Full opinion text
SCHWARZER, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Nineteen states and numerous private plaintiffs have brought actions against a group of insurance companies, reinsurance companies, underwriters, brokers, and individuals, and the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (“ISO”), charging them with violations of the federal antitrust laws and state laws. The charges rest on alleged conspiracies, boycotts, threats, intimidation, and other coercive conduct by defendants to restrict the availability of certain coverage under policies for commercial general liability insurance (“CGL”) and property insurance. The filing of these complaints followed lengthy investigations conducted by the regulatory agencies of several states. Defendants have moved to dismiss, for judgment on the pleadings, and for summary judgment, and plaintiffs have made cross-motions. For purposes of these motions, the well-pleaded allegations of the complaints are accepted as true, and any factual disputes and inferences are resolved in plaintiffs’ favor. Copies of the Court’s proposed ruling were distributed to counsel well in advance of the hearing, and the Court has considered the arguments of counsel in reaching the decision reflected in this memorandum. II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND CGL insurance protects the insured against the risk of liability to third parties for bodily injury or property damage. It is purchased by businesses, non-profit groups, and governmental entities. Defendants Hartford Fire Insurance Company (“Hartford”), Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”), Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (“Aetna”), and CIGNA Corporation (“CIGNA”) are primary insurers who are major providers of CGL insurance. CGL insurance is written predominantly on standard policy forms developed by ISO. ISO is an association of more than one thousand property or casualty insurers, including Hartford, Allstate, Aetna, and CIGNA. It is licensed as a rating, rate service, and advisory organization in all fifty states. One of its primary functions is to develop standardized policy forms for property and casualty insurance that comply with state regulations and will be accepted by state insurance departments. On behalf of its members, ISO files standardized policy forms with state insurance departments. ISO also collects historical loss data, projects future loss trends, and calculates advisory rates for insurance. In the late 1970s, ISO began to develop a revision of the standard CGL form then in use. In 1984, ISO filed or lodged with state insurance departments two proposed new policy forms for CGL insurance. These forms substantially modified coverage previously available to the insured. One of the forms was a “claims-made” policy under which coverage was limited to claims made during the policy period regardless of when the occurrence out of which the claim arose had taken place. This represented a reduction in the coverage available under the previous CGL policy form which was an “occurrence-based” form; under that form, the insured was covered for claims arising out of occurrences during the policy period, no matter when asserted, thus exposing insurers to so-called “long tail risks” that could arise long after the policy period. The proposed claims-made form reduced that exposure and shifted the risk of future claims to the insured. The other proposed form was a modified occurrence policy. These forms became the subject of widespread debate and controversy in the insurance industry. Considerable differences of opinion arose over what should trigger coverage, whether retroactivity of claims-made coverage should be limited, whether the pollution exclusion should be modified, and whether defense costs should be limited by the policy limits. In their complaint, plaintiffs charge defendants Hartford, CIGNA, Allstate, and Aetna with engaging in a concerted effort to block adoption of the 1984 forms because those forms did not restrict coverage sufficiently. Plaintiffs allege that these defendants entered into conspiracies with certain domestic and foreign defendant reinsurance companies, underwriters, and their representatives to “boycott” the 1984 forms unless a retroactive date was added to the claims-made form and a pollution exclusion and defense cost cap were added to both forms. Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the efforts of Hartford, Allstate, Aetna, and CIGNA, certain domestic and London reinsurers threatened to “boycott” North American CGL risks unless these changes were made in the claims-made form and the occurrence form was eliminated. Also as a result of these efforts, the ISO executive committee in September 1984 voted to include a retroactive cut-off date in the claims-made policy form, to exclude pollution coverage from both forms, but to defer until later limiting defense costs, and to offer an occurrence form along with the new claims-made form. Following this agreement, ISO, Hartford, Aetna, and representatives of the London reinsurers undertook joint efforts to promote the new forms. Reinsurers refused to accept new reinsurance business or renew old business unless the primary carrier agreed to switch to the claims-made form when available. Reinsurers also imposed “sunset dates” in their treaties limiting their exposure to losses on occurrence policies. Reinsurance underwriters also entered into an agreement to exclude pollution liability coverage from reinsurance treaties. During the period from 1984 through 1986, when these events are alleged to have occurred, ISO lodged or filed the proposed forms with the insurance departments of all states. Departments in thirty-five states held public hearings and the policy terms that are the subjects of the complaints were discussed within the industry and in public forums. As a result ISO filed or lodged several revisions of its proposed forms with the state insurance departments. At the conclusion of the various states’ proceedings in 1986, all of the plaintiff states and the two non-plaintiff states in which individual plaintiffs reside had approved the ISO forms with the following exceptions: Massachusetts and New Jersey disapproved them, New York approved only the occurrence form, and California and Colorado, having no procedure for approval, took no action. Thereafter ISO withdrew its data collection and risk estimation support for the pre-1984 CGL form. In 1986, ISO and certain defendants agreed that ISO should also develop standard CGL umbrella and excess policy language. In June 1986 ISO released policy language providing for a retroactive date on claims-made policies, a pollution exclusion, and defense costs within policy limits. Finally, in 1987 domestic and London retrocessional reinsurers are alleged to have entered into an agreement regarding property insurance to use their “best endeavors to ensure that all U.S.A. and Canadian exposed [property] insurance/reinsurance business attaching on or after 1st January, 1987 will only be written where the original business includes a seepage and pollution exclusion wherever legal and applicable.” III. THE FEDERAL LAW VIOLATIONS CHARGED The state complaints fall into two groups depending on when they were filed. The First Wave Complaints each contain eight federal claims. The Second Wave Complaints each contain six federal claims. All complaints also contain pendent state law claims. The private complaints track the state complaints. The First Claim of the Second Wave Complaints alleges a global conspiracy by all defendants in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, for the purpose and with the effect of shrinking the scope of CGL property/casualty insurance and reinsurance and retrocessional reinsurance, ... to ... reduce financial exposure to such risks and to increase underwriting profits therefrom. (Conn.Compl’t 11117.) Plaintiffs allege that defendants used boycotts, coercion, and intimidation to limit available coverage. (Id. ¶ 118(a).) No corresponding claim is made in the First Wave Complaints. The Second Claim of the Second Wave Complaints and the First through Fourth Claims of the First Wave Complaints allege a conspiracy by defendants Hartford, Allstate, Aetna, CIGNA, ISO, and certain others to manipulate the ISO design process for CGL forms to limit the available coverage. Plaintiffs allege that defendants conspired to restrict the terms under which reinsurance coverage would be provided for CGL risks, to refuse to provide reinsurance unless the 1984 form were amended to incorporate defendants’ terms, to coerce ISO and its members to adopt the coverage terms and exclusions agreed to by defendants, and to boycott the forms unless amended. (Conn.Compl’t 1111122-123; Cal. Compl’t 1111113-114, 118-119, 123-124, 128-129.) The Third Claim of the Second Wave Complaints and the Fifth Claim of the First Wave Complaints in substance charge certain defendants engaged in the reinsurance business at Lloyd’s of London with a conspiracy to restrict the terms under which reinsurance coverage would be provided for CGL risks and to refuse to rein-sure CGL risks on occurrence forms by coercion and intimidation of primary insurers, among other things. (Conn.Compl’t MI 127-128; Cal.Compl’t MI 133-134.) The Fourth Claim of the Second Wave Complaints and the Sixth Claim of the First Wave Complaints in substance charge certain defendants engaged in the reinsurance business at Lloyd’s of London with a conspiracy to restrict the terms under which casualty reinsurance coverage would be provided for CGL risks and to limit the availability of pollution coverage in primary casualty insurance. No boycott, coercion, or intimidation is alleged. (Conn. Compl’t MI 132-133; Cal.Compl’t UH 138-139.) The Fifth Claim of the Second Wave Complaints and the Eighth Claim of the First Wave Complaints in substance charge certain defendants engaged in the reinsurance business at Lloyd’s of London with a conspiracy to restrict the terms on which property insurance and reinsurance coverage would be provided and to limit its availability by, among other things, agreeing to boycott the provision of retrocessional insurance unless the primary insurance excluded seepage, pollution, and contamination coverage. (Conn.Compl’t ¶¶ 137-138; Cal.Compl’t HU 148-149.) The Sixth Claim of the Second Wave Complaints and the Seventh Claim of the First Wave Complaints charge ISO, Allstate, Hartford, Aetna, and certain other defendants with a conspiracy to restrict terms and conditions under which umbrella and excess insurance would be available. No boycott, coercion, or intimidation is charged. (Conn.Compl’t HU 142-143; Cal. Compl’t MI 143-144.) IY. THE MOTIONS BEFORE THE COURT Defendants have filed five motions to dismiss or for summary judgment on the following grounds: A. Asserting antitrust immunity under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (“the McCarran Act”), all defendants have moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56 to dismiss or for summary judgment. B. Asserting the state action immunity doctrine, all defendants have moved under Rule 56 for summary judgment against all plaintiffs except California, Alaska, Colorado, and Montana on (a) the so-called global conspiracy claim of the Second Wave complaints, and (b) the policy form development claims. C.. Asserting lack of standing, all defendants except ISO, INA, Hartford, Allstate, Aetna, and CIGNA have moved under Rule 12(b)(6) for dismissal of all claims against them. (This motion does not encompass the claims against Merrett and Three Quays alleging an agreement in restraint of trade in the excess and umbrella insurance market.) D. Asserting that there is “no factual allegation linking [them] in a ‘global’ conspiracy,” foreign reinsurer defendants have moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the global conspiracy claim of the Second Wave complaints. E. Asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction and international comity, foreign reinsurer and retrocessional reinsurer defendants and one broker have moved under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss the two claims alleging conspiracies to eliminate pollution coverage. The States have moved to strike the defense based on the state action immunity doctrine. V. DISCUSSION A. THE McCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT DEFENSE Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all federal claims on the ground that their conduct is immunized from antitrust liability by the McCarran Act. Although the primary thrust of the motion is said to be directed at those claims which are based on policy form development activities, the controlling principles apply to defendants’ underwriting-related actions as well. Stripped of their pejorative allegations, those claims charge a conspiracy to reduce the exposure of defendant insurers and reinsurers under CGL policies. The defendants sought to accomplish their objective by bringing about changes in standard policy language and by avoiding underwriting or reinsuring risks written on disfavored policy terms. All of this they did in large part by collective action, and it may be assumed that plaintiffs could prove a consequent .lessening of competition among defendants and a diminution of options available in the market for CGL insurance, resulting in a restraint of trade. In the absence of the McCarran Act, those allegations may well state a claim for relief under the Sherman Act. The issue raised by these motions is whether plaintiffs could prove a set of facts under those general allegations that would entitle them to relief notwithstanding the McCarran Act. That Act states: (a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business. (b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ...: Provided, That ... the Sherman Act, ... the Clayton Act, and ... the Federal Trade Commission Act ... shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law. 15 U.S.C. § 1012. Section 1013(b) of the Act further provides: Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the ... Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. The McCarran Act created limited antitrust immunity for the business of insurance following the Supreme Court’s departure, in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944), from prior holdings that insurance is not a transaction in interstate commerce. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 538-39, 98 S.Ct. 2923, 2928-29, 57 L.Ed.2d 932 (1978). It was passed in response to widespread concern that the states should not be precluded from continuing to regulate and tax the insurance industry. It immunizes the business of insurance from the antitrust laws but only to the extent that it is regulated by the states and does not involve boycott, coercion, or intimidation. See Feinstein v. Nettleship Co., 714 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 972, 104 S.Ct. 2346, 80 L.Ed.2d 820 (1984). Like all antitrust immunities, it must, of course, be narrowly construed. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231, 99 S.Ct. 1067, 1083, 59 L.Ed.2d 261 (1979). The application of the McCarran Act immunity involves a three step analysis: (1) Whether the conduct is within the scope of the business of insurance; (2) Whether that business is regulated by the states; and (3) Whether the conduct involves boycott, coercion, or intimidation. (1) The Business of Insurance In Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 102 S.Ct. 3002, 73 L.Ed.2d 647 (1982), the Supreme Court stated the criteria for what constitutes the business of insurance for purposes of the McCarran Act as follows: first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder’s risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry. 458 U.S. at 129, 102 S.Ct. at 3009. And in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., the Court said: References to the meaning of the “business of insurance” in the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act strongly suggest that Congress understood the business of insurance to be the underwriting and spreading of risk. Thus, one of the early House Reports stated: “The theory of insurance is the distribution of risk according to hazard, experience, and the laws of averages. These factors are not within the control of insuring companies in the sense that the producer or manufacturer may control cost factors.” 440 U.S. at 220-21, 99 S.Ct. at 1078 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs do not dispute that the activities of defendants insofar as they relate to the terms and conditions of primary, excess, or umbrella insurance, are the business of insurance within the meaning of the McCarran Act. {See Plaintiff States’ Unified Opposition Brief (“Unified Opp.”) 37-40.) They contend, however, that reinsurance is not the business of insurance because it relates only indirectly to the spreading of the policyholder’s risk and because, they contend, it is not an integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured. {Id.) There is no authority for excluding reinsurance from the business of insurance. On the contrary, reinsurance was specifically referred to as a part of the business of insurance in the legislative history of the McCarran Act. See 90 Cong. Rec. A4406 (1944); 89 Cong.Rec. 6528 (1943). The Ninth Circuit applied the McCarran exemption to reinsurers as well as to the primary insurer in Feinstein. 714 F.2d at 930. Plaintiffs urge an unreasonably narrow application of the Pireno test. Their own description establishes that reinsurance is an integral and vital part of the business of insurance. The complaints define reinsurance as “insurance for insurers.” {E.g., Conn.Compl’t II 4(p); Cal.Compl’t ¶ 4(o).) They go on to describe reinsurance as a transaction whereby one insurance company, the reinsurer, agrees to indemnify another insurance company, the primary (or “ceding”) insurer, for a designated portion of the insurance risks underwritten by the primary insurer. Reinsurance protects the primary insurer from catastrophic losses, and is heavily relied upon by prudent primary insurers. It also allows the primary insurer to sell more insurance than its own financial capacity might otherwise permit. Thus, the availability of reinsurance affects the ability and willingness of primary insurers to provide insurance to their customers. (Conn.Compl’t ¶ 4(p); see also Cal.Compl’t ¶¶ 26-29, 34.) Thus, reinsurance is no less a part of the process of underwriting and spreading risks than primary insurance. Plaintiffs’ allegations rest, moreover, on the premise that the terms on which reinsurance is available affect the terms on which primary insurance is written and that the terms and availability of reinsurance directly affect the availability of insurance coverage to consumers. (Unified Opp. 13-16.) As plaintiffs’ brief puts it, “by conspiracy to eliminate reinsurance for the consumer-demanded coverages, the reinsurers acted anticompetitively in reinsurance markets ... [which] led inexorably to an injury to the States in the interrelated primary insurance markets.” (Id. at 76.) Because reinsurance is thus an element of the policy relationship with the insured, it is part of the business of insurance. See also SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460, 89 S.Ct. 564, 568, 21 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960) (business of insurance includes “activities of insurance companies [that] relate ... closely to their status as reliable insurers”). By the same logic, retrocessional insurance, which is “insurance for reinsurers” (Conn.Compl’t H 4(r)), is part of the business of insurance. (2) Regulation by the States The condition of state regulation is satisfied by “a state regulatory scheme possess[ing] jurisdiction over the challenged practice.” Feinstein, 714 F.2d at 933. “It is not necessary to point to a state statute which gives express approval to a particular practice.” Id.; see Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Ass’n v. Klamath Medical Service Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822, 104 S.Ct. 88, 78 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Dexter v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 527 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir.1975); Lawyers Title Co. of Mo. v. St. Paul Title Ins. Co., 526 F.2d 795, 797-98 (8th Cir.1975); Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178, 1181-84 (6th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917, 93 S.Ct. 215, 34 L.Ed.2d 180 (1972); see also P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 210.1b (Supp.1988) (McCarran immunity distinguished from Parker v. Brown immunity; the former requiring only the existence of a state regulatory scheme, without regard to the intensity of state regulation). This case involves the insurance business in twenty-one states. The Ninth Circuit has held that California’s scheme of regulation satisfies the McCarran Act. Addrisi v. Equitable Assur. Soc. of the United States, 503 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929, 95 S.Ct. 1129, 43 L.Ed.2d 400 (1975). The Court takes judicial notice of the laws of the other jurisdictions. Each state has an insurance department with jurisdiction over policy forms. Sixteen of the plaintiff states and the two nonplaintiff states in which private plaintiffs reside require filing and review of policy forms, including umbrella and excess policies offered by admitted insurers. All of the states have licensed ISO and permit joint action by ISO and insurance companies with respect to policy forms. All of the states have unfair insurance trade practice statutes enabling them to proceed against conduct such as that alleged in the complaints. Although plaintiffs contend that reinsurance and umbrella and excess insurance are not regulated by the states, these statutes are broad enough to apply to any persons in the business of insurance, including reinsurers. These statutory schemes are sufficient to qualify under section 1012(b) of the McCarran Act. See SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60, 89 S.Ct. 564, 568-69, 21 L.Ed.2d 668 (1969) (state laws protecting or regulating, directly or indirectly, relationship between insurer and policy holder qualify); FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564-65, 78 S.Ct. 1260, 1262, 2 L.Ed.2d 1540 (1958) (state unfair insurance advertising laws qualify); Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 419, 421 (4th Cir.1984) (state unfair insurance practice laws that provide for administrative supervision and enforcement qualify). Plaintiffs’ argument that the regulatory schemes of the states do not reach the allegations of subversion of ISO’s decision-making process and concerted activity to restrict the availability of coverages in the market is self-defeating. To avoid McCarran Act immunity, plaintiffs rely on allegations of boycott, coercion, and intimidation, and contend that this conduct is prohibited by the states. That prohibition is indeed contained in the unfair practice acts of each state, but the fact that it is satisfies the regulation prerequisite to immunity under section 1012. See In re Workers’ Comp. Ins. Antitrust Litig., 867 F.2d 1552, 1558-60 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 3247, 106 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989). Plaintiffs’ argument that the standards for state action immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943), should apply to the McCarran Act lacks any support. As Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp point out, if the regulatory requirements under McCarran “were to coalesce with the Parker requirements, the scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act would be largely irrelevant as a practical matter.” P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 11210.1b, at 97 (Supp.1988). (See infra § V.B(l).) Such an interpretation would tend to nullify Congressional intent in adopting the McCarran Act. (3) The Exclusion of Boycott, Coercion, and Intimidation The States have submitted a Statement of Material Facts in support of their unified opposition brief. (Unified Opp. 6-16.) The following facts are material to this section of the opinion. Twenty of the defendants, including primary insurers, reinsurers, brokers, and underwriters, dissatisfied with the CGL forms approved by ISO in 1984 because those forms failed to eliminate occurrence and pollution coverage, “agreed to and undertook a course of concerted action” to limit the availability of certain CGL coverages, and twelve other defendants ultimately joined in. (Id. at 10-11.) This course of action included the following activities. To coerce ISO into revising its 1984 CGL forms, defendant reinsurers agreed to and did announce that reinsurance would not be provided for coverage written on the 1984 form. (Id. at 11.) In addition, certain defendants took “coercive action” by agreeing to announce and announcing that they would not provide reinsurance on occurrence policies and would impose sunset clauses in their coverage. (Id. at 12.) Certain defendants took “coercive action” by agreeing to include and including a pollution exclusion in their reinsurance treaties. (Id. at 13-14.) Certain defendants made a “coercive statement of intention not to provide reinsurance unless the primary policy excludes all property pollution coverage.” (Id. at 14-15.) Finally, certain defendants agreed to eliminate the same coverage from excess and umbrella policy forms. (Id. at 15-16.) And ISO withdrew statistical support for its 1973 form. (Id. at 12.) It will be noted that plaintiffs’ statement does not allege a boycott. Nor does it (or the complaints) describe conduct that “accords with the common understanding of a boycott.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 552, 98 S.Ct. 2923, 2935, 57 L.Ed.2d 932 (1978). As the Supreme Court described the conduct there in issue, The four insurance companies that control the market in medical malpractice insurance are alleged to have agreed that three of the four would not deal on any terms with the policyholders of the fourth. As a means of ensuring policyholder submission to new, restrictive ground rules of coverage, St. Paul obtained the agreement of the other petitioners, strangers to the immediate dispute, to refuse to sell any insurance to its policyholders. “A valuable service germane to [respondents’] business and important to their effective competition with others was withheld from them by collective action.” The agreement binding petitioners erected a barrier between St. Paul’s customers and any alternative source of the desired coverage, effectively foreclosing all possibility of competition anywhere in the relevant market. This concerted refusal to deal went well beyond a private agreement to fix rates and terms of coverage, as it denied policyholders the benefits of competition in vital matters such as claims policy and quality of service. Id. at 552-53, 98 S.Ct. at 2935-36 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In contrast, plaintiffs here charge no more than an agreement to restrict coverage. But they seek to piggyback this charge on conclusory allegations of pressure and compulsion that echo Barry. The decision in Barry, however, turned not on the pressure and compulsion directed at policy holders to submit to curtailed coverage, but on the agreement with competitors not to deal with those policy holders on any terms. As the Court said: Solely for the purpose of forcing physicians and hospitals to accede to a substantial curtailment of the coverage previously available, St. Paul induced its competitors to refuse to deal on any terms with its customers. This agreement did not simply fix rates or terms of coverage; it effectively barred St. Paul’s policyholders from all access to alternative sources of coverage and even from negotiating for more favorable terms elsewhere in the market. The pact served as a tactical weapon invoked by St. Paul in support of a dispute with its policyholders. The enlistment of third parties in an agreement not to trade, as a means of compelling capitulation by the boycotted group, long has been viewed as conduct supporting a finding of unlawful boycott. Id. at 544-45, 98 S.Ct. at 2931 (emphasis added). Thus, the issue is not whether defendants used pressure to reduce the coverage available to buyers of insurance. The issue is whether they entered into concerted refusals to deal that denied consumers access to the markets for the desired coverages. The Ninth Circuit explained the meaning of boycott in Feinstein: “Because [the agreement] in no way limited the doctors’ ability to deal with third parties, the agreement itself is not an agreement to boycott or coerce the plaintiff to purchase the defendants’ insurance.” 714 F.2d at 933. The distinction between lawful joint action and prohibited boycott and coercion is also explained in Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C.Cir.1977): The facts in South-Eastern Underwriters are a useful guidepost. Logically speaking, a simple agreement among insurance companies to charge certain premium rates could be viewed as a boycott agreement, since its observance would result in a collective refusal to deal with policyholders except at a fixed price. But the Supreme Court’s opinion in South-Eastern Underwriters did not characterize the basic rate-fixing agreement in that case in terms of “boycott, coercion, or intimidation”; those terms were reserved for the additional activities utilized to enforce the agreement. Since the McCarran Act was passed in response to South-Eastern Underwriters, and since a construction of the boycott provision to encompass a simple rate-fixing agreement would indeed emasculate the Act’s antitrust exemption, it is reasonable to infer that in a rate-setting context something in the way of enforcement activity would be required to make out a claim of “boycott, coercion, or intimidation” within the meaning of the Act. Id. at 274 (citation omitted). This interpretation of boycott and coercion has been consistently followed, in the context of coverage as well as rates. See, e.g., Meicler v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732, 734 (5th Cir.1975) (parallel actions of insurance companies to refuse to offer insurance except under rate regulation scheme adopted by state not a boycott); UNR Indus. Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 607 F.Supp. 855, 862-63 (N.D.Ill.1984) (conspiracy among insurance companies to refuse to offer occurrence policies not a boycott); Grant v. Erie Ins. Exch., 542 F.Supp. 457, 464-66 (M.D.Pa.1982) (conspiracy to refuse to offer insurance covering work loss benefits of individuals killed in motor vehicle accidents not a boycott) aff'd mem., 716 F.2d 890 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938, 104 S.Ct. 349, 78 L.Ed.2d 314 (1983). Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp concur with this view and reject the interpretation of Barry urged by plaintiffs: The implications of St. Paul are not clear. On the one hand, a horizontal agreement among competitors to set the terms of insurance policies — for example, price fixing — is a collective agreement not to deal on any other terms; by the agreement, each enlists the aid of the other, a third party, “to compel capitulation by the boycotted group,” namely, insurance buyers. In this sense, virtually any horizontal agreement among competitors could be called a “boycott.” However, there are two reasons for supposing that the Supreme Court did not mean to go that far. First, such a reading would eviscerate the immunity for horizontal agreements on the “business of insurance” and thus seems inconsistent with the statute. Second, St. Paul itself did not involve an agreement to adopt similar terms. Instead, it was alleged that three insurers withdrew from the market for an anticompetitive purpose. P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 210.2, at 107-08 (Supp.1988). The gravamen of the cases before the Court is alleged horizontal agreements relating to the terms on which the participants were willing to write insurance and reinsurance. By joint action in the ISO and in the reinsurance and umbrella and excess insurance markets, the various defendants sought to bring about the use of policies that would limit their exposure. There is no charge and no evidence that any defendants conspired to refuse to do business with any person or firm to achieve their objectives, or that by other improper means they enforced their collective decisions against others. The distinction between prohibited boycott and coercion and immune joint activities is illustrated by In re Workers’ Compensation Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 867 F.2d 1552 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 3247, 106 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989). That court held that “the practice of mere price fixing, i.e. a refusal to deal except at a specified price, without more,” is not a McCarran Act boycott. Id. at 1561. “The crucial element ... [of a boycott] is an effort to exclude or cause disadvantage to one or more competitors by cutting them off from trade relationships which are necessary to any firm trying to compete.” Id. at 1561, n. 14 (quotation omitted). In reversing a grant of summary judgment of no boycott, the Workers’ Compensation court relied on evidence of an agreement to exclude competing insurers from membership in the Minnesota Rating Association; such membership was required by Minnesota law as a condition to writing workers’ compensation insurance in the state. Id. at 1563. In contrast, in the instant case the allegations are limited to collective refusals to do business except upon terms acceptable to defendants. There is not even a suggestion that any underwriter or reinsurer (or anyone else) was prevented from having free and unimpaired access to any market. The purpose of McCarran Act immunity is to permit joint action by insurers and underwriters within the states’ regulatory schemes to formulate policy terms and determine coverage. While it is not a necessary part of the policy development process that the participants would then offer substantially similar policies to the public, it is a consequence that could be reasonably anticipated. To subject the participants in the collective form development process to the risk of antitrust liability for using the product of that process would effectually nullify the McCarran Act. It makes no sense, therefore, for the plaintiffs to rest their boycott claim on the allegation of such an agreement. It is also implicit that joint action comprehends efforts to seek agreement by others, including those who might be unwilling to agree were it not for economic exigencies, and again it makes no sense to assert that such efforts constitute non-immune coercion. What the McCarran Act leaves unprotected is conduct which goes beyond the making and implementation of agreements to do business only on terms acceptable to the participant (even if such agreements would otherwise violate Section 1), such as refusals to deal on any terms and exclusion from alternative sources. See Barry, 438 U.S. at 544-45, 98 S.Ct. at 2931. Such conduct is not charged here. Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is not proper unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). But judgment of dismissal is appropriate if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations. McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir.1988). Conclusory allegations without more are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. Under the well-pleaded allegations of these complaints, plaintiffs could prove no boycott or coercion. Plaintiffs do not suggest that their pleadings could be amended to cure their deficiencies. Nor have plaintiffs come forward with specific facts which raise a triable issue as to boycott or coercion. And this is true though plaintiffs in their capacity as state regulators conducted lengthy investigations under their regulatory laws which gave them extensive access to the files and records at least of the domestic defendants as well as to other sources of relevant information. Plaintiffs have been given the opportunity also to conduct relevant discovery and have not suggested that they needed discovery to be able fairly to meet this motion. Accordingly, all defendants are entitled to dismissal of the complaints without leave to amend, or in the alternative summary judgment (considering defendants’ submissions outside the pleadings), on all federal law claims in the various complaints. In addition all defendants are entitled to judgment on the Sixth and Seventh Claims of the First Wave Complaints and the Fourth and Sixth Claims of the Second Wave Complaints for failure to allege boycott, coercion, or intimidation. See Freier v. New York Life Ins. Co., 679 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir.1982). The foreign reinsurer defendants named in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Claims of the First Wave Complaints and the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Claims of the Second Wave Complaints have joined in this motion as an alternate ground for dismissal. They have also made a motion to dismiss on the ground of international comity which the Court grants. (See infra § V.E(3).) Because that motion rests on the proposition that those defendants are not subject to the antitrust laws, it raises the question whether, as a result, they also are not subject to state regulation to a degree sufficient to be entitled to McCarran Act immunity. It does not appear necessary to resolve that issue here, however; if the dismissal on comity grounds is sustained, the alternative ground for dismissal under the McCarran Act will be moot. Conversely, if it is not sustained, it will be because American regulatory laws apply to them and hence the McCarran Act as well. B. STATE ACTION IMMUNITY, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, AND CAUSATION Defendants have moved for summary judgment with respect to those claims which “relate to the collective form-making process in those states that took action to approve, disapprove or withhold approval of the revised ISO CGL forms.” (Def. Memo. 1.) This motion, therefore, is limited in its scope; it does not reach conduct outside of the collective activities to revise the CGL policy forms and it does not apply to plaintiff states, or plaintiffs in states, that do not have a procedure for approval, disapproval, or withholding approval of policy forms, namely Alaska, California, Colorado, and Montana. Because plaintiffs’ opposition memorandum either misconceives or ignores the narrow scope of this motion, its arguments are in large part irrelevant. (1) State Action Immunity In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1934), the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act was not intended to prohibit states from imposing restraints on competition. The circumstances under which this state action immunity extends to private parties were defined in California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 100 S.Ct. 937, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1980): “First, the challenged restraint must be ‘one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,’ and, second, the State ‘must supervise actively any private anticompetitive conduct.’ ” 445 U.S. at 105, 100 S.Ct. at 943 (quoting City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 1135, 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978) (Brennan, J.)). (a) State Policy There is no question that all of the states have clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed policies permitting collective policy form development activities. Each of the states has licensed ISO and its members to engage in certain collective activities, including filing of rates and policy forms and developing policy forms. These actions are governed by Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 105 S.Ct. 1721, 85 L.Ed.2d 36 (1985). There the Supreme Court applied state action immunity to collective rate making activities under state laws permitting — but not requiring — motor carriers to agree on rates subject to the supervision of the state public service commission having authority to accept, reject, or modify the agreed rates. The same situation is presented here. The states have authorized the insurers to agree on policy forms subject to the supervisory authority of the insurance regulators. Most of the states require regulatory approval before a form may be used; others permit a form to be used unless or until the regulators disapprove it. (Def.Memo. 5-6.) And here, as in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, insurers were not required to participate in the collective activities of ISO and were free to use policies other than those developed and sponsored by ISO. Plaintiffs argue that the states have authorized only voluntary joint action, not coercion or boycotts. But the fact that the states prohibit coercion and boycotts does not diminish the immunity flowing from the authority to conduct collective policy development activities. That immunity depends on the presence of active state supervision, as discussed below, and the states’ prohibition of coercion and boycott is simply one aspect of this supervision. To argue that the presence of such state law prohibitions nullifies the state action immunity would be to turn the doctrine on its head. The premise of that doctrine is that it immunizes conduct that might otherwise run afoul of the antitrust laws. It does so “to resolve conflicts that may arise between principles of federalism and the goal of the antitrust laws, unfettered competition in the marketplace.” Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 471 U.S. at 61, 105 S.Ct. at 1729. It achieves that end by allowing states “to adopt policies that permit, but do not compel, anticompetitive conduct by regulated private parties.” Id. at 66, 105 S.Ct. at 1731. Under the regulatory schemes of the relevant states, insurers are permitted to engage in collective policy development but are not required to do so or to adopt the collectively produced policies; activities directed to an insurer’s individual decision what coverage to offer, as distinct from what terms to include in ISO policy forms, are not claimed to be covered by state action immunity and are not addressed by this motion. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Medic Air Corp. v. Air Ambulance Authority, 843 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir.1988), is misplaced. That case held that defendant did not, by reason of having been designated by the state as an exclusive ambulance dispatcher, become immune against a claim that it had restrained competition in the market for air ambulance services. The immunity which attached to dispatch services did not extend to activities in the separate and distinct market for ambulance services. But that reasoning does not apply where, as here, the restraint complained of occurred (though not exclusively) in the course of the protected conduct, i.e. the collective development of terms for policies to be issued by the participating insurers, which was exactly what the states permitted to be done. (b) State Supervision State action immunity applies only where the state actively supervises “to ensure that [it] will shelter only the particular anticompetitive acts of private parties that, in the judgment of the State, actually further state regulatory policies.” Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 108 S.Ct. 1658, 1663, 100 L.Ed.2d 83 (1988). Plaintiffs argue that state supervision in this case does not reach the restraints alleged, i.e., “the agreements and acts to limit or eliminate the availability of consumer-demanded coverages.” (Unified Opp. 58.) But in Patrick, the Court specifically referred to the state public service commission’s “ultimate authority and control over all intrastate rates” in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference as an example of what constitutes active supervision. Id. (quoting Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, 471 U.S. at 51, 105 S.Ct. at 1723). As noted above, there, as here, supervision took the form of approval, disapproval, or modification of the end product of the collective action. That degree of supervision was sufficient protection of the public interest, without the necessity of additional supervision of the manner in which the participants conducted the collective process. Plaintiffs contend that, even if the state action immunity otherwise applied, its application here is barred by the McCarran Act which, they contend, specifically reserves application of the Sherman Act to boycott and coercion. Cf. Ballard v. Blue Shield of Southern W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075, 1078-79 (4th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922, 97 S.Ct. 1341, 51 L.Ed.2d 601 (1977). The two immunity doctrines are not congruent and need to be distinguished with care. The McCarran Act, as discussed in section V.A., supra, grants to the insurance business a limited immunity from the antitrust laws, conditioned on a degree of state regulation. State action immunity, as discussed here, permits the states to displace the antitrust laws with respect to specified activities actively supervised by the states. See generally P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶¶ 210.1b, 212.1f, at 113 (Supp.1988) (“The [Supreme] Court’s view of federalism [under Parker v. Brown ] has left enormous discretion to the states to displace competition.”). Plaintiffs’ contention was most recently addressed and rejected in Health Care Equalization Committee v. Iowa Medical Society, 851 F.2d 1020, 1027 n. 10 (8th Cir.1988), where the court stated that it would be anomalous to hold that Congress, by adopting the McCarran Act, intended to subject insurance companies to antitrust liability for actions that would be exempt if engaged in by others. The state action immunity motion must therefore be granted. (2) Statutory Interpretation Defendants also contend that because the effects complained of resulted from the actions of the states which approved the use of the revised policy forms, there could have been no restraint of trade. Their reliance on In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 521 F.Supp. 568 (N.D.Cal. 1981), aff'd., 693 F.2d 84 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133, 103 S.Ct. 3114, 77 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1983), is, however, misplaced. The restraint complained of in that case flowed from the decision of airport authorities not to lease space to plaintiffs. The fact that that decision may have been influenced by a conspiracy among defendants did not make the defendants responsible for the airport authorities’ independent exercise of judgment to exclude plaintiffs. In the instant actions, however, the restraints complained of did not flow from the actions of state regulators who approved or disapproved policy forms; they flowed from the collective actions of defendants by which they allegedly sought to bring about the use of policy forms that restricted available insurance coverage. To the extent that their conduct is not immune from antitrust scrutiny, defendants would be responsible for its consequences. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs cannot demonstrate the existence of a restraint in the policy form development process. (Reply 1-10.) The argument seems to rest on confusion between Sherman Act liability and the effect of the McCarran Act. There is little question that, in the absence of McCarran Act immunity, allegations of collective action by defendants to bring about reduced coverage for purchasers of insurance would state a claim under Section 1: There is no doubt that the members of such [trade] associations often have economic incentives to restrain competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a serious potential for anticompetitive harm. Agreement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement not to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of products. Accordingly, private standard-setting associations have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 108 S.Ct. 1931, 1937, 100 L.Ed.2d 497 (1988). It would not matter for purposes of Section 1 that, as defendants argue, the collective action of defendants did not limit an individual insurer’s ability to offer broader coverage. (Reply 5.) The individual insurer’s continued freedom is relevant only to application of Section 1013(b) of the McCarran Act, the boycott exclusion, not to liability for anti-competitive agreements. The motion based on statutory interpretation must therefore be denied. (3) Causation The foregoing analysis also disposes of defendants’ contention that plaintiffs were not injured “by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.” 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). No states required insurers to adopt the approved forms. Hence, injury flowing from prohibited collective action to coerce competitors to restrict coverage or deny consumers access to insurance coverage, unless otherwise immune, would fail within Section 4 of the Clayton Act. There being no disputed issues of fact material to the disposition of this motion, and for the reasons stated, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims based on defendants’ participation in the collective policy development process asserted by states, and plaintiffs in states, other than Alaska, California, Colorado, and Montana must be granted on the ground of state action immunity, but will otherwise be denied. C. STANDING The domestic and foreign reinsurer defendants have moved to dismiss the complaints against them on the ground that plaintiffs do not have standing to complain of actions taken in the reinsurance and retrocessional insurance markets. The reinsurer defendants characterize the complaints as alleging three distinct insurance markets: primary insurance, reinsurance, and retrocessional insurance. They contend that plaintiffs claim to have participated only in the primary insurance market and that the defendant reinsurers are alleged to have conspired only in the reinsurance and retrocessional insurance markets. On this basis, defendants contend that plaintiffs do not claim to have been directly affected by the alleged conduct of these defendants and that, therefore, plaintiffs do not have standing to assert the antitrust claims pleaded. To have standing to assert an antitrust claim, a plaintiff must allege that it has suffered harm as a direct result of the defendant’s conduct and that this harm is within the scope of the protection of the antitrust laws. Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478, 102 S.Ct. 2540, 2547, 73 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982). Accepting, as the Court must, the allegations of the complaint, they establish that the terms and availability of reinsurance directly affect the availability of insurance coverage to consumers. As discussed in section Y.A(l), supra, plaintiffs’ contention is that the reinsurers’ alleged conspiracy to eliminate reinsurance for certain CGL coverages “led inexorably to an injury ... in the interrelated primary insurance market.” The claims against these defendants therefore fall within the analysis in McCready, in which a Blue Cross subscriber was found to have standing to challenge an alleged conspiracy between Blue Cross and psychiatrists to deny reimbursement of psychologists’ services. Though the restraint occurred in a market (the market for psychiatrists’ services) in which plaintiff was not a consumer, the Court reasoned that plaintiff had standing: McCready claims that she has been the victim of a concerted refusal to pay on the part of Blue Shield, motivated by a desire to deprive psychologists of the patronage of Blue Shield subscribers. Denying reimbursement to subscribers for the cost of treatment was the very means by which it is alleged that Blue Shield sought to achieve its illegal ends. The harm to McCready and her class was clearly foreseeable; indeed, it was a necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal conspiracy. Where the injury alleged is so integral an aspect of the conspiracy alleged, there can be no question but that the loss was precisely “ ‘the type of loss that the claimed violations ... would be likely to cause.’ ” 457 U.S. at 479, 102 S.Ct. at 2548 (citations omitted). And that was true even though plaintiff’s plan coverage was purchased and paid for by her employer; as a consumer of psychotherapy services, she nevertheless was within the area of the economy threatened by a breakdown of competitive conditions resulting from Blue Cross’s refusal to reimburse for services she desired. Plaintiffs’ allegations suffice to establish agreements the direct effect of which, if true, would be to restrain the availability of desired coverages in the markets in which plaintiffs purchase insurance. Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983), is distinguishable. There the plaintiff unions complained of a conspiracy by defendants to abrogate or weaken the collective bargaining relationship between the unions and employers. As the Court there observed, “the Union was neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in which trade was restrained.” Id. at 539, 103 S.Ct. at 909. And it was “not clear” whether the Union’s interests would be served or disserved by enhanced competition in that market. Moreover, the claim of causation between the Union’s injury and the alleged restraint contained “somewhat vaguely defined links.” Id. at 540, 103 S.Ct. at 909. On the face of the allegations, plaintiffs have standing. The motion based on lack of standing must be denied. D. GLOBAL CONSPIRACY CLAIM Foreign reinsurer defendants have moved to dismiss the First Claim of the Second Wave Complaints, the so-called global conspiracy claim. That claim alleges that all defendants, including the moving defendants, engaged in a conspiracy to restrain the market for CGL property and casualty risks and for reinsurance and retrocessional reinsurance by agreeing to limit or eliminate occurrence, pollution, retroactive, and long-tail coverage, which are the subjects of the allegations of the complaints. In other words, this claim links all of the various specific claims of wrong-doing by various groups of defendants in various markets to allege one global conspiracy among all defendants. The moving defendants are foreign reinsurers doing business in London. They are named in the Second, Third, and Sixth claims of the Second Wave Complaints in connection with discrete conspiracy claims. They make this motion on the ground that the First Claim merely lumps together the separate conspiracies elsewhere alleged without any allegation indicating how the separate conspiracies became a single global conspiracy. (Def.Memo. 4.) No question is raised as to the sufficiency of the pleading of the discrete conspiracies in the other claims. Plaintiffs respond that the complaints “allege that all of the defendants were conspirators who intended to prevent the States from obtaining consumer-demanded insurance coverages.” (Unified Opp. 106.) Plaintiffs’ theory is that because “the conspiracies alleged are linked by a common purpose, by overlapping defendants and by interconnected acts,” a jury could find a single global conspiracy among all the participants in the separate conspiracies. (Id. at 109-10.) A conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons acting in concert to accomplish a common unlawful purpose. A eoconspirator need not know the identity of all other conspirators or the full extent of the conspiracy. E.g., United States v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc., 728 F.2d 444, 450-51 (10th Cir.1984). But there must be a common agreement and understanding. Mere identity of purpose, interconnected events, and shared participants, on which plaintiffs base their claim, do not link separate conspiracies into one overall, single conspiracy. {See Unified Opp. 110 — 12.) For separate activities to result in a single conspiracy, the allegations and proof must reflect a wheel and spoke arrangement in which a single person at the hub implements the conspiracy by a series of arrangements with others to carry out the purpose of their conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 662-63 (5th Cir.1977). But such separate activities, even if for a common purpose, do not constitute a conspiracy “without the rim of the wheel to enclose the spokes.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 755, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1243, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). There must be a connection among all the alleged participants sufficient to support a finding that they had entered into the alleged conspiracy. Id. at 754, 66 S.Ct. at 1242. See also Pinhas v. Summit Health, Ltd., 880 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir.1989) (“Pinhas alleges ... that as a result of his refusal to sign the ‘sham’ contract, appellees entered into a conspiracy ... to suspend and terminate his medical staff privileges ... and to have the report of his termination disseminated____”) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have made no attempt to show the existence of such a connection to support a finding of a single overall conspiracy, and the allegations of the complaint would not permit proof of one. They allege a number of different conspiracies having different members and different subject matter. For example, the Fifth Claim of the Second Wave Complaints charges some defendants, some of whom are not named elsewhere, with having conspired to restrict the terms under which property insurance and reinsurance would be provided for North American risks. Property insurance has not been alleged to have a connection with CGL insurance or with the market in which CGL insurance is sold. Thus, if all of the facts alleged in the complaint were proved at trial, a conspiracy verdict against these defendants under the First Claim could not stand. The motion of these defendants to dismiss the First Claim of the Second Wave Complaints must therefore be granted. E. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND COMITY The defendants named in the Sixth and Eighth Claims of the First Wave Complaints and the Fourth and Fifth Claims of the Second Wave Complaints have moved to dismiss those claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or on the basis of international comity. The motion is based on the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1246 (“FTAIA”), and on the doctrine of international comity as stated in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America. The following allegations are relevant: In the Fifth Claim, plaintiffs allege that the defendant London reinsurers agreed to restrict the terms on which reinsurance would be written and to refuse to reinsure risks written on the occurrence form or “long-tail” risks. They allege agreements among defendants, coercion and intimidation of primary insurers to use the claims-made form and reject the occurrence form, and coercion and intimidation of individuals who might communicate with regulatory bodies. (Conn.Compl’t ¶¶ 91, 93, 127-128; Cal.Compl’t ¶¶ 87, 89, 133-134.) As a result, it is alleged that occurrence liability has become unavailable for many risks and the price of such coverage has increased. (Conn.Compl’t ¶ 129; Cal. Compl’t H 135.) In the Sixth Claim, plaintiffs allege that, at