions or discovery. And, of course, Selzer did not have to prepare for, or attend, trial. For Selzer, at the time of the Settlement Agreement, any trial and eventual recovery were months in the future. Moreover, any punitive damages award in the Powell case would probably have been admissible as evidence to be considered by the jury in mitigating any additional award. Wangen, supra, 294 N.W.2d at 459-60; J.D. Ghiardi & J.J. Kircher, supra, at § 5.42. The jury, however, might have either considered it to be in mitigation of the Selzer punitive damage claim or proof of the validity of a large award. Finally, Selzer’s signature, like Powell’s, is on the Settlement Agreement and was necessary to effectuate the settlement. The relative imminence of his trial was a threat for defendant to reckon with. An award of $800,000, within the bounds established by the Settlement Agreement, reasonably compensates Selzer for his interest in the litigation and his efforts expended. Selzer also is bound by a fee contract signed by him with his counsel. The Selzer family, like Powell, should understand that, in the Court’s opinion, no more than $525,000 of the distribution to it (less a fee of $175,000 or a net of $350,000) can reasonably be attributable to settlement of the compensatory damage claim, and the balance plus a portion of that distributable to the other 74 families is accounted for by the vitality of the punitive damage claim. Prospective Adoptive Parents and Other Potential Participants Wrongful Death Actions The Settlement Agreement provides that the adoptive parents may be considered as possible participants in the Fund in “the Court’s sole discretion.” Settlement Agreement at 114. It might be possible to differentiate between different categories of adoptive parents. The questionnaires disclosed a wide range of involvement by individual families with the decedents. One such adoptive parent, Use Ewald, was the FFAC in Vietnam and actually lived with her child there. At the other extreme, several families were notified of the identity of the child they were to adopt only a week or so before the crash. Most of the families appeared to have had some ongoing contact with the child destined for their home. In numerous cases due to bureaucratic difficulties, the child had been assigned to them for six months or more before arrangements were complete for the child to leave Vietnam. These families established contact by letters to the child, encouraged their other children to send letters and drawings and to think in terms of a new brother or sister, and lobbied United States and Vietnamese officials to speed up the adoption process. While all the families appeared to welcome the opportunity to nurture one of the war’s unfortunate victims, some were willing to accept special burdens, e.g., handicapped children; and some faced special losses, e.g., orphanage friends who were to be placed together were separated by death. However, the fine tuning required to accommodate this variety of conditions on the basis of the limited information available would be complex and arbitrary. Moreover, as plaintiffs argue persuasively, many prospective adoptive parents (vis-a-vis those adoptive parents who secured adoption decrees) were only prevented from consummating their adoption efforts by the unfortunate accident. Finally, it must be recognized that a substantial portion of the Settlement Fund constitutes satisfaction of claims for punitive damages. The Court’s discretion in making awards to other claimants must be informed, if not controlled, by the prospects of those claims had they been litigated to a conclusion on the various hypotheses which were viable at the time of settlement. In this process it is necessary to distinguish between wrongful death claims and survival actions. The wrongful death claim in Powell was dismissed. Supplemental Pretrial Order # 3 (filed March 26, 1986), as the D.C. Wrongful Death statute contemplates recovery only where the injury occurred in the District of Columbia. D.C.Code § 16-2701. Colorado’s Wrongful Death Statute limits damage recovery to $45,000. Colo. Rev.Stats. § 13-21-203. Moreover, it does not permit an award of punitive damages. Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo.App. 335, 535 P.2d 219, 221 (1975). In the analogous situation of approval of a class action settlement distribution plan pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 23(e), “care must be exercised to see that the plan is consistent with substantive rights to damages governed by state law.” In re “Agent Orange”Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1396, 1402 (E.D.N.Y.1985). Recognizing that the distribution of the Settlement Fund is intended by the parties and the Court to be non-adversarial and equitable, the Colorado statute, while not controlling, provides guidance on what claimants seeking recovery based upon wrongful death claims should ultimately realize. Although Colorado law does not technically allow for punitive damages or compensatory damages in excess of $45,000, such claims were in fact compromised. The December 18 decision that Colorado law applies so as to bar prospective adoptive parents was not final at the time of settlement. Prospective adoptive parents on behalf of these plaintiffs thus had some remaining possibility of recovering punitive damages under D.C. law. Their claims were enhanced by the prospect that they might share in any punitive damage awards to Powell and Selzer. On the other hand, the amount of the awards for the benefit of the survivors ($84,000 plus access to a $2,500,000 trust fund for most of the foreign survivors) is a highly significant benchmark. In light of all these factors, the Court will award $101,205 per decedent to propsective adoptive parents. Once attorneys’ fees are deducted (see later section on Attorneys’ Fees), these awards will be comparable to the $84,000 received by most of the foreign survivors. These awards are made with the understanding that the Court considers at least $39,000 of that sum to be attributable to plaintiffs’ punitive damage claims. Each participant in the Settlement Fund will execute a release on their own behalf to Lockheed, as contemplated by paragraph D.8 of the Settlement Agreement. Survival Actions The Court will also award $10,000 to FFAC on behalf of each decedent’s estate. It is anticipated that FFAC will (1) execute releases on behalf of the estates and (2) proceed to administer the estates in accordance with Colorado probate procedures. As was discussed in the December 18 Memorandum, the Colorado Survival Statute would provide for only minimal recovery by these estates. December 18 Memorandum at 2 (citing Colo.Rev.Stats. § 13-20-101). Moreover, any ultimate beneficiary of the recovery by the estates (other than the State by escheat) may well have already enjoyed some recovery in satisfaction of the wrongful death claim. This procedure will preserve to the probate court its appropriate functions. See, e.g., Turton, supra, 644 F.2d at 347-48. The amount of $10,000 per decedent’s estate may be more than would be authorized under a strict application of the Colorado Survival Statute, which does not permit an award of punitive damages. Colo.Rev.Stats. § 13-20-101. Nevertheless, like the individuals who pursued wrongful death actions on behalf of the deceased plaintiffs, FFAC, on behalf of the decedents’ estates, compromised a punitive damages claim which might have been pursued had the pending appeal resulted in a reversal of the December 18 decision. Thus, some part of the portion of the Fund reflecting satisfaction of the punitive damages claim should inure to the benefit of the decedents’ estates. Under the wrongful death claims there are identifiable participants in the Fund who have, to various degrees, pursued this action since its inception. Under the survival action there are no identified beneficiaries and although the Colorado probate court will presumably attempt to locate heirs and next-of-kin, the prospect of locating any beneficiary at this late date and after the efforts already made, are bleak. The $10,000 sum awarded reflects the lesser likelihood of ultimate recovery by a beneficiary under the survival, as opposed to wrongful death, action. On the other hand, it is important to protect the settlement from collateral attack by affording any presently undiscovered heirs and next-of-kin all of the notice afforded by a state’s probate system. A substantial award to each decedent’s estate and administration of the resulting corpus in the Colorado probate system should accomplish these objectives. Awards to “Other Claimants” The Notice sent to potential claimants on May 23, 1986, stated that the Court would consider a distribution plan which awarded “a lump sum ... to FFAC or some other charitable organization (e.g., American Red Cross) performing a role similar to that performed by FFAC in the 1960’s and 1970’s.” On June 3,1986, Thomas A. Troy-er of Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, was appointed as amicus curiae to advise on the participation of charitable organizations in the Settlement Fund. As part of his services as amicus, Mr. Troyer evaluated those proposals submitted by organizations which might be appropriate recipients of some or all of the punitive damage element of the settlement, i.e., the American Red Cross, the Margaret Moses Memorial Foundation or the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation. He recommended that the Court make a distribution to the Clark Foundation primarily because of its commitment to use any funds distributed to it to assist children who have emigrated to the United States from Southeast Asia, and because it is an established organization which could apply the funds without having to bear heavy start-up and administration expenses. The proposals submitted by Mr. Troyer and by the charitable organizations have been given very careful consideration. Because a substantial portion of the Settlement Fund was generated by plaintiffs’ punitive damage claims, an award to a “non-party” to benefit those whose situation is similar to that which the decedent orphans would have had if they had lived would be particularly appropriate. Punitive damages are not compensatory and they therefore provide a windfall to parties who receive them. In the words of one court, it is ... difficult to understand why if the tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they should go to the compensated sufferer, and not to the public in whose behalf he is punished. Bass, supra, 42 Wis. at 672. Moreover, a substantial award of punitive damages to these claimants would appear inequitable in light of the relatively modest awards received by survivors of the crash who felt compelled by their circumstances to forego an opportunity for punitive damages in order to speed up relief. At the same time, punitive damages serve the necessary and important function of punishing a defendant for conduct injurious to others and to the public and deterring that defendant and others from such behavior in the future. Such damages may be particularly appropriate when the amount of money sufficient to compensate living relatives does not appear to be an adequate measure of the total loss to society. In this case, for example, where the deceased children were orphans, punitive damages may be necessary to ensure that their deaths were not “free”. When plaintiffs agreed to settle this case, they gave up their right to pursue further and obtain such punishment and deterrence of Lockheed by formal verdict and judgment. They may well have contemplated that some of their purpose was achieved through the amount and terms of the Settlement Agreement. To allow the bulk of the fund created in settlement to revert to defendant might deprive plaintiffs of the benefit of their bargain, not only financially, but in terms of the public purpose served by their sometimes painful pursuits of punitive damages. To allow a substantial portion of punitive damages settlement to revert to the alleged wrongdoer because of the perceived inequity of distributing large amounts to the particular plaintiffs would be ironic and unfair and contrary to the higher purposes of plaintiffs. An award to charity from the punitive damage element of the Settlement Fund would therefore serve the important function of deterrence and would help compensate society for the loss of these children. Before making such an award, however, the Court must determine whether it has the authority, under the Settlement Agreement or general principles of tort recovery, to distribute the funds to non-parties. By the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Court has “absolute unreviewable discretion,” to determine how the Settlement Fund will be distributed. In addition, the Agreement seems to contemplate that the Court will made awards to “persons” other than “blood relatives, adoptive parents, identified prospective adoptive parents and siblings by blood or adoption.” Apart from this contractual authorization, recent cases have established that a court need not adhere to traditional principles of individual tort recovery where the result would be unjust, inequitable, or impossible to determine. Agent Orange, supra, 611 F.Supp. at 1402; In re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities Litigation, 603 F.2d 1353, 1365 (9th Cir.1979). In these circumstances, analogy to the cy pres doctrine of testamentary interpretation is in order. Agent Orange, supra, 611 F.Supp. at 1403. As originally formulated, the cy pres doctrine is a rule of construction used by courts to effectuate testimentary charitable gifts that would otherwise fail. When applying cy pres, .the court attempts to conform as closely as possible with the intent of the testators. The court may also consider the degree to which a possible plan would be of public service. More recently, courts have applied cy pres principles when distribution plans arise in large class actions. For example, where it is impossible to reach only those injured and where proposed remedies will benefit those who are not members of the plaintiff class, the court will attempt to ascertain which alternative recipients are preferable. And “[a]s it becomes more difficult, or even impossible, to ascertain which alternative recipients the legislature would prefer, it may be appropriate to devote the funds to a broader public service in order to maximize the benefit to society.” Note, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U.Chi.L.Rev. 448, 452-53 (1972). The cy pres doctrine suggests that funds generated by a settlement of civil litigation may properly be distributed to beneficiaries who are not parties to the law suit if such a distribution effectuates the settlement. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recently affirmed a District Court remedy which relied on a similar principle of equity. In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers v. E.E.O.C., — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3019, 3033, 92 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986), the trial judge used the proceeds of a contempt fine levied against the union defendant in a Title VII case to create a fund to aid minority prospective union members. The Supreme Court approved this remedy despite the fact that it benefited non-parties who were not directly harmed by the defendant. Although punitive damages have not traditionally been recognized in equity, there appears to be no compelling reason not to apply this cy pres doctrine to effect a just distribution of a fund representing settlement primarily of punitive damages claims. Nonetheless, the matter is not free from doubt. Certain sections of the Settlement Agreement do appear to suggest that only those with legal claims against Lockheed should participate in the Fund. And there remains some question about whether the cy pres rationale is appropriate when a settlement agreement contains an explicit reverter provision. Moreover, at and after the August 4 hearing, Lockheed challenged the Court’s authority to distribute funds to a non-party, and argued that any portion not distributed to a plaintiff should revert to Lockheed. In addition, one of the guiding lights of FFAC and of the Moses Foundation has filed a strong objection to the amicus’ proposal of a distribution to the Clark Foundation. These recent developments ominously portend that to distribute a portion of the punitive damage settlement to these institutions instead of to the named plaintiffs could defeat one of the main purposes of the Settlement Agreement: to end this unpleasant controversy. It obviously does not follow that the portion of the fund which might have been generated by the punitive damage claims should revert to Lockheed. Quite the contrary. Punitive damages were claimed, remained at issue, and would have been awarded if plaintiffs had proved their proffer, not to compensate any plaintiff, but to vindicate a public interest. Accordingly, there will be distributions to Powell and Selzer of amounts approaching the limit authorized by the Settlement Agreement and to the 74 families of amounts consistent with that realized by and for the benefit of the survivors who did not prepare for trial. There remains the possibility that the plaintiffs, led by Messrs. Powell and Selzer and their attorneys, will voluntarily share the proceeds traceable to punitive (as distinguished from compensation) damage claims with one or more of the institutions identified by Mr. Troyer or with the two trusts created for the surviving children (i.e., the Vietnam Childrens’ Medical and Educational Trust — Foreign, and the Vietnam Childrens’ Medical and Educational Trust — Domestic). If this desirable result occurs, then the commendable efforts of Mr. Troyer and the institutions which submitted proposals will not have been in vain, but rather will have served as the necessary predicate to the ultimate distribution of a substantial portion of these funds for a public purpose. The Court urges counsel, and particularly Mr. Selzer, to undertake that task, perhaps in concert with Mr. Troyer. As Mr. Selzer so eloquently testified at the August 4 hearing, those who offered to adopt strange, and in some cases unhealthy and handicapped infants must have been inspired by the noblest of motives. These individuals are now in a position to carry out their objectives in what could be a most satisfying and useful way. Each is urged to read the submissions by Mr. Troyer thoughtfully and in the spirit which prompted them to seek to adopt a child ten years ago. Accordingly, as part of the distribution plan, counsel will be directed to send to each individual distributee a copy of this memorandum, with a note directing attention to the section on “Awards to ‘Other Claimants’.” together with copies of the text (but not the appendices) of the submissions by the Red Cross, the Moses Foundation and the Clark Foundation. Reverter As explained in more detail above, it would not serve the purpo