Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER WEINSTEIN, District Judge. This case raises serious questions — some of them novel — about the United States’ obligations under an extradition treaty and the courts’ role in ensuring that those extradited are treated fairly. As indicated below, two changes in law must now be recognized: The “political offense” bar to extradition is narrowed to exclude terrorism and acts of war against civilians. A correlative expansion is required in courts’ power to ensure that those extradited are granted due process and are treated humanely. Petitioner has been afforded due process in this country, and adequate guarantees exist that he will be fairly treated in Israel, the country seeking his extradition to stand trial for alleged terrorist acts against its citizens. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Mahmoud El-Abed Ahmad seeks a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to prevent his extradition to Israel to stand trial. On April 12, 1986, he allegedly attacked by firebombs and automatic weapons fire a passenger bus en route to Tel Aviv traveling between Israeli settlements in the occupied territory of the West Bank. Death of the bus driver and serious injury to one of the passengers resulted. Petitioner, a naturalized United States citizen, formerly a resident of the West Bank, allegedly fled before he could be apprehended. His two alleged accomplices were convicted in Israel and sentenced to life imprisonment for their admitted participation in the planning and execution of the attack. In sworn statements, the co-conspirators implicated petitioner and described their mutual membership in the Abu Nidal Organization, an international terrorist group. That group publicly announced its responsibility for the attack. A year later petitioner was located in Venezuela. Venezuelan officials detained him because of suspected activities in that country on behalf of the Abu Nidal Organization. Venezuela had no extradition treaty with Israel. The Venezuelan authorities advised the United States Ambassador that they were going to expel petitioner to his country of citizenship, the United States. Venezuela placed petitioner on a commercial airline flight from Caracas to the United States. During the flight FBI agents executed a warrant for the provisional arrest of petitioner issued by United States Magistrate John L. Caden of the Eastern District of New York. Pursuant to the Convention on Extradition Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the State of Israel (the “Treaty”), Dec. 10, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476, Israel formally requested the extradition of petitioner from the United States on June 26,1987. Each of the crimes petitioner is charged with under Israeli Penal Law — murder, attempted murder, causing harm with aggravating intent, attempted arson, and conspiracy to commit a felony — is covered by the Treaty. Magistrate Caden held extradition hearings in December, 1987 and February, 1988 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184. In June, 1988 Magistrate Caden denied the extradition request on the ground that the attack on the passenger bus constituted a “political act” for which petitioner was immune from extradition under the Treaty and that, even if he were subject to extradition, the court lacked jurisdiction because petitioner had been brought illegally into the United States. In re Extradition of Atta, 87-0551-M, 1988 WL 66866 (E.D.N.Y.June 17, 1988) (LEXIS 60001). The United States Attorney filed a second extradition complaint seeking de novo consideration. An independent extradition hearing was then held before United States District Judge Edward R. Korman, sitting as an extradition magistrate. He relied on the record before Magistrate Caden and additional evidence received between July and October of 1988. Each party called witnesses and offered exhibits. The court called an expert witness who testified by telephone from Israel. On February 14, 1989 Judge Korman granted the extradition request. He held that res judicata and double jeopardy did not bar the second complaint; if there were any impropriety in the manner petitioner was deported from Venezuela to the United States it did not deprive the court of jurisdiction; the crime alleged was not within the political offense exception to the Treaty; and there was sufficient probable cause to certify petitioner for extradition. In re Extradition of Atta, 706 F.Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y.1989) (hereafter Ahmad). By petition for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner appealed from Judge Korman’s order on March 3,1989. He contended that his alleged crime constituted a political act, that there was insufficient probable cause shown, that Judge Korman lacked jurisdiction and that the court was barred by res judicata and double jeopardy from reconsidering the extradition request denied by Magistrate Caden. In addition, petitioner claimed that should he be extradited to Israel he would face procedures and treatment “antipathetic to a court’s sense of decency.” Because this final ground had not been raised in any prior proceeding, petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that the Israeli judicial system would not afford him due process and that he would be subject to conditions of detention and interrogation in violation of universally accepted principles of human rights. The government opposed petitioner’s request for a hearing. It asserted that the scope of habeas review is extremely narrow and that the rule of non-inquiry prohibited the court from inquiring into the integrity of the requesting state’s judicial system. Neither side requested that the issue be referred to Judge Korman. The petition was referred to the present judge by random selection. On May 16, 1989 this court ruled from the bench that it would consider petitioner’s due process claim and permit both parties to submit further evidence on this and any other issue. The government sought a writ of mandamus from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to prohibit the court from holding a hearing and from receiving evidence on the probable nature of the judicial procedures of the requesting nation in an extradition matter. On June 20, 1989 the Court of Appeals denied the writ of mandamus. This court held evidentiary hearings in July and August of 1989 to supplement the record before Magistrate Caden and Judge Korman. Both parties submitted documentary evidence. Petitioner called four witnesses to testify on the Israeli judicial process and conditions of detention: Professor John Quigley, Abdeen M. Jabara, Leah Tsemel, Esq. and Sami Esmail. Preserving its objection to the proceedings, respondent called two witnesses, Professors Alan Dershowitz and Monroe Freedman, and submitted statements of United States officials who had observed trials in Israel. A representative of the Israeli government certified the protections petitioner would receive in Israel. See Appendix attached infra. The parties then fully briefed and argued the case in September, 1989. In all, some fourteen days of evidentiary hearings, and extensive oral arguments based upon full briefs and the court’s own research, were devoted to this case. Petitioner has had a full opportunity to be heard. II. SCOPE OF REVIEW A. Generally The sole mechanism for review of a magistrate’s order approving extradition is a collateral habeas corpus proceeding. There is no statutory provision for a direct appeal. Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369, 40 S.Ct. 347, 349, 64 L.Ed. 616 (1920) (“proceeding before a committing magistrate in international extradition is not subject to correction by appeal”); Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986); Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833, 97 S.Ct. 97, 50 L.Ed.2d 98 (1976). In extradition cases, the scope of habeas corpus review is limited, according deference to the magistrate’s (here Judge Korman’s) determination. Courts have uniformly purported to stay within the scope of review established by Justice Holmes in Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 542, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925): [Habeas corpus review] is not a means for rehearing what the magistrate already has decided. The alleged fugitive from justice has had his hearing and habeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offence charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 790 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986). In practice, however, habeas review in extradition cases has been somewhat broader than Justice Holmes suggested should be the case. See, e.g., Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1369 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932, 99 S.Ct. 323, 58 L.Ed.2d 327 (1978) (“[T]he ‘victim’ of an extradition order generally gets a pretty broad review under habeas corpus, notwithstanding preachments that it is extremely limited.”) (Chambers, C.J., concurring). For example, district courts have reviewed the political offense exception on habeas corpus as a part of their inquiry into whether the offense charged is covered by the treaty. See, e.g., Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F.Supp. 856, 868 (D.Conn.1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851, 81 S.Ct. 97, 5 L.Ed.2d 74 (1960); In re Doherty, 599 F.Supp. 270, 273 (S.D.N.Y.1984); Eain v. Adams, 529 F.Supp. 685, 687 (N.D.Ill.1980), aff'd sub nom., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 791 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986). Habeas corpus review has also been expanded to include examination of procedural defects in the extradition process that are of constitutional magnitude, and of the constitutionality of the executive branch’s conduct in deciding to extradite the accused. See In re Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1484 (7th Cir.1984); Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 347-49 (4th Cir. 1983). Authority on a habeas corpus petition to examine the conditions the extraditee will be subjected to in the requesting nation to ensure that they comply with fundamental notions of humane treatment and due process is addressed separately in Section III A, infra. This broadening of review parallels the expanded scope of habeas corpus jurisdiction over state court proceedings that has developed since Fernandez was decided. At that time, habeas corpus writs were granted only if the committing court lacked jurisdiction. See In re Extradition of Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1482 (7th Cir.1984). 28 U.S.C. § 2254 codifies the numerous grounds on which writs of habeas corpus may now be granted. It is well settled that “[w]hen the allegations of a habeas petition, if proved, would entitle a petitioner to relief, a federal court ‘must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in state court.’ ” Maddox v. Lord, 818 F.2d 1058, 1061 (2d Cir.1987) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312, 83 S.Ct. 745, 756, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963)). As the Court of Appeals put the matter in Hayden v. United States, 814 F.2d 888, 892 (2d Cir.1987), a case challenging a federal conviction, A petition for habeas corpus requires a hearing to resolve disputed issues of fact unless the record shows that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We have consistently held that the standard to be used in making this determination is whether, “if the evidence should be offered at a hearing, it would be admissible proof entitling the petitioner to relief.” Even where the petitioner has been afforded a full and fair hearing by the state court, a federal court judge “has the power ... to receive evidence bearing upon the applicant’s constitutional claim.” Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318, 83 S.Ct. 745, 760, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). In his petition for habeas corpus relief, petitioner set forth evidence he contended controverted Judge Korman’s findings. An expanded record and hearing was then required to resolve the complicated issues of fact and law that two extradition magistrates previously had decided so disparately and to permit petitioner to demonstrate the merits of his due process claim. Should there be an appeal, the appellate court or courts will have a fully developed record. As with habeas review of state court findings, an extradition magistrate’s purely factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, while mixed determinations of fact and law, such as the political offense issue, and questions solely of law must be reviewed de novo. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 791 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986). Each of Judge Korman’s findings will be addressed in turn. B. Res Judicata and Double Jeopardy Judge Korman held that as a matter of law the United States Attorney was entitled to file a second extradition complaint after Magistrate Caden had denied the initial extradition request. Ahmad, 706 F.Supp. at 1036. Even though this procedure permits the United States Attorney to relitigate issues of fact and law that have been decided by a magistrate, a de novo extradition hearing is permissible and does not violate principles of res judicata or double jeopardy. See, e.g., Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 429-30, 43 S.Ct. 618, 619, 67 L.Ed. 1062 (1923) (double jeopardy principles are inapplicable to multiple extradition applications); United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 501 (2d Cir.1986) (upon denial of extradition request, sole recourse for government is to file request for another proceeding; application of res judicata is inappropriate); Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932, 99 S.Ct. 323, 58 L.Ed.2d 327 (1978) (only limitation on number of extradition requests is that each such request must be based on good faith determination “that extradition is warranted”). The proceedings here were neither vindictive nor designed to harass the petitioner—two of the evils which double jeopardy prevents. Cf. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223-24, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). They were intended to meet the problem of the government’s lack of power to appeal the denial of extradition. See United States v. Doherty, 615 F.Supp. 755 (S.D.N.Y.1985), aff'd, 786 F.2d 491, 495-96 (2d Cir.1986). It would be desirable to allow an appeal by either side from an extradition decision. But this is a matter for the legislature, not the courts. (Legislation to this effect has been proposed but not yet enacted. See Proposed Extradition Act of 1984, H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3195(a)(1), reprinted in H.Rep. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1984) (permitting appeal from an extradition order by government or defendant).) C. Jurisdiction 1. United States Petitioner contends that Judge Korman lacked jurisdiction because petitioner was illegally forced into the United States, not “found” here. Article I of the Treaty provides that the United States is obligated to extradite “persons found in its territory.” An extradition magistrate has jurisdiction over any person “found within his jurisdiction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Petitioner has not produced any evidence to discredit Judge Korman’s factual finding that “the United States did not instigate the defendant’s arrest, that it was not responsible for the conditions of his confinement and that it did everything possible to encourage Venezuela to deport him to Israel rather than the United States.” Ahmad, 706 F.Supp. at 1036-37. In light of the series of telegrams sent in April and May of 1987 from the State Department to the American embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, Judge Korman’s finding was obviously required. There is credible evidence showing that petitioner was properly deported by Venezuelan officials to the United States, his country of citizenship, upon his detention for suspected involvement in a terrorist organization which might be operating in Venezuela. His eventual presence in the United States was not the result of forcible abduction. The jurisdictional requirement that he be “found” in this territory was satisfied. Even if the United States had requested his deportation from Venezuela to this country, petitioner provides no more than vague allegations of impermissible conduct by United States agents in connection with his arrest, detention and deportation. They do not rise to the level of due process violations. In United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.1974), the Court of Appeals held that “a court [must] divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the government’s deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 275. In order to trigger a due process violation, the government conduct must be so outrageous and reprehensible as to “shock the conscience.” See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001, 95 S.Ct. 2400, 44 L.Ed.2d 668 (1975) (absent any contention of torture, terror, or custodial interrogation, abduction of petitioner from Bolivia to United States for arrest under indictment in New York did not constitute a violation of due process). See also David v. Attorney General, 699 F.2d 411, 414 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 832, 104 S.Ct. 113, 78 L.Ed.2d 114 (1983) (abduction to United States does not deprive court of jurisdiction over extradition proceeding). Petitioner’s bald assertion that the United States forcibly kidnapped him in violation of his constitutional rights not only is unsupported by the evidence but is insufficient as a matter of law to divest this court of jurisdiction. 2. Israel There is no merit to petitioner’s contention that Israel lacks jurisdiction to try petitioner because the acts with which he is charged occurred within the occupied territory of the West Bank and trial in an Israeli court would violate the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. See Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Even if, as petitioner argues, under paragraph 1 of article 64 of the Convention the criminal laws of Jordan rather than Israel applied in the occupied territory, that fact would be irrelevant. Israel is not relying on a territorial basis for jurisdiction. It is prosecuting petitioner under its statutes protecting Israeli citizens wherever they are found, relying on passive personality and protected state interest bases of jurisdiction. See generally M. Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order 255-61 (1974) (describing these bases of jurisdiction, and noting the Israeli law). Under section 7(a) of the penal law of Israel, 5737-1977 (as amended): The courts in Israel shall be competent to try under Israeli law a person who committed abroad an act which would have been an offense had it been committed in Israel and which injured or was intended to injure the life, person, health, freedom or property of an Israeli national or resident of Israel. The United States recognizes nationality of the victim as a basis for criminal jurisdiction. See Terrorist Acts Abroad Against United States Nationals, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (allowing prosecution in the United States of persons charged with violent crimes committed against our nationals anywhere in the world). See also Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in United States Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 Yale J.Int'l L. 294, 297 (1987) (describing the United States statute, and noting bases for jurisdiction instead of territoriality: passive personality, protected interest, and the universality of the offense of terrorism). The driver killed was an Israeli national. He was entitled to the Israeli statute’s protection. In view of its nonapplicability, we need not decide whether — as strongly urged by petitioner — he, as a private person, may claim the protection of the Fourth Geneva Convention based upon his presence in the occupied territory at the time of the alleged crime. It should be noted, however, that an argument similar to petitioner’s was rejected in American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756 (N.D.Cal.1989). Plaintiffs were Salvadoran and Guatemalan aliens in the United States facing deportation to their respective countries of origin. Plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to a “temporary refuge in [the United States] until the internal armed conflict in their homelands ceases or they are resettled in a third country.” Id. at 767 n. 6. They contended the conditions in their homelands violated article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which “prescribes the protections that must be provided to civilians during non-international armed conflict.” Id. at 769. Plaintiffs reasoned that “by deporting Salvadorans and Guatemalans to countries where article 3 violations are occurring, the United States has failed to ‘respect and ensure respect' for the Convention within the meaning of Article I.” Id. The court rejected the argument, holding that article I of the Fourth Geneva Convention does not confer any rights on private litigants. It found that article I “does not impose any specific obligations on the signatory nations, nor does it provide any intelligible guidelines for judicial enforcement.” Id. at 770. The court concluded that “Geneva Convention IV does not provide any right of temporary refuge - to Salvadorans or Guatemalans within this country.” Id. If the Fourth Geneva Convention presents no obstacle to deportation, it follows, the government argues, that the Convention cannot impair extradition, since “[e]xtradition is subject to specific international obligations while deportation is essentially at the option of the deporting country.” In re Geisser, 627 F.2d 745, 746-47 n. 1 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031, 101 S.Ct. 1741, 68 L.Ed.2d 226 (1981). We prefer not to rely upon this last argument because of its negative implications on the court’s obligations and power to protect extraditees, particularly those who are American citizens. D. Probable Cause Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Judge Korman’s finding of probable cause to believe that petitioner committed the acts for which his extradition is requested. Ahmad, 706 F.Supp. at 1050. Article V of the Treaty provides that “Extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found sufficient, according to the laws of the place where the person sought shall be found, ... to justify his committal for trial.” The scope of review of Judge Korman’s finding of probable cause is limited to determining whether there was persuasive “evidence” of guilt. See Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 542, 69 L.Ed. 970 (1925); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981). To ascertain whether probable cause existed, Judge Korman correctly applied the following appropriate standard: To establish the level of probable cause necessary to certify one for extradition, evidence must be produced that is “sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.” Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C.Cir.1973). The primary source of evidence for the probable cause determination is the extradition request, and any evidence submitted in it is deemed truthful for purposes of this determination. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315-16, 42 S.Ct. 469, 471-72, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922). Ahmad, 706 F.Supp. at 1050-51. Judge Korman had before him Israel’s extradition request which included sworn affidavits from petitioner’s two alleged accomplices directly implicating petitioner in the attack and a videotape reenactment by one of the accomplices depicting petitioner’s participation in the attack. In his petition for habeas relief, as at the hearing before Judge Korman, petitioner contended that the accomplice testimony is inherently unreliable, self-contradictory, coerced, the result of torture and not corroborated by relevant evidence. Judge Korman found that the accomplice testimony was corroborated by ballistics reports on an Uzi sub-machine gun tying one of the accomplices to the attack, by authenticated Israeli documents and by petitioner’s passport accounting for his travels and whereabouts since 1974 which the accomplices had independently detailed. Ahmad, 706 F.Supp. at 1051. He also found that while credible evidence demonstrated that torture had been used by Israeli officials at times to obtain confessions, there was “no evidence that the confessions here were coerced or that they are not reliable.” Id. The videotape of a person identified as one of the accomplices, being advised of his rights in Arabic, relaxed and showing no signs of abuse, reenacting the attack on the bus at its scene, belied suggestions by petitioner that he had been implicated only because the witnesses against him had been tortured. As a matter of law, accomplice testimony is sufficient even without corroboration to demonstrate probable cause to certify the accused for extradition. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 510 & n. 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981) (citing Suhl v. United States, 390 F.2d 547 (9th Cir.1968), and other cases where uncorroborated accomplice testimony was sufficient to support conviction). Where accomplice testimony is corroborated by other reliable evidence, it will, a fortiori, support a finding of probable cause. Id. at 510 (citing United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 855, 100 S.Ct. 112, 62 L.Ed.2d 73 (1979), and other cases where corroborated accomplice testimony was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to issue an arrest warrant). There is force to petitioner’s argument that inconsistencies among the various confessions and internal indicia of unreliability suggested that the statements were dictated to, rather than by, the alleged accomplices. For example, the petitioner is referred to as “Atta,” the name on his Israeli identification, rather than “Ahmad,” the name by which he was known. Nevertheless, there was, as already noted, substantial internal and external evidence of the truth of the accomplices’ statements. Because the extradition magistrate does not sit to try the guilt or innocence of the accused, the petitioner is generally afforded only a limited right to contradict the demanding country’s proof or to pose questions of credibility as in an ordinary trial. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884, 94 S.Ct. 204, 38 L.Ed.2d 133 (1973). See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315-16, 42 S.Ct. 469, 471-72, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922) (challenges to evidence submitted by United States in extradition proceeding not permissible). The evidence of petitioner’s guilt would more than support an indictment in this country. It was properly found sufficient for extradition. As pointed out in Section III C(3), infra, petitioner will have a full opportunity to challenge the credibility of his alleged accomplices’ confessions at a trial in Israel under the rules of evidence in that country and with the added advantage that the accomplices may be called by him to testify. In any event, even if Judge Korman had found the confessions were coerced, he could give whatever weight to them that he believed they deserved. Cf. United States v. Bloom, 865 F.2d 485, 491-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1762, 104 L.Ed.2d 197 (1989) (jury need not disregard a coerced confession but may give it such weight as it deserves). There is no ground to reverse Judge Korman’s finding of probable cause. E. Political Offense Exception Petitioner concedes that his alleged offense would be extraditable as a form of criminal homicide were it not, in his submission, a political act and therefore immune from extradition under the Treaty. Four questions arise: What is a political offense? Who bears the burden of proof in determining whether petitioner’s act was a political offense? What is the scope of review of the magistrate’s determination? Was petitioner’s offense political? 1. Definition of A Political Offense Article VI, paragraph 4 of the Treaty states that extradition will not be granted when “the offense is regarded by the requested Party [the United States] as one of a political character.” The term “political” is not defined. General law of this country governs construction of the phrase. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508, 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981). There are two classes of political offenses: first, “pure” or directly political and, second, “relative” or incidentally political. An act is considered a pure political offense if it is directed against the state and involves none of the elements of ordinary crime. The violence, if any, is minor and rarely involves private victims. Such offenses include treason, sedition and espionage, Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986); Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 Va.L.Rev. 1226, 1234 (1962), and acts of prohibited speech, such as speaking against ruling authority, demonstrating peacefully, flag burning or waving and the like. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law, § 476, Reporters’ Note 4, at 574 (1986) (hereafter Restatement). Pure political offenses are often specifically excluded from the list of extraditable crimes in a treaty. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d at 794. Even if the treaty is silent, courts generally agree that they do not provide a basis for extradition because the purpose of the political offense exception is to protect individuals’ rights to foster political change through relatively peaceful political activity. Petitioner’s alleged offense of killing a civilian bus driver was not such an act. An act may be a “relative” political offense when it is an otherwise common crime committed as a political act or for political motives or in a political context. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 512; Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d at 794; M. Bassiouni, International Extradition and World Public Order 383 (1974); Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 Va.L.Rev. 1226, 1239 (1962); Restatement, supra, § 476, Reporters’ Note 4, at 574. Petitioner contends that his alleged crime of murder had sufficient political overtones to constitute a relative, non-extraditable political offense. Anglo-American law governing the political offense exception has focused on the scope of “relative” political offenses. To delimit this category for the purposes of the extradition exception, American courts have adopted the “incidence test” of In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, 166 (1890), determining that an act is a political offense when it is “incidental to and formed a part of a political disturbance.” See Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 509, 16 S.Ct. 689, 691, 40 L.Ed. 787 (1896) (act must be “in aid of a political revolt, an insurrection or a civil war”); In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D.Cal.1894) (there must be “ ‘an uprising,’ and ... the acts in question must be incidental to it”); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir.1980) (act must be “incidental to severe political disturbances such as war, revolution and rebellion”); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972) (act must be “in the course of or incidental to” a “violent political disturbance”). As indicated below, the courts have gone further in developing the test of a political offense than requiring “incidence” alone. Defining a political act is itself a form of political act, changing with the nature of the extraditing nation’s foreign relations and treaties. By assigning this task in part to the judiciary, the executive branch avoids political or economic repercussions or accusations that it is not diligent in the enforcement of its treaty obligations or that it is interfering in the internal affairs of another nation. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981); Note, Bringing the Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach, 11 Cornell Int’l L.J. 71, 74 (1974) (politics need not present barrier to extradition if executive defers to judiciary). This division of responsibility also reduces the risk “that majoritarian consensus or favor due or not due to the country seeking extradition will interfere with individual liberty.” Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 789 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986). The State Department retains a key role in the determination of whether the political offense exception applies. Courts have not applied the incidence test in a foreign policy vacuum. Views of the State Department have been taken into account either explicitly or implicitly. See Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981) (“Even though we do not leave sole determination to the Executive branch, we believe its views are entitled to great weight in extradition matters.”); see also Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 579 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986) (interpretation of treaty language by the Department of State is “entitled to considerable deference”); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 468, 33 S.Ct. 945, 952, 57 L.Ed. 1274 (1913) (“A construction of the treaty by the political department of the government, while not conclusive upon a court ... is nevertheless of much weight.”). Judge Korman received testimony regarding the State Department’s position that the political offense exception is not applicable to violent attacks on civilians. Ahmad, 706 F.Supp. at 1039 & n. 5, 1041. See also Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981) (legal advisor for the State Department’s Office of Combatting Terrorism testified that “indiscriminate use of violence against civilian populations, innocent parties, is a prohibited act, and as such, is a common crime of murder, punishable in both [Israel and the United States].”). The State Department’s view deserves deference, unless it represents a substantial departure from national or international norms. Given the national and increasingly international condemnation of terrorism, Judge Korman's recognition of the State Department’s view was appropriate. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53), U.N. Doc. A/40/53, at 301 (1985) (General Assembly of the United Nations’ recognition of the need of member states to cooperate in com bating terrorism through apprehension, extradition and prosecution of terrorists); Council of Europe, European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, arts. 1 & 2, 25 Eur. Y.B. 289, 289-90 (1977), 15 I.L.M. 1272, 1272-73 (1976) (excluding terrorist acts from the political offense exception to treaties between members of Council of Europe), 16 id. 1329 (1977) (reservations and declarations of signatories); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51(2), adopted June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1396, 1413 (hereafter Protocol I), reprinted in L. Henkin, R. Pugh, O. Schachter & H. Smit, Basic Documents Supplement to “International Law Cases and Materials” 195, 202 (2d ed. 1987) (hereafter Documents Supplement) (condemning violence designed to spread terror among civilian populations); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4(2)(d), 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1444 (1977), reprinted in Documents Supplement, supra, 213, 215; 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Pub.L. No. 98-533, 98 Stat. 2706 (seeking more effective international cooperation in the extradition of all terrorists); Gates, The Role of Analysis in Combating Modem Terrorism, FBI L. Enforcement Bull., June, 1989, at 1 (discussing resources utilized in combating terrorism); Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in United States Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 Yale J. Int’l L. 294, 295 (1987) (pointing out rise in terrorism and need for criminal justice system to adapt to deal with it); Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive Discretion and Judicial Participation in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 15 Cornell Int’l L.J. 247, 291 (1982) (advocating reforms to “ensure that the courts do not extend the protection for the exception to those who practice violence against civilians”); id. at 253 (“In recent times ... the philosophic concept of broad protection for political offenders has eroded in view of the phenomenon of terrorism.”); Lubet & Czaczkes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 193, 200 (1980). Attacks on civilians and other terrorist activities have created substantial problems for this and other nations. Terrorism tears the ligaments of civility and security that peacefully bind us together in our communal daily life. Current United States policy on terrorism cannot be ignored when courts define political offenses for extradition purposes. Cf. United States v. Leitner, 627 F.Supp. 739, 741 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 784 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir.1986) (“This country has an obvious stake in its ability to produce extradited persons. That interest is magnified where a defendant is charged with acts of terrorism, a matter of increasingly grave concern to this and every other civilized country.”). The current threat of terrorism to the peaceful expectations of civilians for a secure and safe society is so great as to either require some limitations on the political offense doctrine or an interpretation placing such offenses outside its protection. See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 803-06 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986) (collecting cases and attempting its own limitation based on a theory of territoriality). Courts have recently disagreed over whether the traditional incidence test conforms to the changing realities of the modern world. Some have reappraised the validity of the test in light of current terrorism. In Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981), for example, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) accused of exploding a bomb that killed two and injured thirty-six civilians in a public square in the Israeli city of Tiberias sought the protection in this country of the political offense exception. The Seventh Circuit held that the political offense exception was not meant to protect “the indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace ... even when the larger ‘political’ objective of the person who sets off the bomb may be to eliminate the civilian population of a country.” Id. at 521. The court reasoned that: If ... all that was necessary in order to prevent extradition under the political offense exception [were evidence that the organization to which the accused belongs seeks destruction of the Israeli political structure through the elimination of its population], nothing would prevent an influx of terrorists seeking a safe haven in America____ The law is not so utterly absurd____ We recognize the validity and usefulness of the political offense exception, but it should be applied with great care lest our country become a social jungle and an encouragement to terrorists everywhere. Id. at 520. The Eain court recognized the necessity of balancing the policy interests underlying the exception with those interests necessitating its limits, to insure that the exception does not afford immunity to those who commit atrocities for political ends. The court concluded that the indiscriminate use of violence against civilians will not be regarded as a political offense, regardless of whether it is incidental to political upheaval. Id. at 521. Accord, In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp. 544, 570 (N.D.Ohio), aff'd sub nom., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986). The opinion of Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit, after an extensive historical analysis of the political offense exception, rejected the Eain position and held that even an atrocity, if undertaken for “purely political purposes,” qualifies as a non-extraditable political act. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 806 (9th Cir.) (one judge concurring and one concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986). In Quinn, a member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was accused of conspiracy to cause letter bomb explosions in London and the murder of a police constable seeking to apprehend him for that offense. The court held the political offense exception inapplicable under the incidence test only because the political uprising in Ireland did not extend to England. It wrote: [I]t is not our place to impose our notions of civilized strife on people who are seeking to overthrow the regimes in control of their countries____ We believe the tactics that are used in ... political internal struggles are simply irrelevant to the question whether the political offense exception is applicable. Id. at 804-05. Judge Duniway, concurring in the result, disagreed with the majority viewpoint: I much prefer the rationale of the Seventh Circuit in Eain v. Wilkes, 7 Cir., 1981, 641 F.2d 504____ I cannot believe that the framers of the treaty intended that the exception would embrace the kind of activities that the record in this case reveals. Id. at 819. The Quinn majority found that there was no justification for distinguishing between attacks on military and civilian targets because: It is for the revolutionaries, not the courts, to determine what tactics may help further their chances of bringing down or changing the government. All that the courts should do is determine whether the conduct is related to or connected with the insurgent activity. Id. at 810. Cf. In re Requested Extradition of Mackin, Mag. No. 80 Cr.Misc. 1, p. 54, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981) (political act exception applied to member of IRA accused of murdering a British soldier in Northern Ireland), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1981); In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D.Cal. May 11, 1979) (political act exception applied to former member of IRA accused of murder in connection with the bombing of a military barracks in England). In reaction to the Mac-kin and McMullen decisions, and shortly before Quinn was decided, the United Kingdom and United States concluded a Supplementary Extradition Treaty, expressly excluding from the political offense exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists, including hijacking, hostage taking, murder, kidnapping and specified offenses relating to the use of explosives, firearms or ammunition. See Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 24 I.L.M. 1105 (1985). In finding no distinction between targets, the Ninth Circuit ignored the fact that the civilian status of victims has been a significant factor in the political offense calculus since the nineteenth century. See Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 511, 16 S.Ct. 689, 692, 40 L.Ed. 787 (1896) (magistrate’s refusal to apply exception justified “in view of the character of the foray, the mode of attack, the persons killed or captured, and the kind of property taken or destroyed”) (emphasis added). See also In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp 544, 570 (D.C.Ohio), aff'd sub nom., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1198, 89 L.Ed.2d 312 (1986) (“[T]he focus of inquiry is on the circumstances and status of those harmed and not merely on whether the acts were committed during the disorder.”); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 523 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981) (discussing Ornelas). While seemingly harsh, there is something to be said for the traditional expansive view of a political offense, approved by the Ninth Circuit, in terms of modern conditions. It enables the courts to avoid such fuzzy issues as whether the “civilians” attacked were members of paramilitary forces. In the murky area of internal conflicts taking place all over the world the roles of the various parties are often unclear. Courts may compound their difficulties in dealing with extradition by engaging in such inquiries. Moreover, foreign governments may find it easier to reach out to this country for assistance in returning those who oppose their policies in what are contended to be civil wars of liberation against dictatorial governments. To enforce extradition orders under such circumstances may implicate our courts in grave injustices and cruel repressions. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 68 S.Ct. 836, 842, 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948). But charges can be trumped up by a foreign government no matter what the legal criteria. Some reliance on the alertness, good sense and bona fides of our State Department and our courts seems justified as insurance against abuse by foreign governments. On balance, we cannot say that the current State Department view is wrong as a matter of law or policy. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that as a corollary to limiting the protection of the political offense doctrine, there is the need for increased vigilance of the courts and expansion of their power of inquiry. This issue is discussed at some length in Section III, infra. The more restrictive definition of political offense currently favored by our government was embodied in In re Doherty, 599 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.1984), followed by Judge Korman. In that case Judge Sprizzo, excluding attacks on civilians from its protection, held that: [N]o act [should] be regarded as political where the nature of the act is such as to be violative of international law, and inconsistent with international standards of civilized conduct. Surely an act which would be properly punishable even in the context of a declared war or in the heat of open military conflict cannot and should not receive recognition under the political exception to the Treaty. Id. at 274. Judge Korman agreed. He found that the military “Rules of Engagement” provide a manageable limiting standard accommodating the principles of neutrality underlying the Treaty. Ahmad, 706 F.Supp. at 1042. The appropriate standard by which to define the political offense exception is the “Law of Armed Conflict,” the body of international law governing all armed conflict and all nations, rather than the Rules of Engagement, which a government establishes over the conduct of its armed forces at a particular time and place. Activities that could be prohibited under particular Rules of Engagement might be permitted under the Law of Armed Conflict. If the Law of Armed Conflict outlaws an act, the Rules of Engagement of a particular country cannot validate that act. An army should not be held guiltless if it vindictively slaughters civilians. Cf. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 799 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 271, 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986) (court accepts much of the criticism of its decision in Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.1957), vacated, 355 U.S. 393, 78 S.Ct. 381, 2 L.Ed.2d 356 (1958), in which it characterized as a political offense the killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians in concentration camps in Yugoslavia during the Nazi occupation). The Bible acknowledges that it would be wrong to punish the innocent in Sodom because of the guilt of their neighbors. Genesis 18:24-26. Cf. Association for Human Rights in Israel v. General, Central Command, H.C.J. 358/88, slip op. (July 30, 1989) (in cases involving army’s decision to demolish houses of those suspected of unlawful violent acts, Supreme Court of Israel finds that house residents have right of appeal); J. Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims 125 (1975) (It is “very significant” that an individual civilian “may not be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed.”). Developing international concern over the effect of hostilities on the innocent have led to an emphasis on protection of civilian non-combatants. See, e.g., J. Pictet, Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims 42, 124 (1975); Draper, The Implementation of the Modern Law of Armed Conflicts, 8 Israeli L.Rev. 1, 6 (1973). The “Law of Armed Conflict limitation” on the “incidence of violent political disturbance” test provides essential protection to society and is sound in light of our recent experience with international terrorists as well as “wars of liberation or self-determination.” Under the Law-of-Armed-Conflict limitation on the incidence test, a person opposing extradition must prove the acceptability of his or her offense under conventions governing military conduct in the course of armed conflict. Accepting arguendo that a petitioner was engaged in a war of “self-determination,” see Protocol I, supra art. 1(4), 16 I.L.M. at 1397, reprinted in Documents Supplement, supra, at 195, he or she must still demonstrate that the actions were consistent with Protocol I, which states in pertinent part: In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the'Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives. Protocol I, supra art. 48,16 I.L.M. at 1412. See also The Laws of Armed Conflicts (D. Schindler & J. Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988) (reprinting Protocol I, together with list and declarations of signatories); H. Levie, The Code of International Armed Conflict (1986) (cross-referencing Protocol I with related documents). Protocol I expressly prohibits attacks on individuals and groups of civilians. Protocol I, supra art. 51(2), 16 I.L.M. at 1413, reprinted in Documents Supplement, supra, at 202 (“The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.”). Article 50, id., defines “civilian” in reference to the Third Geneva Convention’s definition of “prisoners of war.” In relevant part, a civilian is anyone who is not a member of: “the armed forces of a Party to a conflict, as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces,” or “other militias and ... other volunteer corps” that are “commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates,” have “a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance,” “carry arms openly,” and “conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.” Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Signed at Geneva, 12 August 1949 arts. 4A(1), 4A(2), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138, reprinted in Documents Supplement, supra, at 187. International covenants, including those like Protocol I which the United States has not ratified, are neither self-executing nor binding on the United States. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373-76 (7th Cir.1985) (U.N. Charter and Helsinki Accords); American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F.Supp. 756, 768-72 (N.D.Calif.1989) (Third Geneva Convention). They do, however, often represent a developing consensus about substantive and procedural due process. See I International Comm, of the Red Cross, Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts 148 (expert notes that Protocol I rules prohibiting attacks on civilians are taken from customary law). American courts may take into account this consensus in interpreting their own Constitution and other laws. Cf. M. Prankel with E. Saideman, Out of the Shadows of Night: The Struggle for International Human Rights 37 (1989) (“[L]aw, especially international law, is not made only by treaties and statutes; it is also generated by the customary usage and beliefs of the civilized people of the world.”). Although the United States has not ratified Protocol I, its reasons stem from the Protocol’s characterization of wars of self-determination, see S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. iv (1987), and do not indicate disapproval of the Protocol’s protection of civilians. In fact, the United States delegation voted to approve the article of Protocol I dealing with the protection of civilians. See 3 H. Levie, Protection of War Victims: Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 164 (1980). The President signed and sent to the Senate for ratification Protocol II, see S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987), which states that in non-international conflicts, “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack.” Protocol II, supra art. 13(2), 16 I.L.M. at 1447, reprinted in Documents Supplement, supra, at 220. The international limitations on acceptable targets of warfare, designed to protect civilians may, for extradition purposes, be deemed embodied in the United States’ Constitution’s due process clauses. Most members of the United Nations have had episodes when its armed forces have beaten, killed, starved and otherwise mistreated civilian populations. This dreadful history of abuse does not justify such actions. The fact that members of national armed forces are seldom punished for such acts does not make them any less illegal. The law has an obligation not to recognize such dark brutality under either the rules of war or of civilian insurrection or political opposition. Were a civilian to detonate a bomb in a peaceful marketplace or rake peaceful shoppers with a machine gun to make a political point, this and most civilized countries would not consider such indiscriminate violence an unpunishable political act. Equally abhorrent would be the knowing and deliberate firebombing and machine gunning of a civilian bus. Nor, we assume, would any disciplined army condone such inhumane acts in time of war. See, e.g., U.S. v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 544, 48 C.M.R. 19, 29 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir.1975) (“An order to kill infants and unarmed civilians ... is ... palpably illegal.”). We recognize the anomaly of the widespread practice during war of blowing up whole cities by air raids and artillery attacks resulting in the wholesale killing of civilians, while condemning by law the deliberate killing of even one civilian. Yet the civilities of war that condemn face-to-face inhumanities do serve to enforce a minimum acknowledgment of the sanctity of life. It keeps alive the hope that the mass inhumanities of wars between and within nations will ultimately be controlled and eliminated. In a sense, to characterize an act as terrorism is to recognize its political nature while at the same time excluding it from the category of protected political crimes. See Comment, Terrorism, Ideology, and Rules of Law, 1 Touro J. Transnat’l L. 213, 255 (1988) (“[Terrorist acts are a category of politically motivated violence purposely directed at civilian targets.”); United States Dep’t of State Bull., Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987, at v. (1988) (“Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”); Forte, Terror and Terrorism: There is a Difference, 13 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 39, 42 (1986) (Terrorism is “the systematic and primary use of randomly focused violence by organized groups against civilian targets to effectuate a political objective.”); Larsehan, Legal Aspects to the Control of Transnational Terrorism: An Overview, 13 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 117,124 (1986) (“The hallmark of modern transnational terrorism is the ‘active’ use of violence in states not ‘directly’ involved in the conflict which results in ‘innocent’ persons becoming victims for ‘political ends.’ ”). See also Bennett, United States Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat International Terrorism, 7 Int’l L. 754, 754 (1973) (“[W]e have attempted to identify specific categories of offenses which, because of their grave and inhuman effect on innocent persons or because of their serious interference with the vital machinery of international life, should be condemned by states of every ideological alignment.”). Offenses that transcend the Law of Armed Conflict are beyond the limited scope of the political offenses the Treaty excludes as bases for extradition. To come within the “relative” political offense perimeter, petitioner must show that: 1) there was a violent political disturbance of such a degree as to constitute in effect a state of civil war; 2) the acts charged were incidental to the disturbance; and 8) the acts did not violate the Law of Armed Conflict. 2. Burden of Proof When the crime alleged is not political on its face, the Treaty uetween Israel and the United States explicitly places the burden of proof with respect to the political offense issue on the petitioner. Article VI of the Treaty provides in relevant part that extradition shall not be granted: [w]hen the offense is regarded by the requested party as one of a political character or if the person sought proves that the request for his extradition has, in fact, been made with a view to trying or punishing him for an offense of a political character. To satisfy this burden of proof, petitioner must establish the required elements of the relative political offense test. See Abu Eain v. Adams, 529 F.Supp. 685, 694-95 (N.D.Ill.1980) (the accused “must show the link between the crimes he allegedly committed and their relation to the political objective;” the burden does not shift to the government after there is evidence of conflict and membership in a political organization), aff'd sub nom., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 390, 70 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981) (agreeing with magistrate that “simply noting membership in the PLO, but not tying membership to the specific act alleged was insufficient to satisfy the burden petitioner must shoulder in order to invoke t