Full opinion text
AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS WITH REVISIONS TEVRIZIAN, District Judge. Two local electronics equipment distributors filed this action against a Japanese multi-national manufacturer of electronics products and two of its wholly-owned subsidiaries. Following several preliminary motions, the Japanese parent company and its Japanese subsidiary filed the present motion to dismiss on various procedural and substantive grounds. The Court took this matter under submission following oral argument. Having read and considered all briefs and documentary evidence presented, including the supplemental briefs filed after oral argument, the Court now grants the motion in part and denies the motion in part as follows: I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE Plaintiff Newport Components, Inc. (“NCI”) is a wholesale distributor of electronics products headquartered in Newport Beach, California. Plaintiff Logic Array, Inc. (“Logic”) is a Newport Beach-based retailer of electronics components, and one of the vendors to whom NCI distributed its products. Defendant NEC Home Electronics (U.S. A.), Inc. (“NECHE-USA”) is a Delaware corporation engaged in the distribution of electronics equipment in the United States. NECHE-USA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of NEC America, Inc., a New York corporation not a party to this action, which is, in turn, wholly owned by defendant NEC Corporation (“NEC”), a Japanese corporation. NEC is a worldwide manufacturer and distributor of computer and communications equipment with Fiscal Year 1985-86 consolidated net sales of more than $2 billion. Defendant NEC Home Electronics, Ltd. (“NECHE-Japan”), a Japanese corporation, is a separate wholly-owned subsidiary of NEC that both distributes NEC’s products and manufactures its own computer equipment for sale at the retail level. On November 27, 1985, NCI and NECHE-USA entered into a written distributorship agreement under which NCI would distribute to retail dealers, among other NEC products, a self-synchronizing high resolution color computer monitor marketed under the trade name “Multi-Sync.” The present dispute arose when NECHE-USA terminated this distributorship agreement on July 28, 1986. Plaintiffs allege that NECHE-USA wrongfully terminated NCI as part of a conspiracy to fix prices and restrain competition in the high resolution color monitor market. Specifically, they allege in relevant part that “distributors, such as NCI, who sell too cheaply to retailers, such as Logic Array, are terminated as distributors whereas those distributors who comply with [defendants’ pricing instructions are not terminated and are rewarded for their participation in the conspiracy to maintain high prices.” Complaint, ¶ 24(a). Plaintiffs filed this action on August 27, 1986, and at the same time sought a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) preventing NECHE-USA from terminating the November 27, 1985, distributorship agreement. This Court granted the TRO with the condition that plaintiffs not place additional orders for products with NECHE-USA. On September 8, 1986, the Court denied plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction preventing NECHE-USA from terminating the distributorship, but enjoined NECHE-USA from refusing to sell and deliver to NCI all back-ordered MultiSync monitors on the same terms and conditions afforded other authorized NECHE-USA distributors. The Court also stayed this action pending arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the distributorship agreement, but allowed discovery to proceed on the federal and state antitrust claims. Plaintiffs undertook mail service of the summons and complaint separately on defendants NEC and NECHE-Ja-pan on December 20, 1986. II. PRESENT MOTIONS BEFORE THE COURT NEC and NECHE-Japan filed the present motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 4 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as follows: (1) To dismiss all causes of action against NEC on the ground the Court lacks jurisdiction over the person of NEC (Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(2)); (2) To dismiss all causes of action against NEC and NECHE-Japan on the ground these defendants have not been properly served with process (Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(5)); (3) To dismiss all causes of action against NEC and NECHE-Japan for failure to effect service of process within 120 days after the complaint was filed (Fed.R.Civ.Proc. (4)(j)); and (4) To dismiss the first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action against NEC and NECHE-Japan for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6)). III. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON NEC moves to be dismissed from this action for lack of in personam jurisdiction. This defendant argues that although it admittedly markets its products in California through NECHE-USA and other wholly-owned subsidiaries, it does not have sufficient contacts itself with the forum state to confer personal jurisdiction. Due process protects a corporate entity from being brought into a forum with which it has established no meaningful “ ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’ ” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). Due process requirements are satisfied, however, when in per-sonam jurisdiction is asserted over a nonresident corporate defendant that has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe, supra, 326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 342, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940); Asahi Metal, Inc. v. Superior Court, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1031, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987); Helicopteros Nationales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984). At bottom, a nonresident “[defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state [should be] such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Burger King, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 2182 (defendant must have “fair warning that a particular activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign”), quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2587, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). The issue presented here is whether NEC’s contacts with the forum are such that it could have anticipated being subject to the present litigation. A. Standard of Review Plaintiffs, as the parties seeking to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction, bear the burden of establishing that personal jurisdiction exists. Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir.1986); Data Disc., Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assoc., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.1977). On a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs are “ ‘obligated to come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting personal jurisdiction.’ ” Scott, supra, quoting Amba Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Jobar International, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir.1977). At this stage in the litigation, however, with discovery ongoing, plaintiffs need not establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence but may merely set forth a prima facie showing that NEC is properly before the Court. Fields v. Sedgwick Associated Risks, Ltd., 796 F.2d 299, 301 (9th Cir.1986); Data Disc., supra, 557 F.2d at 1285; California Software, Inc. v. Reliability Research, 631 F.Supp. 1356, 1359 (C.D.Cal.1986). In an effort to make this prima facie showing, plaintiffs rely on three distinct theories of personal jurisdiction. First, they argue that this Court has “specific jurisdiction” over NEC by virtue of a relationship among NEC, California as the forum state, and the present litigation. Second, they argue that “general jurisdiction” exists over NEC on the basis of this defendant’s overall contacts with the forum state. Finally, although not clearly articulated, plaintiffs appear to claim the Court has jurisdiction over NEC in light of this defendant’s “aggregate” or “cumulative” contacts with the United States as a whole. To support these theories, plaintiffs present evidence of the following uncontro-verted facts: (1) One of NEC’s wholly-owned California subsidiaries, NEC Electronics, Inc. (“NEC Electronics”), imports ninety percent of the NEC computer chips it sells from the parent company. Moreover, NEC retains “control” of this subsidiary by virtue of the fact that NEC corporate directors constitute a majority of NEC Electronics’ board of directors. (2) Prior to November, 1983, NEC was the owner within the United States of the trademark “NEC,” registered with the United States Patent & Trademark Office under Registration Nos. 964,056 and 1,070,-387. In November, 1983, NEC transferred this trademark to NEC Electronics. NEC also has placed advertisements promoting this trademark in various publications circulated in the United States; (3) NEC has voluntarily availed itself of the federal courts to redress grievances; (4) Since at least 1963 and continuing to date, NEC has registered with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and actively traded on the over-the-counter market American Deposit Receipts (“ADRs”); and (5) During the 1970’s and 1980’s NEC has been investigated by the United States Department of Commerce for “dumping” foreign-made televisions sets on the United States market. For its part, NEC provides uncontrovert-ed evidence through the affidavit of Mr. Yuji Ohashi, a former General Manager of NEC’s International Planning Division, that NEC has no officers, employees, or agents anywhere in the United States, and does not own any real or personal property in this country. Defendants’ evidence further indicates that NEC did not manufacture the MultiSync monitors at issue in this dispute, did not enter into or terminate NCI’s distributorship agreement with NECHE-USA, and did not direct NECHE-USA to terminate this agreement. To determine whether personal jurisdiction over NEC exists, the Court must sift through these uncontroverted facts and apply them in turn to each of plaintiffs’ three theories. B. Specific Jurisdiction: NEC’s Relationship with the Present Litigation To establish specific jurisdiction over NEC, plaintiffs must show a “relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation.” Helicopteros, supra, 466 U.S. at 414, 104 S.Ct. at 1872, citing Shaffer, supra, 433 U.S. at 204, 97 S.Ct. at 2580. The Ninth Circuit has established the following three-part test for determining whether specific jurisdiction exists over a foreign defendant: “(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of the laws. (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant’s forum-related activities. (3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.” Hirsch v. Blue Cross, Blue Shield of Kansas City, 800 F.2d 1474, 1477 (9th Cir.1986), quoting Haisten v. Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir.1986); Data Disc, supra, 557 F.2d at 1287. Plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence demonstrating that their claims either arose out of or are related to any of NEC’s contacts with California. Their complaint does allege that NEC “conspired” with others to fix prices, monopolize the market in high-resolution self-synchronizing monitors, and unlawfully terminate NCI as a distributor of NEC products. However, plaintiffs fail to offer any evidence to controvert the declaration of Mr. Ohashi stating that NEC did not terminate NCI’s distributorship, and that NEC’s only contact with this litigation is that it is the parent corporate entity of the defendant corporations which manufacturer and distribute the MultiSync. In short, plaintiffs fail to put forth any evidence linking NEC’s alleged wrongful actions to any of NEC’s alleged contacts with the forum. On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs may not rest on their pleadings but instead must offer at least some facts, through affidavits or other evidence, supporting jurisdiction. Scott, supra, 792 F.2d at 927. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of demonstrating specific jurisdiction over defendant NEC. C. General Jurisdiction: NEC’s Contacts with California To determine whether general jurisdiction exists based on a defendant’s contacts with the forum state, district courts must first examine the state’s long-arm statute. Hunt v. Erie Ins. Group, 728 F.2d 1244, 1246 (9th Cir.1984). In California, Code of Civil Procedure § 410.10 permits the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on any basis not inconsistent with the California or United States Constitutions. California Code of Civil Procedure § 410.10 (West 1973); Kransco MGG, Inc. v. Markwitz, 656 F.2d 1376, 1377-78 (9th Cir.1981); Republic Intern. Corp. v. Amco Engineers, Inc., 516 F.2d 161, 167 (9th Cir.1975); Neadeau v. Foster, 129 Cal.App.3d 234, 180 Cal.Rptr. 806 (1982). In turn, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution imposes certain limits on a court’s power to exert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. Asahi, supra, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1031, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987). Specifically, plaintiffs must demonstrate that NEC has “substantial” or “continuous and systematic” contacts with California, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiffs’ claims are unrelated to NEC’s forum activities. Helicopteros, supra, 446 U.S. at 415, 104 S.Ct. at 1872, citing Perkins v. Beneqet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445, 72 S.Ct. 413, 418, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952); see also Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, Merchent v. Cubbage, 470 U.S. 1005, 105 S.Ct. 1359, 84 L.Ed.2d 380 (1985); Data Disc, supra, 557 F.2d at 1286. As at least one court has noted, these guidelines for determining general jurisdiction are nothing more than “vaguely stated principles” which must be applied to complex fact situations. United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. 162, 248 (W.D.Mo.1985). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the subject provides a benchmark for lower courts to follow. In Helicópteros, a wrongful death action against several defendants, the Court held that a Texas state court could not assert personal jurisdiction over a Colombian corporation which had sent its chief executive officer to Houston to negotiate a contract, purchased $4 million worth of helicopters and parts from a Texas firm, and sent pilots, managers and maintenance personnel to be trained in the forum state. Helicopteros, supra, 466 U.S. at 411-12, 416-19, 104 S.Ct. at 1873-74. In the present action this Court must look for contacts between NEC and California which exceed this bare minimum. As the Ninth Circuit has recently acknowledged, the Helicopteros standard for general jurisdiction is a high one in practice. Fields, supra 796 F.2d at 301. To operationalize this standard the circuit has identified various factors a district court should consider in determining whether general jurisdiction exists, “including whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business, serves the forum state’s markets, designates an agent for service of process, holds a license, has employees, or is incorporated [in the forum state].” Hirsch, supra, 800 F.2d at 1478. To support their claim of general jurisdiction, plaintiffs rely primarily on the following passage from the recent Ninth Circuit opinion in NEC Electronics v. Cal Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.1987): “[NEC] is one of the world’s largest manufacturers of computer chips, reporting sales of nearly $2 billion dollars in 1985. [NEC Electronics] is a wholly-owned subsidiary whose control remains primarily vested in the parent; [NEC] directors constitute a majority of [NEC Electronics’] board of directors. [NEC Electronics] manufactures some computer chips at its own facilities in the United States, but imports ninety percent of the NEC chips it sells from the parent company.” Id. at 1507. Plaintiffs contend that through NEC’s “control” of NEC Electronics, the foreign parent corporation is directly soliciting business in, making sales in, and generally doing business in California. Hirsch, 800 F.2d at 1478. It is firmly established that a nonto personal jurisdiction based solely on the independent activities of its wholly-owned subsidiary. See, e.g., Kramer, supra, 628 F.2d at 1177 (some common members of the boards of directors and parent approval of United States subsidiary’s proposal for consolidating distribution of automobiles not sufficient to make subsidiary an “alter ego” or “agent” of British parent); Mizokami Bros of Ariz., Inc. v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir.1977) (“mere existence of the parent-subsidiary relationship is not alone a sufficient basis for long-arm jurisdiction of the parent”), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035, 98 S.Ct. 770, 54 L.Ed.2d 783 (1977); O.S.C. Corp. v. Toshiba America, Inc., 491 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir.1974) (California court lacked jurisdiction over Japanese parent corporation which sold its products to a wholly-owned New York subsidiary which in turn delivered products to customers in California); Ryder Truck Rental v. Acton Foodservices Corp., 554 F.Supp. 277, 279 (C.D.Cal.1983) (no jurisdiction over foreign parent absent “ ‘clear evidence that the parent in fact controls the activities of the subsidiary’”); Williams v. Cannon, Inc., 432 F.Supp. 376, 379-80 (C.D.Cal.1977) (no jurisdiction over Japanese parent corporation where plaintiff fails to show parent both controlled and managed the internal affairs of subsidiary); see generally Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Co., 267 U.S. 333, 335-37, 45 S.Ct. 250, 251, 69 L.Ed. 634 (1925); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 1069, p. 256 (“if the subsidiary’s presence in the state is primarily for the purpose of carrying on its own business and the subsidiary has preserved some semblance of independence from the parent, jurisdiction over the parent may not be acquired on the basis of the local activities of the subsidiary”). This rule applies even when the separation between parent and subsidiary is “merely formal,” as long as it is “real.” Cannon Mfg., supra, 267 U.S. at 336-37, 45 S.Ct. at 251; Ryder, supra, 554 F.Supp. at 279; Williams, supra, 432 F.Supp. at 379. It is equally well settled, however, that where a nonresident parent corporation carries on “continuous and systematic” activities in the forum state through a subsidiary, due process is not offended by the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the parent entity. See, e.g., Wells Fargo, supra, 556 F.2d at 424 (“if plaintiffs can establish that [the alien corporate defendant] was carrying on ‘continuous and systematic’ activities in Nevada through [its subsidiary] acting as [the alien defendant’s] ‘general agent,’ we see no reason why [the alien defendant] itself should not be said to have been present there”); Brunswick Corp., supra, 575 F.Supp at 1419 (Japanese parent companies’ contacts with Wisconsin satisfied the state’s long-arm statute where parent companies had systematically injected themselves in Wisconsin marketplace through their affiliated subsidiaries, local sales of parent companies’ products were not isolated or insubstantial, and economic benefits accruing to parent companies by virtue of Wisconsin connections rendered exercise of long-arm jurisdiction reasonable); Scott v. Mego Int’l Inc., 519 F.Supp 1118, 1125-26 (D.Minn.1981) (“A nonresident parent corporation may subject itself to jurisdiction in a state by virtue of the activities of its subsidiary company in that state” if the companies are “organized and operated so that one corporation is an instrumentality or adjunct of the other”); Bulova, supra, 508 F.Supp. at 1333 (“a corporation may be amenable to New York jurisdiction when the systematic activities of a subsidiary in the state may fairly be attributed to the parent”); see generally, Roorda, supra, 481 F.Supp. at 874-79 (and cases cited therein); Wright & Miller, supra, at 256 (“if the subsidiary is merely an agent through which the parent conducts business in the jurisdiction or its separate corporate status is formal only and without any semblance of individual identity, then the subsidiary’s business will be viewed as that of the parent and the latter will be said to be doing business in the jurisdiction through the subsidiary”). Moreover, the existence of interlocking directorates, while not dispositive by itself, constitutes strong evidence of a relationship sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over the parent corporation. See e.g., Scott, supra, 1118 F.Supp. at 1126; Bulova, 508 F.Supp. at 1340; Tokyo Boeki (U.S.A.), 324 F.Supp. 361, 366 (S.D.N.Y.1971). In determining whether a parent corporation has interjected itself into the forum through a subsidiary in the antitrust context, courts have identified the following factors, among others, as relevant to the decision: “(1) Whether there is a world-wide partnership in business competition between parent and subsidiary; (2) whether the parent has the capacity to influence decisions of the subsidiary in matters having antitrust consequences (e.g., interlocking directors and officers); (3) whether there is an integrated manufacturing, sales and distribution system; and (4) whether the subsidiary is the marketing arm of the parent and shares a common marketing image (e.g., through advertising and a common trademark).” Cascade Steel v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 499 F.Supp. 829, 838 (D.Ore.1980), citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., Ltd., 402 F.Supp. 262, 327-28 (E.D.Pa.1975). In the instant case, the preliminary evidence indicates that at least some if not all of these factors are present in the NEC-NEC Electronics relationship. First, NEC and NEC Electronics are certainly part of a world-wide effort to compete in the computer equipment market. NEC Electronics v. Cal Circuit Abco, supra, 810 F.2d at 1507 (parent and subsidiary are part of a $2 billion-a-year corporate network). Second, NEC and NEC Electronics have an interlocking directorship such that NEC can influence or control the decisions of its California subsidiary. Id. (NEC’s directors constitute a majority of NEC Electronics’ board of directors). Third, NEC and NEC Electronics appear to have an integrated manufacturing, sales and distribution system through which NEC Electronics imports ninety percent of the products it sells in California from NEC. Id. (NEC Electronics “imports ninety percent of the NEC chips it sells from the parent company”). Finally, NEC and NEC Electronics clearly share a common marketing image through the common use of the trademark “NEC.” Id. (in 1983, NEC assigned its United States rights to the trademark “NEC” to NEC Electronics). Although these facts alone are not sufficient to demonstrate general jurisdiction by a preponderance of evidence, they are adequate to make a prima facie showing sufficient to withstand the present motion to dismiss. Additional questions remain, however, which should be addressed following further discovery, including the variety and volume of products NEC markets in California; the degree to which NEC dictates or facilitates the marketing of these products; the extent to which NEC directly or indirectly controls the corporate decisions of, and does business through, NEC Electronics or other wholly-owned subsidiaries operating in California; and the extent to which NEC controls the day-to-day operations of these subsidiaries. D. “National Contacts” Theory: NEC’s Contacts with the United States In certain cases, courts have held that personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate defendant being sued on a federal cause of action “ ‘may be founded on that defendant’s contacts with the United states as a whole instead of its contacts with the forum state.’ ” See, e.g., Handley v. Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1268-69 (6th Cir.1984), quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237-38 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893, 102 S.Ct. 388, 70 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). This “national contacts” or “aggregate contacts” or “cumulative contacts” theory is “ ‘based on the proposition that a court’s jurisdictional power to render a binding judgment on federal questions must be examined in light of the due process clause of the Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.’ ” Id. This theory allows a court to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate defendant which has substantial contacts with the United States as a whole, even when its contacts with the forum state are insufficient to pass due process muster. See, e.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir.1974); see generally, Born, “Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases,” 17 The Georgia Journal of International and Comyarative Law, 1, 9-10 (1987); Note, “National Contacts as a Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction Over Aliens In Federal Question Suits,” 70 Calif.L.Rev. 686 (1982); Note, “Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Standard,” 95 Harv.L.Rev. 470, 474-81 (1981). The Ninth Circuit has not yet considered the validity of asserting personal jurisdiction over an alien defendant in an anti-trust action based on that defendant’s aggregate or cumulative contacts with the United States. However, the Circuit has upheld this basis for jurisdiction in another context where, as here, the statute under which the plaintiff sued provides for nation-wide service of process on the foreign defendant. In Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir.1985), the court reversed a lower court’s order dismissing four nonresident defendants in a securities fraud action for lack of personal jurisdiction. In adopting the national contacts approach, the court undertook a two-step analysis. First, it found that § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, authorizes nationwide service of process in securities actions. Id. at 1314 n. 1. Second, the court held that due process was not offended where the defendant had “sufficient contacts with the United States” to justify asserting personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1315. The court stated that “ ‘ ‘minimum contacts’ with a particular ... state for purposes of personal jurisdiction is not a limitation imposed on the federal courts in a federal question case by due process concerns. The Constitution does not require the federal districts to follow state boundaries....' Johnson Creative Arts v. Wool Masters, 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir.1984). Where a federal statute such as Section 27 of the [Securities Exchange] Act confers nationwide service of process, ‘the question becomes whether the party has sufficient contacts with the United States, not any particular state.’ Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation District, 491 F.Supp. 1364, 1378 (N.D.Cal.1980....” Id. (emphasis original; citations and footnotes omitted); see also Leasco Data Processing v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339-43 (2d Cir.1972) (same); Paulson Inv. Co. v. Norbay Sec., Inc., 603 F.Supp 615, 618 (D.Ore.1984) (same). Accordingly, the court held that “so long as a defendant has minimum contacts with the United States, § 27 of the Act confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant in any federal district court.” Id. at 1316. Similarly, the Northern District of California has applied the national contacts theory to actions brought against foreign governments acting as private entities under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 et seq. In Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 628 F.Supp. 599 (N.D.Cal.1986), affirmed, 720 F.2d 684 (9th Cir.1987), Judge Schwarzer applied the two-step analysis adopted in Securities Investor. First, the court found that FSIA provides for world-wide service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1330, Id. at 606. Second, it concluded that “it is the federal court, not the state, that exercises jurisdiction over defendants, and the relevant contacts are those with the United States generally.” Id. at 607; accord Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 490, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 1969, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983) (personal jurisdiction under the FSIA is only limited by the requirement of “some form of substantial contact with the United States”); Texas Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d. 300, 314 (2nd Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148, 102 S.Ct. 1012, 71 L.Ed.2d 301 (1982) (“[s]ince service [of process] was made under Section 1608, the relevant area in delineating contacts is the entire United States, not merely New York [the forum state]”). Securities Investor and Meadows provide a model for extending the national contacts theory of personal jurisdiction by analogy to the antitrust area. First, 15 U.S.C. § 22 authorizes service of antitrust complaints “in any district wherein [the defendant] may be found or transacts business.” The Ninth Circuit has held this statute authorizes not only nationwide but worldwide service of process. Kramer, supra, 628 F.2d at 1177; Wells Fargo, supra, 556 F.2d at 418; see also Meadows, supra, 628 F.Supp. at 607. Second, once the prerequisites of § 22 are met “‘the question becomes whether the [corporate defendant] has sufficient contacts with the United States, not any particular state.’ ” Securities Investor, supra, 764 F.2d at 1315; Kramer, supra, 628 F.2d at 1177; Wells Fargo, supra 556 F.2d at 418; see also Black v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 683-86 (5th Cir.1977); Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F.Supp. 160, 164-67 (S.D.T.1983); Hovenkamp, Personal Jurisdiction and Venue in Private Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A Policy Analysis, 67 Iowa L.Rev. 485, 501 (1982). Applying the national contracts theory to the uncontroverted facts in the present record, the Court finds that plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing that NEC has sufficient contacts with the United States generally to confer personal jurisdiction. First, plaintiffs provide evidence that NEC has utilized various federal courts to pursue certain legal claims. For example, NEC has filed claims or counterclaims in the Northern District of California, the Southern District of California, and the United States Court of International Trade. See, e.g., NEC Corporation v. INTEL Corporation, 654 F.Supp. 1256 (N.D.Cal.1987) (NEC filed declaratory relief action); NEC Corporation v. United States, 622 F.Supp. 1086 (Cit.1985), rehearing denied, 628 F.Supp. 976 (Cir.1986), affirmed, 806 F.2d 247 (Fed.Cir.1986) (NEC filed action to contest federal government’s administrative review of anti-dumping finding); NEC Electronics v. Cal Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.1987) (NEC filed counterclaims in trademark infringement action). Certainly, a foreign defendant “who seeks relief in the United States courts [can] be required to respond to claims for relief against it in those courts.” Meadows, supra, 599 F.Supp. at 607; First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 630-32, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 2601-03, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983) (foreign state seeking relief in United States court may not assert sovereign immunity defense to counterclaim); Kyle v. Continental Capital Corp., 575 F.Supp. 616, 620 (E.D.Penn.1983) (in addition to other contacts with forum, defendant filed dozens of liens under Pennsylvania law); In re A & W Publishers, Inc., 39 B.R. 666, 667-68 (D.C.N.Y.1984) (British corporate creditor subject to jurisdiction of New York court when, among other contacts, it utilized New York’s legal system to enforce confessions of judgment and collect funds). Thus, by availing itself of the federal court system, NEC may be fairly called upon now to answer claims brought in that system. Second, plaintiffs present uncontroverted evidence that NEC has directly advertised the “NEC” trademark in periodicals which circulate in the United States. Although advertising by itself is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the advertiser, it remains one factor to be considered in combination with other forum contacts. Runnels v. TMSI Contractors, Inc., 764 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir.1985) (Saudi Arabian partnership had sufficient minimum contacts with Louisiana where, among other contacts, partnership had placed advertisements in two Louisiana newspapers over a five year period); Wentling, supra, 176 F.Supp. at 659 (among other activities, defendant in antitrust action “engaged in various advertising and sales promotion campaigns”); but cf., San Antonio Telephone Company, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 499 F.2d 349, 351-52 n. 5 (5th Cir.1974) (national advertising which finds its way into a particular jurisdiction is insufficient to support a finding that defendant transacted business); Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic v. American Chiropractic Ass’n, Inc., 534 F.Supp. 438, 443 (N.D.Ga.1982) (distribution of public service announcements does not by itself constitute “transaction of business”). Third, the record indicates that NEC has traded American Depository Receipts (ADRs) in the United States securities market since at least 1963. As of March 31, 1986, NEC’s American Depository Shares were held by 514 individuals in the United States, and represented approximately three percent of NEC’s total outstanding Shares. These securities are currently listed with and actively traded in the NASDAQ System. “The ADR is the most widely used form of trading foreign securities in the United States, and its use has grown significantly since its inception in 1927.” Royston, “The Regulation of American Depositary Receipts: Americanization of the International Capital Markets,” 10 N.C. Journal of Intern. Law & Comm. Regulation, 87 (1985). These securities allow foreign corporations to profitably enter the United States capital markets, and have grown in popularity because of their relative cost savings and safety compared with directly traded foreign securities. Id. at 88 n. 4. Foreign corporations who employ ADRs must register with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and are subject to various federal regulations and reporting rules. Id. at 90-95. The Court believes that by registering with, and transacting business under the auspices of, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, NEC has availed itself of the privileges and protections of the United States and its government. These benefits have been ongoing since the early 1960’s, and constitute one form of “systematic and continuous” contact with the United States as a whole. Given the obvious benefits the use of ADRs provide to NEC, and in light of the fact that these securities are actively traded in the United States, and regulated by federal law, the Court believes it is proper to consider the trading of these securities for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction. More information is needed, however, on the nature and volume of NEC’s trading activity. Finally, plaintiffs present uncontroverted evidence that the United States Department of Commerce has determined that since the early 1970s, NEC has engaged in “dumping” television sets on the United States market in violation of federal law. At a minimum, this evidence suggests that NEC has, either directly or indirectly, served the electronics markets throughout the United States. Certainly a defendant’s “purposeful exploitation of the forum's market” constitutes meaningful contact for jurisdiction purposes. United States v. Toyota Motor Corp., supra, 561 F.Supp. at 359 (due process satisfied when Japanese parent corporation knew or should have known that its vehicles would be sold in the United States); Scott, supra, 519 F.Supp. at 1125 (foreign defendant whose products were distributed and sold throughout the United States was “clearly doing business” in forum state). Again, although not dis-positive of the personal jurisdiction issue, this evidence suggests that NEC has maintained a presence in, and established substantial contacts with, the United States as a whole sufficient to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over this defendant. In sum, the above uncontroverted facts, taken together, constitute a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction based on its “national,” “aggregate,” or “cumulative” contacts with the United States. Accordingly, NEC’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(2) is DENIED without prejudice. IV. SERVICE OF PROCESS On December 20,1986, plaintiffs effected mail service of the summons and complaint in this action on NEC and NECHE-Japan respectively in accordance with California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 415.40, made applicable here by Fed.R.Civ.Proc., Rule 4(e). Defendants received these documents at their respective mailing addresses in Japan on December 23, 1986. NEC and NECHE-Japan now challenge the sufficiency of this service on two separate but related grounds. A. Service Under the Hague Convention Defendants first argue that service of process in Japan was invalid because plaintiffs failed to follow the provisions of The Hague Convention. The Hague Convention is a multinational treaty entered into by Japan in 1970. Fijita, “Service of Process Upon Japanese Nationals By Registered Airmail and Enforceability of Resulting American Judgment in Japan,” 12 Law in Japan 69, 70 n. 3 (1979). The United States became a signatory in 1972. 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. 6338, reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. Fed.R.Civ.Proc., 4 (West Supp.1987), pp. 104-108. Article Ten of the Convention states in relevant part: “Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with— (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad, .... (b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination, (c) the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination. Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 4 (West Supp.1987), at 105. In its formal acceptance of The Hague Convention, the Japanese government objected to subparagraphs (b) and (c) of Article 10, but did not object to subsection (a). Fed.R.Civ.Proc., Rule 4 (West Supp.1987), at 114. Courts differ on the meaning and significance of Japan’s decision not to object to Article 10(a). Some courts have held that Japan’s failure to object indicates the country’s acceptance of service of process by mail. See, e.g., Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 839-40 (2nd Cir.1986); Lemme v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 631 F.Supp. 456, 463 (E.D.N.Y.1986); Weight v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 597 F.Supp. 1082, 1085-86 (E.D.Va.1984); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F.Supp. 1182, 1206 (D.D.C.1984); Shoei Kako Co. v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.3d 808, 822, 109 Cal.Rptr. 402 (1973). These courts reason that since the purported purpose of the Convention is to facilitate service abroad, the reference to “ ‘the freedom to send judicial documents by postal channels, directly to persons abroad’ would be superfluous unless it was related to the sending of such documents for the purpose of service.” Id. at 821; Ackerman, supra at 839; Lemme, supra at 463. Other courts have adopted the view that Japan’s failure to object to Article 10(a) of the Convention does not amount to accept-aneé of mail service. See, e.g., Pochop v. Toyota Motor Co., 111 F.R.D. 464 (S.D.Miss.1986); Mommsen v. Toro Co., 108 F.R.D. 444 (S.D.Iowa 1985); Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 129 Misc.2d 317, 493 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80-81 (1985). These courts argue that if the drafters of Article 10(a) had intended this section to provide an additional means of effective service of process, they would have specified “service of process” rather than permitting parties merely to “send” judicial documents through the mail. Pochop, supra at 466; Mommsen, supra at 446; Rissew, supra at 81. This Court finds the reasoning in Ackerman, Lemme, Weight, Chrysler Corp., and Shoei persuasive. Particularly persuasive is the following passage from Shoei: “If it be assumed that the purpose of the convention is to establish one method to avoid the difficulties and controversy attendant to the use of other methods ..., it does not necessarily follow that other methods may not be used if effective proof of delivery can be made.” Shoei, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at 821, 109 Cal.Rptr. 402 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Here, proof of delivery was assured under the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure § 415.40 when plaintiffs received return receipts evidencing that the summonses and complaints were received by NEC and NECHE-USA repectively on December 23, 1986. Moreover, the Court notes that this interpretation of The Hague Convention is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s views on the interface between the Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the discovery context. In Societe Nationale Industrille Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 788 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir.1986), the court upheld a lower court decision not to require that discovery involving a French government-owned corporation be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of The Hague Convention. In explaining its decision the court stated: “The Hague Convention was intended ... not only to protect foreign nationals from American discovery procedures, but also to make more evidence accessible to Common Law litigants through the cooperation and coercive powers of foreign authorities. The Convention was not intended to shield foreign litigants from the normal burdens of litigation in American courts. If the Hague Convention supplanted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, foreign litigants would have an extraordinary advantage in American courts.” Id. at 1411 (citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis added); accord In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 123-25 (8th Cir.1986). The Societe Nationale court directed “that resort to the convention should be considered in each case,” but need not “be utilized first in every case.” Societe Nationale, supra, 288 F.2d at 1411. Furthermore, the court identified the degree of intrusion on the foreign sovereign as a major factor to be considered. Id. In the present action, defendants have not demonstrated how direct mail service of process on NEC and NECHE-Japan represents an intrusion on Japanese sovereignty. Thus, in light of Societe Nationale, and for the reasons stated above, the Court finds that mail service on defendants NEC and NECHE-Japan in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure § 415.40 was proper. B. Timeliness of Service NEC and NECHE-Japan next claim they are entitled to an order dismissing them from this action because service of process on them was not effected within 120 days of the date the complaint was filed as required by Rule 4(j) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this case August 27, 1986, but pursuant to an order staying further action, did not mail the summons and complaint to NEC and NECHE-Japan until December 20, 1986. The documents were received in Japan three days later. NEC and NECHE-Japan argue that under Code of Civil Procedure § 415.40, plaintiffs’ service of process was not effective until December 30,1986, ten days after the summonses and complaints were postmarked and 125 days after plaintiffs filed their complaint. Section 415.40 states: “A summons may be served on a person outside this state in any manner provided by this article or by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by first class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt. Service of a summons by this form of mail is deemed complete on the 10th day after such mailing.” West California Codes 1973 and Supp.1987 (emphasis added). In Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.3d 243, 211 Cal.Rptr. 517, 695 P.2d 1058 (1985), the California Supreme Court held that for purposes of determining the timeliness of service, the date of mailing, not the tenth day following mailing, controls. The Johnson & Johnson Court reasoned as follows: “Clearly, when the Legislature intends that service is not to be effective until the date of actual receipt, it knows how to say so. In section 415.40, it chose instead to make the date of mailing determinative.” Id. at 250, 211 Cal.Rptr. 517, 695 P.2d 1058. Here, the date of mailing was December 20,1986. This date was within the 120-day period provided for in F.R.C.P. 4(j) Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs timely served their summons and complaint on NEC and NECHE-Japan respectively. V. PLAINTIFFS’ FEDERAL ANTITRUST CLAIMS A. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act — First Cause of Action Plaintiffs’ first cause of action alleges three separate but related conspiracies to restrain trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. First, plaintiffs aver that NEC, NECHE-Japan, and NECHE-USA conspired among themselves to unlawfully fix prices and restrain trade. Complaint, ¶ 23. Second, they allege that defendants conspired with “certain other entities and individuals” to violate § 1, including, but not limited to, “certain of the authorized distributors and representatives of NECHE-USA and certain authorized distributors and representatives of NEC and NECHE-Japan located in Japan and other overseas locations.” Id. Finally, plaintiffs claim that NCI participated with the defendants as an involuntary co-conspirator when, for a period of time, NCI allegedly complied with NECHE-USA’s instructions not to transact business with a low-pricing retailer. Id. at ¶ 25(c). Defendants move to dismiss the entire claim on the ground it fails as a matter of law to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For purposes of this motion, the Court will consider each alleged conspiracy in turn. (1) Conspiracy Among NEC, NECHE-Japan, and NECHE-USA Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or foreign nations_” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (West 1973 Supp.1986). The elements of a § 1 violation are: “(1) an agreement or conspiracy, (2) resulting in an unreasonable restraint of trade (3) causing ‘anti-trust’ injury.” Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Foundation, Inc., 783 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 107 S.Ct. 180, 92 L.Ed.2d 115 (1986). In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 2741, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary cannot, as a matter of law, conspire with each other for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 2745. The Copperweld Court explained why “agreements” between a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary do not present the threat of anti-competitive effects that § 1 of the Sherman Act was adopted to address: “[T]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one.... With or without a formal ‘agreement,’ the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its sole shareholder. If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do ‘agree’ to a course of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had previously served different interests, and there is no justification for Section 1 scrutiny.... Indeed, the very notion of an agreement in Sherman Act terms between a parent and wholly owned subsidiary lacks meaning [because] ... in reality, a parent and wholly owned subsidiary always have a ‘unity of purpose’ or ‘[the] common design’ [required to establish a conspiracy to violate Section 1].” Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771, 104 S.Ct. at 2741-42 (emphasis original). The Supreme Court added that “the purposeful choice of a parent corporation to organize a sub-unit as a subsidiary is not itself a reason to heighten antitrust scrutiny, because it is not laden with anti-competitive risk.” Id. at 772 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. at 2742 n. 19. In the present action, NECHE-Japan and NECHE-USA are wholly-owned subsidiaries of NEC. Applying Copperweld, these three corporate entities must be viewed as a “single entity” with a complete “unity of interest” for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 771, 104 S.Ct. at 2742. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ allegations of conspiracy among NEC, NECHE-Japan, and NECHE-USA to restrain trade under § 1 must be dismissed with prejudice. (2) Defendants’ Alleged Conspiracy :with “Other Entities and Individuals” Plaintiffs next allege that defendants combined or conspired with “other entities and individuals,” including, but not limited to both foreign and domestic authorized distributors or representatives of NEC and NECHE-USA. Complaint, 1123. Defendants argue this language is merely conclusory and insufficient to place defendants on notice of plaintiffs’ claims. In the Ninth Circuit, “antitrust pleadings need not contain great factual specificity.” Portland Retail, Etc. v. Kaiser Foundation, Etc., 662 F.2d 641, 648 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1229, 105 S.Ct. 1230, 84 L.Ed.2d 368 (1981); Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 924 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921, 101 S.Ct. 1369, 67 L.Ed.2d 348 (1980). Indeed, “[t]here is no special rule requiring more factual specificity in antitrust pleadings.” Id.; Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 1571, 51 L.Ed.2d 787 (1977). However, it is axiomatic that a complaint must contain allegations sufficient to place the defendants on notice of the facts underlying the plaintiffs claims. Lombard’s Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed.2d 892 (1986); see also Fed.R.Civ.Proc., Rule 8(a). To date two courts have directly addressed the issue of whether pleading the participation of unidentified co-conspirators satisfies the requirements of notice pleading in light of Copperweld. In Sadler v. Rexair, Inc., 612 F.Supp. 491 (D.C.Mont.1985), the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, conspired with “other debtors” to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 494. The court held that “plaintiff [cannot] salvage its complaint [from Cop-perweld ] by adding unidentified participates, i.e., 'other debtors.’ Such pleading is inadequate to give the defendants fair notice of plaintiff’s claim.” Id., citing Lombard’s, Inc. v. Prince MFG, Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed.2d 892 (1985) (“A conclusory allegation of conspiracy to restrain trade will not survive a motion to dismiss”). Similarly, in Garshman v. Universal Resources Holding, Inc., 641 F.Supp. 1359 (D.C.N.J.1986), a defendant cross-complained against a pipeline company, its parent, a public utility holding company, and unidentified “other entities” for violation of § 1. Id. at 1370. In dismissing the cross-claims, the court held that the allegation as to “other entities” was “too vague to stand.” Id., citing Kalmanoivitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 595 F.Supp. 1385, 1400 (D.Del.1984) (in an antitrust action, a “mere general allegation of conspiracy is insufficient”). In the instant action, plaintiffs have done more than simply allege a conspiracy with “other entities.” They have instead identified these entities as certain authorized foreign and domestic distributors of defendants’ products. However, plaintiffs’ allegations are still insufficient to place defendants on notice of a valid § 1 claim for two reasons. First, NEC and NECHE-Japan have numerous distributors throughout the United States. Without identifying which of these distributors allegedly conspired with NEC and NECHE-Japan to control prices, defendants have not been placed on notice as to the identity of their alleged co-conspirators. Id. at 1370 (“Merely adding unidentified participants ... does not provide defendants with adequate notice of [plaintiff's] conspiracy claim”). Second, all the alleged wrongful acts contained in plaintiffs’ first cause of action involve actions taken solely by NEC, NECHE-Japan, and NECHE-USA. See, e.g., Complaint, ¶ 25. Nowhere in their complaint do plaintiffs allege specific wrongful acts by any of defendants’ authorized distributors. In an antitrust complaint, the “mere allegation of a legal conclusion is inadequate of itself to state a cause of action.” Larry R. George Sales Co. v. Cool Attic Corp., 587 F.2d 266, 273-74 (5th Cir.1979). Thus, “[tjhe pleader must allege the facts constituting the conspiracy, its object and accomplishment.” Id. at 273. At this stage in the litigation (over eight months after the complaint was filed) plaintiffs should be able to identify with specificity any co-conspirators if they exist, and plead what wrongful acts these entities allegedly undertook. Plaintiffs’ allegations as to this conspiracy must therefore be dismissed. This ruling is without prejudice and with twenty days leave to amend. (3) Plaintiffs Claim of “Involuntary” Conspiracy Finally, plaintiffs contend their Section 1 claim survives Copperweld because their complaint identifies NCI as an “involuntary co-conspirator” in defendants’ alleged antitrust conspiracy. Specifically, they refer to ¶ 25(c) of the complaint, which states: “In or about May of 1986, NECHE-USA instructed NCI to refuse to deal with a low-pricing retailer.” Although their argument is not clear, plaintiffs apparently rely on the line of cases which hold that a manufacturer may form a “conspiracy” or “combination” under § 1 if it imposes restraints on distributors by coercive conduct, and the distributors involuntarily adhere to those restraints. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50, 88 S.Ct. 869, 871, 19 L.Ed.2d 998 (1968); United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44-45, 80 S.Ct. 503, 511-12, 4 L.Ed.2d 505 (1960); G.H.I.I. v. MTS, Inc., 147 Cal. App.3d 256, 268, 195 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1983). The problem with plaintiffs’ argument is two-fold. First, their complaint cannot be fairly read as alleging that NCI ever assented to or participated in the alleged price-fixing conspiracy. To the contrary, ¶[ 25(e) of the complaint states that NCI’s distributorship was terminated as an “example to other distributors of the consequences to anyone who sold at prices not pleasing to NEC, NECHE-Japan, and NECHE-USA.” This allegation suggests that NCI was targeted precisely because it would not participate in the conspiracy. Second, the continuing validity of Al-brecht and its progeny has been cast in some doubt by the Supreme Court’s decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 1471 n. 9, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984), wherein the Supreme Court stated that a terminated distributor must present evidence “both that the distributor communicated its acquiescence or agreement [in the alleged price-fixing scheme], and that this was sought by the manufacturer.” See also Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1478 (9th Cir.1986). Here, plaintiffs fail to allege that NCI ever communicated its acquiescence in or agreement with the alleged conspiracy involving NEC, NECHE-Japan, and NECHE-USA. For these reasons, the Court finds that plaintiffs have not adequately alleged an involuntary conspiracy among NCI and defendants to restrain trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, the Court dismisses plaintiffs’ allegations in U 25(c) of the complaint. This dismissal is without prejudice and with twenty days leave to amend. B. The Wilson Tariff Act — Fourth Cause of Action Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action alleges violation of § 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. Defendants urge the Court , to apply Copperweld to the Wilson Act by analogy and dismiss this claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim under which relief can be granted. As the Ninth Circuit and several other courts have noted, the language of, and proscribed conduct included within, the Wilson Act is analogous to § 1 of the Sherman Act. Western Concrete Structures Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 760 F.2d 1013, 1018-19 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903, 106 S.Ct. 230, 88 L.Ed.2d 229 (1985); Timerlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 600 n. 1 (9th Cir.1976); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industries, Co., 513 F.Supp. 1100, 1164-65 (E.D.Pa.1981), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 723 F.2d 238 (3rd Cir.1983). Indeed, the common language of both statutes specifically prohibits conspiracies to engage in certain unlawful conduct. Western Concrete, supra at 1018-19. Accordingly, the Court finds that Copperweld’s reasoning applies to violations of the Wilson Tariff Act as well as to violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and, for the reasons stated in § V(A) of this opinion, dismisses plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action without prejudice and with twenty days leave to amend. C. Section 2 of the Sherman Act— Third Cause of Action Plaintiffs’ third cause of action alleges that NEC and NECHE-Japan violated § 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by monopolizing or attempting to monopolize the market for “self-synchronizing high resolution color monitors.” Complaint, ¶¶ 28-29. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides, in relevant part, that “[ejvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.” To establish liability for “monopolization,” plaintiffs must plead and prove: “(1) possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power; [and] (3) a resulting antitrust injury.” Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955, 104 S.Ct. 370, 78 L.Ed.2d 329 (1983); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1704, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege either the “relevant market” or the “willful acquisition or maintenance of a monopoly in that market.” They do not, on the present motion, challenge plaintiffs’ allegations related to antitrust injury. (1) Relevant Market. The relevant market consists of two components: (1) and (2) the geographic market. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com’n v. N.F.L., 726 F.2d 1381, 1392 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990, 105 S.Ct. 397, 83 L.Ed.2d 331 (1984). Here, defendants challenge only plaintiffs’ definition of the product market. Defining the product market involves the “process of describing those groups of producers which, because of the similarity of th