Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION JUSTICE, Chief Judge. This memorandum opinion addresses the demand of the plaintiff, the United States of America, for permanent injunctive relief against the defendants. As explained below, the demand will be granted in part; and a permanent injunction will be entered enjoining the defendants, in the class certified herein, from meeting, gathering, or assembling upon any National Forest System lands in the State of Texas, if they fail to comply with certain conditions necessary to protect the public health and safety. I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND On May 6, 1988, the government filed its original complaint, demanding a permanent injunction, as well as a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The complaint named a number of defendants, including the Rainbow Family (also termed the Rainbow Nation, the Rainbow Family of Living Light, and the Gathering of the Tribes), the Rainbow Family Vision Council, the Rainbow Family Tribal Council, and the Rainbow Family Scout Council. These defendants comprise one form or another of a loosely-knit but identifiable association of persons who, for want of a better name, shall be referred to herein as the Rainbow Family. Among the activities of the Rainbow Family are various meetings, “councils,” or gatherings, often held in the United States National Forests, for the purposes of “celebrating life,” worship, expressing ideas and values, and associating with like-minded persons. The largest of these is the Rainbow Family Summer Gathering, which is held annually and has attracted as many as 20,000 people in the past. The Summer Gatherings typically begin in late May or June of each year, building to a climax over the July 4th holiday weekend. The 1988 Rainbow Family Summer Gathering has been set to take place in a National Forest in the State of Texas, and is the subject of this litigation. Several individual defendants are also named in the complaint, all of whom are purportedly associated with one or more of the Rainbow Family defendants listed above. Additionally, in a first amended complaint filed May 13, 1988, the government has moved for certification of a defendant class, which would include Rainbow Family members and all others who might seek to attend the 1988 Summer Gathering. The original complaint alleged that the defendants intend to conduct the 1988 Summer Gathering without obtaining a “special use permit” in advance, as required by U.S. Forest Service regulations. The complaint further alleged that, preceding the Summer Gathering, smaller gatherings or “seed camps” would be instituted by Rainbow Family members, and would grow into the larger Summer Gathering. The plaintiff contends that such gatherings pose threats of irreparable harm to public health and safety, and to Forest Service lands and property, and that they will entail numerous instances of offensive or criminal conduct, such as public nudity, public disturbances, or use of illicit drugs. The original complaint asserted four causes of action, based upon, respectively: violation of the Forest Service special use permit regulations, found at 36 C.F.R. Part 251 (1987); violation of the Texas Mass Gatherings Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Anno., art. 9002 (Vernon’s 1987), which requires permits from a county judge, for gatherings of more than 5,000 persons outside of an incorporated municipality; and the prospective creation of an alleged public nuisance under federal and state law. By way of relief, the government originally demanded that the defendants be restrained and enjoined from attending, participating, or preparing in any way for any gathering of twenty-five or more persons in the National Forests of the State of Texas, unless and until they had applied for and obtained a special use permit from the U.S. Forest Service. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Honorable J. Michael Bradford, United States Magistrate, was designated to conduct hearings and to prepare recommendations for the disposition of both the application for a temporary restraining order and the demand for a preliminary injunction. A hearing on the application for temporary restraining order was conducted in Lufkin, Texas, on May 10, 1988, at which various individual defendants appeared, and the government presented evidence in support of its allegations. In a report delivered the same date, the magistrate recommended that the application for temporary restraining order be granted, primarily in view of alleged public health dangers and the difficulties authorities might have in controlling a gathering on National Forest lands, once substantial numbers of participants had arrived. The magistrate’s report and recommendations were adopted by the court, and a temporary restraining order was issued on May 12, 1988, enjoining the defendants from attending, conducting, or participating in any way in any meeting of twenty-five or more persons in any National Forest in the State of Texas, without first obtaining a special use permit from the U.S. Forest Service. See Temporary Restraining Order, May 12, 1988, at 5-6. Magistrate Bradford then conducted two days of further evidentiary hearings on the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, while the temporary restraining order was still in effect. The magistrate had been instructed, in the order adopting his recommendation, to take evidence and make recommendations concerning various objections raised by the defendants to the jurisdiction of the court and to the legality of the special use permit regulations. In a report dated May 27, 1988, the magistrate found that the Rainbow Family could be sued as an unincorporated association under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), and that the prerequisites to certification of a defendant class, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), were present. The magistrate further found that the Forest Service’s special use permit regulations were lawfully adopted, would be applicable to the defendants, and would not (with the exception of one provision of the regulations) impermissibly burden the defendants’ constitutional rights under the First Amendment. He, therefore, recommended that the preliminary injunction be issued. See Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate, submitted May 27, 1988, at 12-13, 18-22. In an order entered June 1, 1988, 695 F.Supp. 294, this court adopted the magistrate’s recommendations in part, and rejected them in part, and denied the government’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The magistrate’s recommendations that the Rainbow Family could be sued as an unincorporated association, and that the prerequisites to certification of a defendant class had been satisfied, were adopted over the defendants’ objections. However, it was held that the Forest Service’s special use permit regulations were not valid, insofar as recently promulgated revisions to the regulations were concerned; and, further, that the existing permit regulations — to the extent that they single out expressive activity protected under the First Amendment, and do not provide clear and precise standards governing the issuance or denial of a permit for such activity — impermissibly burden the defendants’ rights to freedom of speech, worship, and association. The permit regulations having been found invalid, the preliminary injunction sought by the government was denied. See Order at 314. After the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction was denied, the government filed its second amended complaint, seeking alternative forms of permanent injunctive relief to that originally demanded. In addition to an injunction barring the defendants from gathering in the National Forests of the State of Texas unless they first secured a special use permit, the government now demands that the defendants also “be enjoined from or ordered to perform such specific acts or omissions as recommended by the Texas Department of Health and the Texas Department of Public Safety and the United States Forest Service to protect the public health and safety and environment and resources of the National Forests, and those set out in the Texas Mass Gathering Act and other state statutes.” Second Amended Complaint, at 3. Further, the government demands that the defendants be “enjoined not to prevent or in any way obstruct free and unencumbered and unrestricted access to the common areas at and to the gathering site, and free and unencumbered and unrestricted ingress and egress, to officials of the Forest Service and the Texas Department of Health and those with them,” and for such further relief, “general or special, in law and in equity, to which Plaintiff may be entitled.” Id. The individual defendants have answered the complaints and have filed counterclaims against the government, demanding injunctive and declaratory relief. The counterclaims allege that the permit regulations are unconstitutional; that the government has sought to suppress the defendants’ exercise of First Amendment rights out of hostility to the Rainbow Family or to the content of their views; and that the Forest Service has unlawfully videotaped and otherwise harassed the defendants. A hearing to consider the grounds alleged as the bases for the final injunctive relief urged by the government was conducted in Tyler, Texas, from June 13, 1988, to June 16,1988. Testimony, videotapes of prior gatherings, and other evidence were submitted by the parties. The substance of the evidence presented at the hearing is set forth in the findings of fact contained herein. II. CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT CLASS Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that two separate examinations must be made to determine whether a suit is properly maintainable as a class action. First, the action must meet each of the four prerequisites to class certification provided under Rule 23(a), that is: the proposed class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; there are questions of law or fact common to the class; the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a); J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 23.03 (1987). Second, the action must fit within one or more of the three categories of class actions specified under Rule 23(b). As noted above, Magistrate Bradford received evidence and found that each of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites to a class action has been met, and his recommendation has been adopted by the court. See Order at 298-299. The numerosity element is clearly present in this instance — the defendants themselves have estimated that from 5,000, to as many as 100,000 persons, may attend the 1988 Summer Gathering. The typicality and commonality requirements are also satisfied, as all persons who may seek to attend the gathering in Texas would be subject to the same legal requirements asserted by the government, would jointly pose an alleged danger of public nuisance, and would have available to them the same constitutional and other defenses raised by the individual defendants. Moreover, the individually-named defendants, many of whom have appeared in these proceedings and have otherwise taken active roles in representing the Rainbow Family in this litigation, will be able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. See Order at 299. Finally, counsel for the individual defendants, Larry Daves, Esquire, is an able civil rights lawyer with considerable experience in class action litigation, and can effectively assist the class representatives in conducting the defense of this civil action. Therefore, all the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met. The evidence presented before Magistrate Bradford and at the hearing on the motion for final injunction makes it apparent that certification of a defendant class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) is particularly appropriate. Rule 23(b)(2) provides: (b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: * * * * >9 * (2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; ____ Although the language of Rule 23(b)(2), if taken literally, would appear to bar certification of a defendant class, it has been held an appropriate mechanism for such certification in circumstances similar to these, where the uniform conduct of multiple defendants is challenged and solely injunctive relief is requested. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 379 & n. 4, 98 S.Ct. 673, 677 & n. 4, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968); Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112 (N.D.Ga.1981). See also H. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, § 4.18 (2d ed. 1985) (permitting defendant classes is a “more flexible approach” and is “more preferable to the restrictive one, because in all probability, the Rules Advisory Committee never focused on how the amended rule would be applied when a defendant class suit is sought”); J. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 23.40[6] (1987). Moreover, class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) is also appropriate when counterclaims generally applicable to the proposed class have been alleged, as here, where injunctive and declaratory relief has been demanded against the government, for its alleged actions in harassing the defendants and in seeking to exclude them from the National Forests of Texas. See Slaughter v. Levine, 598 F.Supp. 1035 (D.Minn.1984); American Finance System v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 572 (D.Md.1974). The uncontested evidence shows that the defendants have, thus far, failed or refused to apply for a special use permit before gathering on National Forest lands in Texas. Further, although strongly contested by the defendants, the evidence also shows that a gathering of large numbers of persons, under the conditions associated with past Rainbow Family Summer Gatherings, puts at risk the public health and safety, if minimum public health and safety regulations are not followed. In particular, as discussed in more detail later in this memorandum opinion, the evidence presented by the government shows that a serious outbreak of bacterial infection, causing a form of dysentery known as shigellosis, occurred at the 1987 Summer Gathering in North Carolina, afflicting several thousand participants and spreading to non-participants in a number of states. Although the precise cause of the outbreak cannot be ascertained, the evidence indicates that unsanitary or unhygienic practices at last year’s gathering, including use of unclean water for drinking and washing, bathing in contaminated streams, failure properly to dispose of human waste and garbage, and unsanitary cooking practices, were cumulatively responsible for the shigellosis outbreak. Although this court has previously ruled that the special use permit regulations are unconstitutional and hence unenforceable, insofar as they target protected First Amendment activity, that ruling has been appealed. If, upon appeal, the regulations are found to be constitutional, entry of a permanent injunction might be an appropriate method of enforcing the permit regulations. Final injunctive relief against a public nuisance is also an appropriate remedy, and would be warranted to the extent that the upcoming gathering may pose a threat of public nuisance. See infra, pages 304-306. Hence, the defendants have “acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief ... with respect to the class as a whole,” justifying class certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). A class of defendants shall therefore be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). The class shall be composed of the Rainbow Family and the other Rainbow defendants named in the second amended complaint; the individual defendants named in the second amended complaint; their officers, servants, employees, agents, attorneys, and all other persons acting in concert or participation with them; as well as any other person attending, or planning to attend, the 1988 Rainbow Family Summer Gathering within the National Forests of the State of Texas, who receives notice of this order, by personal service or otherwise. The class representatives shall be the individual defendants who have appeared one or more times before this court: Stephen Principle (also known as Stephen Sedlardo); Holly Lynn (also known as Lynn Nix); “Electric Ed”; “Bible Bob”; “Water-Singing-on-the-Rocks” (also known as Allan Feldman); Barry Adams (also known as “Plunker”); “Little White Owl”; “Mother Nature”; “Jaydeen”; “Iris Spring Flower”; and “Puma” (also known as David Kennison). Larry Daves, Esquire, of Tyler, Texas, shall be appointed as counsel for the defendant class. III. FINAL INJUNCTION Unlike a preliminary injunction, which is intended to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the issues, a permanent or final injunction is to be granted only after a right thereto has been established at a full trial on the merits. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 396, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 1834, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981); Shanks v. City of Dallas, 752 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1985); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2941 (1973). The standard for a permanent injunction is “essentially the same” as for a preliminary injunction, in that the plaintiff must show the existence of a substantial threat of irreparable harm, that outweighs any harm the relief would accord to the defendants, that there is no adequate remedy at law, and that granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest. See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07, 79 S.Ct. 948, 954-55, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959); Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 760 F.2d 618, 621 (5th Cir.1985); Tubwell v. Griffith, 742 F.2d 250, 251 (5th Cir.1984). To justify a permanent injunction, however, the plaintiff must demonstrate actual success on the merits, rather than a likelihood of success. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 1404 n. 12, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987). It is within the court’s sound discretion to decide whether to exercise equity jurisdiction and grant permanent injunctive relief. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01, 93 S.Ct. 1463, 1469-70, 36 L.Ed.2d 151 (1973). “Injunctive relief is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, not to be granted routinely, but only when the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Holland America Insurance Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir.1985). Speculative injury is not sufficient, for “there must be more than a mere possibility or fear that the injury will occur.” Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674, 51 S.Ct. 286, 291, 75 L.Ed. 602 (1931); Holland, 777 F.2d at 997. If warranted, permanent injunctive relief is a “flexible” remedy, “to be molded to the necessities of a particular case.” Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 62, 95 S.Ct. 2069, 2078, 45 L.Ed.2d 12 (1975); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329, 64 S.Ct. 587, 591, 88 L.Ed. 754 (1944). The government has alleged several bases for the requested permanent injunctive relief, under both federal and state law, including: the Forest Service’s special permit regulations; the Texas Mass Gatherings Act; the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.; and the equitable doctrine of public nuisance. As discussed below, however, final injunctive relief is authorized, only to the extent that the 1988 Summer Gathering constitutes a public nuisance, for the reason that it poses a threat to the public health. Special Use Permit Regulations The government’s demand for a permanent injunction, because the defendants have failed to secure a “special use permit,” in advance, under Forest Service regulations, must be denied. The government previously contended that the planned gathering is a “special event ... for the purpose of exchange of views or judgments,” for which a permit must first be obtained. See 36 C.F.R. § 251.51(1) (1987). That contention has already been addressed, and the permit regulations have been declared invalid (insofar as the May 10, 1988 interim rule amending the regulations is concerned), or unconstitutional (in that the regulations require a permit for events defined solely in terms of expressive activity). See Order at 302-313. Now, however, in its second amended complaint, the government is claiming that “competition, entertainment, or training” will be present at the 1988 Summer Gathering, thus requiring the defendants to obtain a special use permit for a “recreation event,” under provisions of the regulations which have not been declared invalid or unconstitutional. See 36 C.F.R. § 251.50(i) (defining “recreation event” as involving “competition, entertainment, or training”); Order at 312-313. The government has made no showing that “competition” or “training” will be involved in the 1988 Summer Gathering, or any other gathering of defendants for which a special use permit would purportedly be required. The evidence in the record does reflect, however, that “entertainment” undoubtedly would be present. Videotapes introduced by both parties reflected that past gatherings have involved, for instance, music, dancing, exhibitions, and similar activities. In addition, witnesses testified that the gatherings have a “carnival” or “festival” atmosphere, and the videotapes corraborated this. By the same token, however, the record equally demonstrates that the Rainbow Family Summer Gatherings are held — at least to a significant extent — “for the purpose of exchange of views or judgments.” For instance, witnesses testified — again with corroboration from the videotapes— that the gatherings are an important forum for the exchange of views among participants on many issues pertaining to politics and religion, alternative lifestyles, and self-expression. Credible testimony was also given that many participants view the Summer Gatherings as, themselves, a form of political statement that “consensual democracy” — in which all persons who desire can participate in any decision, and can block any decision by their own vote — is a workable alternative to “representative democracy,” even among large groups; as a way of encouraging world peace and ecology; as a demonstration against foreign policies in Latin America and elsewhere; and as a way of worshipping, in common, and giving expression to various religious tenets. Thus, the 1988 Summer Gathering would qualify as a “special event” under the definitions provided in the special use permit regulations, even if it could also be defined as a “recreation event.” In such an instance, when an event will include both “entertainment” and “expression or exchange of views and judgments,” the permit regulations provide no criteria or guidance, whatsoever, as to whether the event will be deemed to be either a “recreation event” or a “special event.” Neither do the regulations provide guidance relating to the standards that will be applied in such instances for issuance or denial of a permit. In the absence of any regulatory standards or criteria, a Forest Service decision-maker has unbridled discretion to term one event a “recreation event” and another a “special event,” and to apply different standards for denial or approval of a permit, even though both might contain elements of recreation and expressive activity. This unbridled discretion to choose the regulatory standard to apply in any particular instance may allow the decision-maker to discriminate between groups applying for a permit, based upon his or her subjective biases. The “very possibility of abuse” will invalidate a regulation requiring a permit for expressive activity, Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272, 71 S.Ct. 325, 327, 95 L.Ed. 267 (1951). Thus, this discretion to define events as being for “recreation” or otherwise further reflects the constitutional infirmities of the permit regulatory scheme previously identified in the June 1, 1988 order. See Order at 306-313; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969). Hence, although the government now urges that the 1988 Summer Gathering is a “recreation event” for which a special use permit is required, the lack of precise standards in the permit regulations to govern the Forest Service’s discretion in denying or approving a permit application for an event involving significant expressive activity, even if it also involves recreation, is constitutionally unsound, and cannot provide a basis for an injunction. National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) Although not addressed in any of the pleadings, at the hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction the government also raised the argument that, without injunctive relief, the Forest Service would be unable to comply with its “obligations” under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. The government did not elaborate on this contention; the thrust of the argument, however, appears to be that NEPA requires the Forest Service to evaluate, in advance, the environmental consequences of proposed activities in the National Forests, and to prevent actions which would have adverse impacts. Normally, according to the contentions of the Forest Service, this would be done through the special use permit application process; but since the permit regulations have been held invalid here, its only remedy is through an injunction delaying the gathering until such time as the necessary environmental analysis has been completed. NEPA mandates that federal agencies prepare an environmental analysis on “proposals for ... major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 355-56, 99 S.Ct. 2335, 2339-40, 60 L.Ed.2d 943 (1979); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 817 F.2d 882, 884 (D.C.Cir.1987). The Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) has developed guidelines to implement the NEPA provisions. See 40 C.F.R. Part 1508 (1987). These CEQ interpretations are accorded “substantial deference” by the courts. Andrus, 442 U.S. at 357-58, 99 S.Ct. at 2340-41; Lyng, 817 F.2d at 884, n. 6. In general, under NEPA and the CEQ regulations, if a “major federal action” exists, the agency must conduct an “environmental assessment” in order to determine whether the action is likely to have “a significant impact on the human environment,” see 40 C.R.F. §§ 1508.9 & 1508.-13; and if such a “significant impact” is determined to be likely, then a full-blown “environmental impact statement” must be prepared. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F. R. § 1508.11. The CEQ regulations define “major federal actions” as “actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. Such actions “include the circumstance where the responsible officials fail to act and that failure to act is reviewable by courts or administrative tribunals under the Administrative Procedure Act or other applicable law as agency action.” Id. Examples of major Federal action, provided in the regulations, include “adoption of official policy ... [or] formal plans,” “adoption of programs, such as a group of concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan,” and “approval of specific projects, such as construction or management activities located in a defined geographic area.” Such projects also include “actions approved by permit or other regulatory decision as well as federal and federally assisted activities.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(l)-(4). The regulations, however, specifically exempt from the definition of “major Federal action” any “bringing [of] judicial or administrative civil or criminal enforcement actions.” In other words, it is not a “major Federal action” under NEPA, requiring environmental analysis, to bring a civil or criminal action to enforce Forest Service or other governmental regulations or statutes. Under these definitions, it is highly doubtful whether there is any “major Federal action” present, requiring that the NEPA analysis be conducted in advance of the gathering. Certainly, there is no “program” or “policy” at issue. Neither is there any “approval of [a] specific project” required, since the special use permit regulations regarding “special events” have been invalidated on constitutional grounds. The actions which the government may take, and — by initiating this litigation — has taken, with respect to the 1988 Summer Gathering relate to the invocation and enforcement of other statutes and regulations regarding uses of Forest Service lands, such as the “prohibited activities” regulations at 36 C.F.R. Part 261; hence, such initiatives do not qualify as “major Federal actions,” falling under the exemption for “civil or criminal enforcement actions.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a). It also is questionable whether the gathering is likely to have any “significant impact” on the environment. The government has presented no evidence that this gathering, or other similar gatherings in the past, have had any but short-term adverse environmental impacts, such as temporary contamination of streams. It is possible, of course, that a particular site chosen for the 1988 Summer Gathering could encroach upon, or threaten, an “ecologically critical area,” “historical site or resource,” or the “habitat of an endangered species.” See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.17. In this respect, the government submitted evidence that there may be an impact upon archeological sites at a location formerly occupied by some Rainbow Family members at Ritter Lake, in the Davy Crockett National Forest. Whether occupation of other specific sites would raise similar concerns, and how those concerns might be remedied by imposing limitations on the gathering at that site, cannot be addressed on the present record. Finally, while it is commendable that the Forest Service is concerned about possible adverse environmental effects, there is reason to question the government’s good faith in raising this argument at this time. Forest Service witnesses testified that environmental analysis of special use permit applications is routinely performed, and that in many cases, such analysis can be completed in a very short time. In this inátance, however, the government apparently seeks complete prohibition of the gathering until such a time as it can perform an environmental analysis. It is significant, however, that Forest Service officials refused to predict how long that analysis might take, speculating that it could be up to several months. Moreover, no evidence was offered to show that such extensive environmental review has ever been required before, of this or other groups, or that any group has been denied access to a forest until after a full environmental assessment or environmental impact statement had been performed. Although NEPA is unquestionably constitutional, even an otherwise valid statute cannot be applied in a manner designed to suppress First Amendment activity, or out of hostility to a particular group. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3068, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). To hold that the government is not required, under NEPA, to perform an environmental analysis of the 1988 Summer Gathering, does not mean that it cannot undertake any review of the likely environmental effects which may occur. It is free to do so. Moreover, after specific gathering sites have been designated, if the Forest Service determines that a particular resource or location is threatened in some way, such as an ecologically critical area, the habitat of some endangered species, or an archeological site, it may demand further relief and present evidence in that relation. Public Nuisance Finally, the government contends that the 1988 Summer Gathering will pose a public nuisance in various ways: by threatening public health and safety, through the spread of communicable diseases arising from unsanitary conditions; by traffic congestion on public roads; by the prospect of disorderly conduct, public nudity, and use of illicit drugs; and through the potential damage or destruction of public lands and property. The plaintiff, therefore, demands that the gathering be permanently enjoined altogether, or that defendants be enjoined to comply with various public health and Forest Service regulations. Second Amended Complaint, at 3. “There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word ‘nuisance.’... There is general agreement that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.” W. Prosser & P. Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 86 at p. 616 (5th ed. 1984). A “public nuisance,” such as that alleged here, “is an entirely different concept from that of a private nuisance____ The term comprehends a miscellaneous and diversified group of minor criminal offenses, based on some interference with the interests of the community, or the comfort or convenience of the general public. It includes interferences with the public health____” Id., § 90 at p. 643. A demand for a permanent injunction against an alleged public nuisance requires that two inquiries be made. First, it must be determined whether the conduct complained of is, in fact, a public nuisance. If so, it must next be determined whether an injunction is the appropriate remedy; and this is an inquiry that entails balancing of the equities. Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-38, 53 S.Ct. 602, 603-04, 77 L.Ed. 1208 (1933); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F,Supp. 11, 54-55 (D.Minn.1974). An injunction will not issue against an alleged public nuisance where the government has an adequate remedy at law. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 750-51, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971); Northern California Power Agency v. Grace Geothermal Corp., 469 U.S. 1306, 105 S.Ct. 459, 83 L.Ed.2d 388 (1984) (Rehnquist, then-J., sitting as Circuit Justice); Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1976); 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2944 at pp. 392-402. Moreover, as an equitable remedy derived from the common law, courts will refuse to issue an injunction for an alleged public nuisance where there is already in place a comprehensive statutory or regulatory scheme concerning the complained-of activities. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317-24, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 1792-96, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981) (hereafter “Illinois II”); Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Mounds View, 651 F.Supp. 551, 567 (D.Minn.1987). The defendants contend, at the outset, that issuance of an injunction under these circumstances would be improper, for the reason that the government has available to it adequate remedies at law for the various alleged harms, through enforcement of federal and state statutes and U.S. Forest Service regulations that prohibit many of the types of misconduct which the government alleges are likely to occur at the 1988 Summer Gathering. See 16 U.S. C. § 551 & § 559 (enforcement of Forest Service regulations); 18 U.S.C. § 1853 & § 1863 (criminal penalties for trespass or unlawfully injuring trees on Forest Service property); 36 C.F.R. Part 261 (1987) (prohibited activities in National Forests). For example, the regulations forbid, in the National Forests, public nudity, disorderly conduct, use of illegal drugs, and destruction of Forest Service property, as well as creation of unsanitary conditions through improper disposal of waste or garbage. 36 C.F.R. §§ 261.4-261.14. Moreover, criminal penalties of a $500.00 fine or up to six-month imprisonment may be imposed for violation of these regulations. Id., at § 261.14; U.S. v. Ventling, 678 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.1982); U.S. v. Doremus, 658 F.Supp. 752 (D.Idaho 1987). Additionally, state and local authorities retain undiminished jurisdiction to make arrests and initiate prosecutions for any violations of the laws of the State of Texas that occur. 16 U.S.C. § 480. Arguing that this regulatory scheme is comprehensive in nature and applicable to the conduct alleged by the government, the defendants maintain that it has preempted any application of nuisance doctrines, under either state or federal law. Illinois II, supra, 451 U.S. 304, 101 S.Ct. 1784 (preemption of federal common law); Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S.Ct. 1322, 10 L.Ed.2d 428 (1963) (preemption of state law). The government responds that it has the inherent power to protect its own lands through an injunction, as well as the public health and safety, notwithstanding the existence of these statutes and regulations. It argues, furthermore, that its regulations will not be enforceable against the large crowd expected at the 1988 Summer Gathering, based on its experience with Rainbow Family gatherings in previous years; and that in any event the regulations and their criminal sanctions are not sufficient to remedy the irreparable harms which the 1988 Summer Gathering allegedly threatens. Accordingly, the government argues that a permanent injunction is the only adequate remedy available. The government undoubtedly has the authority — indeed, the burden — of regulating activities on the National Forest lands, pursuant to its proprietary powers as landowner and as conservator of the lands for the public interest. E.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543, 96 S.Ct. 2285, 2293, 49 L.Ed.2d 34 (1976); U.S. v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 31 S.Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911); Light v. U.S., 220 U.S. 523, 31 S.Ct. 485, 55 L.Ed. 570 (1911); 16 U.S.C. §§ 472 & 551; 43 U.S.C. § 1740. Where necessary to protect its proprietary interests in public lands, or where there is some other genuine interest to protect or defend, such as preserving the public health and safety, the federal government may justifiably seek equitable intervention of the courts to forestall irreparable damage or some other public nuisance. E.g., Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-02, 88 S.Ct. 379, 385-86, 19 L.Ed.2d 407 (1967) (removal of sunken ship in navigable waterway); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492, 80 S.Ct. 884, 890, 4 L.Ed.2d 903 (1960) (injunction against waste discharges into navigable river); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1888) (labor injunction); United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 8 S.Ct. 850, 31 L.Ed. 747 (1887) (injunction against fraudulent patent to public lands); United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.1970) (injunction suit to protect coral reefs); United States v. County Board of Arlington County, 487 F.Supp. 137 (E.D. Va.1979) (suit to enjoin construction near national monuments); United States v. Atlantic-Richfield Co., 478 F.Supp. 1215 (D.Mont.1979) (suit to enjoin industrial discharges into atmosphere); United States v. Brand Jewelers, 318 F.Supp. 1293 (S.D.N. Y.1970). See also United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 214-20 (3rd Cir.1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting from order denying rehearing); United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121, 1126-28 (4th Cir. 1977) (reviewing cases). The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois II does not alter this analysis, as defendants assert, but rather confirms it. The Illinois II decision held only that federal nuisance law is not available to abate alleged pollution of interstate waterways, because Congress “had occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program,” in the form of the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 451 U.S. at 317, 101 S.Ct. at 1792. Where no comprehensive regulation exists, and important federal interests are at stake, there is no indication in Illinois II that the government may not resort to the law of public nuisances to secure equitable relief. See Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 22, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2627, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981); S. Bleiweiss, Environmental Regulation and the Federal Common Law of Nuisance: A Proposed Standard of Preemption, 7 Haro. Environmental L.R. 41, 55-58 (1983). In the circumstances presented here, there is no “comprehensive regulatory program,” as described in Illinois II. This is particularly true, by reason of the fact that the Forest Service’s special use permit regulations have been held invalid in this action. The judicial act of striking down a law should not, by the same stroke, deprive the government of common law remedies it may have enjoyed prior to passage of the law. Moreover, the regulations contained in 36 C.F.R. Part 261, concerning prohibited activities in the National Forests, do not permit actions to forestall a general threat to public health, since they only provide for criminal sanctions after the fact. Where the public health or welfare is threatened, the government need not wait until after the damage has occurred in order to act, even if there happen to be criminal penalties associated with the behavior causing the threat. U.S. v. Jalas, 409 F.2d 358, 360 (7th Cir.1969); People v. Laman, 14 N.E.2d 439, 442-43, 277 N.Y. 368 (N.Y.Ct.App.1938). Thus, the government may rightly proceed on a theory of public nuisance, to remedy the irreparable harm it has alleged. Having determined public nuisance law is applicable, it is necessary to determine whether the government, as the party seeking injunctive relief, has proven the likely existence of a nuisance. Harrison-ville, supra; Mississippi Power, supra. In this regard, the evidence presented by the government credibly showed that thousands of persons attending the 1987 Rainbow Family Summer Gathering in North Carolina contracted shigellosis. This number included children, who are most susceptible to the dangers associated with the bacterial infection. Even members of the Rainbow Family admitted that the outbreak was serious. Moreover, the evidence established that many persons who never attended the gathering, but who were somehow in contact with participants carrying the infection, also contracted the dysentery (including patients at a nursing home in Pennsylvania). Although certain conditions present at the North Carolina gathering appear to have been conducive to the spread of the bacteria (heavier than usual rains, for instance), it is clear from the record that the Rainbow Family’s failure to observe proper sanitary conditions, in many respects, were substantial contributing conditions to the outbreak. These omissions included their failure systematically to use boiled or chlorinated water for drinking, eating, and cleaning; improper disposal of human and solid wastes; swimming or bathing in contaminated streams; and unhygienic conditions in some communal kitchens. It is equally clear from the record, however, that the gathering in North Carolina, and other past gatherings, have not resulted in serious or irreparable harm or damage to the environment or to public property, as the government contends. For example, after the 1984 Summer Gathering in northern California, Forest Service officials themselves stated that no damage to the gathering site could be discerned, and that the land was fully capable of “multiple use” utilization by ranchers, hunters, and others within a short time after the gathering ended. Similarly, Forest Service officials testified that the North Carolina gathering site has not been irreparably damaged after last year’s gathering, even though they felt that the Rainbow Family had failed adequately to clean and restore the site, as promised. Thus, the government has failed sufficiently to demonstrate the likelihood of irreparable harm to the environment or to public property as a result of the 1988 Summer Gathering, in order to justify the total exclusion of the event. Regarding the environment, the evidence in the record does reveal that — at the North Carolina gathering, at least— garbage was left at the gathering site, automobiles were abandoned, pit latrines were not properly closed, and rehabilitation work on the site was not done effectively. Forest Service officials testified that it is common practice to require those disturbing a location, such as for logging or drilling, to clean or repair it. Thus, a limited permanent injunction, to require the Rainbow Family to comply with reasonable requirements for cleaning and rehabilitating any gathering site, will be entered. As to the alleged nudity, disorderly conduct, or use of illicit drugs which the government alleges will occur at the gathering, it is manifest from the circumstances of this litigation that the government can— and intends to — rigidly enforce the criminal statutes applicable to such behavior. In other cases, a “general fear” that narcotics or other laws will be broken by some participants' of a gathering has been held to be an insufficient basis for the issuance of an injunction against the entire gathering, particularly where, as here, the gathering is for significant expressive purposes. Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 1245, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975); Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 572 (9th Cir.1984) cert. denied 471 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 2115, 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985); Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir.1974). Since plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law for any feared criminal violations, no injunction is warranted on these grounds. Finally, the plaintiff’s fears that traffic congestion will occur, or that the local populace will react negatively to the influx of substantial numbers of Rainbow Family adherents, as shown by the evidence presented at the hearing, do not warrant complete abridgement of the defendants’ First Amendment rights to participate in the gathering, especially since the government has made no effort to demonstrate why reasonable restrictions cannot be employed to ameliorate these conditions without wholly banning the gathering. However, the defendants plainly may not obstruct Forest Service or health officials, or law enforcement authorities, in their access into and out of any gathering site, notwithstanding a claim that it would inhibit their exercise of First Amendment liberties. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (even engaging in First Amendment liberties does not allow a group “to form a cordon across the street and allow no pedestrian to pass ...”); Andree v. Ashland County, 818 F.2d 1306 (7th Cir.1987) (concert-goers have no “reasonable expectation of privacy from prying eyes” of peace officers); Davis v. Francois, 395 F.2d 730, 734-35 (5th Cir.1968). Therefore, based upon the preponderance of the evidence in the record, it is found that the plaintiff has sufficiently proven the likelihood of such a threat to the public health, posed by possible unsanitary and unhygienic conditions at the 1988 Summer Gathering, as to constitute a potential public nuisance. The government has failed, however, to prove that the gathering is likely to result in irreparable harm to the environment or to public property, or that the criminal laws and federal regulations are inadequate remedies for other violations which may occur at the gathering. Moreover, even if such alleged harms as traffic congestion or public nudity are likely to occur, a balancing of the equities involved leaves little doubt that the gathering cannot be entirely enjoined. It must be taken into account that a permanent injunction against the 1988 Summer Gathering, which the government seeks, would operate as a prior restraint on the defendants’ exercise of First Amendment rights to speak, worship, and associate. See supra, page 302; Order of June 1, 1988, at 32-33. “Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971) (per curiam) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963)). Further, a prior restraint on the exercise of First Amendment liberties may only be accomplished through narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restrictions; and an outright disallowance of such expression is rarely countenanced. Southeast Promotions, supra, 420 U.S. at 552-58, 95 S.Ct. 1243-46; New York Times, supra; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574, 61 S.Ct. 762, 765, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931). This concern weighs heavily against granting the comprehensive exclusion of the defendants that the government demands. Moreover, in view of the lack of evidence of irreparable injury in any area other than public health, a total proscription of the gathering would be unjustified. Conversely, the interests of the parties and of the public are sufficient grounds for a grant of partial permanent injunctive relief, specifically directed toward health and sanitation concerns. It is a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction to require that the defendants’ First Amendment activities not threaten the public health or welfare. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 113-16, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2301-03, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83, 86-87, 69 S.Ct. 448, 451, 453-54, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65, 57 S.Ct. 255, 259-60, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470 (1919). In requiring that the defendants observe sanitary and hygienic practices at the gathering, they will not be unduly burdened. In fact, the defendants themselves should be healthier as a result. “Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved.” Golden State Bottling Co. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168, 180, 94 S.Ct. 414, 423, 38 L.Ed.2d 388 (1973), quoting Virginia Railway Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552, 57 S.Ct. 592, 601, 81 L.Ed. 789 (1937). However, “an order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by the constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order____ In other words, the order must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case.” Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183-84, 89 S.Ct. 347, 352-53, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968). Permanent injunctive relief, in such circumstances, “must be specific and reasonably detailed____” Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976); Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38 L.Ed.2d 661 (1974); Gunn v. University Committee to End War, 399 U.S. 383, 90 S.Ct. 2013, 26 L.Ed.2d 684 (1970). Thus, the defendants will be enjoined, as a class, to comply with discrete health and sanitation provisions appropriate for an outdoor gathering of large numbers of persons, as provided in Exhibit A to the permanent injunction, entered herewith. The defendants will be limited to 5,000 persons at any one gathering site, so that governmental authorities may retain sufficient control over the persons gathering at the site. The defendants also will be required to establish, in advance of occupying any site, that basic health and sanitation measures will be met; and regular inspections will be required to ensure that such measures are maintained during the course of the gathering. A neutral agency, the United States Public Health Service, will be designated to inspect the gathering sites and certify that minimum health and sanitation standards are met. The Forest Service will be authorized to order the closure of any site in the event that the defendants fail to comply with the terms of the permanent injunction; but, as long as the injunction is complied with, the government may not unreasonably restrict the defendants in their access to or participation in the 1988 Rainbow Family Summer Gathering. PERMANENT INJUNCTION Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the Memorandum Opinion of this court, entered simultaneously herewith, the defendant class, that is, the Rainbow Family, also known as the Rainbow Nation, also known as the Rainbow Family of Living Light, also known as the Gathering of the Tribes, also known as the Rainbow Family Gathering; the Rainbow Family Vision Council; the Rainbow Family Tribal Council; the Rainbow Family Scout Council; Stephen Principle, also known as Steven Principle, also known as Stephen Sedlardo; “Electric Ed;” Holly Lynn, also known as Lynn Nix, also known as Holley Lynn; “Bible Bob;” Diane Temperance; Barry Adams, also known as “Plunker;” “Emmett;” Lynette Johnson; “Jaydene;” “Water-Singing-on-the-Rocks;” C.A.L.M./M.A.S.H., also known as Center for Alternative Living Medicine; the East Texas Networking Center; Michael John, also known as Eugene Earl Hector; their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; all persons acting in concert or participation with them; and all persons attending, or planning to attend, the 1988 Rainbow Family Summer Gathering, who receive actual notice of this permanent injunction by personal service or otherwise, shall be, and they are hereby, permanently enjoined: (1) Forthwith to designate to the United States Forest Service three or more specific sites, not closer to each other than five miles, for the purposes of meeting, gathering, and camping within the National Forests of the State of Texas; (2) To refrain from using or occupying any such designated site until such time as a representative of the United States Public Health Service shall have formally certified, in writing, that the facilities and means employed and provided, and to be employed and provided, by defendants at such site for food service sanitation, for water supply, and for the disposal of sewage, garbage, and solid waste, are in substantial compliance with the standards for food service sanitation, water supply, and waste disposal set forth herein in Exhibit A (attached hereto); provided, however, that if the United States Public Health Service Representative shall determine, in the exercise of his or her sound discretion, that the facilities and means actually employed by defendants at a designated site for food service sanitation, water supply, and waste disposal are at variance with the standards set forth in Exhibit A, but are equally as efficacious as those so specified, such existing facilities and means may be certified as substantially complying with the criteria of Exhibit A; provided, further, that up to 300 persons may immediately enter and occupy any such site, although prior to the certification of the United States Public Health Service representative heretofore mentioned, for the purpose of preparing such site for occupancy and use; (3) To take such affirmative measures to preserve, protect, and restore the environment and ecology of any designated site and its surrounding area, as may reasonably be required by the United States Forest Service; (4) To take such affirmative measures as may be reasonably necessary to maintain continuing substantial compliance with the standards for food service sanitation, water supply, and waste disposal as are set forth in Exhibit A; and (5) To take affirmative measures, in conjunction with the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of Texas, or his delegates, to prevent the occupancy or use of any such designated site by more than 5,000 persons. ORDER In accordance with the terms of the Permanent Injunction and the Memorandum Opinion, entered simultaneously herewith, it is ORDERED: (1) That the plaintiff, the United States of America, by and through its Surgeon General, as director of the United States Public Health Service, or his delegate, shall assign duly qualified personnel to conduct inspections of each of the three or more sites designated by the defendants, the Rainbow Family and others, for the purposes of meeting, gathering, and camping, in advance of the occupation of such sites, to determine whether the facilities and means employed and provided, and to be employed and provided, by such defendants for food service sanitation, water supply, and disposal of sewage, garbage, and solid waste at such site are in substantial compliance with the standards set forth in Exhibit A to the Permanent Injunction, this day issued, or whether equally suitable and effective facilities and means are or will be employed and provided for the purposes referred to at such site; and if any such site is found satisfactory in such respects, the inspecting personnel shall immediately certify such determination, in writing, to the Supervisor of the National Forests in Texas, or to his delegate. (2) That the plaintiff, the United States of America, by and through its Supervisor of the United States Forest Service, or his delegate, and its United States Marshal for the Eastern District of Texas, or his delegate, shall immediately following the delivery to them, or their delegates, of the certificate alluded to in paragraph (1), take affirmative actions to insure that defendants have free, uninterrupted, and unobstructed access, in at least one place, to and from any such designated site, for the purposes of meeting, gathering, and camping; and to take any such additional steps as are reasonably necessary to assure defendants’ continued free, uninterrupted, and unobstructed access, in at least one place, to and from such designated site, except (a) when a closure order is in effect, pursuant to paragraph (6), or (b) when the persons present at such designated site exceed 5,000 in number, as determined by the United States Marshal for the Eastern District of Texas, or his delegate. (3) That the plaintiff, the United States of America, by and through its Surgeon General, or his delegate, shall appoint and require suitable and qualified inspectors of the United States Public Health Service to make periodic inspections of each of the designated sites referred to above, for so long as they are occupied by three hundred or more persons, to determine whether proper measures are being observed as to food service sanitation, water supply, and waste disposal, under the standards set forth above; such inspectors to be accompanied, in each instance, by representatives of the defendants and of the United States Forest Service, if such representatives, or either of them, so desire. (4) That any substantial deficiencies observed by such inspector at a designated site shall be noted, in writing, and a copy thereof shall be delivered to the representatives of the defendants and the United States Forest Service accompanying him or her; and if there is no representative of the defendants, such copy shall be posted at some conspicuous place at such designated site. (5) That the defendants shall rectify the observed deficiency or deficiencies at such designated site within twenty-four hours of the delivery of such writing to the representative of the defendants; (6) That, if such deficiency or defici