Full opinion text
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW LEINENWEBER, District Judge. COMPLAINT FINDINGS OF FACT 1.Plaintiff in this action is the South Suburban Housing Center, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation (“SSHC” or “Housing Center”). The SSHC carries on its activities within a Chicago, Illinois suburban area that is described in No. 4 of these Findings of Fact. The SSHC states that its purposes are to “promote and encourage multi-racial communities in the South Suburbs” of Chicago and “promote open housing to all people regardless of race.” (Tr. 170, 346-47, Klepper; PX23) The SSHC’s activities include providing assistance to homeseekers, “testing” for discriminatory real estate practices and suing those found to be engaged in such practices, conducting fair housing educational programs for realtors, apartment rental agents and the public, and assisting various government units in carrying out fair housing efforts. (Tr. 190-92, 215, 253-59, 266-67, 259-61, 286-89, Klepper) Christine Klepper (“Klep-per”) has been the Executive Director of the SSHC from 1980 to the present. (Tr. 190, Klepper) 2. The first named of two defendants in this action is the Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors (the “GSSBR” or the “Board”). The GSSBR, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, is an association of licensed real estate brokers and salesmen and a local affiliate of the other named defendant in this action, the National Association of Realtors (“NAR”). (Counterclaim, 113) The GSSBR carries on its activities within approximately the same Chicago, Illinois suburban area in which the SSHC operates, and operates therein a real estate multiple listing service (“MLS”) that is described in Nos. 25-27 of these Findings of Fact. Robert Turpin (“Turpin”) was Executive Vice President of the GSSBR for “close to twenty years” and the chief operating officer of the GSSBR MLS at all times relevant to this action. (Tr. 625-27) 3. The second named defendant in this action is the NAR, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, and an association of licensed real estate brokers and salesmen which provides policy guidance and materials and services of various sorts to its local affiliates, including the GSSBR. (Counterclaim, ¶ 2; Tr. 1471-80, North) William D. North (“North”) was Senior Vice President and General Counsel of the NAR from 1980 to 1986, at which time he became Executive Vice President of the NAR. (Tr. 1459-63, 2114-15, North) 4. Both the SSHC and the GSSBR carry on their respective activities within approximately the same area in south Cook County and a small portion of northern Will County, Illinois. The area referred to (the “South Suburban Area”) includes approximately thirty-seven municipalities and is bordered on the north by the southern border of the City of Chicago, on the west roughly by Harlem Avenue or Interstate 57, on the south roughly by the northern border of Will County (except that a few Will County communities are included in the South Suburban Area), and on the east by the Indiana state line. (Tr. 171-72, Klepper; Tr. 373-75, Pearson) The South Suburban Area 5. As of 1970 the suburban communities south and southwest of Chicago had almost no black residents, including the communities immediately west and northwest of the South Suburban Area, Alsip, Burbank, Bridgeview, Chicago Ridge, Evergreen Park, Hickory Hills, Hometown, Oak Forest, Oak Lawn, Orland Park, Palos Hills, Palos Park, Palos Heights, Tinley Park, West Haven and Worth (collectively the “Southwest Suburban Area”). (MX500A; MX481A and 481C) In the South Suburban Area however several small communities, such as Robbins and Phoenix, had virtually all black populations from their inception; a few communities, such as Blue Island and Chicago Heights, had substantial black enclaves for many years; and a few others, such as Park Forest and University Park, had growing non-negligible black populations. Id. 6. During the period from 1970 to 1980 some communities in the central corridor of the South Suburban Area, directly south of the south side of Chicago, experienced substantial racial change while communities to the east and to the west continued to have negligible black populations. (Tr. 6843-48, Orfield; Tr. 1107-08, K. Williams; MX500A) For example, by 1980 the population of University Park had become 44.3 percent black; the population of both Harvey and Markham had become about two-thirds black; and the population of Calumet Park and Chicago Heights had become 30 percent and 28.8 percent black, respectively. (MX500A) In municipalities immediately adjacent to these communities there was also significant racial change; the populations of Country Club Hills, Hazel Crest and Matteson each changed from less than one percent to approximately 12 percent black. Id. During the same decade some communities in the eastern portion of the South Suburban Area and the entirety of the Southwest Suburban Area remained with negligible black populations. (Tr. 1107, K. Williams; Tr. 6845-46, Orfield; MX481A and 481B; MX500A) Racial enrollment data for elementary school districts indicates that since 1980 the same pattern of racial change has continued and in some cases accelerated in communities in the South Suburban Area, while the black population of the Southwest Suburban Area has remained negligible. (Tr. 6860-62, Or-field; MX480-81, 481A, D and E) 7. These racial settlement patterns in the South Suburban Area, where historically all white areas experience integration and are subsequently threatened with re-segregation, result from a complex mix of market forces. These market forces include racial prejudice: some whites and some blacks prefer to live in segregated communities; the belief that high concentrations of blacks result in a drop in home values; the expectation that an integrated community will eventually become segregated; and housing search practices that are reinforced by certain real estate practices. (Tr. 621; 4483-84; 6809-10) 8. Certain real estate practices tend to exacerbate the problem. Realtors, like any salesmen, adopt marketing strategies that will maximize sales at minimum effort. For example, since realtors make more money selling in house listings, realtors push these houses. Since black realtors tend to have listings from black clients they tend to push listings in black or integrated neighborhoods to their prospects who also are mostly black. White realtors push listings in white neighborhoods to their white customers for the same reasons. (Tr. 350; 363; 1115; 7588-92). Advertising strategies complement these sales efforts. Realtors advertise in the communities in which they expect to make the most sales. This means black realtors advertise in black communities and white realtors in white communities. (Tr. 73; 1115-16; 2653-61; 6069) In short, realtors have little incentive in promoting integration for the sake of integration. They are interested in making sales. Accordingly, they are followers and not leaders of change in housing patterns. 9. In order to counter these market forces and to promote integrated living in the South Suburban Area, the SSHC has attempted to influence the housing market by encouraging the sales and marketing of real estate in what it terms to be “non-traditional” ways, i.e., encouraging whites to move to black or integrated areas and blacks to move to white or integrated areas. (Tr. 202-07) Plaintiffs Definition of “Affirmative Marketing” 10. “Affirmative Marketing”, according to plaintiff, consists of race conscious efforts to promote integration or prevent segregation through special marketing of real estate to attract persons of particular racial classifications who are not likely to either be aware of the availability or express an interest in the real estate without such special efforts. Affirmative marketing is multi-racial in that it approves of and encourages efforts to attract whites to racially integrated areas as well as blacks to racially segregated areas. (PX27) 11. “Affirmative Marketing” insofar as it involves special outreach to whites is controversial and has among its most vociferous critics some mainline black organizations who feel that such marketing efforts stigmatize blacks and tend to make housing less available to blacks. (DX41; DX44; Tr. 615-616) Others, principally the realtors, contend that affirmative marketing to whites is “benign steering” and quite possibly illegal. (Tr. 1649-63) If, for example, realtors assess that special outreach to whites is appropriate, they contend that they could be prosecuted for steering if their assessment is determined to be inaccurate. The NAR/HUD Voluntary Affirmative Marketing Agreement 12. In 1979 the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and the NAR executed a Voluntary Affirmative Marketing Agreement (“VAMA”). It provides an uniform approach to fair housing for NAR’s boards and members. Acceptance of the VAMA eliminated the need for signatories to promulgate any other affirmative marketing plans but did not preclude them from doing so. (DX456) 13. The VAMA defines affirmative marketing “as a program to inform the minority community of the homes listed for sale or rent by Realtors, of the services offered by Realtors in selecting a home for purchase, and of the availability of these homes and services to all buyers without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin” (emphasis supplied). Thus the VAMA requires special outreach to minorities only. (DX456) This form of affirmative marketing is justified as remedial; i.e., to open areas that had previously been closed to minorities because of past discriminatory practices. The Apache Street Listings 14. William Motluck (“Motluck”) of Century 21-Host Realty (“Host”) was the broker with whom the SSHC listed the three Apache Street homes involved in this case. (Tr. 325, Klepper) Motluck and Host were participants in the MLS, paid all fees charged by the MLS and had entered into agreements which bound them to comply with the MLS rules and regulations. (Answ. to complt., ¶¶ 13, 32) Motluck had performed the duties required of him under those agreements, including submission of his exclusive listings to the MLS. (DX549, p. 248) 15. The three homes involved in this action are on Apache Street, a horseshoe-shaped street of some forty-seven homes located in the northeast corner of the East-gate subdivision in the Village of Park Forest, Illinois. (PX11; Tr. 141, Bean) East-gate is bounded by Western Avenue on the west, 26th Street on the south, forest preserves on the east and the Beacon Hill and Forest Heights subdivisions of the City of Chicago Heights on the north. (PX11; Tr. 135-36, Bean) 16. Forest Heights subdivision, immediately north of the Apache Street area (MX582, pp. 364-65; PX11), was built beginning in 1970 and the majority of the homes were sold to blacks, many from Chicago’s south and west side ghettos (MX582, p. 356) and by 1972 the population in Forest Heights was 99 percent black. Id. Racial turnover ensued in Beacon Hill, the subdivision immediately west of Forest Heights, which also adjoins Eastgate. Id., pp. 355-56. (PX11) During 1970-1971 the Beacon Hill School which was a part of a Park Forest School District serving the Beacon Hills-Forest Heights area as well as parts of Park Forest, including Eastgate, had changed from 25 to 90 percent black and had become a racially identifiable school. It was the only such one in Park Forest School District 163. (MX582, p. 360) 17. The evidence also indicated that as black families moved onto Apache Street in the early 1970’s rumors had begun to circulate that the Eastgate area was going black. Many whites wanted to sell their houses and brokers began to steer whites away from the area. Id., p. 365. Although the situation stabilized by the time of the 1980 census, the census block including Apache Street (No. 207) had become over 56 percent black, more than double the black population of any other census block in Eastgate. (MX582, p. 365; PX18-19; Tr. 149-51, 156, Bean; Tr. 1245, 1253, K. Williams; DX131) 18. At the time relevant to this action, homeseeking traffic on Apache Street was “predominately black” (Motluck dep., p. 95) and there had been very little white demand for housing for some time. (Tr. 322, Klepper) The real estate industry in Park Forest was “knowledgeable” about Apache Street and its “makeup” and perceived that Apache Street was “a black block” on which whites were underrepresented. (Tr. 637-44, Turpin) 19. VA and FHA mortgage foreclosures in Eastgate leading to abandoned homes and neighborhood blight were an ongoing problem. (Tr. 141, Bean) In response to this problem Park Forest began a program of acquiring vacant or abandoned homes, chiefly by purchase from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) or the Veteran’s Administration (“VA”), rehabilitating the homes, and then reselling them. (Tr. 141, Bean; PX12) 20. Pursuant to this program Park Forest in 1982 purchased the vacant homes at 9, 15 and 26 Apache Street (the “Apache Street homes”) from HUD or the VA. (Tr. 141-42, Bean) In September of 1982 Park Forest published a notice seeking bidders to purchase, rehabilitate and resell the Apache Street homes. (PX13) 21. On September 23, 1982 the SSHC submitted a proposal to Park Forest for the acquisition, rehabilitation and resale of the Apache Street homes, including affirmative marketing. (PX14; Tr. 145-46, Bean) Based on its analysis of a variety of data the SSHC had determined that without special outreach efforts few white home-seekers would be attracted to the Apache Street homes. (Tr. 322-23, Klepper) 22. On November 1, 1982 the Park Forest Board of Trustees voted to accept the SSHC’s proposal for the acquisition, rehabilitation and resale with affirmative marketing of the Apache Street homes. (Tr. 146, Bean; DX142A-C) The SSHC then bought the three Apache Street homes and began to rehabilitate them. (Tr. 323-24, Klepper) 23. The SSHC and Motluck then entered into listing agreements for the Apache Street homes. (PX15-17) The listing included an affirmative marketing plan (“AMP”). (Tr. 1240-43, 1249-50, K. Williams) The AMP provided that Motluck was to use his “best efforts to attract minority and majority persons” to the Apache Street homes (PX15-17; AMP, ¶ 1), make a special outreach to whites by advertising in newspapers with a predominately white circulation and distributing information to rental developments and employers where whites could be reached, id.; AMP, 113, and collect data on persons shown the homes, including their race. {Id.; AMP, 11115, 7) The listings forbade “any action which prohibits, restricts, narrows or limits the housing choice of any client on the basis of race.” (PX15-17; AMP, H 4) 24. Through its village manager Park Forest reviewed and approved the Apache Street AMP as consistent with the Park Forest/SSHC contract. (Tr. 148-49, Bean) 25. The special outreach efforts provided for in the Apache Street listing agreements were to be carried out by Motluck alone; the agreements did not require other MLS participants, the MLS itself, or anyone other than Motluck to engage in special outreach activities. (PX15-17; Tr. 673, Turpin) No obligations were imposed upon MLS participants by inclusion of the Apache Street listings in the MLS; participants remained free to ignore the listings. (Tr. 660-62, Turpin) However, if a MLS participant chose to show Apache Street homes to a customer he was to provide Motluck with certain information about the customer, including race, either before or after the showing. (Tr. 1031-33, Klepper; PX15-17; AMP, 117) Lock boxes were provided for the Apache Street homes and all MLS participants had keys for such boxes which they could use to show the homes without any advance notice to Motluck. (Tr. 7492, Klepper) 26. The listing agreements for 9,15 and 26 Apache Street were signed, respectively, on April 5th, April 10th and June 13, 1983. (PX15-17; Tr. 328, Klepper) Motluck submitted the listings to the MLS (Motluck dep., p. 34) and they were published in the MLS book. (PX55; Tr. 648-49, Turpin) The information which the MLS published concerning the Apache Street homes was exactly the kind of information published on all other homes listed (i.e., price, size, location, etc.); there was no reference in the MLS publication to affirmative marketing or special outreach. (PX55) The listings as published indicated that access to the homes was available by means of a lock box so that Realtors could enter and show the homes to homeseekers without contacting Motluck. (PX55; Tr. 7492, Klepper) 27. There was no evidence at all that the SSHC intended Motluck to reduce or that Motluck in any way reduced his efforts to market the Apache Street properties to blacks; in fact since his commission was contingent upon successfully marketing the properties to any purchaser regardless of color, and since homeseeking traffic in Eastgate was predominantly black, it would be easier to market the properties to blacks. Therefore he had a strong market incentive to market the properties in a way to reach the maximum number of blacks as well as whites. The GSSBR Multiple Listing Service 28. The Board operates a multiple listing service (“MLS”) a facility by which a MLS member broker makes a blanket unilateral offer of subagency to all other MLS participants with respect to a home listed with that broker. (Tr. 1499-1500) The MLS computer database contains information about homes listed for sale with its members. MLS members and their home-seeking prospects can review this data via computer terminals or by reviewing printed compilations distributed to members on a bi-weekly basis. (Tr. 2638-39) 29. The GSSBR’s MLS is governed by its rules and regulations which provide, inter alia, that for a fee and agreement to submit all listings to the MLS, the MLS shall be available to participating Realtors and that the MLS reserves the right to refuse to accept a listing which in the opinion of its legal counsel failed “to protect adequately the interest of the public and the participants.” (DX34) 30. On June 24, 1983 the GSSBR, based upon advice of its legal counsel, Stuart Lindenberg (“Lindenberg”), removed the Apache Street listings from the MLS. The reason that the listings were removed was because in the opinion of Lindenberg they were very possibly illegal and would violate the MLS rules and regulations and the concern that the data collection under the listings might constitute illegal racial steering. The court finds that the removal was done in good faith and was not a pretense for discrimination. Equal Opportunity Commission Complaint Against Motluck 31. On June 24, 1983 the Equal Opportunity Commission (“EOC”) voted against Lindenberg’s advice to file a complaint against Motluck pursuant to Article 10 of the NAR’s Code of Ethics (Tr. 479-83, Pearson; Tr. 7423, Lindenberg), Article 10, which is intended to “track” the Fair Housing Act (Tr. 2202-04, North), provides: “The Realtor shall not deny equal professional services to any person for reasons of race, creed, sex, or country of national origin. The Realtor shall not be party to any plan or agreement to discriminate against a person or persons on the basis of race, creed, sex, or country of national origin.” (PX48, p. 29). 32. The EOC voted to file its complaint against Motluck because the Apache Street agreements called for “special outreach ... to whites rather than to minorities.” (Tr. 479-82, 491, Pearson) The EOC’s position, based upon the HUD/NAR VAMA, was that special outreach to white homeseekers gave rise to a violation of Article 10. (Tr. 483-84, 486-87, Pearson) 33. Turpin was present during the EOC meeting of June 24, 1982. (Tr. 480, Pearson) On that day, after the EOC voted to file its complaint against Motluck, Turpin withdrew the Apache Street listings from the MLS. (Answ. to complt., ¶ 19; Tr. 676, Turpin) The court finds that the filing of the complaint was done in good faith and not a pretense for discrimination. Indemnification Agreement 34. Some time after the withdrawal of the listings from MLS, very late in June or early July, Turpin first contacted North about the listings. (Tr. 1649-50, North) Turpin then sent North a copy of the Apache Street listings. (Tr. 1650, North) North examined the listings, but with other documents (Tr. 2510-11), and then drafted an Indemnification Agreement (“Agreement”). (Tr. 1670, North; PX44) The Agreement began as follows: “WHEREAS, Century 21-Host Realty [i.e., Motluck’s company] requires its subagents to employ race-conscious criteria provided by the South Suburban Housing Center (‘SSHC’) when determining which prospective buyers to introduce to property owned by the SSHC and listed with Century 21-Host Realty; and “WHEREAS, the Greater South Suburban Board of REALTORS, Inc. (‘the Board’) is concerned that the use of such criteria may violate federal or state fair housing laws or the Illinois real estate licensing law ...’” (PX44, p. 1) The Agreement called upon the SSHC and Motluck’s company to indemnify the GSSBR and its members from all liability, including damages, costs, attorney’s fees and other expenses by reason of any legal proceeding arising out of the Apache Street listings. (PX44, pp. 1-2) 35. On July 5,1983 North sent Turpin a letter enclosing the Agreement (DX162) and a letter stating the NAR’s recommendation that the GSSBR allow MLS access for the Apache Street listings only upon condition that the Housing Center and Mot-luck sign the agreement. Id. At trial North said that his “concerns” respecting the Apache Street listings (Tr. 1650-69) led him to recommend indemnification because he believed the listings could lead to “legal liability” or “potential exposure” of the MLS or MLS participants under legal prohibitions against steering. (Tr. 1671-72) 36. The justification advanced by defendants for thus conditioning MLS access for the Apache Street listings was North’s asserted belief that the listings called for actions which “likely” were racial steering and therefore could lead to “legal liability” or “potential exposure” for the MLS or MLS participants. The court finds that this justification was made in good faith and was not a pretense for discrimination. Plaintiff’s Claims 37. The Housing Center asserts that defendants have violated its rights under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (the Fair Housing Act), and at common law through their treatment of certain real estate listings (the “Apache Street listings” described in No. 23 of these Findings of Fact), particularly because (1) the GSSBR threatened the Housing Center’s broker and then brought a formal ethics complaint against him for entering into the Apache Street listings, (2) for a time the GSSBR unconditionally denied the Apache Street listings access to its MLS, and (3) thereafter defendants conditioned access to the MLS for such listings upon a requirement that the Housing Center and its broker indemnify the GSSBR and its members from all liability and expenses occasioned by any legal proceeding out of the Apache Street listings. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Jurisdiction 1. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action and counterclaim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612, 3617; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,1334; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02; and upon this court’s pendent jurisdiction. I. Fair Housing Act Claims A. Section 3604(a) 2. Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful “[to] ... make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ...” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) There are two recognized methods of proving a Section 3604(a) violation: by proving discriminatory intent or by proving discriminatory effect. Metropolitan, etc. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.1977). (i) Intent 3. The actions of defendants were motivated by other than discriminatory intent; the actions of defendants were motivated by a strong philosophical disagreement as well as a deep concern for the legality of the Apache Street listings’ AMP. Although the court upholds the legality and constitutionality of the Apache Street AMP (Conclusion No. 8, infra, pp. 1087-88), there was substantial room for disagreement, on both the legal and the philosophical front. In any event there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendants’ concerns over illegality were a pretense for discrimination. (ii) Effects 4. Arlington Heights provides the Section 3604(a) standard when, as here, a plaintiff alleges that racially-neutral behavior created a discriminatory effect. See, Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Assn., 685 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir.1982). The four Arlington Heights factors to be considered are: 1) the strength of the showing of discriminatory effect; 2) some evidence of discriminatory intent; 3) the party’s interest in taking the action complained of; and 4) whether the plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to affirmatively further, or merely keep the defendant from interfering with, the fair housing activity. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290. 5. There are two different ways a facially-neutral decision can produce a discriminatory effect: (a) when that action has a greater adverse impact on one racial group than another; or (b) when the decision “perpetuates segregation.” Id. 6. The actions of defendants did not have a racially disparate impact on white homeseekers in the south suburbs. The purpose of plaintiff’s affirmative marketing with special outreach to whites was to increase the likelihood that whites would view the Apache Street properties in numbers beyond what would be expected if normal marketing techniques were used. Therefore plaintiffs affirmative marketing itself has a racially disparate impact. To the extent that defendants’ activities may decrease the impact of affirmative market ing would not itself equal disparate impact. 7. The inability of Motluck to use the MLS did not perpetuate segregation. Plaintiff and its broker were free to continue with their special outreach activities. The actions of defendants in denying use of its MLS if anything would make it more difficult to sell the homes to blacks because cooperating brokers had no affirmative marketing obligations themselves and were knowledgeable about Apache Street, its racial and demographical makeup, and that there was little white demand. (Findings of Fact, ¶ 13) 8. The uncontradicted testimony of Turpin, Lindenberg, and others established that close adherence to the VAMA and their fear of being charged with racial steering motivated the Board’s refusal to participate in the Apache Street plan. (Findings of Fact, 1f 30). Defendants’ desire to comply with the YAMA is a substantial interest deserving of deference from the court. See, Hennessey v. NCCA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1142-43 (5th Cir.1977) (holding that where collegiate athletic association was formed, in part, to adopt rules to govern its members, it was inappropriate for the court to reject the association’s reasonable interpretation of its own bylaws.) Defendants’ attempt to avoid liability for the Apache Street plan in what was perceived to be uncertain legal terrain is a legitimate and normal precautionary practice. Therefore the interest of defendants in taking the actions complained of was legitimate and not a pretense for discrimination. 9. Although the relief sought, the inclusion of certain listing agreements into defendants’ MLS, seeks to compel defendants to assist in its affirmative marketing activities, the intrusion is not severe. However this factor is not determinative. Arlington Heights, at 1295. 10. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove a violation of Section 3604(a) under either intent or effects analysis. B. Section 3606 Section 3606 of the Fair Housing Act proscribes the denial or conditioning of access to a MLS “on account of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 3606. Defendants’ actions were not racially motivated. The requested indemnification was for reasons which were not pretextual for racial discrimination. The court therefore finds that defendants’ actions did not violate Section 3606 on this claim for the same reasons as those stated with respect to the SSHC’s claim under Section 3604(a). C. Section 3617 11. Section 3617 of the Fair Housing Act prohibits interference with the enjoyment of fair housing rights. 42 U.S.C. § 3617. But that section does not under the circumstances of this case provide an independent ground for liability. In Arlington Heights the Seventh Circuit noted that “where the conduct that allegedly violated Section 3617 is the same conduct that allegedly violated Section 3604(a) and was engaged in by the same party, the validity of the section 3617 claim depends upon whether the [conduct] violated section 3604(a).” 558 F.2d at 1288 n. 5. See, also, Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F.Supp. 852, 865 (E.D.Va.198Z), aff'd 733 F.2d 318 (4th Cir.1984). Consequently, since the SSHC failed to establish that the NAR and the GSSBR’s actions violated Sections 3606 or 3604(a), its claim under Section 3617 also fails. II. Breach of Contract 12. The SSHC also alleges that it was a third-party beneficiary of an “agreement” between Motluck and the MLS and that the Board breached that “contract” by requesting indemnification from Motluck and the SSHC. 13. However the SSHC did not establish an essential element of its third-party beneficiary claim, breach of contract between GSSBR and Motluck. The MLS rules and regulations do not require the GSSBR to publish whatever listings Motluck chose to submit. Section 12 clearly states that the MLS through its legal counsel may “refuse to accept a listing form which fails to protect adequately the interests of the public and the participants.” This provision granted the GSSBR discretion to act as it did with respect to the Apache Street listings when, as here, the court found that the decision of the legal counsel was not pretextual. (Findings of Fact, ¶ 27; Conclusions of Law, 113) Thus, even if the SSHC was a third-party beneficiary of the alleged “MLS contract,” its breach of contract claim would lose under the express terms of the MLS rules. See, R & L Grain Co. v. Chgo. Eastern Corp., 531 F.Supp. 201, 209 (N.D.Ill.1981). III. Tortious Interference 14. In order to prove a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, a party must establish the following elements: (1) a reasonable expectancy of an economic advantage (here entering into contracts for the sale of homes); (2) knowledge of the expectancy by defendants; (3) the intentional wrongful interference with the expectancy; and (4) damages resulting from defendants’ actions. Knapp v. McCoy, 548 F.Supp. 1115, 1117 (N.D.Ill.1982); Tom Olesker’s Exciting World of Fashion v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 16 Ill.App.3d 709, 306 N.E.2d 549, 553 (1st Dist.1973), rev’d in part on other grounds, 61 Ill.2d 129, 334 N.E.2d 160 (1975). 15. The SSHC has failed to show that defendants’ alleged interference was “wrongful” or intended to injure the SSHC. See, R.H. Donnelley Corp. v. IBT, 595 F.Supp. 1202, 1208 (N.D.Ill.1984). Defendants’ motive was not to interfere with the SSHC’s attempts to sell the Apache Street homes; they wanted to protect the Board and its MLS participants from exposure to suit or liability. Since defendants were pursuing legitimate business and legal interests when they acted on the Apache Street plan, their actions do not approach the level of legal malice required to sustain the SSHC’s claim. Bank Computer v. Continental Ill. Nat. Bank, 110 Ill.App.3d 492, 66 Ill.Dec. 160, 167, 442 N.E.2d 586, 593 (1982). See, Petit v. Cuneo, 290 Ill.App. 16, 22, 7 N.E.2d 774, 777 (1st Dist.1937) (“one who has an interest may take action to protect his rights.”) Accordingly, Counts I, II and III of plaintiff’s complaint are dismissed. COUNTERCLAIM FINDINGS OF FACT I. Parties 1. Counterplaintiffs in this action are the Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors (“GSSBR”) and the National Association of Realtors (“NAR”) (collectively “counterplaintiffs” or “Realtors”). As a professional association of real estate brokers and salesmen, the NAR’s organizational goals are to (1) help its members understand and comply with laws governing the sale of housing — in particular fair housing laws — thereby reducing its members’ risk of violating such laws, (2) promote its members and the profession, and (3) establish a free and open housing market which operates without regard to race. (Tr. 1475-76) The NAR has invested substantial time and money in developing a comprehensive program to attain these goals. That program includes establishing bylaws, regulations and training programs that assist Realtors in complying with fair housing laws (Findings of Fact, HIT 3-6), entering into the NAR’s VAMA (Findings of Fact, ¶¶ 7-9), and assisting members in challenging regulations and legislation that unconstitutionally restrict Realtors’ or the public’s right to a market founded on the principles of equal opportunity and free choice. (Tr. 1577-83; DX78) 2. In addition to counterdefendant South Suburban Housing Center (“SSHC” or “Housing Center”), there are five remaining municipal counterdefendants (or “municipalities”) in this case: the City of Country Club Hills, the Village of Glen-wood, the Village of Hazel Crest, the Village of Matteson and the Village of Park Forest. A sixth municipality — the Village of University Park — is in the case only with respect to counterplaintiffs’ challenge of its “for sale” sign regulation. 3. Country Club Hills has a city form of government, with a mayor elected at large and eight alderman elected, two from each of four wards. (Tr.6498) It is located in the central corridor of the South Suburbs, bordered by Markham, Flossmoor, Hazel Crest and unincorporated areas. (MX481) As of 1980 Country Club Hills’ population was approximately 14,767 — eighty-four percent white and twelve percent black. (MX500A) It has twelve subdivisions (MX510A) and approximately three thousand owner-occupied and twelve hundred renter-occupied households. (MX478K, Table 26) 4. Hazel Crest was incorporated in 1912. It has a village form of government, with a president and board of trustees elected at large and a village manager. (Tr.6321) It is also located in the central corridor of the South Suburbs, bordered by Markham, Harvey, East Hazel Crest, Homewood, Flossmoor and Country Club Hills. (Tr.6322; MX481) As of 1980 Hazel Crest’s population was approximately 14,-000 — eighty-six percent white and twelve percent black. (MX500A) The present population is still estimated to be 14,000, of which now sixty to sixty-five percent is white and twenty-five to thirty percent is black. (Tr.6278-79; 6360-61) Hazel Crest has ten subdivisions and approximately thirty eight hundred owner-occupied and approximately six hundred sixty renter-occupied households. (MX478T, Table 26) 5. Glenwood was originally settled in 1835 and incorporated in 1903. (Tr.5745) It has a village form of government, with six trustees and a mayor elected at-large. (Tr.5741-42) Glenwood is also located in the central corridor of the South Suburbs, approximately bordered by Thornton, Homewood, Flossmoor and Chicago Heights, with Cook County forest preserves around its remaining borders. (MX481) In 1980 Glenwood’s population was approximately 10,500 — eighty-nine percent white and ten percent black. (MX500A) Glenwood’s current population is still estimated to be 10,500 — approximately eighty to eighty-five percent white and fifteen to twenty percent black. (Tr. 5746; 5753) Glenwood has five subdivisions and approximately twenty three hundred single family homes, seven hundred condominiums and four to five hundred apartment units. (Tr.3360; 3687; 5743-45; MX478R, Table 26) 6. Matteson has a village form of government, with a president, board of trustees and village manager. Matteson is located in the southern half of the central corridor in the South Suburbs and is bordered by Olympia Fields, Park Forest and Richton Park. (MX481) In 1980 Matte-son’s population was 10,233 — of which approximately twelve percent was black and eighty-three percent white. (MX500A) Matteson has eight neighborhoods or subdivisions (MX251-58) and approximately twenty five hundred owner-occupied and seven hundred renter-occupied households. (MX478AA, Table 26) 7. Park Forest was initially developed in 1947 and incorporated in 1949. (Tr.4976) Park Forest has a village form of government with a board of trustees, village president and village manager. It is located at the south end of the central corridor in the South Suburbs, bordered by Chicago Heights, Olympia Fields, Matteson, Richton Park and University Park. (MX481) In 1980 Park Forest’s population was approximately 26,000 — eighty-eight percent white and twelve percent black. (MX500A) While its population is still the same the composition it is now approximately eighty-three percent white and seventeen percent black. (Tr.4979; 4981) There are fifty five hundred single family homes, twenty three hundred co-ops or condominium townhouses, six hundred thirty townhomes and seven hundred high-rise rental units in Park Forest. (Tr.4990) 8. University Park has a village form of government and is located at the far southern end of the central corridor in the South Suburbs. (MX481) It is bordered by Park Forest, Richton Park, Monee and unincorporated areas. (MX481) As of 1980 University Park’s population was 6,245 — fifty-three and one-half percent white and forty-four and three tenths percent black. (MX500A) Within its borders there are approximately twelve hundred forty owner-occupied and eight hundred twenty renter-occupied households. (MX478WW, Table 26) II. Nature of the Action 9. Counterplaintiffs’ second amended counterclaim is a six-count attack against the fair housing policies of the SSHC and certain fair housing and other policies and ordinances of the municipalities. As set forth below, not all counts seek relief against every counterdefendant. Count I alleges that the Apache Street AMP of counterdefendants SSHC and Park Forest violates the Fair Housing Act and Sections 1982 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Count II asserts that the so-called “integration maintenance” programs of all coun-terdefendants are a pattern and practice of racial steering and discrimination which violates the Fair Housing Act, the Constitutional right of equal protection and Sections 1982 and 1983. Count III attacks Hazel Crest’s “for sale” sign ban and the sign placement and size regulations of Country Club Hills, Matteson, Park Forest and University Park, alleging that those ordinances violate the First Amendment, the Fair Housing Act and Sections 1982 and 1983. Count IV is directed against the solicitation ordinances of the municipal counterdefendants and alleges that those ordinances, both facially and as applied, violate the First Amendment, due process and equal protection, Sections 1982 and 1983 and the Fair Housing Act. Count V alleges that Glenwood and Matteson’s fair housing data reporting ordinances violate privacy rights, equal protection and due process, the First Amendment, Sections 1982 and 1983 and the Fair Housing Act. Count VI alleges that profit/not-for-profit distinctions in the fair housing ordinances of the municipal counterdefendants violate equal protection and Section 1983 and are preempted by Section 3615 of the Fair Housing Act. 10.Although the counterclaim originally sought damages as well as equitable relief, counterplaintiffs withdrew their damage claims at the commencement of trial and never offered any evidence as to damages. Consequently only claims for declaratory and injunctive relief remain with respect to each count. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Standing of the NAR and the GSSBR 1. The NAR and the Board have standing under Article III of the Constitution and Title VIII to assert their counterclaims because they have allegedly suffered a distinct and palpable injury that is fairly traceable to counterdefendants’ conduct and because relief from the injury would be likely to follow from a favorable decision. See, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261-62, 97 S.Ct. 555, 561-62, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Counterdefendants’ programs and ordinances allegedly impair the NAR and the Board’s ability to attain their organizational goals by interfering with their activities, policies and programs and causing a consequent drain on their resources. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). In addition they have standing as representatives of their members because they satisfy the three requirements for representational standing: (1) their members have standing; (2) the interests the NAR and the Board seek to protect are genuine to their organizational purpose; and (3) neither the claims asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). Counterdefendants’ arguments as to standing tend to go to the merits of counterplaintiffs claims rather than to the nature of the injury complained of. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). 2. Counterplaintiffs also have standing to assert claims under Sections 1982 and 1983 because of the allegations that coun-terdefendants’ actions interfere with the right to market real estate to blacks. Here counterplaintiffs have taken steps to develop and implement its YAMA which they allege is being undermined by counterde-fendants. Warth v. Seldin, 107 S.Ct. at 2210. Prudential considerations have also been met. Here the alleged injury is specific to counterdefendants’ members whose rights are being asserted. Warth, p. 2206. FINDINGS OF FACT COUNTS I and II 1. The SSHC conducts the following programs that are objected to by counter-plaintiffs. a.Assistance to Homeseekers Counterplaintiffs apparently do not challenge the SSHC’s assistance to black south suburban residents victimized by racial harassment, nor the SSHC’s efforts to help CHA families, mainly black, find housing in the south suburbs. These activities are plainly inconsistent with a purpose of restricting the number of black South Suburban Area residents. Although the counterclaim (¶ 35c) refers to homeseeker “counseling services sponsored by either SSHC or the municipalities,” counterplaintiffs’ counsel indicated at trial they are not attacking some part or all of the SSHC Homeseekers Service (“Service”). (Tr.7506) In any event, the evidence indicates that the SSHC’s Service “is a supplement to the normal housing market” which any homeseeker may use if he chooses. (Tr.209, Klepper) The Service provides the same assistance to blacks or whites, although the “traditional” and “nontraditional” choices which are discussed with blacks and whites differ because, given the normal housing search patterns, blacks are unlikely to consider all white areas and whites are unlikely to consider all black or rapidly integrating areas. (Tr.7296-97, Matthews; Tr.201-02, 208-09, Klepper; Tr.5371-74, Cardona) The SSHC makes “clear to everyone” assisted by the Service that “[t]he final choice is always that of the individual.” (Tr.209, Klepper; PX23; PX96) Service clients are asked to read cards which explain the SSHC’s policy and state “SSHC works with homeseekers individually to expand options to include the total marketplace,” and “the final choice is always that of the individual.” (PX23; PX96) If home-seekers decide “they want traditional housing listings, we will give them those ...” (Tr.208, Klepper) Ultimately, a “few more families make nontraditional moves than traditional.” (Tr.211, Klepper) b.Testing and Compliance Activities The evidence indicates that the SSHC’s testing and litigation activities have been designed to “open up” housing options and combat discrimination, particularly with respect to blacks. Although the counterclaim asserts that SSHC tests are used “to force Realtors to comply with ... integration maintenance programs” (counterclaim, 1135(b)), counterplaintiffs’ counsel withdrew that allegation during the trial. (Tr.7508-12) c.Educational Activities Counterplaintiffs apparently do not challenge many of the SSHC’s educational activities, including those designed to inform Realtors and the public about fair housing laws. Counterplaintiffs do appear to challenge the SSHC’s education about affirmative marketing. (Counterclaim, ¶135(d)) Respecting such activities, the evidence indicates that the SSHC . always says[s] affirmative marketing is absolutely not to limit anybody’s housing choice. It’s to do exactly the opposite.” (Tr.268, Klepper) SSHC literature distributed to Realtors during seminars states “Affirmative Marketing is assisting homeseekers individually to expand options to include the total marketplace ... The final choice is always that of the individual.” (PX27) The evidence indicates that during the seminars the SSHC stresses that “you never take anything away from somebody. You only add something,” and the goal should be “100 percent of the people competing for 100 percent of the housing.” (Tr.220, 226, Klepper) Although several hundred GSSBR Realtors have attended SSHC seminars (Tr.228, Klepper), counterplaintiffs offered no evidence from any Realtor that the SSHC’s message has ever been different. Similarly, the SSHC’s guide for apartment managers and rental agents (PX29) states: “Affirmative Marketing is a method of providing information to racial groups least likely to apply for housing ... The goal: to promote racially diverse traffic and demand for housing.” (PX29, p. 3) “Affirmative Marketing has nothing to do with racial ‘quotas.’ No person can be lawfully denied access to the housing of his or her choice because of race. The legitimate function of promoting residential racial diversity cannot be done by limiting the options of individuals.” (PX29, p. 11) The principles embodied in the quoted language are always part of the information about Affirmative Marketing that the SSHC gives to rental agents. (Tr.255, Klepper) d. Apache Street The SSHC’s stated purpose in entering into and implementing the Apache Street listings was to add some “white traffic to the properties in addition to the black traffic,” not to decrease or restrict the black traffic. The relevant evidence supports a finding that that was in fact the SSHC’s purpose. (Cmplt., Findings of Fact, If 27) e. SSHC Activities in General Respecting all of the SSHC’s activities, Klepper testified: “We [are] about encouraging racial diversity. We are about promoting demand from blacks and whites in housing ... Whatever the racial makeup of the community turns out to be, whatever it is, as long as it is the result of free choice, people making fully informed decisions, not decisions based on past discrimination, not decisions based on past discriminatory housing practices, not based on fears, not based on perceptions, you know, true free choice; and whatever the community turns out to be is what it turns out to be ... “We’re talking about ending a dual housing market where people do not have free choice. That is what we’re talking about. Expanded housing opportunities. “We are not about restricting anybody’s housing choice. We make recommendations to expand housing choice ... It doesn’t mean if you suggest to a black family something in addition to University Park that you don’t offer University Park. You don’t take anything away. You add something ...” 2. The court finds that the effect of the SSHC activities has not been to “restrict” or “control” access to housing but rather to expand the information about housing available for consideration by homeseekers and to promote racially diverse living and the prevention of resegregation. 3. In addition to the foregoing, the complaint attacks the foregoing as being elements of municipal “integration maintenance programs.” (Counterclaim, ¶¶[ 25-31, 35) The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the SSHC (and not the municipalities) has controlled and implemented most of the programs challenged. The specific municipal efforts appear to be advertising and marketing campaigns of Hazel Crest, Matteson and Glenwood. 4. There was no evidence presented that the purpose of any advertising or marketing efforts was to deny equal housing opportunity, restrict access to housing, manipulate choice, or otherwise impose a quota on any racial group. Instead, the efforts were directed to providing information to those felt less likely to consider housing in those suburbs and thus to promote integrated living. 5. These efforts also, to the extent that housing demand is increased as a result of such efforts, has a beneficial effect on the real estate business in general and homeowners and brokers in particular. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW COUNTS I and II 1. Counterplaintiffs are the GSSBR and the NAR, the defendants to the complaint. Counterdefendants under Count I of the counterclaim are the SSHC and the Village of Park Forest. Counterdefendants under Count II of the counterclaim are the SSHC and nine municipalities (including Park Forest), all of which are located in the South Suburban area. 2. It is a fundamental national policy to promote stable, long-term racial diversity in the communities of the United States. As the Supreme Court repeatedly has said, “ ‘[t]here can be no question about the importance’ to a community of ‘promoting stable, racially integrated housing.’ ” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1613, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979), quoting Linmark Assocs., Inc, v. Willingboro Twsp., 431 U.S. 85, 94, 97 S.Ct. 1614, 1619, 52 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977). The Seventh Circuit observed in the Arlington Heights decision: “[The Fair Housing] Act was intended to promote ‘open, integrated residential housing patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of opportunities the Act was designed to combat.' ” Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1289 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1025, 98 S.Ct. 752, 54 L.Ed.2d 772 (1978) (hereinafter referred to as Arlington Heights II), quoting Otero v. NY City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2nd Cir.1973). The national commitment to the promotion of integrated housing has long been emphasized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Traficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211, 93 S.Ct. 364, 368, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972) (perpetuation of segregation can be as deleterious as purposefully discriminatory conduct in frustrating national commitment “to replace the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living quarters’ ”.) 3.This national commitment requires special attention to the needs of an integrated community threatened with resegre-gation. As the Supreme Court said in Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110, 99 S.Ct. at 1613, the “adverse consequences attendant upon a ‘changing’ neighborhood” are often “profound.” These harms basically “flow from the realities of a racially segregated community” and include a reduction in homebuying demand, the diminishment of the tax base, a threat to the ability of the community to bear the costs of local government and to provide essential services and the loss of the positive benefits of living in an integrated community. Id. at 110-11, 99 S.Ct. at 1613-14. 4. The types of activities the SSHC engages in which counterplaintiffs challenge — Affirmative Marketing, Testing, Counseling, and Realtor Training (counterclaim, ¶ 35) — are all per se lawful: (a) Affirmative Marketing. For the reasons given affirmative marketing is a lawful activity. (See Conclusion No. 8, infra, p. 1087) (b) Testing. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has noted that courts “have repeatedly approved and sanctioned the role of ‘testers’ in racial discrimination cases,” and “the evidence provided by testers is frequently valuable, if not indispensable.” Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir.1983). (c) Counseling/Assistance to Home-seekers. Providing homeseekers with information about additional housing options, in particular options which would promote integration, is lawful for the same reason affirmative marketing is lawful — it does not deny or “otherwise make unavailable” any housing to anyone. See, also, the NAR’s statements that “encouragement of integration ... [is] consistent with the national housing policy.” (PX52, p. 45; PX53, p. 15) (d) Realtor Training. Patently it is not unlawful for a fair housing center to exercise its First Amendment rights to provide educational seminars for Realtors who choose to attend. 5. Thus the issue on the counterclaim with regard to the SSHC is not the Center’s stated purpose of promoting integration, nor the types of programs it employs to pursue that purpose. Rather, the issue is whether the SSHC’s specific implementation of its programs which counterplaintiffs call “integration maintenance” is in some respect unlawful. The court will examine counterplaintiffs’ claims to this effect under the Fair Housing Act in Parts a and b below, and their claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983 in Parts c and d respectively. a. Fair Housing Claims — Effects Analysis 6. A Fair Housing Act violation may be established by means of an “effects” analysis involving four factors: (1) the effect of challenged conduct (whether it perpetuates segregation or has a greater adverse impact on one racial group than another); (2) some evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) the “interest” of the defendant in taking the challenged action; and (4) the nature of the relief plaintiff seeks. Arlington Heights, at 1290-93. 7. The alleged invidious effect of the SSHC programs “is to enforce [SSHC’s] preferred population mix” or “quota” (counterclaim, 1124), thus “restricting access to housing, with minority home buyers and renters shouldering most of the burden.” Id., 1Í 22. The court concludes that counterplaintiffs have failed to show any such effect of the SSHC’s programs. As in Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Assn., 674 F.Supp. 1313 (N.D.Ill.1987), the SSHC’s activities do not “affect detrimentally the availability of housing” because they “do not deprive anyone of ... housing information,” but “served to increase, not decrease, the existing supply of housing information,” and its “practice of fully informing homeseekers of its policy avoided the dangers inherent in the typical steering situation ...” Steptoe, supra at 1319, 1320. 8.The main thrust of counterplaintiffs case was the assault against “affirmative marketing” adopted by counterdefendant, the SSHC, for use in the Apache Street AMP. (See Findings of Fact, Nos. 10 and 23, complt.) The court concludes that such affirmative marketing does not have the effect of a greater adverse impact on one racial group than another. Since affirmative marketing does not contemplate the lessening of normal marketing activities designed to reach the racial group most likely to be attracted to the property in question, there is little adverse impact on the availability of the housing in question. Such measures are temporary in nature: to be used only in efforts to integrate segregated housing or to prevent resegregation of integrated housing. When integration occurs or the threat of resegregation abates affirmative marketing would no longer be necessary. There was no evidence submitted that affirmative marketing was being used to prevent integration or encourage resegregation; on the contrary, all of the evidence indicated that the opposite was the case. 9. Counterplaintiffs’ allegation respecting the second Arlington Heights factor of intent is that the SSHC’s intent is to limit homeseekers’ housing choices: “restrict[] access to housing”, id., 1122; “manipulate the racial composition of the homeseeker traffic”, id., ¶ 24; “control the movement and distribution of minorities”, id., 1Í 33. The court concludes that counterplaintiffs have failed to prove those allegations. The activities of the SSHC are carefully designed not to modify “normal” homeseek-ing activities or limit anyone’s housing choices. 10. The third Arlington Heights factor is counterdefendants’ interest in taking the challenged action. Although the SSHC is a private entity, in taking the actions of which counterplaintiffs complain the SSHC is not “seeking to protect private rights”, Arlington Heights, p. 1293, so as to render its interest inconsequential. Rather, the SSHC seeks to further what Congress and the courts have recognized is an important national goal of promoting stable, racially integrated housing. Many SSHC programs are undertaken in cooperation with or at the behest of government bodies. Thus the SSHC’s activities are infused with a strong public interest that should be accorded considerable weight. Under the circumstances, the third Arlington Heights factor also weighs the SSHC’s favor. 11. The fourth Arlington Heights factor, the nature of the relief plaintiff seeks, was posed in terms of whether the plaintiff sought to “compel the defendant to ... take affirmative steps to ensure that integrated housing is built,” rather than merely “to enjoin the defendant from interfering with that construction.” Arlington Heights, at 1293. The underlying principle was a desire to avoid “a massive judicial intrusion on private autonomy.” Id. Here counterplaintiffs seek relief that goes far beyond enjoining the SSHC from “interfering” with a particular construction project. They ask the court to permanently enjoin virtually all of the the SSHC’s programs, including but not limited to affirmative marketing, testing, counseling and Realtor training. (Counterclaim, 1135, p. 14) This would be “a massive judicial intrusion” on SSHC autonomy. Moreover, such intrusion would shut down efforts to promote integration — precisely the kind of efforts the Arlington Heights decision was designed to protect. Therefore the court concludes that the fourth Arlington Heights factor weighs in favor of the SSHC. 12. In this case, since all four Arlington Heights factors support the SSHC, the court concludes that counterplaintiffs have failed to prove an “effects” case under the Fair Housing Act. b. Fair Housing Claim — Intent Analysis 13. To establish an “intent” case coun-terplaintiffs must prove that the SSHC denied or made housing unavailable to a person or persons because of race, or otherwise “directly” and “detrimentally” affected the availability of housing because of race. Steptoe, supra at 1319; Phillips v. Hunter Trails Comm. Assn., 685 F.2d 184, 199 (7th Cir.1982). Since counterplaintiffs offered no evidence respecting any persons who sought to purchase or rent homes and who were denied that right by the SSHC, or that the SSHC denied or made housing available to anyone, or in any way restricted or limited anyone’s housing choice, the court concludes that counterplaintiffs have failed to prove an “intent” case under the Fair Housing Act. c. Section 1982 Claim 14. Section 1982 provides: “All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey any real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982. “[I]n sharp contrast to” the Fair Housing Act, “42 USC § 1982 is not a comprehensive open housing law,” Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 2189, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968), but is “limited on its face to discrimination with respect to property rights.” Krieger v