Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER SHADUR, District Judge. This Court conducted an extended trial in this action January 28 through February 10, 1986 (the “Trial”). Following the Trial (but after a considerable delay occasioned by the need to obtain the final Trial transcript) the parties tendered their respective versions of proposed findings of fact (“Findings”) and conclusions of law (“Conclusions”). After full consideration, in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. (“Rule”) 52(a) this Court sets forth the following Findings and Conclusions, which will constitute the grounds for the contemplated Order referred to at the conclusion of this memorandum opinion. Findings of Fact I. Background A. Claims 1. This action has been brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and state law. Plaintiffs allege defendants, as past and present administrators of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“Department”) or Stateville Correctional Center (“State-ville”), have violated plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under state law. Those alleged violations arise from the living conditions and institutional programs provided to inmates assigned to protective custody at Stateville (Stip. ¶ 1; Cplt.). 2. Department is an Illinois state agency created pursuant to the Unified Code of Corrections (“Code”). Under the terms of and pursuant to the Code, Department is responsible for maintaining and administering all state correctional facilities and institutions, for accepting persons committed to it for care, custody, treatment and rehabilitation, and for developing and maintaining programs of control, rehabilitation and employment for such committed persons (Stip. 112; Code §§ 1001-1-1, 1003-2-2(a) and (d); PXs 1, 2). 3. Stateville is a maximum security prison located near Joliet, Illinois and administered by Department. It covers an area of 2,200 acres, of which approximately 64 are within its walls. Stateville houses approximately 2,000 inmates within five cellhouses: Cellhouse B, said to be the largest cellblock in the world; Cellhouses E and F, which are panopticons or round cellhouses; and Cellhouses H and I, two new “super-max” cellhouses. Stateville inmates are incarcerated primarily for violent crimes, such as murder and Class X felonies, and are serving sentences up to and including life imprisonment. Stateville has approximately 1,000 staff members, of whom 850 work full time (Stip. 113; PXs 4-A, 4-B; DeRobertis Tr. 109; O’Leary Tr. 6-7). 4. Protective custody is a status available to a Stateville inmate when he fears for his safety or when the Warden or the Warden’s designee believes the inmate’s safety may be in jeopardy. Since protective custody at Stateville was created in 1976, the number of inmates with that status has averaged about 200 or 10% of the inmate population, though the precise number varies. At the time of the Trial there were between 260 and 300 inmates in protective custody at Stateville (Stip. Ml 12,14; Pedersen Dep. 68). B-l. Parties Plaintiff 5. Willie Williams (“Williams”) is an inmate who was assigned to protective custody at Stateville from approximately November 1977 until October 13, 1983, when he was transferred to the protective custody unit at Department’s Menard Correctional Center in Menard, Illinois. Williams is the representative of the plaintiff class (Williams Tr. 175-78; 96 F.R.D. 383 (N.D. Ill.1982)). 6. Plaintiff class consists of all inmates who have been assigned to protective custody at Stateville at any time since April 30, 1982 or who will be assigned there in the future. It is estimated the total number of class members exceeds 500 (Stip. II4). B-2. Parties Defendant 7. Michael Lane (“Lane”) is Department's Director, a position he has held since 1981. As Director, Lane presides over and supervises Department’s total operations. He is responsible for developing, approving and reviewing Department policy and is charged with implementing the statutes and regulations applicable to Department. He regularly performs inspections of the various institutions, has visited Stateville often and is aware of the types of programming available to inmates at the facility (Stip. 115; Lane Tr. 26-30). 8. Since November 18, 1983 Richard W. DeRobertis (“DeRobertis”) has been Department’s Assistant Deputy Director for Adult Institutions. As Assistant Deputy Director, DeRobertis is aware of the types of security and custodial measures used and the types of programming available to inmates at Stateville. Before he became Assistant Deputy Director, DeRobertis served at Stateville as Assistant Warden for Programs from June 1979 to February 1980, as Assistant Warden for Operations from February 1980 to March 1981, as Acting Warden from July 1980 to March 1981 and as Warden (also known as Chief Administrative Officer) from March 1, 1981 to November 18, 1983 (Stip. 11 6; DeRobertis Tr. 96-98, 103). While DeRobertis was Stateville Warden he directed the overall operations of the institution. DeRobertis’ job responsibilities as Warden were controlled by statute and Department regulations and directives. He was responsible for implementing the regulations governing Department and for ensuring that his subordinates did so. He also directed all security and custodial measures and all programming for inmates. DeRobertis’ staff reported to him through a regular chain of command, was subject to discipline by him, was subject to his rules and orders and performed all official duties under his authority. Through his frequent visits to the units that housed protective custody inmates and his discussions with those inmates, DeRobertis had knowledge of the conditions in the protective custody units and the programming available to protective custody inmates within those units and the institution generally (Stip. II6; Code § 1003-1-2; PX 6; DeRobertis Tr. 97-98, 150-52; O’Leary Tr. 6, 88). 9. Michael O’Leary (“O’Leary”) has been Stateville Warden since November 19, 1983. O’Leary’s responsibilities as Warden have been identical to those formerly held by DeRobertis in that capacity. Between February 1980 and March 1981 O’Leary served at Stateville as Assistant Warden for Programs, and between March 26, 1981 and November 19, 1983 he was Assistant Warden for Operations. In both Assistant Warden positions he was responsible for formulating operating procedures, coordinating resident programs and carrying out the policies, rules and regulations of the institution to ensure the orderly operation of the daily functions of the institution. As Assistant Warden for Operations and as Warden, O’Leary has been principally responsible for security measures within the institution. In all of his Stateville positions O’Leary has made frequent visits to the units that house protective custody inmates, has remained aware of the conditions there and has had knowledge of the programming available to protective custody inmates within those units and the institution generally (Stip. 117; O’Leary Tr. 6). 10. Salvadore Godinez (“Godinez”) has been Stateville Assistant Warden for Operations since November 19, 1983, with responsibilities identical to those formerly held by O’Leary in that capacity. Between April 1981 and November 19, 1983 Godinez was Stateville Assistant Warden for Programs with responsibility for formulating operating procedures, coordinating resident programs and carrying out the policies, rules and regulations of the institution to ensure the orderly operation of the daily functions of the institution. As Assistant Warden for Programs and as Assistant Warden for Operations, Godinez has made frequent visits to the units that house protective custody inmates, has been aware of the conditions there and has knowledge of the programming available to protective custody inmates within those units and the institution generally (Stip. 118). 11. Gayle Franzen (“Franzen”) was Department’s Director from January 1979 to February 1981. As Director, his duties and responsibilities were identical to those described in Finding 7 for Lane (Stip. II9). 12. Marvin Reed (“Reed”) was State-ville Warden from June 1979 to June 1980. As Warden his duties and responsibilities were identical to those described in Finding 8 for DeRobertis when he was Warden (Stip. ¶ 10). 13. Lou Brewer (“Brewer”) was State-ville Warden from September 1978 through June 1979. As Warden his duties and responsibilities were identical to those described in Finding 8 for DeRobertis when he was Warden (Stip. ¶ 11). C. Protective Custody 14. In 1976 Department adopted Administrative Regulation (“A.R.”) 808. A.R. 808 provided for the creation of a protective custody unit in each maximum security facility operated by Department. As established by A.R. 808, protective custody is not an assignment made for disciplinary reasons or because an inmate is regarded as a threat to institutional security. Instead, an inmate is assigned to protective custody either because he believes and the Warden or the Warden’s designee confirms, or because the Warden or the Warden’s designee believes, protective custody is necessary for the inmate’s safety (PX 1-808). 15. Under either method for protective custody placement, defendants are obligated to determine within 10 days of protective custody assignment whether an inmate’s protective custody needs are substantiated. If defendants determine the inmate needs protective custody, the inmate is permitted to remain in protective custody as long as the need exists. Between 1979 and 1984 defendants were required to conduct semiannual reviews of an inmate’s need for continued protective custody status. More recently those reviews have been scheduled every 30 days (Stip. 1112; PXs 1-808, 2-501D; O'Leary Tr. 34; Pedersen Tr. 233-34; Wheaton 1/29/86 Tr. 154-58). 16. If an inmate’s protective custody needs are not substantiated, defendants are supposed to have the inmate removed from protective custody. Inmates are permitted to grieve such orders and to remain in protective custody during the pendency of such grievances. Any inmate assigned to protective custody at his own request is allowed to sign out at any time (Stip. ¶ 12; O’Leary Tr. 24). 17. It is true most protective-custody placements initially result from an inmate’s self-designation. But because no inmate is authorized to remain in protective custody unless defendants have substantiated the existence of an identifiable threat to the inmate’s safety in the general population, and because on the other hand an inmate’s signout subjects him to the risk of such threats if they exist, protective custody status is not truly “voluntary.” And although most stays in protective custody are short-term, the length of time that an inmate spends in protective custody is often long-term (and on occasion can last the entire term of the inmate’s sentence). Defendants’ approach to the handling of protective custody inmates cannot be rationalized on the basis that protective custody status is “temporary” (Flowers Tr. 4-5; Huff Tr. 209-10; Pedersen Tr. 240, 251-52; Williams Tr. 177-78). 18. Since the creation of protective custody status at Stateville, the unit has been located in three different cellhouses. Until January 1, 1979 all protective custody residents at Stateville were assigned to Cell-house E. No inmates of any other classification were assigned to Cellhouse E at that time (DeRobertis Tr. 100-01; Williams Tr. 179). 19. In early 1979 defendants locked down Stateville and completely reorganized the inmate population. As part of that reorganization, all protective custody inmates were moved to Cellhouse B-West, then known as “Death Valley” because the disciplinary segregation inmates were housed there. Disciplinary-segregation inmates are those who have been found guilty of serious and often repeated violations of prison rules and are generally considered behavioral problems posing security concerns to the institution and other inmates (Stip. ¶[¶ 14, 15; Lane Tr. 18-19; DeRobertis Tr. 104; Williams Tr. 189). 20. Some few protective custody inmates were later assigned to a gallery in Cellhouse B-East. Otherwise, both protective custody and disciplinary segregation inmates remained housed in Cellhouse B-West (though separated from each other there) until April 1982. At that time defendants moved the disciplinary segregation inmates to Cellhouse F and replaced them in Cellhouse B-West with general population inmates (Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 53-55; Stip. ¶[¶ 14, 15). 21. In January 1985 defendants moved all protective custody inmates to Cellhouse H, which had previously housed general population and orientation inmates. Defendants first permitted some general population inmates to remain in Cellhouse H to serve as cellhouse help, but later they limited Cellhouse H solely to protective custody inmates (O’Leary Tr. 73; Thomas Tr. 104; Whéaton 10/30/85 Dep. 49-50; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 59-60). 22. Between 1979 and 1982 defendants made no special housing arrangements within Cellhouse B-West for either (a) inmates who had requested protective custody, but for whom defendants had yet to substantiate the need for protective custody status, or (b) for inmates who had been determined by defendants not to need protective custody, but who remained in the protective custody unit pending resolution of their grievances challenging that determination. In 1982 defendants created an investigative section in protective custody for inmates in those two classes. Currently those two classes of inmates are also placed in specially designated areas within Cellhouse H (Flowers Tr. 7-8; O’Leary Tr. 23-25; Pedersen Tr. 239; Wheaton 1/29/86 Tr. 170-73). D. Defendants’ Job Responsibilities 23. Defendants administer Stateville pursuant to the United States Constitution, governing state statutes, applicable court decrees and Department regulations, rules and directives. At a minimum, defendants perform their jobs within the guidelines set by the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the Code, defendants are responsible for implementing Department’s goals, in part through the adoption of appropriate regulations (Code §§ 1003-1-1 et seq.). 24. Department regulations provide specific directives as to the conditions and programs to be provided to all inmates. As adopted in 1976, A.R. 808 provided “[h]ousing and programmatic accommodations [for protective custody inmates] shall be comparable to those provided to the general population.” Programmatic accommodations comprise the full spectrum of programs and services provided to general population inmates, thus covering far more than essential services (PX 1-808; O’Leary Tr. 90-94). 25. In July 1981 defendants entered into a consent decree in Meeks v. Lane, 75 C 96 (N.D.Ill.) (the “Meeks Decree”), containing numerous provisions relating to the living conditions and programs to be made available to protective custody inmates. Implementation of those provisions was required to be completed no later than July 1984 (DX 3). Among the provisions of the Meeks Decree: (a) Several provisions relate to inmates who “are not likely to behave in a manner so as to threaten or intimidate other residents” and who require special protection because of “their age, size, nature of crime, prior testimony [or] gang involvement.” Stateville’s protective custody unit includes such inmates, and they are class members here. Under the Meeks Decree, such inmates “shall have the same opportunities as other inmates in other housing areas of the general population for ... job assignments, vocational and educational assignments, recreation, access to prison libraries, access to religious services and to all other institutional programs” (DX 3; O’Leary Tr. 104-05). (b) Various provisions concern programs and conditions for all protective custody inmates generally, compelling: “educational opportunities commensurate with those available to inmates in the general population”; the availability of living conditions, including showers and laundry, “on an equal basis” with the general population; a “plan” to be implemented by June 1984 to provide jobs for protective custody inmates; and a good faith attempt to locate an area suitable for communal dining for protective custody inmates (in the latter respect the Meeks Decree specifies “[i]f any new facilities are constructed at Stateville, the Department will consider using them for protective custody dining”) (DX 3). 26. To allow for implementation of the Meeks Decree, Department promulgated a revised A.R. 808 on an emergency basis. Revised A.R. 808 (now Rule 501.310) altered the regulation to state “[h]ousing accommodations and essential services shall be comparable to those provided for the general population.” Although the altered language embraced less than the language of original A.R. 808, revised A.R. 808 is meant to be read together with the requirements of the Meeks Decree (PXs 1-808A, 2-501.310, 89, 90, 91; O’Leary Tr. 96-103). II. Comparison of General Population Programs and Conditions with Those for Protective Custody Inmates 27. “Comparable,” as used in A.R. 808, means “equivalent” or “equal in value or extent.” In fact, however, neither the housing or programmatic accommodations nor the essential services provided the protective custody inmates were truly comparable to those offered the general population despite the mandate of A.R. 808. Protective custody programs also were not the “same” as general population programs, though in some instances that is a requirement of the Meeks Decree. Nor were they “equivalent” or “equal” in other cases where the Meeks Decree specifies they must be (Webster’s Third International Dictionary; DX 3; Huff Tr. 215-16; O’Leary Tr. 107-09). A. Religion 28. Under the First Amendment all persons, including prison inmates, are guaranteed the right to the free exercise of religion (though inmates’ rights may be restricted to the extent prison rules are “reasonably adapted” to the legitimate goals of institutional security). Illinois’ Code requires defendants to permit “religious ministrations and sacraments” to be available to every inmate at Stateville. Since October 1976 A.R. 839 (now Rule 425) has expressed Department’s policy “to provide resources with which residents may expand their knowledge, understanding and commitment to the religious faith of their choice” and “to provide religious activities for all residents” (Code § 1003-7-2(g); PXs 1-839, 2-425; Ledford 1/28/86 Tr. 19-20). 29. Communal religious worship, religious instruction and religious counseling are essential aspects of many individuals’ exercise of religion. Those aspects are critical elements of all major religious traditions, particularly the “ministrations and sacraments” that Illinois law requires defendants to make available to every inmate. For many inmates, such religious programs and services provide (or have a substantial potential for providing) vital contributions to health, safety and welfare, a help to moral and ethical conduct and assistance toward rehabilitation. Another important part of the free exercise of religion is an adequate setting for religious programming, offering symbols and a sense of sanctuary (Ledford 1/28/86 Tr. 25-26, 29-81, 49; Ledford 2/6/86 Tr. 50; Yerkes Tr. I 129, 131-39; Yerkes Tr. II 5, 9-13). 30. Defendants have provided State-ville’s general population inmates the opportunity for free exercise of religion through numerous programs, including communal worship services, classroom religious instruction and private religious counseling. Some 13 different denominational communal worship services are made available every week, held in one of the three rooms in the chaplaincy building, which are supplied with religious symbols and in at least one case an organ. Through visiting clergy and staff chaplains, the Chaplaincy Department has stood ready to meet any inmate’s bona fide request (including such requests by protective custody inmates) for denominational services (PXs 14,17A, 23, 83G; Ledford 1/29/86 Tr. 23-24, 34-35, 100-01, 105). Defendants similarly offer the general population a wide variety of different courses in religious instruction, taught either with staff or visiting clergy. Defendants have also brought in a large number of special religious programs for the benefit of the general population (PXs 14, 16, 17B; Thomas Tr. 96). 31. Before May 1979, while protective custody inmates were in Cellhouse E, they were afforded opportunities for the free exercise of religion essentially equivalent to those afforded the general population. Protective custody inmates were able to participate in weekly denominational communal worship services, and Bible classes were offered in the cellhouse “dayroom” (Williams Tr. 185). Since May 1979 the access to, and the settings for, all aspects of religious programming for ■ protective custody inmates have been significantly and needlessly inferior to those offered the general population. Those deficiencies, summarized in the following Findings, have denied plaintiffs the opportunity for their meaningful free exercise of religion (PX 11; Yerkes Tr. I 120-23, 127-29; Yerkes Tr. II 10-11; Ledford 1/28/86 Tr. 31, 50-53; O’Leary Tr. 108; Huff Tr. 215-16; Wells Tr. 36-37). 32. When they moved the protective custody unit to Cellhouse B-West in May 1979, defendants stopped all communal worship services and religious instruction for protective custody inmates. Defendants’ only “religious programming” (if it may be called that) was to allow the staff clergy to walk the galleries of the protective custody unit. On DeRobertis’ orders, visiting clergy were not allowed access to the protective custody unit, thus depriving plaintiffs of access to clergy from several faiths. Because the guards often denied even staff clergy access to the cellhouse, plaintiffs could go several weeks without seeing any clergyman (PX 16; Flowers Tr. 20-26, 41-42; Godinez Dep. 97; Ledford 1/28/86 Tr. 42-43, 94; Ledford 2/6/86 Tr. 50-52; Thomas Tr. 98-99; Williams Tr. 195-96). 33. That absence of religious programs for protective custody inmates was a continuing concern to the Chaplaincy Department, which considered existing conditions deplorable. Yet defendants did not even consider reinstituting communal worship services for protective custody inmates until after April 1982, under the compulsion of the Meeks Decree and the pressure of this lawsuit (PX 15; Ledford 1/28/86 Tr. 55-56, 63-65, 90; DeRobertis Tr. 187-90). 34. In November 1982 a multipurpose room was constructed at the back of Cell-house B-West. When that room was opened for use in January 1983, defendants allowed a single weekly nondenominational communal worship service for protective custody inmates. Because services were limited to nondenominational worship, defendants did not permit religious symbols to be present. Even so, services were often crowded, and not all protective custody inmates wanting to attend were able to do so because the room was often full. Those services were discontinued sometime in mid-1984 without explanation (Flowers Tr. 22-23; Thomas Tr. 99-100; Yerkes Tr. 129-31). 35. When defendants moved the protective custody unit to Cellhouse H in January 1985, a single weekly nondenominational service was reinstituted. Such services are held in an area of the cellhouse converted from garage use. Because the area has a capacity of 20 to 25 inmates, not all inmates desiring to attend are able to do so (Flowers Tr. 26; Ledford 1/28/86 Tr. 96-99; O’Leary Tr. 85). 36. Defendants have never taken a survey of the denominational preferences of protective custody inmates for religious services, nor have they heeded the professed willingness of the Chaplaincy Department to provide services for even the smallest groups of separate denominations. Instead DeRobertis decided a single nondenominational service was sufficient for the religious needs of protective custody inmates. Then just before the trial of this case, defendants allowed the Chaplaincy Department to offer protective custody inmates a single different denominational service each week. Even now the chaplains have been instructed to deemphasize the denominational aspects of such services, however, and religious symbols are consequently still not present at services (Led-ford 1/28/86 Tr. 80-81, 102-04, 129-31; Ledford 1/28/86 Tr. 54-55, 57). 37. Defendants have not allowed protective custody inmates the opportunity to counsel with clergy in private. Even during such sacraments as communion or confession, clergymen have been forced to stand outside the cells while the inmates remained in their cells. Other inmates could usually overhear what was said, which generally proved embarrassing or humiliating to inmates (Flowers Tr. 22-26; Thomas Tr. 99). 38. Finding 37’s conditions did not change after construction of the room at the back of Cellhouse B-West (see Finding 34) or after the move to Cellhouse H. Although Cellhouse H contains interview rooms, defendants have not permitted them to be used for private religious counseling. Instead, clergymen must administer sacraments through the “chuck hole” in the solid steel cell doors used in Cellhouse H. Visits by clergymen average once a week, with defendants now making available fewer denominations of clergy than in the past (PX 83C; Flowers Tr. 20-26; Thomas Tr. 101-02; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 162-65). 39. Neither the restrictions imposed by defendants on communal worship services and religious instruction (see Findings 32-36) nor the restrictions they have imposed on religious counseling (see Findings 37-38) are either necessary or reasonably adapted to achieve Stateville’s institutional security goals or any other legitimate correctional goals. B. Library 40. Under the Constitution all prison inmates are guaranteed meaningful access to the courts. Illinois’ Code requires every inmate to be given access to a library of legal materials, as well as published materials, including newspapers and magazines. To meet those requirements, defendants have established in a secure, separate building at Stateville a general and law library with a capacity of approximately 75 to 100 inmates (Code §§ 1003-7-2(a); Johnson Tr. 35, 62-63). 41. Stateville’s library has been available to general population inmates Monday through Friday for morning, afternoon and evening sessions. Each cellhouse of general population inmates is scheduled to have access to the library one day per week. That arrangement calls for only weekday use, so the library is closed most weekends (Stip. ¶ 23; PX 8A; Johnson Tr. 60-61, 63; Morris Dep. 42). 42. All Stateville’s library services and programs have been made fully available to general population inmates. That includes full access to the general and law library collections. General population inmates may browse, do their own research and work together on legal projects. Browsing is the way most inmates select books. Tables and chairs are provided, allowing general population inmates to read and study either separately or together. Stateville’s library has an audiovisual room, which contains films, videotapes, records, video equipment and record players for both entertainment and education (Stip. 1123; PX 73; Johnson Tr. 42, 44-46, 49-50). 43. Stateville’s law library also has a legal clinic, in which inmate clerks provide legal counseling and such materials as envelopes, paper and typewriters. General population inmates are permitted to have confidential interviews with the Chief Legal Advocate in a converted study cell in the library (Stip. 1123; PX 73; Johnson Tr. 47, 49-54). 44. Stateville’s library also offers special programs to the general population approximately once a week. Such programs include legal seminars and paralegal training, awareness workshops, mental health programs and ethnic and cultural programs. Many programs bring in outside speakers and allow participation, such as question and answer sessions (PXs 8, 73; Johnson Tr. 70-74). 45. While protective custody inmates were housed in Cellhouse E before May 1979, their opportunities for meaningful access to the courts were essentially equivalent to those offered to the general population. Inmates went to the library on a day set aside exclusively for protective custody use, enabling them to browse and otherwise take full advantage of all of the resources of both the law and general library (Williams Tr. 186). Since May 1979 the access given protective custody inmates to library services (as described in Findings 46-54) has been significantly inferior to that afforded the general population and has been insufficient to permit meaningful access to the courts (Huff Tr. 215-16; Wells Tr. 37). 46. When any protective custody inmate is now permitted in the library, he must be locked in one of the seven operative security cages. Only one protective custody inmate is permitted in a cage at a time, except where two can demonstrate that they are cellmates, co-litigants or codefendants. Protective custody inmates are never permitted out of the cages to browse, study at tables or use the audio-visual equipment. Instead they must rely on inmates assigned as library clerks to get books and materials for them (Stip. If 24; Johnson Tr. 46-47, 53, 55-56, 63, 84). 47. Until January 1985 defendants limited the library access of protective custody inmates to Monday morning from 8 to 11 a.m. and Monday through Friday afternoons from 12 noon to 4 p.m. Because only seven cages have been available, the number of protective custody inmates afforded any library access is severely restricted. Plaintiffs’ requests to go to the library were taken on a first-come, first-served basis (unless an inmate had a verifiable court deadline) and were granted only if space in the cages was available (Stip. It 24; PXs 8A, 75, 76; Johnson Tr. 61, 63; Morris Dep. 44-45). Since January 1985 all Monday morning library access has been eliminated, so protective custody inmates have been scheduled for library use only Monday through Friday afternoons from 12 to 4 p.m. One floor of Cellhouse H (each consists of about 100 inmates) is separately designated for the library each day, and inmates are chosen by the gallery officer on a first-come, first-served basis. If there is not enough room to permit a particular inmate to go on one day, he does not get priority on later days (Pedersen Tr. 243-44; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 80-81). 48. Defendants have never made any lists of legal materials, general library materials or periodicals available to plaintiffs. Because of the locked-cage arrangement, protective custody inmates are entirely dependent on the library’s law clerk coming to them, and the clerk designated to assist them with legal matters is the same clerk assigned to help the general population. Plaintiffs have had difficulty obtaining library materials because that law clerk is often busy in helping general population inmates or in performing his other responsibilities. Under the established procedures, the law clerk may not get general library materials for plaintiffs, but must forward any request to a general library clerk (Flowers Tr. 27-28; Johnson Tr. 56, 59; Thomas Tr. 112-13). 49. Defendants have never permitted plaintiffs to have confidential interviews with the Chief Legal Advocate in the privacy of the converted study cell. If a protective custody inmate wants legal counseling, he must discuss his case while the Chief Legal Advocate or law clerk stands outside the bars of the study cage. Defendants have never permitted plaintiffs to attend any special library programs, including legal programs (Flowers Tr. 28; Huff Dep. 52; Johnson Tr. 54-55, 74; Morris Dep. 55-57, 67). 50. Because they are put on display in full view of persons in the library while in the cages, plaintiffs often would not go to the library “to keep from being harassed.” Plaintiffs understandably found the experience of being locked in the library cages “dehumanizing” and “humiliating” — they were like animals on display. For those reasons, the cages often remained empty when the more aggressive general population houses were scheduled for the library (Flowers Tr. 28; Johnson Tr. 85, 91; Thomas Tr. 112). 51. Even apart from its humiliating aspects, plaintiffs’ access to library and legal materials is inadequate, and they are often unable to make any effective use of legal resources. For example, plaintiff Williams, when attempting to respond in 1981 to a motion to dismiss his complaint in this lawsuit, could not obtain the legal research or materials he requested or get his pleadings typed (Johnson Tr. 59, 88; Williams Tr. 199-202). More generally, as anyone who has done legal research knows, it is essential to have free access to the books to know just which ones you really need. No one — even the most skilled legal scholar— can work effectively by having to designate in advance precisely which books (or which pages) are needed, then having those books (or pages) brought to the individual, then designating other books (or pages) as a result of reviewing the first designation, and so on. Even if an inmate were sophisticated and attuned to the nuances of legal meaning, the limitations imposed by defendants would convert the possible work of minutes into a need to spend hours— and, moreover, hours to which no plaintiff could gain access. 52. When plaintiffs were housed in Cell-house B-West, inmate law clerks were supposed to visit the protective custody galleries periodically to take requests for and deliver certain legal and general materials from the library. Often correctional officers denied the clerks access to the cell-house. Even when they were admitted, they were not permitted to deliver law books from the library to any inmate cell. Although inmates may receive photostatic copies of law materials, they must pay for the copying if it exceeds 300 pages in a year. All the problems described in Finding 51 applied with equal or greater force to such arrangements (Stip. ¶ 25; Johnson Tr. 68-69, 88, 93). 53. With the move of plaintiffs to Cell-house H in January 1985, library carts stopped coming to the unit to provide services. Inmate library clerks may come to the unit, but they do not bring large numbers of books into the unit. That aggravated even further the problems described in Finding 51 (Pedersen Tr. 251; Wheaton 10/30/85 Dep. 87-88). 54. Since May 1979 defendants have never set aside the library for the exclusive use of protective custody inmates. In 1982 the Stateville librarian proposed that the library be opened on weekends for “low profile” inmates, such as those in protective custody. However, the correctional staff library liaison told the librarian to drop the matter, because such weekend library services would require a change in the defendants’ “mindset.” No weekend library services have been instituted for protective custody inmates (Johnson Tr. 63-66). C. Vocational and Educational Programs 55. Illinois’ Code specifies that a goal of Department is to “restore offenders to useful citizenship.” To meet that objective, defendants are required to provide vocational and educational programs designed to give all inmates the opportunity to attain the achievement level equivalent to the completion of the twelfth grade, to encourage the attainment of higher levels of education and to maintain professional instruction wherever possible (Code §§ 1001-1-2(d) and 1003-6-2(d)). 56. Under A.R. 500 (effective June 1, 1977) and its subsequent revisions, Department’s policy is to “provide residents with academic and vocational opportunities ... so that their return to the free society will be enhanced and their prospects for employment increased.” Administrative Directive 04.10.101 (effective January 15, 1985) further provides defendants must “ensure that academic and vocational programs are available for inmates to better equip themselves for productive lives” (PXs 1-500, 3-04.10.101; Susner Tr. I 5-7, 12). 57. In keeping with those policies, defendants have made available to State-ville’s general population inmates the full spectrum of vocational courses offered by the Education Department. Vocational training teaches inmates job skills, both to qualify them for certain jobs within the institution and to prepare them for legitimate employment upon their release. Vocational classes currently available to general population inmates include barbering, welding, small engine repair, graphic arts and building maintenance, which includes training as a plumber or electrician. All the equipment needed to reach vocational training programs is maintained in the vocational education center (Stip. ¶ 27; PX 8A; Susner Tr. I 74-75, 79-81; DeRobertis Tr. 155-56). Stateville’s Education Department also offers a career planning program, which evaluates an inmate’s vocational interests and abilities so that he can be assigned to a vocational training program (Susner Tr. I 71-72). 58. In like manner, defendants have made available to Stateville’s general population inmates the full spectrum of academic courses offered by the Education Department. Since at least 1979 defendants have made available to general population inmates: (a) classroom instruction in Adult Basic Education (“ABE”) and General Education Development (“GED”) on an open-entry, open-exit basis; (b) classroom instruction programs designed for younger inmates who read below a seventh grade level; and (c) college level courses leading to degrees of Associate of Arts or Bachelor of Arts. (Stip. ¶ 26; PXs 8A, 35; Susner Tr. I 16, 18-23, 54; Susner Tr. II 11-15). 59. Defendants hold all classes for general population inmates at the Education Center, which has 17 classrooms. That classroom setting serves a valuable function and is more conducive to learning than individual study because of the interaction among the class members. Indeed, although some learning can take place under other conditions, a classroom setting may fairly be viewed as “essential” to obtaining an effective education (Susner Tr. I 23, 54; Susner Tr. II 14-15). 60. Since 1979, defendants have paid $15 per month to each general population inmate assigned to educational programs on a full-time basis. Any general population inmate may participate in educational programs on a part-time basis, even if he has a job assignment, and receive the greater pay available for working the job (Susner Tr. I 63-64, 67). 61. Before May 1979, while protective custody inmates were housed in Cellhouse E, the opportunities for academic education were essentially equivalent to those afforded the general population. Each day a “line” of such inmates went to the Educational Center for regular classroom instruction (Stip. 1113; Williams Tr. 186-87). As the following Findings show, since May 1979 the vocational and academic programming available to protective custody inmates has been significantly inferior to that afforded the general population. Although O’Leary purports to list vocational education as his top priority for protective custody inmates, defendants have never offered such programs to plaintiffs. Nor have defendants ever made the career planning program or any college level degree programs available to plaintiffs (PX 11; Huff Tr. 215-16; O’Leary Tr. 137; Susner Tr. I 63, 72-73, 82; Wells Tr. 37). 62. From May 1979 through January 1983 plaintiffs received no classroom instruction of any type. During that period protective custody inmates had access to ABE and GED only by individual cell study, an arrangement under which teachers would occasionally visit the galleries, stand in front of the inmate’s cell and answer the inmate’s questions on the materials. While disciplinary segregation inmates were housed in Cellhouse B-West, defendants focused academic educational programming on them, not on protective custody inmates. Many protective custody inmates became disenchanted with the system because they quite understandably found they could not use the cell study materials effectively (Susner Tr. I 25-26; Susner Tr. II 31; Thomas Tr. 94). 63. Because he recognized the educational services being provided to plaintiffs were “minimal” and because a large number of the plaintiffs had expressed interest in educational programs, Stateville’s education administrator proposed to defendants in May 1982 that the Education Department begin regular classroom instruction for protective custody inmates. However, no classroom instruction was permitted until January 1983, when the room at the back of Cellhouse B-West was opened (see Finding 34) (PX 36; Susner Tr. I 29-31). 64. Beginning in January 1983 defendants permitted classroom GED instruction for plaintiffs. Because the class was limited to 15 inmates, there was a waiting list. In mid-1983 defendants ordered GED classroom instruction discontinued for all inmates and had GED taught by closed-circuit television instead (Susner Tr. I 48-51). 65. In January 1983, solely to satisfy the Meeks Decree, defendants permitted a single college level course to be offered to plaintiffs. Since moving the protective custody unit to Cellhouse H in January 1985, however, defendants have offered no college courses to plaintiffs. Defendants have once again permitted plaintiffs GED classroom instruction, with the classes held in the cellhouse’s converted garage. As for ABE, even though the Education Department believes it can deal more effectively with such students in a classroom setting and such classroom instruction had been offered since July 1983, in Cellhouse H the offering has been confined to cell study (O’Leary Tr. 41; Susner Tr. I 51-56, 59-61). 66. Until July 1985 defendants paid plaintiffs $10 a month “idle pay,” even when they participated in classroom instruction. In the fall of 1985 defendants finally started to pay plaintiffs educational pay of $15 per month, retroactive to July 1985. Through complaints written by plaintiff Williams and others, defendants had known since at least 1983 that protective custody inmates in educational programs were not being paid the $15 educational pay available to general population inmates in such programs. That difference in treatment — though perhaps not significant in a monetary sense — is all of a piece with defendants’ total attitudes toward protective custody inmates, manifested in their testimony in this case (though never acknowledged by defendants): Whatever the source or cause of their mindset, they perceive protective custody inmates as a class entitled to fewer privileges, falsely rationalizing their treatment in terms of “security” considerations (PXs 41, 43; O’Leary Tr. 124-25; Susner Tr. I 67-68). D. Jobs 67. Illinois’ Code requires Department, insofar as possible, to employ inmates at useful work. “Such employment shall equip such persons with marketable skills [and] promote habits of work and responsibility____” In connection with such programs, defendants must maintain “programs of training in various vocations and trades” and must “provide opportunities for training outside working hours” (Code §§ 1001 — 1—2(d), 1003 — 6—2(d), 1003-12-1, 1003-12-3). 68. To meet their statutory obligations, defendants have made jobs available to general population inmates as skilled workers, semi-skilled workers, clerical workers and general laborers. Defendants pay from $15 to $45 per month for those jobs, depending on skill levels and length of time on the job. Unassigned inmates receive $10 per month in “idle pay” (Stip. H 30; PXs 3-05.03.103A, 10). 69. Before May 1979, while protective custody inmates were housed in Cellhouse E, they held a variety of jobs (such as gallery workers and cellhouse help) within the cellhouse (PX 50; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 40-43; Williams Tr. 187). As the following Findings Show, since May 1979 the job opportunities for protective custody inmates have been either nonexistent or significantly inferior to those offered to general population inmates (PX 11, Huff Tr. 215-16; Wells Tr. 37). 70. From May 1979 until November 1982 defendants made no jobs available to plaintiffs. Throughout that period plaintiffs received only idle pay of $10 per month. From time to time defendants used plaintiffs to do certain tasks around or near the cellhouse, but those tasks were labeled “voluntary” nonpaying jobs, carrying no pay but only the benefit of a potential award of good time (Stip. 1131; PX 10; Flowers Tr. 30-31; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 145-48; Williams Tr. 204-06). 71. In November 1982 defendants made available to plaintiffs a limited number of jobs as gallery help, food handlers and members of cleaning details on a 90-day rotating basis. Defendants made those jobs available solely because of the Meeks Decree (Stip. ¶ 32; DeRobertis Tr. 167; O’Leary Tr. 56, 74-75; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 145; Wheaton 2/5/86 Tr. 139-40). 72. Defendants have never made available to protective custody inmates any jobs in prison industries or such skilled job categories as plumbers or electricians. Plaintiffs have frequently complained to the correctional staff that they want jobs to earn good time, help their chances for parole, earn money and get out of their cells (Flowers Tr. 30; O’Leary Tr. 56; Pedersen Tr. 257; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 154). 73. Despite the mandate of the Meeks Decree, none of the defendants has developed any plan to provide jobs to protective custody inmates. Before becoming subjected to the compulsion of the Meeks Decree, DeRobertis had done nothing to create job assignments for protective custody inmates because he did not want to take any jobs away from the general population. Defendants even permitted approximately 15 general population inmates formerly housed in Cellhouse H to keep jobs as Cellhouse H help, rather than providing those jobs to the protective custody inmates who had been moved there (DeRobertis 11/26/84 Dep. 92, 94; DeRobertis Tr. 175; O’Leary Tr. 110-11; Wheaton 10/30/85 Dep. 49-50). E. Conditions 74. Because out-of-cell recreation is a basic service critical to inmates’ well-being, Illinois’ Code requires defendants to provide every inmate with the opportunity to leave his cell for at least one hour each day “unless the chief administrative officer determines that it would be harmful or dangerous to the security or safety of the institution.” Other statutory provisions guarantee each inmate (a) at least one shower per week, (b) bedding, soap and towels and (c) a wholesome, nutritious diet at regularly scheduled hours (Code §§ 1003-7-2(a), (c), (d)). 75. General population inmates have access to a wide variety of recreational opportunities. Yard access is regularly available, often twice a day. Stateville’s new gymnasium, built in 1979, has two full-sized basketball courts, Universal weight machines, at least one ping-pong table, one pool table and a music room. There is also an auxiliary gym with free weights and boxing equipment. Dayrooms in most general population houses are available for leisure time use and are stocked with weights (Wheaton 1/29/86 Tr. 197, 203; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 5-6). 76. Defendants offer numerous other leisure time activities to general population inmates. In addition to the general library, there are chess and checker tournaments, art shows, movies, sports tournaments and picnics (Flowers Tr. 14-16; Godinez Dep. 107-08). 77. Before May 1979, while protective custody residents were housed in Cellhouse E, they (like general population inmates) had both regular day yard and night yard. They also had regular use of the “old gym” located in the central rotunda area of the institution from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m. twice a week. They were also permitted to play checkers or cards on folding tables in the dayroom when they finished their job assignments for the day (Williams Tr. 182-85). As the following Findings show, since May 1979 the protective custody inmates’ opportunities for out-of-cell recreation have been significantly inferior to those offered to general population inmates. 78. While plaintiffs were housed in Cell-house B-West, they were scheduled for yard privileges once per day, but they were often denied such access, particularly if disciplinary segregation inmates had caused disturbances. At other times weather conditions made it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to go when yard was offered. Plaintiffs did attend movies once a week in the “old gym” portion of the central rotunda area (Flowers Tr. 15-16; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 87-88; Williams Tr. 193-94). 79. Until January 1985 defendants made no indoor alternatives to yard recreation available to plaintiffs. They have never permitted plaintiffs to use either of the two gyms, nor did they generally permit the use of flags (the ground-level area within a cellhouse), galleries or other areas in Cellhouse B for recreation by protective custody inmates. For a short time the then Cellhouse B superintendent allowed recreation at the back end of the flag for the 30-40 protective custody inmates in Cell-house B-East, but defendants discontinued the program when that superintendent was transferred. No attempt was ever made to renew any similar type of flag area recreation (DeRobertis Tr. 177-78, 198; O’Leary Tr. 112-14, 117, 143-45; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 6, 83-84). 80. Since the unit was moved to Cell-house H in January 1985, protective custody inmates have received about V-k hours of dayroom or yard access on alternate days. Defendants provide no recreation on Sundays, though there are no security constraints preventing it. Cellhouse H’s yard is smaller and allows for fewer activities than the yard in Cellhouse B, and defendants continue to make the gym and all other recreational programs unavailable to protective custody inmates (Pedersen Tr. 264; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 84-85; Wheaton 2/5/86 Tr. 118-19). 81. Before May 1979, while housed in Cellhouse E, protective custody inmates ate in one of the dining rooms in the central rotunda area, as did the general population. Access to the dining area was through the Cellhouse E tunnel, then across the rotunda corridor to a doorway into the dining room directly facing the tunnel. Security could be provided by sealing off the rotunda corridor by remote-controlled security gates monitored by television cameras and by guards posted in the area (Wheaton 1/29/86 Tr. 195-96; Williams Tr. 180-82). As the following Findings show, since May 1979 the food service for protective custody inmates has been significantly inferior to that afforded general population inmates. 82. Since May 1979 defendants have forced protective custody inmates to eat all meals in their cells except on two occasions — once when such inmates were fed in the central rotunda “old gym” and once on a Thanksgiving when, solely for administrative convenience, such inmates were allowed into the dining hall to get food to take back to their cells. As for the “old gym,” it had tables and chairs already set up and, in fact, was used to feed general population inmates during renovation of the existing dining rooms in 1984-85. Access to the “old gym” was directly across the rotunda corridor from the Cellhouse B tunnel. As they did when protective custody residents went to the movies there, defendants were able to provide both access and security in the same way they did so for the dining hall in the same rotunda during the period protective custody inmates were in Cellhouse E (DeRobertis Tr. 132; O’Leary Tr. 50-52, 119-20; Thomas Tr. 107-08; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 135-44; Williams Tr. 191-93). 83. In Cellhouse B and until very recently in Cellhouse H, the delivery of food to protective custody inmates in their cells — given the fact it was prepared elsewhere and had to be transported some distance, with several potentials for delays— frequently caused hot food to be served cold or in an otherwise unpalatable condition. Despite their early recognition of that obvious problem, defendants did little to correct it. Finally, in November 1985 they procured heated food carts to deliver food to protective custody inmates. Such carts had long been available, but defendants had rejected their use. Though such use did pose some logistics problems, this was still another instance of defendants’ discriminatory frame of reference as to protective custody inmates (see Finding 66) (PXs 54-72; Flowers Tr. 19-20; Morrison Dep. 23, 34, 102, 110; O’Leary Tr. 118; Thomas Tr. 108-09; Wheaton 1/30/86 Tr. 117-21; Williams Tr. 191-92). 84. Before May 1979, while protective custody inmates were housed in Cellhouse E, they received showers four to five times a week, particularly after yard or the completion of a job assignment. Defendants converted cells at the end of several galleries for individual showers. Group showers were also located in the basement area. Laundry was picked up once a week (Williams Tr. 179-80, 185). 85. Between May 1979 (when the protective custody unit was moved to Cell-house B-West) and January 1985 (when the unit was moved to Cellhouse H), the shower and laundry services to protective custody inmates were erratic and less frequent than described in Finding 83 for the preMay 1979 period (Stip. H 36; Flowers Tr. 8-10,16-19; Williams Tr. 191, 194-95, 212). Since the move to Cellhouse H, though, daily showers and weekly laundry services have been available to plaintiffs. There have been periods, however, when there was no hot water (Thomas Tr. Ill; Wheaton 2/5/86 Tr. 120). III. Security Concerns A. General Security Problems of a Maximum Security Institution 86. As a maximum security prison housing inmates drawn from among the worst offenders in Illinois, Stateville presents understandable security concerns. Confinement in a tightly-controlled institution can increase tension and thus the danger of violent behavior. There are a large number of mutually hostile gangs in the institution, with gang affiliation running as high as 85% (DeRobertis Tr. 109-10; O’Leary Tr. 9-10). 87. General population prisoners face a day-to-day threat to their safety — usually incapable of being identified and particularized in advance — simply from being incarcerated at Stateville. Using the principles of modern penology, defendants have employed a wide range of means for dealing with that inherent threat. First and most obviously, there are ever-present direct security measures, including the guards, restraint systems and “shake-down” searches. Second, there is prison intelligence, accumulated primarily through informants. Third, there are institutional management techniques, such as specified periods for inmate movement, a pass system and, particularly after the afternoon count, strict controls on all inmate movement (O’Leary Tr. 61-62, 78-79, 81; Wheaton 2/5/86 Tr. 183). 88. All the techniques referred to in Finding 87 help minimize, but cannot eliminate, the generalized threat to general population inmates. Inmates and staff must live with the dangers within the institution on a daily basis. Defendants cannot stop individual acts of violence. They can only institute reasonable and prudent procedures to contain violence and the threat of violence. Although general lockdowns would reduce inmate-to-inmate contact and thus eliminate some of the danger, defendants have opted not to lock down the institution except when absolutely necessary to respond to a specific disturbance within the institution or when a general search is called for (DeRobertis Tr. 205-06; O’Leary Tr. 81-82). 89. One reason for not locking down Stateville more frequently is that severe restrictions on inmate movement and activity are likely to be counterproductive and self-perpetuating. Defendants have therefore recognized that while the extreme measure of lockdown is always available, it is highly undesirable. Idleness and isolation tend to create inmate tension and a concentration of violence during the times inmates are together. Just as security is necessary for successful programming, programming is necessary for security (Godinez Dep. 107; O’Leary Tr. 62, 65-66, 82-83; Wells Tr. 81). B. General and Special Security Problems of Protective Custody Inmates 90. Once incarcerated at Stateville, inmates who are ultimately assigned to protective custody must continue to face a general unidentified threat to their security (that is, one usually incapable of being particularized and identified in advance), just as general population inmates do. Even though isolated from the general population, protective custody inmates may still face a general unidentified threat from other protective custody inmates. Protective custody inmates fight, as do general population inmates, and may be subjected to the additional security techniques applied to the general population, such as confinement in disciplinary segregation. Protective custody is not a guaranty that an inmate will be insulated from the general dangers of life in a maximum security prison (Wells Tr. 61, 69). 91. Protective custody is not intended to eliminate the generalized threats that apply to all inmates equally, but rather to protect protective custody inmates from a second level of danger, which is the reason for their placement in protective custody. Unlike the generalized unidentifiable threat, the second level of danger has been identified or is identifiable and specifically substantiated. Defendants know what the danger is. It is from that danger only that plaintiffs have a right to expect additional protection beyond that afforded general population inmates (O’Leary Tr. 79-81). 92. Additional security measures are necessary to safeguard plaintiffs from the second-level threat. Because that level of danger ordinarily comes from the general population, the bulk of the concerns can be addressed by limiting protective custody inmates’ interaction with the general population. At times, the source of the identified danger may be from an inmate who is himself at risk and thus also housed within protective custody. In such cases, defendants must use institutional management techniques to keep the inmates separated (Wells Tr. 66). 93. Except for the need for added techniques to deal with the special problems referred to in Finding 92, the techniques defendants use in the case of general population inmates, to address the generalized threat applicable to all Stateville inmates, can and do work with protective custody inmates as well. When protective custody inmates were housed in Cellhouse E, for example, security was stringent. Protective custody residents did not feel threatened by the general population or by other protective custody inmates when participating in the various activities in groups. Although defendants regarded Cellhouse E as a relatively unsafe house, there is no record of any significant incidents or of gang violence in that cellhouse. And that was so in an institution that defendants otherwise characterized as “up for grabs” and “not in control” in 1979 (DeRobertis Tr. 104-05; Lane Tr. 51; Williams Tr. 187-89). C. Defendants’ Professed Concerns with, and Exaggerated Responses to, the Special Security Problems of Protective Custody Inmates 94. As various previous Findings have indicated and as later Findings will reflect as well, every administrative step defendants have taken or failed to take in providing housing and programmatic accommodations for protective custody inmates has been sought to be explained by them during the Trial as security-motivated and security-oriented. Those rote explanations have been so all-embracing and Pavlovian in nature as to make it difficult for this Court to determine (a) in which instances (limited at best) they represent defendants’ credible and actual reasons for action or inaction, (b) in which instances they may have initially represented defendants’ actual reasons for action or inaction, but were shortly thereafter overtaken