Full opinion text
ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE PAINE, District Judge. This cause comes before the court on the report and recommendation of the Magistrate (DE 128), defendants’ amended response and objections (DE 155), and plaintiffs’ reply (DE 170). The court has studied these submissions and has reviewed the voluminous transcripts, exhibits, and other materials in the case file as well as the relevant authorities. Now being fully advised, the court renders the following memorandum and order. I. BACKGROUND This class action for damages and injunc-tive relief was brought by inmates who claim that their federal constitutional rights were violated when they were gang raped or otherwise assaulted while incarcerated at the Glades Correctional Institution (GCI), a state prison in Belle Glade, Florida. The procedural history of the case is set out at length by the Magistrate. Briefly, this litigation was commenced on May 14, 1982 with the handwritten pro se complaint of Anthony LaMarca, who alleged that he was subjected to ongoing physical violence and harassment by other GCI inmates because he refused to participate in homosexual activity and that prison officials failed to act to alleviate the situation (DE 1). As the lawsuit continued, counsel was obtained and the complaint was amended several times (DE 23, 62, 93, 129, 131). On April 13, 1984, the undersigned district judge ordered that for purposes of injunctive relief the case proceed as a class action defined as those persons within the Florida prison system who are or will be incarcerated at GCI (DE 47). The third amended complaint contains claims for damages by ten inmates. Named plaintiffs LaMarca, Saunders and Johnson also seek equitable remedies on behalf of the class. Defendant Turner is sued in his individual capacity as former superintendent of GCI. Defendant Lamb-din, the current superintendent, is sued solely in his official capacity for purposes of injunctive and equitable relief (DE 129). The State of Florida is a defendant for purposes of attorneys’ fees and expenses. The district court referred the case to United States Magistrate Peter Nimkoff for a report and recommendation pursuant to Magistrate Rule 1(f) of the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida. The Magistrate conducted two weeks of eviden-tiary hearings, reviewed deposition testimony and numerous exhibits, and heard oral argument. The Magistrate then filed a 135-page report and recommendation containing findings of fact and conclusions of law (DE 128) which found Turner liable to the ten named plaintiffs in the aggregate amount of $201,500 and recommended the creation of two committees to assist the court in formulating specific injunctive relief. Defendants filed extensive objections to the Magistrate’s report in accordance with Local Magistrate Rule 4(b) (DE 155). Defendants dispute the Magistrate’s failure to grant a continuance, to grant a jury trial, and to recuse himself from the proceedings, and also lodge numerous objections to specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiffs submitted an equally extensive reply (DE 170). II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The court’s review of the Magistrate’s findings and recommendations is governed by a de novo standard: A District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate. The District Judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the Magistrate, making his own determination on the basis of that record. The District Judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate with instructions. Magistrate Rule 4(b), Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida; accord 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982). The Supreme Court has held that, in providing for a de novo “determination” rather than a de novo hearing, “Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose to place on a Magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2413, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). The former Fifth Circuit has held that, in situations involving the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, a district court should not enter an order inconsistent with the Magistrate’s credibility determinations without personally hearing the live testimony of the witnesses whose testimony is determinative. Louis v. Blackburn, 630 F.2d 1105, 1109 (5th Cir.1980). Although the Louis court expressly limited its holding to criminal- cases, see id. n. 3, the exercise of sound judicial discretion compels this court to extend substantial deference to the Magistrate’s credibility choices absent counterveiling considerations. In a criminal case which preceded Louis, the Fifth Circuit stated: In our view it would be a rare case in which a district judge could resolve credibility choices contrary to the recommendations of the magistrate without himself having had an opportunity to see and hear the witnesses testify. Certainly, in such a rare case there should be found in the transcript an articulable basis for rejecting the magistrate’s original resolution of credibility and that basis should be articulated by the district judge. United States v. Marshall, 609 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir.1980). III. FAILURE TO GRANT JURY TRIAL Defendants first object to the Magistrate’s failure to grant a jury trial. The Magistrate found that defendants waived that right by failing to make a demand within ten days of November 2,1983, when they filed an answer to the first amended complaint (DE 23, 41). Defendants first demanded a jury trial on November 8,1985, over two years later, in response to the second amended complaint (DE 62, 69, 83). Following the Magistrate’s denial of a jury trial (DE 105), defendants filed an emergency appeal with the district court (DE 104), which the undersigned denied (DE 112). Defendants again argue that the second and third amended complaints introduced new issues into the lawsuit which merited a jury trial and that therefore their demand was timely. As the Magistrate correctly concluded, the right to jury trial is waived by a failure to make a demand within ten days of the “last pleading directed to such issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b). If the original pleadings effectively waive jury trial, the right cannot be revived by amending the original pleadings. Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir.1977). A jury trial may be demanded, however, for any “new issues” in the amended pleadings. Amendments not introducing new issues do not give rise to a demand for jury trial. Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 753 (5th Cir.1978). What constitutes a “new issue” is the bone of contention. The court's review of the law on this subject has yielded less than clear results. The former Fifth Circuit has said that “[t]he term ‘new issues’ has been interpreted to mean new issues of fact and not new theories of recovery.” Id. at 753. Notwithstanding, not every new fact question has been held to give rise to a jury trial. For example, in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.1973) (en banc), a securities case, the court held that a claim for punitive damages and an allegation of willfulness were not new issues within the meaning of Rule 38: The willfulness and falsity as of a particular date merely clarified “the same general issues” raised in the original complaint. Moore v. United States, 196 F.2d 906, 908 (5th Cir.1952). Kircher had been put on notice of the underlying facts and basic legal theory — fraud— upon which plaintiffs sought relief, and the character of the suit was in no way changed by the amendments. Id. at 1310 (emphasis added). One district court has articulated the following standard: The test to be employed by a court in ruling on a motion to strike a jury demand is whether the “new issues” alleged in the amendments “touch ... the same general issues ” raised by the original pleadings, Roth v. Hyer, 142 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir.1944), or whether the issues contained in the amended complaints “were in any material way different from those presented by the original [complaint].” Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Breslin, 332 F.2d 928, 931 (5th Cir.1964). Reading & Bates Construction Co. v. Baker Energy Resources Corp., 96 F.R.D. 564, 565 (S.D.Tex.1983) (emphasis added). In this case, the second and third amended complaints introduced claims for damages by seven new plaintiffs. As defendants contend, each of these claims requires proof as to whether the alleged incidents occurred, whether the evidence establishes a causal connection with defendants’ conduct, and whether damages have been sustained. All of these questions raise “new” factual issues in the plainest sense of the word. The peculiar circumstances of this case, however, suggest a contrary result. First, the record of the evidentiary hearings conducted by the Magistrate provides the court with 20/20 hindsight on the nature and materiality of the new factual issues. Second, a class action posture requires that the plaintiffs raise common questions of fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Of particular relevance is the testimony of the named plaintiffs and of Dr. Richard M. Swanson, plaintiffs’ expert witness in the field of correctional psychology. Considered as a whole, this evidence shows that plaintiffs’ claims possess a factual congruity of sickening proportion. Their stories are strikingly similar, reflecting common experiences of harassment, threats, attack, official indifference, and resulting damage. The similarity of the factual questions is particularly apparent in the court’s analysis of the causal connection between Turner’s acts or omissions and plaintiffs’ claims. See infra at 681-682. Thus, the issues raised by the seven new plaintiffs in the second amended complaint “touch ... the same general issues” raised in the first amended complaint, Roth v. Hyer, 142 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir.1944), and are not materially different from the original issues, see Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Breslin, 332 F.2d 928, 931 (5th Cir.1964); see also Reading & Bates, 96 F.R.D. at 565. The first amended complaint put defendants “on notice of the underlying facts and basic legal theory ... upon which plaintiffs sought relief, and the character of the suit was in no way changed by the amendments.” Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1310. Having failed timely to demand a jury trial in response to the first amended complaint, defendants effectively waived their right to such a trial, and their objection is overruled. IV. FAILURE TO GRANT CONTINUANCE Defendants next object to the Magistrate’s failure to grant a continuance of the evidentiary hearings. This court has previously denied defendants’ emergency appeal of the Magistrate’s ruling (DE 104, 112). Orders concerning the conduct of a trial, such as continuances, “are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the trial court” and “will not be disturbed except upon a showing of abuse of discretion, and then only upon a showing that such abuse of discretion resulted in substantial harm to the parties seeking relief.” Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig & Associates, Inc., 785 F.2d 877, 881-82 (11th Cir.1986). Defendants principally assert that they were not prepared to defend against the damage claims because circumstances forced them to depose the seven new plaintiffs as well as plaintiffs’ expert witnesses at the last minute. Further, defendants contend that these depositions revealed the names of new witnesses with knowledge of plaintiffs’ claims but defendants had no opportunity to depose them. The court is not persuaded that these circumstances justified a continuance. Defendants had already been granted one continuance from November 4, 1985 to a special setting on December 2, 1985. In that order the Magistrate pointed out that defendants had had notice of the claims of the seven new plaintiffs at least since September 1 (DE 80). While it is true that discovery continued after the evidentiary hearings had begun, such a schedule does not appear to have dampened the energy and enthusiasm of competent counsel for both sides. Defendants were able to depose the seven new plaintiffs on November 13-15. Defendants do not explain, however, why this accelerated discovery schedule precluded them from deposing the newly-revealed witnesses before or after the commencement of trial on December 2, particularly considering that these new witnesses appear to be prisoners in defendants’ custody. Defendants’ assertion that they were unprepared to try this case, moreover, is belied by their effective cross-examination of plaintiffs’ witnesses. Most important, defendants have demonstrated no actual prejudice. Accordingly, defendants’ objection to the Magistrate’s failure to continue the trial is overruled. V. FAILURE OF MAGISTRATE TO ENTER RECUSAL During the testimony of Dr. Swanson, defendants first became aware that the Magistrate had visited GCI in the early stages of this litigation. Judge Nimkoff told counsel that in 1982 he had conducted an informal hearing of LaMarca's claim, as was often his custom in prisoner cases. Also present at that unrecorded proceeding were Joe Belitsky of the Attorney General’s Office, representing the State, and GCI Assistant Superintendent Arline. LaMarca related to the court his concern for other inmates who had been abused. Belitsky and Arline assured the Magistrate that a full investigation would take place. No such inquiry ever occurred, and Turner testified that he was unaware that these assurances were made to the court (DE 128, at 30-31). At trial defendants requested Judge Nimkoff to recuse himself, but the Magistrate denied that he would become a witness in the suit and accordingly refused the request. A judicial officer is required to disqualify himself in a proceeding in which he has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1)(a) and (d)(iv); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1982). Defendants argue that the Magistrate relied upon these events as evidence establishing either Turner’s knowledge of alleged conditions at GCI or his failure to act on those conditions after he he was put on notice. As defendants point out, the 1982 proceedings conducted at GCI were nonrecord, and no witness testified concerning the Magistrate’s recollection of the events. Notwithstanding, knowledge acquired by a judge while he performs judicial duties does not constitute grounds for disqualification. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). Where it is alleged that a judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning a proceeding such that he should recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455, the information or knowledge must stem from an extrajudicial source to warrant disqualification. United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916, 102 S.Ct. 1771, 72 L.Ed.2d 176 (1982). Judge Nimkoff’s 1982 visit to GCI was undisputedly conducted as part of the instant proceeding and occurred in the presence of counsel for the State. See United States v. State of Washington, 459 F.Supp. 1020, 1093-97 (W.D.Wash.1978), aff'd, 645 F.2d 749 (9th Cir.1981). Defendants, moreover, conceivably could have called Belitsky or Arline to testify to their memory of the proceeding. Defendants finally argue that the Magistrate was inclined to rely on the 1982 hearing as evidence tending to establish notice to Turner or Turner’s failure to act. The transcripts disclose that the Magistrate asked questions of several witnesses regarding that hearing. In his report and recommendation, however, the Magistrate states that those events serve “merely to underscore Plaintiffs’ position that GCI, under the Turner administration, was an institution not under the control of that Defendant” (DE 128, at 31). Thus, the Magistrate did not accord those events with dispositive weight. Cf. State of Washington, 459 F.Supp. at 1095. In any event, disregarding the account of the 1982 hearing, the record contains more than enough evidence to support the Magistrate’s findings and conclusions regarding Turner’s control of GCI. The objection is overruled. VI. OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT The court next will address in turn each of defendants’ objections to the Magistrate’s findings of fact and will analyze their significance to the overall disposition of the case. The numbers preceding each paragraph correspond to the paragraph numbering in the report and recommendation. ¶ 31. As plaintiffs concede, defendants’ objection should be sustained. Turner was superintendent of GCI from mid-1976 to his retirement on July 31, 1984. 1132. The racial breakdown of the GCI inmate population in 1985 is somewhat relevant to the issue of injunctive relief. The Magistrate’s finding that approximately sixty percent of the population was Black and the remainder White or Hispanic is generally supported by the evidence which concededly was not the most competent proof. Although the documentary evidence contains no support for the conclusion that the figure for Whites included Hispanics, there was testimony to that effect. Objection overruled. 1133. Although defendants are correct that Music estimated the Hispanic population at seven percent (Music, DE 160, at 133), the evidence supports the inference that that percentage may have been higher at times. Defendants also contest the definition of “close custody” prisoners; however, the Magistrate did not define the term. Objection sustained in part and overruled in part; the Magistrate’s finding is modified accordingly. ¶ 36. Defendants protest the Magistrate’s overall characterization of factors present at GCI such as “wholesale manufacture of prison wine,” “regular screenings of sexually explicit videotapes,” and “maintenance of an ill-assorted guard corps whose members the inmates perceived as regularly trafficking in contraband, extortion and neglect.” Defendants admit that instances of these factors appear in the record but far less frequently than the Magistrate implied. The record supports findings that prison wine was prevalent at GCI, that sexually-explicit films were shown, and that many of the guards were perceived as corrupt or at least neglectful. Although the Magistrate’s language is somewhat hyperbolic, the objection is overruled. 1138-39. Defendants argue that the Magistrate implied that Turner was aware of all of the conditions at GCI relating to plaintiffs’ claims and that two letters Turner wrote to Louie L. Wainwright, secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), constitute admissions of GCI’s unsafeness. It is apparent from the letters in evidence, however, that Turner’s comments must be viewed in the context of his reporting a staffing shortage to his superior. Objection overruled. Defendants make much of the relevance to this litigation of the accreditation of prisons and GCI in particular by the American Correctional Association. The Magistrate found that the GCI accreditation had “virtually no significance” to this lawsuit because accredited prisons have been found unconstitutional by courts. Having considered the GCI accreditation along with the remainder of the evidence, the undersigned district court finds it of marginal relevance in this case. Objection overruled. 1140. On January 30, 1980, the Palm Beach County Grand Jury issued a presentment regarding conditions at GCI (pltf.ex. 4). Although the investigation was apparently provoked by shortages in meat supply, other security issues were addressed. Defendants’ objection to the report’s admissibility in evidence on the ground of hearsay is overruled pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C) and is also overruled on the basis of relevance because the report is germane at least to the question of notice to Turner. Defendants again complain about the Magistrate’s use of the phrase “a free flow of contraband.” The grand jury heard testimony of lax security at GCI as well as “many allegations and accusations of drugs, alcohol, and other contraband, gambling, theft, confiscation, and payoffs among the inmates and personnel of GCI.” The report stated that alcohol use and its manufacture was apparently “prevalent.” Pltf.ex. 4, at 6. That such contraband was freely flowing at GCI is a reasonable construction of the grand jury’s findings, and the objection is overruled. ¶ 42. On August 26-29, 1980, the DOC Office of the Inspector General issued a report on its management review of GCI (pltf.ex. 4). Among other things, the report noted a serious lack of supervision on the compound due to staffing shortages. The Magistrate simply cited this portion of the report and did not seem to hold Turner personally responsible for staff shortages. Accordingly, the objection is overruled. 1Í 44. Defendants dispute the Magistrate’s finding of low morale among GCI staff. The district court believes the record contains sufficient evidence to support this finding. This evidence includes an employee questionnaire which reflected that staff members felt that on-job training and the number of available staff were inadequate as well as the various witnesses’ perception of staff apathy. Objection overruled. 1145. The Office of the Inspection General issued a second GCI management report approximately three years later, on September 19-21, 1983 (pltf.ex. 6). The management report supports the Magistrate’s finding of some laxity in security, which included improper control and supervision of inmate movement from one location to another and inadequate staffing of the perimeter posts (id. at 8-9). Objection overruled. 111146-50. The Magistrate found that the use of excessive force by Lieutenant William Barrett when he was acting chief correctional officer at GCI was relevant to Turner’s management of GCI. In brief, Barrett was summoned from a local festival in Belle Glade to the prison after a fight broke out in a dormitory. Barrett was accompanied by Sergeant Rickey Hayes and Lieutenant L.A. Peters, GCI’s internal inspector. All three had been drinking. Barrett and Hayes had their faces made up like clowns. Although the incident had been largely quelled, Barrett took a loaded shotgun into the compound and used it to beat several inmates in the back of the head. As plaintiffs emphasize, the Barrett incident is relevant not as a showing of improper use of force but as an illustration of Turner’s reaction to the situation. The incident report of the Office of the Inspector General states that on the night of the incident Turner advised Barrett to go home and rest and that Turner did not feel the situation warranted notification of a prison inspector (pltf.ex. 9, at 5). Defendants are correct to add that Turner eventually notified the inspector general, who sent a team to GCI within three days of the incident (Swanson, DE 117, at 213-14). Swanson criticized Turner for not immediately suspending Barrett and taking away his gun and badge rather than merely telling him to go home and rest. Significantly, defendants do not object to the Magistrate’s finding at II49 that Barrett remained functioning as a correctional officer for at least a full week after the incident. It is clear that the Magistrate did not attribute undue weight to the Barrett incident. Objection overruled. The Magistrate also related Swanson's testimony concerning the transcript of Turner’s interview with one of Barrett’s victims (pltf.ex. 9, subex. 13). The Magistrate quoted Swanson’s testimony that the inmate’s reporting of wine-drinking among the prisoners did not appear to surprise Turner. Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the district court does not believe that the Magistrate found that Turner “failed to register appropriate outrage” at this revelation. The Magistrate simply quoted Swanson’s opinion in a footnote and did not comment on it in any way. Objection overruled. ¶¶[ 51-52. Defendants also challenge as irrelevant the Magistrate’s findings regarding the investigation and eventual dismissal and arrest of GCI correctional officer Clarence Dixon. As defendants note, Turner did testify that, although the investigation was hindered by several obstacles, he ordered it to continue. Turner’s persistence, however, does not negate the Magistrate’s finding that if Dixon’s employment application had been properly screened he probably would not have been hired at all. Objection overruled. ¶ 53. Defendants again protest the Magistrate’s use of the phrase “wholesale staff corruption.” The Barrett and Dixon reports and the testimony of alleged inmate-enforcer Larry Pryor obviously do not in themselves impugn the integrity of the entire GCI security staff. Barrett, however, was one of GCI’s top-ranked security officers. Further, the testimony of the inmate-witnesses discloses the perception of extensive staff corruption. Objection overruled. 1f 56. The Magistrate agreed with Swanson’s conclusion that the GCI staff or administration took little or no effort to control the extensive contraband at the prison. Defendants complain that the Magistrate ignored their evidence of substantial measures to control the flow of contraband during Turner’s regime. Both sides have done a heroic job of providing citations to the evidence supporting their respective positions. The district court has considered all the evidence as well as the possible biases of the witnesses. The record as a whole supports the Magistrate’s conclusion that little or no effort was taken to control illicit activity at GCI, resulting in readily-available contraband. Objection overruled. 111157-58. The Magistrate found that evidence of several incidents involving use of firearms tended to show inadequate staff training. Defendants claim that the Magistrate exaggerated the significance of these occurrences and that the GCI staff was in fact well-trained. The district court finds that the firearms incidents bear somewhat on the issue of staff training. Objection overruled. 1159. Defendants’ objection to the finding of low morale among staff is overruled for the reasons stated in supra H 44. The district court agrees with defendants’ assertion that Turner is not solely to blame for high staff turnover and vacancies. As plaintiffs and defendants note, the staff turnover and vacancy rates declined in 1982 and continued to decline through 1984. The relevancy of these observations, however, is not critical to the resolution of this case, because six of the ten individual plaintiffs were raped or assaulted after the turnover and vacancy rates had declined in 1983 and 1984. The Magistrate’s findings are modified in accordance with the district court’s observations in this paragraph. ¶ 61. Defendants take issue with the finding that the individual plaintiffs’ claims are directly related to the lack of staff supervision due to Turner’s failure to station the officers properly. The objection is overruled for the reasons stated in infra ¶¶ 62 and 63. 1162. During the Turner administration, GCI inmates were in the habit of hanging sheets, towels, clothes, and personal lockers from the bunk beds. These obstructions obscured activity in the bunks from the view of the officer stationed in the cage or “wicket” at the front of each dorm. The showers at the back of the dormitories were obscured from the officers’ view by these obstructions and also by double-bunking the middle row of beds. Defendants point to testimony that an officer stationed in the wicket could not see into parts of the shower even if these obstacles were removed. This does not change the fact that visibility was greatly improved with the removal of these obstructions in one of the dormitories under one of Turner’s successors, Superintendant Randall Music. Objection overruled. ¶ 63. Although the officers were supposed to be on constant patrol of the dorms, the Magistrate found that this did not occur. The Magistrate’s finding that routine patrol did not in fact take place is supported by the weight of the evidence, particularly the testimony that gang rapes in the showers or beds endured for fifteen to forty minutes. Objection overruled. The Magistrate also found that Turner could recall no action taken against an officer for failure to patrol the dormitories. Turner actually testified that such action may have been taken but that he could not recall a specific instance. Objection overruled. H 64. Defendants take issue with the Magistrate’s finding that GCI’s chief investigator, Lieutenant Peters, testified that GCI had no standard operating procedure for investigating rapes (Peters, DE 162, at 444). Peters later testified to a procedure he had used to investigate a rape (id. at 464-65). From this testimony defendants allege that the Magistrate misrepresented the evidence. The court disagrees. Peters stated that no formal procedure in fact existed and later recounted his own methodology. Peters testified, as defendants note, that no procedure existed for line officers to report rapes directly to him, the prison investigator, but that line officers were supposed to pass on the information to their superiors. The individual plaintiffs’ stories, which the Magistrate found credible, demonstrate that the passing of rape reports to superior officers did not produce competent or thorough investigations of those reports. Objection overruled. 1165. DOC Inspector General Brierton testified that, in a prison rape investigation, at a minimum, (1) medical evidence should be secured, (2) a full victim statement should be taken, and (3) the matter should be referred to a local prosecutor. These steps were not followed at GCI with respect to the individual plaintiffs. Defendants question whether the individual plaintiffs were actually raped and, if they were, whether the rapes were reported. Again, the Magistrate found credible plaintiffs’ accounts of their rapes and the ensuing events. The district court sees no reason to doubt this finding, and the objection is overruled. 1166. Both Turner and Peters specifically testified to only one prosecution for a rape at GCI. Peters remembered that it occurred in 1984. Although it is true that internal GCI statistical reports note five sexual assaults from 1980-84 (pltf.ex. 31), no incident reports regarding these attacks were introduced. The Magistrate’s finding is so modified. 1171. The Magistrate found that various factors, considered in combination, should have made it apparent to a prudent administrator that rapes were occurring, and that, considering this knowledge, the failure to promulgate and adhere to the most rudimentary investigative and preventative procedures constitutes a deliberate indifference toward inmate security. The objection is overruled for the reasons stated in infra 1I1Í 72 and 73 and elsewhere in this memorandum and order. 1172. The Magistrate found that the background of contraband, violence, and other illegal activity at GCI was compatible with the existence of violent sexual assaults. Defendants’ objection that contraband was not free-flowing is overruled for reasons stated previously. Defendants’ further objection that there is no connection between contraband and rape is belied by the plaintiffs’ testimony evidencing the presence of weapons, drugs, and alcohol when they were raped. Objection overruled. ¶ 73. The Magistrate found that the disproportionate numbers of White inmates who received protective confinement should have put Turner on notice that these inmates felt in danger in the population. As defendants note, inmates may request protective confinement for reasons unrelated to fears for their safety. The district court makes two observations. First, if protective confinement houses twenty Whites to one Black in a population where Blacks outnumber Whites (pltf.ex. 6), a prudent administrator should at least have inquired why this was the case. Second, the evidence as a whole supports the inference that Whites who requested protective confinement did so out of fear of sexual or other assault. Again, a prudent administrator would have investigated. Objection overruled. II75. Defendants criticize the Magistrate’s finding that conditions in protective confinement were “punitive” because certain physical problems such as lighting, ventilation, and overcrowding were out of Turner’s fiscal control. Those conditions, however, comprised only part of the reason that protective confinement was punitive. For example, the cells were infested with waste and vermin, inmates were harassed by inmates in nearby disciplinary confinement and the compound, no exercise was afforded, only three brief showers a week were allowed, and canteen and often library privileges were lost. Objection overruled. Tí 76. The fact that some inmates elected to remain in protective confinement for months was found to be evidence that those inmates experienced high anxiety in the compound. Overcrowded conditions in confinement supports an inference of a high inmate demand for protection. Defendants state only that other reasons could have contributed to the overcrowding, such as increase in inmate population, the nationwide rise in number of inmates in protective confinement, and inclusion of disciplinary and administrative confinement detainees. The Magistrate’s finding is modified accordingly. 1177. An experience repeated over and over in the testimony is the “wolfing” and cat-calling by Black inmates to White inmates upon the arrival of the latter group at GCI. Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the Magistrate found only that Swanson testified that the corroboration of this experience by inmates unknown to each other and presently incarcerated in different institutions enhances the probability of its occurrence. Objection overruled. 1178. The Magistrate found other indicia of sexual activity at GCI such as sheets hung from bunk beds, inmates moaning in their beds, and the showing of pornographic movies in a trailer where cries and moans were heard. Defendants object that reasons other than sexual activity existed for these occurrences and that there was no evidence that Turner knew of these phenomena. Such reasoning does not comport with the totality of the evidence including the inmate testimony that cries, moans, and screams were frequently heard emanating from the showers and from bunks concealed by sheets. Further, defendants’ protest that “a superintendent with all of his other responsibilities cannot screen each movie shown in prison” is almost disingenuous. Uncontra-dicted evidence shows that sexually-explicit videotapes — with graphic depictions of intercourse — were regularly shown in a trailer on the compound, that these movies were unsupervised, and that sounds consistent with human sexual activity could be heard from the trailer. Several witnesses provided more lurid accounts of the scene inside the trailer itself. Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses rendered their opinion that such films are inappropriate for a prison audience. Defense witness Brierton acknowledged that a different school of thought exists which holds that adult movies may be appropriate for adult prison audiences. Brierton, however, was adamant that group events such as movies should always be supervised. Defendants also point to the lack of evidence that Turner saw the hanging sheets, heard the cries, moans, and screams suggestive of sexual activity, or saw or selected the videotapes. A prudent administrator, however, should have been aware of these occurrences, which the evidence shows to have been a prevalent and unmistakeable part of life at GCI. Objection overruled. ¶ 79. The Magistrate found that some rapes were reported and that this should have signalled a problem to a prudent administrator. There is no reason to question the finding that rapes were reported to GCI officers. That these reports never made their way to Turner or to the prison investigator, considering the totality of the evidence, shows not Turner’s exculpatory ignorance but rather his liability. Objection overruled. ¶ 81. Objection overruled for the reasons stated in supra 1164. 1182. The record contains no evidence that the rapes, which the Magistrate found to have occurred, were even minimally investigated. Defendants’ objection is overruled for the reasons set forth in supra ITU 64 and 79. 1183. The objection regarding rape prosecutions is overruled for the reasons stated in supra 1166. The objection regarding weapons prosecutions is sustained as follows: the last sentence of the Magistrate’s finding is deleted and replaced with the following: “There was no evidence that during Turner’s administration a State prosecution was initiated for any weapons possessed by any inmate at GCI (Peters).” 1184. The Magistrate found that during Turner’s administration inmates bent on violence “roamed the compound with impunity.” This finding is supported by the evidence that during Turner’s reign inmates were free to wander the compound and dormitories other than the one to which they were assigned. The procedure whereby inmates need passes to move about the compound was instituted by a successor superintendent, Randall Music (Music, DE 160, at 146). Objection overruled. The Magistrate further found that Turner refused to seek assistance from federal and state prosecutors and investigators to cope with the crimes committed on the compound. The record, however, contains some evidence of outside prosecutions initiated by Turner. The evidence does fairly show that outside state and federal criminal justice remedies were grossly underutilized during Turner’s administration considering the crime-ridden atmosphere at GCI. The Magistrate’s finding is modified accordingly. 1186. The Magistrate found that the rapes of plaintiffs Aldred, Saunders, and Harper were reported to prison authorities, and the record contains no articulable reason for the district court to disregard this credibility determination. This finding supports an inference that the rapes were never investigated at least partially due to the lack of an established procedure for reporting rapes to the prison investigator. Objection overruled. H 87. The Magistrate found that Turner also failed to avail himself of or underutilized other possible investigative arms of the government such as the State Attorney General’s Office, State Attorney’s Office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Whether or not these agencies could have assisted in improving the conditions at GCI, the record does not show that Turner requested assistance from other agencies, on a consistent or persistent basis, in order to alleviate GCI’s problems. Defendants also note that there was no evidence that GCI’s internal inspectors were unwilling or unable to investigate matters brought to their attention. These assertions ring hollow considering that, because of inadequate reporting procedures, many grave matters were never brought to their attention. Objection overruled. 1189. The district court does not doubt the evidence cited by defendants that sometimes inmates were disciplined for being in an area in which they were not authorized to be. This proof, however, does little to mitigate the testimony which shows that inmate movement about the prison was inadequately controlled. See, e.g., supra 1184. Objection overruled. 1192. The objections are overruled for reasons previously addressed. H 93. The Magistrate found that, even though parts of the dormitories were concealed from the view of an officer stationed in the wicket, “Turner never initiated any administrative policy that officers patrol the dormitory on a regular basis” (DE 128, at 45). As defendants note, Turner did testify that posted orders required officers to patrol (Turner, DE 164, at 643). The weight of the evidence, notwithstanding, shows that the guards did not regularly patrol. The Magistrate’s finding is so modified. ¶ 94. Succeeding superintendent Music was able to increase visibility by single-bunking the middle row of beds in one of the dormitories. Defendants argue that this modification was not cost-free, because $7,000 was expended for new lockers (Music, DE 160, at 141-42). The district court is unable to determine from the record whether new lockers were an essential element of the single-bunking or simply an added security measure for inmate property. Even if the $7,000 was a necessary expenditure, there is no significant evidence that Turner possessed or tried to obtain funds for that purpose. Objection overruled. 1196-97. The Magistrate compared Turner’s practice in managing the transfer out of GCI of problem inmates with that of successors Jones and Music. “Problem inmates” includes both aggressive inmate “wolves” and especially vulnerable inmates. There was evidence that Turner often achieved the difficult goal of transferring problem inmates out of GCI. Successor superintendent Jones transferred out forty to forty-five inmates in less than three months. Music transferred five a month over a six-month period. Defendants point to instances where Turner moved seven inmates on one occasion and twelve on another, although his monthly average of such transfers is not in evidence. There is other compelling proof, however, that Turner was not zealous enough in transferring problem inmates: for example, Peters’ admission, found credible by the Magistrate, that Turner did not view “wolves” as problem inmates; the chronicles concerning “wolves” Larry Pryor, Willie Dock, and Levi Fisher (DE 128, at 42-44); and the length of time the vulnerable plaintiffs were effectively forced to endure protective confinement before transfers took place. In the district court’s view, the record shows that Turner could have exercised much more diligence in attempting to transfer problem inmates from GCI and that this failure constitutes evidence of deliberate or callous indifference to inmate safety. Objections overruled. ¶¶ 98-100. Defendants challenge the Magistrate’s findings regarding inmate-wolves Pryor, Dock, and Fisher with minor discrepancies in the evidence. The Magistrate’s findings are ultimately grounded in credibility determinations which the district court sees no reason to disturb. Objection overruled. 11101. The objections are overruled for the reasons set forth at length in supra ¶ 78. 11103. The Magistrate’s analysis of the relationship between financial feasibility and the constitutional obligations of a prison superintendent comports with the prevailing law in the Eleventh Circuit (see infra at 38-39). Objection overruled. H 105. The Magistrate detailed specific measures which were inexpensive or cost-free, which were ignored or rejected by Turner, which were within his control, and which would have minimized or eliminated the likelihood of rapes and other assaults at GCI. (i) Defendants claim that there was no evidence that Turner failed to discipline staff for failure to patrol the dorms, that staff in fact failed to patrol, or that Turner was made aware of any such failure. To the contrary, the district court can discern no significant evidence that the staff did patrol the dorms or that Turner disciplined staff for not patrolling. Further, there is no evidence explaining why Turner was not aware of this failure. Objection overruled. (ii) The record reflects extensive contraband at GCI which was often provided or at least tolerated by Turner’s staff, prevalent extortion activities by inmates which were not redressed by officers who were made aware of it, several instances of extortion activities by staff, and the tolerance of obvious consensual and nonconsensual sexual activity by inmates. Each of these matters is addressed elsewhere in this memorandum and order and in the report and recommendation. Turner’s overall laxity in managing and controlling his staff can be inferred from the prevalence and apparent obviousness of these conditions and from the absence of substantial evidence of disciplinary action directed to staff. Objection overruled. (iii) The weight of the evidence supports the finding that during the Turner administration it was common practice for inmates to hang sheets and other objects from their bunks, thereby obstructing visibility in the dormitories. The inference is inescapable that a prudent administrator would have been aware of this problem. Objection overruled. (iv) The district court has previously addressed the lack of adequate procedures for the reporting and investigation of rapes (supra ¶1¶ 64-66). Objection overruled. (v) Defendants’ arguments have been rejected elsewhere (supra TTTT 37, 66), and the objections are overruled. (vi) These assertions also have been rejected previously (supra ¶ 84). The objection is overruled. (vii) The court has already addressed Turner’s lack of zeal at transferring problem inmates (supra HU 96-100). Objection overruled. 11108. Swanson utilized various methodologies to evaluate plaintiffs’ accounts of their rapes. Defendants’ objection appears to be a semantical one and is overruled. ¶ 109. The Magistrate found the expert opinion testimony of Dr. Caddy to be credible, and the district court does not question this finding. Objection overruled. ¶ 111. The Magistrate’s credibility finding will not be overturned. Objection overruled. 11118. The Magistrate’s essential finding that the atmosphere of undeterred violence at GCI was conducive to acts of rape is supported by the weight of the evidence. Objection overruled. 11121. The record does not support defendants’ assertion that rectal examinations were actually used at GCI upon the reporting of a rape. Objection overruled. 1111122-195. The gravamen of defendants’ objections turn on credibility determinations which the district court finds no reason to disturb. The objections are overruled. HIT 196-199. The district court finds persuasive and supported by the evidence the Magistrate’s observations on the overall integrity of plaintiffs’ case. Objection overruled. VII. OBJECTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Defendants’ objections to the Magistrate’s conclusions of law reflect a general agreement with the prevailing legal standards but dispute the application of the facts to those standards. In particular, defendants argue with the Magistrate’s conclusion that plaintiffs have put forth sufficient proof of violation of their civil rights. As the Magistrate concluded, the following legal standards apply. A prisoner has a right to be protected from the constant threat of violence and from sexual assault. When prison officials have failed to control or segregate prisoners who endanger the physical safety of other prisoners, resulting in a high level of violence, it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1373-74 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 27, 69 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1981); see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) (eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment made applicable to states by fourteenth amendment due process clause). To hold a prison official liable in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) based on cruel and unusual punishment, plaintiffs must show that the official’s conduct constitutes an intentional or callous indifference to the prisoner’s right to reasonable protection from violence. Wiliams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380-81 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 335, 78 L.Ed.2d 305 (1983). Plaintiffs must prove deliberate indifference on the part of the defendant official rather than simple negligence. Section 1983 further requires “proof of an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular person ‘under color of state law’ and the constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 1380. Where the defendants hold supervisory positions, vicarious liability will not suffice. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (municipality not vicariously liable for acts of employees absent proof that execution of official policy inflicts injury). Supervisory defendants may be held liable if they have direct responsibility for the actions of the employees who engage in misconduct. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76, 96 S.Ct. 598, 606, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “the inquiry into causation must be a directed one, focusing on the duties and responsibilities of each of the individual defendants whose acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in a constitutional deprivation.” Williams, 689 F.2d at 1381. The district court first examines whether Turner’s conduct rose to a level of intentional or callous indifference to the plaintiffs’ right to “reasonable protection from violence.” Id. at 1380. The former Fifth Circuit elaborated on the elements of this requirement of intent in Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1981). A section 1983 plaintiff seeking to sue prison officials must prove either that “the official knew or should have known that his action infringed a clearly established constitutional right of the plaintiff,” Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 534 (5th Cir.1980), regardless of the officials’ subjective intent, Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 411 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883, 100 S.Ct. 173, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979), or that the “official either actually intended to do harm to the plaintiff, or took an action which, although not intended to do harm, was so likely to produce injury that the harm can be characterized as substantially certain to result,” id. at 412. The Magistrate found that Turner knew or should have known that his acts or omissions infringed plaintiffs’ constitutional right to reasonable safety. Evidence that Turner knew of serious security problems included official documents such as Turner’s letters to Wainwright, the 1980 grand jury presentment, the management reports of the DOC inspector general, the Barrett and Dixon incidents of staff corruption, and knowledge from various sources of the prevalence of contraband. The Magistrate further found that a prudent administrator should have known of widespread extortion activities by inmates often in collusion with officers and widespread rape and physical assaults by inmates on inmates (see supra 111177-78). The extensive findings of fact cited by the Magistrate provide adequate support for his conclusion that Turner’s conduct constituted callous indifference to plaintiffs’ right to reasonable protection from violence. Thus, plaintiffs have satisfied the objective test of Bogard, that Turner knew or should have known that his actions violated a clearly defined constitutional right, as well as Bogard’s subjective test, that Turner took an action which was so likely to produce injury that the harm can be characterized as substantially certain to result. A defendant cannot have the requisite intent for callous indifference if full compliance with constitutional norms is beyond his control and if he can show that he accomplished what could be accomplished within the limits of his authority. Williams, 689 F.2d at 1388. Over defendants’ persistent protest that Turner’s means were limited, the Magistrate identified administrative measures within Turner’s control which imposed little or no financial limitation. These include measures Turner could have taken to identify and remedy his staff’s failings at weapons training, the reporting of rapes, assaults, and other illegal activities through the chain of command, patrolling of the dormitories, and ensuring maximum visibility in the dormitories. Turner also could have implemented a standard operating procedure for investigation of rapes and assaults, availed himself of outside agencies in that regard, established inmate movement controls, and intensified his efforts to transfer particularly aggressive or vulnerable inmates from GCI. The fact that succeeding superintendents Jones and Music were able to achieve or at least take preliminary steps toward these goals attests to their feasibility. Thus, the district court is convinced that the means to satisfy constitutional minimums were within Turner’s control. Accordingly, the court overrules the objection to the Magistrate’s conclusion that plaintiffs failed to prove callous indifference. Defendants more strenuously object to the Magistrate’s conclusion that Turner’s actions constituted a legal cause of plaintiffs’ constitutional deprivation. The critical causation inquiry is whether Turner “was in a position to take steps that could have averted” the attacks on plaintiffs “but, through callous indifference, failed to do so. Resolution of this issue necessarily entails a very individualized approach, taking into account the duties, discretion, and means” of the defendant. Id. at 1384. Defendants essentially maintain that the Magistrate painted with such broad strokes that he failed to analyze whether the conditions at GCI which were under Turner’s control proximately caused the injuries to the particular plaintiffs at the particular times of each occurrence. The district court is not persuaded. The following conditions which were under Turner’s control provide direct causal links to plaintiffs’ injuries. First, every plaintiff was attacked or threatened with a weapon, typically a knife. The evidence establishes the prevalence of such weapons and Turner’s failure to take reasonable measures designed to control such contraband. Second, the long duration of several of the attacks, the places in which they occurred, and possibly the fact that they occurred in the first place, are functions of Turner’s failure to take even minimal steps to ensure that GCI was adequately patrolled (Aldred raped in shower for fifteen to twenty minutes; Durrance led away at knifepoint from place between bunks which was concealed by hanging blanket; Bronson raped with baseball bat on recreation field in broad daylight; Saunders raped in bathroom for twenty-five to thirty minutes; Harper raped in top bunk; Cobb stabbed in front of canteen in fight lasting ten to twelve minutes). Third, Turner’s failure to implement adequate reporting procedures for rapes and assaults was a legal cause of plaintiffs’ psychological and possibly physical damage (Aldred reported rape to several officers with no results; Aldred not given protective confinement; Durrance and Bronson did not report out of fear of consequences; Saunders raped by two inmates who previously had attacked him; Saunders reported rape and received inadequate treatment and no investigation; inmates identified as assailants by LaMarca were not confined for investigation and continued to assault him; classification officer told Johnson to take protective confinement or to get a weapon and fight back). Fourth, Turner’s callous indifference to the obvious and rampant indicia of homosexual activity was the proximate cause of rapes, attacks, or repeated harassment (Aldred, Durrance, Bronson, Saunders, and Harper raped; Bronson forced to commit nonconsensual sexual act in movie trailer; Johnson sexually harassed and later attacked four times; constant threats and sexual solicitation caused LaMarca to escape, take protective confinement, and receive disciplinary reports; Cobb injured in fight over homosexual). Fifth, Turner’s failure adequately to supervise correctional officers up to the lieutenant level resulted in corruption and incompetence among the officers and a lack of reasonable protection of inmates (Cobb’s assailant worked as an “enforcer” with GCI staff and was protected by them; LaMarca complained to Barrett about threats and assaults and was given a knife by Barrett; Bronson afraid to report rape because he had witnessed inmates exchanging money and drugs with guards). The Magistrate’s findings, supported by the record, contain more examples of how Turner’s callous indifference proximately caused the injuries to Aldred, Durrance, Bronson, Saunders, Harper, Johnson, Cobb, and LaMarca. The district court is not satisfied, however, that the requisite causal connection has been established with respect to the claims of Epprecht and Gordon. When Epprecht was assaulted with a pipe in the dormitory, he could see no guard in the wicket. Because there is no other evidence regarding the attack, such as its length, the district court is unable to determine whether the lapse in supervision was merely accidental or whether it flowed from Turner’s actions. The fact that the attack was provoked because Epprecht possessed cash money also does not establish causation because a cash money system in prison does not in itself prove callous indifference. Similarly, with respect to Gordon, the evidence shows only that he was assaulted three times at GCI. He was knocked unconscious once in front of the canteen, his buttocks were burned when inmates who had been drinking prison-made wine set his polyester underwear on fire, and he was hit in the head with a pipe in a robbery. The eighth amendment entitles a prisoner only to reasonable protection from violence. Williams, 689 F.2d at 1380. The district court fears that, were it to find Turner liable for the damage sustained by Ep-precht and Gordon, Turner might become an insurer for every attack on an inmate which occurred during his tenure. The recommended $17,000 award of compensatory damages to Epprecht and the $6,000 to Gordon must therefore be rejected. In summary, the facts and the law support the Magistrate’s conclusions that certain of defendant Turner’s actions and inac-tions in running GCI constituted callous indifference to plaintiffs’ eighth amendment right to reasonable protection from violence. The evidence further establishes that, with respect to all of the plaintiffs except Epprecht and Gordon, Turner was in a position to take steps that could have averted the attacks on these plaintiffs but, through his callous indifference, failed to do so. The record finally establishes that these constitutional deprivations were a legal cause of plaintiffs’ damages. Under the prevailing law in this circuit, see id. at 1381, plaintiffs Aldred, Durrance, Bronson, Saunders, Harper, Johnson, Cobb, and La-Marca should prevail against defendant Turner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. VIII. OBJECTIONS TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF The Magistrate found that, although defendants had instituted improvements of unconstitutional conditions at GCI, there was a reasonable expectation that the violations would recur. Accordingly, the Magistrate held that defendants’ efforts at correcting deficiencies at GCI did not deprive the court of the power to order injunctive relief. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979). He recommended the creation of two committees, one of penologists and the other of psychologists or psychiatrists, to advise the court in the formulation of specific injunctive relief. The charter of the committee of penologists is to ferret out other rape victims at GCI who were not identified through this litigation so that they might be provided with therapeutic assistance and to review and develop procedures at GCI to minimize future assaults, extortions, and rapes. The charter of the committee of psychologists or psychiatrists is to prescribe a treatment plan for the plaintiffs and witnesses in this action who remain incarcerated and to develop procedures at GCI to provide rape victims with support similar to that received by unincarcerated rape victims from rape crisis centers. Defendants argue