Full opinion text
Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ............................................................................page 319 I. THE NEW LAW SET FORTH BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN PALMER V. SHULTZ MAY NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IN THIS CASE ........................................................................................... 319 II. THE OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES AT ISSUE IN THIS SUIT .... 320 A. The job categories in which the Court found discrimination have been reclassified ...................................................................... 320 B. Foreign Service Officer applicants are included in the plaintiff class unless they actually sought relief under the consent decree in Palmer v. Shultz .................................................................... 321 C. Women who submitted multiple applications and were later hired for one position are eligible for inclusion in the plaintiff class ... 324 D. The plaintiff class includes women who were denied a position that was allegedly filled by another woman ..................................... 324 E. The plaintiff class includes non-resident aliens who applied for USIA jobs to be performed in the United States ................................ 324 III. TO BE A MEMBER OF THE PLAINTIFF CLASS, A WOMAN MUST HAVE APPLIED FOR ONE OF THE POSITIONS AT ISSUE IN THIS SUIT BETWEEN OCTOBER 8, 1974 AND NOVEMBER 16, 1984 .... 325 A. The plaintiff class opens on October 8, 1974 ............................. 325 B. The plaintiff class closes on November 16, 1984 ....................... 328 IV. EXCEPT FOR FOREIGN SERVICE APPLICANTS, CLASS MEMBERS WHO WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN CLASS RELIEF ARE ENTITLED TO INDIVIDUALIZED DETERMINATIONS OF THEIR CLAIMS ... 328 A. The large majority of class members has not been identified ..... 328 B. Notice will be mailed to identified class members and, because of the large number of unidentified class members, notice by posting, publication, and memoranda will also be ordered. In addition, plaintiffs will be permitted to conduct limited discovery in order to identify additional class members who may have been encouraged to apply for the jobs at issue by word-of-mouth recruitment .......... 329 C. The content of the notice must explain the basic facts about this suit, including the definition of the plaintiff class, the Court’s finding of liability, the Court’s remedial order, and what potential class members must show in order to be eligible for a determination of defendant’s liability to each of them .................................... 331 D. The proof-of-claim forms must ask plaintiffs to show that they applied for a job within one of the relevant job categories during the relevant time period and that they were rejected ...................... 332 E. The claims of class members who were not Foreign Service applicants will be determined through individual Teamster hearings unless the parties can agree on an alternative procedure __________333 F. The Court will determine whether Teamster hearings should be conducted by a United States Magistrate or by one or more Special Masters once class members have submitted proof-of-claim forms 334 G. Burden of proof at the Teamster hearings ............................... 335 V. REMEDIES FOR SUCCESSFUL INDIVIDUAL CLAIMANTS WHO WERE NOT FOREIGN SERVICE APPLICANTS ............................335 A. Plaintiffs are entitled to back pay ............................................336 B. Plaintiffs who request employment with the Agency but cannot be hired immediately are eligible for front pay as well .................. 337 C. Class members were obligated to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages, and the monetary awards must be reduced by the mitigating earnings ................................................................. 337 D. Plaintiffs who request positions with the Agency are eligible for hiring priorities and retroactive promotions ............................... 338 VI. RELIEF FOR FOREIGN SERVICE APPLICANTS TO THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY .................'............................. 338 A. The Court will model the relief for Foreign Service applicants to the United States Information Agency on the consent decree in Palmer v. Shultz ................................................................................ 338 VII. THE COURT WILL NOT ORDER PROSPECTIVE RELIEF ............340 VIII. THE COURT WILL RESERVE JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES ................................................. 341 IX. CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 341 INTRODUCTION CHARLES R. RICHEY, District Judge. By Order of April 19, 1978, the Court conditionally certified this case as a class action. That class consisted of “all women who have applied for employment with or are currently employed by the United States Information Agency and who have been or continue to be adversely affected by the discriminatory employment practices of the defendant.” On November 16, 1984, this Court found that defendant had “discriminated against women as a class with regard to hiring” in six occupational categories at the defendant agency. Hartman v. Wick, 600 F.Supp. 361, 375 (D.D.C. 1984). That Opinion details the background of this long-lived litigation, as does De Medina v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997, 1000-01 (D.C.Cir.1982), an appeal of an earlier decision in this case. The Court’s 1984 Opinion and Order dealt solely with the question of liability. From January 12, 1987, through January 14,1987, the Court held a trial to determine appropriate remedies. At trial, and in their post-trial submissions, the parties clarified the areas of agreement and disagreement about the proper scope and contour of remedies in this case. The Court has carefully considered the testimony, the exhibits, the pre-trial and post-trial briefs of both parties, and the underlying law. On the basis of the record and the law, the Court has made the following determinations. I. THE NEW LAW SET FORTH BY THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA IN PALMER V. SHULTZ MAY NOT BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IN THIS CASE. The Court must first note that the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has recently wrought a significant change in the law governing the use of statistics in a discrimination case. In Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84 (D.C.Cir.1987), the D.C. Circuit distinguished between “one-tailed” and “two-tailed” statistical analyses. Ending its earlier silence on this issue, the Circuit stated that “although we by no means intend entirely to foreclose the use of one-tailed tests, we think that generally two-tailed tests are more appropriate in Title VII cases.” Id. at 95. If the Palmer decision were applied retroactively to the case at bar, the Court’s 1984 finding of liability might be questioned, as it was based on a “one-tailed” statistical test that might no longer be deemed appropriate in this type of suit. See Hartman v. Wick, 600 F.Supp. 361, 369, 375 (D.D.C.1984). Consequently, the Court must consider whether Palmer’s strong suggestion that courts should employ a “two-tailed” analysis should be applied retroactively in this case. In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the seminal case on retroactive application of new case law, the Supreme Court noted that, although retroactive application is the usual rule, three factors may counsel against retroactivity: First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied ... or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was clearly foreshadowed____ Second, [a court] ... must ‘weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ ... Finally [a court must weigh] the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “(w)here a decision ... could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” Id. at 106-07, 92 S.Ct. at 355 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) and Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 1900, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969)). These factors suggest that retroactive application of Palmer would be inappropriate in this case. First, prior case law did not “foreshadow” Palmer’s near-requirement of a two-tailed test; in fact, the Palmer court confessed “some trepidation” in approaching this uncharted issue. Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d at 92. Second, failure to use a “two-tailed” test in this case will have no effect whatever on use of the test in subsequent cases. Moreover, equity clearly counsels against retroactive application of Palmer’s preference for two-tailed tests. When remanding this very case, the Court of Appeals expressed approval for the statistical method that would later underlie the liability finding. Hartman v. Reinhardt, 686 F.2d 997, 1009-1010 (D.C.Cir.1982). In light of that decision, and the resources devoted to this suit as a consequence thereof, the Court finds that equity prevents retroactive application of Palmer v. Shultz in this suit. II. THE OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES AT ISSUE IN THIS SUIT. A. The job categories in which the Court found discrimination have been reclassified. In its 1984 decision on liability, the Court found that the United States Information Agency (“USIA” or “the agency”) had discriminated against women applicants for jobs in six major occupational categories: Electronic Technician (Series 856), Foreign Language Broadcaster (Series 1048), Production Specialist (Series 1071), Writer/Editor (Series 1082), Foreign Information Specialist (Series 1085), and Radio Broadcast Technician (Series 3940). Hartman v. Wick, 600 F.Supp. at 370. Three categories have been reclassified and now have titles and job series numbers different from those described in the 1984 suit. See Defendant’s Exhibit No. (“Def.Ex.”) 3. As plaintiffs applied for and were unlawfully denied jobs with the abandoned title and series number, they may well not realize the newly categorized job series include the posts they originally sought. Consequently, the Court will order that the notice to potential class members refer to the jobs at issue by both former and current names and numerical categories. B. Foreign Service Officer applicants are included in the plaintiff class unless they actually sought relief under the consent decree in Palmer v. Shultz. In its 1984 Opinion and Order, the Court found that female Foreign Service officer applicants were among the women against whom defendant had discriminated in hiring. 600 F.Supp. at 370. Prior to the January, 1987, trial on remedies, defendant moved for partial summary judgment on claims raised by unsuccessful female applicants for the Foreign Service who sought appointment at USIA after December, 1980. At the January 8, 1987, pre-trial, the Court denied that motion, without prejudice to renewal after trial. Defendant has now renewed that motion, which the Court will now deny with prejudice in all but one respect and will grant with respect to one group of foreign service candidates. Defendant raises several arguments to support his summary judgment motion. First, he maintains that unsuccessful Foreign Service applicants cannot be considered “applicants” for the positions at issue in this suit and therefore cannot be part of the plaintiff-applicant class. Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief at 3-4. The trial record does not support this assertion. During the first trial in this case, defendant produced evidence showing that (former) Job Series 1085 largely consisted of Foreign Service officers. Transcript, June 1, 1979, at 8-10; 103-03; 117-20; 144-50 (Testimony of Dr. Seymour Wolfbein). Plaintiffs’ expert reached the same conclusion. Id. at 64-165, in passim (Testimony of Dr. Marc Rosenblum). As Job Series 1085, also called the Foreign Information Specialist Series, was one of the series in which defendant is liable for sex discrimination in hiring, Hartman v. Wick, 600 F.Supp. at 372, defendant would have to prove that Foreign Service applicants can no longer be considered “applicants” to that job series or any successor designation. First, Defendant has not produced any evidence suggesting that Job Series 1085 changed during the relevant time period so as to exclude Foreign Service officer applicants. To the contrary, defendant’s own expert stated during the 1987 trial that Series 1085, and its successor Series 130, include Foreign Service officers. Transcript, at 337-38 (Testimony of Bliss Cornell Cartwright, Senior Analyst, Long-branch Research Associates) (“Cartwright Testimony”). As such, this argument does not support exclusion of Foreign Service applicants to USIA from the plaintiff class. Nor does defendant gain support from his argument that Foreign Service applicants should be excluded from the class because they do not specify that they wish to be placed in the USIA job series. The testimony establishes that Foreign Service applicants are placed wherever the Board of Examiners believes them best suited. Transcript, at 96-110 (Testimony of Frontiss Burbank Wiggins, Jr., Director of Policy and Coordination for Director General, Department of State) (“Wiggins testimony”). Among such Foreign Service slots are those in the successor job series to Job Series 1085. Id. Thus, if Foreign Service candidates “apply” anywhere, they apply, inter alia, to a Job Series at issue in this suit. Next, defendant argues that the Department of State is unilaterally responsible for testing potential Foreign Service officers and therefore the defendant United States Information Agency cannot afford relief to aggrieved Foreign Service applicants. This is the same argument that defendant raised in his unsuccessful Motion to Dismiss and his Motion to Reconsider the Court’s denial of that motion. The Court continues to believe that its earlier decisions are correct and stands by the reasoning set forth in its December 24, 1986, Order. Moreover, the testimony at trial undercuts any argument that defendant cannot afford relief to potential Foreign Service Officers. There is no question that the Board of Examiners, which conducts and evaluates foreign service examinations, is not controlled by the State Department but is an inter-agency board on which USIA officials serve as equal partners. Transcript, at 95-96 (Wiggins testimony). Although the agencies participating in the Junior Foreign Service Officer program have jointly tested candidates since December, 1980, one section of the written exam is substantially designed by the USIA and used solely to evaluate candidates’ potential for USIA employment. Id. at 96-99. Candidates must pass this section of the test to be considered for a foreign service post within USIA. Id. Even though the Board of Examiners may in theory determine the passing score, the Board customarily allows USIA to set the passing score on this portion of the exam in order to assure the necessary number of candidates for USIA employment. Id. at 99-100. The evidence at trial revealed that, at least in some Foreign Service programs, the USIA also exerts control over other stages of the Foreign Service applicant process. Candidates for “Mid-Level” programs do not sit for the written Foreign Service examination but proceed directly to the Oral Assessment of potential Foreign Service officers. Id. Plaintiffs showed that USIA controlled the selection of these Mid-Level officials and in fact misused the selection process for political purposes. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit Number (“Pl.Ex.”) 231 (“RLC: Subj: BEX/Affirmative Action Program”); Transcript at 122-24 (Wiggins testimony). Indeed, plaintiff even adduced unrebutted evidence showing that USIA vetoed at least one Mid-Level applicant because there were “enough women in the Foreign Service at mid-level.” Pl.Ex. 230 (Memo from Cowan to Albright Re Candidacy of Dr. Shirley Hill-Witt). In sum, Junior Foreign Service applicants to the United States Information Agency take an examination that is developed in pertinent part by that agency and scored in pertinent part by that agency. The State Department does not control the portion of the Foreign Service selection process that is specifically dedicated to evaluating Foreign Service applicants to the United States Information Agency. And the United States Information Agency can exert substantial control over the so-called “objective” Oral Assessment process and review. Thus, there is no merit to defendant’s claim that the Foreign Service examination process is outside the control of the defendant in this case. Finally, defendant argues that the claims of these applicants have been resolved through the consent decree entered in Palmer v. Shultz, Civil Action No. 76-1439, and thus are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. While this argument is largely unconvincing, the Court will grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to one particular group of foreign service applicants. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses that are waived unless specifically and timely raised. See, e.g., C.A. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 4405. Defendant neither raised these defenses in his answer nor sought leave to amend his answer to include them. As such, defendant may not raise either bar if he is guilty of “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive” and plaintiff would experience “undue prejudice” if the defense were permitted. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). Plaintiffs’ burden is inversely proportional to the length of delay: the longer defendant has waited, without explanation, to raise the defense of preclusion, the lesser amount of prejudice must plaintiffs show. See, e.g., Evans v. Syracuse City School District, 704 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir.1983). Defendant’s unexplained delay in raising his claims of preclusion was extreme. Defendant states that the Palmer v. Shultz consent decree that allegedly resolved the claims of unsuccessful foreign service applicants to the USIA was entered on October 12, 1983. Yet defendant never broached the issue of preclusion prior to this Court’s November, 1984, finding of liability in the instant case. Nor was the Palmer decree mentioned prior to the originally scheduled September, 1986, trial date, or even prior to December 21, 1986, when the rescheduled trial was to have occurred. In fact, it was not until December 23, 1986, more than three years after the decree was entered, after trial of the remedial phase of this action was to have begun, and on the eve of the rescheduled January, 1987, trial, that defendant brought the possibility of preclusion to the Court’s attention. Defendant has offered no explanation for his three-year delay in raising the res judicata and collateral estoppel defenses. To allow defendant to inject the possibility of issue or claim preclusion after this long and unexplained delay would inevitably prejudice plaintiffs’ case. For nearly three years, plaintiffs have framed their case and formulated their legal strategy on the assumption that the Palmer consent decree was not relevant to this case. This prejudice alone is ample ground on which to deny defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. See Evans v. Syracuse City, School District, 704 F.2d at 46-47 (significant delay in raising affirmative defenses “invariably” causes prejudice). Although the Court is convinced that plaintiffs would be prejudiced if defendant were permitted to raise the collateral estoppel and res judicata defenses, plaintiffs themselves do not elaborate upon the prejudice they have suffered. Accordingly, the Court will not deny defendant’s motion on grounds of waiver alone. There is, however, another reason that the Court must deny defendant’s motion. In order to maintain a res judicata or collateral estoppel defense, defendant must first offer sufficient evidence that foreign service applicants to USIA were parties or in privity to the parties to Palmer v. Shultz and were eligible for relief under the consent decree. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). Defendant has not done so. First, defendant does not offer argument, citation to case law, or citation to the record to support his claims of preclusion. Rather, he merely notes that the consent decree in Palmer v. Shultz was binding on all applicant class members except those who “opted out” of the Palmer plaintiff class and implies that the Palmer class consisted of all women who applied for Junior Foreign Service Officer positions from February 4, 1976, through October 12, 1983. These allegations are not supported by the trial record. The record demonstrates that the relief afforded by the consent decree was available only to Foreign Service applicants who sought appointment to the State Department. Transcript at 79-80 (Wiggins testimony) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Palmer class notice asked class members to state that they sought employment in one of four “functional fields,” all of which related to jobs only in the State Depart ment. Id. at 85 (Wiggins testimony). The class notice itself stated that the Palmer class consisted only of women who applied for Junior Foreign Service positions within the State Department. Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Attachment B. Equally telling, any respondent to the class notice who expressed interest in a job at the USIA was told categorically that she could not be hired under the Palmer decree and would have to compete for a USIA spot under a different program. Transcript at 87 (Wiggins testimony). Thus, Foreign Service applicants who sought a post at the United States Information Agency — in other words, the Foreign Service applicants who are unquestionably members of the plaintiff class in this lawsuit — were not eligible for relief under the Palmer decree. The Court can only conclude from the unrebutted trial record that Foreign Service applicants to the United States Information Agency were neither parties nor privies to the consent decree in Palmer v. Shultz and the defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel therefore may not be invoked. Although the Court has found that the Palmer plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in this case are conceptually separate and identifiable classes, the Court realizes that some Foreign Service applicants who preferred appointment to USIA may nevertheless have sought appointment to the State Department under the procedures set forth in the Palmer decree. As post-December, 1980 applicants could not indicate a preference for USIA appointment when they applied to the Foreign Service, Transcript at 88-89 (Wiggins Testimony), the Court must assume that women who sought relief under the Palmer decree were primarily interested in State Department positions and therefore ineligible for any remedy in this case. Indeed, equity commands this finding, else some women might seek recovery under both Palmer and this case for what amounts, at base, only to one “act” of discrimination. This result is bolstered by the Palmer consent decree, which specifically states that it represents the full settlement of all claims of discrimination against members of the Palmer plaintiff class. Pl.Ex. 204; see also, e.g., Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 740 F.2d 1011, 1021 (D.C.Cir.1984). Therefore, the Court will grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment only with respect to those female Foreign Service applicants who sought relief under the Palmer consent decree and must therefore be deemed members of the Palmer plaintiff class. C.Women who submitted multiple applications and were later hired for one position are eligible for inclusion in the plaintiff class. Defendant argues that potential class members who applied for several jobs, were rejected for at least one, and were ultimately hired for one position must be excluded from the plaintiff class. See Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief at 3. Neither logic nor law supports this position. At base, defendant’s argument suggests that a woman who was unlawfully denied employment on the basis of sex discrimination can recover nothing if she is hired when she applies for the same or a similar job several years later. While a plaintiff cannot recover relief for any period after she obtains the position sought, her right to a remedy for the years in which she was denied employment cannot be erased by defendant’s belated decision to forswear sex discrimination in hiring. See Ford v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 458 U.S. 219, 227 n. 9 & 232-34, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 3063 n. 9, 3066, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982). The law demands that any member of the plaintiff class who was ultimately employed by defendant obtain a remedy based on the amount of time in which she experienced discrimination and its effects. The fact that she subsequently achieved her goal cannot erase this basic right. D. The plaintiff class includes women who were denied a position that was allegedly filled by another woman. Defendant argues that the Court must exclude from the plaintiff class any woman who applied for a position at issue in this suit that was filled by another woman. This is incorrect as a matter of law. As detailed below, once a particular plaintiff has carried her burden of proof and shown that she is entitled to relief, defendant may produce evidence showing that there was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for failing to hire the female applicant. See pp. 335-336, infra. Defendant may at that time prove that a different woman was hired for the same position, see, e.g., Harrison v. Lewis, 559 F.Supp. 943, 946 (D.D.C.1983), and plaintiff may attempt to show that this action was pretextual. Id. Thus, while a plaintiff may not be entitled to recover if she was denied a position in favor of another woman, she is nonetheless eligible for an individualized determination of her claims. Id. E. The plaintiff class includes non-resident aliens who applied for USIA jobs to be performed in the United States. Title VII explicitly excludes aliens employed “outside any State” from its protections. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l. Defendant urges the Court to interpret this language as excluding from Title VII’s protections non-resident aliens employed within the United States and therefore asks the Court to exclude potential class members who were neither citizens nor residents of the United States when they applied for one of the jobs at issue in this suit. This claim has been rejected by another Court, see Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F.Supp. 590, 592 (D.Md.1986), and this Court must reject it as well. Nothing in Title VII’s language, or its legislative history, supports exclusion of aliens employed in the United States from the Act’s scope. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; see also, e.g., H.R.Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in, 1964 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 2355, 2393. And, as courts must give the language of civil rights statutes “broad and inclusive effect,” and must extend their coverage to the outer limits permitted from a fair reading of the statute, Sutherland Stat. Const. § 74.05 (4th ed.), there is no basis upon which the Court can exclude non-resident aliens from the Act’s stateside scope. Thus, in light of the plain language of the statute, the silent legislative history, and accepted rules of statutory construction, the Court must find that Title VII applies to non-resident aliens who apply for employment within the United States. Any such potential members of the plaintiff class will be able to seek relief through the mechanism afforded by the Court in this Opinion and the accompanying Order. III. TO BE A MEMBER OF THE PLAINTIFF CLASS, A WOMAN MUST HAVE APPLIED FOR ONE OF THE POSITIONS AT ISSUE IN THIS SUIT BETWEEN OCTOBER 8, 1974 AND NOVEMBER 16, 1984. A. The plaintiff class opens on October 8, 1974. A federal class action is “a truly representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions.” American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550, 94 S.Ct. 756, 764, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974). Consequently, the filing of a class suit tolls the applicable statute of limitations so that potential class members need not file separate actions simply to avoid a statute of limitations bar. Id. at 550-51, 94 S.Ct. at 764-65. In the Title VII context, the law provides that the timely administrative charge of discrimination generally tolls the applicable limitations period for all those who could join in that complaint as a class. See, e.g., Movement for Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235, 1248 (7th Cir.1980); McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934, 99 S.Ct. 2869, 61 L.Ed.2d 303 (1979); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (Laffey I), 567 F.2d 429 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086, 98 S.Ct. 1281, 55 L.Ed.2d 792 (1978). More precisely, only those individu als who could have filed a discrimination claim at or after the time a named plaintiff first brought an administrative charge are eligible for class membership and do not themselves have to pursue administrative process. E.g., id.; see also, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n. 8, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2370 n. 8, 45 L.Ed. 2d 280 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1333-34 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1973) (per curiam). Because a federal employee must file a charge of discrimination within thirty days of the allegedly discriminatory act, see 29 C.F.R. § 1613.213(a)(1), a class of federal employee plaintiffs “opens” thirty days prior to the date on which a named plaintiff sought an administrative remedy for defendant’s sex discrimination in hiring. See, e.g., Laffey I, 567 F.2d at 472. The parties agree that the plaintiff class should open on the date a person who later brings suit files an administrative complaint of discrimination. The parties disagree, however, about the precise date to which the Court must look. Defendant urges the Court to look to the date on which a named plaintiff filed a formal administrative complaint; in contrast, plaintiffs would have the Court look to the date on which a named plaintiff first initiated the required administrative processing of her charge. Thus, plaintiffs claim, the Court must use the date on which a named plaintiff filed a formal grievance, a prerequisite to the filing of a formal administrative charge. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(i) (1987). Plaintiffs are correct. To determine when the statute of limitations is tolled, a Court must look to the date on which a class representative initiated mandatory administrative processing of a discrimination charge. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1613.213; see also, 5 C.F.R. § 713.214 (1974). Where, as here, counseling is a prerequisite to the filing of an administrative complaint of discrimination, id., the date on which counseling was requested is the date that the class opens. See, e.g., McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d at 361. There is, however, a more complicated area of disagreement with respect to the opening date of the class. Defendant would have the Court set the opening date with reference to the administrative complaint filed by named plaintiff Carolee Brady Hartman on March 3, 1977. See Def.Ex. 85, Part I. Plaintiffs would have the Court look instead to the administrative complaint filed by named plaintiff Toura Kem on November 7, 1974. Id. at 93, Part I. Defendant advances two arguments against the use of Ms. Kem’s complaint as the referent for the opening date of the class. First, defendant maintains that, unlike Ms. Hartman’s, Ms. Kem’s administrative complaint did not explicitly allege discrimination against a class of women and therefore did not provide adequate notice that defendant might face a class suit. See Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief, at 2. In addition, defendant contends that Ms. Kem is not a “named plaintiff” for the purpose of determining the opening date of the plaintiff class because she became a named plaintiff only when the Court ordered Ms. Kem’s separate lawsuit consolidated with this one. See Defendant’s Post-Trial Reply Brief, at 2-3 There is no merit to either of defendant’s arguments. The Court will address each in turn. First, an administrative complaint need not specify that it contains class allegations. Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1322-23 (D.C.Cir.1981). The law clearly holds that a federal employee puts the agency on notice that it may be subject to a class-wide claim of discrimination when he or she files an administrative charge of discrimination, even if the charge purports to be filed only on the signatory’s behalf. See, e.g., Paskuly v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 1210, 1211 (7th Cir.1981) (per curiam); McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 357, 361 n. 11 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934, 99 S.Ct. 2869, 61 L.Ed.2d 303 (1979); Allen v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 718, 554 F.2d 876 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 891, 98 S.Ct. 266, 54 L.Ed.2d 176 (1977). In fact, federal regulations in effect when Ms. Kem’s 1974 complaint was filed did not clearly allow an agency to consider a “class” claim. Barrett v. United States Civil Service Commission, 69 F.R.D. 544, 553 (D.D.C.1975). Indeed, when Ms. Hartman filed her “class” complaint, the agency Administrator responded that he was “not authorized to accept class action suits” and summarily dismissed the complaint. Def. Ex. 85, Part II, Tab A. Given both the relevant case law and the history of the treatment afforded to Ms. Hartman’s complaint, the Court cannot find that it is barred from considering Ms. Kem’s administrative charge because the charge did not clearly state that it was filed on behalf of a class. See, e.g., Bachman v. Collier, 73 F.R.D. 300, 303 (D.D.C. 1976) (“class” caption not required if it would have been a “futile act.”). Moreover, defendant is wrong to allege that Ms. Kem’s charge provided no notice of the possibility that defendant might face a class suit. By explicitly calling her charge a claim of discrimination “against females” at USIA, Def. Ex. 93, Part III, and not just on her own behalf, Ms. Kem surely informed defendant that a class suit might follow. Indeed, she may actually have come as close to filing a class administrative claim as was then possible. Thus, the contention that Ms. Kem’s claim cannot be the administrative predicate for this class lawsuit cannot stand. Defendant’s other argument against the use of Ms. Kem’s claim is that Ms. Kem was not originally a named plaintiff in this suit and therefore “the fact that Ms. Kem eventually became a named plaintiff ... is of little consequence other than to establish her class membership.” Defendant’s Post-Trial Reply Brief, at 2. Defendant argues that “case law and equity” mandate against use of the date of Ms. Kem’s claim as the benchmark for opening the class. Quite in contrast to defendants’ proposition, law and equity require the use of Ms. Kem’s complaint. If defendant’s objection is merely that Ms. Kem was not originally a co-plaintiff in this suit but became a named plaintiff when her case was consolidated with the Hartman case, it must fail. The law clearly provides that an administrative complaint filed by a litigant not originally a party to the particular suit can be the basis for determining the opening date of a plaintiff class. See, e.g., McDonald v. United Air Lines, 587 F.2d at 361 n. 11. If defendant is maintaining that only a complaint filed by a named plaintiff can provide adequate notice of the eventually resulting lawsuit, it still fails. The purpose of the administrative filing requirement is “to give notice to the charged party and enable the Commission to conciliate” the allegation of discrimination. Laffey I, Inc., 567 F.2d at 472. This purpose is “adequately served by a timely filing by any member of the class.” Id. Because notice and a chance for conciliation are provided whether or not the administrative complainant becomes an “originally named plaintiff,” the opening of a Title VII class “can be controlled by complainants who filed earlier than the date on which the class representative filed.” McDonald v. United Air Lines, Inc., 587 F.2d 357, 361 n. 11 (7th Cir.1978); Allen v. Isaac, 99 F.R.D. 45, 50 (N.D.Ill.1983). Thus, the law provides that named plaintiff Kem’s complaint properly serves as the reference for the opening of the plaintiff class. Equity supports this decision as well. Were a different rule to apply to this case, plaintiff Toura Kem herself could not be a member of the class. As mentioned above, plaintiff Kem began the grievance procedure in November, 1974, while plaintiff Hartman filed her charge in March, 1977. Ms. Kem filed a lawsuit on April 28, 1977, and moved to consolidate her action with Ms. Hartman’s on October 25, 1978. If defendant’s interpretation of the law is correct, and anyone who experienced discrimination more than thirty days before Ms. Hartman filed her administrative complaint is excluded from the plaintiff class, clearly plaintiff Kem could not recover. Equity demands a different result. Exclusion of Ms. Kem from the plaintiff class on the grounds of a time bar is a concept relatively new to this suit. In fact, in his Opposition to Ms. Kem’s motion to consolidate, defendant noted that Ms. Kem “potentially qualified” as a member of the class. Response to Motion to Consolidate, at 2. Defendant suggested only that Ms. Kem’s claim raised substantive issues different from those raised by Ms. Hartman’s case; he never once hinted at the possibility that consolidation of Ms. Kem’s claim was inappropriate because hers was temporally distant from the Hartman administrative charge. On November 22, 1978, the Court consolidated Ms. Kem’s claim with the suit filed by Carolee Brady Hartman. Nearly nine years later, it is more than a little late for defendant to raise a statute of limitations question that suggests consolidation was inappropriate for a reason never before brought to the Court’s attention. See, e.g., 5 Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1278. In sum, there is no basis in law or equity on which to ignore the administrative claim filed by named plaintiff Toura Kem as the proper basis for determining the opening date of the plaintiff class. Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiff class will open on October 8, 1974, thirty days prior to Ms. Kem’s invocation of the mandatory grievance procedure. B. The plaintiff class closes on November 16, 1984. The parties agree that the plaintiff class should close on November 16, 1984, the date of the Court’s determination of defendant’s liability in this case. See Plaintiffs Post-Trial Brief at 8-9; Defendant’s Post-Trial Brief at 2. The Court agrees that the law, and the evidence adduced at trial, supports closing the class on this date and will therefore order that the plaintiff class closes on November 16, 1984. See, e.g., Harrison v. Lewis, 559 F.Supp. at 946. IV. EXCEPT FOR FOREIGN SERVICE APPLICANTS, CLASS MEMBERS WHO WISH TO PARTICIPATE IN CLASS RELIEF ARE ENTITLED TO INDIVIDUALIZED DETERMINATIONS OF THEIR CLAIMS. A. The large majority of class members has not been identified. The parties agree, and the evidence adduced at trial demonstrates, that defendant has not maintained a complete list or file of job applicants from which the names of all potential members of the plaintiff class can be culled. See Transcript at 218-22 (Testimony of Patricia Howell Hoxie, Chief, Domestic Personnel Division, United States Information Agency) (“Hoxie Testimony”); id. at 264-66 (Testimony of Johnnie Otto Manzo, Chief, Operations Division, Voice of America) (“Manzo Testimony”). In fact, the evidence suggests that until the Court’s November, 1984, finding of liability against defendant, or even until a few months thereafter, defendant had a policy of destroying employment applications that were more than two years old. Id. at 219, 222 (Hoxie Testimony); 264 (Manzo Testimony). The testimony of defendant’s expert Bliss Cartwright, as well as testimony provided by Ms. Hoxie and Ms. Manzo, shows that defendant has maintained partial applicant information for 1983 and nearly complete applicant information for 1984. Transcript at 281-82 (Cartwright Testimony); see also, id. at 219-220 (Hoxie Testimony); id. at 265 (Manzo Testimony). These records will help identify some potential members of the plaintiff class. But it is evident that these files, which cover at most two of the ten years relevant to this case, do not provide a basis for identifying the large majority of the plaintiff class. In order to identify as many members of the plaintiff class as is reasonably practicable, a broad-based approach to notifying potential class members is necessary. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(d).; see also, e.g., Segar v. Smith, 28 Empl. Prac.Dec. ¶32, 588 (D.D.C.1982). As the Court has already found defendant liable, defendant must bear the full expense of this notification task. See, e.g., H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 8.22 (1985 and Supp. April, 1987); see also, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company, 396 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 616, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970); Segar v. Smith, 28 Empl.Prac.Dec. 1132,588. B. Notice will be mailed to identified class members and, because of the large number of unidentified class members, notice by posting, publication, and memoranda will also be ordered. In addition, plaintiffs will be permitted to conduct limited discovery in order to identify additional class members who may have been encouraged to apply for the jobs at issue by word-of-mouth recruitment. As defendant has maintained applicant information for some years at issue, Transcript at 281-82 (Cartwright Testimony), defendant will be ordered to send notice by certified mail to all female applicants for the relevant job categories who can be identified by a search through defendant’s files. See, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 572 F.Supp. 354 (D.D.C.1983), appealed on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1021, 105 S.Ct. 3488, 87 L.Ed.2d 622 (1985). As notice by mail is not a practicable method for reaching the vast majority of the plaintiff class, defendant will also have to provide notice through wider-reaching channels. Defendant agrees that the class notice must be published in the largest newspaper in each of the eighteen largest Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“SMSA”s) in the country. Defendant’s Post-Trial Reply Brief, at 5-6. The Court agrees that these measures are necessary and proper methods for notifying potential class members. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 167, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2147, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974); In re National Student Marketing Litigation v. The Barnes Plaintiffs, 530 F.2d 1012, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1976) (newspaper publication); Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68, 76 (D.D.C.1981) (same); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 196 (N.D.Ga.1974) (posting in defendant’s offices). The Court does not agree, however, that the limited publication suggested by defendant is notice reasonably calculated to reach as many members of the plaintiff class as is reasonably practicable. For one, class members may not read the newspaper of largest circulation; although the New York Daily News has a larger circulation than the New York Times, USIA itself often advertises job openings in the Times rather than the Daily News. See Pl.Ex. 247 (Aug. 30,1985, Memo to Nierenberg from Rosacker). This suggests that USIA expects its recruits to read the less widely circulated paper. At trial, plaintiffs introduced into evidence a USIA memorandum that contained a list of newspapers and other publications in which the Agency had advertised job openings during the period at issue in this suit. See Pl.Ex. 210. As the agency believed that those publications were appropriate recruitment tools, it is reasonable to infer that applicants for employment at USIA, among them members of the plaintiff class, read those publications. Given the unrebutted showing that these publications were used to advertise for the very jobs at issue in this suit, the fact that this suit involves an applicant class, and the likelihood that readers of the publications include at least some members of the plaintiff class, the Court will order publication of the class notice in these journals and newspapers as well. See Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. at 76-77 (Court may order publication of class notice in journals and newspapers with readership likely to include class members). One remaining question is the frequency with which these notices should be published. Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68 (D.D.C.1981) is instructive on this point. As in the instant case, in Luevano the government had not maintained records from which most class members could be identified. Id. at 76. Judge Joyce Hens Green of this Court therefore ordered that defendants publish the class notice once per week for four weeks in 117 newspapers and magazines. Id. Although the potential class in Luevano was significantly larger than plaintiffs’ estimate of the potential size of the plaintiff class in this case, see id. at 75, the Court believes that newspaper publication once a week for four weeks, including publication on at least one Sunday in each paper with a Sunday edition, is a reasonable method of attempting to reach as many members of the plaintiff class as possible. Publication should begin in the middle of one month, and continue for four weeks, so that any class members who may be out of town during the period of publication will not be prejudiced. The Court believes that publication in four issues of the journals and magazines listed on Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 210 is warranted as well. The Court will therefore order defendant to undertake such publication and to provide plaintiff with proof of each publication ordered. Notice must, of course, be of a physical size, appearance, and location within the publication calculated to attract the reader’s attention. Although mailed and published notices are reasonably calculated to reach large segments of the plaintiff class, other efforts to identify class members are warranted as well. Because the evidence suggests that applicants for the jobs at issue in this suit may continue to apply for government employment, see Transcript at 425 (Testimony of Stephan Michelson, President, Longbranch Research Associates) (“Michelson Testimony”), notice should be posted in government employment offices. See, e.g., Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. at 77. Defendant agrees that it should be required to post a copy of the class notice in all USIA personnel offices and at the Office of Personnel Management. See Defendant’s Post-Trial Reply Brief, at 5-6. The Court believes that these measures are necessary and proper attempts to notify the maximum possible number of potential class members and will order such postings. The Court also believes that notice must be posted at all regional OPM offices as well. As the evidence shows that defendant sometimes recruits on a “government-wide” basis, Transcript at 196 (Hoxie Testimony), it is not unlikely that some members of the plaintiff class will be among those who check OPM regional offices for vacancy announcements and other information. Plaintiffs ask, in addition to posted notice, that defendant be ordered to give copies of the class notice to new applicants for jobs at the agency. This proposal is reasonable in light of defendant’s contention that some rejected applicants reapply to the agency. See supra Section II C. Consequently, the Court will order that, throughout the period in which claims may be brought, defendant provide class notice to all women who apply for jobs with defendant agency. The evidence points to additional areas in which distribution of class notice would likely lead to identification of class members. The evidence shows that, at least in recent times, defendant tailored some of its recruitment toward agency employees. See id. at 196-98 (Hoxie Testimony). Moreover, agency personnel apparently encouraged women who were potentially qualified for the positions at issue to apply for lower-level jobs within the Agency, in-eluding clerical positions, so that they might in future be eligible for promotion to the job categories at issue in this suit. Id. at 198. In addition, testimony revealed that some “purchase order vendors” {i.e., contract providers of USIA services) applied or were recruited for the positions in which the Court found defendant liable for sex discrimination. Id. at 196 (Hoxie Testimony), 254-55 (Manzo Testimony). On the basis of these facts, the Court finds that defendant must send class notice, via certified mail, to each and every current female employee and purchase order vendor. Defendant must also search whatever files it maintains on prior employees and purchase order vendors in order to identify any previous female employees or purchase order vendors who unsuccessfully applied for employment within the relevant job categories during the time period relevant to this suit. Defendant must send notice by certified mail to any additional applicants revealed through this search. Plaintiffs have asked, in addition to these procedures, to take limited discovery of agency officials in order to identify potential class members who were orally encouraged to apply—or discouraged from applying—for the relevant positions. In light of the unrebutted evidence that defendant recruits many employees by word-of-mouth and through other informal channels, see Transcript at 258-67 (Manzo Testimony), plaintiff will be permitted to submit interrogatories and requests for production of documents to USIA and YOA selecting officials, and to conduct depositions of these officials. Any such discovery must be designed only to facilitate identification of these potential members of the plaintiff class. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 531 F.Supp. 957, 961 (N.D.Tex.1982); Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 674 (S.D.N.Y.1981). In sum, defendant will be ordered to send class notice by certified mail to all identifiable members of the plaintiff class and to publish class notice in a wide variety of print media sources, all of which are reasonably calculated to reach potential members of the plaintiff class. Defendant will also be ordered to post class notice in its personnel offices and to circulate notice among female employees and job applicants. Plaintiffs will be permitted to conduct limited discovery of defendant’s selecting officials in order to identify additional members of the plaintiff class who may have been encouraged to submit applications for employment in the relevant job categories. This broad approach to class-wide notice, while by no means ideal, is the best notice possible under the circumstances of this venerable case. C. The content of the notice must explain the basic facts about this suit, including the definition of the plaintiff class, the Court’s finding of liability, the Court’s remedial order, and what potential class members must show in order to be eligible for a determination of defendant’s liability to each of them. Notice to potential members of the plaintiff class must satisfy due process concerns. See, e.g., Newberg on Class Actions, §§ 8.22, 8.32. Thus, it must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise” potential members of the plaintiff class “of the ... action and afford them an opportunity to present their [claims]____ The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information ... and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). Accordingly, the Notice to Potential Class Members must include the following: a description of the nature of this lawsuit; a statement that the Court found defendant liable for sex discrimination against female applicants for certain positions and by job categories within the Agency; a list of the job titles in which the Court found discrimination and a list of any reclassification of those job titles; notice that the case is now in its remedial phase; and a statement that any female who applied for a job in one of the relevant categories during a period from October 8, 1974, through November 16, 1984, and who was rejected for that position, may be a member of the plaintiff class. The notice must further state that any woman who believes she falls into this category must obtain and submit a “proof of claim” form. The notice must state that these forms are available from plaintiffs’ counsel and the USIA Personnel Officer, as well as USIA and OPM employment offices. The notice must also state that proof-of-claim forms must be returned to plaintiffs’ counsel within sixty days of the date on which the notice was sent or published. The notice must inform potential plaintiffs that neither the Court nor its Clerk will accept proof-of-claim forms or forward them to plaintiff’s counsel. Finally, the notice must inform potential class members about the process by which individuals can obtain relief. As detailed below, the notice to class members who were not Foreign Service applicants must include a brief and clear description of what each plaintiff will have to prove in order to recover, of the process through which relief will be determined, and of the possible forms that relief might take. Because the relief to be afforded to Foreign Service applicants is different from the relief available to other members of the plaintiff class, those claimants must receive a different notice form, which must clearly and simply explain this suit, the Court’s finding of liability, which Foreign Service applicants are eligible for relief in this suit, the nature of the relief available to them, and the steps that claimants must take next. The parties have submitted proposed Notices, but neither proposal fully encompasses these points. Accordingly, the Court will order the parties to confer and develop a class notice consistent with this Opinion and submit this proposed Notice to the Court within sixty days of the date of the Order that will accompany this Opinion. D. The proof-ofclaim forms must ask plaintiffs to show that they applied for a job within one of the relevant job categories during the relevant time period and that they were rejected. Each woman who believes that she is a member of the plaintiff class must submit a “Proof of Claim” form that provides information about her possible class membership. See, e.g., Harrison v. Lewis, 559 F.Supp. 943, 946 (D.D.C.1983). The parties agree that the form must ask each potential class member to identify the position sought, when she applied for the position, and a statement that her application was rejected. See Plaintiffs’ Post-Trial Brief at 29; Defendant’s Post-Trial Reply Brief at 1. The Court agrees that the Proof of Claim form must request this information in straightforward terms that do not deter potential class members from submitting a form. The form must also, however, inform potential class members that they will have the burden of proving these facts at the hearing on their individualized claims. Plaintiffs suggest that the form also ask each respondent to state her name, address, telephone number, and whether she currently wishes to be considered for a position at USIA. The Court agrees that these questions should be included on the form, and it will order that the form include them. Defendant has argued strenuously and consistently that each class member must prove that she was “minimally qualified” for the job for which she applied and that the proof-of-claim form must ask potential class members to show these minimal qualifications. In light of the previous finding of liability, defendant is incorrect. To be sure, prior to a finding of liability, a plaintiff bears the burden of proof on all issues, including the burden of showing qualification for the job sought. See, e.g., Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). But once “the employer is a discriminator,” McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C.Cir.1982), there is a presumption that its actions against alleged victims of that discrimination were illegal. Id. On November 16, 1984, the Court found that defendant had discriminated against women who applied for employment in six broad job categories. As the Supreme Court has put it, in class-wide suits such as this one, individual relief does not arise until it has been proved that the employer has followed an employment policy of unlawful discrimination. The force of that proof does not dissipate at the remedial stage of the trial____ The [plaintiffs] need only show that an alleged individual discriminatee unsuccessfully applied for a job and therefore was a potential victim of the proven discrimination. As in Franks [v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976)], the burden then rests on the employer to demonstrate that the individual applicant was denied an employment opportunity for lawful reasons. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1868, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (emphasis added); see also, McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d 62, 77 (D.C.Cir.1982); Harrison v. Lewis, 559 F.Supp. 943, 946 (D.D.C. 1983); Chewning v. Schlesinger, 471 F.Supp. 767, 770 (D.D.C.1979). Thus, the proof-of-claim forms for this case may not, and will not, require potential members of the plaintiff class to show or prove their minimum qualifications for the job or jobs for which they applied. The proposed proof-of-claim form submitted by plaintiffs largely satisfies the requirements set forth in this Opinion and the accompanying Order. The Court will order the parties to confer to develop an amended form that encompasses all requirements set forth herein and to submit the amended form for the Court’s approval when they resubmit the proposed class notice. The Court will order plaintiffs’ counsel to send a copy of the Court-approved proof-of-claim form to each and every respondent to the class notice within ten days after receiving such response. Plaintiffs’ counsel will be entitled to reimbursement from defendant for the mailing costs. In addition, the Court will order defendant to make these forms available at all USIA and OPM national and regional personnel offices so that potential class members who see the posted class notice can obtain a proof-of-claim form in the personnel offices as well. E. The claims of class members who were not Foreign Service applicants will be determined through individual Teamster hearings unless the parties can agree on an alternative procedure. A decision that an employer has violated Title VII with respect to the rights of an entire class does not, of course, automatically entitle each member of that class to relief. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Sawyer, 684 F.2d at 75. Rather, unless the defendant’s actions were egregious and pervasive, the finding of discrimination only creates a presumption that each class member is entitled to an individualized hearing at which hi