Full opinion text
OPINION AND ORDER SUSAN H. BLACK, District Judge. I. Introduction Howey-in-the-Hills is a small town in Central Florida, approximately forty miles northwest of Orlando. The town is sixteen blocks long from north to south and four blocks wide from east to west. It has a population of some 650 residents. The town governs itself through a Mayor, Town Council, Zoning Commission, and other agencies. The town controls land use and development within its borders through its power to zone. The Town of Howey-in-the-Hills [hereinafter “Howey-in-the-Hills,” “Howey,” or “town”] is one of the defendants in this case. Various educational institutions have for many years used property in the town. One of these institutions, located on a forty-one acre tract of land on the southern border of the town, has been a privately owned and operated high school. In 1980, Michael DeSisto and Will Roberts through a partnership bought the high school campus. They leased the campus to the DeSis-to School [hereinafter “DeSisto School” or “DeSisto High School”], a high school for learning disabled students. In 1986, DeSisto and Roberts through their partnership purchased property for the use of a second educational institution in Howey-in-the-Hills. This second educational institution was the DeSisto College, a college serving learning disabled students. DeSisto College, Inc. [hereinafter “DeSisto College” or “College”] is one of the plaintiffs in this case. The town at first accepted and even promoted the creation of a college for the learning disabled. When the College purchased residential homes in areas not adjacent to the DeSisto High School, the town withdrew its support for the DeSisto College. The town discovered that certain college uses in residentially-zoned areas violated its Zoning Ordinance. The town also promulgated new ordinances to more closely regulate the function of colleges in resi-dentially zoned areas. DeSisto College and Loren E. Horner, a student at the College, sue the town and various government officials under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection and due process clauses. DeSisto College wishes to secure the right to use residential property without restriction anywhere within the town’s boundaries. Plaintiff Homer wishes to safeguard the College’s operations in Howey to prevent her loss of DeSisto College’s “unique educational and treatment program.” If this case went to trial, the plaintiffs would attempt to prove that the defendant town opposed the College and used its powers to exclude it from the town based on irrational fear and prejudice towards learning disabled students. The town would attempt to prove that Michael DeSisto was no more than a businessman trying to establish a business in Howey in the cheapest possible way, by converting residences into college facilities rather than by building on vacant land from the ground up. Although the Court finds that the parties genuinely dispute each of these extreme factual contentions, neither of these facts if established are material to this case. The Court finds from the facts that are not genuinely disputed that summary judgment is appropriate. The Court will first review the procedural history of this case. The Court will then summarize background facts as they appear from the record and specify the standard of review on a motion for summary judgment. Finally, the Court will analyze plaintiffs’ claims. II. Procedural History The present plaintiffs along with a party who is no longer a plaintiff, Keith Murphy, filed their original Complaint in this action on January 2, 1987. The original Complaint named as defendants Thomas P. Line, Arthur Pratt, Alan B. Mills, Jr., Rodney T. Griffin, individually and in their capacity as members of the Zoning Commission of Howey-in-the-Hills, Paul Mazade, John P. Purser, III, Carlin Washo, individually and in their capacity as members of the Town Council of Howey-in-the-Hills. Plaintiffs voluntarily filed an Amended Complaint on January 15, 1987. The First Amended Complaint named the same defendants as the original Complaint with the addition of the Town Of Howey-in-the-Hills. On January 29, 1987, defendant Thomas P. Line filed a Motion To Dismiss First Amended Complaint. On March 17, 1987, the Court granted the motion as to Count III, but denied the motion as to Counts I and II. The Court stated that “plaintiffs [had] alleged sufficient facts to state the causes of action for violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” The motion did not raise and the Court did not address questions of immunity of the individual defendants. Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint on July 10, 1987. The Second Amended Complaint named the same defendants as the First Amended Complaint. Keith Murphy was not included as a plaintiff in the Second Amended Complaint. The defendants filed various motions to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. In an order dated November 10, 1987, the Court granted the motions to dismiss on the grounds that the Second Amended Complaint sought to hold the individual defendants personally liable for their legislative conduct for which the individuals were absolutely immune. The Court gave plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint “eliminating any causes of action against the defendants in their individual capacities based on the defendants’ legislative activities.” November 10, 1987, order at 16. In order to clarify plaintiffs’ claims against each defendant and to distinguish the claims from one another, the Court further ordered plaintiffs to plead each count and the facts supporting each count separately, to plead separate counts for each defendant, and to plead counts based on defendants actions in their individual capacities separately from counts based on defendants’ actions in their official capacities. Id. at 15-17. On December 7, 1987, the plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint. The Third Amended Complaint included the same defendants as the Second Amended Complaint with the exception of Carlin Washo and John P. Purser III. The Third Amended Complaint further named Paul Mazade in his capacity as Mayor of Howey. The plaintiffs failed, however, to plead each count and the facts supporting each count separately, to plead separate counts for each defendant, and to plead counts based on defendants’ actions in their individual capacities separately from counts based on defendants’ actions in their official capacities. On April 1,1988, the Court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint for violation of the Court’s order of November 10, 1987. The Court gave plaintiffs leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint and gave plaintiffs further instructions in pleading. Plaintiffs filed the Fourth Amended Complaint on April 20, 1988. The defendants listed in the Fourth Amended Complaint were the same as those in the Third Amended Complaint with the exception of Alan B. Mills. The plaintiffs withdrew the claims against defendants Arthur W. Pratt and Rodney T. Griffin by stipulation on May 6, 1988. Defendants once again filed a motion to dismiss. In light of counsels’ representations as to the law and the fact that discovery in the case had terminated on June 29, 1988, the Court summarily denied the motion to dismiss stating that the issues would be more appropriately addressed on a motion for summary judgment. Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment at bar on September 22, 1988. Plaintiffs filed their own motions for summary judgment on Counts IV and V on May 18,1988, and July 22,1988, respectively. The parties filed timely responses and replies. The Court heard oral argument on November 18, 1988. III. Background Facts The Court has carefully reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, exhibits, depositions, memoranda, transcript of oral argument on the instant motions for summary judgment, and the file in this case as a whole. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and for the purpose of summarizing the record, the Court will list various background facts as they appear on the record. In listing facts, the Court will resolve all genuinely disputed factual questions in plaintiffs’ favor. The inclusion of facts in the statement of facts does not indicate that those facts listed are material pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Court’s discussion of materiality is encompassed in the Court’s analysis of the substantive law. Furthermore, the inclusion of various facts is not a finding that the defendants could not establish different facts if this case went to trial. A. The Parties 1. This is an action pursuant to 42 U.S. C. § 1983, brought by a college for the learning disabled and one of its students. The defendants are Howey-in-the-Hills and two town officials who are sued in their individual capacities. The Complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 1. 2. Plaintiff DeSisto College is a Florida not-for-profit corporation. The College is located in Howey-in-the-Hills, Florida. The College was temporarily licensed by the Florida State Board of Independent Colleges and Universities in March, 1986, and has operated under that temporary license since the College commenced classes on September 8, 1986. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 2 & 7. Appendix To Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit B, Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 10 [hereinafter “First Affidavit of Marsha Glines”]. 3. Plaintiff Loren E. Homer, is a student at DeSisto College. Affidavit of Loren Homer ¶¶ 1-4. Plaintiff Loren E. Hor-ner suffers from emotional difficulties which impair her cognitive functioning. First Affidavit of Marsha A. Glines ¶ 7. 4. Defendant Thomas P. Line [hereinafter “Line”] is the Chairman of the Zoning Commission of the town and lives in Howey. Plaintiffs sue Line in his individual capacity. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 3. 5. Defendant Paul L. Mazade [hereinafter “Mazade”] is a member of the Town Council of Howey as well as Howey’s May- or. Mazade also lives in Howey. Defendant Mazade is sued in his individual capacity. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 4. 6. Defendant Town of Howey-in-the-Hills is a Florida municipal corporation. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 5. The town is located approximately forty miles northwest of Orlando and has a population of approximately 650 people. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 6; First Affidavit of Marsha Glines U 2. The town is sixteen blocks long from north to south, and four blocks wide from east to west. Map of Howey, Comprehensive Land Use Development Plan at 1-3, filed June 13, 1988; Map of Howey, Plaintiffs Exhibit 19. B. Educational Institutions At Howey 7. DeSisto College was not the first educational institution based in Howey. Until 1978, the Howey Academy operated as a private high school in Howey. During the 1970’s, the student population at the Academy was approximately 400 students. The Academy’s students were not handicapped and the Academy operated until its closing without interference from town officials. In 1980, C.V. Griffin, the owner of the Academy, sold the Academy’s campus to the LaMancha Partnership, a partnership whose general partners are A. Michael De-Sisto [hereinafter “Michael DeSisto” or “DeSisto”], and Will Roberts. Fourth Amended Complaint 1113; Defendant’s Answer ¶ 13; Roberts, 8/12/87, at 51, 56-59. 8. DeSisto College was not the first educational institution in Howey formed by Michael DeSisto to serve learning disabled students. In February, 1980, the DeSisto School, a high school for learning disabled students, first began operations on the grounds of the former Howey Academy and surrounding properties. The DeSisto School, also known as “DeSisto Howey” or the “DeSisto High School,” is situated on State Route 19 in the southern section of the town. DeSisto Howey is one of three educational institutions founded by Michael DeSisto. In addition to DeSisto Howey and DeSisto College in Howey, Michael DeSisto operates the DeSisto School in Stockbridge, Massachusetts. DeSisto Howey continues to operate legally in Howey without opposition from Howey. DeSisto Howey is not a party to this litigation. The campus of DeSisto Howey, like the campus of the Academy, is comprised of a forty-one acre tract of land with numerous school buildings, including classrooms, dormitories and a gymnasium. First Affidavit of Marsha Glines 112. DeSisto Howey has had a student population in excess of 100 students. 9. DeSisto College is the first college that has operated in Howey. DeSisto College serves students who live both in and out of Howey, many of whom drive. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines 117. The students of DeSisto College are older than high school students. Many are of drinking age. Various professionals, such as psychologists, psychiatrists and special education teachers, have identified DeSisto College students at various times as emotionally disturbed or educationally handicapped. First Affidavit of Marsha Glines 113. 10. DeSisto College shares many characteristics with traditional colleges. For example, DeSisto College contemplates the establishment of classrooms, dormitories, faculty housing, administrative offices, a library, day-care facilities for faculty, a testing lab, a computer center, a visual arts studio, a gymnasium, laboratory space, a dance studio, a student services center, and therapy-related facilities. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶¶ 6, 16; First Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 14; Glines at 98-99. 11. By virtue of its function and layout, DeSisto College causes greater movement of persons and automobiles than ordinary residential owners of property in Howey. DeSisto College also has greater parking requirements than ordinary residential owners of property in Howey. Parking requirements and the movement of persons in residential areas would grow as the College increased in size to its projected size of 160 students or beyond. First Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶¶ 6 & 15; Second Supplemental Affidavit Of Marsha Glines 117. Such movement of persons and automobiles must by necessity cause greater noise than would otherwise exist in residential areas. Furthermore, present operations of DeSisto College and its planned operations are more intensive uses of property than ordinary residential use of property. C. Acquisition Of Property By DeSisto College 12. In the spring of 1985, Michael De-Sisto hired Marsha Glines to serve as Executive Director of the DeSisto College Project. The purpose of the project was to initiate steps to acquire property and hire faculty and staff for a college which was to serve learning disabled students. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 2. 13. By September, 1986, the College used or occupied the following property in Howey: 1) a classroom and dining room facility located at 507 South Palm Avenue, 2) a dormitory building, called the “transition house,” located at 509 South Palm Avenue, 3) a single-family house at 110 South Palm Avenue, 4) 411 South Palm Avenue, 5) 308 South Palm Avenue, 6) 703 North Lakeshore Boulevard, and 7) 800 North Palm Avenue as the residence and office of Marsha Glines. All of these facilities are located in Howey’s residential zoning districts. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶¶ 3, 6, 8-9. 14. As with the property used by DeSis-to Howey, all of the property used by the College prior to September, 1986, with the exception of the president’s residence, was located in the southern section of the town. Affidavit of Ronald Glines ¶ 4. Defendants Mazade and Line, together with other past and present town officials, reside in the northern section of Howey. Affidavit of Ronald Glines, Exhibit A. The town is, however, only sixteen blocks long from north to south, and four blocks wide from east to west. Map of Howey, Comprehensive Land Use Development Plan at 1-3, filed June 13, 1988; Map of Howey, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 19. 15. Marsha Glines first occupied the property at 800 North Palm Avenue in December, 1985. From that time to the present, that property, in addition to serving as Glines’s residence, has served as one of the administrative offices first of the DeSisto College Project and subsequently for its successor, DeSisto College, Inc. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines 116. 16. On September 8, 1986, the LaMan-cha Partnership acquired property at 703 North Lakeshore Boulevard. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 9. Sometime thereafter in early September, 1986, the College entered into a lease of the property at 703 North Lakeshore Boulevard. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶¶ 8-9. 17. On August 22, 1985, Marsha Glines, together with a real estate broker from Howey, Louisa Wrobel [hereinafter “Wro-bel”], appeared at a meeting of the Howey Zoning Commission. Wrobel at 17, In. 15. Wrobel had filed a request that the College be permitted to use the property. First Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 9. Two former Mayors of the town, Fletcher Bishop and Sam Adams [hereinafter “Adams”], also attended the meeting. Bishop at 120, In 13 to 126, In. 19. Glines also stated that the property would be used for conference rooms or administrative offices for the College, and for counseling purposes. Wrobel at 17, In. 25. Affidavit of Bishop ¶ 5. 18. In response to Marsha Glines’s statements, Edmond Stachowski, then-chairman of the Zoning Commission, expressed his opinion that the property could not be used for “college purposes.” Wrobel at 18, In. 15; Bishop at 120, In. 18. At that point, Wrobel interjected and explained to Chairman Stachowski that the property was located in an R-1 district which permitted “school” use. Wrobel at 18, In. 21; Bishop at 120, In. 19. 19. After some discussion among the committee members, Chairman Stachowski then changed his opinion and agreed that the proposed use was a permitted one under the Howey Zoning Ordinance. Bishop at 122, In. 19; Wrobel at 21, In. 11. Chairman Stachowski said that it was not necessary for the College to file an application with the Zoning Commission for authorization to use the property. Wrobel at 22, In. 5; Bishop at 123, In. 9; Affidavit of Bishop ¶ 6. Adams recounted similar facts. Affidavit of Adams ¶¶ 4-5; Adams at 17, In. 12-24. 20. On March 24, 1986, the Florida State Board of Independent Colleges and Universities granted temporary licensure to DeSisto College. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 7. The College decided to hold a party in celebration of its licensure. Invitations were sent to a number of the defendants and the party was, in fact, attended by defendants Line and Mazade. Line I at 231, In. 23. 21. At various times, Marsha Glines spoke to various community groups concerning the College, including the Town of Howey Men’s Club and the Town of Howey Women’s Civic and Garden Club. Deposition of Marsha Glines at 98, In. 18-25. By April, 1986, it was common knowledge in the town that the College would be opening the following fall. See, e.g., Mazade I at 121, In. 25 to 122, In. 9; Line I at 234, In. 5-10; see also Warner II at 42, In. 18-22. 22. In May, 1986, at the suggestion of Mazade, then a member of the Town Council, Mayor Fletcher Bishop decided to schedule a “Mayor’s Forum” to discuss the opening of the College. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 8; Bishop at 107, In. 4 to 108, In. 3-7. The Mayor’s Forum, which was held in June, 1986, was announced at a meeting of the Town Council and was publicized in the local newspaper, the Howey Herald, First Affidavit of Marsha Glines 118. 23. The College participated in the “Mayor’s Forum” on June 16, 1986. The forum was attended by a number of public officials of the town, including then-Mayor Fletcher Bishop and approximately 50 Howey residents. At the forum, Marsha Glines distributed copies of the College’s catalogue. She also answered questions from town residents, including questions as to where students would be living. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 17; Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines 117. 24. Glines stated that, as a condition of the College’s licensure, it would have to grow to approximately 160 students within four years. There is, however, nothing in the record to indicate that there is any upper limit on the number of students that DeSisto College could or would in the future enroll. Glines stated that some students would require close supervision and would reside in the College’s dormitory referred to as the “transition house,” a dormitory building which presently accommodates approximately 24 students and is located on the west side of State Route 19 opposite the DeSisto High School. Glines explained that other College students would be residing in private homes within the community or in private homes outside of Howey. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 7; Bishop at 110, In. 1 to 113, In. 17. 25. On October 8, 1986, the Howey Zoning Commission approved an “Authorization for Building Permit Application” for property used by the College. This permit allowed DeSisto College to “replace garage door opening with windows and wall — remove cement driveway.” Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 10. D. Zoning In Howey Prior to December 25, 1986 26. In March, 1967, Howey adopted a Zoning Ordinance. Under the ordinance, the town was divided into four different districts, R-1, R-2, R-3 and C-1. The ordinance set forth various permitted uses. Appendix A, Zoning, Code of Ordinances of the Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, Florida, [hereinafter “1967 Zoning Ordinance”], Editor’s Note at 947, Exhibit 2 to Second Supplemental Affidavit of M. Glines. 27. Until December 25, 1986, Section 6(1)(A)(2) of the 1967 Zoning Ordinance [hereinafter “Section 6(1)(A)(2)”] provided that “schools, elementary, high and private, but excluding correctional institutions” were permitted uses in R-1, R-2 and R-3 districts. This same language was contained in a Zoning Ordinance of the town which pre-dated the existence of the Academy. Zoning Ordinance, Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, Adopted December 4, 1950, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1. 28. Under section 6(3)(A)(1) of the 1967 Zoning Ordinance, any use permitted in R-l, R-2, and R-3 districts was permitted in a C-l district. Thus, prior to its repeal on December 25, 1986, the 1967 Zoning Ordinance permitted the use of property for “school, elementary, high, and private but excluding correctional institutions” in all areas of the town. In addition, various other uses were permitted as a matter of right in residential zoning districts until December 25, 1986, including libraries, community centers, government buildings, churches and home offices for physicians or surgeons. 1967 Zoning Ordinance, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2. E. The September 29, 1986, Citation Letter 29. On September 8, 1986, Diane Brownlee, the College’s admissions officer, telephoned defendant Line, and informed him that the College had leased the Lake-shore Boulevard property. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 10; Brownlee at 64, In. 14 to 65, In. 17. 30. The original purpose of the College’s acquisition of the Lakeshore Boulevard property was to use it as a faculty residence and a part-time tutoring or therapy facility. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Glines 119. The property was, however, later used as a classroom. Second Suppler mental Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 16. Sykes at 41-42; Murphy at 34, In. 7 to 35, In. 21. 31. Defendant Line responded to Brownlee by expressing his opposition to the College’s acquisition of the property. Brownlee at 64, In. 14 to 65, In. 17. 32. On the same day of Brownlee’s telephone conversation with defendant Line, a meeting of the Zoning Commission was scheduled. The posted agenda for the meeting was a discussion of the enforcement of the Zoning Code in the town. The meeting was scheduled to take place at 6:30 p.m. on September 8, immediately prior to a meeting of the Town Council. At the meeting, members of the Zoning Commission discussed the College’s acquisition of the Lakeshore Boulevard property. Warner II at 28, In. 13 to 32, In. 2. 33. On September 22, 1986, the Howey Zoning Commission convened its next meeting. The meeting also concerned the College’s acquisition of the 703 North Lake-shore Boulevard property. The meeting was chaired by the defendant Line. Unlike most meetings of the Zoning Commission, which were sparsely attended, approximately one hundred town residents were in attendance. First Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 11; Warner II at 6, In. 13-17 & 21. 34. Ronald Glines began the meeting by making a presentation on behalf of the College. Ronald Glines served from May through October 1986, as a consultant to the College. Affidavit of Ronald Glines ¶ 1. 35. When Ronald Glines was unable to answer all of the questions posed by the audience, Marsha Glines agreed to respond to questions. She stated that no classes would be held at the Lakeshore Boulevard house and that the property would be used as a faculty residence and a study hall/therapy center between the hours of 3:30 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. The College had no plans for students to reside at the Lake-shore Boulevard house. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 13; Willis, at 48, In. 3, 18. 36. The Zoning Commission voted to refer the question of the College’s use of the property to the town attorney for an opinion. Minutes Of The Meeting Of The Zoning Commission on September 22, 1986, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 11. Michael Croak was Town Counsel from 1977 to December, 1986. Croak, at 4, In. 9-10. 37. The next meeting of the Zoning Commission was held on September 27, 1986. Prior to this time, defendant Line had met with Michael Croak. Croak at 14, In. 3 to 15, In. 21. The result of the defendant Line’s meeting with Croak was a one-paragraph letter from Croak dated September 26, 1986. The letter addressed the question of the legality of the use of property as a “college classroom or office” in a residential zoning district and was appended to the September 28, 1986, citation letter. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4 at 2. Croak expressed two reasons why a college classroom or office in a residential district would violate the Zoning Ordinance. Croak opined that such a use would violate the town’s ordinance “establishing the districts,” and would also “violate the town ordinance on building permits inasmuch as this would be a different use than as described in the original building permit issued for the property.” Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4 at 2. 38. Croak did not undertake any legal research with respect to his letter of September 26, 1986. Croak at 21, In. 4-8. Croak’s opinion of September 26, 1986, was a “preliminary” one. Croak at 23, In. 1-11. The letter reflected both Croak’s own personal opinion as to the legality of the use as well as defendant Line’s position that the College’s use of the Lakeshore property was illegal. Croak at 17, In. 1-9, & 36, In. 14-15; Croak at P-1. Croak’s final opinion expressing the same conclusion with some reservations as to the certainty of his interpretation of the ordinance is contained in his letter to Line dated October 27, 1986. See Defendant’s Exhibit 1, Croak Affidavit ¶ 4. 39. At the time that Croak rendered his opinion, he was unaware of a number of facts. He did not know that the College had been occupying property in residential zoning districts since April, 1986. Croak at 25, In. 6-11. Likewise, Croak was unaware of the August 22, 1985, meeting of the Zoning Commission. Croak at 26, In. 16 to 28, In. 11. He was unaware of the “May- or’s Forum” held in June, 1986. Croak at 26, In. 11-15. 40. At no time had the College represented that the property at 703 North Lakeshore Boulevard would be used for an office or for a college classroom. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 15; Defendants’ Exhibit 7. Although no such representation was made, the property was in fact used for classroom purposes. Sykes at 41-42; Murphy at 34, In. 7 to 35, In. 21; Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 16. See also supra Background Facts ¶ 30. 41. At the meeting of the Zoning Commission on September 27, 1986, the members of the Commission discussed the enforcement of the Zoning Ordinance against DeSisto College in its use of the North Lakeshore Boulevard property. Commission member Patricia Warner expressed her concern that the Zoning Ordinance was not always enforced in the past. Warner at 52, In. 8-15. Defendant Line expressed his view that enforcement of zoning regulations and construction standards was especially important as applied to public assembly buildings such as colleges. 42. The Commission members, including Commission member Warner, voted unanimously to notify the owners of the North Lakeshore Boulevard property that they were in violation of the Zoning Ordinance. Minutes Of Special Zoning Commission Meeting, September 27, 1986, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 12. That college students drive automobiles, that DeSisto College in particular would have greater parking requirements than an ordinary residential owner of property, that the movement of DeSisto College students and their automobiles would cause greater noise than would exist without the College being located in residential areas, and that college use is a more intensive use of property than ordinary residential use, were facts before the Zoning Commission when it voted to cite DeSisto College for violating the Zoning Ordinance. 43. On September 29, 1986, defendant Line sent a letter to Michael DeSisto, advising him that the Lakeshore Boulevard property could not be used as a “classroom, meeting house or other college uses”. Defendant Line’s letter to DeSisto also included a copy of Croak’s letter of September 26, 1986, and a copy of the Howey Zoning Code pertaining to building permits. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4. F. Ordinances 160, 161, and 162 44. In October, 1986, Croak drafted Ordinances 160, 161, and 162, for the purpose of clarifying the zoning regulations as they applied to, among other things, the legality of colleges in residential areas. Croak at 51-52, 65-66; Affidavit of Croak ¶¶ 10-11; Letter dated October 27, 1986, Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 21. Under Ordinance 160, various uses of property, including school use, were removed as permitted uses in residential zoning districts. Defendants’ Exhibit 17. Defendant Line also proposed Ordinance 161, which allowed for the creation of a “public facility district” [hereinafter “PFD”] in all zoning districts of the town. Defendants’ Exhibit 18. Under this ordinance, uses more intensive than a college, such as hospitals, electric plants, railroad systems, airports, and stadiums, were required to satisfy the requirements of the ordinance. Defendants’ Exhibit 18. Ordinance 162 limited the number of unrelated individuals who could live in a residential home to three. 46.Croak was discharged from his position as Town Counsel in December, 1986. Croak at 62, In. 2-7. Richard Langly was appointed as Croak’s replacement on December 8,1986. Mazade I at 212, In. 16-22; Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 28. 46. On December 1, 1986, the Town Council convened for a first reading of Ordinances 160 and 161. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 15. On December 15, 1986, the Town Council convened for a second reading of Ordinances 160 and 161, and on that date passed the two ordinances, Ordinances 160 and 161. Plaintiffs Exhibit 17. These ordinances became effective on December 25, 1986, and have remained in effect since that time. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 18. Ordinance 162 was adopted January, 5,1987, and took effect on January 15, 1987. Fourth Amended Complaint ¶ 69; Defendant’s Answer ¶ 69; Defendant’s Exhibit 19. That college students drive automobiles, that DeSisto College in particular would have greater parking requirements than ordinary residential owners of property, that the movement of DeSisto College students and their automobiles would cause greater noise than would exist without the College being located in residential areas, and that college use is a more intensive use of property than ordinary residential use, were facts before the Town Council when it voted to enact Ordinances 160, 161, and 162. G. The Change Of Use Application 47. On September 29, 1986, defendant Line sent Michael DeSisto a letter which stated that the College’s use of the Lake-shore Boulevard property was in violation of the town’s Zoning Ordinance. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3. 48. In an effort to resolve the matter, the College filed a “change of use” application on November 25,1986. In the application, the College contended that authorization from the Commission was unnecessary because the Zoning Commission had no authority to deny a landowner the right to use his property for a use which was already permitted in a particular zoning district. The College’s application was filed with a reservation of rights. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 16. 49. A hearing on the application was held before the Zoning Commission on December 11, 1986. Richard Langley represented the Zoning Commission. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 23. The College’s application to use the 703 Lakeshore Boulevard property for college purposes was denied by the Zoning Commission. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 16. H. Citations of December 19, 1986 50. The Howey Mansion is located on approximately 15 acres of land in the northern section of Howey. Second Supplemental Affidavit of Marsha Glines ¶ 18. 51. On December 19, 1986, defendant Line met with defendant Mazade at the offices of the Line Construction Company in Tavares, Florida. Mazade I at 171, In. 23 to 172, In. 8. During their meeting, a series of “citation” letters were typed by Line’s secretary on town stationery on behalf of Mazade. Mazade I at 172, In. 12-14. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5. That college students drive automobiles, that DeSisto College in particular would have greater parking requirements than ordinary residential owners of property, that the movement of DeSisto College students and their automobiles would cause greater noise than would exist without the College being located in residential areas, and that college use is a more intensive use of property than ordinary residential use, were facts before the Mayor and the Chairman of the Zoning Commission when they decided to cite De-Sisto College for violating the Zoning Ordinance. 52. In one letter, defendant Mazade cited the College for violating the use provisions of the Zoning Ordinance with respect to the College’s use of the Mansion. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5 at 5-6. The letter states that “colleges are not allowed under this use regulation in the Town of Howey-in-the-Hills.” Id. Mazade also cited the College for using the Mansion property for a use other than the use set forth in the Mansion’s original building permit. Id. Finally Mazade cited the College for having more than six unrelated individuals living in the Mansion. Id. 53. Town Council member Joyce Powers wrote a letter to Mayor Mazade calling for a Town Council meeting on December 29, 1986, to discuss among other things the December 19, 1986, citation of the College. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 29. Mazade called a special meeting of the Town Council for December 29, 1986. Over one hundred residents attended the meeting. Pretrial Stipulation, Stipulated Fact 14. 54. Howey government officials have not enforced Howey’s Zoning Ordinances against all persons who have in the past been in violation of the zoning ordinances. I. Articulated Purposes For Governmental Actions 55. Michael Croak, the attorney who drafted Ordinances 160, 161, and 162, stated in his affidavit that based on his personal observations, the enforcement of the zoning code against Desisto College was based on concern for protecting the residential character of the town. See Affidavit of Michael Croak 119, Appendix To Defendants’ Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit 1. Croak stated that the residential character of the town would benefit from maintenance of a low level of vehicular traffic, Croak at 72, and the exclusion of boarding houses. Croak at 68. 56. Similarly, defendant Thomas P. Line suggested at the October 27, 1986, meeting of the Zoning Commission that the enforcement of the Zoning Ordinance against the College promoted the “privacy, tranquility, lifestyle, and the peaceful and quiet atmosphere.” See Minutes Of Zoning Board Of October 27, 1986, Appendix To Defendants’ Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit 16 at page m/z 28, Appendix In Support Of Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit 15. Line made similar remarks in his deposition. Line at 129, In. 19-23. Other Howey government officials expressed similar concerns. See Pratt at 236, In. 16-24, 239, In. 4-7; Griffin at 198, In. 25 to 199, In. 25; Washo at 103, In. 20 to 104, In. 3, 114, In. 16-25, 115, In. 6-14, 129, In. 11-23. 57. A seventeen-page petition dated November 10,1986, indicates that the signatories wished to “restrict R-1, R-2, and R-3 districts for private single family residences only, to maintain our town’s serenity ... [and] to preserve the residential character of [their] neighborhood.” See Petition, Appendix To Defendants’ Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit 20. 58. Plaintiffs’ legal advisors, the Director of Desisto High School, and Michael DeSisto recognized at least the articulation of the purpose of preserving the residential character of Howey. See DeSisto, 8/21/87, at 10, In. 17 to 13, In. 11, 93 In. 6-12; Doktor, at 10, In. 22 to 11, In. 14; Plaintiffs Exhibit 44, Memorandum From M. Morley to H.D. Robuck, legal advisors of DeSisto College, at 3-4. 59. A number of citizens and government officials of Howey made derogatory statements at public gatherings, public meetings, private meetings, and in newspaper interviews concerning DeSisto College and the students at the College. IV. Standard Of Review A district court’s review of a case on a motion for summary judgment is governed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A moving party discharges its burden on a motion for summary judgment by “showing” or “pointing out” to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 permits the moving party to discharge its burden with or without supporting affidavits and to move for summary judgment on the case as a whole or on any claim. 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. When a moving party has so discharged its burden, the nonmoving party must then “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The district court must enter summary judgment “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Whether or not the moving party has met its burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, requires the court to draw inferences from the evidence as viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and to resolve all reasonable doubts in that party’s favor. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained the reasonableness standard in WSB-TV v. Lee, 842 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir.1988): In deciding whether an inference is reasonable, the court must “cull the universe of possible inferences from the facts established by weighing each against the abstract standard of reasonableness.” ... The opposing party’s inferences need not be more probable than those inferences in favor of the movant to create a factual dispute, so long as they reasonably may be drawn from the facts— When more than one inference reasonably can be drawn, it is for the trier of fact to determine the proper one. 842 F.2d at 1270 (citations omitted). Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) requires the district court to deny a motion for summary judgment if the court finds that there exists a genuine issue for trial. What constitutes a “genuine issue for trial” was addressed by the Supreme Court in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In Anderson, the Court stated that “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The Court further stated that the inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12. V. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint The Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint seeks inter alia the following relief: A) a declaration that under Florida law the meaning of the word “school” as it appears in the use regulations of the 1967 Zoning Ordinance includes the Plaintiff College’s use, see Count V; B) a declaration that Ordinance 161 is unconstitutionally vague on its face under the substantive due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see Count IV; C) a declaration that the defendants’ citation of the College on September 29, 1986, and December 19, 1986, for violating Section 6(1)(A)(2) of the Town’s 1967 Zoning Ordinance violates the College’s substantive due process rights and both the College’s and Loren Homer’s equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment, see Counts I, II, III, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI; D) a declaration that Ordinance 160 violates Desisto College’s substantive due process rights and both the College’s and Loren Homer’s equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment, see Counts I, VI, VII; E) a declaration that the town’s passing Ordinances 161 and 162 violated plaintiffs’ equal protection rights under the fourteenth amendment, see Counts VI, VII. The Court will first determine whether or not the term “school,” as used in the 1967 Zoning Ordinance, includes “college” use. The Court will then determine whether or not Ordinance 161 is unconstitutionally vague on its face. Finally, the Court will address the equal protection and substantive due process claims. A. The Term “School” In Section 6(1)(A)(2) Of The 1967 Zoning Ordinance The parties have each filed motions for summary judgment on Count V of the Fourth Amended Complaint. They each agreed at the hearing on the motions for summary judgment that the Court did not need to resolve any factual issues to rule on the motions and that the motions raised only questions of law. This Court agrees that statutory construction is a question of law. See Devin v. Hollywood, 351 So.2d 1022, 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). The issue raised by Count V is whether or not the term “school” in Section 6(1)(A)(2) of the 1967 Zoning Ordinance includes colleges. Plaintiffs argue that colleges are schools under the ordinance. Defendants argue that colleges are not schools under the ordinance. The Court will first outline Florida’s law of statutory construction applicable to this case and then apply that law in construing Section 6(1)(A)(2). The goal of statutory interpretation is to determine legislative intent. See Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So.2d 833, 836 (Fla.1963). Where legislative intent is not clear, however, Florida Courts have designed rules of construction to aid in the search for legislative intent. See Lanier v. Bronson, 215 So.2d 776, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). These rules of construction are equally applicable to the construction of municipal ordinances as to other statutes. See Carroll v. City of Miami Beach, 198 So.2d 643, 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). It is a general principle of statutory construction, well-established in Florida’s jurisprudence, that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another, expressio unius est exclusion alterius. See Towerhouse Condominium, Inc. v. Millman, 475 So.2d 674, 676 (Fla.1985); Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla.1976); Ideal Farms Drainage Dist. v. Certain Lands, 19 So.2d 234, 239 (Fla.1944). Therefore, where a statute enumerates the things on which it is to operate, the statute will ordinarily be construed as excluding from its operation all those things not expressly mentioned. Id. Another principle of statutory construction is that words take meaning based on their context or their association with other words in the statute, noscitur a sociis. See State ex rel. Triay v. Burr, 84 So. 61, 73-75 (Fla.1920); Orange County Audubon Soc. v. Hold, 276 So.2d 542, 543 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Where one of the enumerated terms is a general one, it may be restricted to a narrower sense or less general meaning by the context in which it is used. See Carraway v. Armour & Co., 156 So.2d 494, 495 (Fla.1963); Ex parte Amos, 112 So. 289, 293 (Fla.1927). If the legislature excludes a thing by omission from the statute, a court may not in the process of construction supply the omission. See Brooks v. Anastasia Mosquito Control Dist., 148 So.2d 64, 66 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963). The final principle of statutory construction applicable to this case requires a court 1) to presume that the legislature puts every provision in a statute for a purpose and 2) to construe the statute to give each of the statute’s provisions effect, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. See Forehand v. Board of Public Instruction, 166 So.2d 668, 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). A construction that would leave any part of the language in a statute without effect should be rejected. See Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So.2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). Section 6(1)(A)(2) of the 1967 Zoning Ordinance provides in pertinent part as follows: Section 6. Schedule of district regulations — Use regulations; height and area regulations; prohibited regulations. (1) Use regulation-R-1, R-2, R-S districts. (A) In the R-l and R-2 and R-3 single-family districts, no building or land shall be used and no building shall hereafter be erected, constructed, reconstructed, structurally altered, repaired or moved unless otherwise provided in this ordinance, except for one of the following uses: (2) Schools, elementary, high, and private, except correctional institutions. Code of Ordinances of the Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, Florida, Appendix A, Zoning, Section 6(1)(A)(2). The Court finds that the term “school” is an ambiguous term. It is unclear whether or not the term does or does not include college in its meaning. The parties have presented the Court with numerous cases from various jurisdictions in which courts have diverged on the question whether or not a college is a school. The Court notes that these courts interpreted statutes with language different from the ordinance in this case. The parties have also presented the Court with various statutory definitions of the term “school” that are in conflict. Various dictionaries also diverge on the issue. Despite the general ambiguity of the term, the Court finds under the various applicable principles of statutory construction that Howey’s legislative authority did not intend the term “school” to include colleges in Section 6(1)(A)(2). The term “school” in Section 6(1)(A)(2) is a general term followed by a series of specific types of schools. Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius, the Court finds that the enumeration of specific types of schools in Section 6(1)(A)(2), implies the exclusion of other specific types of schools that were not mentioned. These other specific types of schools cannot be included under the general term “school.” Therefore, even if this Court considered a college to be a school, that was not the intent of the legislature that promulgated Section 6(1)(A)(2). Furthermore, under the doctrine of nos-citur a sodis, the specific types of schools following the general term “school” narrow the meaning of the general term. Thus, the meaning of the word school in context is restricted to those types of schools enumerated. Because a college is not one of the specific types of schools enumerated, it is excluded. Finally, under the doctrine of ut res magis valeat quam pereat, a construction that included unenumerated specific types of schools like colleges, would render the inclusion of specific types of schools like elementary and high schools unnecessary to the statute and, therefore, meaningless. Because a college is at best a specific type of school, even if the Court found that a college could be a school, that was not the intention of the legislative authority in enacting Section 6(1)(A)(2). The Court disagrees with plaintiffs’ argument that because Howey’s zoning regulations are in derogation of Desisto College’s private rights of ownership they should, therefore, be interpreted in favor of the property owner. Although plaintiffs have articulated a valid principle of statutory construction, that principle will not be applied where legislative intent to the contrary is clear. See Hoffman v. Brevard County Board Of Commissioners, 390 So.2d 445, 446 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Based on the foregoing analysis of legislative intent, the Court finds that legislative intent is clear and that the Court need not construe the ambiguity in the term “school” in Section 6(1)(A)(2) in plaintiffs’ favor. The Court also disagrees with plaintiffs’ argument that the exclusion of “correctional institutions” from Section 6(1)(A)(2) indicates a legislative intent that the term school is broad enough to include colleges. To the contrary, the exclusion of correctional institutions is a further refinement of the specific types of schools. This Court agrees with defendants’ suggestion that the exclusion is intended to exclude reform schools which are either elementary, high, or private schools. The exclusion was not intended to broaden the meaning of the term school or otherwise cause the term school to include colleges. Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to Count V and grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Count V. B. Facial Challenge Of Ordinance 160 For Vagueness The standards for evaluating the vagueness of a statute or ordinance were enunciated in Grayned v. City Of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). First, a person must be given a reasonable opportunity to know what the law prohibits so that he may act accordingly. Id. Second, in order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, laws must provide explicit standards. Id. These standards should not, however, be mechanically applied, because the degree of vagueness tolerated by the constitution “depends in part on the nature of the enactment.” Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). Economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). Moreover, laws which contain only civil penalties, are also given greater tolerance. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 1098, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115 (1959). The speculative danger of arbitrary enforcement does not render an ordinance void for vagueness in a preenforcement challenge to the law. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 503-04, 102 S.Ct. at 1195-96. A “facial” challenge is a claim that the law is “invalid in toto — and therefore, incapable of any valid application.” Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. at 1191 n. 5 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1223, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974)). On review of a statute for facial constitutionality, a federal court must consider limiting constructions that state authorities have proffered. Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. at 1191 n. 5 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)). Plaintiffs argue that Ordinance 161 is unconstitutionally vague on its face. Defendants argue that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague because Howey’s Comprehensive Development Plan is incorporated by express reference in Ordinance 161 and is also necessarily applied in any zoning decision pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 163.3194. Similarly, defendants argue that Howey’s Comprehensive Development Plan requires that its standards be applied in enforcing each and every ordinance. Defendants argue that f lorida courts have approved the incorporation of a town’s comprehensive plan by reference in an ordinance and that such ordinances will not be considered vague. See Alachua County v. Eagle’s Nest Farms, Inc., 473 So.2d 257, 261 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Plaintiffs respond that the ordinance does not incorporate the Comprehensive Development Plan by reference. Plaintiffs argue that the only reference to the plan in the ordinance is one that requires the Director of Planning, or other person designated by the Town Council to “check compliance with the Comprehensive Development Plan.” Plaintiffs argue that this cannot be construed as a requirement that applicants for a Public Facilities District designation comply with the Comprehensive Development Plan. Plaintiffs apparently concede that if the Comprehensive Development Plan is incorporated by reference, that ordinance provides adequate standards to give it fair notice of what the law requires. The Court finds that Ordinance 161 incorporates the Comprehensive Development Plan by reference. First, if the Director of Planning is to “check compliance” with the Comprehensive Development Plan, failure to comply would a fortiori require denial of the application. Unless such compliance is deemed a mandatory requirement of the Ordinance, the legislature’s inclusion of the language in the ordinance would be rendered meaningless. Such an interpretation should be avoided. Second, the ordinance should be interpreted so as to make it constitutional. If incorporation of the Comprehensive Development Plan is a reasonable interpretation and such incorporation renders the ordinance constitutional, it is incumbent on this Court to make such an interpretation. Third, as an economic regulation with only civil penalties, the ordinance must be given greater tolerance. Fourth, the Court finds that the possibility of discriminatory enforcement judged only from the face of the ordinance is speculative. Finally, this Court finds that the ordinance is capable of valid application and that the limiting constructions proffered by state authorities render the statute constitutional. Accordingly, the Court will deny the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on Count IV and grant defendant’s motion on that count. C. Equal Protection Claims The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment mandates that “[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. This provision requires that “similarly situated” persons receive equal treatment from the government. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982)). If a person challenges a state created classification under the equal protection clause and the classification does not affect “fundamental rights” or use a “suspect classification,” a federal court must presume that the classification is valid, and uphold the classification if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. City of Cleburne 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). Rationality review has been described as “lenient.” Exxon Corporation v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 195, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 2308, 76 L.Ed.2d 497 (1983). In conducting this analysis, federal courts must keep in mind that states are accorded wide latitude in regulating their local economies, and they may make rational distinctions or classifications among persons “with less than mathematical exactitude.” New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108, 99 S.Ct. 939, 948, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 825 F.2d 367, 371 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 1022, 98 L.Ed.2d 987 (1988). See also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254. 1. The Legitimate Governmental Purpose As to the first prong of the equal protection review, whether or not a particular classification has a legitimate purpose, a court need not discover the actual purpose the legislature had for its actions. See United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 461, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980); see also Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d 1211, 1218-19 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Middleton, 690 F.2d 820, 822-23 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051, 103 S.Ct. 1497, 75 L.Ed.2d 929 (1983); Equity Group Holdings v. DMG, Inc., 576 F.Supp. 1197, 1205-06 (S.D.Fla.1983) (“The Court infers that the legislature means what it does not say, as well as what it explicitly has set forth in the laws it has passed”); cf. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448, 105 S.Ct. at 3258 (finding that special zoning requirement was not supported by “any rational basis”). It is enough if the legislation is supported by plausible or hypothesized reasons. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179, 101 S.Ct. at 461. It is “constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision.” Id. (quoting Flem ming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). A court will, therefore, accept contemporaneous statements of legislative purposes, or, in the absence thereof, rationales constructed after the fact, as the actual purpose of legislative action, unless “an examination of the circumstances forces [the court] to conclude that [the plausible or hypothesized purposes] ‘could not have been a goal of the legislation.’ ” Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 715, 723 n. 7, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 1233 n. 16, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975)) (emphasis added); Hancock Industries v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225, 237 (3d Cir.1987); Christian Science Reading Room Jointly Maintained v. City And County Of San Francisco, 792 F.2d 124, 124 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1066, 107 S.Ct. 953, 93 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1987); Stern v. Tarrant County Hospital, 778 F.2d 1052, 1060-61 (5th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108, 106 S.Ct. 1957, 90 L.Ed.2d 365 (1986); Shelton v. City Of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 484 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905, 106 S.Ct. 3276, 91 L.Ed.2d 566 (1986) (substantive due process); Scott v. City of Sioux City, Iowa, 736 F.2d 1207, 1216 n.11 (8th Cir.1984). See also Alamo Rent-A-Car, 825 F.2d at 372; E & T Realty v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107, 1115-16 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 108 S.Ct. 1225, 99 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988) (Circuit Judge Kravitch concurring in part and dissenting in part). A district court may not substitute its own judgment as to the wisdom or utility of legislative purpose for that of local legislatures. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469, 101 S.Ct. 715, 726, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 1030, 10 L