Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION McGLYNN, District Judge. This is a class action in which individuals under sentence of death and currently confined to “death rows” at Pennsylvania’s Correctional Institutions at Graterford and Huntingdon challenge the conditions of their confinement under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The inmates also challenge restrictions on their first amendment right to the free exercise of religion and their sixth amendment right to access to courts. Original jurisdiction is vested in this court by 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West Supp.1986). There were eleven days of hearings including two days of testimony at Grater-ford, at which death row inmates from both Graterford and Huntingdon testified. In addition, the court visited the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) at Graterford on two occasions, first in June, 1986, and then again in December, 1986. The court also heard extensive testimony about the conditions of confinement in the RHU at Huntingdon. This Memorandum of Decision represents my findings of fact and conclusions of law. For the reasons that follow, I find that the conditions of confinement for capital inmates at Graterford and Huntingdon are not constitutionally infirm. Similarly, I find that the plaintiffs have failed to establish a violation of their first or sixth amendment rights. I. Parties A. Plaintiffs By order dated June 2, 1986, the court certified the plaintiff class to represent all inmates under sentence of death and confined to administrative segregation at the State Correctional Institutions at Grater-ford, Huntingdon, and Pittsburgh during the pendency of this litigation. B. Defendants The defendants in this action, named individually and in their official capacities, are: Glen Jeffes, Commissioner of the Bureau of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Grater-ford; Charles H. Zimmerman, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon; and George Petsock, Superintendent of the State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh. II. Role Of The Courts In Eighth Amendment Challenges The eighth amendment prohibits prison conditions that inflict cruel and unusual punishment. It is well established, however, that incarceration necessarily entails the withdrawal or limitation of rights and privileges. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 524, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3199, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). Indeed, sentenced inmates may even be subject to punitive conditions. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 n. 16, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). The eighth amendment applies to this case because confinement in a state penitentiary is subject to eighth amendment scrutiny. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1083-84, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), represents the first Supreme Court decision to set the boundaries of an eighth amendment challenge to the conditions of confinement. Drawing on a long line of eighth amendment decisions, the Court in Rhodes held that the eighth amendment proscribes conditions that result in an “unnecessary and wanton” infliction of pain, including practices that are “totally without penological justification.” Id. at 346, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2925, 2929, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). The Rhodes Court construed the eighth amendment to permit punitive conditions that are compatible with “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” but that are not “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.” Id. at 346, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (citations omitted). The Court also held that the eighth amendment does not mandate comfortable prisons. Id. at 349, 101 S.Ct. at 2400. Rather, the Court concluded that “restrictive” and even “harsh” conditions are a penalty criminal offenders must pay for their offenses against society. Id. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. In deciding eighth amendment cases, a federal court is not authorized to interfere with the policy choices of state officials concerning the operation of prisons. In Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), the Supreme Court explained its policy of deference: As we said in Rhodes v. Chapman, “a prison’s internal security is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administrators.” In assessing the seriousness of a threat to institutional security, prison administrators necessarily draw on more than the specific facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they must consider the character of the inmates confined in the institution, recent and longstanding relations between prisoners and guards, prisoners inter se, and the like. In the volatile atmosphere of a prison, an inmate easily may constitute an unacceptable threat to the safety of other prisoners and guards even if he himself has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially disastrous incidents. The judgement of the prison officials in this context, like that of those making parole decisions, turns largely on “purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future behavior,” indeed, the administrators must predict not just one inmate’s future actions, as in parole, but those of an entire institution. Id. at 474, 103 S.Ct. at 872-873 (citations omitted). At the same time, this policy of broad deference does not divest a court of its authority to remedy genuine constitutional violations. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. Nevertheless, it does require that, absent a constitutional violation, a court grant wide ranging deference to the expertise of prison officials in deciding how to best administer their prisons. See Whitley, 106 S.Ct. at 1085 (1986); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 & n. 29, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2461 & n. 29, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). See also Harris v. Pernsley, 755 F.2d 338, 349 (3d Cir.) (Garth, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 331, 88 L.Ed.2d 314 (1985). In discharging its constitutional duty, a court faced with an eighth amendment challenge to the conditions of confinement must consider the challenged conditions “alone or in combination,” recognizing that the totality of the conditions “may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. Concurring in Rhodes, Justice Brennan wrote that “[e]ven if no single condition of confinement would be unconstitutional in itself, ‘exposure to the cumulative effect of prison conditions may subject inmates to cruel and unusual punishment.’ ” Id. at 363, 101 S.Ct. at 2407 (quoting Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269, 322-23 (D.N.H.1977)) (Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring). What emerges from these pronouncements is not a static test; the necessary determinations are imprecise and indefinite. Id. at 346, 361. Rather, the eighth amendment must be interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner. Id. at 345. Also, a court must look to objective factors as much as possible. Id. at 346. Appropriate objective factors include basic human needs such as food, shelter, and medical care, as well as sanitation, safety, the physical plant, educational/rehabilitational programs, the length of confinement, and out-of-cell time. The opinions of experts, while helpful, “simply do not establish the constitutional minima.” Id. at 348 n. 13 (citation omitted). In the end, the court must “rely upon its own expertise and on its own knowledge of contemporary standards.” Id. at 364 (Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (citation omitted). I address each of the myriad aspects of confinement in light of the foregoing principles. Since Rhodes v. Chapman instructs me to consider each aspect alone or in combination, I will address the issues serially to determine whether, taken alone, they establish a constitutional violation. After reviewing each separately, I will determine whether the cumulative impact of the challenged conditions rises to the level of an eighth amendment violation. III. Pennsylvania’s Correctional System A. Penal Institutions The Pennsylvania correctional system consists of ten institutions of varying degrees of security. Tr. 7/29/86: 6-7. Additionally, the Commonwealth utilizes fifteen community service centers. Id. The prison population totals approximately 15,-000 inmates, and the Commonwealth employs in excess of 4,000 people to operate its correctional facilities. Id. For the fiscal year 1986, the Commonwealth allocated $200 million dollars for prison operations. Id. Since the reinstitution of the death penalty in 1978, three institutions have housed capital inmates: Graterford, Huntingdon, and Pittsburgh. At present, all of Pennsylvania’s capital inmates are housed either at Graterford or Huntingdon. 1. State Correctional Institution at Graterford Graterford is a maximum security institution situated on approximately 1700 acres of land, 65 of which are enclosed by a wall that spans approximately one mile. Tr. 7/28/86: 101. The prison itself consists of five cellblocks, each more than 600 feet long. Id. The RHU at Graterford is a fairly modem building, separate from the main building containing the five primary cellblocks. It is a one-level, U-shaped structure. Tr. 6/16/86: 16-17. One wing of the RHU houses only capital inmates, the middle wing houses both disciplinary and capital inmates, while the third wing houses inmates with psychiatric problems. Id. Graterford is not an accredited correctional institution. Tr. 7/28/86: 100; Tr. 7/29/86: 104-05. Nearly 2600 inmates are confined at Graterford. Tr. 6/27/86: 65-66; Tr. 7/28/86: 115. Of this population, 17% are serving life sentences. Tr. 7/28/86: 101. The RHU has a maximum capacity of thirty-six inmates, but Graterford houses only about twenty capital inmates. Tr. 6/27/86: 73; Tr. 7/28/86: 116. Generally, the Commonwealth houses capital inmates with significant psychiatric histories at Graterford due to its proximity to Pennsylvania’s only maximum security psychiatric hospital, Farview State Hospital. Tr. 6/27/86: 89. Graterford employs 650 people, of which 400 are correctional officers. Tr. 7/28/86: 101. The RHU requires a disproportionate number of these correctional officers to manage its inmate population. Specifically, the RHU requires between four and eight correctional officers for the day and afternoon shifts, while the night shift requires between two and three officers. Tr. 6/18/86: 35; Tr. 7/28/86: 115-16, 130-31. Correctional officers walk through the RHU every thirty minutes to an hour. Tr. 6/18/86: 35. 2. State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon Huntingdon is a medium/maximum security institution. Tr. 6/27/86: 4. Its layout patterns a “hub” and “spoke” concept, where the hub is the center of the institution and the spokes, six in all, are the cellblocks. Id. at 4-5. A large wall surrounds the entire facility, and two modular units, which also house inmates, are located outside the wall. Id. at 4. The Commission on Accreditation and Corrections accredited Huntingdon in 1984. Tr. 6/18/86: 140; Tr. 6/27/86: 5-6. The general prison population at Huntingdon consists of slightly more than 2000 inmates. Tr. 6/26/86: 22, 101; Tr. 6/27/86: 4. Only 1179 cells are available, however, so the institution is presently operating at maximum capacity. Tr. 6/27/86: 4-5. One cellblock, referred to as “B” block, serves as the RHU. Tr. 6/26/86: 112; Tr. 6/27/86: 5. An RHU annex adjoins the “B” block. Tr. 6/26/86: 114. Cells in the RHU are located in the center of the cell-block. Unlike Graterford, the cells at Huntingdon are stacked on top of one another, three tiers high. Tr. 6/18/86: 37; Tr. 6/26/86: 109. The RHU at Huntingdon houses between 145 and 150 inmates; another 90 inmates are kept in the RHU annex. Tr. 6/26/86: 141; Tr. 6/27/86: 5. Of this population, forty-two are capital inmates. Tr. 6/26/86: 111; Tr. 6/27/86: 13-14. Huntingdon employs 450 people, of which 250 are correctional officers. Tr. 6/27/86: 7-8. Like the RHU at Grater-ford, the RHU at Huntingdon requires a disproportionate number of correctional officers to manage its population. Id. Both the day and afternoon shifts require between eight and twelve correctional officers, although the night shift requires only two correctional officers. Tr. 6/27/86: 8. 3. State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh The oldest prison in Pennsylvania, the Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh is a maximum security prison built in 1882. Tr. 7/29/86: 117-118. It is situated on twelve acres of property in downtown Pittsburgh, and houses approximately 1,600 inmates. Id. The prison employs 450 staff, of which 235 are correctional officers. Id. Pittsburgh is currently undergoing structural improvements, and for this reason the Commonwealth does not presently have any capital inmates there. Tr. 7/28/86: 102. Prison officials intend to house capital inmates at Pittsburgh upon completion of the ongoing construction. Details of the construction and planned relocation of capital inmates to Pittsburgh are discussed below. B. New Construction Defendant Glen Jeffes, Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, testified that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is currently undertaking a $300 million dollar prison construction and renovation program. Tr. 7/29/86: 11-12. Once complete, the project will create more than 3,000 new beds, which will be divided among two state hospitals that are being converted to state correctional facilities, two new penitentiaries, and a new diagnostic/medical unit that is under construction at Graterford. Id. 1. Impact of New Construction on Graterford As a part of the planned construction, the Commonwealth intends to build the aforementioned medical unit and a new RHU at Graterford. Tr. 7/29/86: 12. The new RHU will consist of 104 beds, 28 outside recreation areas, and 5 day rooms. Id. Once construction is complete, the Commonwealth plans to phase out the present RHU, unless overcrowding dictates otherwise. Id. at 12, 36-37. State officials project a completion date of mid-1988. Id. at 13. 2. Impact of New Construction on Huntingdon The Commonwealth is not planning any construction that will affect the RHU at Huntingdon. Id. at 37-38. The Commonwealth is, however, allocating one million dollars to renovate the existing medical facility at Huntingdon. Id. at 13. The Commonwealth intends to continue housing capital inmates at Huntingdon, despite the construction of new RHU’s at Graterford and Pittsburgh. Id. at 37. 3. Impact of New Construction on Pittsburgh The Commonwealth is close to completing construction of the new RHU at Pittsburgh. Tr. 7/28/86: 102; Tr. 7/29/86: 13. At trial, Commissioner Jeffes estimated completion by late 1986. Tr. 7/29/86: 13, 16. Twenty-four cells in the new RHU will be designated for capital inmates Id. Further, the new RHU will have one day room for every eight cells. Some of the capital inmates presently confined at Huntingdon will be transferred to Pittsburgh upon completion of the RHU. Tr. 6/27/86: 31. C. Segregation of Capital Cases Pennsylvania reinstated capital punishment in September, 1978. See 42 Pa.Cons. StatAnn. § 9711 (Purdon 1982). The Commonwealth did not decide to segregate capital inmates from the general prison population, however, until November, 1982. At that time, then Commissioner of Corrections Roland Marks ordered that all capital inmates be transferred from the general prison population to administrative segregation in the RHU’s of Graterford, Huntingdon, and Pittsburgh. Ex. D-43; Tr. 6/27/86: 9. Commissioner Marks premised this policy on the inability of prison officials to adequately supervise capital inmates in the general prison population and on the attendant security problems. Ex. D-43. There is an abundance of evidence in the record supporting the decision to segregate capital inmates. See Tr. 6/27/86: 9-11; Tr. 7/28/86: 102-04; Tr. 7/29/86: 8-9, 28, 126; Ex. D-l & D-44. Moreover, the plaintiffs do not challenge the decision to segregate capital inmates. Tr. 11/7/86: 3. The decision to segregate is only relevant to this action in that it serves as a benchmark to determine how long some capital inmates have resided on death row, which exceeds four years in some cases. Because of the dilatory effect of the legal and political predicates to the implementation of the death penalty, I expect the average length of confinement and capital inmate population to continue to grow substantially in the years to come. IV. Challenges To The Physical Plant At Graterford And Huntingdon A primary part of the plaintiffs’ challenge to the conditions of confinement concentrates on limitations in the physical plants of Graterford and Huntingdon. A. Square Footage of the Cells Plaintiffs argue that the square footage of the cells, combined with the amount of time spent in the cells, jeopardizes their physical and mental health. Further, plaintiffs maintain that the usable square footage, that is the space available taking into account in-cell trappings such as a bed and sink/toilet fixture, falls far below acceptable standards. The Commonwealth, on the other hand, contends that the cells provide sufficient space and thus do not pose a health hazard. The cells in the RHU at Graterford and Huntingdon measure sixty and seventy-one square feet per cell respectively. Tr. 6/17/86: 12; Tr. 6/18/86: 119, 131. The cells planned for the new RHU at Grater-ford measure sixty square feet as well. Tr. 7/29/86: 16. Taking into account the bed and sink/toilet fixture, the cells at Graterford and Huntingdon provide thirty-eight and forty-six “usable” square feet respectively. Tr. 6/17/86: 12; Tr. 6/18/96: 121, 131. The plaintiffs adduced testimony from their expert in environmental health, Curtis A. Golden, that cell size affects the likelihood of contracting respiratory diseases. Tr. 6/18/86: 120. Based on a Department of Defense study of servicemen residing in troop barracks, Golden testified that when the available space per person is “significantly” less than sixty square feet per person, an increased incidence of respiratory infection results. Id. at 120-21. The Commonwealth’s expert in environmental health, Harry Steigman, disputed Golden’s reliance on the Defense Department study. Tr. 7/30/86: 22-23. Steigman argued that the conditions in that study are considerably different than those found at Graterford and Huntingdon. Id. He noted that the inmates in the study share a large, common space, whereas the inmates on death row each occupy their own cell. Id. On the issue of cell size, the applicable American Correctional Association (ACA) standard recommends eighty square feet per cell. Tr. 6/18/86: 119. The standard is not mandatory, however. Id. at 147. Moreover, numerous courts have held that recommendations by experts regarding desirable or ideal space allotments do not constitute constitutional minima. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348-50 & n. 13, 101 S.Ct. at 2400-01 & n. 13; Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 999 & n. 24 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S.Ct. 1600, 80 L.Ed.2d 130 (1984); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1248-49 (9th Cir.1982) (followed in DiBuono). In Rhodes, which held that the practice of double celling long term inmates did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the Court described an expert’s recommendation calling for fifty to fifty-five square feet per inmate as merely aspirational. 452 U.S. at 348-49, 101 S.Ct. at 2400. The Court concluded that, considered alone, the fact that the conditions provide less space than the aspirational goal falls “far short” of proving cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 348, 101 S.Ct at 2400. Plaintiffs challenge to the size of the cells fails for several reasons. First, the cells at Graterford, which are smaller than those at Huntingdon, measure sixty square feet. In Rhodes, the Court dismissed an eighth amendment challenge even though the cells provided only thirty-five square feet per inmate. 452 U.S. at 340, 101 S.Ct. at 2395. Second, plaintiffs argument fails because there is no proof that the existing cells have injured the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs hypothesize an injury by relying on the Department of Defense study, yet the relevance of the study to the conditions of confinement on Pennsylvania’s death row is tenuous at best. The conditions in that study were substantially different, and even plaintiffs’ expert testified that the study only applied to situations where “you have space significantly less than 60 square feet per person,” which is not the case here. Tr. 6/18/86: 120-121 (emphasis mine). Nor did plaintiffs introduce any evidence of the proliferation of respiratory disease, despite the fact that capital inmates have resided under these conditions for in excess of four years. Finally, my inspection of the RHU at Grater-ford convinced me that the capital inmates have ample space to move about. The space available to each inmate is more than adequate. Accordingly, while square footage is a factor to be taken into consideration in assessing the totality of the conditions of confinement, I find that confinement in cells the size of those at Graterford and Huntingdon does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. B. Heating/Ventilation Plaintiffs complain that inadequacies in the heating and ventilation systems at Graterford and Huntingdon create steambathlike conditions, thus causing discomfort and threatening their health. The Commonwealth counters that the temperature at both institutions is seasonally adequate. The Commonwealth further contends that, to the extent there are ventilation deficiencies, they at worst create uncomfortable conditions that are not actionable under the eighth amendment. There can be no dispute that the inmates have a right to be free from extreme hot and cold temperatures. Adequate ventilation is a fundamental attribute of shelter, but a distinction must be made between ventilation that is necessary to support life or prevent disease, and ventilation sought to improve comfort levels. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Rhodes made clear that “the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons____” 452 U.S. at 349, 101 S.Ct. at 2400. The Court stressed that prisons housing “persons convicted of serious crimes cannot be free of discomfort.” Id. In this case, RHU inmates from both Graterford and Huntingdon testified about the temperatures in the RHU. Neil Ferber, an inmate formerly confined at Grater-ford, testified that the RHU has absolutely no ventilation. Tr. 6/16/86: 20, 61. He stated that the RHU is hot in the summer and cold in the winter. Id. Two inmates, Henry Lee and Michael J. Travaglia, testified about temperatures in the RHU at Huntingdon. In the summer, the two testified that conditions are “humid and damp” and “very warm.” Tr. 6/24/86: 14, 58. With regard to winter conditions, Lee and Travaglia described the conditions as “pretty hot” and “very hot.” Tr. 6/24/86: 14, 58. Lieutenant Kenneth Dean Kyler, supervisor of correctional officers at Huntingdon and former supervisor of Huntingdon’s RHU, testified that the RHU often becomes warm in the summer, but that correctional officers open the windows upon request to alleviate the heat. Tr. 6/26/86: 114-15. Lieutenant Kyler noted that inmates in the top tier of the RHU have been offered cells on a lower tier to escape the heat, but have declined the offer. Id. at 115. Kyler added that Huntingdon’s RHU does not have fans or air conditioning. Id. In the winter months, Kyler testified that the temperature averages between 78 and 80 degrees. Tr. 6/26/86: 114. In addition to temperature, plaintiffs introduced testimony challenging the adequacy of the airflow. The ACA standard on airflow recommends that ten cubic feet of air per inmate circulate into the cell. Tr. 6/18/86: 100. The standard is not mandatory. Tr. 7/30/86: 14-15. Plaintiffs’ environmental expert, Curtis Golden, testified that the twofold purpose of this standard is to avoid individuals with respiratory infections from reinfecting themselves and to avoid the transmission of respiratory pathogens to other inmates. Tr. 6/18/86: 100. Golden opined that, absent sufficient airflow, a high probability of respiratory disease exists. Id. at 100-01. Golden measured the airflows in a sampling of cells at both Graterford and Huntingdon. At Huntingdon, he could not detect any airflow in the cells he inspected. Tr. 6/18/86: 100-01. At Graterford, he similarly could not find any airflow in two cells, but found twenty cubic feet of airflow in two other cells. Tr. 6/18/86: 130-31. In rebuttal, the Commonwealth offered the testimony of its environmental expert, Harry Steigman, who accompanied Golden on his inspections of Graterford and Huntingdon. For the last three years, Steigman has served as an environmental health consultant to the Commonwealth, and in this capacity, has conducted numerous health inspections at Graterford and Huntingdon. Tr. 7/30/86: 7-8. Consequently, he is very familiar with the physical health of the capita] inmates. Steigman did not refute Golden’s airflow findings. However, he did not agree with Golden’s conclusions about the probable consequences of his findings. In his role as consultant to the Commonwealth, Steigman has not observed any incidence of the development or spreading of infectious respiratory diseases in the RHU, other than common colds. Id. at 10-11. Also, he noted that officials at Huntingdon have taken steps to improve the air circulation in the RHU since Golden’s visit. Id. at 26-27. The plaintiffs’ contentions regarding the airflow and temperature, while legitimate considerations, fall short of stating an eighth amendment violation. I have no doubt that some of the inmates are uncomfortable as a result of the temperature. In Rhodes, however, the Court unequivocally stated that the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons. The Court went further, stating that “[t]o the extent... conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. Relying on Rhodes, a recent decision in this district rejected an eighth amendment challenge to the lack of central air conditioning and ventilation fans at Graterford. See Jones v. Zimmerman, No. 86-4135 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 1, 1986). Numerous other decisions have likewise rejected challenges to a prison’s climate absent a showing of extreme temperature variations. See, e.g., Shelby County Jail Inmates v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085, 1087-88 (7th Cir.1986); Loe v. Wilkinson, 604 F.Supp. 130, 132-33 (M.D.Pa.1984). The only evidence remotely supportive of unacceptable actionable temperatures is the testimony of the inmates that the RHU is “very hot,” but these statements, taken alone, are not sufficient to support a finding of cruel and unusual punishment. Similarly, I am not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ claim regarding the potential health hazards posed by the airflow. Plaintiffs’ expert did indeed demonstrate a lack of a significant airflow at Huntingdon, and a similar situation tó a lesser extent at Graterford. I am persuaded, however, by the opinion of the state’s expert that the airflow situation at both institutions does not pose a genuine health risk. Steigman based his opinion on his familiarity with both institutions, which predates the segregation of capital inmates, whereas plaintiffs’ expert visited each institution only once. Also, the Commonwealth’s expert relied on the medical records of the RHU inmates, which disclosed no evidence of the health risks urged upon the court by the plaintiffs. Indeed, plaintiffs’ expert did not point to any manifestations of the proffered health risks. It is my opinion that the plaintiffs have exaggerated the potential health risks of minimal airflows at the two institutions. For these reasons, I find that the plaintiffs have failed to state an eighth amendment violation on this issue. C. Lighting Plaintiffs claim that the lighting in the RHU is inadequate, and thus causes eye strain and eye damage. The defendants maintain that the lighting is sufficient. The ACA standard on lighting recommends twenty footcandles in writing or grooming areas. Tr. 6/18/86: 122. The standard is not mandatory. Id. at 149; Tr. 7/30/86: 15. In Shelby, the Seventh Circuit recently rejected an eighth amendment challenge to the conditions of confinement in which the plaintiffs averred, inter alia, that lighting of less than twenty footcandles is unconstitutional. 798 F.2d at 1088-89. In rejecting this claim, the court noted that the lighting in the trial judge’s courtroom measured only seventeen footcandles. Id. The cells in the RHU at Huntingdon have a fluorescent light in each cell that the inmate controls. Tr. 6/26/86: 113. In addition, the RHU at Huntingdon has four or five 100 watt bulbs in the corridor outside the cells that are kept on constantly, as well as a substantial number of screened windows that provide some natural light. Id. At Graterford, inmates in the RHU similarly have lights that can be controlled from within the cell. The corridor outside the cells at Graterford has overhead lighting. The natural light at Graterford is negligible, however, since the windows in the unit are relatively narrow and covered by screens. Plaintiffs’ environmental health expert measured the footcandles in cells at Huntingdon and Graterford. Tr. 6/16/86: 121-23. At Huntingdon, Golden measured approximately eighteen footcandles in the seven or eight cells he tested. Id. at 122; Tr. 7/30/86: 13. At Graterford, he measured approximately twenty-six footcandles. Tr. 7/30/86: 13. The experts dispute the worst case measurements: Golden claims he measured only three footcandles in one cell at Huntingdon, while Steigman recalls a worst case of eight footcandles. Tr. 7/30/86: 37-38. Steigman conceded that the lighting in some instances is inadequate. Id. at 36. However, he testified that, subsequent to Golden’s inspection, Huntingdon officials installed a fluorescent lighting system to correct the lighting deficiencies. Id. at 13, 36. Golden testified that inadequate lighting would cause the capital inmates to experience eye strain and potentially eye damage. Tr. 6/18/86: 122-23. Steigman opined that the only probable consequence of inadequate lighting is eye strain. Tr. 7/30/86: 14. I find no merit in the plaintiffs’ arguments on this issue. The plaintiffs own expert testified that the average footcandle measurement at Graterford exceeds the ACA standard. He also testified that the average footcandle measurement at Huntingdon is only two footcandles below the standard. My two visits to the RHU at Graterford leave me convinced that the lighting is more than adequate. The testimony of plaintiffs’ expert about eye damage is not persuasive. There is simply no evidence that the lighting has caused any eye damage. While more light might be preferable, the present conditions hardly amount to a wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor do they transgress contemporary “concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2570, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (citations omitted). D. Bedding The Commonwealth furnishes each cell with a bed. Plaintiffs argue, however, that structural deficiencies in the bed-frames force inmates to place their mattresses on the floor, a practice they contend causes “serious back problems.” The Commonwealth retorts that the practice of placing mattresses on the floor does not pose a health hazard. The plaintiffs adduced testimony from both Golden and Gorden C. Kamka, an independent criminal justice consultant and former Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Service for the State of Maryland, that many inmates place their mattresses on the floor because the mattress would otherwise fall through slats in the bed-frame. Tr. 6/18/86: 49-50, 116-18. Plaintiffs corroborated this testimony by introducing photographs of bedframes with widely spaced slats and of cells with mattresses placed on the floor. Ex. P-65 & P-67. Golden testified that all of the mattresses he inspected were dirty. Id. at 116. The applicable ACA standard recommends that correctional officials sterilize used mattresses, pillows, and bedding before they are reissued to another inmate. Id. at 116-17. The standard also provides that mattress covers should be cleaned regularly. Id. The concern, according to Golden, is the transmission of disease causing organisms. The Commonwealth’s expert acknowledged that some inmates place their mattresses on the floor. Tr. 7/30/86: 23. Steigman commented, however, that inmates continued this practice even after the officials at Huntingdon replaced the slatted bedframes with solid bedframes. Id. at 23-24, 27-28. Further, Steigman observed that no adverse health consequences have resulted from the practice of placing mattresses on the floor. Id. at 24-25. In addition to Steigman’s testimony, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of its policy regarding the reissuance and cleaning of bedding materials. Ex. D-42. Effective February, 1986, its policy instructs superintendents to issue disinfectant materials to inmates who are moved from one cell to another, which complies with the ACA standard. The policy also precludes the issuance of used bedding that has not been sanitized. I conclude that the issue of bedding presents no eighth amendment concern. First, the plaintiffs have failed to introduce any evidence of adverse health consequences attributable to the slat type bed-frames, the placement of mattresses on the floor, or the sanitation of bedding supplies. Over and above this, the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert belies their contention that the existing bedframes and placement of mattresses on the floor cause “serious back problems.” Golden testified only that the beds were “very uncomfortable.” He did not document a single incident of serious back problems or the transmission of disease causing organisms. Tr. 6/18/86: 118. Moreover, the evidence leads me to believe that many of the inmates place their mattresses on the floor because the slat type bedframe could be used to store personal items and to better organize the available space. Accordingly, since the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons and no injury has been proven, I do not find an eighth amendment violation on this issue. E. Sanitation and Maintenance The plaintiffs make several challenges to the general state of repair and level of sanitation at Graterford and Huntingdon. For purposes of clarity, I discuss each of these as subtopics to the broader issue of sanitation and maintenance. In DiBuono, the Third Circuit addressed the significance of the state of repair and level of sanitation in an eighth amendment analysis. 713 F.2d at 1000-01 & n. 30. The court noted that “basic physical amenities, and the consequent effect on sanitation and health, go to the heart of what is meant by ‘habitable shelter’ for eighth amendment purposes.” Id. at 1001 n. 30. The Third Circuit declared that “a decaying physical plant allowed by disrepair to become virtually inoperable” always provides an important background element in an eighth amendment analysis. Id. The court reasoned, however, that where conditions at an institution have not fallen into disrepair in “basic physical facilities such as heating, ventilation, and showers,” no constitutional violation is shown. Id. 1. Toilets and Sinks Each cell has a standard, institutional sink and commode. Tr. 6/17/86: 12; Tr. 6/18/86: 132. The plaintiffs introduced evidence that some of the toilet fixtures at both institutions are dirty. Ex. P-49 to P-52, P-62 (photographs of Huntingdon); Ex. P-72 & P-73 (photographs of Grater-ford). Golden testified that approximately one half of the twenty-three toilets and sinks he inspected at Huntingdon were dirty, although he found fewer dirty toilets at Graterford. Tr. 6/18/86: 101-02, 106, 132. Golden also testified that several of the toilets he inspected leaked upon flushing. Id. at 101-02. Steigman, the Commonwealth’s expert, agreed that some of the toilets at Huntingdon are “chipped and stained.” Tr. 7/30/86: 27. The applicable ACA standard provides that all plumbing fixtures should operate properly and be sanitary. Tr. 6/18/86: 102. 2. Walls and Ceilings Some of the cells at Huntingdon are beset by peeling paint and deteriorating plaster wall surfaces. Tr. 6/18/86: 101-03; Ex. P-55 to P-58. The plaintiffs’ environmental health expert warned that the peeling paint and falling plaster may cause severe health problems. Tr. 6/18/86: 103. He testified that wall surfaces should be smooth so that they can be readily disinfected. Id. at 112-13. Steigman conceded that some of the cells at Huntingdon need to be repainted. Tr. 7/30/86: 27. He noted, however, that the Commonwealth has undertaken renovations in many of the cells at Huntingdon. Id. at 29. Furthermore, he concluded that the deteriorating plaster wall surfaces and peeling paint do not pose a genuine health hazard. Id. 3. Cleaning Procedures Each inmate is responsible for the cleanliness of his cell. Tr. 6/18/86: 144; Tr. 6/24/86: 100; Tr. 6/26/86: 144; Ex. D-13. The inmates at Graterford receive cleaning materials daily. Tr. 7/30/86: 40-41. At Huntingdon, inmates receive cleaning materials weekly, but can obtain them sooner upon request. Id.', Tr. 6/26/86: 144. In order to clean their cells, inmates receive a bucket, scrub brush, disinfectant, and cleaning rags for approximately one half hour. Tr. 6/24/86: 100; Tr. 6/26/86: 144; Ex. D-13. The institution bears the ultimate responsibility for maintaining a minimal level of cleanliness. Tr. 7/30/86: 25. The applicable, nonmandatory ACA standard recommends that cells should be cleaned daily. Tr. 6/18/86: 103. 4. Inspection Procedures To ensure a certain level of maintenance and sanitation, authorities at both institutions adhere to a comprehensive inspection routine. The Commonwealth conducts sanitation, health, and safety inspections weekly. See Ex. D-41 (Consolidated Inspection Policy for Sanitation, Hygiene, Fire Prevention, and Safety Inspections). The Commonwealth also maintains inspection policies for housing areas, work areas, and food service facilities. Ex. D-25 to D-27. The maintenance and sanitation issues raised by plaintiffs give me some pause, but on balance, fall short of stating an eighth amendment violation. Regarding the sink and toilet fixtures, it is obvious that many are dirty, some are filthy. To a large extent, however, many of these conditions exist not because correctional officials have neglected them, but because the inmates refuse to cooperate in routine maintenance and housekeeping. The Extraordinary Occurrence Reports document at least twenty separate incidents where capital inmates refused to follow safety or sanitary regulations. Ex. D-53. Nevertheless, when a toilet is as dirty as some of those in this case, or when it requires repairs, the Commonwealth bears the ultimate responsibility for cleanliness, and must take affirmative steps to remedy the situation. Although some of the toilets are not as clean as I would think is desirable, all of the toilets appear functional and generally in a state of good repair. The plaintiffs’ photographic evidence, while disturbing examples of shortcomings, are misleading to the extent they suggest the entire RHU is similar to an unattended lavatory. The inmates have ample access to cleaning materials, and indeed many inmates clean their cells assiduously. Moreover, my visits to the RHU at Graterford indicate that any problems with the toilet or sink facilities are isolated. Though these facilities could be better, requiring capital inmates to use the existing toilet and sink facilities does not inflict cruel and unusual punishment. Likewise, the condition of the plaster walls at Huntingdon does not transgress the eighth amendment, although here too prompt repairs in some cells would appear to be warranted. At Graterford, I observed no evidence of peeling paint or cracking plaster. At Huntingdon, however, the plaintiffs’ evidence persuades me that the plaster wall surfaces in some cells are deteriorating. Also, some of the cells are in dire need of fresh paint. Nevertheless, despite being aesthetically unpleasant, plaintiffs have not shown that these conditions threaten the well being of the inmates. In fact, the plaintiffs’ contention that “falling plaster” presents a risk of injury is frivolous. On the whole, I find that the general state of repair and level of sanitation at both institutions is sufficient to withstand eighth amendment scrutiny. The cells and fixtures therein are functional, the Commonwealth provides necessary cleaning materials, and prison officials maintain an acceptable inspection routine. Despite this, however, both institutions are aging and thus some of the conditions are less than ideal. Indeed, some of the conditions are quite disturbing. It appears that the Commonwealth has become complacent in maintaining certain cells in the RHU. If I were charged with the responsibility of running these institutions, I would give immediate attention to the cells with seriously soiled toilets and sinks, peeling paint, or deteriorating walls. Even though the existing conditions do not inflict cruel and unusual punishment, they certainly do not reflect credit on the Commonwealth or the RHU residents. Particularly since Huntingdon is an old institution, it is incumbent upon the Commonwealth to implement a more effective program of regular maintenance. Without attention, these conditions could cross the threshold proscribed by the eighth amendment in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, based on the evidence before me, I have no hesitation in concluding that the RHU’s at Graterford and Huntingdon are far from “virtually inoperable” as required by DiBuono. Thus, the plaintiffs’ challenge to the state of repair and the level of sanitation falls short on these facts. Sanitation and maintenance, however, are issues that must be considered in assessing the totality of the conditions of confinement. F. Noise Level in the RHU Plaintiffs aver that the noise level in the RHU deprives them of their psychological privacy. Several factors account for the noise level in the RHU. Televisions and radios constitute a primary source of noise. Tr. 6/16/86: 19-20; Tr. 7/28/86: 129-30. Prison policy requires the use of earplugs with radios and televisions, howéver, correctional officials enforce the policy on a discretionary basis. Tr. 6/16/86: 46, 52-53; Tr. 6/17/86: 14; Tr. 6/26/86: 133; Tr. 7/28/86: 130. Correctional officers enforce the policy more strictly at Hunting-don than at Graterford. Tr. 6/17/86: 14-15, 66; Tr. 6/26/86: 133; Tr. 7/28/86: 130. Lieutenant Flannigan testified that the guards at Graterford do not strictly enforce the earplug policy because most inmates find the earplugs uncomfortable and prefer not to use them. Tr. 7/28/86: 130. The fact that inmates communicate with one another by talking between cells also contributes to the noise level. Tr. 6/17/86: 14; Tr. 6/24/86: 57-58; Tr. 6/26/86: 154-55; Tr. 7/28/86: 129-30. Some inmates play chess with one another in this manner. Tr. 6/27/86: 98. Finally, the fact that the Commonwealth confines mentally' disturbed in the RHU at Huntingdon creates a third source of noise. Tr. 6/24/86: 14-15, 36, 58, 109. Corrections officers, however, ordinarily locate noisy inmates in remote cells. Tr. 6/26/86: 134-35. Moreover, the new medical facility to be constructed at Huntingdon will house many of these mentally disturbed inmates. Tr. 7/29/86: 16-17. Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Richard Lonsdorf, described the noise level in the RHU as a “constant din.” Tr. 6/17/86: 14; Lieutenant Kyler testified that the noise level is cyclical, depending upon the degree of activity in the RHU, such as visits, new arrivals, showers, meals, or inmate releases. Tr. 6/26/86: 132-33. He testified that the RHU typically quiets down after the 9:00 p.m. inmate count. Id. Dr. Canals testified that the RHU is the quietest part of Graterford. Lieutenant Flannigan testified that whenever an inmate makes too much noise, a guard usually attempts to resolve the situation by talking with the offender. Tr. 7/28/86: 129-30. Still, when necessary, prison officials take disciplinary action against inmates who persist in conducting themselves at unacceptably loud levels. See Ex. D-6 & D-7 (Adjustment Records for inmates Robert Atkins and Joseph Szuchon). Although conceding my presence in the RHU no doubt contributed to a reduced level of noise, nevertheless, I am not persuaded that the noise in the RHU is intolerable. While noise may irritate many of the capital inmates, a certain level of noise is inherent in institutional confinement. The situation cannot fairly be said to inflict cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment. Accordingly, I will consider the noise level in assessing the totality of the conditions of confinement, but do not find that the noise level alone can be translated into an eighth amendment violation. Y. Daily Routine And Privileges In addition to the physical plant, a second and primary element of plaintiffs’ eighth amendment claim concerns the privileges afforded capital inmates. I have divided my analysis of capital inmate privileges into out-of-cell and in-cell categories. I discuss not only the routines and privileges challenged by the plaintiffs, but also discuss briefly unchallenged privileges, such as in-cell accommodations, mail, and commissary privileges, to provide a complete insight into the totality of the conditions of confinement. A. Out-of-Cell Privileges The heart of plaintiffs’ challenge to the conditions of confinement centers on the amount of time capital inmates are forced to pass in their cells, which the plaintiffs characterize as “enforced idleness.” Plaintiffs argue that capital inmates spend the vast majority of their time without meaningful stimulation. They demand that inmates under sentence of death who are institutionally well-adjusted be permitted more out-of-cell time and group recreational privileges. The Commonwealth insists that it presently provides a sufficient level of out-of-cell activity. Moreover, the Commonwealth argues that the security concerns attendant to out-of-cell activity justify the existing restrictions. 1. Exercise Privileges With regard to exercise, the plaintiffs object to the conditions under which they exercise, the lack of indoor exercise facilities, and the ban on group exercise. The present policy permits capital inmates to exercise outdoors for two hours a day, seven days a week. Tr. 6/16/86: 17-18; Tr. 6/27/86: 17; Tr. 7/28/86: 111-12. The applicable ACA standard recommends one hour a day. Tr. 6/18/86: 53; Tr. 7/29/86: 94. At both institutions, capital inmates exercise in individual exercise areas that are enclosed by a chain link fence topped with barbed wire. Tr. 6/16/86: 21; Tr. 7/28/86: 132; Ex. P-69 & P-70 (photographs of exercise areas at Huntingdon); Ex. P-77 & P-78 (photographs of exercise areas at Graterford). At Graterford, the exercise areas measure twenty by fifty feet. Tr. 7/28/86: 132. One larger exercise area measures seventy-five by one hundred feet. Id. At Huntingdon, the exercise cells are smaller, measuring nine by twenty feet. Tr. 6/17/86: 13, 15-16; Tr. 6/18/86: 52, 125, 139. The exercise areas adjoin one another, so inmates are able to converse during the exercise period. Tr. 6/17/86: 17, 60; Tr. 6/23/86: 47; Tr. 7/28/86: 132. Capital inmates are permitted to take handballs, playing cards, or a bible into the exercise area. Tr. 6/26/86: 127. The exercise areas at Graterford also have newly installed game tables at which two inmates can visit or play chess. Tr. 7/28/86: 136. Authorities do not permit any other recreational equipment, such as weights, into the exercise areas. Tr. 6/217/86: 154; Tr. 6/18/86: 126, 139; Tr. 6/26/86: 152; Tr. 7/28/86: 141. Neither lavatory nor drinking fountain facilities are available in the exercise areas, although correctional officers provide a pitcher of drinking water in the summer months. Tr. 6/16/86: 22; Tr. 6/17/86: 154; Tr. 6/24/86: 59. At both institutions, inclement weather cancels the exercise period. Tr. 6/16/86: 18, 23; Tr. 6/18/86: 53,153. If the weather permits outdoor exercise, the inmates must remain outside for the entire two hour exercise period so that correctional officers need not continually shuttle inmates to their cells. Tr. 6/16/86: 22-23; Tr. 6/24/86: 62; Tr. 6/26/86: 149. In the winter months, the Commonwealth provides overcoats. Tr. 6/16/86: 65. The exercise area is adjacent to the RHU at both institutions. Nevertheless, escorting capital inmates to the exercise yard requires significant manpower. The procedure for escorting capital inmates to the exercise area differs slightly at the two institutions. At Huntingdon, two guards let the inmate out of his cell, who proceeds by himself but within the sight of the guards to the ground level. Tr. 6/26/86: 124-25. A contingent of four officers awaits the inmate at ground level, where he is pat searched. Id. Once past the search point, the inmate walks directly to his exercise area, where two correctional officers then secure the inmate in his designated exercise area. Id. At Graterford, three correctional officers go directly to the inmate’s cell, where he is strip searched, and then escorted to the exercise area. Tr. 7/28/86: 132. I do not find that the Commonwealth’s exercise regimen, which permits capital inmates to exercise individually or in pairs, two hours a day, seven days a week, violates the eighth amendment. See Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589 (7th Cir.1986); Loe v. Wilkinson, 604 F.Supp. 130 (M.D.Pa.1984). Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the amount of outdoor exercise or the conditions under which they exercise, namely in individual exercise cells, injures them. To the contrary, the evidence shows that most of the capital inmates enjoy good health. Furthermore, the time allotted for outdoor exercise exceeds the ACA standard of one hour per day and comports with the normal range of outdoor exercise afforded capital inmates in other jurisdictions. Tr. 6/18/86: 64-65. David DiGuglielmo, Director of Treatment at Graterford, testified that even though allowing more exercise time might not create an additional security risk in some cases, it certainly would in others. Tr. 6/27/86: 120-21. Thus, since there is a correlation between the Commonwealth’s policies and institutional security, the existing policy is not “totally without penological justification.” Plaintiffs also take issue with the lack of indoor exercise facilities. Neither institution has indoor exercise facilities. Tr. 6/18/86: 124,138; Tr. 6/24/86: 62; Tr. 7/28/86: 138; Tr. 7/29/86: 14, 18. The new RHU’s at Graterford and Pittsburgh, however, will have rooms available for indoor exercise. Tr. 7/29/86: 14, 18. The applicable ACA standards recommend that indoor space for out-of-cell activity be available five days per week. Tr. 6/18/86: 124. The standard is not mandatory. Tr. 7/30/86: 20-21. I do not find a constitutional problem on the issue of indoor recreational facilities. Plaintiffs have not shown that protracted periods of inclement weather, which would foreclose outdoor activity altogether, occur with any frequency. Moreover, while indoor exercise facilities might be desirable, they are not mandated by the Constitution. The final issue concerns group exercise, which the Commonwealth prohibits for capital inmates. Tr. 6/26/86: 126-27. Capital cases used to be exercised in groups, but in 1984 the Commonwealth eliminated that practice and constructed individual exercise areas. Tr. 6/24/86: 61; Tr. 6/26/86: 150; Tr. 6/27/86: 27-28; Tr. 7/28/86: 112. In the spring of 1986, the Commonwealth modified its policy to permit capital inmates to exercise in groups of two. Tr. 6/17/86: 20; Tr. 6/23/86: 19; Tr. 6/24/86: 61; Tr. 7/28/86: 112. Under this modified policy, the inmates decide who they will exercise with, provided the inmates are compatible. Tr. 6/26/86: 153; Tr. 7/28/86: 138. Plaintiffs nevertheless object to the modified policy, and demand that the Commonwealth reinstate the policy of complete group exercise. Plaintiffs note that the former policy existed without any incidents of hostage taking or escape attempts. Tr. 6/26/86: 150-51; Tr. 6/27/86: 27-28. Plaintiffs also argue that the individual exercise areas, which they refer to as “dog kennels,” are an affront to the personal dignity of the inmates. Tr. 6/17/86: 19-20, 154; Tr. 7/28/86: 136. Dr. Richard G. Lonsdorf, an expert in the field of psychiatry, confirmed that capital inmates have a critical need for meaningful physical activity, which plaintiffs argue is discouraged by the individual exercise yards. Tr. 6/17/86: 19, 22-24. Further, plaintiffs established that individual exercise areas such as those at issue here are no longer in use in any other jurisdiction. Tr. 6/17/86: 159. The Commonwealth countered that, with few exceptions, the capital inmates enjoy good health. Tr. 7/28/86: 93. The Commonwealth introduced additional testimony that the existing exercise areas permit meaningful exercise in the form of calisthenics and limited jogging. Tr. 6/16/86: 64; Tr. 6/17/86: 60; Tr. 6/23/86: 19; Tr. 6/24/86: 59; Tr. 7/28/86: 133. The Commonwealth supported its exercise policies by demonstrating the legitimate security reasons underlying those policies. The Commonwealth established that group exercise would enable capital inmates to plan concerted actions, attempt escapes, or take hostages. Tr. 6/26/86: 127-28; Tr. 6/27/86: 12. George Petsock, an expert in corrections and Superintendent at Pittsburgh testified that the Commonwealth’s policy emanated from the murder of the Captain of the correctional officers at Pittsburgh, who was bludgeoned to death with a baseball bat by an RHU inmate, albeit a noncapital case. Tr. 7/29/86: 124, 130. See Commonwealth v. Terry, 521 A.2d 398 (Pa.1987). On several occasions, capital inmates have made appointments to fight and have fought one another when permitted to play handball in the same exercise area. Tr. 6/26/86: 23; Tr. 7/28/86: 135, 139. One inmate attempted to smuggle a leg he had broken from his desk into the exercise yard. Tr. 6/27/86: 38. Also, Commissioner Jeffes testified that, on one occasion, the capital inmates at Graterford refused to leave the exercise area and return to their cells. Tr. 7/29/86: 21-22. He opined that had the inmates not been exercised individually, significant manpower and the use of force would have been required to defuse the situation. Id. Similarly, Lieutenant Kyler, former supervisor of RHU correctional officers at Huntingdon, Thomas A. Fulcomer, an expert in corrections and Superintendent at Huntingdon, Charles H. Zimmerman, an expert in corrections and Superintendent at Graterford, and Lieutenant Donald W. Flannigan, Chief Supervisor at Grater-ford, all testified that the group exercise of capital inmates would increase the security risks substantially. Tr. 6/26/86: 127-29; Tr. 6/27/86: 12; Tr. 7/28/86: 112-14, 134-35. In light of these facts, I hold that the Commonwealth’s policy prohibiting group exercise does not contravene constitutional norms. Even accepting that the prior group exercise of capital inmates did not result in any serious security infractions, it is certainly reasonable for Pennsylvania’s correctional officials to conclude that group exercise confers upon capital inmates a heightened ability to breach security. I see no evidence to suggest that the inmates are physically harmed by this policy. Nor am I persuaded that the psychological harm, if any, is sufficient to override the Commonwealth’s legitimate security concerns. Under Bell v. Wolfish, prison administrators must be afforded wide-ranging deference in adopting and executing policies that in their judgment are necessary to preserve order, discipline, and security. 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. Accordingly, the evidence and applicable law compel me to defer to the Commonwealth’s policy banning group exercise. 2. Ban on Communal Religious Activities As a part of their challenge to the conditions of confinement, plaintiffs object to the practice of prohibiting communal religious worship. The Commonwealth claims that, as with exercise, the security concerns implicated by group activity justify its prohibition of communal religious worship. Many capital individuals under a sentence of death turn to religion. Tr. 6/17/86: 24-26; Tr. 6/24/86: 71, 98; Tr. 6/27/86: 78, 80, 87; Tr. 7/28/86: 71, 78. Although communal worship is prohibited, a chaplain visits capital inmates at Grater-ford and Huntingdon on a daily basis. Tr. 6/23/86: 43; Tr. 6/26/86: 65; Tr. 6/26/86: 117; Ex. D-18. Chaplains are permitted to distribute religious materials and to provide the basic sacraments, communion, and other religious needs. Tr. 6/16/86: 41; Tr. 6/23/86: 19, 44; Ex. D-18. Capital inmates may also visit with outside spiritual advisors without diminishing their weekly visitation privileges. Tr. 6/26/86: 53-54; Ex. D-18. Visits by the prison chaplains take place at the cell door. As a result, several inmates complained of a lack of privacy during chaplain visits. Tr. 6/16/86: 26; Tr. 6/23/86: 44, 55. The new RHU at Grater-ford will have rooms available that could be used for private discussions. Tr. 7/29/86: 33. Although the ban on communal religious worship and diminished privacy during religious visits are proper considerations in an eighth amendment challenge to the conditions of confinement, I find that the facts presented here, taken alone, do not constitute an eighth amendment violation. As noted in my discussion of plaintiffs’ challenge to the ban on group exercise, the Commonwealth put forth substantial testimony regarding the security risks presented by group exercise. These same con-' cerns apply here. See Tr. 6/27/86: 11; Tr. 7/28/86: 114-115. Moreover, William D. Leeke, an expert in corrections and Commissioner of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, testified that communal religious services involve a “calculated risk.” Tr. 7/29/86: 96-98. He opined that the ban on communal religious activities at Graterford and Huntingdon accords with acceptable correctional practice. Id. at 104. Since the Commonwealth allows capital inmates to possess religious materials, permits regular visits by chaplains and specially arranged visits by outside clergy, and has articulated compelling security risks that are implicated by communal religious activity, I cannot find that the decision of the prison authorities to disallow communal religious activities inflicts cruel and unusual punishment. Nevertheless, I will consider the ban on communal religious activity in assessing the totality of the circumstances under the eighth amendment and in assessing plaintiffs’ first amendment claim. 3. Visitation Privileges The plaintiffs oppose the ban on contact visits on the grounds that it is psychologically harmful to the inmates and leads to increased tension. Dr. Richard G. Lonsdorf, plaintiffs’ expert in psychiatry, testified that the ban on contact visits contributes to depression and psychological dysfunction among the capital inmates. Tr. 6/17/86: 28-29. In response, the Commonwealth argues that its visitation policy is reasonable and based upon legitimate security concerns. In Block v. Rutherford, the Supreme Court held that a blanket prohibition on con