Full opinion text
MUNSON, Chief Judge. MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER This action is the latest in a series of legal conflicts centering around the Shore-ham Nuclear Power Station (“Shoreham”), an unlicensed nuclear reactor located on the north shore of Long Island in the Town of Shoreham, New York. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. County of Suffolk, 628 F.Supp. 654 (E.D.N.Y.1986); Citizens for an Orderly Energy Policy, Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.Supp. 1084 (E.D.N.Y.1985), aff'd, 813 F.2d 570 (2d Cir.1987); Long Island Lighting Co. v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.Supp. 759 (E.D.N.Y.1985); Cuomo v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972 (D.C.Cir.1985); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 589 F.Supp. 1387 (E.D.N.Y.1984); see also Kessell v. Public Service Comm’n, 123 A.D.2d 203, 511 N.Y.S.2d 441 (3d Dept.1987). In the present case, plaintiff Long Island Lighting Company (“LILCO” or “the utility”), a New York corporation engaged in the production and sale of electricity and the sole owner of the Shoreham plant, raises a number of facial constitutional challenges to two recent enactments passed by the New York legislature which the utility claims are designed to allow a newly-created public power authority to bypass New York State’s eminent domain procedures and will result in the public takeover of LILCO without providing its shareholders fair and just compensation. The Used and Useful Act, Chapter 518 of the laws of 1986 (McKinney’s Session Laws), amended § 66 of the Public Service Law and provides that if Shoreham is not in commercial operation at least by January 3, 1989, LILCO cannot recover construction costs for the nuclear reactor through the rates it charges its customers. See N.Y.Pub.Serv.Law § 66(24) (McKinney Supp.1987). The Long Island Power Authority Act (“LIPA Act”), chapter 517 of the laws of 1986 (McKinney’s Session Laws), establishes the Long Island Power Authority (“LIPA” or “the authority”) and authorizes this newly-created public entity to acquire LILCO through a negotiated buy-out, hostile tender offer, or the exercise of eminent domain powers. See N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020 et seq. (McKinney Supp.1987). Before the court are motions by the various defendants to dismiss the complaint or for summary judgment and cross-motions by LILCO for partial summary judgment and a preliminary injunction preventing any actions by state officials pursuant to the LIPA Act. I. BACKGROUND A. The History of the Shoreham Nuclear Reactor LILCO is the sole owner of the Shore-ham Nuclear Power- Station, an 809 megawatt (MW) nuclear-powered electricity generating facility located on the north shore of Long Island in the County of Suffolk. As a utility possessing a natural monopoly over its service area, LILCO is subject to extensive regulation by the New York State Public Service Commission ("PSC”) with respect to the rates it may charge its customers, the issuance and sale of its securities, and most details concerning its day-to-day and long-term operation. See generally N.Y.Pub.Serv.Law § 64 et seq. (McKinney 1955 & Supp.1987). Specifically, § 69 of the Public Service Law imposes on the PSC considerable responsibility in overseeing and approving an electric utility’s issuance of “stocks, bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness” to finance “the construction, completion, extension or improvement of its plant or distributing system, or for the improvement or maintenance of its service_” N.Y.Pub.Serv.Law § 69 (McKinney Supp.1987). With regard to the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, LILCO is subject to extensive regulations promulgated by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2282; 10 C.F.R. Part 50 (1987). To build and operate a nuclear power generating plant in the United States, a utility must first obtain a construction permit from the NRC and, after construction has been completed, must apply for an operating license and satisfy all NRC licensing requirements. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2035, 2131; 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.10, 50.33, 50.47. The standards for obtaining these permits have become increasingly stringent over the years since the Shoreham project began. Following the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, LILCO gave serious consideration to the feasibility of nuclear reactor power generating facilities as an alternative to “traditional” fossil-fuel electricity generating plants. Case 27563, Long Island Lighting Co.—Shoreham Prudence Investigation, App. A at 1 (Opinion No. 85-23, Dec. 16, 1985) (hereinafter PSC Prudence Report) (see Doc. 18, Tab 10). In the 1960s, a marked escalation in the demand for electric energy in LILCO’s service area reinforced the utility’s movement toward nuclear energy sources. Between 1963 and 1973, LILCO’s summer peak hour demand for electric energy increased from 1,099 MW to 2,620 MW, or 138 percent. Affidavit of Adam M. Mad-sen, Doc. 53, Exh. 2. In 1973, LILCO forecasted a continued increase in peak demand for its service area of 6.5 percent per year. Id. at 114. Yet, in 1971, LILCO operated electricity generating facilities with a total capacity of only 2,874 MW. Doc. 39, ¶ 1. In 1965, LILCO took its first steps toward the construction of a nuclear power plant to service Long Island. In April of that year, the utility’s Board of Directors informed LILCO’s shareholders that the construction of a 500 MW nuclear reactor was being considered. Two months later, the Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation (“Stone & Webster”) became the fledgling project’s architect engineer. In July 1965 LILCO’s Board of Directors approved the construction of a 540 MW nuclear reactor. The reactor was expected to commence commercial operation in 1973 and to cost $124 million to build. On March 30, 1966 LILCO’s Board approved the purchase of the Shoreham site, and in May 1968 LILCO submitted a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and an application for a construction permit to the Atomic Energy Commission, the predecessor to the NRC. PSC Prudence Report, App. A at 1. In November 1968 LILCO notified the Atomic Energy Commission that it intended to construct a larger facility than originally contemplated at the Shoreham site. In March 1969 the LILCO Board authorized the construction of an 820 MW boiling water nuclear reactor. This larger plant was expected to cost $217 million and was slated to begin commercial operation in May 1975. Site clearing and grading began in July 1968; a revised cost estimate of $261 million was issued in September 1969. In 1970, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety and the Atomic Energy Commission issued favorable reports on the Shoreham project; that same year LILCO modified its contract with Stone & Webster to reflect that a larger plant than had been initially anticipated was to be constructed. The revised total cost estimate for the construction of the reactor rose to $300 million. PSC Prudence Report, App. A at 1-2, In September 1970, hearings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (“ASLB”) of the Atomic Engergy Commission began. The Commission’s issuance of construction permits was abruptly halted a short time thereafter, however, in the wake of a decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit holding that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., required the Atomic Energy Commission to perform a comprehensive environmental impact analysis before issuing construction permits. See Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.Cir.1971). In July 1971, the Commission ceased issuing construction permits pending its development of procedures designed to comply with the Calvert Cliffs holding. In August, LILCO instructed Stone & Webster to curtail its engineering and procurement work, and the Shoreham project was effectively shut down. In May 1972 a hew project schedule was submitted by Stone & Webster and the Shoreham project was restarted; nonetheless, it was not until September 1972 that project engineering was fully reactivated and pre-permit work was begun. In December 1972 the estimated construction cost for Shoreham was $351.4 million, and the anticipated start-up date was July 1977. PSC Prudence Report, App. A at 2-3. On April 12, 1973 the Atomic Energy Commission issued a construction permit for the Shoreham project. Affidavit of Edward M. Barrett, Doc. 9, 116. Within a month of receiving that permit, LILCO’s cost estimate jumped dramatically to $506 million. Then, in 1974, LILCO began to encounter numerous construction problems. There were delays in the installation of piping and pipe fabrication, delays in equipment deliveries, and delays in the deliveries of hangers and valves. Union members refused to work in double shifts, as had been contemplated by Stone & Webster’s construction schedule. Further, many laborers working on the Shoreham project lacked the skills required to perform their assigned tasks, and unanticipated delays and expenditures were incurred in the time required to train those laborers. In July 1974, the cost of constructing Shoreham was estimated as $695 million, and the anticipated date for commencing commercial operation was extended from July 1977 to May 1978. PSC Prudence Report, App. A at 3-4. Despite the problems that had dogged the Shoreham project through 1974, the PSC concluded in an opinion and order dated April 17, 1975 that there was “no basis” for deferring the construction of the project. Case 26721, Long Island Lighting Co.—Construction and Maintenance Practices, (Opinion No. 75-7, April 17, 1975) (see Doc. 18, Tab 2). The PSC found that Shoreham was needed if LILCO was to meet its 1978 reserve requirements and that if Shoreham were not in service in 1979, LILCO would fall short of its “capacity objective.” The PSC concluded that “[a]s long as Shoreham is needed to meet LILCO’s 1978 through 1980 loads, the cost of its delay would outweigh any projected benefits therefrom,” and that in view of “the uncertainty of load forecasting and LILCO’s relatively weak interconnections with neighboring utilities, purposeful delay of the completion of Shoreham beyond the summer of 1978 would not be prudent.” Id. at 464. In prophetic tones, the Commission did note that “so much money has been expended on, or committed to, Shore-ham that it has, in fact, acquired a momentum of its own.” Id. In September 1975 LILCO submitted its Final Safety Analysis Report and environmental report for NRC review; in January 1976 LILCO filed its application for an operating license. ' Yet delays and cost overruns continued to plague the project. In June 1976 the target date for beginning commercial operation was extended to May 1979, and the estimated construction cost of Shoreham rose to $969 million. In March 1977, Stone & Webster informed LILCO that the plant’s fuel load would be delayed by fifteen to twenty-eight months. LILCO was advised by a management consulting firm that the Shoreham project was being hindered by the fact that neither LILCO nor Stone & Webster had sufficient authority or clearly defined roles in overseeing the plant’s construction, In August 1977, LILCO assumed the lead role in managing Shoreham’s construction. In October, the estimated construction cost of Shoreham was revised to $1,233 billion and the date upon which the reactor was expected to commence commercial operation was pushed back to September 1980. In October 1978, the estimated cost of Shore-ham was at $1,337 billion. PSC Prudence Report, App. A at 4-5. On May 21, 1979 the PSC commenced a proceeding to investigate the management of the Shoreham project in order to determine whether the costs of Shoreham had been prudently incurred, whether the steep escalation of the projected costs of Shore-ham was attributable to factors within the control of LILCO’s management or due to outside forces such as inflation, and whether the incurred cost of Shoreham exceeded that which would be considered reasonable and prudent due to mismanagement or gross inefficiency on the part of LILCO. PSC Prudence Report, at 2. The Shore-ham project had come under PSC scrutiny before this investigation began; through 1978, the project had been audited by the PSC four times. See Case 27136, Long Island Lighting Co.—Electric Rates, 18 N.Y. P.S.C. 45, 45 (Opinion No. 78-1, January 9, 1978) (see Doc. 18, Tab 3). The investigation commenced in 1979 would result in extensive findings six years later that were critical of LILCO’s management of the Shoreham project. As the investigation proceeded, Shoreham’s cost overruns and delays continued. In July 1979, Shore-ham’s total cost was projected to be $1.58 billion and its anticipated start-up date was extended to May 1981; a year later, the projected cost rose to $2.21 billion and the date for commencing commercial operation was pushed back to November 1982; in July 1981, the estimated construction cost was at $2.49 billion. Affidavit of Kevin Bronner, Doc. 36, ¶ 6. In March 1979, radioactive material es-capéd during an accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In the wake of this incident, the NRC suspended all licensing activity and subsequently adopted more rigorous emergency planning requirements for applicants seeking an operating license. See 45 Fed.Reg. 55,402 (1980). A detailed off-site emergency response plan, which provides reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected in the event of a serious radiological accident and meets with the approval of the NRC, is now a prerequisite for a full power operating license. See generally 10 C.F.R. § 50.47 and Part 50, App. E (1987). The plan must set out “protective actions” for the area encompassed within a fifty-mile radius around the nuclear power plant, and an evacuation plan for citizens who are within a ten mile radius of the plant at the time of an accident must be developed. The NRC regulations contemplate that local and state governments may sponsor and implement offsite plans, 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(g), but federal law does not require state and local governments to develop, participate, or cooperate in the implementation of any such plans. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) LBP-85-31, 22 N.R.C. 410, 427 (August 26, 1985) (see Doc. 19, Tab 12). At first, officials of Suffolk County indicated a willingness to cooperate with LILCO in the implementation of an acceptable emergency response plan. See, e.g., “Memorandum of Understanding Between Suffolk County, New York and Long Island Lighting Co. on Emergency Planning,” December 28, 1979 (see Doc. 19, Tab 8). The sentiment among state and county officials favoring accomodation turned out to be short-lived. The Three Mile Island accident did more than merely spur changes in the regulatory framework governing nuclear power facilities; it eroded public confidence in the safety of nuclear power plants in general and raised doubts in the minds of many public officials about the wisdom of the Shoreham project in particular. In February 1983, officials of Suffolk County withdrew an emergency response plan which the County had previously endorsed, determining that the demographic conditions of the area surrounding Shoreham made it impossible to fashion a feasible evacuation plan in the event of a radiological accident. PSC Prudence Report, App. A at 5-6. On February 17, 1983, New York Governor Mario Cuomo directed New York’s Disaster Preparedness Commission (“DPC”) to refrain from acting on any emergency response plan submitted by LILCO that did not win the support of Suffolk County officials. Doc. 19, Tab 11. Neither the State nor the County of Suffolk has cooperated in the implementation of an evacuation plan since that date, and they have in fact actively opposed the licensing of Shoreham for the past four years in proceedings before the ASLB and NRC, as well as in state and federal courtrooms. On May 26, 1983, LILCO proposed an offsite emergency response plan in which company employees were to assume the duties traditionally performed by local police and fire departments during an evacuation of the area surrounding Shoreham. This plan was actively opposed by state and county officials. In February 1985, New York Supreme Court Justice William R. Geiler held that LILCO could not implement its plan because it provided for the unlawful usurpation of the police powers of the state by private actors. Cuomo v. Long Island Lighting Co., No. 84-4615 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Feb. 20, 1985), aff'd, 127 A.D.2d 626, 511 N.Y.S.2d 867 (2d Dept.1987). In April 1985 and again in August 1985, the ASLB denied Shoreham an operating license because LILCO lacked the legal authority to implement its emergency plan and because opposition by the state and Suffolk County created uncertainty as to whether the plan was workable. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) LBP-85-31, 22 NRC 410 (August 26, 1985) (see Doc. 19, Tab 12). The ASLB found that there was nothing about the demography, topography, available access routes, or jurisdictional boundaries of the area surrounding Shoreham that made it impossible to fashion an effective emergency response plan for Shoreham, but found that the lack of cooperation from the state and county was fatal to LILCO’s plan. Id. at 427. This determination was subsequently reversed by the NRC and LILCO's application was remanded to the ASLB for a determination of whether LILCO’s plan would be adequate if, irrespective of the current opposition to it, the county would use LILCO’s plan in the event of an actual emergency as the best source of information and options for its emergency response. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) CLI-86-13 (July 24, 1986). A final decision on LILCO’s application has not yet been issued by the ASLB. Opposition by state and local officials to the licensing of Shoreham was not the only problem encountered by LILCO in the first half of this decade. In May 1982, the NRC began hearings on LILCO’s application for an operating license. In June 1983, LILCO filed a motion with the NRC for a low-power nuclear testing license. While this motion was pending, an undersized crankshaft on one of Shoreham’s three emergency diesel generators failed. All operative nuclear reactors must have a reliable onsite source of power in the event of an emergency under the NRC’s regulations. See NRC Prudence Report, at 92. Shoreham diesel generators did not obtain the NRC’s approval as a back-up power source until June 1985. The direct costs of repair for the diesel generators and the indirect costs attributable to delays caused by the generators’ failure has been estimated to be $494 million. PSC Prudence Report, at 92, 120. The delays caused by design defects such as that evident in Shoreham’s back-up power system, unanticipated regulatory changes by the NRC, and the opposition by state and local governmental officials to the operation of Shoreham have contributed to the continued escalation in cost of the ill-fated project through this decade. The sting of the massive cost overruns was exacerbated by the growing realization that the construction of nuclear power plants may not have been essential to meeting the future energy needs for LILCO’s customers after all. Reduced energy demand and conservation efforts followed the two Middle East oil embargoes of the 1970s, and as a result LILCO’s projected increases in peak demand for electricity in its service area never came about. Affidavit of Adam M. Madsen, Doc. 53, 11 6. Construction work on Shoreham was substantially completed in 1984. In November of that year, the NRC issued a license allowing LILCO to load nuclear fuel into Shoreham and to operate the plant at .001% of its rated power. On February 12, 1985, the NRC authorized low-power testing of the Shoreham reactor (up to five percent of Shoreham’s rated power), but rescinded that decision nine days later because of the problems with the plant’s back-up power generators. PSC Prudence Report, App. A at 6. In June 1985, after LILCO’s diesel generators were determined to satisfy the NRC’s requirements, a low-powered testing license was again granted. The NRC’s decision to grant this license was unsuccessfully challenged by state and local officials. Cuomo v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972 (D.C.Cir.1985). LILCO’s inability to obtain the ASLB’s approval for its offsite emergency response plan is now the only obstacle impeding the issuance of a full-power operating license for Shoreham. On December 16, 1985, the PSC issued an opinion and order in which the Commission found that $1,395 billion of the then-estimated $4.62 billion total cost of Shoreham had been imprudently incurred and could not be recovered through rates charged to LILCO’s customers. PSC Prudence Report, at 129. The PSC cited poor planning, LILCO’s inadequate oversight of Stone & Webster and other major • contractors who were working under open-ended cost-plus agreements, poor communication between LILCO’s Board of Directors and Stone & Webster, inadequate supervision of skilled laborers, unrealistic schedules, and “imprudent management of the regulatory process” as major contributors to the massive cost overruns that have characterized the Shoreham project. However, the PSC also noted that delays in the completion of Shoreham and consequent escalation of costs were also attributable in part to Shoreham’s “unusual regulatory environment.” Id. at 87. There is no question that the regulatory requirements applied to Shoreham were quite stringent and that intervention made the Shoreham licensing proceedings extraordinarily complex and lengthy. The Shoreham construction permit proceeding lasted three years and was the longest such proceeding in the NRC’s history. It was 22 months longer than the average proceeding, for contemporaneous nuclear plants. Because of this experience, NRC officials expected a similar, intense level of intervention in the operating license proceeding. There is also evidence that they required Shore-ham to comply with the most stringent interpretations of the regulatory guides and standards so that Shoreham would have the strongest possible technical case in the operating license proceeding. As a former NRC official testified: ... The use of Regulatory Guides in the Shoreham proceeding demonstrates the way the Shoreham OL [operating license] review was conducted that was different from other OL reviews in the same time frames. Regulatory Guides are not requirements, as I have indicated, but deviations from them need to be justified extensively. How extensively depends on staff attitudes. In Shoreham’s case it was thought to be desirable to build the strongest technical record that would show equivalent conformance to this guidance. Shoreham was always held to a higher standard and this frequently resulted in delays that did not impact other plants. The reason for this situation was straightforward. The legal staff, based on the CP [construction permit] experience, wanted the strongest technical case possible for the Shoreham OL hearing. This naturally effected [sic] the depth of review to which the application was subjected.... Finally, the length of the proceeding exposed the Shoreham plant to the plethora of regulatory changes that were issued by the NRC in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. The intense level of intervention can also be seen in the voluminous discovery and lengthy hearings in Shoreham’s operating license proceeding. This proceeding, which has yet to be completed, was made even more complex when Suffolk County, which initially cooperated with LILCO on emergency planning matters, withdrew its cooperation and actively opposed any license for Shoreham. As the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board noted in October 1984, Shoreham’s licensing hearings proceeded with [t]he unremitting and often bitter opposition of Suffolk County as an inter-venor [which] has resulted in litigation of very extensive scope and depth. It is beside the point to argue that such litigation is permitted under NRC regulations. Although not illegal, such interminable litigation has resulted in great expense to LILCO, both in terms of time and resources. In fact, LILCO is currently unable to obtain a full power operating license for Shoreham due to the lack of a tested emergency plan for the plant. Id. at 86-86 (citations omitted). The total cost of the Shoreham project as of December 31, 1986 was $4,766 billion, and this cost increases by $25-35 million in carrying charges and overhead expenses for each month the plant is not in operation. Affidavit of Edward M. Barrett, Doc. 9, 113. For several years, LILCO has teetered on the brink of insolvency. In 1986, the state’s opposition to Shoreham took a new form. On July 24, Governor Cuomo signed into law two bills that LILCO argues will either push the company over the edge and into bankruptcy or, alternatively, will allow the state to seize control of the company without giving its shareholders just compensation in return. These two laws, which together constitute an unusual exercise of the state’s police power, are challenged on a number of constitutional grounds. B. Chapters 517 and 518 of the Laws of 1986 Concern that the ever-escalating cost of Shoreham would pose an unacceptable financial burden on ratepayers within LILCO’s service area, particularly in light of the real possibility that the facility would never be put to commercial use and recoup part or all of the multi-billion dollar investment put into it, moved the New York Assembly and Senate to pass similar bills in February 1986 that would prevent LILCO from passing the costs of Shoreham on to its customers if the reactor did not become commercially operative. On February 24, 1986, the Assembly passed a bill that would have amended § 66 of the New York Public Service Law to prohibit the PSC from allowing the recovery through the rates it sets of “any costs incurred by a utility corporation relating to a nuclear power plant if such plant fails to commence operation.” Assembly Bill No. 6891 (introduced March 25, 1986) (see Doc. 17, Tab 1). One day later, the State Senate passed a similar bill, differing from the Assembly’s bill only in that the Senate's version applied to nuclear power plants “owned by a single electric or gas and electric corporation.” Senate Bill No. 6411A (introduced June 6, 1985) (see Doc. 17, Tab 3). These two bills had the same objective: to require the PSC to apply the traditional “used and useful” rate-setting method to deny certain utilities recovery of the direct and indirect costs associated with the construction of nuclear power plants that are not “used and useful in the public service.” Cf. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547, 18 S.Ct. 418, 434, 42 L.Ed. 819 (1898) (“What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience. On the other hand, what the public is entitled to demand is that no more be exacted from it for the use of [such a facility] than the services rendered by it are reasonably worth.”). In recent years, the PSC has generally adhered to a policy allowing utilities to recover through rates charged its customers costs “prudently incurred” as a result of construction work on facilities which never commence commercial operation or are abandoned before their costs have been fully recovered, see Abrams v. Public Service Comm’n, 67 N.Y.2d 205, 214-15, 501 N.Y.S.2d 777, 781, 492 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 (1986), though the Commission has employed the “used and useful” approach in calculating a utility’s rate base on occasion. See, e.g., Matter of Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 85 A.D.2d 486, 449 N.Y.S.2d 77 (3d Dept.1982). While these bills were pending in the New York legislature a seven-member panel appointed by Governor Cuomo in January 1986 was studying the feasibility of replacing LILCO with a publicly-owned utility. On June 24, 1986, the Long Island Public Power Panel, headed by New York University President John C. Sawhill, issued a report indicating that the replacement of LILCO with a Long Island Power Authority (“LIPA”) could result in significant ratepayer savings. The Panel considered three methods for effectuating the takeover of LILCO: Negotiation with LILCO’s Board of Directors, a hostile tender offer for LILCO’s stock, and the condemnation of LILCO’s stock or assets under New York’s Eminent Domain Procedure Law. The Panel concluded that a negotiated agreement was the best option, since the public takeover of LILCO could be accomplished most quickly and with the least litigation through that method. Report of the Long Island Public Power Panel (hereinafter “Sawhill Report”) at 28 (June 24, 1986) (see Doc. 17, Tab 21). Condemnation was deemed the least attractive option. Control of the acquisition price, a key criterion, cannot be satisfied under condemnation. New York courts would have the discretion to apply a wide range of valuation theories to determine “just compensation.” Estimates of a possible award for a LILCO asset condemnation are as high as $16 billion, applying a “reproduction cost less depreciation” theory of value. Estimates for a stock asset condemnation are as low as $1.2 billion, applying a market-value theory_ [T]he court's discretion in determining just compensation cannot be restricted by legislation, and it is highly uncertain what weight would be given to legislative directives concerning valuation. Unless waivers were secured, stock condemnation would trigger default provisions in LILCO’s Third Mortgage and [1984 Revolving Credit Agreement], thus increasing the funding requirements for a stock condemnation.... [A] hostile tender offer is preferred to condemnation because it provides LIPA with direct control over the price it will offer.... A tender offer is legally feasible and could be facilitated if LIPA were provided with an exemption from New York State law that restricts unfriendly tender offers.... [T]he availability of the tender offer strategy strengthens LIPA’s ability to negotiate with LILCO toward a mutually acceptable agreement. ... [One] reference point for shareholders [in determining how to respond to a tender offer] may be book value. For electric utilities, book value is usually an appropriate measure of the underlying value of stock since the regulators will usually grant rate increases that will provide a return on that value commensurate with the firm’s cost of equity. For LILCO, if there were .no dispute over Shoreham or NMP 2 [Nine Mile Point II] costs, this value could be in excess of $25 per share. However, substantial imprudence disallowances have been made on Shoreham (and are on appeal) and have been agreed to for NMP 2. These disal-lowances lower LILCO’s adjusted book to the $17-to-$19-per share range as of year-end 1986. If abandoned utility plants continue to realize the same cost recovery as plants that operate, LILCO’s adjusted book value could be essentially unaffected by whether Shoreham operates or not. However, if ratemaking policy changed, such that if Shoreham did not operate LILCO ... could not recover in rates any of Shoreham’s cost, adjusted book value could fall substantially below the $17-to-$19-per-share range. In the case where Shoreham costs are not recovered if the unit were abandoned, LILCO’s book value would fall to zero since the cost of the plant significantly exceeds LILCO’s book value of equity. In any event, if shareholders believe that there is a reasonable probability that Shoreham will not operate and that stringent used and useful legislation will be enacted, the current market value will probably decline and a tender would be be [sic] more likely to succeed at lower prices than without such legislation. Id. at 28-34 (footnote omitted). On June 16, 1986, Governor Cuomo submitted to the legislature a “program bill” that would require the PSC to apply the used and useful method of determining an electric company’s rate base when costs associated with nuclear power plants that fail to commence or continue in commercial operation are incurred by the utility. Doc. 17, Tab 6. The proposed bill, which by its terms was applicable to all utilities operating or constructing nuclear reactors in the State of New York, precluded the PSC from considering costs associated with reactors that fail to “commence or continue commercial operation” when computing a utility’s revenue requirement after the proposed act’s effective date. “Failure to commence or continue commercial operation” was defined as either the abandonment of the plant, the denial of a full-power operating license, the failure of the plant to become operative within two years of the issuance of a low-power testing license, or the occurrence of events or circumstances which render the nuclear power plant not commercially used and useful after commercial operation had begun. On June 26, 1986, Governor Cuomo submitted a second program bill. This bill differed from that submitted ten days earlier in that its terms were made applicable only to nuclear reactors “owned by a single utility” and “not commercially used and useful on the effective date” of the proposed act. Doc. 17, Tab 8. These changes effectively excluded from coverage of the act all existing nuclear power plants in the state other than Shoreham. The language of the Governor’s second program bill was substantially adopted and enacted as Chapter 518 of the laws of 1986 (“Used and Useful Act”). The Act provides: (a) If a nuclear power plant which is not commercially used and useful in the actual generation of electricity on the effective date of this subdivision and which is owned by a single utility on or after the effective date of this subdivision fails to commence or continue commercial operation after the effective date of this subdivision, the commission shall thereafter remove and exclude from the utility corporation’s revenue requirement all amounts, costs, charges, adjustments, or extraordinary cost of capital allowances theretofore made, granted or provided which are attributable, directly or indirectly, to such nuclear power plant or to such plant’s failure to commence commercial operation. (b) The commission shall not thereafter, unless and until such plant commences or recommences commercial operation, include in such utility’s revenue requirement any amounts, costs, charges, adjustments or extraordinary cost of capital allowances attributable, directly or indirectly, to such plant or to such plant’s failure to commence commercial operation. (c) Nothing in this subdivision shall be deemed to require a refund of the charges paid by or billed to a customer of such utility prior to a failure to commence or continue commercial operation of such plant. (d)For the purposes of this subdivision, the failure to commence or continue commercial operation shall mean the abandonment of such plant after the effective date of this subdivision; the denial, including any denial pursuant to or as a result of any administrative or judicial review, of a commercial operating license or other regulatory approval necessary for the plant to become commercially used and useful in the actual generation of electricity; the failure of the plant to become commercially used and useful in the actual generation of electricity within forty-two months of the issuance of the low power testing license for such plant; or the occurrence of any event or the existence of any circumstances (other than customary inspection and maintenance and related repairs or refueling requirements) after the plant becomes commercially used and useful in the actual generation of electricity which renders the plant not commercially used and useful in the actual generation of electricity. N.Y.Pub.Serv.Law § 66(24) (McKinney Supp.1987). Thus, Shoreham’s costs will be excluded from LILCO’s rate base if the plant is not in operation by January 3,1989 (forty-two months after LILCO obtained a low power testing license from the NRC), and the Act conceivably could go into effect earlier than that. The Used and Useful Act was signed into law on July 24, 1986, the same day Governor Cuomo approved the Long Island Power Authority Act. The LIPA Act established the Long Island Power Authority, provided for its organization, and outlined its general powers. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law §§ 1020 et seq. (McKinney Supp.1987). The newly-created authority is a political subdivision of the state to be operated on a non-profit basis, N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-c(1) and (3), and, with some exceptions not material to this lawsuit, is exempted from coverage by the Public Service Law. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-s. LIPA is empowered to form wholly-owned subsidiaries and may exercise all or part of its powers through such subsidiaries. N.Y. Pub.Auth.Law § 1020 — i. LIPA is to serve the area now constituting LILCO’s franchise area. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law §§ 1020-c(2), 1020-b(17). The authority is empowered to acquire the securities or assets of LILCO either through a negotiated agreement, a tender offer, or the exercise of the power of eminent domain. N.Y.Pub. Auth.Law § 1020-h. Under the LIPA Act, the authority may not attempt to acquire the stock or assets of LILCO until it makes a determination that the acquisition would result in savings for ratepayers in LILCO’s franchise area. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-h(2) and (3). Once that determination has been made, LIPA must attempt to acquire LILCO through negotiation or a tender offer for all or a portion of LILCO’s securities “at a price ... the authority may determine to be appropriate” before resorting to condemnation proceedings. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-h(3)(a). LIPA may attempt to purchase LILCO’s securities with either cash or bonds issued pursuant to § 1020-k of the Act. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-h(3)(a). LIPA is specifically exempted from New York’s anti-takeover laws, and the LIPA Act overrides provisions in New York’s Business Corporation Law (“BCL”) which would otherwise allow LILCO’s Board of Directors or a majority of LILCO’s preferred shareholders to veto any proposed merger. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-h(3)(b) and (c). In determining whether acceptance of a tender offer is in the best interests of LILCO, the Act directs LILCO’s Board to “consider not only the dollar amount of such offer but the interests of employees, suppliers, ratepayers, creditors (including holders of LILCO’s debt securities), and the economy of the service area and the state.” N.Y.Pub. Auth.Law § 1020-h(3)(d). If a subsidiary of LIPA acquires two-thirds of LILCO’s common stock the subsidiary “may merge with LILCO and either continue in existence or dissolve, as it may determine.” N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-h(3)(b). If LIPA fails to acquire LILCO via a tender offer, it is empowered to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire LILCO’s stock or assets. Under the LIPA Act, if LIPA condemns LILCO’s property, valuation must be determined by “giving due consideration to the applicable findings and determinations of the legislature” set out in § 1020-h(1). N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-h(6)(e). The legislature specifically found that LILCO had “no reasonable expectation of realizing actual earnings” from Shoreham, that LILCO’s present economic viability depends upon “extraordinary and unprecedented” rate adjustments by the PSC, and the LILCO’s financial problems were the result of its own “mismanagement, imprudent decisions regarding the Shoreham plant and general inefficiency” rather than “any repressive or other improper action taken by any governmental entity.” See N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-h(1) (gHn). The Act requires LIPA to close and decommission the Shoreham plant “[a]s soon as practicable after the authority has acquired sufficient shares of LILCO stock to do so or after it has acquired all the property of LILCO” pursuant to the Act. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-h(9). Further, LIPA is prohibited from constructing or operating a nuclear power plant in its service area. N.Y.Pub. Auth.Law § 1020-t. LIPA is exempted from taxation, and the Act provides that payments are to be made to the taxing jurisdictions affected by the closure of Shoreham in gradually decreasing increments over a ten-year period in order to ameliorate the effects of the sudden loss of a major source of revenue for those taxing jurisdictions. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law §§ 1020-p, 1020-q. The Act also provides that the taxing jurisdictions are not to be liable “to the authority or any other entity” for the refund of any property taxes previously assessed against Shore-ham. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-q(3). On January 14, 1987 LILCO commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, raising a number of constitutional challenges to the Used and Useful Act and the LIPA Act. In Counts I-IV of its Complaint, LILCO claims that the Used and Useful Act violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, the fifth amendment’s takings clause, and the prohibition against bills of attainder found in article I, section 10 of the Constitution. Challenges to the LIPA Act are made under these same constitutional provisions in Counts V-VIII. In Count IX, LILCO alleges that defendant Cuomo conspired with officials of the State of New York and the County of Suffolk to close the Shoreham plant in violation of § 1983. LILCO seeks a declaration that the Used and Useful Act and the LIPA Act, or specifically designated sections of the LIPA Act, violate the Constitution, an injunction preventing the Commissioners of the Public Service Commission (“PSC defendants”) from implementing the Used and Useful Act, an injunction preventing LIPA and its individual trustees (“LIPA defendants”) from making a tender offer for LILCO’s stock or otherwise implementing or enforcing the LIPA Act, an injunction preventing defendant Cuomo and other specified members of the Executive Branch from “taking any actions or issuing any reports or findings ... contrary to law or contrary to their own discretion and better judgment with respect to the Shoreham Plant,” and an order granting attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of this action. The various defendants move to dismiss the Complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. LILCO moves for summary judgment on its equal protection, bill of attainder, and unlawful takings claims respecting the Used and Useful Act, and for a preliminary injunction preventing a tender offer under the LIPA Act. II. DISCUSSION A. Ripeness As a preliminary matter, the court must determine whether LILCO’s claims present a justiciable case or controversy properly subject to judicial resolution. The legal concept of justiciability blends the constitutional limitations placed upon the federal courts by Article III with prudential considerations cautioning the exercise of judicial restraint. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1951, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). This fusion of constitutional prohibitions and policy considerations has made the jus-ticiability doctrine “one of uncertain and shifting contours,” id., without “fixed content” nor “susceptible of scientific verification.” Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1759, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961). The fine line separating an abstract question from a “case or controversy” is often difficult to define, and the justiciability of a claim “is not discernible by any precise test.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers National Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). In an oft-quoted passage, Chief Justice Hughes defined a justiciable controversy as one that is appropriate for judicial determination. ... A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot_ The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal in-terests_ It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937) (citations omitted). In sum, “the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality” to justify judicial resolution. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 512, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941). Various doctrines have evolved as conceptual aids in defining the unsettled borders separating the hypothetical from the concrete, each addressing the different as-pecto of justiciability revealed in the above-quoted passage from Maryland Casualty. See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3529 (2d ed. 1984). Among them is the ripeness doctrine, which is intended “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements” over governmental policies that have not yet been implemented nor have had a palpable impact upon the parties before the court. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 3333, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 200, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1720, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983). “[Rjipeness is peculiarly a question of timing,” Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140, 95 S.Ct. 335, 357, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974), that must be assessed within the context of the legal and factual posture of the parties’ claims at the time a judicial pronouncement is sought. See Nichol, Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U.Chi.L.Rev. 153, 167 (1984). Determining whether a claim is ripe for review is particularly difficult in cases, like this one, where a party seeks a declaration concerning the constitutionality of a recently-enacted statute when implementation of the terms of that statute is contingent on some future event. In the present dispute, the various defendants urge that LILCO’s claims are not ripe for adjudication. Under the terms of the LIPA Act, LIPA cannot acquire LILCO until it has determined that public takeover of the utility would result in ratepayer savings. N.Y.Pub.Auth.Law § 1020-h(2). Further, the specific provisions of the LIPA Act which have been attacked by LILCO will not have force and effect until LIPA’s trustees have made such a determination. See, e.g., N.Y. Pub.Auth.Law §§ 1020-h(2)-(6), (9). Similarly, the Used and Useful Act may never directly affect the rates charged by LILCO, since the utility may obtain a full-power operating license for Shoreham before some event occurs which would require the PSC to remove and exclude the cost of the plant from LILCO's revenue requirement. N.Y.Pub.Serv.Law § 66(24). To date, the LIPA trustees have not determined whether acquisition of LILCO would likely result in savings for consumers in LILCO’s franchise area, nor has an event triggering the terms of the Used and Useful Act occurred. Whether a dispute is ripe for decision turns on a twofold inquiry into the “fitness” of the issues presented for a judicial disposition on the merits and the hardship to the parties that would result if court review was withheld. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). The first factor addresses essentially prudential concerns regarding the propriety of judicial intervention before a fuller factual record has been developed. The second factor focuses on the “hardships” on the parties, an inquiry inescapably intertwined with the concept of a “distinct and palpable injury,” the essence of the case or controversy requirement of Article III. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The court will address the second factor of the Abbott Laboratories formula first. 1. Hardships Imposed by Withholding Decision on Merits When a declaration is sought concerning the legal consequences of events that may or may not occur, the determination of whether postponing decision might work unacceptable hardships on the litigants often turns on the “practical likelihood that the contingency will occur,” see Browning-Ferris Industries of Alabama, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management, 799 F.2d 1473, 1478 (11th Cir.1986) (quoting 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2757 (2d ed. 1983)), and the severity of the harm that would result if the contingency does occur. See, e.g., Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164-65, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 1524-25, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967) (distinguishing between cases in which serious consequences result from delaying decision and cases in which harm caused by delay is minor); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1215, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (“[I]t is not necessary that [plaintiff] first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statutue that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.”). In short, the party challenging a statute must demonstrate a “realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement,” Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. at 2308, but need not “await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending that is enough.” Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593, 43 S.Ct. 658, 663, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923); see also Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. at 298, 99 S.Ct. at 2308; Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 143, 95 S.Ct. at 358. Turning first to the hardship imposed on LILCO by withholding consideration of its claims challenging the LIPA Act, the court finds that this factor militates in favor of the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction. The LIPA Act constitutes an imminent threat to the continued corporate existence of LILCO itself, since a tender offer could be made immediately upon a determination by LIPA’s trustees that a public takeover of LILCO would be beneficial to the utility’s ratepayers. Though certainly not of the magnitude of the possible criminal prosecution of an individual for the exercise of his speech rights, see Steffel, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, the potential harm that would be suffered by LILCO should LIPA find acquisition of LILCO advantageous for consumers is nonetheless severe, particularly if the utility’s constitutional objections to the statutory scheme devised to implement LIPA’s takeover of LILCO are meritorious. Further, the extensive record that has already accumulated in this case strongly indicates that LIPA will find that ratepayer savings will result from the acquisition of LILCO. First, it appears that LILCO’s rates are currently among the most exorbitant in the nation. See Sawhill Report, Exh. 2. Further, an exhaustive study by the Long Island Power Panel indicates that significant savings — ranging from seven to nine percent — would result from LIPA’s acquisition of LILCO under any set of plausible assumptions, though ratepayer savings would be greater under some scenarios than they would under others. Id. at 1-44. For example, if it were assumed that LILCO would successfully operate Shoreham while LIPA would abandon the plant, ratepayer savings of seven percent were projected. Id. at 14-15. Though these findings are in no way binding on LIPA, which must make an independent assessment of the benefits of public takeover of LILCO, the court finds that the conclusions of the Long Island Power Panel is some evidence relevant to the likelihood that LIPA will conclude that such a takeover would be advantageous. Finally, the court cannot simply ignore altogether political reality. The LIPA Act was specifically designed to facilitate the takeover of LILCO. In Entertainment Concepts, Inc., III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919, 101 S.Ct. 1366, 67 L.Ed.2d 346 (1981), the Seventh Circuit found that the owner of an adult theater could challenge zoning and licensing ordinances specifically aimed at the theater itself, even though no film it had exhibited had been declared obscene, thus invoking the ordinances’ penalties, and even though there was no assurance that any film the theater exhibited in the future would be declared obscene. The court concluded that the circumstances under which the ordinances were passed “indicate[d] more than a broad policy that [the Village] will enforce the laws generally” and that the plaintiff “need not risk closure of its theatre in order to activiate judicial review.” Id. at 500. Similarly, the factual backdrop for the passage of the LIPA Act detailed above and the fact that the Act was enacted for the specific purpose of providing a means for the public takeover LILCO is relevant to assessing the "practical likelihood” that LIPA’s trustees will find acquisition of LILCO beneficial to area ratepayers and that LILCO will suffer direct harm as a result. The court also finds that withholding consideration of LILCO’s challenge to the Used and Useful Act would work a palpable hardship on the utility, even though the statute may never in fact directly affect the determination of LILCO’s revenue requirement. First, there is evidence that the Act, when coupled with LILCO’s well-known difficulties in obtaining a full-power operating license for Shoreham from the NRC, has created concern over whether LILCO will ever recoup a significant part of its Shoreham investment, and this concern has depressed the value of LILCO’s stock, Affidavit of Kenneth S. Crews, Doc. 12, till 9-12, and has hindered LILCO’s efforts to refinance the redemption of certain outstanding bonds and other debts. Affidavit of Herbert M. Leiman, Doc. 11. Further, the immediate hardship felt as a result of the Used and Useful Act must be assessed with reference to the terms of the LIPA Act. Informed holders of LILCO securities, when assessing how to respond to any tender offer made by LIPA, no doubt would be influenced by the fact that if LILCO fails to obtain a full-power operating license from the NRC the value of LILCO’s stock would in all probability plummet, and indeed the utility could be forced into bankruptcy. It is not unreasonable to conclude, then, that this threat might induce LILCO’s shareholders to sell at a lower price than they might otherwise be inclined when and if LIPA makes its initial tender offer. If the Used and Useful Act is unconstitutional, withholding decision could result in serious harm to LILCO’s shareholders. 2. Fitness of Issues Raised for Judicial Resolution The court’s inquiry does not end upon finding that withholding consideration of LILCO’s claims would impose palpable hardships on LILCO and its shareholders. In determining whether the first prong of the Abbott Laboratories formula has been satisfied and the issues presented are “fit” for decision, the court necessarily must look to the substance of LILCO’s claims themselves. For example, the ripeness doctrine rarely has stood as an impediment to a litigant challenging laws regulating speech. The first amendment mandates that an individual’s speech rights are not unnecessarily “chilled,” and the mere existence of a statute can have such a chilling effect even though no steps have been taken toward enforcing the statute. See, e.g., Steffel, 415 U.S. at 459, 94 S.Ct. at 1215; Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 45-46, 81 S.Ct. 391, 392-93, 5 L.Ed.2d 403 (1961). At the other end of the spectrum, claims under the takings clause of the fifth amendment usually require a more developed factual background before judicial intervention is appropriate. See, e.g., Williamson Co. Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). In assessing the fitness of a particular claim for judicial resolution, the courts have as a general rule focused on whether further factual development would clarify the issues presented. See, e.g., Thomas, 473 U.S. at 581, 105 S.Ct. at 3333; Pacific Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 201, 103 S.Ct. at 1720; Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162-64, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 1523-24, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967). Thus, facial attacks on statutes or regulations ordinarily survive ripeness challenges even when actions toward the enforcement of the challenged laws have not been taken. See, e.g., Times Film Corp., 365 U.S. at 45-46, 81 S.Ct. at 392-93; Browning-Ferris Industries, 799 F.2d at 1477 & n. 3. In addition, in cases in which “further factual development would not render the issue more concrete,” the ripeness doctrine will not stand in the way of judicial review. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes v. Board of Oil and Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782, 789 (9th Cir.1986); see also Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 297-301, 99 S.Ct. at 2308-10 (constitutional challenge to statutory election procedures ripe even though plaintiffs had not yet invoked those procedures since no factual record was needed to address issues raised); Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm’n, 659 F.2d 903, 917 (9th Cir.1981) (challenge to statute requiring utilities to include three alternate sites in a “notice of intention” to build a nuclear power plant ripe, even though no utility had submitted a notice of intention containing less than three sites). In cases where the facial validity of a statute is challenged, or where further factual development will not alter the legal inquiry that must be made, the issues presented are “purely legal,” Pacific Gas & Electric, 461 U.S. at 201, 103 S.Ct. at 1720, nothing would be gained by delaying decision, “and the public interest would be well served by. a prompt resolution of the constitutionality” of the challenged statute. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 582, 105 S.Ct. at 3333; Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 82, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2635, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). Applying these basic outlines to the case at bar, the court finds LILCO’s bill of attainder and equal protection claims, as well as its due process claims not based on an “unconstitutional taking” theory, are ripe for consideration since they present facial constitutional challenges to the Used and Useful Act and the LIPA Act. It does not appear that the issues presented would be honed or clarified by further factual development, and thus no benefit would be gained by delaying decision on these claims. The court reaches a different conclusion, however, with regard to LILCO’s “unconstitutional taking” claims. LILCO argues that, when read together, the LIPA Act and the Used and Useful Act will enable LIPA to acquire LILCO through a tender offer without fairly compensating the utility’s shareholders for the costs of Shoreham. In brief, LILCO asserts that the Used and Useful Act poses an imminent threat of significantly reducing the value of LILCO’s stock, or even bankrupting the company, particularly in light of LILCO’s difficulty in obtaining a full power operating license from the NRC in the face of opposition by state and county authorities. This threat could make a tender offer by LIPA which might otherwise be deemed inadequate seem more attracti