Full opinion text
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL AND TO DECERTIFY CLASS (AS AMENDED BY THE COURT’S ORDERS OF OCTOBER 14, 1986 AND MARCH 10, 1987) ROSS T. ROBERTS, District Judge. White Industries, Inc. (“White Industries”) and Carthage Airways, Inc. (“Carthage Airways”) seek, for themselves and for the members of a nationwide class composed of all “zone dealers” of Cessna aircraft who operated as such during the years between April 14, 1968 and June 5, 1974, treble damages for alleged violations of § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), and § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Still present as defendants are The Cessna Aircraft Company (“Cessna”), and Cessna Finance Corporation (“CFC”). Following assignment to this division, the case proceeded to trial before the court sitting without a jury. During the course of trial, it was determined: (a) that presentation of the individual claims asserted by White Industries and Carthage Airways would be bifurcated between liability and damages; (b) that upon completion of the liability phase of those individual claims the court would recess the case, issue its rulings on evidentiary questions which had been reserved, and thereafter rule defendants’ anticipated motion for involuntary dismissal of those claims; and (c), that in tandem with its liability rulings on the individual claims the court would rule defendants’ motion—made during trial—to decertify the class. The court’s evidentiary rulings having been made, see White Industries v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F.Supp. 1049 (W.D.Mo.1985), I now turn to the substantive matters mentioned. I. DEFINITIONS Given the scope and complexity of this litigation, I commence with a definition of certain terms which recur throughout. The exercise, however, is not purely advisory; the definitions which follow also incorporate findings of fact and conclusions of law. (a) General Aviation: As described by Cessna itself, “general aviation” includes all flying except for commercial airlines and military, encompassing everything from the single-seat aerial application aircraft to a planeload of commuters traveling to major airports for airline connections. It [includes] air taxi trips, busy executives visiting outlying plants, an injured child being airlifted to medical facilities, pipeline patrol, aerial examination of forests for fires, the shipment of high priority cargo, rushing spare parts to equipment requiring immediate service, aerobatics, reseeding strip-mined areas, restocking lakes with fish [and] floatplane hunting and fishing trips into the North Woods. It [includes] almost every conceivable business and recreational use. Pit. Ex. # 2 (Cessna brochure, circa 1969). (b) Fixed Base Operator (“FBO”): A generic term signifying a business (individually owned, corporate, or otherwise) which occupied physical space at an airport and which carried on some or all of a variety of general aviation related activities, including flight training, aircraft rental, aircraft chartering, aircraft maintenance, servicing and repair, aircraft hangaring or tie-down, and the sale of aircraft, avionics, accessories and parts. As would be expected, some FBOs were larger and more aggressive in their operations than others, and some did not engage in all the activities mentioned above. It appears, however, that many were at least occasionally involved in the resale of both new and used aircraft to most kinds of “end consumers” (see “end consumer,” infra), and a number were active in that line of business. Both “contracted dealers” of Cessna aircraft (see “Contracted Dealer,” infra) and “zone dealers” of Cessna aircraft (see “Zone Dealer,” infra) were ordinarily FBOs, although many other FBOs were never formally associated with the Cessna distribution system. (c) Cessna Distributor: As used in this opinion, a business operating under a franchise contract with Cessna, performing—at least in theory—a more or less traditional wholesale function in the distribution of Cessna aircraft, accessories and parts: viz, the purchase and maintenance of an inventory of Cessna aircraft, accessories and parts; the development of “contracted dealers” (see “Contracted Dealer,” infra) within the distributor’s assigned geographic “area of responsibility;” and the sale of Cessna aircraft, parts and accessories to those contracted dealers. (d) Contracted Dealer: As used in this opinion, a business—ordinarily if not without exception an FBO—operating under a contract (ordinarily of one year duration) with a Cessna distributor. A “contracted dealer” was in theory to perform a more or less traditional retail function in the distribution of Cessna aircraft, accessories and parts: viz, purchase Cessna aircraft, accessories and parts and resell the same to the buying public. In practice, a “contracted dealer” usually acquired its Cessna aircraft from the Cessna distributor with whom it had a contract, although nothing in any of the contracts shown in evidence required the same or restricted either the distributor or its dealers in buying from or selling to any person either might choose. (e) Zone Dealer: A business—again, ordinarily if not without exception an FBO— operating under a direct contract (ordinarily of one year duration) with Cessna, in theory performing a retail function in the distribution of Cessna aircraft, accessories and parts; a function parallel to that performed by a contracted dealer. As with contracted dealers, nothing in any of the “zone dealer” contracts shown in evidence restricted either Cessna or its zone dealers in buying from or selling to any person either might choose. (f) Independent Dealer: As used in this opinion, a business—usually an FBO— which was not under contract with Cessna or a Cessna distributor, but which engaged (even if occasionally) in purchasing new or used Cessna aircraft for the immediate principal purpose of resale. (g) Used Aircraft: As used in this opinion, any aircraft which at the time of the sale in question carried 100 hours or more of flight time. My present selection of 100 hours of use is based upon the testimony of two of plaintiffs’ witnesses (Love and Desciose), but of course is made without prejudice to defendants’ ability to show that some lesser number of hours would be appropriate. (h) New Aircraft: As used in this opinion, any aircraft which at the time of the sale in question carried less than 100 hours of flight time, unless materially damaged. (i) Current and Non-Current Aircraft: Cessna marketed each of its models of aircraft on a “model year” basis. Although there were differences from model to model, a “model year” generally commenced in the fall or early winter of each year, and terminated upon the introduction of the new model the following year. The term “current aircraft” refers to an aircraft which, at the time in question, was still within its “model year.” By the same token, a non-current aircraft would be any aircraft, even if “new,” which at the time in question had been succeeded by the next year’s model. (j) End Consumer: One who acquired an aircraft for the immediate principal purpose of using it (whether for business or for pleasure), as opposed to reselling it. Thus a commuter airline which purchased a plane for use in that business was an end consumer; so too was an individual who purchased a plane to fly for pleasure, or a company which acquired a plane for executive use. In theory at least, the definition would also include an FBO—even a contracted dealer, zone dealer or independent dealer—which purchased an aircraft, as some did, for the immediate principal purpose of using it in a flight school, air charter service or similar activity. II. GENERAL BACKGROUND Cessna was incorporated in 1927. It has been engaged, since that time and insofar as pertinent here, in the manufacture and distribution of aircraft for use in general aviation. During the period in question (April 14, 1968 to June 5, 1974), Cessna manufactured a variety of models of single and multi-engine aircraft for such use. Those planes were assembled by Cessna at plants in or near Wichita, Kansas—also the location of Cessna’s corporate headquarters— and reached the “consuming” public through one of two general distribution systems then utilized by Cessna: (a) the Cessna distributor system; and (b), the zone dealer system. It is the functioning and interrelationship of these two systems which form the core of plaintiffs’ claims. Historically, in the period before and immediately after World War II the Cessna distribution system—like that of other general aviation aircraft manufacturers at the time—was essentially single-tiered, made up of “distributors” who purchased aircraft and parts from Cessna and resold to “operators.” The latter were at that time the predominant end consumers of general aviation aircraft, who used the planes they purchased for flight school training, rentals, charter service and special use work. The “distributors,” although called such, generally performed little in the way of traditional “wholesale” functions, and in fact operated in a capacity which would ordinarily be thought of as that of a “dealer” or “retailer.” In the 1950’s, Cessna undertook to broaden the market for its aircraft to include more of the general public—those who would purchase for what might be called “personal use” (whether business or pleasure, individual or corporate). To that end, it sought to expand the number of airport based outlets which would bear its name and provide a point of contact with the general public. That effort led to the creation of a more formal, two-tier distribution system composed of Cessna distributors operating under contracts with Cessna, and contracted dealers operating under contracts with those Cessna distributors—the so-called Cessna distributor system. Cessna sold its aircraft to Cessna distributors at a discount of 25% (during some periods, 26%) from Cessna’s suggested list price; the suggested “dealer” price was a discount of 20% from the suggested list price. In general, the original Cessna distributors were the larger and more stable of the earlier “distributors,” who converted their operations and entered into appropriate contracts with Cessna; the contracted dealers were either earlier “distributors” who did not convert, or were drawn from the ranks of FBOs. In the event, however, Cessna was unable to obtain and keep a sufficient number of Cessna distributors to service all areas of the country. Cessna sought to fill these voids, where they existed, by the creation of its “zone” distribution system. Under that arrangement Cessna established, for each geographic area in need thereof, its own “zone” outlet, responsible for performing in that geographic area the same functions that a Cessna distributor would otherwise have performed. These “zones” were wholly owned divisions of Cessna, but each had its own, separate operating facility and staff and was in general dealt with as a separate “profit center” within the Cessna organization. It was the responsibility of each “zone” to develop and enter into contracts with local “zone dealers.” Over the years, Cessna expanded this “zone” method of operation (by buying out Cessna distributors or by implementing the system in areas where Cessna distributors chose not to renew their agreements), until by 1970 substantially over 60% of the company’s business was conducted through the “zone” system. Zone dealers acquired their air-, craft from Cessna at a discount of 20% from the suggested list price. In summary, during the period in question the Cessna distribution system was a “dual” system: in some parts of the country planes were sold by Cessna to Cessna distributors, who in theory resold to their contracted dealers, who in turn resold to the 'buying public; in other parts of the country planes were sold by Cessna through its “zone” outlets to zone dealers, with those dealers reselling to the buying public. CFC is, and was during the time in question, a wholly owned Cessna subsidiary which provided wholesale and retail financing to purchasers of Cessna aircraft. It is the source of a good bit of the documentary evidence offered in this case, but aside from whatever tactical advantage may have accrued to plaintiffs in that connection its presence as a defendant is largely unexplained. White Industries was incorporated in 1965. In excess of 95% of its stock is and always has been held by Frank Terry White, who is and always has been its President and chief executive officer. Originally, the company was involved principally in the foreign automobile salvage business, although it also maintained an aircraft rental, aircraft charter, flight instruction and aircraft sales business at Fairfax Airport in Kansas City, Kansas. The assets of the automobile salvage business were sold in 1968, and thereafter the bulk of the company’s operations were represented by the above mentioned aircraft related activities, eventually expanded to include the operation of an aircraft commuter service as well. On August 8, 1968, the company entered into a contract with Cessna and became a Cessna zone dealer (under the “Kansas City zone”) for all but one of the models of Cessna single and twin-engine aircraft. The dealership was “non-exclusive” (as were all Cessna dealerships, whether established under a Cessna distributor or under a zone), with an assigned “area of responsibility” consisting of two Missouri counties (Jackson and Clay) and two Kansas counties (Johnson and Wyandotte), all part of the greater Kansas City metropolitan area. The arrangement was continued until December 31, 1969, during which time the company purchased 27 aircraft from Cessna, each at a discount of approximately 20% from Cessna’s suggested list price. Eugene Ingram is and was at all relevant times a resident of Carthage, Missouri, a Southwestern Missouri community located approximately 150 miles to the south of Kansas City. In July of 1962, Ingram acquired a fixed base operation at the Carthage Municipal Airport. That business had previously been, among other things, a contracted dealer (single engine) under Hackett-Aire Distributors (“Hackett”), a Cessna distributor located in Kansas City. Ingram, operating as a sole proprietorship under the name “Carthage Airways,” continued the relationship until 1966, when the business was incorporated under the name “Carthage Airways, Inc.” In approximately 1967, the Hackett distributorship was acquired by Cessna and became the Kansas City “zone” operation. Carthage Airways thereupon entered into a contract with Cessna and became a zone dealer (single engine). In late 1968, the dealership was expanded to include multiengine aircraft. In February, 1969, Carthage Airways acquired a fixed base operation at Miami, Oklahoma, approximately 60 miles to the southwest of Carthage. That Miami operation, carried on under the name “Miami Aircraft,” was actually a separate dealership (multi-engine) conducted under a contract with Skyliners Distributors, Inc. (“Skyliners”), a Cessna distributor located in Wichita, Kansas. Carthage Airways continued the “Miami Aircraft” operation for approximately two years. In 1970 or 1971, the Kansas City “zone” was acquired by DAD Incorporated (“DAD”), a Cessna distributor located in Omaha, Nebraska. Despite that fact, Carthage Airways apparently continued as a single engine Cessna dealer under a separate contract with Cessna until February 4, 1972, although it actually purchased its aircraft from DAD during that time frame. On the latter date, it entered into a dealer (single engine) contract with DAD. This last arrangement continued until Carthage Airways’ business ended in 1973. During the period at issue in this suit, Carthage Airways purchased 23 Cessna aircraft. Those planes, as with the planes purchased by White Industries, encompassed a variety of models extending from the cheapest of Cessna’s single engine craft (the Model 150) to sophisticated and expensive twin-engine models (e.g., the Model 421A). III. STANDARD OF REVIEW As noted, the individual plaintiffs’ claims have been bifurcated between liability and damages. As also noted, those claims have been bench-tried and are presently before me on defendants’ motion, pursuant to Rule 41(b), for involuntary dismissal at the close of that individual liability evidence. Both the language of the Rule and the Advisory Committee comments demonstrate that the standard employed in dealing with such a motion is quite different from that applied to counterpart motions made in jury-tried cases under under Rule 50(a). In the latter instance, of course, the court determines only whether the evidence presented is sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury; a process that requires viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and prohibits a weighing of the evidence or any assessment of witness credibility. See generally 9 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2524 (1971). With regard to the present sort of motion, however, there are no special inferences applied in favor of the party opposing the motion, id. § 2371, at 224-25, and the court may weigh the evidence presented, resolve any conflicts therein and decide for itself where the preponderance lies. Id.; and see Byrd v. Vitek, 689 F.2d 770, 771 n. 2 (8th Cir.1982); Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 154-55 (8th Cir. 1977); Lang v. Cone, 542 F.2d 751, 754 (8th Cir.1976). In short, under a Rule 41(b) motion the court may undertake a full-blown examination of the merits of the claims to which the motion is directed, complete with fact finding and credibility resolutions. If, having made that examination, the court finds that the opposing party has not supported those claims by a preponderance of the credible evidence, the motion should be granted. IV. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN CLAIM Reduced to its most prosaic terms, plaintiffs’ Robinson-Patman claim is that some or all Cessna distributors sold Cessna aircraft on other than a “wholesale” basis, and in fact sold in direct competition with plaintiffs at the retail level. Because of that, plaintiffs allege, and because of the price advantage Cessna distributors enjoyed in their acquisition of Cessna aircraft—a 25% (or during some periods 26%) discount as against the 20% discount at which Cessna sold its planes to zone dealers (and at which contracted dealers often acquired planes from Cessna distributors) —plaintiffs have been, m Robinson-Patman vernacular, the victims of discrimination by Cessna in the price charged “different purchasers [Cessna distributors vs. zone or contracted dealers] of commodities of like grade and quality [the aircraft in question] ... where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition ... in any line of commerce, or to injure ... competition with any person who ... knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination [the Cessna distributors]____” See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). As the Supreme Court has observed, “the Robinson-Patman amendments by no means represent an exemplar of legislative clarity.” FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 349, 88 S.Ct. 904, 908, 19 L.Ed.2d 1222 (1968). Nonetheless, the constituent elements of § 2(a) are not difficult to identify, even if they are not always easy to apply. According to the Federal Trade Commission: In order to bring the substantive portions of [§ 2(a) of] the Act into play, there must be (1) two or more consummated sales, (2) reasonably close in point of time, (3) of commodities, (4) of like grade and quality, (5) with a difference in price, (6) by the same seller, (7) to two or more different purchasers, (8) for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any territory thereof, (9) which may result in competitive injury. Furthermore, (10) the “commerce” requirement must be satisfied. All ten of these jurisdictional elements must be met in order to invoke the power of the Federal Trade Commission or the courts to consider the lawfulness of pricing transactions. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,188, at 23,090-91 (1984). Further (and finally), in any claim for damages a plaintiff must also meet the “actual injury” requirement of § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 561-62, 101 S.Ct. 1923, 1926-27, 68 L.Ed.2d 442 (1981). Defendants suggest that plaintiffs’ case fails in connection with several of these elements. Specifically, defendants assert: (a) that plaintiffs have failed to meet the “like grade and quality” requirement with respect to aircraft purchased by them, as compared to aircraft purchased within a “reasonably close” time frame by any alleged competing Cessna distributor; (b) that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the “in commerce” requirement with respect to any sales to them, or any sales to a Cessna distributor; (c) that plaintiffs have not shown themselves to be in “competition” with any Cessna distributor; and (d), that plaintiffs have failed to show any actual injury within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act. In addition, defendants suggest that portions of Carthage Airways’ claim are time-barred. To the extent necessary to reach them, these and certain related issues will be addressed below, seriatim. A. The Relevant “Commodities” As concerns purchases by the plaintiffs and by Cessna distributors, the relevant “commodities” would be either new or used (as sold by Cessna) aircraft, purchased for resale. Although dealers (and other FBOs) sometimes purchased aircraft (new or used) for use in their businesses (flight school, air charter service, etc.), no one has asserted that pricing differentials by Cessna had any impact upon competition in those endeavors, even if I make the assumption that such “business use” competition falls within the Act. Nor can a purchase for use, albeit with the idea of resale when sufficient use has been made, be considered a purchase for resale. General Motors Corp., 3 Trade Reg.Rep. at 23-023. Accordingly, while I do not suggest that plaintiffs’ claims are adversely affected by their use of planes purchased from Cessna if they purchased those planes for the immediate principal purpose of reselling them, and if their ability to resell them was adversely impacted by Cessna’s differential pricing policies, in turn leading to use in order to mitigate loss, the “commodities” in question here are in fact limited to aircraft purchased for resale. In that connection, Frank Terry White testified that all of the aircraft purchased by White Industries in its capacity as a zone dealer were purchased for the purpose of resale. While more elaboration would have been helpful, and while the company did use some of those aircraft in ■other facets of its business after they remained unsold for a period of time, I find this testimony sufficient for the present purpose. The same is true with respect to Carthage Airways; in fact, the evidence there was in some respects more explicit. And, of course, Cessna distributors ordinarily purchased only for the purpose of resale. I thus find that all parties immediately involved meet the requirement set forth above. B. “Like Grade and Quality” “Airplanes,” as plaintiffs’ counsel once said (somewhat unfortunately it might seem), “are not like hotdogs sold at a ballgame.” And therein lies the nub of the parties’ argument over § 2(a)’s “like grade and quality” requirement. Section 2(a) demands, generally speaking, not only that there be contemporaneous “actual sales” of the relevant “commodities,” but also that the commodities thus sold be of “like grade and quality.” Although a different test has been applied where the commodities are sold to purchasers for use in a manufacturing process, see, e.g., Bruce’s Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 87 F.Supp. 985, 987 (S.D.Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.1951), modified on other grounds, 190 F.2d 73 (5th Cir.1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 875, 72 S.Ct. 165, 96 L.Ed. 657 (1951) (applying substitutability or functional interchangeability as a key test), and where identical products are sold under a nationally advertised label and a private label, see, e.g., FTC v. Borden Company, 383 U.S. 637, 640, 86 S.Ct. 1092, 1095, 16 L.Ed.2d 153 (1966) (consumer preference irrelevant), in the more ordinary case, where the commodities are destined for resale to the consuming public in an unchanged form and where the focus of the dispute concerns whether those commodities are sufficiently different (even if the seller’s cost is the same) to warrant differential pricing, the test is said to be whether there is any “genuine physical difference [between the commodities], regardless of magnitude, that is not merely decorative, artifical or fanciful and which affects consumer use, preference or marketability.” 4 Von Kalinowski, supra § 25.02[2], at 25.18, and authorities cited; and see also III Kintner and Bauer, supra §§ 21.19, 21.20, 21.21. The problem is that the instant case is not an ordinary case. First, and in contrast to most reported § 2(a) cases, it involves highly complex products which are offered (and sold) with a wide variety of “optional” equipment. Second, the pricing differential at issue—the difference in the functional discounts allowed to zone dealers on the one hand and to Cessna distributors on the other—was wholly unrelated to any physical differences between those aircraft or their optional equipment. That is, while as an abstract matter any two aircraft—unless new aircraft of the same model and year, identically equipped— would obviously be sold by Cessna at different prices, and legitimately so, it is not that fact which generated the price differential in question; any Cessna distributor would always pay approximately 5 (or 6)% less for a given plane than a zone dealer, solely as a result of the different functional discounts granted by Cessna. In these circumstances, plaintiffs suggest, the optional equipment features of the aircraft in question should be ignored, with the result that all planes of a given model (at least all new planes of the same model and year) would be treated as being of “like grade and quality,” citing Moog Industries v. Federal Trade Commission, 238 F.2d 43 (8th Cir.1956), aff'd per curiam, 355 U.S. 411, 78 S.Ct. 377, 2 L.Ed.2d 370 (1958), reh’g denied, 356 U.S. 905, 78 S.Ct. 559, 2 L.Ed.2d 583 (1958). Defendants dispute Moog’s applicability and argue instead for an application of the conventional test mentioned above, applied to each plane as actually sold. I am uncertain how Moog itself would dictate the result plaintiffs seek, although I also confess to some uncertainty over just how the case should be interpreted and applied in the present sort of situation. The products in Moog (automotive coils, piston rings and leaf springs, each sold as a separate “line” with a number of different items in each such “line”) did not involve “optional” equipment, nor as defendants correctly point out were Cessna aircraft sold as a “line,” with each purchaser buying the entire “line” (although, in fairness, apparently not all of the purchasers in Moog bought all of an entire “line” either). Nevertheless, Moog does suggest at least two general concepts which bear upon the present issue: (a) since the “like grade and quality” language of the Act “ ‘was designed to serve as one of the necessary rough guides for separating out those commercial transactions insufficiently comparable for price regulation by the statute,’ ” Moog, 238 F.2d at 50, quoting from the Report of the Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the AntiTrust Laws 157 (1955), the phrase demands a sensible approach and permits a somewhat flexible application; and (b), where the price differential in question is in fact unrelated to physical differences in the items sold, one should not—at least within certain limits which remain consistent with the other features and general purpose of the Act—allow those physical differences to dictate the answer to the “like grade and quality” issue, even though they otherwise ordinarily would. See Moog, 238 F.2d at 49-50. These two concepts have application here. Given the highly sophisticated nature of the products in question, the wide variety of options available (particularly in multi-engine aircraft) and the relatively small number of product sales, defendants’ argument would make it virtually impossible to apply the Act to the general aviation aircraft sales industry—or to any other industry involving sophisticated products sold with options—despite the fact that the discounting practice in question, if plaintiffs’ allegations concerning its effect are true, is something the Act was clearly intended to prevent. In view of the Act’s general prophylactic nature, J. Truett Payne Co., 451 U.S. at 561, 101 S.Ct. at 1926, and the fact that it was obviously intended to apply (in a general sense) to the length and breadth of domestic sellers and purchasers, I am unwilling to concede such a gap in its practical reach. Further, the evidence demonstrates that many optional items could be readily removed or replaced or (conversely) ordered and installed by the dealer or by someone in the dealer’s area, thus undercutting significantly the idea that optional equipment must inevitably be considered an integral part of an aircraft for the present purpose. Finally, to the extent that the presence or absence of optional equipment actually did affect any given resale, it seems to me a point better dealt with in connection with the “actual injury” requirement imposed by § 4 of the Clayton Act. On balance, I conclude that plaintiffs’ ultimate premise is correct: in determining the “like grade and quality” issue in this case, the options sold with a particular aircraft should be disregarded. I find, accordingly, that for purposes of this case all new, current Cessna aircraft of a given model were commodities of “like grade and quality,” as were all new, non-current Cessna aircraft of a given model and model year, and, as sold by Cessna, all used aircraft of a given model and year (since Cessna applied the same functional discounts to those aircraft, simply adding an additional discount based on hours of use). I note, however, that used aircraft, even as sold by Cessna, cannot be considered of “like grade and quality” when compared with new aircraft (either current or non-current)—a point that perhaps needs no explanation—and that the same would often if not always be true as between current and non-current aircraft. C. The “In Commerce” Requirement Although there were exceptions, Cessna ordinarily sold its aircraft to Cessna distributors and to zone dealers on an “f.a.f.” (“fly away field”) basis from its facilities in Wichita, Kansas. Under that arrangement, a purchaser from Cessna would take possession of the aircraft at the factory in Wichita and at that point assumed both the risk of subsequent loss and the cost of transporting the aircraft to the purchaser’s facility. Defendants urge that any sale thus accomplished will fail to meet the “in commerce” requirement of the Act. It is true that § 2(a)’s “in commerce” language is considerably more restrictive than the broad “effect on commerce” test adopted in Sherman Act cases. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95, 95 S.Ct. 392, 398-99, 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974); and see generally III Kintner and Bauer, supra 146; 4 Von Kalinowski, supra § 26.01[2], at 26-6 to 26-14. Essentially, the requirement under the present aspect of § 2(a) is that “ ‘at least one of the two [or more] transactions which, when compared, generate a discrimination ... [have] crossed a state line,’ ” Gulf Oil Corp., 419 U.S. at 200, 95 S.Ct. at 401, although it is immaterial which of the relevant transactions meets that test, see Moore v. Mead’s Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119, 75 S.Ct. 148, 150, 99 L.Ed. 145 (1954). Despite the superficial plausability of defendants’ argument in this connection, however, I believe it overlooks the “flow of commerce” doctrine: a general doctrine of federal law which considerably antedates the Robinson-Patman Act, see, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398, 25 S.Ct. 276, 280, 49 L.Ed. 518 (1905), which in fact forms part of the legislative history of the Act, see Representative Utterback’s remarks at 80 Cong.Rec. 9416 (June 15, 1936), and which clearly may be utilized in meeting the Act’s “in commerce” requirements, see Gulf Oil Corp., 419 U.S. at 195, 95 S.Ct. at 398; L & L Oil Co., Inc. v. Murphy Oil Co., 674 F.2d at 1116-17; S & M Materials Co. v. Southern Stone Co., 612 F.2d 198, 200 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832, 101 S.Ct. 101, 66 L.Ed.2d 37 (1980); Roorda v. American Oil Co., 446 F.Supp. 939, 941-43 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). Under that doctrine, the “flow of commerce” begins when goods are transported from their place of origin, if the movement of those goods is intended or expected to cross a state line (unless the goods are raw materials which are to be physically altered before they cross a state line), and continues until the goods come to rest at their ultimate intended destination in another state or states; all that occurs during that flow is “in commerce” for Robinson-Patman purposes. See generally 4 Von Kalinowski, supra at 26-38. It is likewise clear that the existence of the flow depends (with the limitations mentioned above) only upon the general fact that the goods are intended or expected to and do in fact cross a state line during the course of the flow; technicalities regarding passage of title, or whether the goods are shipped f.o.b. (or, as in this case, f.a.f.) are essentially immaterial. S & M Materials Co. v. Southern Stone Co., 612 F.2d at 200; and see also L & L Oil Co., Inc. v. Murphy Oil Corp., 674 F.2d at 1116-17; Vanco Beverages, Inc. v. Falls Cities Industries, Inc., 654 F.2d 1224, 1228 (7th Cir.1981), vacated on other grounds, 460 U.S. 428, 103 S.Ct. 1282, 75 L.Ed.2d 174 (1983). Here, each of the Cessna distributors in question was located outside the State of Kansas. It was obviously clear to all concerned that the aircraft they purchased from Cessna, whether delivered f.a.f. in Wichita or otherwise, would be transported from Wichita to their respective places of business in those other states. No more is necessary for the purpose of § 2(a)’s “in commerce” requirement, and I accordingly reject defendants’ argument. D. Carthage Airways as a “Purchaser”from Cessna As noted, during the years 1971 and 1972 Carthage Airways purchased its aircraft from DAD, a Cessna distributor in Omaha, Nebraska. In addition, Carthage Airways’ “Miami Aircraft” operation purchased its aircraft from Skyliners, a Cessna distributor in Wichita, Kansas. Defendants suggest that all such purchases fall outside the scope of § 2(a), since they were not made directly from Cessna. By conventional analysis defendants’ position would be correct, since the case law makes clear that one who does not purchase directly from the alleged discriminatory seller (here Cessna) cannot ordinarily be considered a “purchaser” within the meaning of § 2(a). See Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 665 F.2d 74, 83 (6th Cir.1981); Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d 4, 7 (5th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901, 90 S.Ct. 212, 24 L.Ed.2d 177 (1969); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13, 14-15 (3d Cir.1956); and see generally Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679, 691 (8th Cir.1966); III Kintner and Bauer, supra at 192; 4 Von Kalinowski, supra at 24-40. The only commonly recognized exception is found in the so-called “indirect purchaser” doctrine: where one purchases a manufacturer’s goods through a distributor, he may be deemed to have purchased directly from the manufacturer if the latter in fact deals directly with him in promoting the sale of the goods, or exercises control over the terms on which he buys. See Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 665 F.2d at 83-4; Hiram Walker, Inc. v. A & S Tropical, Inc., 407 F.2d at 7-8; and see generally III Kintner and Bauer, supra at 202-08; 4 Von Kalinowski, supra at 24-49 to 24-58. That exception is clearly inapplicable here, since there is no showing that Cessna dealt directly with Carthage Airways in promoting the sale of aircraft, or controlled the prices charged it by Cessna distributors. In truth, the most to be said in this respect is that Cessna’s “wholesale” price to those distributors had the practical effect of establishing a “floor” on the resale price imposed by them. That undistinguished fact of life is not a sufficient basis for invoking the doctrine. Barnosky Oils, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 665 F.2d at 84. Carthage Airways concedes as much, and instead urges the application of a new and different exception said to be based upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Fred Meyer, 390 U.S. 341, 88 S.Ct 904. I believe Fred Meyer does indeed support—in fact perhaps dictates—the result sought, and accordingly find the argument persuasive. In that case, suppliers of canned corn and canned peaches sold those products both to the Fred Meyer Company, which operated a chain of supermarkets, and to certain wholesalers who in turn sold to supermarkets which competed with Meyer. Meyer’s supermarkets were the beneficiaries of promotional allowances paid by those suppliers; the same allowances were not made available to the wholesalers or to the supermarkets which purchased from them. The Federal Trade Commission found (among other things) that this practice violated § 2(d) of the Act, and entered a cease and desist order barring Meyer from inducing the suppliers to grant promotional allowances which were not available to the wholesalers. Fred Meyer, 390 U.S. at 344-47, 88 S.Ct. at 906-08. The Court of Appeals reversed that portion of the order, holding (a) that Meyer and the wholesalers did not themselves compete (since Meyer sold only to the public while the wholesalers sold only to supermarkets), and (b), that the supermarkets which purchased from those wholesalers, and did compete with Meyer, were not “customers” of the suppliers within the meaning of § 2(d)’s use of that term. Fred Meyer, 390 U.S. at 348, 88 S.Ct. at 908. The Supreme Court in turn reversed. The essence of the holding is captured in the following two quotations, 390 U.S. at 348-49, 352, 88 S.Ct. at 908, 910: Respondents press upon us a view of § 2(d) which leaves retailers who buy from wholesalers for the most part unprotected from discriminatory promotional allowances granted their direct-buying competitors. We are told that § 2(d) in specific terms requires this result. To benefit from the statute’s requirement of proportional equality, it is urged, a buyer must be a “competing customer” within the narrowest sense of that phrase. Thus, the wholesalers in this case are not competing customers because they do not compete with Meyer, and the retailers who do compete with Meyer in the resale of the suppliers’ products are outside the protection of § 2(d) because they are not customers of the suppliers. For reasons stated below, we agree with respondents that, on the facts of this case, § 2(d) reaches only discrimination between customers competing for resales at the same functional level and, therefore, does not mandate proportional equality between Meyer and the two wholesalers. But we cannot accept the second half of this argument, for it rests on a narrow definition of “customer” which becomes wholly untenable when viewed in light of the central purpose of § 2(d) and the economic realities with which its framers were concerned. Of course, neither the Committee Report nor other parts of the legislative history in so many words define “customer” to include retailers who purchase through wholesalers and compete with direct buyers in resales. But a narrower reading of § 2(d) would lead to the following anomalous result. On the one hand, direct-buying retailers like Meyer, who resell large quantities of their suppliers’ products and therefore find it feasible to undertake the traditional wholesaling functions for themselves, would be protected by the provision from the granting of discriminatory promotional allowances to their direct-buying competitors. On the other hand, smaller retailers whose only access to suppliers is through independent wholesalers would not be entitled to this protection. Such a result would be diametrically opposed to Congress’ clearly stated intent to improve the competition position of small retailers by eliminating what was regarded as an abusive form of discrimination. If we were to read “customer” as excluding retailers who buy through wholesalers and compete with direct buyers, we would frustrate the purpose of § 2(d). We effectuate it by holding that the section includes such competing retailers within the protected class. As did the courts in Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. DIC Concrete Corp., 467 F.Supp. 1016, 1019 (S.D.N.Y.1979), and Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F.Supp. 876, 887 (S.D.N.Y.1968), aff'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, denied, 394 U.S. 999, 89 S.Ct. 1595, 22 L.Ed.2d 777 (1969), I believe this language rather clearly leads—at least in the circumstances of this case—to the same result with regard to the word “purchaser” as used in § 2(a). Granted, the holding in Fred Meyer involves § 2(d) and the word “customer” rather than § 2(a) and the word “purchaser,” but those terms, as they appear in their respective sections of the statute, have long been held synonymous, see American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir.1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824, 83 S.Ct. 44, 9 L.Ed.2d 64 (1962); Kennedy Theater Ticket Service v. Ticketron, Inc., 342 F.Supp. 922, 925 (E.D.Pa. 1972); K.S. Corp. v. Chemstrand Corp., 198 F.Supp. 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y.1961), a holding which certainly seems correct given the similar context in which the two words are used. Nor is the spirit of the two sections essentially different; both seek, within the limits of the statutory language employed, to prevent “ ‘all devices by which large buyers gained discriminatory preferences over smaller ones by virtue of their greater purchasing power,’ ” see Fred Meyer, 390 U.S. at 349, 88 S.Ct. at 908, quoting from FTC v. Henry Brock & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168, 80 S.Ct. 1158, 1160, 4 L.Ed.2d 1124 (1960). And certainly an indirect purchaser in the present situation would suffer precisely the same ultimate competitive disadvantage the Supreme Court noted in Fred Meyer in connection with § 2(d), unless a similar definition is given the word “purchaser” in § 2(a). In short, if it makes sense to construe the word “customer” in § 2(d) as including an indirect purchaser— and the Supreme Court says it does—it makes equal sense, at least in some situations, to construe the word “purchaser” in § 2(a) in that same way. I agree that this sort of cross-pollination from Fred Meyer should be allowed only with “great caution,” III Kintner and Bauer, supra 208, so as to avoid consequences unintended by Congress. In the limited circumstances of this case, however, I do not believe an application of the principle in question will produce any such result. Where (as here) a retailer who purchases indirectly claims to be in competition with someone who purchases directly, where (as here) that direct purchaser receives a functional discount predicated upon its claimed status as a wholesaler—a discount not available to the indirect purchaser—and where (as here) the seller in question has notice that its direct purchaser may in fact be competing at the retail level, the seller’s options—and duties— are (or should be) no more or less than where both purchasers buy directly. The suggested answer to the latter problem is one as old as the Act itself: the seller must take reasonable steps to keep advised of the resale activities of those who receive its functional discounts, and where retail selling by one who receives a wholesaler’s discount occurs, post-resale price adjustments should be made. See Sherwin-Williams, 36 F.T.C. 25, 73-4 (1943); E. Edelman & Co., 51 F.T.C. 978, 988 (1955); Schniderman, “The Tyranny of Labels” —A Study of Functional Discounts Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 60 Harv.L. Rev. 571, 601-02 (1947); and compare Abbott Labs v. Portland Retail Druggists, 425 U.S. 1, 19-20, 96 S.Ct. 1305, 1317, 47 L.Ed.2d 537 (1976). This is admittedly a burden upon the seller, but it represents the price paid under the Act for maintaining a dual distribution system. The burden would be no greater in the present instance. The problem is by no means easy. All things considered, however, I believe Carthage Airways’ suggested application of Fred Meyer is appropriate, and I accordingly hold that, as to the aircraft it purchased from DAD and Skyliners, Carthage Airways was in fact a “purchaser” from Cessna within the meaning of § 2(a). E. “Competition” With exceptions not pertinent here, it is axiomatic that a seller’s differential pricing as between purchasers of a commodity can be a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act only when those purchasers actually compete in the resale or distribution—or perhaps business use—of that commodity, see National Distillers and Chemical Corp. v. Brad’s Mach. Products, Inc., 666 F.2d 492, 496 (11th Cir.1982), reh’g denied, 673 F.2d 1342 (11th Cir.1982); M.C. Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Texas Foundaries, Inc., 517 F.2d 1059, 1066 (5th Cir.1975); Ag-Chem Equipment Co., Inc. v. Hahn, Inc., 480 F.2d 482, 490 (8th Cir.1973); III Kintner and Bauer, supra 295; 5 Von Kalinowski, supra 30-41, 30-50, or would, but for that differential pricing, see Patman, Complete Guide to the Robinson-Patman Act 60 (1963). Such purchasers must thus compete both in the geographic sense—that is, in the same relevant geographic market area, see III Kintner and Bauer, supra 295-98; 5 Von Kalinowski, supra 30-41, 30-72—and in the functional sense—that is, at the same functional level in the distribution system for the commodity, see III Kintner and Bauer, supra 298-99; 5 Von Kalinowski, supra 30-48 to 30-64. Accordingly, a determination as to whether two purchasers are “in competition” within the meaning of § 2(a) will involve two separate points of inquiry: (a) an identification of the kinds of customers for which each competes in connection with the commodity in question; and (b), an identification of the geographic area in which each thus competes. 1. Functional Competition The parties have argued at length over whether a Cessna distributor’s sales to FBOs should be treated as sales made “in competition” with plaintiffs. Since the term “FBO” does not even necessarily identify a dealer in aircraft, much less what an FBO’s immediate principal purpose in purchasing an aircraft might have been, I believe both arguments miss the mark to some extent. As will be seen, however, it is the plaintiffs who ultimately suffer from that fact. I do reject plaintiffs’ theory that an aircraft sold by a Cessna distributor to any purchaser other than an “authorized Cessna dealer” (defined by plaintiffs as a dealer under current contract with a Cessna distributor or with a Cessna zone) would be (assuming the necessary geographic market factors) a sale made “in competition” with plaintiffs, no matter what the purchaser’s reselling function might be. In particular, plaintiffs urge, a sale by a Cessna distributor to an independent dealer, who purchased in order to resell, would be a sale “in competition” with plaintiffs even though that dealer in turn actually competed with plaintiffs in the resale of the aircraft to an end consumer. Plaintiffs take this position despite the fact that their contracts with Cessna (as with all Cessna contracts shown in evidence, both zone dealer and Cessna distributor) clearly specify that the sales rights thereunder are “non-exclusive” {see, e.g., White Industries 1969 contract, Pit. Ex. #40, page 2 para. 1), and despite the fact, clearly shown by the evidence, that any given independent dealer may have been, in its business operations, indistinguishable from one of the plaintiffs except for the fact that the latter was a party to a Cessna contract for that particular year and the former was not. Indeed, as the evidence shows, that independent dealer may in fact have been an “authorized” Cessna dealer the previous year, or may have become one the next, or both, all with no observable change in its business functioning or functions. Plaintiffs’ theory results, apparently, from an attempt to apply an oft-repeated statement regarding the legality of functional discounts under the Robinson-Pat-man Act, viz: Section 2(a) does not exempt functional differentials from its general prohibitions. Such differentials are neither prohibited nor expressly permitted. They must therefore be subjected to the same tests as any other price differences in determining whether they amount to unlawful discrimination in price. The only need for a separate discussion of functional differentials, therefore, is with respect to certain situations in which the granting of such differentials may result in injury to competition. Manufacturers do not ordinarily compete with wholesalers, nor wholesalers with retailers; but it cannot be assumed that differentials as between those classes of customers, granted solely on a functional basis and not justifiable by difference in costs, may not result in injury to competition and be unlawful. If injury to competition results, the fact that the differential was made in good faith on functional grounds is no defense. Austin, Price Discrimination and Related Problems Under the Robinson-Patman Act 50 (rev. ed. 1953); and see also I ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 4, The Robinson-Patman Act: Policy and Law 54, 59 (1980); Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 176 (1962); Schniderman, supra at 579-88. Such statements in turn suggest that determining the presence or absence of functional competition between purchasers of a commodity is, with reference to any particular kind (in a functional sense) of customer, not so much a process of labeling as simply a factual process of determining whether they both sell the commodity to that kind of customer—a rather straightforward approach I generally accept. But see 5 Von Kalinowski, supra, at 30-16 n. 35. If that is plaintiffs’ theory, however, it encounters an immediate impasse, at least as concerns new aircraft (either current or non-current), since the available evidence fails to show that either White Industries or Carthage Airways ever competed, in any meaningful way, in selling such aircraft to other dealers for resale, and since a dealer (independent or otherwise) who purchases to resell is obviously not the same kind of customer (in a functional sense) as an end consumer. Carthage Airways, for example, never sold any plane to a dealer (or an FBO) for any purpose, so far as the evidence shows. Neither did White Industries, insofar as new planes are concerned. Nor does the evidence show that dealers elsewhere customarily sold new aircraft to other dealers (independent or otherwise) for resale, other than perhaps on an accommodation basis—something which is the antithesis of a competitive sale. Indeed, if Cessna distributors supplied new aircraft to independent dealers at dealer cost prices as commonly as plaintiffs claim, ■practical market economics alone would tend to dictate the absence of any real dealer-to-dealer market involving new planes for resale. The alternative argument, of course, is that plaintiffs were “frozen out” of that market by virtue of Cessna’s differential pricing as between Cessna distributors and zone dealers; that plaintiffs wished to compete in that market, and would have done so but for the differential pricing—an approach which might be theoretically acceptable, see Patman, supra; Schniderman, supra 596, but which also poses certain dangers, since the viewer may be led to substitute his own concepts of what “ought to be” for the actual realities of the marketplace. In any event, this approach does require an examination of the parties’ functions and functional levels in the distribution of general aviation aircraft, as well as an inquiry into some of the more theoretical aspects of Robinson-Patman policy. When that analysis is performed, the argument flounders. Plaintiffs urge, in this connection, that it is the independent dealers’ status as purchasers which controls, not whether they resell. That suggestion is directly contrary to the law on the subject (much of which plaintiffs freely acknowledge elsewhere in their brief): that one’s functional level is determined not by “the character of his buying, but [by] the character of his selling ” (emphasis added). Kintner, A Robinson-Patman Primer 154 (1979), quoting from Mennen Co. v. F.T.C., 288 F. 774, 782 (2d Cir.1923); and see Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 1955 Report 204-05 (1955). And, of course, the argument also ignores the fact that independent dealers and “authorized” Cessna dealers occupied precisely the same functional level in the resale of new Cessna aircraft. In fact, if the two were located at the same airport (as was sometimes the case), the ordinary independent dealer would be the direct, primary competitor of the ordinary “authorized” Cessna dealer in all aspects of their respective businesses: flight training, aircraft rental, aircraft charter, aircraft servicing, maintenance and repair, aircraft hangaring and tie-down, new aircraft sales and used aircraft sales. It has been said that the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act is to protect competition, not competitors. See Hampton v. Graff Vending Company, 478 F.2d 527, 533 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 859, 94 S.Ct. 69, 38 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973), reh’g denied, 414 U.S. 1087, 94 S.Ct. 609, 38 L.Ed.2d 493 (1973); Anheuser-Busch v. F.T.C., 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir.1961); Kintner, supra, at 117-20; Rowe, supra, at 126-32. Perhaps more to the point, it has also been said that [i]n short, Congress intended to assure, to the extent reasonably practicable, that businessmen at the same functional level would start on equal competitive footing as far as price is concerned. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520, 83 S.Ct. 358, 367, 9 L.Ed.2d 466 (1963); and see also Abbott Labs, 425 U.S. at 12, 96 S.Ct. at 1313. Given these principles, to accept plaintiffs’ alternative theory would be to stand the Act on its head. Since independent dealers were plaintiffs’ direct competitors in the only new plane resale market in which either actually competed (the end consumer market), to find illegal a Cessna pricing policy which allowed a Cessna distributor to sell new aircraft for resale to both at the same price could only curtail competition, not enhance it. I refuse to apply the Act in that fashion. The situation with respect to used aircraft, sold as such by Cessna (factory or zone demonstrator aircraft), is more troublesome. There is no question that dealers sold used aircraft to FBOs, including other dealers. White Industries, for example, did so with regard to several planes. It is, however, considerably less clear how frequently such sales were made for the immediate principal purpose of resale, and how frequently factory or zone demonstrator aircraft—which were considered the “cream puffs” of the trade, because of the care given them by Cessna—were involved, at least without a substantial number of added use hours by the selling dealer. And, of course, the same theoretical principles regarding competition, noted above, would apply here as well. I conclude, in these circumstances, that the answer must be the same as for new Cessna aircraft. All this leaves plaintiffs in a rather awkward position, given their method of proof. As suggested by the preceding passages, for the purposes of ascertaining competition between plaintiffs and any Cessna distributor I will consider only distributor sales to end consumers—i.e., sales to those who purchased for the immediate principal purpose of using an aircraft. Unfortunately, plaintiffs’ technique of lumping together all of a distributor’s sales to any purchaser other than a contracted dealer of that distributor, usually without further elaboration, does not ordinarily allow me to make that determination. Simply being advised, for example, that Florida Aircraft Distributors (“FAD”) (a Cessna distributor in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida) made a sale to “Cam Aircraft” during the relevant time period does not tell me that the sale was to an end consumer (a purchase for use); “Cam Aircraft” may, for all I know, have been a dealer purchasing to resell. Accordingly, unless a given Cessna distributor sale is affirmatively shown to have been an end consumer sale—as where the buyer is shown, directly or by fair inference, to have purchased for use (e.g., a commuter airline’s purchase of aircraft suitable for use in that business), or where the buyer is at least shown to have had no connection with the business of reselling aircraft—the sale cannot be used in deciding plaintiffs’ claims. The end result is the rather meager collection of sales tabulated in Appendix A. 2. “Captive” Dealerships According to plaintiffs, where a contracted dealer was a wholly owned (or perhaps even partially owned) subsidiary of a Cessna distributor, or where both were owned by a third party, the distributor and the dealer should be classed as a single entity for present purposes, with sales by the dealer treated as sales in fact made by the distributor—“in competition,” of course, with plaintiffs. Under the proof here, I am obliged to reject the argument. The result plaintiffs seek—a disregard of separate corporate entity status—can certainly be accomplished in Robinson-Patman litigation, see, e.g., National Dairy Products Corporation v. United States, 350 F.2d 321, 326-27 (8th Cir.1965) (subsidiary and parent treated as same entity for Robinson-Patman criminal liability); Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 256 F.Supp. 581, 585-86 (S.D.N.Y.1966) (parent and subsidiary treated as same seller for Robinson-Patman purposes); and see generally III Kintner and Bauer, supra §§ 21.15, 21.16; 4 Von Kalinowski, supra § 24.04[2]; the doctrine is, after all, one of general application. The difficulty here is simply that plaintiffs have generally shown, in this regard, no more with respect to any Cessna distributor and its alleged “captive” dealer(s) than the fact of ownership (i.e., a parent-subsidiary relationship, or ownership of both by some third party), varying degrees of director or officer interlock, and in one instance (FAD, a Cessna distributor, and Sunny South, a dealer, both wholly owned by a third corporation) a sharing of the common parent’s accounting services. None of these things—or even all of them together—are sufficient to support the end plaintiffs propose. See generally Tennessee Valley Authority v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 753 F.2d 493, 497 (6th Cir. 1985); Baker v. Raymond Intern., Inc., 656 F.2d 173,179-81 (5th Cir.1981); REA v. An-Son Corp., 79 F.R.D. 25, 29 (W.D.Okl. 1978); 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations 472 (Perm. ed. 1983) (all standing for the proposition that “[ojwnership of all the stock of a corporation coupled with common management and direction does not ... operate as a merger of the two corporations into a single entity,” or otherwise permit a disregard of the separate corporate entities, 1 Fletcher, supra). To the contrary, the general rule is that separate corporate entity status can be disregarded only “where [the corporation in question] is so organized and control