Full opinion text
GERRY, Chief Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Before us today is a motion for entry of a partial consent decree, which embodies a so-called “de minimis ” settlement negotiated pursuant to § 122(g) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”). 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g). The settlement resolves the United States and the State of New Jersey’s claims against certain parties in this action pursuant to § 107(a) of CERC-LA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), to recover costs incurred for enforcement, investigation and clean-up activities at the Lipari Landfill in the Township of Mantua, Gloucester County, New Jersey. The decree was lodged with this court on July 28, 1988, as was a fact sheet explaining EPA’s determination to enter into the decree. United States Exhibits 1 & 2. On August 8, 1988, the United States published a notice of the lodging of the decree inviting public comment on the proposed settlement. Fed.Reg. 12613 (Aug. 8, 1988); U.S. Ex. 3. The United States received three sets of comments on the proposed settlement from three defendants who are not parties to the settlement. U.S. Ex. 4-6. The United States, or more specifically the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), reviewed these comments and decided to move this court for entry of the Partial Consent Decree. U.S. Ex. 7 & attachments. The motion is before us now and is joined in by the settling defendants. The motion is opposed by certain defendants to this action. Rohm & Haas, which is alleged to have contributed 46,507 55-gallon drums out of the estimated 54,361 drums of the hazardous waste dumped at Lipari, opposes entry of the decree on the grounds that the settling parties’ payment does not adequately reflect their proportionate share of the waste at Lipari. Rohm & Haas asserts that the plaintiffs are allowing the settlors to cash out so cheaply because they can recover any shortfall, which could run into the millions of dollars, from the remaining defendants. The non-settlors will bear this risk, because the settlement extinguishes their contribution rights vis-a-vis the settlors and leaves the defendants with only a credit in the amount of the settlement. Another defendant, Manor Health Care (“Manor Health”), the successor company to a waste haulage firm, objects to and seeks to enjoin the proposed consent decree because it has not been permitted to participate as a de min-imis party, while its predecessor’s customers have. These objections will be dealt with during our evaluation of whether to enter the proposed consent decree. On August 9, 1989, this court held a lengthy hearing on the proposed consent decree, in which it entertained argument from the United States on behalf of itself and the State of New Jersey; by the objecting defendants, Rohm & Haas and Manor Health Care; and by several of the de minimis settlors. The presentations made at that oral argument, voluminous briefs and the record evidence compiled by all parties informs the analysis that follows. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The landfill site, as we have indicated in a previous opinion, see 669 F.Supp. 672 (D.N.J.1987), occupies approximately six acres in Mantua Township, New Jersey. It is bordered by two streams. Beginning in 1958, the Landfill’s owner, Nicholas Lipari, accepted chemical and industrial wastes for deposit at the site. Overall, the United States now estimates that 55,782 55-gallon drums, or approximately 3,068,010 gallons, of liquid wastes were deposited at Lipari before it was closed by the State of New Jersey in 1971. A variety of hazardous substances, including benzene, chromium, lead, zinc and arsenic, have been detected at the site and on areas adjacent to and down gradient from the Landfill. The Lipari Landfill has the dubious honor of being the number one site on the National Priorities List, a ranking of hazardous waste sites based on potential threat to human health and the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c); 40 C.F.R. Part 300, Appendix B; U.S. Ex. 2 at 1. The United States has responded to the situation at Lipari by undertaking or preparing to undertake three phases of remedial action. During Phase I, the EPA installed a slurry wall encircling 16 acres of contaminated soil and groundwater, topped by an impermeable cap. See Record of Decision (“ROD”) for Phase I, U.S. Ex. 9. Costs incurred through June 1, 1988 for Phase I, and for Phases II and III, are approximately $10,500,000. U.S. Ex. 7, Attachment 1. Phase II, selected by EPA on September 30, 1985, consists of a flushing system, and its estimated price tag is $33,-800,000. ROD for Phase II, U.S. Ex. 10, 10A; U.S. Ex. 7, Attachment 1. On July-11, 1988, EPA selected the Phase III remedy which will address off-site contamination. See ROD for Phase III; U.S. Ex. 11. Its cost is projected at $20,970,000. U.S. Ex. 7, Attachment 1. Thus, total costs for remedial action are currently estimated at $65,270,000. On September 10, 1985, the United States filed a complaint under § 107 of CERCLA against Rohm & Haas Company, Inc., Owens-Illinois, Inc.', CBS Records, Inc., Almo, Inc., Cenco, Inc., Manor Health Care Corporation and Marvin Jonas, Inc. The complaint seeks to recover costs already incurred in responding to the problem at Lipari, as well as a declaratory judgment on liability for future costs. The complaint alleges that Rohm & Haas, CBS Records and Owens-Illinois were parties that arranged with a transporter for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances they generated, and that Almo and Marvin Jonas transported these hazardous substances to the Lipari Landfill. See 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3), (4) (“generators” and “transporters,” respectively). Cenco and Manor Health were named as successor corporations to Almo. In January 1986, the State of New Jersey intervened pursuant to § 104(c) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c), to recover its 10 percent share of the response costs incurred. On July 28, 1988, the United States filed an amended complaint and named Triangle Publications, Inc., The Glidden Company, E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., Allied Paper, Inc., Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., SPS Technologies, Inc., The Gilbert Spruance Company, Betz Laboratories, Inc., and Hercules, Inc. as additional defendants. These nine defendants are parties to the proposed consent decree which was filed with the court on the same day. III. THE PROPOSED CONSENT DECREE A. Its Terms The decree embraces 12 parties: the two plaintiffs, the United States and the State of New Jersey; one original defendant, CBS Records, and the nine defendants added by the amended complaint. It requires the settlors to pay a total of $3,034,807. Proposed Consent Decree, § III, U.S. Ex. 1. Approximately $2,586,000 is slated to partially reimburse the United States for its response costs, and $287,000 will be paid to New Jersey toward its claim for response costs. New Jersey will receive an additional $161,220 as payment for potential damages to natural resources within its jurisdiction. In return for these payments the settlors receive a release from liability for all claims related to Lipari. The United States and the State of New Jersey covenant not to sue for future civil claims under §§ 106 and 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 and 9607, and § 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6973. U.S. Ex. 1, § V. New Jersey has provided the settlors with releases from liability under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 et seq., the Water Pollution Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10A-1 et seq., and any other state statutory and common law. In addition, the United States Department of Interior and the State of New Jersey have provided releases for damages to any natural resources within their respective jurisdictions. Id. Finally, the decree grants the settlors contribution protection from the remaining defendants, i.e., the non-settling defendants, in accordance with §§ 113(f)(2) and 122(g)(5) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(2) and 9622(g)(5), which we will discuss shortly. Id., § VII. It is this feature, or more properly this effect, of the settlement which has impelled the objections of Rohm & Haas and Manor Health. The decree contains two “reopener” provisions. The first allows the plaintiffs, and non-settling defendants, to seek relief from the settlors if information not currently known shows that a settling party is no longer eligible for de minimis status, defined in the agreement as a volumetric contribution to the Landfill of 1 percent or less. In negotiating the settlement, the United States used as a rule of thumb the notion that a de minimis party was one which had contributed 1 percent or less of the waste at Lipari. Indeed, each settling party was required to and has certified that it contributed less than 1 percent of the hazardous waste at Lipari. The second reopener allows the plaintiffs and any other parties to seek relief from any of the settling parties if total response costs exceed $94 million. Id., § VI. According to the United States, this figure was selected because: ... during negotiations an off-site remedy had not been selected, but the United States desired to establish a settlement figure which accounted for unknown future costs while still providing for a premium payment and ensuring that the United States at least received an amount that represented the de min-imis settlor’s volumetric share of the costs. Since the settlors cumulatively were considered responsible for approximately 3.0% of the waste at the site during the negotiations, the selection of the $94 million reopener along with the settlement amount of $2.87 million ensured that all of these goals were accomplished. United States Brief at 11. Even though the United States now views the best estimate of the settlors’ volumetric contribution to be 4.23 percent, it still believes the $94 million reopener is adequate, since the settlors are still bearing approximately their proportionate share and might be contributing a premium, since they could have contributed even less than the 3.0 percent used to select the $94 million reopener. Rohm & Haas, as we shall see, believes these reopeners are inadequate. It contends that the evidence currently in the record demonstrates that the settling parties are responsible for over 10 percent of the hazardous waste at Lipari and therefore should be paying almost $4 million more. B. Background The United States and Rohm & Haas agree that it was, rather ironically, Rohm & Haas which initiated and drove the process that led to the proposed decree. They part company with respect to what affect this had on the settlement ultimately agreed upon by the Government and the settlors. Rohm & Haas avers that after settlement negotiations between the original defendants and the United States failed it approached the United States about the possibility of identifying other parties potentially responsible for the clean-up of Li-pari Landfill (“potentially responsible parties” or “PRPs”). The United States evinced very little interest in this proposal, being quite content to recover its response costs from the then named defendants. Therefore, it was Rohm & Haas which undertook primary responsibility for identifying other PRPs. The purpose of this process, according to Rohm & Haas, was to develop a “cash-out” agreement whereby these generators would settle all claims relating to Lipari Landfill by paying a lump-sum amount in return for a covenant not to sue pursuant to CERC-LA, Section 122(g), 42 U.S.C. 9622(g). The Government expressed little interest in conducting the discovery necessary to allocate the share of total costs to companies other than defendants Rohm and Haas, Owens-Illinois and Manor Health Care. Therefore, the burden fell on Rohm and Haas and the other defendants to investigate the extent of liability of the so-called “de minimis” parties. Rohm & Haas Brief at 4-5. To facilitate this process, United States Magistrate Jerome B. Simandle established a discovery period to identify other PRPs. Discovery was stayed, except insofar as it was directed at identifying such PRPs. Numerous depositions were taken, most important of which was that of Marvin Jonas, whose company had transported large amounts of Rohm & Haas waste to Lipari. During his deposition, Jonas said that he had transported to Lipari the waste of several generators that were not named as defendants in the original complaint. Jonas Deposition of April 17, 1986; U.S. Ex. 12. By way of this deposition, and from the records of those companies mentioned by Jonas, and from further discovery taken from Nick Lipari, other PRPs were identified. Through this discovery, Rohm & Haas was able to persuade the United States that these parties were responsible for the Lipari response costs. On October 10, 1986, counsel for Rohm & Haas drafted and transmitted a proposed settlement agreement and release. Whitman Certification, Rohm & Haas Ex. 1. Under this proposal seven companies identified during this discovery process (seven of the ten who are parties to the proposed consent decree) would have paid $2.6 million in return for a release of liability for all claims relating to Lipari. U.S. Ex. 4, Attachment 1A. This figure, Rohm & Haas says, was premised on its belief that the total response costs at Lipari would be $20 million, and EPA’s belief that $26 million, given the potential for cost overruns, was a “liberal” estimate of the potential response costs. Whitman Cert., Rohm & Haas Ex. 1; U.S. Ex. 7, Attachment l. At a meeting on October 14, 1986, Rohm & Haas presented its settlement to the parties and explained that the $2.6 million figure was premised on estimated clean-up costs of $20 million. Id. Rohm & Haas viewed the settlement as representing a 10 percent share of the waste at Lipari, plus a $600,000 “premium” for an early “cash-out,” whereby the settling parties pay additional funds above their volumetric share of the waste in exchange for avoiding the possible joint and several liability and substantial litigation costs which accompany being a CERCLA defendant. On November 13, 1986, the United States “preliminarily endorsed” the $2.6 million figure. U.S. Ex. 33. This approval, says Rohm & Haas, was at that time based on EPA’s view that the settlement constituted a payment for the seven settlors’ estimated 5 percent share of the waste, plus a 5 percent premium for an early cash-out. Rohm & Haas Brief at 7-8; U.S. Ex. 7, Attachment 1. Under either of these scenarios, Rohm & Haas was prepared to support the settlement. However, in 1988, Rohm & Haas learned that EPA’s estimate of the response costs had soared from $26 million to $65 million after completion of the Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (“RI/FS”) pursuant to § 104(b) of CERC-LA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b). Further, three other companies, Gilbert Spruance, Allied Paper and Betz Laboratories, joined the original settlors. Despite this, the United States entered into a settlement with these ten parties for only $360,000 — $200,000 for response costs, and $160,000 for natural resource damages — more than the $2.6 million figure originally proposed by Rohm & Haas. Rohm & Haas urged the United States to demand a markedly higher dollar figure from these PRPs in light of the new circumstances. The United States’ refusal to do so demonstrates, according to Rohm & Haas, the non-adversarial nature of this settlement. The United States did not pursue these settlors with the vigor one usually associates with plaintiffs. Rather, it went along with the de minimis process so long as it was convenient for it to do so; i.e., while Rohm & Haas was doing all the work, but was never committed to striking a fair bargain which would exact an adequate sum from the de minimis PRPs. After all, notes Rohm & Haas, these PRPs were not targets chosen by the United States, and the Government never wished to devote much time to pursuing them since it already had strong cases against Rohm & Haas and Owens-Illinois. Moreover, the United States believed that the non-settlors, as opposed to itself, would bear the brunt of a bad settlement. As such, it had little incentive to engage in a hard-fought bargaining process. The United States and the settling PRPs vehemently differ with Rohm & Haas’s characterization of the bargaining process. With respect to the increase in response cost estimates which occurred after Rohm & Haas circulated its draft settlement, the United States insists that it never viewed the original settlement figure as being contingent on clean-up estimates of $26 million or lower. It points out that any estimates of response costs, especially those attributable to the Phase III off-site remedy, were necessarily speculative prior to completion of the RI/FS process, a fact that Rohm & Haas was repeatedly made aware of and seemed to recognize. U.S. Exs. 34-37. During the negotiating process, the United States insists that it engaged the set-tlors in lengthy and hard-fought bargaining. The settlors demanded a complete release from liability for claims related to Lipari. The United States refused this demand and insisted upon the inclusion of the two reopeners described earlier. Moreover, many of the settlors originally offered to pay significantly lower dollar contributions than what were eventually agreed upon. The United States held out for and eventually accepted a dollar settlement which constituted 90 percent of its original demand. At oral argument, counsel for the United States and for some of the de minimis settlors represented to the court that the settlement was a good-faith compromise of this litigation. Counsel for the de minimis settlors assured the court that the United States was a tough and largely unyielding adversary. Counsel for the United States accorded equal respect to counsel for the settlors, who, it says, consistently made suggestions for inclusions or deletions from the United States settlement proposal and never hesitated to point out the weakness of the case against their clients. Rohm & Haas does not contest these assertions of good-faith. It does not deny that there were proposals and counter-proposals, drafts and counter-drafts. Rather, Rohm & Haas believes that the settlement was not the product of truly spirited negotiating because the United States felt it had nothing at risk, and thus lacked the underlying incentive to hold out for a fair deal. The United States would not, Rohm & Haas asserts, have entered into this settlement, negotiated based on a response costs estimate of $26 million, if it bore the risk that this was a bad settlement. It was only because the Government believed that Rohm & Haas and the other non-settling defendants would be responsible for making up any underpayment by the settlors that it allowed the ten settlors, among whom are corporate titans like DuPont and CBS Records, to cash out so cheaply. To fully understand this argument, one must recognize the effect a CERCLA de minimis settlement has on the contribution rights of a non-settling PRP, such as Rohm & Haas. It is to that subject that we now direct our attention. IV. THE CONSENT DECREE AND NON-SETTLORS’ CONTRIBUTION RIGHTS CERCLA ordinarily accords any potentially responsible party, such as Rohm & Haas, the right to seek contribution from other PRPs during or following any action under §§ 106 or 107(a). § 113(f)(1) of CERCLA; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). In resolving such claims, “the court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.” Id. However, the contribution rights of PRPs vis-a-vis defendants who settle a CERCLA action with the United States or a state are extinguished by such a settlement. Under the proposed consent decree’s provisions, the non-settling defendants, and any unidentified PRPs, would be barred from seeking contribution from any of the settling defendants. In lieu of such rights, any potential liability of the non-set-tlors would be reduced by the amount of the settlement. U.S. Ex. 1, § VII. Therefore, if the United States obtains a judgment of X dollars against all the PRPs and Rohm & Haas satisfies that entire judgment, it will only receive a credit in the amount of the settlement even if the amount of the settlement is only 4.4 percent of X and Rohm & Haas can show that the settlors’ equitable share is 10 percent of X — a scenario which under comparative fault principles would ordinarily give rise to a contribution right in Rohm & Haas since it had satisfied more than its equitable share of a joint liability. This result, the United States argues and Rohm & Haas fears, is dictated by two specific CERCLA provisions added by the SARA amendments which address the effect CERCLA settlements have on non-settling parties. The first of these provisions, § 113(f)(2), applies generally to CERCLA settlements involving governmental plaintiffs and provides: A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially liable persons unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). The second provision, § 122(g)(5), directly addresses the effect of a de minimis settlement upon non-settlors’ contribution rights: A party who has resolved its liability to the United States under this subsection [§ 122(g)] shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the settlement. Such settlement does not discharge any of the other 'potentially responsible parties unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others by the amount of the settlement. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5). (Emphasis added.) While non-settlors lose their contribution rights, defendants who are parties to a CERCLA settlement retain the right to seek contribution from the non -settling PRPs. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B). And, of course, the Government retains the right to bring or maintain an action and seek relief from non-settling PRPs if the settlement provides it with less than complete relief. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3). Prior to the 1986 SARA amendments, CERCLA had been silent as to whether defendants were jointly and severally liable for response costs, whether a right of contribution existed among PRPs, and therefore, of course, what effect settlements would have on non-settling PRPs’ contribution rights. Courts, both pre- and post-SARA, have consistently held that defendants under CERCLA are jointly and severally liable where the harm at a particular waste site is indivisible. United States v. Monsanto Company, 858 F.2d 160, 171 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, Monsanto Company v. United States, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 3156, 104 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1989); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company (NEP-ACCO), 579 F.Supp. 823, 844-845 (W.D.Mo.1984), aff'd in relevant part and reversed in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, sub nom., Armco, Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 484 U.S. 1008, 108 S.Ct. 703, 98 L.Ed.2d 654 (1988), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848, 108 S.Ct. 146, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987); United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1337-39 (E.D.Pa.1983); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802, 805-810 (S.D.Ohio 1983). There was, pre-SARA, more dispute about how settlements would affect contribution rights, which were generally assumed to exist under CERCLA. See State of Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F.Supp. 1484, 1492 (D.Colo.1985) (citing cases). EPA tried to encourage settlements by agreeing to indemnify any party with whom it settled to the extent necessary to extinguish any contribution claims against that party. However, EPA did have a preference for resolving the effect of a settlement on non-settlors in accord with section four of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (“UCTA”), 12 Uniform Laws Annotated 63 (1975), which states: When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death: (a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors for liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and (b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor. Id. at 98; Interim Settlement Policy, 50 Fed.Reg. 5034, 5043 (Feb. 8, 1985) (emphasis added). At least one court, however, held that the rule articulated in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, U.L.A. pocket part 40 (1989), was preferable to the UCTA for use under CERCLA. United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 628 F.Supp. 391 (W.D.Mo.1985). Section 6 of the UCFA provides: A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount of the released person’s equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2. U.L.A. pocket part at 51-52 (1989). Section 2 of the UCFA calls on courts to determine the percentage fault of the respective parties, including settlors, based on the nature of their conduct and its relation to the plaintiffs’ damages. Id. at 45. In Conservation Chemical, Chief Judge Wright held that the effect of a CERCLA settlement “upon non-settling parties should be determined in accordance with the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act for the reason that the principles of that model act are the most consistent with, and do the most to implement, the congressional intent which is the foundation for CERCLA.” Id. at 402. In fact, one post-SARA opinion has indicated that the effect a consent decree to which the United States is a party has on non-settlors’ contribution rights is to be determined in accordance with the UCFA. United States v. Laskin, Case No. C84-20354, 1989 U.S. Dist. Court, LEXIS 4900 (N.D.Ohio, February 27, 1989). But, however interesting it might be, we need not, and may not, engage in a federal common law analysis to decide whether non-settling defendants should be credited with the proportional or equitable share of the liability attributable to the settling parties, the UCFA approach, or only with the settlement amount, the UCTA approach. By enacting § 113(f)(2) and § 122(g)(5) of CERCLA in 1986, Congress has plainly indicated that non-settling defendants’ contribution claims will be barred, and they will be credited only with the amount of the settlement and nothing more. Accord, Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F.Supp. 1019 (D.Mass.1989). We see no reason to deviate from this clear expression of congressional intent. It would be puzzling indeed if CERCLA, post-SARA, permitted a court to credit a non-settling defendant with the “equitable” share of the liability attributable to defendants who have resolved their liability to the United States or a State via a judicially approved settlement, since sections 113(f)(2) and 122(g)(5) seem much more closely modeled on the UCTA than on the UCFA. One suspects that Congress would have chosen somewhat different words than “reduces the potential liability of the other[] [non-settling potentially responsible parties] by the amount of the settlement,” to express the view that non-settling parties should have their liability “reduced by the released person’s equitable share of the liability.” Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5) with UCFA, 12 U.L.A. pocket part 51-52. Moreover, the use of a UCFA proportional judgment reduction mechanism is inconsistent with Congress’s intent to expedite “effective remedial action and minimize litigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F.Supp. 677, 693 (S.D.N.Y.1988). It is undoubtedly true that a settlement bar raised under either a UCFA or a UCTA approach will provide PRPs with the peace required to induce them to enter into settlements. However, the use of a UCFA approach has a tremendous negative impact on the benefit the United States or a State could hope to receive from a settlement under CERCLA. As one district court has aptly noted, if courts deviate from the plain language of § 113(f)(2) (and in our case § 122(g)(5)) and use a proportional mechanism: the responsibility of a settlor for damages would need to be fully litigated by the sovereigns and the non-settlors to determine the settlor’s proportional share, thus largely duplicating the aspects — and expense — of the litigation the settlement was designed to avoid. Acushnet River, 712 F.Supp. at 1027. In fact, the only parties which would avoid or decrease litigation expenses via such a settlement would be the settling defendants. The overall litigation would remain, insofar as the issues to be considered are concerned, as complex and unwieldy as it was prior to the settlement. The only difference would be that the United States and the relevant State rather than the settling defendants would litigate the contribution issues with the non-settlors. There would be no incentive for Government plaintiffs to enter into such settlements since by doing so they would not decrease their enforcement costs but, indeed, have to take on the burden of showing that the settling parties paid their equitable share. If the Government shirks this burden, it could be faced with covering the shortfall between the amount of the settlement and the set-tlors’ equitable share of the response costs. In this situation: It thus might cost the sovereigns more to settle with one party than not to settle since, if the sovereigns do not settle, they can merely prove that all ... defendants ... polluted and seek recovery from all or any one of them in any proportion the sovereigns choose because the defendants in such a case are generally jointly and severally liable. Acushnet River, 712 F.Supp. at 1027, n. 14. We do not believe that this scenario, which follows from use of a proportional or equitable approach, is consistent with Congress’s intention to facilitate the voluntary settlement of CERCLA litigation. In sum, we believe that if this proposed decree is accepted by this court, then the non-settling PRPs will only receive a credit in the amount of the settlement. This means that they bear the risk that the settling defendants are paying less than their equitable share. If, for example, the settling parties’ volumetric contribution to the waste at Lipari is determined at trial to have constituted 10 percent of the waste at the site and this is their “equitable” share, and the settlement amount is only 4.4 percent of the response costs, then the non-settling parties will be liable for a portion of the response costs, which ordinarily they may have recouped, upon a proper showing, via contribution. As such a shortfall could constitute millions of dollars, the harm to a non-settlor if the settlement does not reflect the settlors’ equitable share is potentially large. As a result of this potential harm, Rohm & Haas contends that this court has a duty to review very carefully the factual evidence linking the settling parties to the landfill. If the evidence is best read as suggesting that the settlement amount is grossly disproportionate to the settling defendants’ most likely volumetric share of the waste, then Rohm & Haas argues that we must refuse to enter the consent decree. We evaluate this contention during consideration of the standard of review which must be applied to evaluate the proposed decree. V. STANDARD OF REVIEW The consent decree presented for our approval was negotiated under § 122(g) of CERCLA, a provision added, as was § 122 in its entirety, by the 1986 SARA amendments. However, § 122(m) specifically provides that “[i]n the case of consent decrees and other settlements under this section ... no provision of this Act shall be construed to preclude or otherwise affect the applicability of general principles of law regarding the setting aside or modification of consent decrees or other settlements.” 42 U.S.C. § 9622(m). The parties and the pre- and post-SARA case law are in agreement that before entering a consent decree under CERCLA, this court must satisfy itself that the proposed decree is fair, adequate and reasonable, and consistent with the Constitution and the mandate of Congress. City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F.Supp. 677, 692 (S.D.N.Y.1988); see also Acushnet River, 712 F.Supp. at 1028; United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 628 F.Supp. 391, 400 (W.D.Mo.1985); United States v. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F.Supp. 1334, 1337 (S.D.Ind.1982); United States v. Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp., 540 F.Supp. 1067, 1072 (W.D.N.Y.1982). This standard comports with the standard applicable within the Third Circuit to judicial approval of class actions, a standard which also requires the court to determine whether the proposed settlement is “fair, adequate and reasonable.” Walsh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir.1983); Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir.1975); Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900, 95 S.Ct. 184, 42 L.Ed.2d 146 (1974). The court’s core concern in deciding whether to approve this proposed decree is with ensuring that the decree furthers the public interest as expressed in CERCLA. Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F.Supp. at 1337; H.R.Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1985), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1986, p. 3042 (“Before initially approving a consent decree under CERCLA, a court must satisfy itself that the settlement is reasonable, fair and consistent with the purposes that CERCLA is intended to serve”). As this decree was negotiated pursuant to § 122 of CERCLA, we must measure the reasonableness of this decree against that section’s purpose to “expedite effective remedial action and minimize litigation,” while keeping a weather eye on the overall statutory constellation that is CERCLA. A number of factors have been articulated as being potentially relevant to determining whether a CERCLA settlement is fair and reasonable, including: the strength of the Government’s case, the good faith efforts of the negotiators, the possible risks of and transaction costs involved in litigation under CERCLA, and the effect of the proposed settlement on non-settling parties. See, e.g., City of New York, 697 F.Supp. at 692; Conservation Chemical Co., 628 F.Supp. at 401-402; Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 540 F.Supp. at 1072. Additional and similar factors utilized in the class action context which seem helpful include: “the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation,” “the risks of establishing liability,” “the ability of the defendant to withstand a greater judgment,” and “the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation.... ” Girsh, 521 F.2d at 157 (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 453 (2d Cir.1974)). In considering whether to accept a consent decree in light of these factors, courts have regularly followed Grinnell’s admonition that a court: must eschew any rubber stamp approval in favor of an independent evaluation, yet, at the same time, it must stop short of the detailed and thorough investigation that it would undertake if it were actually trying the case. Grinnell, 495 F.2d at 462, quoted in Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 540 F.Supp. at 1072; Conservation Chemical Co., 628 F.Supp. at 400; Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F.Supp. at 1337-38. At the same time, however, we are urged not to substitute our own judgment for that of the parties. Conservation Chemical Corp., 628 F.Supp. at 400 (quoting Seymour Recycling Corp., 554 F.Supp. at 1338). Our task is not to make a finding of fact as to whether the settlement figure is exactly proportionate to the share of liability appropriately attributed to the settling parties; rather, it is to determine whether the settlement represents a reasonable compromise, all the while bearing in mind the law’s generally favorable disposition toward the voluntary settlement of litigation and CERCLA’s specific preference for such resolutions. Acushnet River, 712 F.Supp. at 1032; cf. Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 676 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir.1982) (“Voluntary settlement of civil controversies is in high judicial favor ... ”). Indeed, where a settlement is the product of informed, arms-length bargaining by the EPA, an agency with the technical expertise and the statutory mandate to enforce the nation’s environmental protection laws, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, one court has indicated that a presumption of validity attaches to that agreement. City of New York, 697 F.Supp. at 692; accord, United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 679 F.2d 1104, 1108 (5th Cir.1982). Applying the foregoing criteria to this proposed de minimis decree requires us to focus on two independent questions. First, does a different standard of review apply to the determination of the United States that these settling defendants are eligible for a de minimis settlement under the criteria set forth in § 122(g)? Second, assuming that these settling parties are appropriate candidates for a de minimis settlement, what sort of scrutiny does our inquiry into the reasonableness of this settlement precisely require? We turn to the first question now. A. Satisfaction of the De Minimis Criteria Set Forth in CERCLA Section 122(g), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g), clearly evinces a congressional preference for the speedy settlement oí cost recovery actions brought against parties meeting certain criteria. The President, by way of EPA, shall, whenever practicable and in the public interest, as promptly as possible, reach a final settlement with a defendant if the settlement involves a minor portion of the response costs at the facility and, in the President’s judgment: (1) the amount of hazardous substances contributed by the settling party is minimal in comparison to the other hazardous substances at the facility (minimal volumetric contribution); and (2) the toxic or other hazardous effects of the substances contributed by the settling party is minimal in comparison to the other substances at the facility (minimal toxicity). 42 U.S.C. §§ 9622(g)(1)(A)®, (ii). The United States & Rohm and Haas initially addressed the question of whether the defendant settlors met these statutory requirements as if this were the most important issue before the court. The United States urged upon us the notion that the court’s only duty was to ascertain that the EPA “made a ‘good faith’ inquiry in determining that each de minimis defendant met the three criteria specified in section 122(g)(1)(A).” U.S. Reply Brief at 6. According to the Government, once we are convinced that EPA made such an inquiry, our task ends. Id. Rohm & Haas, meanwhile, did not contend that the EPA’s determination that each settlor qualified for a de minimis settlement should be substantively reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Instead, Rohm & Haas argued that this question should somehow be subsumed in the court’s overall analysis of the fairness, adequacy and reasonableness of the proposed consent decree. These contending positions somewhat puzzled the court. While we were comfortable reviewing the “fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness” of the decree’s terms under that federal common law standard, we were less certain that such a standard was useful or appropriate in reviewing the question of whether parties are statutorily eligible for de min-imis status. And, candidly, we had never heard of the “good-faith” standard of review advocated by the United States. If a proposed decree was challenged on the basis that it included PRPs ineligible for de minimis status, the court would be required to review whether (1) the agency utilized some permissible interpretation of the statutory criteria set forth in § 122(g)(1)(A), and (2) whether the agency appropriately applied those criteria to the evidence relevant to the settling parties’ de minimis status. Fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness seem to have little to do with such an inquiry. Moreover, while we are keenly aware that the compromise of litigation is certainly not the usual sort of agency action reviewed under the APA, i.e., it is not an adjudication, rulemaking or licensing decision, see 5 U.S.C. § 551(5), (7), (8), under § 122(g)(4), a de minimis settlement may be entered as a consent decree or be embodied in an administrative order, which may be enforced by a district court. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(4). Such an order might constitute agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 551(13), potentially reviewable in accordance with the standards set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), see 5 U.S.C. § 702, especially if the agency seeks to have the order enforced by a district court. Of course, only a party who was “adversely affected or aggrieved” by such an administrative settlement, 5 U.S.C. § 702, could seek review; however, the settlement does extinguish the otherwise legally available contribution rights of the non-settling PRPs against the settlors. Of course, review could also be precluded to the extent that CERCLA precludes judicial review of the EPA’s determination that parties are de minimis or commits that determination to agency discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1), (2). The Supreme Court has said with respect to these exceptions that: The former applies when Congress has expressed an intent to preclude judicial review. The latter applies in different circumstances; even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review, review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1655, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). Whether these two exceptions are applicable to review of a § 122(g)(1)(A) determination by EPA is doubtful. Though the United States argues that this determination has been committed to agency discretion, it is doubtful whether § 122(g)(1)(A) provides a court with no law to apply, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-413, 91 S.Ct. 814, 820-822, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), i.e., with “no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830, 105 S.Ct. at 1655; but see United States v. Cannons Engineering Corp., 720 F.Supp. 1027, 1044 (D.Mass., 1989). (“The definition of de minimis is left to the discretion of the President.”) Further, it is unlikely that Congress precluded judicial review of this determination. Congress explicitly limited judicial review or dictated a specific standard of review of certain EPA actions under CERCLA. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(h), 9622(e)(3). It did not do so in reference to the President’s determination that parties meet the criteria set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 122(g)(1)(A). Indeed, the SARA Conference Report says with respect to § 122: Nothing in this section diminishes the responsibility of or precludes the court from reviewing the lodged consent decree to determine whether relevant requirements of the Act have been met and whether entry of the decree is in the public interest. H.R.Rep. 99-962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 252 (October 3, 1986). Of course, there are intuitively appealing reasons why this particular agency determination should be subject to a different standard of review than normal agency actions, since the de min-imis determination is in large respect a matter of litigation strategy within the prosecutorial discretion of EPA and the Department of Justice. We, however, need not resolve this interesting administrative law question. It has become clear that none of the parties, including those objecting to the settlement, are arguing that the parties to the settlement do not qualify as de minimis under § 122(g), nor do any of the parties urge review of this determination under the standards set forth in the APA. Rather, the crux of our dispute is whether the settlement agreed to by these settlors and the Government is fair, adequate and reasonable. No party has suggested that it was impermissible for EPA to interpret a “minimal” volumetric share as a contribution of less than 1 percent of the hazardous waste at Lipari. See Chevron v. N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In fact, Manor Health Care, as we shall see, feels this standard is unduly restrictive. Nor has EPA’s determination that these particular parties are de minimis been challenged. As will be shown, EPA’s determination that these ten settlors contributed no more than 4.23 percent is based on its reading of the factual evidence available to it, evidence which no party has suggested is insufficient for purposes of the § 122(g) settlement process. The EPA has explained how it reached the conclusions it did based on this evidence. Its reading and application of this evidence is rational and there has been no clear error of judgment; moreover, the EPA considered and addressed the comments sent to it after the decree was published in the Federal Register. Finally, even Rohm and Haas estimates these ten settlors shares to be, generally, only slightly over 10 percent of the total waste at Lipari. In sum, based on our review of the record cited us by the parties, there would be no basis, if the APA applied, to hold that the EPA’s determination that these parties are eligible for de minimis treatment is arbitrary and capricious or a clear error in judgment. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S.E.P.A., 790 F.2d 289, 296 (3d Cir.1986). B. Fairness, Adequacy, and Reasonableness Having considered the statutory criteria in § 122(g), we must now assess the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of this settlement. This, in our view, involves an important, but quite limited, inquiry. We need not determine if the settlement precisely reflects what we feel to be the settlors’ most likely volumetric share of the waste dumped at Lipari. Such a finding would be akin to that made at trial and would involve no savings in terms of judicial or enforcement resources. If a settlement were required to meet some judicially imposed platonic ideal, then, of course, the settlement would constitute not a compromise by the parties but judicial fiat. Respect for the litigants, especially the United States, requires the court to play a much more constrained role. In the context of this particular dispute, it is how we treat the settlement figure’s relationship to the proportion of settlors’ waste at Lipari which is the most important aspect of our review. Rohm & Haas, it seems, wishes the court to consider this settlement unreasonable if the dollar figure set forth therein is not closely approximate, as a percentage, to this court’s view of the most reasonable volumetric share attributable to the settling parties. That is, if we are persuaded that it is more likely that Rohm & Haas, as opposed to the United States, is correct about the settlors' volumetric contribution, then we should set aside the settlement. If, as Rohm & Haas contends, these parties contributed over 10 percent of the waste, then allowing them to settle for 4.4 percent of the projected response costs is unreasonable. We, frankly, do not share this conception of our task. Ours is not, at this stage, a factfinding mission. It is rather an assignment to ensure that this is a reasonable compromise of this litigation. For this settlement to be reasonable, it need not be bottomed on the most convincing analysis of the present factual record, it must merely be reasonable when measured by the range of plausible interpretations of that record. Compromise of litigation occurs precisely because there is uncertainty about the underlying factual circumstances and the range of possible recoveries. If a settlement is reasonable in light of those circumstances, it ought to be approved. On the other hand, if a settlement is based on a clear error of judgment, like a serious mathematical error, it may be appropriate to disapprove it because there is a likelihood that it is not a compromise intelligently entered into by the parties. But when a settlement is based on a plausible interpretation of the record evidence, and there has been no clear error of judgment, we do not believe that it is appropriate for the court to substitute its judgment for that of the statutorily appointed representatives of the public interest — the EPA and the Department of Justice. Rohm & Haas insists that the court must delve more searchingly into the facts since it is, as we have discussed, Rohm & Haas and the other non-settlors, rather than the plaintiffs, who bear the risk that this is a bad settlement. Given this situation, Rohm & Haas urges us to use our equitable powers to disapprove this consent decree if it is likely to be unfair to a non-settling party. Only the court, after all, is in a position to ensure that the settlement is adequate since none of the settlors, including the plaintiffs, have the incentive to do so, and the non-set-tlors have no power to affect its terms. Unfortunately for Rohm & Haas, CERC-LA, as we read it, is not a legislative scheme which places a high priority on fairness to generators of hazardous waste. Obviously, EPA cannot comply with § 122(g)’s command to “as promptly as possible reach a final settlement” with de minimis PRPs if such settlements are going to be accompanied by an evidentiary review as careful as a trial on the merits. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1). Subsections one and three of section 122 are headed by the phrases “Expedited final settlement” and “Expedited agreement,” respectively. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9622(g)(1), (3). Such expedition is at odds with the scientific congruity between a de minimis settlor’s equitable share of the liability and the settlement amount that Rohm and Haas urges. And if Rohm and Haas is arguing that a de minimis settlement should only receive approval if it is for a dollar figure at the high end of a settlor’s potential equitable share of the liability, then it has a much different view of what is meant by the term “voluntary compromise of litigation” than does this court. Moreover, it is inconceivable that Congress, wishing to provide EPA with the statutory tools to make the most efficient use of its enforcement resources, would urge EPA to reach speedy settlements with de minimis parties but then require such settlements to be subject to de maximis judicial review. Courts have consistently held that lengthy evidentiary hearings are not required under CERCLA when a court is merely deciding whether a non-cíe min-imis monetary settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. Acushnet River, 712 F.Supp. at 1031, n. 21 (“to grant inevitably lengthy hearings in cases such as this would either frustrate the express intent of Congress to encourage settlement or negate the benefits of any settlement that resulted”); United States v. Laskin, 1989 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 4900, at 30 (February 27, 1989, N.D.Ohio) (“We do not believe that the public’s interest in how cleanup costs are apportioned among the private parties is sufficient to justify an extensive hearing”); City of New York, 697 F.Supp. at 691 (“section 122 [of CERCLA] strongly supports the view that settlements involving monetary payments only are to be reviewed with lesser stringency than those involving response action ... [and] [t]ell-ingly, section 122 contains no requirement that proposed money settlements be reviewed via an evidentiary hearing ... ”); United States v. Thomas Solvent Co., 717 F.Supp. 507, 519 (W.D.Mich.1989), ,(“I see no reason to subvert the very purpose of this settlement agreement, which is to avoid the costs of extended litigation, by ordering a hearing on whether the settlement represents the percentage of responsibility that would be adjudicated against [the settlor] if this case were tried”). In this case, Rohm & Haas does not urge us to hold an evidentiary hearing, it merely asks us to review the paper record (cashbooks, receipts, depositions, etc.) and determine whether its view of that evidence is more plausible than that of the United States. But even this we will not do. It may be that there are certain circumstances in which a de minimis settlement is so grossly inadequate that the blatant unfairness to the non-settling parties and the rough requirements of justice would cause a court to hesitate before entering such a decree. But where a money settlement is shown to bear a reasonable relation to some plausible estimate, or range of estimates, of the settling parties’ volumetric contribution, CERCLA requires that such a settlement be accepted and entered as a consent decree. Any unfairness to a non-settlor such as Rohm & Haas is a by-product of the congressional scheme, about which a court may do nothing in the absence of harm rising to a constitutional level. Bearing these thoughts in mind, we now delve into the factual record. Following our review of this evidence, we will evaluate the reasonableness of the decree in light of the following factors: (1) the relative costs and benefits of litigating this case under CERCLA; (2) the strength of the plaintiff’s case against the de minimis defendants, i.e., the risks of establishing liability on the part of the settlors; (3) the good faith efforts and adversarial relationship of the negotiators who crafted the settlement; (4) the reasonableness of the settlement as compared to the settlor’s potential volumetric contribution; (5) the ability of the settlors to withstand a greater judgment; and (6) finally, and most importantly, the effect of the settlement on the public interest as expressed in CERCLA. If the proposed decree is reasonable in light of these factors, we need not, based on our view of our role, separately consider the fairness of the decree to non-settling parties. VI. FACTUAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Identity and Estimated Contribution of the Parties The United States estimates that a total of 55,782 55-gallon drums of waste, or approximately 3 million gallons, were trucked to and disposed of at the Landfill. Three separate haulers were involved: Owens-Illinois, Almo Tank and Maintenance Corp. (“Almo”), and Marvin Jonas. Based upon the testimony of Lipari, landfill receipts and Owens-Illinois check stubs, the Government calculates that over a period from June 1958 to December 1969, Owens-Illinois hauled four drums of waste per week to the site. Thus, they are responsible, according to the United States, for 2208 drums, or approximately 4.0 percent of the total amount. Almo delivered approximately 194,750 gallons of waste to the Landfill between November 1968 and February 1970, according to Government estimates based on Almo checks and check stubs and entries in Lipari’s cashbooks. This amount is the equivalent of 3380 55-gallon drums, or approximately 6.1 percent of the total number of drums deposited at the Landfill. Almo customers included three entities which the Government contends are de minimis generators — CBS, Hercules and Owens-Corning. Marvin Jonas was the major hauler to Lipari. In addition to Rohm & Haas, Jonas hauled the waste of over two dozen generators to Lipari, including seven which, again according to the Government, qualify as de minimis parties — Triangle Publications, DuPont, Allied Paper, Glidden Co., Betz Laboratories, SPS Technologies and Gilbert — Spruance. Piecing together Lipari’s cashbooks, his deposition testimony, and the deposition testimony of Jonas, the Government contends that between November 1967 and early February 1970, Jonas hauled at least one trailer load of waste, consisting of 80 55-gallon drums, per day to Lipari. This totaled 44,800 drums, but the Government felt it appropriate to revise this figure upward to reflect the fact that Jonas occasionally transported two loads of waste per day to the site. Originally, the United States estimated that an upward adjustment of 10,000 drums was necessary; however, closer scrutiny of the record evidence, most especially a note prepared by Lipari in January, 1974, led the Government to revise its estimate downward by some 4,606 drums, making Jonas’s estimated contribution to the Landfill 50,-194 drums, or approximately 90 percent of the total amount deposited. At the August 9 hearing, counsel for Rohm & Haas demonstrated its disagreement with the Government’s estimates of Jonas’s share of waste dumped at the site by making a detailed presentation of three possible methods of computing Jonas’s involvement with the Lipari Landfill. These estimates showed, according to Rohm & Haas, that Jonas contributed up to 52,097 drums to the site. While the Government, not surprisingly, attempted to punch holes into Rohm & Haas’s methodologies, both sides seem to agree that the January 1974 Lipari note established the amount Jonas paid Lipari to dump Rohm & Haas’s waste and, consequently, provides a good estimate of the total amount of Rohm and Haas’s waste deposited at Lipari. The disagreement arises over what amount of non -Rohm & Haas waste was transported by Jonas to Lipari. The Government claims that at most 2332 drums, representing approximately 4.2 percent of the total amount deposited at the site, came from the non-Rohm & Haas customers of Jonas. Rohm & Haas, employing the varied methods mentioned above, arrives at a figure as high as 8,097 drums, representing as much as 15 percent of the total number of drums, contributed by Jonas’s non-Rohm & Haas customers. We think that, for the most part, this is a battle being fought on the wrong field. While Rohm & Haas argues from these numbers that the de minimis parties to the consent decree may have contributed, collectively, up to 18 percent of the aggregate amount of waste at Lipari, they cannot escape the fact that Jonas’s non-Rohm & Haas customers included at least three and up to six entities who are not parties to the consent decree. Therefore, absent evidence specifically linking the ten companies who are signatories to the decree to Lipari, the total amount of non-Rohm and Haas waste delivered to Lipari by Jonas and Almo is largely irrelevant. We thus must turn to an examination of the available record evidence tying these parties to the Landfill. The partial consent decree embraces ten PRPs, all of whom, as previously noted, are customers of either Almo or Jonas, and all of whom certify in the decree that they are responsible for no more than 1 percent of the total amount of waste dumped at the site. Of these ten, the volumetric share of only five — CBS, Triangle Publications, Inc., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Allied Paper, Inc., and the Glidden Company — is specifically challenged by Rohm & Haas. As we have noted above, Rohm & Haas’s opposition to this settlement is bottomed upon its contention that the ten settlors in the aggregate contributed over 10 percent, and that these five settlors in particular each contributed more than 1 percent of the total volume of hazardous substances disposed of at Lipari. Therefore, the proposed decree, which allows ten PRPs to settle the Government’s claims against