Full opinion text
OPINION SAND, District Judge. By Order dated January 23, 1989, this Court expanded the scope of its earlier reference to Magistrate Dolinger to “include all pretrial matters including, but not limited to, questions of class definition and certification, except that questions relating to defendants’ immunity are not included in this reference.” On March 31, 1989, this Court denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity, 709 F.Supp. 482 (1989). On April 21, 1989, Magistrate Dolinger filed a Report and Recommendation (“Report”) (Appendix A, hereto) dealing with all other matters raised by the pending motions except as noted. The case is now before the Court on the parties’ objections to the Report. Correctional Service Defendants’ Objections Initially, defendants Coughlin, Lord and Duncan object that the Magistrate’s Report exceeded the scope of the reference to him and that it was their understanding that his Report would be limited to class decertification and class definition issues on the grounds that all other matters dealt with by the Magistrate relate to the issue of immunity excluded from the reference. The Magistrate clearly understood and acted within the scope of the reference. Of course, there is an intermeshing between the immunity issues and other questions in the case. But there is no significant inconsistency between the Magistrate’s Report and this Court’s March 31, 1989 Opinion denying the motion for summary judgment. The claims of inconsistency relate to matters that this Court left open for possible revisiting and that defendants assert the Magistrate foreclosed. These contentions lose sight of the fact that both this Court’s Opinion and the Magistrate’s Report are denials of summary judgment. If the factual development of the ease as it evolves furnishes a good faith basis for asserting that the premises upon which those denials were predicated are not valid, e.g., if the Court (which will be the fact finder in these proceedings) concludes that plaintiffs’ damage claims do not involve any constitutional rights, defendants may ask that the immunity issue be reexamined. Indeed, in such an event, the § 1983 claims would fail and only state law issues would remain. A re-examination by the Court of its role in such a controversy would be entirely appropriate. Suffice it to say, on the record as presented at the time these motions were made, the March 31, 1989 Opinion of this Court and the April 21, 1989 Magistrate’s Report are consistent, harmonious, and provide adequate ground rules for the future conduct of this vexatious litigation. Correctional defendants assert that the Magistrate has erroneously placed the burden of proof on them on the issue of class certification. They claim that the burden should properly rest with the plaintiffs since plaintiffs are now, for the first time, asserting a new class and subclasses and a new theory for certification. We find it unnecessary to resolve this question (which the Magistrate characterized as “doubtful,” Report at 60) because we are satisfied that plaintiffs would prevail on the class certification issue even if it were entirely their burden to sustain such certification de novo. Plaintiffs’ Objections Plaintiffs object to the Magistrate’s exclusion from the class of those inmates who were placed in Building 118 for purposes of protective custody rather than for disciplinary infractions. Plaintiffs urge that “Building 118” and “SHU” were used interchangeably and synonymously for many purposes in this litigation and for purposes of the monitoring pursuant to the settlement of the injunctive aspects of this case. But plaintiffs fail to address their concession that, were such inmates included, there would be need for a fourth subclass which they have never sought and for which they have no such class representative (Report, at 90). Indeed, plaintiffs still do not seek a fourth subclass: “Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court’s adoption of the Magistrate’s findings and recommendations accepting plaintiffs’ definition of three subclasses.” Plaintiffs’ Response to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate at 37 (Apr. 21,1989). We adopt the Magistrate’s definition of the scope of the class, including the three subclasses, and the August 31, 1981 commencement date. Defendant King’s Objections Defendant Klug urges that the Magistrate’s Report is erroneous particularly because plaintiffs have not asserted a “conditions” claim against him. But plaintiffs have asserted a “treatment” claim against Dr. Klug and we see no error in the Magistrate’s reasoning and conclusion denying summary judgment to Dr. Klug. Dr. Klug argues that plaintiffs have introduced evidence as to only eighteen of the 250 class members and that summary judgment should therefore be granted as to the remaining 232 class members. This claim misconceives the difference between a motion for summary judgment in a class action and the trial itself. We adopt the Magistrate’s Report in this regard. Miscellaneous Matters The parties are to take up with the Magistrate the details concerning class notice. See Report at 96, n. 48. Correctional defendants point out (Correctional Defendants’ Objections, at 19, n. 7) that N.Y.Pub.Off.Law § 17(3)(c) (McKinney 1988) was amended in 1986 to delete the clause that specifically excluded indemnification for “punitive or exemplary damages.” Historical Notes to N.Y.Pub. Off.Law § 17 (McKinney 1988). The law now excludes indemnification of intentional wrongdoing, fines and penalties but does not exclude indemnification of “deliberate indifference” claims. No change in the Magistrate’s Report is occasioned by this correction. CONCLUSION We have considered and find to be without merit the other objections raised by the parties. The Report and Recommendation is adopted. SO ORDERED. APPENDIX A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE HONORABLE LEONARD B. SAND, U.S.D.J.: This class-action prisoner lawsuit was commenced in 1984 to seek relief from certain allegedly unconstitutional conditions and practices on the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”) at the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility. Plaintiffs allege principally that until September 1987 New York State Correction Department officials routinely placed severely mentally ill inmates on SHU and that in so doing they failed to conduct any screening of these inmates, failed to provide even marginally adequate treatment for their mental condition while they were on SHU, and failed to protect the other inmates on SHU from the conditions that resulted from the presence of these disturbed inmates — including filth, noisome odors, deafening noise, fire and smoke, and the sight and sound of prisoners engaging in such psychotic behavior as attempted suicide, self-mutilation and hallucination. According to plaintiffs, these failings reflected a violation of the jailers’ obligations (a) to provide medical care for the serious medical needs of the disturbed inmates and (b) to ensure that living conditions on SHU not fall below constitutionally permissible standards for all inmates on that unit. Following the certification of a class under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b)(2) in December 1985, and the settlement of plaintiff’s injunctive claims in July 1987, the parties commenced discovery concerning plaintiff’s demand for compensatory and punitive damages. During the later phase of this discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on the merits and on the basis of qualified immunity or for dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Alternatively they seek decerti-fication of the class for purposes of any trial on damages. In addition, the New York State Office of Mental Health seeks dismissal of a cross-claim asserted against it by one of the individual defendants, Dr. Ronald Klug. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the motions for summary judgment or dismissal be denied except with respect to Dr. Klug’s cross-claim. As for the class, I recommend that it be recertified as a Rule 23(b)(3) class, with appropriate notice to be provided to the putative members. PROCEDURAL HISTORY In its original form plaintiffs’ complaint was not styled as a class suit, but it sought both injunctive relief and damages based upon the asserted continuing violation of the Eighth Amendment rights of SHU inmates. The complaint named as defendants Thomas Coughlin, III, the Commissioner of Correctional Services; Frank Headley, the Superintendent of Bedford Hills; Elaine Lord, the Deputy Superintendent; Dr. James Prevost, the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene; Dr. Ronald J. Klug, the Unit Chief of the Mental Hygiene Unit at Bedford Hills; a Lieutenant George Duncan, who was assigned to supervise security at the Bedford Hills SHU; and various other officials and corrections officers assigned to Bedford Hills. All of these defendants were named in both their official and individual capacities, a dual status that reflected the fact that plaintiffs were seeking both injunctive and monetary relief. Subsequently plaintiffs prepared an amended complaint that mirrored the factual allegations of the original pleading and incorporated class action allegations. Plaintiffs moved in 1985 for class certification, and the Court granted that motion by order dated December 23, 1985. Since the predominant relief then sought by plaintiffs was injunctive in nature, the class was certified under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2). The order defined the class as encompassing “every NYS prisoner who resided on the disciplinary segregation Special Housing Unit, Unit 118[,] Bedford Hills ... at any time between January 1, 1983 to date.” In March 1986 plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. The Court thereafter ordered that plaintiffs’ applications for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief be tried at a consolidated hearing and that the damage claims be severed. The injunction hearing apparently served as a catalyst for the parties to settle all injunc-tive issues in the case. By twin stipulations dated July 23, 1987, between plaintiffs and both the New York State Office of Mental Health (“OMH”) and the New York State Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”), it was agreed that OMH and DOCS would take specified steps to increase the availability and quality of mental health care for SHU inmates, including the provision of qualified OMH personnel at SHU itself, improved record-keeping, training for DOCS personnel assigned to SHU with respect to mental health problems of the SHU inmates, the prompt preparation of a mental health evaluation for all inmates placed on SHU with recommendations for treatment as needed and follow-up review as to the appropriateness of removal from SHU for the purpose of treatment. In addition, the stipulations provided for the appointment of a supervising “psychiatric expert” to monitor defendants’ compliance with the terms of the stipulation for a minimum period of two years and required periodic reports to the Court by the expert. The agreement also invoked the continuing jurisdiction of the Court for a minimum of two years and authorized plaintiffs to seek relief there in the event of non-compliance by defendants with their obligations under the settlement. Following the approval of these stipulations, the parties began to conduct sporadic discovery with respect to the remaining question of plaintiffs’ entitlement to damages. This process was given particular impetus when the Court, in the late fall of 1988, set a trial date of January 30, 1989. This announcement substantially increased the level of discovery activity, and also led to the filing of defendants’ motions for summary judgment, dismissal or decertifi-cation of the class. In the wake of these motions, the Court adjourned the trial date to May 1, 1989 and, except with respect to issues of qualified immunity, referred the motions to me for a report and recommendation. Additional briefing has since been received from the parties, and oral argument was conducted on February 17, 1989. Although discovery has not yet been completed, the record is sufficient to permit me to address the merits of all issues raised by the parties. ANALYSIS The present posture of the case is that the plaintiffs, on behalf of a proposed revised class of all inmates who lived in Building 118 of the Bedford Hills Correctional Facility from August 31, 1981 through August 20,1987 now seek compensatory and punitive damages from five individual defendants, Commissioner Coughlin, Superintendent Lord, former Superintendent Headley, Dr. Klug, and now-Captain Duncan. The basis for these demands is plaintiffs’ contention that defendants carried out policies or practices that resulted in the routine placement of severely mentally disturbed inmates on SHU with no thought to whether such placement would exacerbate the mental disorders of these inmates, a systemic failure to supply proper treatment for SHU inmates with mental problems and a lack of any effort to protect the inmate housed on SHU from the effects of housing seriously disturbed inmates on the same unit. According to plaintiffs, this approach to prison discipline created conditions of confinement on SHU that were so deplorable as to violate the Eighth Amendment strictures against cruel and unusual punishment, and at the same time involved such an egregious failure to address the serious medical needs of the disturbed inmates as to constitute constitutionally impermissible “deliberate indifference” under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). Defendants’ motions attack the factual premises for plaintiffs’ claims. Specifically, they argue that there is insufficient evidence to sustain either the claim that plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were violated or the assertion that the moving defendants were responsible for such violations. They also claim that the Eleventh Amendment bars recovery. Defendants alternatively challenge the appropriateness of class treatment of plaintiffs’ claims, asserting that those claims depend crucially upon proof of the individual circumstances of each inmate housed on SHU during the relevant time period. At the outset I address the constitutional issues and then turn to the class question. I. The Summary Judgment Motions A. General Standards for Summary Judgment Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the court to enter summary judgment only if it finds that there is no dispute as to any material fact and that, based on these undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Montana v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n of Rochester, 869 F.2d 100, 103 (2d Cir.1989); Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 932, 107 S.Ct. 1570, 94 L.Ed.2d 762 (1987); Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir.1985). It is axiomatic that the role of the court on such a motion “is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried, while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable inferences against the moving party.” Knight v. U.S. Ins. Co., 804 F.2d at 11; Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987). See, e.g., Montana, supra, at 103-104; Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir.1989). The movant bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant is not required, however, to proffer evidence negating the elements of its adversary’s case; thus, if the opposing party would bear the burden of proof at trial, the mov-ant need not offer evidence to disprove the other side’s claims. Id. Once the movant has carried his initial burden, the party opposing the motion bears the burden of showing that there is in fact a genuine dispute as to one or more of the material facts. Id. See also Greater Buffalo Press, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 866 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir.1989). In so doing, he cannot simply rely on his pleadings or on conclusory allegations or conjecture as to the facts, but rather must present specific evidence in support of his contention that there is a genuine dispute as to the facts. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Montana, at 103; Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., supra, 804 F.2d at 12; L & L Started Pullets, Inc. v. Gourdine, 762 F.2d 1, 3-4 (2d Cir.1985); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, supra, 762 F.2d at 251. To demonstrate that there is a “genuine dispute,” the party opposing summary judgment must come forward with enough evidence to justify a reasonable jury in returning a verdict in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Cinema North Corp. v. Plaza at Latham Associates, 867 F.2d 135, 138 (2d Cir.1989). Thus, the party that bears the burden of proof cannot meet its burden on the motion by adducing evidence that is “merely color-able” or “not significantly probative.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11. See, e.g., Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 865 F.2d 492, 493 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam). In effect, the Court must apply the same standard as it would utilize under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a) in deciding a motion for a directed verdict at trial, and therefore must enter summary judgment if there can be only one reasonable conclusion based on the evidence adduced. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citing Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80, 64 S.Ct. 232, 234, 88 L.Ed. 239 (1943)). See, e.g., Trebor Sportswear Co. v. The Limited Stores, Inc., 865 F.2d 506, 511 (2d Cir.1989). Bearing these standards in mind, I turn to the substantive issues on which defendants seek summary judgment. B. The Plaintiffs’ Claims As noted, plaintiffs’ legal theories rests on two related contentions, both stemming from the asserted failure of defendants adequately to address the psychiatric needs of mentally disordered inmates assigned to SHU. According to plaintiffs, the decision to place severely disturbed inmates on SHU without prior consideration of whether such placement was medically appropriate for them and the subsequent systematic failure to address the psychiatric needs both of these inmates and of other inmates on SHU who suffered from significant mental problems while on this unit amounted to a violation of those inmates’ right to treatment. In addition, the result of leaving those inmates on SHU without proper medical care was that the conditions of confinement for all SHU inmates failed to meet minimum Eighth Amendment standards. Defendants’ challenges to these claims are twofold. First, they assert that the procedures utilized at Bedford Hills did not violate plaintiffs’ rights. Second, they assert that in any event they did not bear any direct responsibility for these alleged failings, and thus they cannot be held liable for them. In addition, as a separate matter they seek summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages. 1. Failure to Treat The constitutional obligation of the state to meet certain minimum standards of medical care for individuals held in custody is traceable to both the Eighth Amendment prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment,” see, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), and the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1004-05, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). Although the applicable standards under these two provisions have been somewhat differently articulated, they reflect a common concern for ensuring at least minimally adequate medical care for individuals confined against their will. We start with the recognition that prison officials are traditionally accorded substantial deference in administering the internal affairs of their prisons, see, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 n. 9, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2572 n. 9, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), including the medical care that they provide. See generally Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 213-15 (2d Cir.1986). Nonetheless, when the state confines an individual against his will, it assumes an obligation to provide for his basic needs, see, e.g., DeShaney, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 1004-05; West v. Atkins, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2258, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (discussing Estelle v. Gamble); Youngberg v. Romeo, supra, 457 U.S. at 324, 102 S.Ct. at 2462, and the extent of that obligation is, in general terms, defined by decisional authority under both the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments. The “cruel and unusual punishment” provision of the Eighth Amendment was designed principally to protect against such extreme conduct as “ ‘torture[s]’ and other ‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment.” Estelle v. Gamble, supra, 429 U.S. at 102, 97 S.Ct. at 290 (quoting Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 Calif.L.Rev. 839, 842 (1969)). See also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 354 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 668, 673 n. 3, 88 L.Ed.2d 677 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus in most Eighth Amendment cases, as Judge Friendly noted in Johnson v. Glick, “[t]he [common] thread ... is that ‘punishment’ has been deliberately administered for a penal or disciplinary purpose, with the apparent authorization of high prison officials charged by the state with responsibility for care, control, and discipline of prisoners.” 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Employee-Officer John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973). This focus on punitive intent does not, however, describe the full reach of the provision, which also offers some protection against the unjustified failure of the state to provide basic services to the prisoners, even if not for a punitive purpose. In Estelle v. Gamble, supra, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291, the Supreme Court defined the obligation of the State to provide medical care by holding that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” would constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, supra, 108 S.Ct. at 2255; Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir.1986); Archer v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir.1984). Although this standard is not one that can be applied with geometric precision, its outer limits can be discerned with reasonable clarity. On the other hand, an isolated and inadvertent error in treating even a serious medical need would not constitute a violation since the Eighth Amendment does not constitutionalize the law of medical malpractice. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, supra, 429 U.S. at 105-06, 97 S.Ct. at 291-92; Archer v. Dutcher, supra, 733 F.2d at 17 (Bonsai, J., dissenting); cf. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1245 (2d Cir.1984). On the other hand, a serious failure to provide needed medical attention when the defendants are fully aware of that need could well constitute deliberate indifference, even if they did not act with a punitive intent. See, e.g., Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 144-45 (2d Cir.1981) (test is indifference, not intent to harm), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983). See also Bass v. Jackson, supra, 790 F.2d at 262-63 (noting that claim can be established by showing “an evil intent, or recklessness, or at least deliberate indifference to the consequences of [defendant’s] conduct for those under his control and dependent upon him.”) (quoting Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir.1985); Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir.1974)) (emphasis added). Since the minimum test is one of indifference rather than intent, see Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, supra, 649 F.2d at 144, the courts have repeatedly noted that while one isolated failure to treat, without more, is ordinarily not actionable, it may in fact rise to the level of a constitutional violation if the surrounding circumstances suggest a degree of deliberateness, rather than inadvertence, in the failure to render meaningful treatment. See, e.g., Gill v. Mooney, supra, 824 F.2d at 196. Moreover, the inference of such indifference may be based, upon proof of a series of individual failures by the prison to provide adequate medical care even if each such failure— viewed in isolation — might amount only to simple negligence. See, e.g., Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir.1977); Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1226 (2d Cir.1974). As the Court noted in Todaro: [W]hile a single instance of medical care denied or delayed, viewed in isolation, may appear to be the product of mere negligence, repeated examples of such treatment bespeak a deliberate indifference by prison authorities to the agony engendered by haphazard and ill-conceived procedures. Indeed, it is well-settled in this circuit that “a series of incidents closely related in time ... may disclose a pattern of conduct amounting to deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners.” Todaro v. Ward, supra, 565 F.2d at 52 (quoting Bishop v. Stoneman, supra, 508 F.2d at 1226). The alternative substantive due process standard has been similarly interpreted in this Circuit in the context of prisoners’ claims based on their guardians’ alleged misconduct. Such claims are, at least in principle, governed by the “shock the conscience” test enunciated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). See Johnson v. Glick, supra, 481 F.2d at 1032-33. As further elaborated by Judge Friendly in addressing a claim of assault by a prison guard, this somewhat amorphous test does not consti-tutionalize ordinary tort law: While the Rochin test, “conduct that shocks the conscience,” 342 U.S. at 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, is not one that can be applied by a computer, it at least points the way. Certainly the constitutional protection is nowhere nearly so extensive as that afforded by the common law tort action for battery ...; still less is it as extensive as that afforded by the common law tort actions for assault. Id. at 1033 (footnote omitted). This view has been explicitly adopted by the Supreme Court, which has held in recent decisions that, whatever its scope, substantive due process does not extend to negligent conduct by prison guards or officials. See Davidson v. Cannon, supra, 474 U.S. at 347-48, 106 S.Ct. at 670; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S.Ct. 662, 663, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Accord, O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 n. 1 (2d Cir.1988). In so holding, the Court found it unnecessary to decide “whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or ‘gross negligence,’ is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.” Daniels v. Williams, supra, 474 U.S. at 334 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 667 n. 3. See also City of Canton v. Harris, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1204 n. 8, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). Although it could be argued that the due process clause permits a more searching review of the alleged misdeeds of prison employees and officials than does the Eighth Amendment, see, e.g., Davidson v. Cannon, supra, 474 U.S. at 354 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 673 n. 3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting more liberal due process standard because “the concerns underlying the Due Process Clause are broader than those underlying the Eighth Amendment ... ”); West v. Atkins, supra, 108 S.Ct. at 2260 (Scalia, J., concurring); Johnson v. Glick, supra, 481 F.2d at 1032-33, the Supreme Court and Second Circuit have made no such distinction in recent decisions. Instead, in cases subsequent to Daniels and Davidson, they have indicated that a plaintiff inmate must establish, on the part of the prison official, “an evil intent, or recklessness, or at least deliberate indifference to the consequences of his conduct for those under his control and dependent on him.” Bass v. Jackson, supra, 790 F.2d at 262-63 (quoting Ayers v. Coughlin, supra, 780 F.2d at 209, and Williams v. Vincent, supra, 508 F.2d at 546). See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1005 & n. 5, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326-27, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1088, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). This due process standard appears to be identical to the Eighth Amendment test for denial of medical care, which, as noted, requires at a minimum a showing of “deliberate indifference.” Bass v. Jackson, supra, 790 F.2d at 263 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, supra, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 291). Accord, Whitley v. Albers, supra, 475 U.S. at 326-27, 106 S.Ct. at 1088; Gill v. Mooney, supra, 824 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir.1987). Cf. City of Canton v. Harris, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 1204 (municipal liability under due process clause for failure to provide medical care must be premised on “deliberate indifference”). In determining whether a party is guilty of deliberate indifference under a due process analysis — as under the Eighth Amendment — we are instructed by the Second Circuit that “a pattern of omissions” may permit the inference of such “deliberate unconcern for plaintiffs’ welfare,” Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, supra, 649 F.2d at 145, and that evidence of “gross negligence” — although not equivalent to “deliberate indifference” — “creates a strong presumption of deliberate indifference.” Id. at 143 (citing cases). The due process cases — while similar in these respects to the Eighth Amendment line of decisions — add a further gloss that may be helpful in analyzing the record in this case. In parsing the degree of care required of the State in providing habilita-tive training to persons involuntarily confined, the Court in Youngberg v. Romeo, supra, 457 U.S. at 321-23, 102 S.Ct. at 2461-62, addressed the standards to be applied when the individual is not claiming denial of all access to such services, but rather contends that the care provided was glaringly inadequate. Youngberg involved mentally retarded individuals who had been involuntarily committed, and the Court there suggested that decisions affecting habilitation, “if made by a professional,” are deemed to be “presumptively valid” but can be challenged on a showing that “the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” 457 U.S. at 323, 102 S.Ct. at 2462. The Court in Youngberg did not specify whether this standard — as opposed to other aspects of its holdings — would apply to decisions regarding all forms of medical treatment and, if so, whether it would apply in all cases involving individuals involuntarily confined by the State, including convicted criminals. See id. at 313 n. 11, 102 S.Ct. at 2456 n. 11. Nonetheless, since Youngberg was decided, a number of courts have invoked its standards to adjudicate claims of denial of medical care by convicted prisoners. See, e.g., Lewis v. New York City Dep’t of Correction, 87 Civ. 3640 (MBM), opinion at 6, 33/88 Star. Dec. 422, 427, 1988 WL 85445 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 1988), (1988 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 8845, 8); Harding v. Kuhlmann, 588 F.Supp. 1315, 1316 n. 6 & 1317 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y.1984), aff'd mem., 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir.1985). See also Santana v. Collazo, 793 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir.1986) (Youngberg “professional judgment” analysis applied to juvenile prisoners’ complaint regarding isolation); Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1261-62 (7th Cir.1985) (Youngberg analysis applied to prisoner’s complaint regarding bodily restraint); Newby v. Serviss, 590 F.Supp. 591, 598-99 (W.D.Mich.1984) (combining Youngberg and Estelle analyses to adjudicate prisoner’s claim of unsafe conditions of confinement). Cf. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, supra, 737 F.2d at 1245 (invoking Estelle v. Gamble, supra, in connection with claim of lack of adequate medical care asserted by residents of state school for the retarded). But cf. Doe v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 709 F.2d 782, 790 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 195, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983) (questioning whether Youngberg applies to prison setting). This approach is certainly defensible since the constitutional requirement that medical care be provided to convicted inmates rests in significant measure upon the same rationale as that which requires comparable care for others who are involuntarily committed. As explained by the Supreme Court in DeShaney, in which it equated Youngberg and Estelle for this purpose: when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being_ The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety — it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. See Estelle v. Gamble, [429 U.S. at 103-04, 97 S.Ct. at 290-91]; Youngberg v. Romeo, supra, [457 U.S. at 315-16, 102 S.Ct. at 2457-58]. The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf. See Estelle v. Gamble, [429 U.S. at 103, 97 S.Ct. at 290] (“An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met”). In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf — through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty — which is the “deprivation of liberty” triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means. 109 S.Ct. at 1005-06. In view of this unitary theory underpinning the obligation of the state to provide appropriate care for people involuntarily in its custody, we may fairly infer that the standards by which to judge an alleged failure to provide such care should be comparable regardless of the circumstances under which the individual is involuntarily confined. Application of either of these standards suggests that plaintiffs have prof-erred sufficient evidence to survive defendants’ summary judgment motion insofar as it challenges the “failure to treat” claims. Specifically, plaintiffs have demonstrated triable issues of fact as to whether those class members with serious medical needs were injured by being denied medical care and whether those inadequacies were sufficiently serious or common to justify the conclusion that they were the result of deliberate indifference by the State or its officials. The key evidence proferred by plaintiffs is found in a series of affidavits by their designated psychiatric experts, who, by the time that the motion was briefed, had undertaken a review of the medical files of thirteen class members, all but one of whom appeared to be suffering from severe mental disorders. Based upon their review of these files, which account for perhaps a quarter to a third of the class members who are alleged to suffer from the most serious disorders, these experts have offered similar conclusions suggesting serious inadequacies in the manner in which the State addressed the inmates’ mental health problems. Drs. Stuart Kleinman, Richard G. Dudley, and Stephen S. Teich each found strong indications of repeated and systemic failures in the provision of health care services to inmates with very serious mental disorders. These included such basic inadequacies as the failure to take a complete medical history, failure to keep adequate records, failure to take into account the inmate’s prior psychiatric history, failure to see inmates suffering from seeming mental crises, failure properly to diagnose mental conditions, failure to prescribe proper medication and prescription of inappropriate medication, failure to provide any meaningful treatment other than medication, failure to justify decisions as to diagnoses or treatment or termination of treatment, and seemingly cavalier refusals to consider that an inmate’s bizarre behavior could conceivably be the result of a genuine mental disorder, even though in some cases OMH had previously diagnosed the inmate as suffering from such a disorder. In describing their review of the OMH records, the psychiatrists cite repeated instances of what they view as dramatic failures to meet even minimal professional standards in providing psychiatric services, and a number of instances in which apparently unqualified or untrained personnel were performing functions that should have been undertaken by a psychiatrist or under his close supervision. In addition, plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Stuart Grassian offers an analysis of the severe psychological impact that placement in SHU is likely to have on disordered individuals, an impact that may be accentuated both by the alleged failure to provide minimally adequate screening and care for those placed on SHU and by the presence on SHU of other mentally ill inmates whose conditk is involve dramatic outbursts of screaming, self-mutilation, attempted or staged suicides, throwing of feces and garbage, fires and other distressing behavior. Given this premise, the psychiatrists further opine that the failure to screen out from SHU those individuals who, by virtue of their mental condition, are likely to be severely and adversely affected by placement there constitutes still another basic failure to provide adequate professional care. Not surprisingly, based on these findings, the psychiatrists further opine that the individuals whose records they have reviewed suffered significant harm by virtue of the failings that they note. Moreover they indicate that the OMH records themselves reflect serious deterioration of most or all of the inmates while on SHU. Even without reference to other evidence in the record, these affidavits are sufficient to create triable issues with respect to whether plaintiffs were injured by the deliberate indifference of state officials in the handling of medical care on SHU. They recount a significant number of individual instances of alleged outright denial of medical care for serious medical needs— conduct that, if proven, would plainly be tantamount to a violation of the inmates’ rights under Estelle. They also describe repeated examples of significant delay— sometimes of many days — in providing any such services, which may also constitute a violation under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Archer v. Dutcher, supra, 733 F.2d at 16 (5-hour delay). See also Bass v. Jackson, supra, 790 F.2d at 263 (5-to-6-hour delay can constitute violation). They identify numerous occasions on which the services rendered could be viewed by a trier of fact as so egregiously poor that, even viewed in isolation, they reflect deliberate indifference on the part of the responsible prison officials. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the testifying psychiatrists all find and document a pattern of alleged medical inadequacy that is so far-reaching and consistent as to persuade them that the mental health care efforts for SHU inmates reflected a systemic failure. Thus, even if none of the numerous individual failings themselves established a violation of constitutional rights on the basis of the prison officials’ deliberate indifference, the pattern of consistent and repeated failures of this sort over an extended period of time would permit a trier of fact to conclude that the responsible officials were in fact deliberately indifferent. See, e.g., Todaro v. Ward, supra, 565 F.2d at 52. In relying upon these experts’ affidavits, I note that the opinion testimony of purported experts is not in all cases a guarantee against the adverse entry of summary judgment. If an expert’s opinions rest on pure speculation or are directly contradicted by the factual record or are otherwise unworthy of even arguable belief, they may be rejected. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1223, 1258-59 (E.D.N.Y.1985) (citing cases), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.1987). In this case, however, there is no basis at this stage for declining to give weight to the proffered testimony of plaintiffs’ experts. First, the opinions of these individuals are grounded in the evidentiary record, specifically the OMH medical records. Defendants do not demonstrate that the psychiatrists have misrepresented the content of those records. Second, the witnesses’ credentials are plainly adequate to justify— for present purposes — their recognition as experts on the matters concerning which they are testifying. Third, the conclusions they reach are central to and supportive of plaintiffs’ “failure to treat” claims. As such, their testimony constitutes sufficient evidence to withstand a Rule 50(a) motion at trial, and it thus withstands defendants’ motion for summary judgment. I also note that the record contains substantial additional evidence that, if credited, reflects a pattern of inadequate medical care to the mentally ill inmates housed on SHU. The record suggests repeated failures to conduct required psychological testing and evaluation (see Pl.Exh. 8 at 39-41; Exh. 7 at 53, 55, 64, 66, 70); failure to inquire about the patient’s prior history (Exh. 7 at 59); improper methods for making diagnoses (Exh. 7 at 60, 62); failure to monitor seizure disorders (Exh. 7 at 77; Exh. 6 at 190); improper placement on SHU of inmates with seizure disorders (Exh. 6 at 191-92); improper medication that exacerbated these disorders (Exh. 7 at 76-77); lack of any regular access to coun-selling for those in need, despite the importance of such regularity (Exh. 7 at 126, 127); an absence of criteria for DOCS personnel to follow concerning when to make referrals to OMH (Exh. 10 at 37); failure to follow mandated procedures for referral, with the result that no treatment was given those critically in need of it (Exh. 5 at Oct. 9, 1986; Exh. 2); a consistent failure by OMH to monitor inmates’ behavior for deterioration or crises for purposes of rendering treatment (Exh. 7 at 22, 23, 41, 42; Exh. 6 at 152-53; Exh. 21); minimal coun-selling (Exh. 2 at ¶ 10); failure to develop adequate treatment plans (Exh. 7 at 72; Exh. 6 at 79, 96, 118-20; Exh. 7 at 98-99); failure to comply with state standards for “quiet rooms” for inmates removed from SHU as a result of mental crisis (Exh. 7 at 110 & 42); improper procedures for determining medication (Exh. 7 at 40; Exh. 13; Exh. 8 at 295, see also Exh. 6 at 136; Exh. 7 at 75-76); displays of hostility by prison psychiatrists to their female patients (Exh. 7 at 44-45; Exh. 13; Exh. 14 at M 10, 27), which sometimes led to outright refusals to treat (Exh. 7 at 24, 26, 37-38, 40); placement of inmates on SHU when such assignment would predictably cause exacerbation of already several mental disorders (Exh. 6 at 116-18; Exh. 7 at 104-05); and a failure to maintain any capacity to treat inmates who were assaultive or aggressive but could not tolerate isolation. (Exh. 22; Exh. 3 at 115-16; Exh. 21.) The record also contains substantial evidence reflecting the injuries allegedly suffered by the mentally disordered inmates as a result of these various failings. {See Exh. 1 (Plaintiffs’ Responses to Defendant Klug’s Second Set of Interrogatories) at Question 20; Exh. 2 (Affidavits of Judith Clark, Annie Eason, Vermeil Whitley); Exh. 29; Exh. 7 at 104-05; Exh. 17 at 63 — 64; Exh. T to plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.) This congeries of evidence is ample to sustain plaintiffs’ burden of proof that they were injured by a failure to treat serious medical needs. As noted, many of these alleged failings appear to be so serious that, even viewed in isolation, they could justify a finding of deliberate indifference. Moreover, the consistency of the pattern adds further weight to the plaintiffs’ case. Based on this evidence, a trier of fact could conclude that the responsible state officials were aware of the limitations of the mental health care system for SHU inmates and simply chose — for whatever reason — not to correct the situation. These findings would suffice to justify a conclusion that plaintiffs’ rights were violated under both the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments. Finally I note that, as a separate matter, the record is adequate to find a violation of substantive due process under the Youngberg analysis, assuming it to be applicable. First, there is evidence that a number of decisions were made by untrained personnel that should have been made by psychiatrists or others adequately trained and under close supervision. Second, to the extent that some of the decisions were arguably motivated by the personal hostility of the psychiatrists or other staff towards the inmates, those decisions would not reflect the exercise of “professional judgment.” Third, to the extent that some of the decisions may represent substantial deviations from any defensible professional standard, a trier of fact could conclude that they do not reflect the exercise of “professional judgment.” Fourth, there is some question in the record concerning the professional credentials of Dr. Klug, who administered the mental health care system at Bedford Hills and was directly responsible for many treatment decisions vt 1th respect to plaintiffs’ care. Depending on the resolution of this question, it is possible that a trier of fact could find Dr. Klug to have been professionally unqualified for his position at the prison and thus by definition incapable of exercising “professional judgment” to which deference might be due under Youngberg. See 457 U.S. at 323 & n. 30, 102 S.Ct. at 2462 & n. 30. 2. Conditions of Confinement It has long been recognized that, consistent with the discretion ordinarily accorded prison administrators, even convicted felons “have a constitutional right to decent and humane conditions....” Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, supra, 737 F.2d at 1243 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, supra). The obligation of the state with respect to conditions of confinement is not defined with rigorous clarity by the Supreme Court, which has instead referred to “the contemporary standard of decency,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, supra), as a means of measuring whether conditions fall below constitutional minima. A further articulation of this general principle is that “[cjonditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment.” Id. The State must, in other words, ensure all inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id.; Anderson v. Coughlin, 757 F.2d 33, 34-35 (2d Cir.1985). In judging the adequacy of challenged conditions, the central focus appears to be on whether they result “in pain without any penological purpose.” Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, supra, 429 U.S. at 103, 97 S.Ct. at 290). Deference to the judgment of the prison administrators is most substantial when their decisions involve matters of prison security. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085-86, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3200-01, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. at 349 n. 14, 101 S.Ct. at 2400 n. 14; Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. It is less so when the condition in question does not itself implicate security concerns. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. at 362, 101 S.Ct. at 2407 (Brennan, J., concurring); Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir.1985). Cf. Stubbs v. Dudley, 849 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1095, 103 L.Ed.2d 230 (1989) (giving less deference when the only security threat is the incident about which plaintiff complains). Moreover, notwithstanding the recognized complexity of administering penal institutions and the assumed expertise of their administrators, “deference” by the courts is not tantamount to abdication. If conditions are unjustifiably harsh, judicial remedies are available. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. at 352 & n. 17, 101 S.Ct. at 2402 & n. 17 (citing cases). Accord, id. at 352-54 & n. 1, 101 S.Ct. at 2402-03 & n. 1 (Brennan, J., concurring). More specific guidance may be found in cases addressing some of the types of “conditions” that form the predicate for plaintiffs’ “conditions of confinement” claims in this case. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that a multiplicity of challenged conditions may have a more acute effect on the inmates than would any one in isolation. It is the cumulative effect of the conditions that must be weighed. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. at 362-63, 101 S.Ct. at 2407 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362, 373 (E.D.Ark.1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.1971); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269, 322-23 (D.N.H.1977)). In this case plaintiffs allege that life on SHU routinely and on a continuing basis involved exposure to the smell of the filth that accumulated in the cells of some of the disturbed inmates, the sight and smell of feces and other malodorous objects that were thrown by the disturbed inmates out of their cells, constant intense noise resulting principally from the deranged screaming of some of the disturbed inmates, the smell and choking sensation and fear occasioned by fire and smoke that resulted from the setting of fires by the disturbed inmates, fear of and actual assaults by some of those inmates (presumably during the one hour per day during which the SHU inmates were released from their cells), and the sounds and occasional sights of deranged inmates attempting to hang themselves or engaging in self-multi-lation or hallucination or other forms of seemingly demented activity. The record contains evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that some or all of these types of conditions were a fact of life on SHU from 1981 to 1987. Indeed the prison’s own records contain a list of so-called “unusual incidents” of this nature and it reflects a seemingly high incidence of such events. Similar evidence is reflected in the affidavits of several of the plaintiff class members. {See Exh. 2 — Affidavits of Judith Clark, Annie Eason, Ver-meil Whitley, Patsy Kelly Jarrett). Moreover, with regard to certain of the conditions, particularly noise, both non-party witnesses and the defendants themselves have acknowledged — both by testimony and by documentary evidence — its severity and uninterrupted nature. {See, e.g., Exh. 6 (Koson Dep.) at 35, 38, 106-07; Exh. 10 (Duncan Dep.) at 34; Exh. 17 (Lord Dep.) at 63-64, 82; Exh. 21 at 1; Exhs. 26-30.) If credited, this evidence could permit the conclusion that during some or even all of the relevant time period, conditions on SHU severely threatened the mental or physical well-being of all inmates housed there, a finding that would permit a conclusion that the Eighth Amendment rights of the inmates were in fact violated. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566-78 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101 S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981). Even considered in isolation, the existence of unsanitary conditions and noxious odors, e.g., LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878, 94 S.Ct. 49, 38 L.Ed.2d 123 (1973); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525-26 (2d Cir.1967), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885, 93 S.Ct. 115, 34 L.Ed.2d 141 (1972), the constant sound of the “screamers,” e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594, 627-28 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir.1974), the threat or presence of fire and smoke, e.g., Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 783-84 (9th Cir.1985); Coniglio v. Thomas, 657 F.Supp. 409, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y.1987); and the constant exposure to the bizarre and occasionally assaultive behavior of deranged inmates, cf. Morales v. New York State Dep’t of Corrections, 842 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir.1988), all could be viewed as being without evident penological purpose and therefore as inconsistent with the standards mandated by the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, if several of these conditions existed to some degree and in some combination, a trier of fact might even more reasonably conclude — taking into account the likely cumulative effect of these conditions on the inmate, see Rhodes v. Chapman, supra, 452 U.S. at 362-63, 101 S.Ct. at 2407 (Brennan, J., concurring) — that the challenged conditions violated the basic requirement of “decent and humane conditions.” Society for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, supra, 737 F.2d at 1243. In seeking to avoid this conclusion, defendants appear to put much weight on the fact that the relevant prison log does not itself establish that so-called unusual incidents occurred every day. This argument is beside the point. First, it is not at all clear why plaintiffs must show that specific incidents occurred daily for the entire six years in order to establish their claims. Depending on the nature of the incidents, even their periodic occurrence might establish a continuing constitutional violation. Second, plaintiffs’ claims rest nc. merely on the specific incidents such as suicide or arson attempts, but on the general conditions that are said to have continued for extended periods of time — including unhygienic conditions, noxious odors, very loud noise, and reasonable fear of the frequently recurring incidents. Third, there is a dispute as to whether the prison log reports all of the incidents that took place, and thus the content of the log cannot provide a basis for summary judgment by defendants. Fourth, there is a substantial body of evidence, some of which is cited above, suggesting the pervasive nature and severity of the conditions that plaintiffs are alleging. Given this evidence, summary judgment would not be appropriate in any event. Finally, even if conditions on SHU were entirely acceptable for extended periods of time, this would not bar members of the class from proving a violation of their constitutional rights for even short periods during which conditions were not constitutionally sustainable. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 193 n. 23 (2d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S.Ct. 719, 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972) (“In some instances ... five days or even one day might prove to be constitutionally intolerable.”). In sum, plaintiffs have proffered sufficient evidence to demonstrate triable issues of fact with respect to whether the conditions of confinement on SHU for all of its residents were constitutionally deficient during the period from 1981 to 1987. Accordingly, summary judgment cannot be entered for defendants on this question. 3. The Involvement of the Individual Defendants Even if plaintiffs prove that their constitutional rights were violated and that they were injured as a result, they face two additional hurdles in their effort to hold defendants liable. First, they must establish that it was the defendants who were responsible in some meaningful way for the violations. Second, since defendants are invoking a qualified immunity defense, plaintiffs must contend with the question of whether the defendants’ “actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The District Court has itself addressed the immunity question, and I therefore consider only the issue of whether the individual defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on their claimed lack of responsibility for the asserted constitutional violations. Section 1983 imposes liability only on a person who “subjects or causes [the plaintiff] to be subjected” to a constitutional violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Accordingly, a defendant cannot be held liable under that section unless he was personally involved in the complained-of action. See, e.g., Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1338, 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989); Gill v. Mooney, supra, 824 F.2d at 196; Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir.1986). Liability of a supervisory official may be premised on various types of involvement in the alleged wrongdoing. As summarized by the Second Circuit: The defendant may have directly participated in the infraction. A supervisory official, after learning of the violation through a report or appeal, may have failed to remedy the wrong. A supervisory official may be liable because he or she created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed such a policy or custom to continue. Lastly, a supervisory official may be personally liable if he or she was grossly negligent in managing subordinates who caused the unlawful condition or event. Williams v. Smith, supra, 781 F.2d at 323-24 (citations omitted). Although this summary was written more than three years ago, it appears still to be good law, e.g., Bellamy v. McMickens, 692 F.Supp. 205, 211-12 (S.D.N.Y.1988), except that, in the wake of City of Canton v. Harris, supra, 109 S.Ct. at 1204, it may be the case that inadequate supervision of subordinates is not constitutionally actionable unless it is so egregious as to demonstrate “deliberate indifference” to defendants’ rights. The four moving defendants seem to argue that they had no responsibility for the constitutional violations, if any, that plaintiffs suffered. Based upon the applicable standards, I conclude that defendants have not justified the entry of summary judgment in their favor on this question. a. Commissioner Coughlin As New York State Commissioner of Correctional Services, defendant Cough-lin has responsibility for the operation of the entire prison system. There appears to be no dispute that he was not directly involved in the delivery, or non-delivery, of mental health services to the inmates on SHU at Bedford Hills and did not have an active role in deciding how that particular unit should function. Similarly there is no real dispute that he di