Full opinion text
PEREZ-GIMENEZ, Chief Judge. “Prison inmates are voteless, politically unpopular, and socially threatening____ Under these circumstances, the courts have emerged as a critical force behind efforts to ameliorate inhumane conditions ____ There is no reason of comity, judicial restraint, or recognition of expertise for courts to defer to negligent omission of officials who lack the resources or motivation to operate prisons within limits of decency____” Mr. Justice William J. Brennan, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). MEMORANDUM OPINION The incarceration as punishment for those convicted of crime, and at times, the detention of those who await trial, are integral components of the administration of criminal law. As any judge must, the Court has accepted and exercised the awesome authority to punish the commission of crime by the deprivation of liberty. Those who are accused of the commission of a crime must at times be detained to assure their presence at trial even if the law holds them to be innocent until their guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The time is long past, however, when the punishment of crime was the occasion for spectacles of imaginative cruelty or secret torture. We must punish crime and serious crime must be punished severely. But we must not diminish our humanity by inflicting wanton pain and degrading suffering on those convicted of crime, and we must not punish at all those who wait for the processes of the law to have their innocence or guilt adjudged. The Eighth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments compel our obedience to these salutary principles of political morality which our society has accepted as necessary premises of substantive and procedural criminal law. The plaintiffs in this class action are all in the custody of the Administration of Correction of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the Administration). Most have been convicted of crime, a substantial minority are pretrial detainees, some have been imprisoned for. civil contempt. This is not the first time that the Court is called upon to adjudicate the rights of the plaintiff class, nor does the Court expect that it will be the last: the enforcement of federal injunctive relief for the protection of the constitutional rights of prison inmates is notoriously difficult. Today we commit the authority of this Court to the enforcement of the federal rights of these plaintiffs. The Court is fully aware of the deference which is owed to the sound discretion and expertise of prison administrators and to the right of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to define and punish crime. The Court is also aware, however, of its duty to protect federal rights and enforce the Constitution of the United States within this jurisdiction, even behind the prison walls. The Court’s experience in the implementation of the preliminary injunction entered in this action five years ago has been an education in the peculiar needs and the problems confronted by the Commonwealth and the Administration of Correction in the field of penology. The Court has given careful consideration and given great weight in deciding this case to those needs and to the difficulties which even well intentioned administrators acting in good faith meet within the performance of their duties. The Court must regretably find, however, that the defendants have all too frequently offered the appearance of compliance with its decree as a substitute for obedience, the laws of the Commonwealth have been ignored by administrators (at all levels) who disobey in silence, and vast sums of money, whose expenditure has been repeatedly proffered to the Court as evidence of reformation, have been wasted without bringing about any substantial and enduring change in the reality of daily life in Puerto Rico’s prisons. What little has been done, the Court finds, is only the result of the Court’s prior intervention, and the fragile and limited improvements in the provision of medical services have been made in spite of the Administration and not because of any institutional determination calculated to turn around an agency which systematically inflicts cruel and unusual punishment on the persons whom the law has committed to its custody. Nothing in this record even hints at the inability of the Commonwealth to comply with the commands of the Constitution. What is clear to anyone who cares to give even cursory attention to the evidence before the Court is that the intolerable cruelty of the conditions forced on the plaintiff class is caused by the intentional acts and omissions, or the deliberate disregard of the natural consequences of the acts and omissions, of the defendants and their agents and employees. This has been true for decades: the problems which the Administration faces have been a long time in the making. But every person now before the Court has acted or omitted to act to perpetuate the systematic violation of plaintiff’s federal rights. The Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, if obeyed, would have been sufficient protection against the evils prevalent in the institutions operated by the Administration. In the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction we do not, as we must not, rely on Commonwealth law to shape injunctive relief. But we take the law of the Commonwealth as evidence of the longstanding policy to maintain humane conditions in penal institutions, evidence to which we must give greater credence than to the protestations made by defendants’ counsel unsupported as they are by any meaningful evidence. This action was commenced by a complaint filed on February 7, 1979, and certified as a class action on April 2, 1979. After extensive discovery, bitterly contested by the defendants, a motion for emergency and extraordinary relief resulted in a preliminary injunction. The parties stipulated that the Court determine the equitable claims without precluding the rights of the parties to a trial by jury on the claims for damages, and the Court approved that stipulation. The record now before the Court was completed in hearings which extended over months and it is a thorough and accurate evidentiary basis on which to predicate an understanding of the conditions in the penal institutions run by the Administration and the structures and modus operandi of the Administration. The transcript of the testimony given by dozens of witnesses (inmates, experts, Administration officers and employees, health professionals) runs into thousands of pages. The documentary evidence, no less extensive, includes films and still pictures, Administration and prison records, inmate files and medical charts, reports prepared for or by the Administration. The Court has conducted an ocular inspection of most of the closed institutions operated by the Administration. Counsel have thoroughly and repeatedly briefed the issues before the Court. This has not been an easy process. The defendants have fought the plaintiffs’ every step of the way frequently beyond the limits of responsible litigation. The Court encourages, indeed requires, forceful advocacy in the representation of any client, but the defendants and their attorneys have insisted on an adversary of extreme vexatiousness which has sorely tested the patience of the Court and wasted judicial resources. It is not proper in a civil action to litigate protractedly factual matters which a party knows to be true beyond any reasonable doubt. This the defendants have done throughout the course of these proceedings. The Administration is an integral system which operates all institutions within the Commonwealth where pretrial detainees are held pending trial and convicts are housed to extinguish their sentences. Its operations are highly centralized at its main offices in San Juan. The institutions are of three kinds: closed institutions, agricultural camps, and halfway houses. The closed institutions are at San Juan, Rio Piedras, Bayamón, Arecibo, Aguadilla, Ponce, Guayama, and Humacao. The institutions known as The Industrial School for Women at Vega Alta and the Miramar Annex (which houses most but not all of the minors in the custody of the Administration) are also closed institutions. The State Penitentiary at Rio Piedras includes a maximum security unit known by various names, but usually refered to by a euphemism as the U.T.I. or Intensive Treatment Unit. Bayamón and Guayama are recently built structures in a state of accelerated dilapidation which results from overcrowding and inadequate maintenance. Ponce and Aguadilla are nineteenth century structures. The rest are of intermediate age. All, particularly Arecibo, Aguadilla, Ponce and the Miramar Annex, which are both dangerous and unfit for human occupation, are badly dilapidated. During the pendency of this action millions were spent on the modernization of the State Penitentiary: a riot caused extensive damages which had not yet been repaired months later at the time of our ocular inspection. The status of the institution at Sabana Hoyos has changed during the course of this action from a camp to a closed institution. The agricultural camps are underused and except intermittently and for short periods do not present the conditions of overcrowding which prevail in the closed institutions. These institutions are located at Sabana Hoyos, Mayaguez, Jayuya, Cayey, Rio Grande and Naguabo. The halfway houses at Río Piedras, Arecibo and Carolina were only incidentally mentioned in litigation and their marginal function in the system makes them non-significant to our findings and conclusions. Every penal institution has its own superintendent, who is responsible for the day-to-day management of the institution. A division within the Administration hierarchy, known as the Program for Penal Institutions, supervises and oversees the operation of all the penal institutions at the central office level. The director of the program is directly responsible to the Administrator and sub-Administrator of Correction. Every year the Administration submits a budget request necessary to cover its operations and projected expenditures for the coming fiscal year. This budget request is made to form a part of the general expenditures budget for the Government of Puerto Rico that is submitted to the Legislature of Puerto Rico by the Governor. In the preparation of the Administration’s budget, each of the penal institutions submits a budget for its operations. That includes food, medicines, supplies, equipment and personnel. The central offices asume the distribution of medicines, the transfer of inmates, the allocation and transfer of guards, social workers and medical services personnel, and supervisory responsibility of each institution’s capability to deliver services to provide for the needs of the inmates such as health services, educational and vocational services, security to life and property, food and beding and general hygiene services. The total penal population in Puerto Rico hovered around the 3,800 mark for the year 1981. This number has continued to increase during the pendency of this action. The inmate population is divided initially in two broad categories: pretrial detainees and sentenced inmates. Except for pretrial detainees, who are not classified in any way, inmates in the penal institutions in Puerto Rico are classified into three custodial categories: minimum, medium and maximum. Pretrial detainees are normally kept in the closed institutions. There they account from anywhere between 20% to 50% of the total penal population of the institution at any given time. In most institutions, pretrial detainees are indiscriminately mixed with sentenced inmates. Only minimum custody classification inmates can be placed at the penal camps. Additionally, only minimum custody classification inmates are allowed to work with the Correctional Enterprises Corporation. The number of inmates that are confined in any given institution is theoretically determined by capacity ratings which have been assigned to each institution by the central office. Daily reports on the penal population of each institution are sent to the central office. The Court has been unable to find any rational criteria for the capacity ratings originally assigned by the Administration to the several institutions. Overcrowding Overcrowding is at the center of the many ills which make the conditions of imprisonment in the Commonwealth’s penal institutions constitutionally unacceptable. Neither statistics nor anecdote will suffice to express the intensity of confinement, physical and psychological, to which the plaintiff class is condemned. Medical and social services cannot be rationally planned or systematically delivered in institutions filled beyond capacity to such an extent that at times inmates will cover the entire floor space in their living quarters when they lie down to sleep on the floors — with or without mattresses — and in double bunks ranged so closely together that they must be entered from the front rather than the side. Recreation, exercise and education, even where the facilities exist to provide them, are available only to a small fraction of the population. But all of these services and necessities are luxuries to these plaintiffs whose property and lives cannot be protected by the Administration. The overcrowding evidenced by the testimony of the superintendents, the films and photographs are hard to believe even when experienced. As the Court visited each institution the sense of physical closeness and the revulsion at so much compressed humanity grew to an awareness of the psychological stress which must affect any human being almost totally deprived of any privacy or intimacy. Towels and sheets have turned bunks into cubicles of isolation in spite of the Administration’s prohibition of these make-shift partitions which increase security problems by reducing custodial visibility within the dormitories. Some few inmates, by the use of unapparent authority and power, have appropriated disproportionate amounts of space; in the newer institutions spaces meant to be linen and utilities closets have become the privileged domain of one or two inmates. Otherwise, the inmate population lives in oppressive physical propinquity in communal housing units in the tropical heat, with inadequate ventilation and not infrequently unprotected against the rain. Unprotected, convicts and pretrial detainees are housed together, most of them in total idleness, without regard to even the availability of sanitary facilities. At the remodelled State Penitentiary the Court saw a group of over sixty men housed in two large rooms whose only furniture was the thin plastic mattresses on which they slept: all sixty had access to two toilets, one of which was out of order, and both of them were beyond two locked gates manually operated by a guard who, as part of his duties, allowed one inmate at a time access to the single sanitary facility. Other institutions operate on the same standard of callous indifference to even the basic physical needs of inmates. The rated capacities assigned to each institution by the Administration are more a declaration of intent than anything else and there is no rational basis for the capacity assigned except in Bayamón and Guayama, which were recently constructed and designed to house a specific number of prisoners. Bayamón was designed for a population of 450-500 inmates, the population has at times reached over 1,400; Guayama, which should have no more than 220 has been doubled. We quote from the evaluation of the Administration prepared by Moyer Associates Incorporated, at the Administration’s request, titled Plan for Corrections: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, filed on September 12, 1984, (Moyer Report), the descriptive summary of housing conditions at Bayamón: Unacceptable. There are two types of housing at this site, maximum security single cells provide housing for approximately 184 inmates. The remainder of the housing is for all minimum security custody. Both housing types require complete building rennovations, hardware maintenance or replacement and new equipment. Also inmate counts should be determined for each housing unit and not exceeded. The comment on this institution is in part to the effect that: While this is a very new and reasonably good institution for 450-500 inmates as it was originally designed, the over population to inmate levels of 1,400 inmates have resulted in an almost total vandalism of the entire physical plant. The entire facility requires a major renovation and all new equipment. The housing at Guayama was also rated unacceptable and although the population levels have not been there as dramatically over capacity as at Bayamón, overcrowding is still the assignable issue for the deficiencies in housing, caused by vandalism to be sure, but also by the poor maintenance given all facilities and the Administration’s abdication of its duty to maintain order within all institutions. The National Institute of Corrections (NIC) Report also describes the institution at Bayamón. As far as it is a description of the conditions of life and the environment in which the inmates live it is in agreement with the evidence before the Court. We quote in extenso with the coreat, here as elsewhere, that the recommendations made by the Report have been weighed by the Court in reaching the decision which we set out below, but that we have also taken care to limit the remedy which we grant to the plaintiffs to what is constitutionally required and not what is expertly desired. At pages 27-29 the Report reads: a. Metropolitan Regional Institution/Bayamón. The original design of this facility, which began in 1968, and for which construction was completed in 1976, compares very favorably with the features called for by current standards for correctional facilities. The design designated a range of program and administrative spaces that would accommodate educational, counseling, recreational and other client activities. Today extreme overcrowding has caused these spaces, and others, to be redesignated as sleeping areas for additional inmates. An additional result of the overcrowding has been the rapid deterioration of the relatively new physical plant. In part this appears to have been caused by the overloading of building systems which were designed for a much smaller number of inmates. In greater part it seems due to other impacts stemming from overcrowding, most particularly the institutional atmosphere that has developed. The prevailing situation is one in which inmates are in much greater control than staff over events that occur. Increased tensions and hostilities tend to become expressed through attacks upon the institution itself. Deliberate abuse and vandalism of the buildings is prevalent, some intended to achieve personal environments and individual expression in a place where there is no recognition of the individual. The same results could occur, and sometimes do occur, without overcrowding— e.g., where minor repairs are neglected and thereby lead to major structural or functional problems. An unsatisfactory institutional climate, however, is exacerbated by overcrowding, though it will not be remedied by a reduction in the number of inmates alone nor explained by suggestion that the architect has produced a faulty design. The condition which exists at Bayamón, in addition to its outward display of deterioration, is an extremely unsafe one for staff and inmates alike. Recommendations are separately offered concerning classification, programming and administrative measures relative to this condition. With respect to the physical environment, the following is offered. Population should be reduced to allow originally designated classrooms, corridors, and other spaces to be returned to their intended use. Dependent upon the classification of inmates who might be assigned to Bayamón, several alternatives are suggested that would allow compliance with the recognized standards in the field. In terms of the specific requirements of the preliminary Opinion and Order issued by the United States District Court, the requirements are quite clear. Population must be reduced to achieve 35 square feet of living and sleeping space within the specified time requirement, and later, 55 square feet. In the case of Bayamón it is found that a total capacity of 568 inmates is possible under the first condition. A systemwide plan which achieves 55 square feet per inmate in dormitories and single occupancy of cells (which at Bayamón are approximately 60 square feet in size) allows a total capacity of 416 inmates. Under the latter condition of occupancy, considering dormitories as minimum security space, Bayamón would offer 304 minimum security beds and 112 medium or maximum security individual cells. These cells are unaccompanied by day-room space required by recognized standards. Consequently the total capacity of 416 inmates at 55 square feet per inmate is qualified. The further consideration of necessary amounts of day space to accompany the dormitory sleeping areas, in accordance with standards, produces a capacity finding of 268 inmates in these areas. Coupled with the 112 individual cells, the total capacity is 380 inmates on this basis. (emphasis added) The Ponce institution was built between 1830 and 1849 and is functionally obsolete as well as in a serious state of structural deterioration. Constructed as a barracks made of timber, frame and brick (the administrative area is a warren of cardboard and plastic partitions) structural cracking is evident at several locations on the outside wall. The dormitories are obviously unsafe for inmates and staff — a condition from which the guards and their supervisors try to protect themselves by never entering the dormitories alone and carrying out routine supervisory duties from outside the dormitories. About the Arecibo institution the NIC has this to say at page 32: Constructed in 1905, it possesses the degree of functional obsolescence that can be expected of a facility of this vintage. All building sub-systems are substandard, including the structure itself. Roof and floor structure consists of timber beams on masonry bearing walls with wood purlins supporting a brick and concrete deck (see Figures 47, 48 and 54). In some areas the bricks have fallen out. In other areas, an insect infestation is eating away the wood support members and tracking their wastes all over the walls. [Figure 48 documents this condition in the commissary.] Facilities in less serious condition have been condemned for public use. And about the District Jail at Humacao: It is a fire trap; it is unsanitary, overcrowded, and generally unfit for human occupancy. Paint is falling off the ceiling into the food preparation area. Food spillage is everywhere. Tiles are missing from the walls. Vermin infest the inmate lockers and living areas. Water damage is evident throughout. Electrical wiring is outdated and unsafe. Locking devices present a life safety hazard. Clothing hangs everywhere. Mattresses are tom and dirty. Because there are more inmates than beds, many sleep on mattresses placed on the floor. Rats also occupy the floor. The capacity ratings presented in this report address area allowances only. The continued use of the Humacao District Jail, even at these levels should be considered only on a temporary basis. Facilities in less serious condition and posing less danger to their occupants have been ordered closed in other jurisdictions. Humacao, like Ponce, Arecibo and Aguadilla, should be considered no differently. The jail at Aguadilla is exceptionally sound in structure, which advantage is offset by there being no grounds: an 848 square foot courtyard surrounded by the three story building and a blank wall is the only space for recreation. The courtyard is used for dispensing meals to inmates and for cleaning cooking utensils after use: all other uses are therefore limited to the late afternoon hours. Visits are conducted in the dining room, as they are conducted at Arecibo in the entrance hall. Kitchen equipment, electrical systems, plumbing and locks are substandard and patently dilapidated. This institution is particularly dark, damp and ill-ventilated. The Miramar Annex, used to house young adults (almost exclusively since adult inmates who work there are also housed in the institution) is particularly shocking. Built as a hospital, the structure is totally inadequate to a penal purpose. It is deteriorated beyond redemption: the kitchen is unsanitary, open drains and open sewers, malfunctioning and insufficient toilets and drains, insufficient ventilation, bad illumination, inadequate recreational and educational facilities, heat and intolerable levels of noise characterize this hellhole where youth is expected to rehabilitate itself or wait for the judgment of society. What is remarkable about the conditions which we have set out here is that they are evident: the films and pictures in evidence, a visit to the institutions, a layman’s knowledge are enough to establish what we have described. The defendants knew that such was the reality which they so strenuously fought to keep from the record; they just plainly could not have not known. They have received the expert and documented advice of highly qualified professionals. Nothing has been done except at the command of the Court and that grudgingly and incompletely. Let us for the sake of illustration tabulate the numerical capacities of these institutions at different intensities of occupation and compare them to the by now exceeded, recent levels of overcrowding. To deal with this level of overcrowding policy decisions must be made and line personnel must be trained to carry them out and all employee and staff persons must be aware of the complexity of the issues, the magnitude of the effort to be made and the Capacity at 35 square feet per inmate Total Actual Beyond Actual Beyond Capacity Occupancy Capacity Occupancy Capacity _12/31/80 7/21/83 Bayamón 568 1242 674 916 348 Guayama 220 410 190 2449 229 State Pen 507 310 (197) 943 436 Aguadilla 80 188 108 112 32 Stop 8 66 56 (10) 74 12 Humacao 73 177 104 179 106 Vega Alta 94 74 (20) 141 47 Arecibo 109 215 106 125 16 Miramar 183 250 67 358 175 Ponce 236 325 89 499 263 Under Professionally Recognized Standards Total Actual Beyond Actual Capacity Occupancy Capacity Occupancy 12/31/80 7/21/83 Beyond Capacity Bayamón 380 1242 902 916 536 Guayama 116 410 294 449 333 State Pen 500 310 (190) 943 443 Aguadilla 36 188 152 112 116 Stop 8 25 56 31 74 49 Humacao 41 177 136 139 98 Vega Alta ■ 62 74 12 141 79 Arecibo 52 215 163 125 73 Miramar 55 250 195 358 303 Ponce 99 325 226 499 400 need to abide by decisions and perform duties. Overcrowding will not be solved immediately and it affects every area of inmate life. But overcrowding must be dealt with and other problems resolved if the prisons of Puerto Rico are ever to pass constitutional muster. We again quote from the National Instutite of Corrections Report, at pages 26-27, to show the interrelation of the several areas and the magnitude of the problems to be addressed by the Court, the parties and, ultimately, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The recently constructed facilities at Bayamón and Guayama have deteriorated quite rapidly with overcrowding as one of the principal reasons. The older district jail facilities, including Humacao, Ponce, Arecibo and Aguadilla, are severely deteriorated for different reasons, although they are also extremely overcrowded. These older facilities are obsolete in their original design. They are uniformly characterized by violations of recognized health standards, life safety codes and building codes. They are substandard structures which, at the same time, fail to provide appropriate space in either quantity or quality for detention or corrections use. As a matter of introduction to the material that follows, the question of requirements for pretrial as opposed to sentenced inmates needs to be addressed. As it affects facility conditions, such a distinction generally only involves the provision of intake processing spaces for pretrial use — which are not required in sentenced facilities — and the provision of additional program spaces in sentenced facilities beyond basic recreation, counseling or interviewing spaces which any facility should have. Recognized standards, as well as the results of cases filed under the equal protection provisions of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, establish that inmates who are not yet adjudicated should be provided no lesser level of safety or adequacy in housing condition than those who have been tried and found guilty. As a result, necessary housing, programming and support requirements are not significantly different for pretrial and sentenced individuals. Further, the type of housing, whether individual cell or dormitory, will be tied to classification in either instance. The foregoing statement has particularly significance for the Puerto Rican corrections system. The shortcomings of the various existing facilities will not be remedied by redesignating them as pretrial facilities. It is observed that existing facilities primarily offer open dormitory sleeping and living space. Despite a certain amount of cell space in the system (728), none is accompanied by necessary day space. The dormitories are generally appropriate for inmates classified as minimum security only. Consequently, the representation of system capacity which follows is qualified and should be correlated to the results of a classification analysis of the total system population. Also, it should be correlated to the results that would be obtained by diverting socio-medical and psychiatric cases from the corrections system to more appropriate resources. Adequacy of existing facilities will not be obtained by a reduction in population alone. Were this possible, the charts presented in this section of the report indicate the need for a very significant reduction in population, the development of additional bedspace, or a combination of these. Compliance with the preliminary Opinion and Order of the United States District Court, dated September 5, 1980, at the levels of 35 square feet and 55 square feet of sleeping and living space per inmate points directly to such a need. While every facility has not been analyzed under this technical assistance, the major facilities and some camps have been. By extending the findings in most institutions to those remaining, it is possible to approximate the implications of compliance with the court order. This is done by comparing the existing total incarcerated population to that which is possible under the stipulated floor area allowances. Setting aside the issue of type of population, whether minimum, medium, or maximum security, it is found that the total existing institutional capacity is approximately 3187 inmates at 35 square feet, and 2332 inmates at 55 square feet. Compared to an existing population of approximately 3948 inmates, current utilization of facilities is excessive in the amount of 761 and 1616 inmates respectively. It should be noted that we are cognizant of the U.S. District Court’s mandate requiring, at a time in the future, 70 square feet per individually-celled inmate. Currently, the corrections system does not have cells that meet this requirement, although almost all are within ten to fifteen square feet of the required size. Professional standards suggest 60 square feet as adequate where time-in-cell is limited. In order to accommodate such standards, considerable day space would have to be created and increased emphasis placed on productive activity and programming. Without such arrangement, it would be necessary to construct new cells. In this regard, compliance with the court order requires a similar analysis of options. However, for purposes of the assessment of capacity as described in the remainder of this section, we have assumed continued use of those cells currently available. The Administration should keep this caveat in mind when preparing its report to the District Court. Considering the matter of type of beds-pace and the recognition of established standards in the field, it is found that the system has a total of 1069 minimum security beds and 721 medium and maximum security beds. Under this analysis, which is qualified to include certain improvements in existing facilities, the system has a total bedspace capacity of 1790. Particular reference is made to the Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails adopted by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Manual of Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions issued by the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections of the American Correctional Association. While compliance with these standards has not been mandated under the preliminary Opinion and Order, it has been considered as potentially useful to assess the capacity of the institutions in the system under these standards as a reference point when considering interim or short-term actions. Beyond this approximated assessment of capacity, it is recommended that a more detailed follow-up analysis be undertaken. The study should be a part of a planning focus for the total system in which facility requirements are determined by decision-making in the larger context. The amount of bedspace and kind of bedspace are inextricably tied to a range of system options that may be considered and acted upon. Each of these needs to be analyzed both for the immediate impact and that which may be projected. Such option — affecting routing of clients in or out of the system, classification and programming for individuals incarcerated, and lengths of client stay — should be compared against a profiling of the inmate population to determine the extent of their potential impact, and referenced to the values of the public in Puerto Rico to discern the extent of their acceptability- The overcrowding which pervades the system cannot be corrected by a uniform assignment of square feet per inmate. Nor can we rely on the standards proferred by expert opinions and professional associations. The life in these institutions is in such a state of disarray and the incapacity of the Administration to manage the system is so evident, that we can only take square footage and recommended standards as our point of departure. As improvement is shown in other areas of penal life we will have to reconsider and modify our decision of today. Let us now examine those other areas. Security An inmate’s protection against inmate violence may often depend on how fast he can run to a locked gate to call a guard. Violence takes the form of sexual assaults, mayhem or homicide, all of which occur with intolerable frequency throughout the system. Firearms and explosives have been used during riots which have produced several fatalities. Suicides are frequent. Assaults by guards on inmates are frequently reported. Guards frequently look the other way or incite other guards or inmates when violence occurs. There is a widespread insecurity and universal fear throughout the system. Gangs form and reform themselves around shifting loyalties. The Administration has admitted what was patently evident during our visit that institutions have in recent years been dedicated to one of two island-wide gangs who are the effective government of prison life, and no person who belongs to whichever is the other group is safe within an institution held by either gang. At Bayamón the guards were observed to be outside the individual buildings which house the communal dorms: the fact of gang control is accepted everywhere and by all. The ratio of guards to inmates is, on paper, well within the 1:5 proportion prevalent throughout the nation. Absenteeism and sick leave modify substantially that sufficiency of guards, pay and morale are low, training is deficient. And the effective use of guards is further diminished by the need to assign them to non-custodial tasks. Almost every superintendent who testified or was heard during the inspection of the closed institutions asserted that he needed more guards to assure inmates of their personal security: requests that were routinely ignored by the central office. A staffing pattern recommended by the National Institute of Corrections, at the Administration’s request, could not be met. Guards are routinely not deployed within overcrowded dormitories: as we have noted they are at times not even deployed within buildings at the posts expressly designed for this function. Locks are of unacceptable standard throughout the institutions and security equipment is equally deficient: padlocks, with individual keys, and chains have been substituted for standard locking systems. This condition presents life safety problems as does the absence of devices to detect and suppress fires. What has been said here is only a brief and concentrated extract of the evidence spread on the record and we will not make the crisis worse by detailing here the risks inherent to the system, but the record will uphold the Court’s conclusion that the Administration does not afford inmates or staff protection against violence and that the plaintiff class lives in fear. The moral degradation of a law enforcement agency which yields its authority over persons in its custody to gangs of convicts can only work to the deterioration of inmates and force them to accept extra-legal structures of life and government. Protective Custody Considering the Administration’s failure to protect plaintiffs from violence, it is not surprising that large numbers of inmates request to be placed in protective custody. To do so they must execute a waiver since protective custody is frequently only available in isolation cells — before the preliminary injunction in the infamous “calabozos”. Once isolated in a hospital ward, maximum security cell or other isolated space the inmate is given no further particularized attention. Pre-trial detainees must often place themselves in protective custody because unfamiliarity with prison life makes them vulnerable, because the prison in the locality of arrest is in control of an enemy gang, or because the young must be protected against sexual assault. Although it is not the Administration’s policy to change the classification of an inmate placed in protective custody, it does occur. The practical effect of living in protective custody, however, is that the inmate forfeits his participation in work, study and recreational programs and the time-credits which go with work and study. (See Tr. 1466-68). One Administrator, Irba Cruz de Batista, was under the unaccountable impression that special tutoring was provided for persons in protective custody. The Court must reiterate that the low credibility which it assigns to Administration witnesses is at least in some part due to the bizarre beliefs and impressions to which they testified. Considered with the deplorable conditions in the institutions and the fact that protective custody means mostly a 24-hour lock-up (with perhaps a walk down the hall for a shower once a day), the extended time for which an inmate must stay in protective custody (often months on end) and the absence of medical supervision of any kind, the Court finds that protective custody wantonly inflicts on inmates considerable pain and deprives them of opportunities to shorten their time of incarceration. The waivers, executed in fear of sexual assault, violence or death, are nullities. Disciplinary Proceedings Regulations on disciplinary proceedings were promulgated by the Commonwealth as a result of prior litigation in this Court: Milton Sandoval, et al v. Francisco de Jesús Schuck, et al, Civil No. 939-75. On paper, the regulations pass muster. But the operation of the disciplinary process causes delay and is frequently used arbitrarily and capriciously by custodial and administrative personnel. Once the inmate is charged with a violation of prison regulations he is placed in the same living conditions as those discussed above for inmates in protective custody — with the same results. An inmate who wins his case after waiting for a hearing and a decision after a hearing will have been punished without any cause. Classification There is neither a rational nor adequate classification system in the Administration of Correction. Pretrial detainees are regularly housed with convicted prisoners. First offenders are not separated from recidivists. Dangerous and aggressive inmates are housed with passive individuals. Misdemeanants are not separated from felons. There are three custodial classifications for convicted prisoners: maximum, medium and minimum. Classification of a prisoner after conviction is made by a Classification and Treatment Committee in the closed institution to which he is assigned. Before being seen by the Classification and Treatment Committee, the convicted prisoner must be interviewed and recommended by the socio-penal worker. The Classification and Treatment Committee is, within each institution, the operational administrative unit in charge of classification. Classification and Treatment Committees are composed of the superintendent of the institution, a custodial officer and the socio-penal worker. Automatically, upon entry, the convict is classified in the medium custody unless same reason appears for a maximum classification. There is no entry point or entry points where inmates are sent after conviction for a full physical and psychological evaluation, coupled with a detailed analysis of their criminal record and past custodial behavior. The Classification and Treatment Committee does not have the authority to transfer the convict to any other institution. Pretrial detainees are not classified: indeed, they rarely, if ever, receive any social services and are mostly left to their individual or family resources to establish communications with the outside world to secure the assistance of counsel, arrange bail and prepare for trial. Inmates may remain unclassified for long periods of time. At all times prior to the consolidated hearing in this case the number of socio-penal workers in the several institutions had never reached more than 75% of the positions allocated, and for some periods of time there were only about 60% of the positions filled. Months could go by, as happened for example at Arecibo, with no socio-penal worker at all. Nearly every socio-penal worker has a case load that is unmanageable. This underutilization of allocated resources continued through the hearings on various contempt motions and was apparent during the inspection by the Court. It must be remembered that referrals to the CTC are one of the many duties of these underpaid and sometimes unqualified employees. All the evidence shows that the Classification and Treatment Committees invariably decide by unanimous vote and there are hardly ever any discussions or dissents spread upon the minutes. Upon classification, the inmate is given an institutional plan. The institutional plan generally has nothing to do with the inmate’s custodial classification, his propensities and talents, or his former work experience, if any. Institutional plans are determined by the size of the population in the particular institution, the services available there, the jobs open and the number of penal guards available. Once classified as a medium custody prisoner, there are no regular periods for reevaluation of that classification. Except for a proposition in the Manual of Classification that convicts should be observed for eight months before classification from medium to minimum custody, re-classification is not geared to the length of sentence, the type of crime committed, or other rational criteria. When re-classification is made, the result is noted but reasons are seldom, if ever, placed on the record. As a result of the chaotic classification procedure, inmates who would benefit from anti-addiction treatment may be confined in institutions where such services are unavailable. Inmates who could be learning academic courses are confined in institutions where they are not offered. Nothing is done to assure the continuity of treatment or education when a transfer from one institution to another takes place. The record is replete with instances of the institutional mixing of young adult offenders with mature persons; of first offenders with recidivists; of minimum custody prisoners with medium and maximum custody prisoners; of misdemeanants with felons; of addicts with non-addicts; of passive and aggressive individuals; of relatively normal persons with persons suffering from mental illnesses; of the sick and contagiously ill with the healthy. This failure of classification operates to prevent rehabilitation. It also militates against the personal security of the inmates and of the institutions themselves. The classification procedures or their malfunction adversely affect the convicts’ liberty rights. Extra time credit for work or study do not depend upon an inmate’s custodial classification as much as upon the fortuitous placement in one or another of the ten closed institutions. This may result in the anomalous situation where maximum custody prisoners are able to lower their sentences by working while minimum custody prisoners cannot. In essence, classification depends in great measure upon such determinants as proximity to the sentencing court and availability of beds, which are not the considerations on which the classification manual is elaborated. The implementation of the institutional life-plan will further depend on the availability of guards and the institution’s safety levels since an inmate will often have to lock himself up in protective custody beyond the reach of work, study or therapy. The Court concludes that proper classification is essential to the operation of orderly and safe institutions. Without proper classification of inmates, equal opportunity to prison work, to credits for lowering time served, for therapy for addiction, and for educational opportunities, do not exist. The haphazard operations of classification and institutional life-plan of inmates further contributes to the confusion and frustration of their lives and to the deterioration of said lives and opportunities for rehabilitation. Arbitrariness becomes the norm in granting or withholding services and programs which are the required means to earn time-credits or obtain parole. We do not here consider the effect of this chaos on any individual inmate. The Court does find, however, that systematic administrative malpractice and negligence engendered by a routine failure to comply with Commonwealth law and regulations produce the random denial of statutory rights and the reasonable and well-founded expectations of members of the plaintiff class without the due process of law secured to them by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Rehabilitation and Parole A. Rehabilitation: All the sociopenal workers, their supervisors and the superintendents asserted that rehabilitation of the convicted inmates is the most important goal of their work: rehabilitation is achieved through participation in institutional programs, successful adjustment to prison life and finally reintegration to the free community as a law-abiding citizen. Institutional programs, however, do not exist or are inadequate: when in operation they can be arbitrarily suspended for lack of materials or space, or because teachers or guards are unavailable. Program schedules are conflictive and inmates may have to drop out of one to participate in another. Educational courses are above or below the educational levels of the inmates. Work sources are few and the available work is not meaningful. Recreational facilities are either entirely lacking, underutilized or not used at all because of the unavailability of equipment, guards or other personnel. Inmates are not assessed or diagnosed for work or vocational training but made to fit the available slots: another inmate or a guard is frequently a better source of employment opportunities than the CTC, which is officially responsible for job assignments. The agricultural camps are not an exception to the general inexistence or disarticulation of institutional programs and deterioration of facilities for recreation and education. This situation places the mass of the population in custody in degrading idleness, shut up in overcrowded dormitories and cells during most of the day, day in, day out, for years on end. It deprives most inmates of their statutory right to reduce their terms of incarceration by obtaining good-time credits through work or education through the arbitrary capricious operation of individual whims or through the grossly negligent failure of the Administration’s officers and employees who fail to comply with their duties under Commonwealth law to provide recreational and educational programs. The Administration’s failure to maintain order and secure the personal safety of all persons in its custody is one of the most important factors in the deterioration of facilities, unstructured programs, the break-down of schedules. The resources are available but they are wasted by daily acts of negligence, the abdication of responsibility and the failure to supervise on the part of individual Administration officers and employees at all levels. Thus, we find unused playing fields, classrooms turned into dormitories, teaching funds withheld because of poor enrollment, classes suspended because of unavailable guards, failure to coordinate arrangements with other government agencies or the improper exercise of power by custodial personnel under the carefully averted eyes of their supervisors. B. Parole: The sociopenal workers are supposed to help the inmates in preparing their institutional life plans and their reintegration plans with a view to accumulate evidence that will show the Parole Board that their time in prison has been well spent and that they will be able to reintegrate into the free community as law-abiding and working citizens. That the inmates cannot acquire the necessary evidence of educational or work experience in prison we have already seen. But sociopenal workers are further impeded in their duty by work overloads and inadequate resources. Caseloads are normally beyond the limit of all witnesses’ estimate of reasonable and manageable number of cases per worker. But even a reduction would not provide the resources needed to prepare a reintegration plan which requires a verifiable offer of employment and approved place for residence. The sociopenal worker has no time or resources to check out the information obtained by the inmate through his family and friends and parole is frequently denied through mistakes that could have been corrected by the sociopenal worker if only the reintegration plan had been properly verified and evaluated. But of greater adverse significance to the inmate’s prospects for parole is the fact that the sociopenal workers do not have adequate information about the standards used by the Parole Board to grant or deny parole. They must rely on their own experience in prior cases which they have handled to guess at what information the Board wants, the weight given to the factors purportedly applied or the corrections needed to prepare a successful application. Even the testimony at trial of the Parole Board members conflicted on the applicable standards and the weight given to the factors considered in making a decision. The Parole Board is independent from the Administration in discharging its obligation to grant or deny parole but is administratively integrated and the two agencies are interdependent in functional ways. In spite of prior litigation in this Court, there are frequent backlogs and delays because the Administration does not adequately perform its work of preparing cases for the Board which lacks personnel needed to work efficiently. Because it must rely on the Administration, the Board’s fact finding is frequently wrong. This administrative chaos militates actively against the plaintiffs’ right to present their cases for parole to the Board and to have an adjudication of their claim according to Commonwealth statutes and regulations. And it contributes significantly to exacerbate the frustration of convicted inmates, to increase the level of tension in the penal population and to inculcate in each person’s mind an image of irrationality in the processes of the law. The discrepancies between the realities of prison life and the requirements for parole, promoted as they are by the callous indiference or malfeasance of Administration officers and employees, deprive the plaintiff class of even their ability to exercise rights which implicate liberty interests without the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. Drug Addiction More than half of the total population in the Administration’s custody have had some involvement with drugs. Treatment against drug addiction is unevenly provided throughout the penal system by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s Anti-Addiction Services Department (hereinafter DSCA). Additional services are provided by Hogares CREA, Inc., a private non-profit organization which receives substantial funding from the Commonwealth. The pre-trial detainees are normally not provided these services. Inmates are referred to treatment modules by the sociopenal workers who identify and determine the need for treatment from an inmate’s own statements, evidence of prior contacts with drugs, or, in some cases, because treatment against drug addiction is specific in the sentence imposed by the Commonwealth courts. After approval by the Classification and Treatment Committee an inmate is once again evaluated by DSCA personnel. Neither the sociopenal workers nor the DSCA therapists know each other’s criteria for identifying and defining drug-addiction or treatment needs. The criteria used by sociopenal workers and therapists at the several institutions are also unclear: misidentifications have occurred. Evaluation does not include physical or psychological testing. Therapists send descriptive reports of an inmate’s therapy history to the sociopenal worker in charge of his case. This information may be included in the report forwarded to the Parole Board and used to grant or deny parole, yet DSCA employees do not know the standards applied by the Parole Board, they do not coordinate their work with Board personnel and they ignore the weight given by the Board to the information which they originate. No studies have been made to determine the treatment needs of the inmate population and no studies have been made to determine the efficacity of the treatment delivered to inmates. When an inmate is transferred from one to another institution the DSCA therapists prepare reports for referral to the therapists at the receiving institutions — if there is a treatment module there. Since transfers are recommended and approved by Administration personnel, an inmate is not necessarily moved to an institution where DSCA treatment facilities are available, and inmates have been in fact transferred to institutions which do not provide therapy services and their treatment has been disrupted. DSCA also operates residential programs outside the prisons. Transfers to these residential programs are recommended by the CTC and are approved by an Interagency Committee which is composed of Administration and DSCA personnel under the authority of the Director of the Administration’s Penal Institutions Program. The Director, however, does not supervise the Committee and merely signs the transfers. Although the criteria for admission to the residential programs are initially to be found in statutory law, there is no uniform understanding of what is required to make a successful application for a transfer. Generally, an inmate must be classified in minimum custody and show an interest in rehabilitation evidenced by positive acts in the institution beyond mere compliance with institutional norms. At least one therapist also listed the completion of custodial treatment and community passes (furloughs) as requirements before a recommendation for a transfer to a residential program is made. The DSCA therapists agree that residential treatment is the only stage at which the adequacy and success of treatment can be accurately established since it is then that the addict is once again in contact with the free community and his conduct can be observed. Treatment for drug addiction is considered by the Parole Board in reaching a decision to grant, deny or postpone parole. Sometimes it denies parole or postpones a decision because treatment records are unavailable. Board decisions which consider drug addiction and treatment as decisional factors are not uniform. Parole has been granted to addicted inmates who have not received or completed treatment. At other times it has required the initiation or continuation of treatment or a transfer when such measures have not been necessary. Parole Board decisions do not always reflect the reality of the treatment received by an inmate or his addictive status. Frequently, the trained personnel responsible for the conduct of therapy have had to take measures with which they do not professionally agree to comply with Board orders. Treatment status is also important for admission to a half-way house which is a frequent prerequisite to release on parole. Expert Testimony Both plaintiffs and defendants relied on expert witnesses to sustain their claims and defenses. Their guidance in making these findings has been of great help to the Court. It is perhaps one of the most outstanding features of this case that no matter which party retained and called the experts they all substantially agreed in their damning evaluation of conditions in the Administration’s institutions. This unusual agreement among experts went so far that the defendants unsuccessfully tried to withhold from the Court the testimony of their correctional expert. The testimony given by the experts was based on their own observations at the institutions which they visited (on occasion more than once) over a span of several months. The facts ascertained by them were abundantly corroborated by other testimonial and documentary evidence. Dr. Frank Rundle testified as a witness for the plaintiffs as an expert witness primarily on mental illness and psychiatric problems within prisons. His testimony was also pertinent to the issue of general medical care and must be read in conjunction with the evidence given by two other witnesses for plaintiffs, Dr. Lambert King, M.D., and Dr. Antonio T. Diaz Royo, Ph.D. Dr. Rundle also testified as to the effect of prison conditions on incarcerated inmates. Defendants stipulated Dr. Rundle’s qualifications as an expert and with good reason; he had extensive experience in both California and New York in the mental health problems of prison life and his academic and professional qualifications were found by the Court to be impeccable. His testimony has been given the greatest weight and credibility by the Court. His testimony best integrates the effect of the totality of conditions throughout the prisons and the deleterious effect of those conditions on the inmates. We find these conclusions, and the conclusions of all the other expert witnesses, as set out here, to be a true and accurate statement of what transpires through the penal system in Puerto Rico. Not surprisingly, Dr. Rundle underlined the need for order and continuity in the delivery of medical and rehabilitati