Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER NOLAND, District Judge. Summary of Decision In this case the Court is asked to decide the right of possession as between the plaintiffs, the Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus (“Church of Cyprus”) and the Republic of Cyprus, and the defendants, Peg Goldberg (“Goldberg”) and Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., of four Byzantine mosaics created in the early sixth century. The mosaics, made of small chips of colored glass, were originally affixed to and for centuries remained in a church in Cyprus, a small island in the Mediterranean. In 1974, Turkish military forces invaded Cyprus and seized control of northern Cyprus, including the region where the church is located. At some point in the latter 1970s, during the Turkish military occupation of northern Cyprus, the mosaics were removed from their hallowed sanctuary. The plaintiffs claim that the Church of Cyprus has never intended to relinquish ownership of the mosaics, that the mosaics were improperly removed without the authorization of the Church or the Republic of Cyprus, and that the mosaics should be returned to the Church. The defendants, on the other hand, claim that export of the mosaics was authorized by Turkish Cypriot officials, and that in any event Goldberg should be awarded the mosaics because she purchased them in good faith and without information or reasonable notice that they were stolen. Having heard and reviewed all the evidence in the case, the Court concludes that possession of the mosaics must be awarded to the plaintiff, the Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus. The Court concludes that because the place where the mosaics were purchased, Switzerland, has an insignificant relationship to this suit, and because Indiana has greater contacts and a more significant relationship to this suit, the substantive law of the state of Indiana should apply to this case. Under Indiana law, a thief obtains no title to or right to possession of stolen items. Therefore, a thief cannot pass any right of ownership of stolen items to subsequent purchasers. Because the mosaics were stolen from the rightful owner, the Church of Cyprus, Goldberg never obtained title to or right to possession of the mosaics. Under this analysis of Indiana law, it is unnecessary to consider whether Goldberg exercised good faith or due diligence in obtaining possession of the mosaics. In the alternative, the Court considers the issues under Swiss law. Under Swiss law, in certain situations a thief may sell and pass good title to stolen items to a good faith purchaser. Whether one qualifies as a good faith purchaser is determined by evaluating certain factors. These factors are evaluated to determine whether the purchaser knew that the seller lacked title, or whether an honest and careful purchaser would have had doubts with respect to the seller’s capacity to transfer property rights, and if so, then whether the purchaser reasonably inquired about the seller’s ability to pass good title. Evaluating those factors under the facts of this case, the Court concludes that Goldberg is not a good faith purchaser under Swiss law. This is so because suspicious circumstances surrounded the sale of the mosaics which should have caused an honest and reasonably prudent purchaser in Goldberg’s position to doubt whether the seller had the capacity to convey property rights, and because she failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry to resolve that doubt. Therefore, principally under Indiana law and alternatively under Swiss law, Goldberg never obtained good title to or the right to possession of the mosaics. The Church of Cyprus, the original and rightful owner of the mosaics, has requested and made a proper showing for the return of the mosaics. The mosaics are unique. The paramount significance of their existence is as part of the religious, artistic, and cultural heritage of the Church and the government of Cyprus, and as a part of the national unity of the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, the Court orders that possession of the mosaics is awarded to the plaintiff, the Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus. Memorandum of Decision Trial of this action was to the Court on May 30 through June 6, 1989. This Memorandum of Decision is entered in accordance with Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows findings of fact and conclusions of law to appear in a memorandum of decision filed by the court. I. Procedural History The plaintiffs filed their complaint in this suit on March 29, 1989. On March 31, 1989, the parties entered into an “Agreed Order,” which was approved and signed by this Court on that same date. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreed Order, the plaintiffs posted a security bond in the amount of $150,000, and the defendants in turn agreed not to take any “action to alter, destroy, sell, or transfer possession of the four Kanakaria mosaics” identified in the plaintiffs’ complaint. In their Agreed Order, the parties also agreed to a trial date of May 30, 1989. The defendants filed their answer on April 19, 1989. On May 24,1989, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (“TRNC”) filed a “Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff.” A hearing on TRNC’s motion to intervene was held by this Court on May 30, 1989. By order dated May 30, 1989, this Court denied TRNC’s motion to intervene and also denied TRNC’s motion to stay the trial (which was scheduled to start that same day) pending appeal of the denial to intervene. Before trial the issue of money damages was separated from this case. Thus, the only issue presently before the Court is who is entitled to possession of the mosaics. From May 30, 1989, through June 6, 1989, a bench trial was held by this Court. The parties agreed to submit post trial briefs in lieu of closing arguments; those briefs were filed with this Court on July 11, 1989. Finally, by joint stipulation dated June 27, 1989, the parties agreed to extend the March 31st Agreed Order until August 15, 1989. II. Jurisdiction This Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff the Republic of Cyprus is a sovereign nation located on the island of Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea. Plaintiff Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus is a religious organization with its principal offices in Nicosia, Cyprus. Defendant Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Indiana, with its principal place of business in Carmel, Indiana. Defendant Peg Goldberg is a citizen of the state of Indiana. The amount in controversy in this case exceeds the sum of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). III. Historical Setting and Factual Background The facts established by the evidence presented are as follows. A. The Mosaics of the Church of the Pa-nagia Kanakaria This case involves a dispute as to the ownership of four Byzantine mosaics. These four mosaics were originally part of a larger mosaic (“the original mosaic”). The original mosaic was affixed to the apse of the Church of the Panagia Kanakaria (“Kanakaria Church”) in the village of Lythrankomi, Cyprus, in 530 A.D. Except for a unique quirk of fate, the original mosaic would have ceased to exist a thousand or more years ago. During the period of Iconoelasm (roughly the 8th century), government edicts mandated the destruction of religious artifacts so that such religious “images” would not be the subject of veneration. These iconoclast edicts were responsible for the destruction of many significant religious artifacts. The original Kanakaria mosaic is one of only six or seven Byzantine mosaics to survive the ravages of Iconoelasm and the passage of time. The original Kanakaria mosaic depicted Jesus as a young boy seated in the lap of his mother, the Virgin Mary, who sat on a throne surrounded by a mandorla of light. The figures of Jesus and the Virgin Mary were bordered on each side by depictions of two archangels. This central composition was in turn bordered by a frieze containing the busts of the twelve apostles. The original mosaic was made of small pieces of colored glass referred to in the art world as tesserae. As stated previously, the original mosaic was affixed to the apse of the Kanakaria Church in the early sixth century. Over the centuries, the mosaic has deteriorated. By 1960, all that remained of the original Kanakaria mosaic was the figure of Jesus, the bust of the North Archangel, and nine of the twelve apostles. Between 1959 and 1967, the mosaic was cleaned and restored ,..>der the sponsorship of the Department of Antiquities of the Republic of Cyprus, the Church of Cyprus, and Harvard University’s Dumbarton Oaks Center for Byzantine Studies. With the knowledge gained in its efforts to restore the mosaic, Dum-barton Oaks published an authoritative volume on the Kanakaria Church and its art: The Church of the Panagia Kanakaria at Lythrankomi in Cyprus: Its Mosaics and Frescoes, authored by A.H.S. Megaw and E.J.W. Hawkins (1977). The four mosaics at issue in this case were once a part of the original Kanakaria mosaic. These four mosaics depict the figure of Jesus as a young boy and the busts of the North Archangel, the apostle Matthew, and the apostle James. Each of the four mosaics measures approximately two feet by two feet. . This brief background enables one to understand the origin of the four mosaics at issue in this case and their invaluable and irreplaceable significance to Cyprus’s cultural, artistic, and religious heritage. Had it not been for an unusual series of events, these four mosaics would probably have remained in the Kanakaria Church to this day — undisturbed in their deteriorating but readily recognizable state. B. The Partition of Cyprus Cyprus is an island located in the Mediterranean. The island covers 3,572 square miles and is smaller than the state of Connecticut. The population of Cyprus is approximately 696,000. The Cypriot population is comprised mainly of persons of either Greek or Turkish descent. Today, approximately 79 percent of the population is made up of persons of Greek descent, and approximately 18 percent of the population is made up of persons of Turkish descent. Historically, Greek Cypriots follow the Greek Orthodox faith; Turkish Cypriots follow the Muslim faith. Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 to 1960, at which time it became an independent republic. In 1963, civil disturbances broke out between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. United Nations peacekeeping forces were sent to Cyprus to restore order in 1964. The U.N. forces have remained in Cyprus ever since. On July 20, 1974, Turkish military forces invaded Cyprus. Turkish troops landed on the north coast of Cyprus and advanced to Nicosia. By late August, the Turkish forces had extended their control over the northern 37 percent of the island". This region has remained under Turkish military occupation since the invasion. After the invasion, the Turkish military established in essence a puppet government in northern Cyprus called the “Autonomous Cyprus Turkish Administration.” That government was succeeded in February 1975 by the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.” In 1983, the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was succeeded by the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.” The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognized as a legitimate government by only one nation in the world: Turkey. It is not recognized, nor has it ever been recognized, by the United States government. The United States government recognizes only the plaintiff Republic of Cyprus as the legitimate government of all the people of Cyprus. The Kanakaria Church is located in the village of Lythrankomi, which is in an area of northern Cyprus now under Turkish military occupation. After the 1974 invasion, the Greek Cypriot population of Lythranko-mi was “enclaved” by Turkish military forces. During this time the Greek Cypriots were denied many basic human rights, including freedom of movement, medical care, and the ability to earn a living. Many men from the village were arrested and detained in Turkish jails; there they received severe beatings by Turkish soldiers. Despite the hardships that fell on the Greek Cypriot parishioners of the Kanaka-ria Church, religious services continued to be conducted in that church on a regular basis. In July 1976, the pastor of the Ka-nakaria Church, Father Antomis Christopher, was forced to flee to non-occupied southern Cyprus for fear of his life. The church itself was not physically damaged between the invasion in July 1974 and Father Christopher’s departure in July 1976. By the end of 1976, all Greek Cypriots in Lythrankomi had vacated the village and had relocated to southern Cyprus, which is controlled by the plaintiff Republic of Cyprus. Their departure from northern Cyprus was not voluntary. C. The Theft of the Mosaics Since the 1974 Turkish invasion, the government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Church of Cyprus have generally been denied access to occupied northern Cyprus. However, since that time they have received reports from persons in the occupied area that several churches and national monuments have been looted and destroyed and that many mosaics, frescoes, and icons in those churches and national monuments have been stolen or destroyed. When Father Christopher fled occupied northern Cyprus in July 1976, the mosaics were still intact and affixed to the apse of the Kana-karia Church. Sometime between August 1976 and October 1979, the interior of the Kanakaria Church was vandalized and the mosaics were forcibly removed from the apse of the church. The mosaics were severely damaged during their removal. Neither the Republic of Cyprus nor the Church of Cyprus has ever authorized the removal or sale of the Kanakaria mosaics. D. Cyprus’s Efforts to Recover the Mosaics As previously noted, since the Turkish invasion in 1974, the Republic of Cyprus has learned of the theft or destruction of much cultural property in Cyprus. Many churches, museums, and private collections have been looted, and other property has suffered destruction or loss. In some instances visitors who were allowed access to the occupied area would note such losses and report them to the Republic of Cyprus. It was through one such visitor that the Department of Antiquities first learned in November 1979 that the mosaics of the Kanakaria Church were missing. The Department is charged with the responsibility, among other things, of protecting church property which is either an antiquity or a national monument. The mosaics fall under this responsibility. Therefore, the Republic of Cyprus decided to seek recovery of the mosaics. Immediately upon learning that the mosaics were missing, the Republic of Cyprus contacted UNESCO, informing it of the significance of the lost art and seeking its assistance. Thereafter, the Republic of Cyprus notified several people and entities whom it believed could assist it in disseminating information about the missing mosaics and in recovering them. Cyprus continued to meet and discuss the situation with UNESCO officials in order to heighten awareness of Cyprus’s loss of cultural property. Cyprus notified the International Council of Museums, an organization that coordinates and develops measures and security for museums throughout the world. It notified the International Council of Museums and Sites, an organization that works with restorers and specialists in the preservation of ancient monuments. The Republic of Cyprus introduced a resolution concerning the missing mosaics to Europa Nostra, a European organization interested in the conservation of the architectural heritage of Europe. The Republic of Cyprus sent the Europa Nostra resolution to the Council of Europe, which it believed would give wide publicity to the problem. Cyprus’s ambassador and permanent delegate to the United Nations, Constantine Leven-tis, assisted in contacting these organizations. In addition, Ambassador Leventis spoke of the missing mosaics to individuals from museums, such as the British Museum and the Louvre, and to individuals from international auction houses, such as Christie’s and Sotheby’s. The Republic of Cyprus also contacted both European and American museums about the missing mosaics. It contacted Harvard University’s Dumbarton Oaks Institute for Byzantine Studies, considered to be the leading center in the United States for the study of Byzantine art. Dr. Vassos Karageorghis, Cyprus’s Director of the Department of Antiquities from 1964 to 1989, and Anthanasios Papageorghiou, Curator of Ancient Monuments in Cyprus since 1962 and currently Acting Director of the Department of Antiquities, disseminated information about the missing mosaics to their colleagues and scholars throughout the world by sending letters and by addressing symposia, congresses, and other such meetings. In addition, the Embassy of Cyprus in Washington, D.C. sent press releases and mailed information on a routine basis concerning the loss of Cyprus’s cultural property in general and specifically the missing mosaics. Such information was disseminated to journalists, Members of Congress, legislative assistants working in foreign affairs, and individuals in academia, archaeol-ogy, and in organizations who have expressed an interest in Greek and Cypriot affairs. The Embassy’s mailing list contains several hundred names. The information sent out from the Embassy often included the speeches given around the world by Greek Cypriot officials asking for assistance in recovering the mosaics. Throughout all these efforts, the Republic of Cyprus intended to disseminate the information that the mosaics were missing, to seek assistance from those in positions who might be able to aid Cyprus in its efforts, and to eventually recover lost or stolen cultural properties such as the mosaics. As a result of these efforts, the Republic of Cyprus has recovered some antiquities, including frescoes originally from a church in occupied northern Cyprus and other parts of the original Kanakaria mosaic. Additionally, as a result of these efforts, the Republic of Cyprus located the mosaics in this case. E. The Mosaics Resurface Goldberg is president and majority shareholder of Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. The co-owner of the company is George Feldman who serves as its vice president. Since becoming an art dealer in 1981, Goldberg has dealt almost exclusively in 19th and 20th century paintings, etchings, and sculptures. Goldberg is not, nor does she claim to be, an expert in Byzantine art. On June 30, 1988, Goldberg flew to Amsterdam, The Netherlands, to inspect and possibly purchase for a client a painting by Amadeus Modigliani. The availability of a Modigliani painting for sale was brought to Goldberg’s attention by Robert Fitzgerald, an art dealer from Indianapolis whom she “had known [ ] casually since 1980 or ’81.” Tr. 433. It was Fitzgerald who had located the purported Modigliani; he was to help facilitate the sale. In Amsterdam, Goldberg met Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald then took Goldberg to meet the owner of the painting. After inspecting the painting, Goldberg developed doubts “about being able to prove the authenticity of the painting.” Tr. 438. At this point, the sale of the Modigliani painting fell through. After the Modigliani sale fell through, Fitzgerald mentioned to Goldberg another deal. On July 1, 1988, Fitzgerald informed Goldberg that he was aware of four early Christian mosaics that were for sale. Later that day, Fitzgerald introduced Goldberg to Michel van Rijn, a Dutch art dealer, and Ronald Faulk, an attorney from California. Goldberg knew very little about van Rijn or Faulk. She was told, however, that van Rijn was once convicted in France for forging Marc Chagall’s signature to prints of that artist’s work and that he also had been sued by an art gallery “[f]or failure to pay money.” Tr. 539. She was also aware that Faulk was in Europe to act as attorney for Fitzgerald and van Rijn. At this July 1st meeting, van Rijn showed Goldberg photographs of the four Byzantine mosaics, and she immediately “fell in love” with them. Tr. 447. van Rijn told her that the seller requested $3 million for the four mosaics. She was also told that the seller was interested in selling the mosaics quickly because he “had recently become quite ill and had [a] cash problem.” Tr. 457. All of the information that Goldberg received regarding the mosaics and the seller came from Fitzgerald, van Rijn, or Faulk. van Rijn told Goldberg that the seller of the mosaics was a Turkish antiquities dealer. In addition, he told her that the seller had “found” the mosaics in the rubble of an “extinct” church in northern Cyprus while serving as “an archaeologist from Turkey assigned to northern Cyprus.” Tr. 456. According to van Rijn, the seller had been granted permission by Turkish Cypriot authorities to retain the mosaics and, in the late 1970s, to export them to Germany. Goldberg was not told the identity of the seller at the initial meeting on July 1st; however, two days later she was told that the seller was a man named Aydin Dik-man. Previously, on June 28, 1988, Faulk went to meet with Dikman in Munich, Germany. Faulk was sent to meet with Dikman at the direction of his clients, van Rijn and Fitzgerald. It is interesting to note that Fitzgerald sent Faulk to meet with Dikman even before Fitzgerald mentioned the mosaics deal to Goldberg. In Munich, Faulk discussed a possible sale with Dikman, and Dikman gave him photographs of the mosaics. At the July 1st meeting in Amsterdam, Goldberg knew that Faulk and Dikman had met earlier to discuss the sale of the mosaics. Goldberg asked Faulk to travel to Munich to inform the seller of her interest in purchasing the mosaics. At Goldberg’s direction, Faulk met with Dikman on July 1st and 2nd. Faulk was shown documents that Dikman claimed were proof that the mosaics had been exported properly from northern Cyprus. Faulk returned to Amsterdam on July 2nd and reported to Goldberg that, in his opinion, the export documents appeared to be in order. At trial, the defendants offered Exhibits 702, 3015, and 3016, as support for their contention that Goldberg reasonably believed the mosaics had been properly exported. None of these documents, however, even mentions Dikman or the four mosaics at issue in this case. For example, exhibit 702 is a sales invoice from a “Goklaney’s Cash & Co.” to an individual named Helga Bechly. The invoice refers to five floor mosaics, not the four wall mosaics at issue in this case. The Court is at a loss to understand how this sales invoice substantiates the defendants’ contentions that Dikman found the mosaics in the rubble of an extinct church, and that Turkish Cypriot officials authorized the export of the mosaics. On July 3, 1988, while still in Amsterdam, Goldberg negotiated an agreement with van Rijn, Fitzgerald, and Faulk, whereby “the parties agree[d] to acquire the mosaics for their purchase price of $1,080,000 (U.S.).” Exhibit 700. The agreement also provided that the parties would split the profits made on any future resale of the mosaics as follows: Goldberg & Feldman 50 %; Fitzgerald 22.5 %; van Rijn 22.5 %; and Faulk 5 %. Id. This agreement was executed on July 4th in Amsterdam. Id. Later, Goldberg and Fitzgerald traveled to Geneva, Switzerland, to investigate a lead on a second possible Modigliani and to examine the mosaics. On July 5th, Faulk and Dikman transported the mosaics by airplane from Munich to Geneva. The mosaics were stored in crates in the free port area of the Geneva airport. The mosaics never passed through Swiss Customs. After arriving in Geneva, Faulk and Dik-man met Goldberg in the free port area of the airport. This was the only time that Goldberg met Dikman.. Dikman introduced himself to Goldberg and then left. In the presence of Faulk, Goldberg then inspected the four mosaics. Upon seeing the mosaics, she “was in awe” and wanted to buy them “more than ever.” Tr. 486. She was concerned, however, about their deteriorating condition. Goldberg testified that while she was in Geneva she inquired as to whether the mosaics had been reported as stolen or missing and whether any applicable treaties might prevent the mosaics from being imported into the United States. She testified that she contacted, by telephone, the International Foundation for Art Research (“IFAR”) in New York and UNESCO’s office in Geneva. In addition, Goldberg claims she telephoned customs offices in the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Turkey. F. Goldberg Secures Financing Goldberg has done business with Merchants National Bank of Indianapolis (“Merchants”) for about five years. Her principal contact at the bank is Otto N. Frenzel III, Vice Chairman of Merchants National Bank & Trust Company of Indianapolis and Chairman of the Board of Merchants National Corporation. Goldberg and Frenzel have known each other for several years and have developed a good friendship. In addition, Frenzel and his wife have purchased art from Goldberg on several occasions, and Merchants has requested Goldberg’s assistance in evaluating whether to loan money for art purchases. In Amsterdam, while contemplating the purchase of the Kanakaria mosaics, Goldberg knew she would have to borrow a substantial amount of money if she were to purchase the mosaics. She called Frenzel at his home to discuss possible financing from Merchants. Freiizel indicated that if Goldberg were certain about the propriety of purchasing the mosaics, he would attempt to arrange a loan for her. Frenzel referred her loan request to Timothy Massey, Vice President of the Professional Banking Department. Frenzel testified that he can recommend individuals for loans by volunteering to a loan officer his impressions of an individual’s background, what he might know about a person, and what a person’s expertise might be. Fren-zel told Massey that Frenzel thought that Goldberg was a very bright individual with regard to art, that she was credible, and that she had a great deal of expertise. Frenzel also indicated to Massey that he, Frenzel, was comfortable with Goldberg. Goldberg testified that she told Frenzel and Massey that the bill of sale of the mosaics to her would reflect a purchase price of $1.2 million. She further testified that she told Frenzel that out of this amount, she would either keep or receive back from the seller ten percent of the amount, or $120,000, to pay for her expenses, such as insurance, shipping, restoration, and operation of the business. Massey testified in his deposition that he understood the purchase price to be $1.2 million, and that he did not know at the time of the loan that she intended to keep ten percent of the loan. Frenzel testified in his deposition that he understood the purchase price to be $1.2 million. After Goldberg arrived in Switzerland, Merchants agreed to loan her $1,224,000 for the purchase of the mosaics. Goldberg signed a business promissory note binding Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. as a corporation and herself individually on the loan. She also signed a security agreement offering the mosaics as security for the loan. Upon returning home to Indiana, Goldberg signed an additional agreement with Merchants, granting the bank five percent of the profits of the resale of the mosaics, not to exceed $175,000. G. Goldberg Purchases the Mosaics The sale and transfer of the mosaics was originally scheduled for July 5th; however, a delay in securing financing from Merchants prevented Goldberg from consummating the sale on that date. The $1.2 million from Merchants did not arrive at a bank in Geneva until July 7th. The $1.2 million was in $100 bills and was placed in two carrying bags. Of the $1.2 million, Goldberg kept $120,000 in cash, and gave the remaining $1,080,000 to Faulk and Fitzgerald for the purchase of the mosaics. Goldberg testified that she did not know how the $1,080,000 was to be divided among the seller and the middlemen. She testified that she thought the middlemen would receive a small amount as commission, such as $80,000. However, the remaining $1,080,000 was actually divided as follows: —$350,00 to Dikman as payment for the mosaics; —$282,500 to van Rijn as a commission; —$297,500 to Fitzgerald as a commission; —$70,000 to an attorney in London; —$80,000 to Faulk for legal fees and/or assistance in facilitating the sale. Tr. 318-20. Upon completion of the sale on July 7th, Dikman issued a “General bill of sale” to Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc. Exhibit 9. The bill of sale lists $1.2 million as the price Goldberg paid for the mosaics. Id. On July 8, 1988, Goldberg returned with the mosaics to the United States. Goldberg insured the mosaics for $1.2 million and declared their value at U.S. Customs to be $1.2 million. As previously noted, Goldberg paid $1.08 million for the mosaics. H. Significant Events in Indiana Goldberg returned to Indiana with the four mosaics and with approximately $70,-000 of the $120,000 she kept from the Merchants loan. In Europe she spent approximately $50,000 on conversion charges, shipping and insurance, and the purchase of four paintings and a small piece of art in The Netherlands. Goldberg testified that she deposited the remaining $70,000 in several of her bank accounts in Indiana. Exhibits 2201 through 2209 show a series of deposits, each under $10,000, in various business or personal accounts of Goldberg. At some point after Goldberg returned to Indiana with the mosaics, Frenzel and another Indiana resident, Dr. Stewart Bick, acquired interests in the resale profits of the mosaics. Frenzel personally loaned Goldberg $25,-000 in an unrelated art transaction. Fren-zel stated in his deposition that the terms of the loan were ten percent interest and a two percent interest in the resale profits of the mosaics. Additionally, at some point after Goldberg’s return to Indiana, Dr. Bick and Frenzel together acquired an interest in the resale profits of the mosaics. Fitzgerald testified that he and van Rijn each sold half of their interest in the resale profits to Dr. Bick. Dr. Bick gave them $780,000 for such interests. Fitzgerald received $375,-000 for his half of his interest. As van Rijn and Fitzgerald each originally owned 22V2 percent of the resale profits, this sale of interests to Dr. Bick gave him a 2Zlk percent interest in the resale profits, and left van Rijn and Fitzgerald with a 221/2 percent interest. Of this percentage, Dr. Bick sold an eight percent interest to Fren-zel for $390,000. Frenzel testified that he gave $390,000 of his own money to Dr. Bick and acquired the additional eight percent interest. This, when combined with Frenzel’s two percent noted earlier, provides Frenzel with a total of ten percent interest in the resale profits. Massey testified in his deposition that Merchants loaned Dr. Bick $390,000. It was Massey’s understanding that, with Dr. Bick’s borrowed $390,000 and with Frenzel’s personal $390,-000, Dr. Bick and Frenzel purchased and owned an interest in the resale profits of the mosaics. Goldberg intended to sell the mosaics. Beginning in the fall of 1988, she contacted at least two people in an attempt to market and sell the mosaics. By October 1988 Goldberg had discussed the sale of the mosaics with Dr. Geza von Habsburg, an art dealer operating out of Geneva and New York. In October of 1988 von Habs-burg contacted Dr. Marion True of the Getty Museum in California and discussed whether the Getty would be interested in purchasing the mosaics. Dr. True explained that the Getty does not collect Byzantine art and told von Habsburg that, because of her close working relationship with Cyprus, it would be necessary for her to contact her friend Dr. Vassos Karageor-ghis about the mosaics. Dr. True had developed a working relationship with Dr. Karageorghis, and he had often spoken to her of Cyprus’s attempts to recover the mosaics. Dr. True then called Dr. Kara-georghis, who told her that export of the mosaics was not authorized by Cyprus and that the mosaics she described were the mosaics which Cyprus had been so interested in recovering. Dr. True gave Dr. Kara-georghis the name of Geza von Habsburg and how to contact him. In November 1988, Dr. Karageorghis and Papageorghiou, in conjunction with Cyprus’s Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contacted the Ambassador of Cyprus in Washington, D.C. They informed the Ambassador of the mosaics’ existence in the United States and suggested that immediate and discreet action be taken to recover the mosaics. The embassy then began working with its attorneys, the plaintiffs’ Washington law firm in this case, to determine the location and possessor of the mosaics. Embassy officials worked discreetly so as not to put the mosaics in any danger or cause them to disappear underground again. By January 1989, Goldberg had also contacted her friend and art mentor Barbara Divver, who is an art dealer in New York. Divver contacted her friend John Walsh, Director of the Getty Museum, about the Getty’s possible acquisition of the mosaics. Goldberg and Divver had agreed that if the Getty Museum eventually purchased the mosaics, Goldberg would give Divver a ten percent commission. Walsh directed that Dr. True, because she was more familiar with Cyprus’s situation regarding the mosaics, respond to Divver’s inquiry. Dr. True spoke with Divver and explained to her substantially the same things she had discussed with von Habsburg. Dr. True told Divver that Dr. True would report this contact to the plaintiffs’ Washington law firm and to U.S. Customs, which she did. The plaintiffs and their attorneys eventually learned that the mosaics were in Goldberg’s possession in Indianapolis. The plaintiffs wrote to Goldberg requesting the return of the mosaics. Upon the defendants’ refusal, the plaintiffs instructed their attorneys to file suit to recover the mosaics. Throughout this opinion, the Court will discuss such additional facts as may be necessary to support the determinations reached herein. IV. Statute of Limitations A federal district court sitting in diversity must follow state statutes of limitations. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 66 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945). Moreover, a federal district court sitting in diversity must follow the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon v. Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). Because in Indiana statutes of limitations are procedural in nature, Indiana choice-of-law rules state that the statute of limitations of the forum state, Indiana, will apply. Albrecht v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co., 178 F.2d 577 (7th Cir.1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 804, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950); Dart Industries, Inc. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., 517 F.Supp. 9 (S.D.Ind.1980); Horvath v. Davidson, 148 Ind.App. 203, 264 N.E.2d 328 (1970). The Indiana code provides in relevant part: The following actions shall be commenced within six [6] years after the cause of action has accrued and not af-terwards. Third. For injuries to property other than personal property, damages for any detention thereof, and for recovering possession of personal property. I.C. § 34-1-2-1 (Burns 1986). Particularly in light of the plaintiffs’ claim that the mosaics should be returned to the Church of Cyprus, the Court concludes that the Indiana statute of limitations providing specifically “for recovering possession of personal property” governs the issue of possession of the mosaics. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ action is governed by a six-year statute of limitations. Sometime between August 1976, when military force and threat of harm had forced church officials to leave the church involuntarily, and November 1979, the mosaics were removed from the Kanakaria Church. In November 1979 church and government officials first learned that the mosaics were missing from the Kanakaria Church. Goldberg acquired the mosaics in July 1988. The plaintiffs first learned that the mosaics were in Goldberg’s possession in late 1988. The plaintiffs filed this action against Goldberg in March 1989. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ cause of action first accrued in 1979 and that, because the complaint was not filed within six years thereof, plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred. The plaintiffs, however, argue that under the circumstances of this case, they are not barred from recovering the mosaics. Thus the issue is whether the plaintiffs have filed their complaint in a timely fashion. A. Policy The courts reflect a strong policy in favor of statutes of limitations. The Indiana supreme court has stated: Formerly, statutes of limitations were looked upon with disfavor in that they are invariably in derogation of the common law. “Now, however, the judicial attitude is in favor of statutes of limitations, rather than otherwise, since they are considered as statutes of repose and as affording security against stale claims.” ... Such statutes rest upon sound public policy and tend to the peace and welfare of society and are deemed wholesome.... They are enacted upon the presumption that one having a well-founded claim will not delay in enforcing it. Shideler v. Dwyer, 275 Ind. 270, 417 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1981). Further, the Indiana court of appeals has ruled that “statutes of limitations are favored by the courts.... [t]hey are statutes of repose, founded upon a rule of necessity and convenience and the well-being of society.” Spoljanic v. Pangan, 466 N.E.2d 37, 43 (Ind.App.1984) (citations omitted). These cases indicate that Indiana follows the policies reflected in statutes of limitation. Accord, O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862, 868 (1980) (“The purpose of a statute of limitations is to ‘stimulate to activity and punish negligence’ and ‘promote repose by giving security and stability to human affairs,’ ”) (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139, 25 L.Ed. 807, 808 (1879)). B. Determination of the Timeliness and Accrual of a Cause of Action The fact that statutes of limitations exist, however, does not mean that the timeliness of a claim is determined solely by the mechanical application of a period of months to a file-stamp date. Rather, under certain circumstances a court is required to evaluate the timeliness of a claim under rules and doctrines of law designed to ensure fairness and equity in the adjudication of claims. The facts of this case warrant that the Court evaluate the timeliness of the plaintiffs’ claims under the following rules and doctrines. First, the Indiana supreme court has held that the determination of when a cause accrues is the court’s responsibility. Burks v. Rushmore, 534 N.E.2d 1101 (Ind.1989). The applicable Indiana statute of limitations states that actions for the recovery of personal property “shall be commenced within six [6] years after the cause of action has accrued and not afterwards.” I.C. § 34-1-2-1. Regarding the language “after the cause of action has accrued,” the court has stated that “the legislature designated the reasonable time for bringing an action and left to the courts the responsibility of determining when the cause accrues.” Burks, 534 N.E.2d at 1103 (citation omitted). See also Barnes v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 476 N.E.2d 84, 85 (Ind.1985) (“[i]t is clear this Court has the authority and responsibility to interpret the intentions of the legislature by deciding when a cause of action accrues.”). In Burks, supra, the Indiana supreme court reviewed the rules for determining when a cause of action accrues in Indiana. The Burks court noted that the general rule is that the statute of limitations begins to run when damage was ascertained or ascertainable by due diligence. 534 N.E.2d at 1104 (citing Barnes, 475 N.E.2d at 86). Thus, this Court notes that in Indiana the statute generally begins to run when damage was ascertained or by the use of due diligence could have been ascertained. Second, Indiana recognizes a discovery rule as it may affect the running of a statute of limitations. In the Barnes case, supra, the Indiana supreme court, on a certified question from the Seventh Circuit, considered when a cause of action accrues when the injury to the plaintiff is caused by a disease which may have been contracted as a result of protracted exposure to a foreign substance. The court held that “in those circumstances, a discovery type rule should be applied, and the statute of limitations in such causes commences to run from the date the plaintiff knew or should have discovered that [the plaintiff] suffered an injury or impingement, and that it was caused by the product or act of another.” 476 N.E.2d at 87-88. See also Burks, 534 N.E.2d at 1103; Walters v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 781 F.2d 570, 572 (7th Cir.1986). The court was careful to note that its adoption of the discovery rule in Barnes was limited to the specific circumstances before it, i.e., injury as a result of protracted exposure to a foreign substance. The Court declined to adopt a discovery rule for all tort claims, stating “that would be going beyond the scope of the inquiry and put us in the position of issuing an advisory opinion.” 476 N.E.2d at 87. However, it is important for this Court to note the Barnes court’s discussion of the discovery rule in general. In adopting a discovery rule in the case before it, the Indiana supreme court discussed the important policies supporting the discovery rule. The court stated: Many jurisdictions have responded to the problems presented by this type of case by adopting a “discovery rule.” The discovery rule provides that the statute of limitations in this type of cause runs from the date the negligence was or should have been discovered. The rule is based on the reasoning that it is inconsistent with our system of jurisprudence to require a claimant to bring his cause of action in a limited period in which, even with due diligence, he could not be aware a cause of action exists. 476 N.E.2d at 86. Further, in support of its decision to adopt a discovery rule, the court observed that “[¡Increasing numbers of jurisdictions are adopting some form of discovery rule,” citing recent cases from 14 states. Finally, the court stated that it had discussed a discovery rule previously, in Shideler, supra. In that , case the court noted “that in many cases where the discovery rule has been applied or alluded to, the misconduct was of a continuing nature or concealed ...” 417 N.E.2d at 291 (emphasis added). The Indiana supreme court’s adoption of the discovery rule in Barnes and its discussion of the policies and other jurisdictions supporting it indicate Indiana’s willingness to extend the rule to other circumstances, if appropriate. Third, Indiana recognizes the doctrine of fraudulent concealment as it may affect the running of a statute of limitations. Indiana has adopted the doctrine by case law and has reflected the doctrine in a statute. The Indiana supreme court has stated: The harshness which may result from the application of a statute of limitations has been avoided by judicial recognition of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is the doctrine of fraudulent concealment which operates as an equitable doctrine to estop a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations when he has, either by deception or by a violation of duty, concealed from the plaintiff material facts thereby preventing the plaintiff from discovering a potential cause of action. Burks, 534 N.E.2d at 1104 (citations omitted). The Indiana supreme court has also held that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment has its roots in equity, and that in general the doctrine operates to disallow a defendant, who by deceit or fraud prevents a plaintiff from learning of a cause of action, from taking advantage of his own wrong by asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to the plaintiff’s action. Guy v. Schuldt, 236 Ind. 10, 138 N.E.2d 891, 894 (1956) (“While a wrongdoer is concealing from an injured person his wrongful act, the law will not, through a statute of limitations, strip the injured party of his remedy against the wrongdoer”). See also Snyder v. Tell City Clinic, 181 Ind.App. 188, 391 N.E.2d 623, 628 (1979) (concealment of fraud tolls the statute of limitations) (citing Guy v. Schuldt, supra); Brown v. Gardner, 159 Ind.App. 586, 308 N.E.2d 424, 428 (1974); Ferrell v. Geisler, 505 N.E.2d 137 (Ind.App.1987) (doctrine of fraudulent concealment as applied in context of medical malpractice). To invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, Indiana requires that the concealment be active and intentional, and that such concealment misleads or hinders the plaintiff’s inquiry or ability to investigate. Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 998 (7th Cir.1969); Forth v. Forth, 409 N.E.2d 641, 644-45 (Ind.App.1980). See also Lambert v. Stark, 484 N.E.2d 630, 632 (Ind.App.1985). For a plaintiff to invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, Indiana requires that the plaintiff exercise due diligence to investigate the claim and attempt to discover the fraud. As the supreme court noted in Guy v. Schuldt, supra, If the fraud, although not discovered, ought to have been discovered, and could have been if reasonable diligence had been exercised by the plaintiff, the statute will run from the time discovery ought to have been made. To prevent the the barring of an action, it must appear that the fraud not only was not discovered, but could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence, until within the statutory period before the action was begun. 138 N.E.2d at 896 (citations omitted). See also Morgan v. Koch, supra, 419 F.2d at 999; Tolen v. A.H. Robins Co., 570 F.Supp. 1146, 1151-52 (S.D.Ind.1983); Lambert, 484 N.E.2d at 632; Estate of Ballard v. Ballard, 434 N.E.2d 136, 142 (Ind.App.1982). In addition to common law and statutory fraudulent concealment, Indiana courts have held that equitable estoppel will serve the same purpose and foreclose the use of a statute of limitations to a defendant who through fraud or misrepresentation prevents a plaintiff from commencing an action within the statute’s original time frame. See Donella v. Crady, 135 Ind. App. 60, 185 N.E.2d 623, 625 (1962); Landers v. Evers, 107 Ind.App. 347, 24 N.E.2d 796, 797 (1940). The requirement that the plaintiff exercise due diligence applies to fraudulent concealment grounded in equitable estoppel as well. Spoljanic, supra, 466 N.E.2d at 44-45. Further, one Indiana court has held that under equitable estop-pel, “[a] defendant may be prevented from relying upon a statute of limitations by his own misrepresentations or fraud, even though he has not concealed the cause of action.” Marcum v. Richmond Auto Parts Co., 149 Ind.App. 120, 270 N.E.2d 884, 886 (1971). C. Application of Law to Case at Bar The Court now applies the rules and principles developed above to the facts of this case. The Court notes that there is no Indiana case which controls the issues of when the statute of limitations begins to run and whether it has been tolled in an action for the replevin of stolen property such as valuable artwork. Therefore, it is this Court’s responsibility to determine these issues as an Indiana court would. “The duty of a district court sitting in diversity faced with a novel [issue] ... is to predict, as best as possible, how an [Indiana] court would decide the issue.” Walters, supra, 781 F.2d at 572 (citation omitted). Although many of the Indiana cases discussing the timeliness of claims have been malpractice or products liability actions, the Court believes that Indiana has developed rules sufficient to allow this Court to apply them in the context of a replevin action for the recovery of stolen artwork. Under the facts of this case, the Court concludes that under Indiana law the plaintiffs’ action is timely filed. The Court holds that the plaintiffs’ cause of action did not accrue in this case until the plaintiffs, using due diligence, knew or were on reasonable notice of the identity of the possessor of the mosaics. In this context a discovery rule should apply and prevent the statute from running until the plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known who possessed the mosaics. The court in O’Keeffe v. Snyder, supra, was faced with a similar issue. In that case the plaintiff Georgia O’Keeffe filed suit to replevy from the defendant three small pictures she had painted. She contended that the paintings were stolen. The defendant contended, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s action was barred by a six-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff O’Keeffe claimed that the paintings were stolen in 1946. In 1976, O’Keeffe learned that her paintings were in the possession of the defendant. She filed suit for their return in 1976. In determining whether O’Keeffe’s action was filed in a timely manner, the New Jersey supreme court reviewed its applications of the discovery rule. It noted that it had adopted the rule in the area of medical malpractice, and then extended it to other contexts. The court concluded that the discovery rule applies to an action for replevin of a painting ... [the plaintiff’s] cause of action accrued when she first knew, or reasonably should have known through the exercise of due diligence, of the cause of action, including the identity of the possessor of the paintings. 416 A.2d at 870. Similarly, this Court is persuaded that the discovery rule should apply to this case. The discovery rule prevents the statute from beginning to run in situations where a plaintiff, using due diligence, cannot bring suit because he is unable to determine a cause of action. In a replevin action, a plaintiff sues a defendant for the recovery of specific property. An element of the cause of action is the defendant’s wrongful detaining or wrongful possession of the property sought to be recovered. In order to maintain a replevin action, the plaintiff must know who is in possession of the property at issue. If a plaintiff is unable to determine the possessor of stolen items, the plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action in replevin. The Court concludes that a plaintiff who seeks protection under the discovery rule has a duty to use reasonable diligence to locate the stolen items. See DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2823, 100 L.Ed.2d 924 (1988). Determination of due diligence is fact-sensitive and must be made on a case-by-case basis. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 873. Having reviewed the facts of this case, the Court is persuaded that the plaintiffs exercised due diligence in their search to locate and to recover the mosaics. From the time they first learned of the mosaics’ disappearance, the Republic of Cyprus engaged in an organized and systematic effort to notify those who might assist them and to seek the return of the mosaics. As previously set out by the Court, Cyprus has contacted and worked with the United Nations, UNESCO, museums, museum organizations, leading Byzantine scholars and curators, and the press. Officials of the Republic of Cyprus have sent press releases and other information, delivered speeches, and made numerous personal contacts with individuals reasonably calculated to assist in recovery of the mosaics. Tr. 80-81, 90-101, 190-206, Leventis Deposition 21-45, True Deposition 25. Dr. Marion True, Curator of Antiquities at the J. Paul Getty Museum in Los Ange-les, testified that the Cypriots “had brought the loss of these mosaics to the attention of people who would have been more directly involved with Byzantine art.” True Deposition 127. Cyprus’s actions were designed to recover the mosaics at opportunities where the mosaics might be offered for sale. According to Dr. Gary Yikan, the plaintiffs’ art expert and Assistant Director for Curatorial Affairs/Medieval Curator of the Walters Art Gallery in Baltimore, this strategy was “consistent with what is happening in the art world today, the goal is to stifle the trade at the point of destination.” Tr. 388. Dr. Vikan further testified that, in his opinion, the Republic of Cyprus has been duly diligent in its attempts to recover lost cultural property, including the mosaics. Tr. 342, 382. In fact Dr. Yikan stated that in the Mediterranean, Cyprus “stands apart” in its attempts to recover such property. Tr. 342. Dr. Vikan’s testimony on this issue, as well as the testimony of the Greek Cypriot officials who were directly involved in these efforts, is credible and persuasive on this issue. The Court concludes that the plaintiffs have exercised due diligence in their search for the mosaics. Further, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs did not know and were not reasonably on notice of the identity of the possessor of the mosaics until late 1988. The defendants argue that two incidents, an article in a Turkish publication and the recovery (assisted by the Menil Foundation) of frescoes and portions of the Kanakaria mosaic, should have put Cyprus on notice as to who was in possession of the mosaics at issue in this case. The Court disagrees. A June 10, 1982 article in the Turkish publication Ortarn contained the headline “Antique Smuggler, Aydin Dikmen, [sic] Allegedly to Deposit Money in the Bank Account of a Judge.” Exhibit 2174. The article reported that Dikman was wanted for smuggling antique artifacts, that he was arrested and released shortly thereafter, and that Dikman’s wife had allegedly deposited a large sum of money in the bank account of a judge. Id. The single paragraph of the article discussing Dikman linked him by implication to the theft of church icons from the Girne Castle museum. The majority of the article discussed the loss of cultural property from churches and museums in general on the island of Cyprus. The last section of the article discussed the mosaics missing from the Kanakaria Church. The article contained two pictures, each of portions of the Kana-karia mosaic. Id. Papageorghiou testified that the article did not make any connection between the mosaics and Aydin Dik-man. Tr. 173. When Cyprus was made aware of Turkish press reports of missing Cypriot antiquities, it repeated its systematic steps of notification such as contacting UNESCO and sending out press releases. Tr. 193-94; Leventis Deposition 82. The Court concludes that Cyprus took reasonable steps upon learning of such information. The Court further concludes that nothing in the Turkish press did or reasonably should have put the Republic of Cyprus on notice that the mosaics were or could have been in Dikman’s possession. Similarly, Cyprus’s recovery of frescoes and portions of the original Kanakaria mosaic in 1983 and 1984 with the assistance of the Menil Foundation in Texas did not and reasonably should not have put Cyprus on notice of who may have possessed additional portions of the mosaic. A series of events beginning in 1983 led to the recovery of the frescoes and portions of the mosaic. In 1983, London-based art dealer Yanni Petsopoulos contacted the Menil Foundation, de Menil Deposition 18. The Foundation has done business with Petso-poulos and employed him as a special agent for several years. Hopps Deposition 65. Petsopoulos had been approached by a man of Turkish nationality based in Germany (who, unbeknownst to any officials of the Republic of Cyprus turned out to be Aydin Dikman). Dikman asked Petsopoulos to help sell some frescoes in Dikman’s possession. Leventis Deposition 47-48. Dikman represented that the frescoes were from Turkey. Hopps Deposition 73. Petsopou-los contacted the Menil Foundation about the possible purchase of the frescoes. Representatives of the Menil Foundation, including Walter Hopps, senior consultant, and Mrs. Dominique de Menil, president of the Foundation and widow of its founder, traveled with Petsopoulos to Germany to view the frescoes. In Munich, they met Aydin Dikman, viewed the frescoes, and discussed their acquisition. Id. at 89. In Dikman’s apartment they observed a mosaic. Hopps Deposition 68, 91; de Menil deposition 18. Later, Petsopoulos discussed with Hopps his suspicion that the mosaic was a part of the Kanakaria mosaic. Petsopoulos decided to research the matter. Petsopoulos’s suspicion raised a question in Hopps’s mind as to whether the frescoes were actually from Turkey, or whether they too could be from Cyprus. Hopps Deposition 114-15. The Menil Foundation decided to purchase the frescoes. Hopps Deposition 98. It was determined that the frescoes were from Cyprus and that the mosaic seen in Dikman’s apartment was part of the Kana-karia mosaic. Hopps Deposition 118, 125, 128-29. The Menil Foundation acquired the frescoes for the Church of Cyprus and reached an agreement which allowed the Menil to exhibit the frescoes for a period of time before returning them to Cyprus, de Menil Deposition 13, 32. Petsopoulos devised a plan to recover the Kanakaria mosaic in Dikman’s possession for the Republic of Cyprus. Petsopoulos went to Dikman’s villa in Turkey. Petsopoulos accused Dikman of lying to him and to the Menil Foundation about the origin of the frescoes. The meeting became “stormy” and there ensued an “enormous emotional explosion.” Hopps Deposition 154-55. Petsopoulos proposed that to make up for having lied about the frescoes, Dikman should turn over what portions he possessed of the mosaic. Hopps Deposition 146-47. After an “emotional fracas,” Dikman agreed and felt that the “honorable thing to do was to turn over what he had of the mosaics.” Hopps Deposition 156. Petsopoulos arranged to effect transfer of the mosaics. Ambassador Le-ventis secured the recovery of four pieces of mosaic, two of which Cyprus determined were not genuine. Leventis Deposition 52-53. Dikman represented to Petsopoulos that he was returning all portions of the mosaic in his possession. Throughout this series of events, officials of the Republic of Cyprus questioned Petsopoulos and Menil Foundation officials about who was in possession of the frescoes and mosaics, but no one would reveal such information. Leventis Deposition 48-49, 53; Tr. 207; Hopps Deposition 141-42, 163. Ambassador Leventis questioned on several occasions whether the individual from whom the mosaics were recovered possessed any additional pieces of the mosaic, and he was always told no. Leventis Deposition 51, 52, 54. Hopps himself did not believe that Dikman possessed any additional parts of the mosaic. Hopps Deposition 149. Hopps and Petsopoulos did not tell Cypriot officials who had possessed the frescoes and mosaics because they feared reprisals against any remaining artwork or against the individuals or families of individuals who were involved in recovery. Hopps Deposition 150-53. Dr. Karageor-ghis stated that he understood this danger, having relayed at least one story of a violent reprisal in which the quarters of some individuals assisting Cyprus in recovering some antiquities were bombed. Hopps Deposition 152-53, 165, 187-89. The Court concludes that throughout this series of events, the plaintiffs were not nor should they reasonably have been on notice of the possessor of the mosaics at issue in this case. The plaintiffs made diligent inquiries of those involved. However, the plaintiffs never learned of any identity or information sufficient to put them on notice of whom to investigate or of who possessed the mosaics. It was reasonable for both those involved in recovering antiquities for Cyprus and Greek Cypriot officials to fear reprisals against individuals or the art itself. It would be pointless and destructive to require the plaintiffs to hav