Full opinion text
DECISION KAY, District Judge. Plaintiff Bunny Kishaba claims she was constructively discharged by Defendants Hilton Hotels Corporation, dba Hilton Hawaiian Village (“Hilton”), and Earl McDon-ough because of her Asian race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1978) (“Title VII”) (Paragraph 37, First Amended Complaint). After reviewing all the evidence, arguments and memoranda of the parties, it is the decision of this Court that Plaintiff Kishaba has failed to establish either race discrimination or a continuous pattern of conduct that rendered her work environment so intolerable and discriminatory that a reasonable person in the same position would have felt forced to quit. While Mc-Donough may have been abrupt and treated employees poorly, there is no evidence that the Defendants treated any employee less favorably than others because of his or her race. In fact, in some ways McDon-ough gave Plaintiff more preferential treatment than other secretaries. In particular, Plaintiff has not shown that there existed aggravating factors such as a pattern or practice of disparate treatment and that any such treatment was racially premised. Plaintiff has failed to prove she was subjected to different or abusive working conditions because of her Asian race. In viewing the demeanor and testimony of all witnesses, as well as the other evidence, this Court finds that Plaintiffs testimony is not as credible as that of Defendants’ witnesses. The Court concludes that there was no constructive discharge nor violation of Title VII. This Court finds that Plaintiff’s longtime and loyal employment with Hilton was tragically ended by Plaintiff’s decision to resign as the result of her supersensitivity over the hiring of a second secretary to service McDonough, for which there were legitimate, non-discriminatory business reasons, and in her mistaken belief that Mc-Donough had pulled her file in furtherance of some plan to fire her. In view of this Court’s decision, the motions for dismissal of McDonough and concerning respondeat superior are moot. TITLE VII Section 703(a) of Title VII, provides: (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Plaintiff in the instant action has argued that Defendants treated her in a discriminatory manner because of her Asian race. She has proceeded, therefore, under a “disparate treatment” theory of Title VII liability. The disparate treatment theory, as distinguished from a “disparate impact” approach, applies where an employer has treated some person less favorably than others because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See International Bro. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-343, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854-859, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). In a disparate treatment case, “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.” Id. at 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. at 1854-855 n. 15 (1977); see also, Gay v. Waiters’ and Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.1982) (“By their very nature, these claims [disparate racial treatment] require proof of intentional discrimination.”) In United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983), the Supreme Court stated: The “factual inquiry” in a Title VII case is “[whether] the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.” (cite) In other words, is “the employer ... treating ‘some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’ ” Ai-kens, 460 U.S. at 715, 103 S.Ct. at 1482. The Teamsters Court established a two-prong analysis for disparate treatment cases. The Title VII plaintiff must establish (i) that there existed at the place of employment a “pattern or practice” of disparate treatment and, (ii) that such disparate treatment was “racially premised.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, 97 S.Ct. at 1854. Indirect Evidence of Discrimination As in any lawsuit, a Title VII plaintiff may rely upon either direct or circumstantial evidence to prove his case. Accordingly, intentional discrimination under a disparate treatment theory may be demonstrated through either direct or indirect, i.e., “circumstantial,” evidence. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. at 1481 n. 3. The trier of fact, therefore, “should consider all the evidence, giving it whatever weight and credence it deserves.” Ibid. By “direct evidence” is meant that evidence which, if believed, establishes the existence of a fact in issue without reliance upon inference or presumption. Black’s Law Dictionary, 413-14 (5th ed. 1979). By “circumstantial” or “indirect” evidence is meant evidence which, if believed, establishes the existence of a fact not directly proved through the medium of inferences drawn from those facts that are directly proved. Id. at 221. As applied to the instant case, therefore, direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, establishes discrimination without the need for further inference or presumption, whereas indirect evidence is evidence which, if believed, requires further inference from such evidence to establish discrimination. The landmark case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), created a series of shifting burdens of proof which is applicable to Title VII actions based upon either direct or indirect evidence. Plaintiff mistakenly assumes that McDonnell Douglas is inapplicable to a Title VII action involving direct proof of discrimination. What the Supreme Court actually prescribed is that “the McDonnell Douglas formula does not require direct proof of discrimination.” Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714, n. 3, 103 S.Ct. at 1481, n. 3, quoting, Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358, n. 44, 97 S.Ct. at 1866, n. 44 (emphasis added). It is apparent, however, that the Eleventh Circuit has distinguished Title YII actions involving direct evidence of discrimination from those involving indirect evidence by requiring a variation of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. That variation is discussed below. Under standard McDonnell Douglas analysis, the plaintiff has the initial burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36, 97 S.Ct. at 1854-855; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2375, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975); Gay v. Waiters’ and Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 694 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.1982) (“This initial burden of production ... is met upon a ‘showing of actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such action was based upon’ race or another impermissible criterion.”) Although McDonnell Douglas articulated a four-factor formula specific to the issue of discriminatory hiring, Plaintiff’s threshold burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination may be discharged by “an alternative presentation of evidence supporting an inference of discrimination.” Gay, 694 F.2d at 538; see also, Diaz v. American Telephone and Telegraph, 752 F.2d 1356, 1361 (9th Cir.1985); Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir.1989). Thus, while the McDonnell Douglas’ four-factor formula of discriminatory hiring is not required, the shifting burden of proof analysis is most commonly followed. Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1361. And the burden of establishing a prima facie case is not designed to be “onerous.” Id. By successfully establishing a prima fa-cie case of discrimination, the Title VII plaintiff thereby creates a “rebuttable ‘presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against’ him.” Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714, 103 S.Ct. at 1481. If the plaintiff is successful in establishing his prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the allegedly discriminatory action. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“Burdine”), quoting, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Finally, if the employer successfully rebuts the plaintiff’s prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence “that the employer’s purported reason for non-selection was ‘a pretext for invidious discrimination.’ ” Fragante, 888 F.2d at 595, quoting, Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-094. It is at this stage, however, that the rebuttable presumption established by the plaintiff’s pri-ma facie case “drops from the case” and “ ‘the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.’ ” Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715, 103 S.Ct. at 1482, quoting, Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, n. 10, 101 S.Ct. at 1095, n. 10. The Supreme Court clarified the impact of these shifting burdens of proof: The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 [101 S.Ct. at 1093]; see also, Gay, 694 F.2d at 537 (“The plaintiff in a Title VII disparate treatment case, like most civil plaintiffs, bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of discriminatory intent.”) Where a plaintiff alleges a pattern or practice of disparate treatment, [The plaintiff must] prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or “accidental” or sporadic discriminatory acts.... [he must] establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was the company’s standard operating procedure. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. at 1855. A “pattern or practice” exists where a “company repeatedly and regularly engaged in acts prohibited by the statute. * * * The point is that single, insignificant, isolated acts of discrimination by a single business would not justify a finding of a pattern or practice.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n. 16, 97 S.Ct. at 1855 n. 16, quoting with approval, 110 Cong.Rec. 14270 (1964). Plaintiff in the instant case has offered statistical evidence in support of her contention that Defendants regularly engaged in racial discrimination. Statistical evidence may be relevant in a Title VII disparate treatment case to establish a general discriminatory pattern in an employer’s hiring or promotion practices which would in turn be probative of the employer’s motive relevant to an inference of discriminatory intent regarding an employment decision at issue. Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1363. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s statistical evidence is of no probative value in the instant case because the analysis of Plaintiff’s statistician erroneously categorized Plaintiff as an “official and manager” and was otherwise flawed. Plaintiff has failed to meet even her threshold burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination through reliance upon either direct or indirect evidence. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to establish a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against her. Accordingly, there is no shift of the burden to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory action and this Court must hold that Plaintiff has not succeeded in proving Title VII liability on the part of either Hilton or McDonough. Direct Evidence of Discrimination Plaintiff has argued that a McDonnell Douglas shifting burden analysis is not appropriate where there exists “direct evidence” of racial discrimination. In support of her theory she relies upon a series of Eleventh Circuit cases that have in reality only modified the McDonnell Douglas analysis and have not, as Plaintiff has claimed, rejected the McDonnell Douglas analysis in toto. Moreover, as mentioned above, the McDonnell Douglas analysis is clearly not limited to only those Title VII actions wherein there exists only indirect evidence of discrimination; rather, McDonnell Douglas analysis is appropriate whether there exists direct evidence, indirect evidence, or some combination of the two. Plaintiff places primary reliance upon the Eleventh Circuit decision in Wilson v. City of Aliceville, 779 F.2d 631 (11th Cir.1986). It will be remembered that the McDonnell Douglas analysis requires a three-stage shifting of burdens from the plaintiff to the defendant and back to the plaintiff. By successfully establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the Title VII plaintiff creates a rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against her. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 714, 103 S.Ct. at 1481. The burden then shifts to the employer “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the alleged discriminatory action. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093, quoting, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. The defendant’s burden is merely one of production — no proof of the alleged legitimate business reason is required. Finally, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason proffered by the defendant was not its true reason, but was a mere pretext for discrimination. This analysis is appropriate whether there exists direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. Under the Wilson modification, where the plaintiff has direct evidence of racial discrimination, the defendant may not rebut plaintiffs prima facie case, and the resultant rebuttable presumption of discrimination, by merely articulating a legitimate reason for its actions. Wilson requires the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same decision or pursued the same course of action even absent the “impermissible factor” of discrimination. Wilson, 779 F.2d at 634. Plaintiffs argument for a different shifting of burdens in a case involving direct evidence of an impermissible motive receives some support from Justice O’Con-nor’s concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), a mixed motives case. In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor argued that the burden of proof in a disparate treatment case should shift to the defendant only where the plaintiff has demonstrated by “direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor" in an employment decision. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1804. O’Connor went on to say that: Where a disparate treatment plaintiff has made such a showing, the burden then rests with the employer to convince the trier of fact that it is more likely than not that the decision would have been the same absent consideration of the illegitimate factor. Id. at 1804. O’Connor’s argument, therefore, both supports and undermines Plaintiff’s position. While O’Connor agrees that a Title YII defendant’s burden should exceed that of the mere production of a legitimate business reason for the contested employment decision, she contends that there should be no shift of burden to the defendant until the plaintiff has established through the use of direct as opposed to inferential evidence that a Title VII violative factor was a substantial element in the contested employment decision. Even if this Court were to reject the clear mandate of the United States Supreme Court for Title VII analysis, as articulated in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, as well as clear Ninth Circuit precedent as stated in Gay v. Waiters’, 694 F.2d at 538, and adopt either the Wilson modification or Justice O’Connor’s model, plaintiff would still have failed to establish Title VII liability for either Hilton or McDon-ough. This is so because Plaintiff has not presented this Court with any direct evidence of racial discrimination. However, even if some of the evidence heard by this Court were construed to constitute direct evidence of discrimination, Plaintiff’s case must nevertheless fail because it is the holding of this Court that Defendants have successfully rebutted any possible presumption of racial discrimination, whether established by direct or indirect evidence, by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have taken any employment-related action that they implemented even absent the alleged unpermis-sive motive. This Court reaches the same conclusion as found in Fragante, i.e., “we have not been able to find even a hint of a mixed motive such as existed in Price Wa-terhouse. Instead, it appears that defendants were motivated exclusively by reasonable business necessity.” Fragante, 888 F.2d at 598. In order to prevail in a Title VII action, Plaintiff must establish (i) that there existed at the place of employment a “pattern or practice” of disparate treatment and, (ii) that such disparate treatment was “racially premised.” Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335, 97 S.Ct. at 1854. It follows from the discussion above, that Plaintiff has met neither of these requirements. Hostile Environment Even if Plaintiff herself was never the object of racial harassment, she might nevertheless have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such harassment was pervasive. See, e.g., Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 (D.C.Cir.1985), aff'd, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2404-405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (holding that harassment of women working alongside plaintiff was relevant to question of creation of environment viola-tive of Title VII — although Vinson was a sexual harassment case, the principles underlying a hostile environment theory are equally applicable in sexual harassment and racial harassment cases). The phrase “terms, conditions or privileges of employment” in Title VII has been recognized as “an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination.” Vinson, 477 U.S. at 66, 106 S.Ct. at 2405, quoting with approval, Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 2058, 32 L.Ed.2d 343 (1972). Title VII, therefore, provides employees with the “right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Vinson, 477 U.S. at 66, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. Plaintiff has cited Equal Employment, etc. v. Murphy Motor Freight, 488 F.Supp. 381 (D.Minn.1980), in support of her claim that a racially hostile environment existed in the executive offices in which she worked at the Hilton Hawaiian Village. Murphy articulated a two-pronged requirement for Title VII liability under a hostile environment theory. First, [M]ore than a few isolated incidents of harassment must have occurred. Racial comments that are merely part of casual conversation, are accidental, or are sporadic do not trigger Title VIPs sanctions. Murphy, 488 F.Supp. at 384 (cites omitted) (found Title VII violation where plaintiff subjected to “vicious, frequent, and reprehensible instances of racial harassment.”) Second, a Title VII claimant is required to demonstrate that the employer “ ‘failed to take reasonable steps to prevent racial harassment_Id. at 385, citing, Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F.Supp. 1138, 1191 (E.D.Pa.1977). The Supreme Court, however, has stated that there must exist some nexus between alleged improper conduct and a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Of course, ... not all workplace conduct that may be described as “harassment” affects a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment within the meaning of Title VII. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. Moreover, the “mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee” does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to violate Title VII. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d at 238, quoted with approval in, Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405, see also, Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.1977) (holding that employer’s occasional reference to plaintiff as “dago” and to other Italian-American employees as the “Mafia,” constituted isolated or sporadic derogatory ethnic comments as part of casual conversation that did not rise to level necessary for violation of Title VII). The Supreme Court has decided that for racial harassment to be actionable under Title VII, “it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the claimant’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’ ” Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405, quoting, Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.1982). While Plaintiff in the instant case has not proved the occurrence of a single incident that would rise to the level of the “vicious, frequent, and reprehensible instances of racial harassment” that were found in Murphy, more important, she has failed to establish the existence of any objective racially offensive statement or conduct either directed at herself or that occurred in her presence. Nor has Plaintiff established, as required by Vinson, some nexus between alleged improper conduct and a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Accordingly, this Court holds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated the existence of a racially hostile environment invoking Title VII liability. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE It is now well established in the Ninth Circuit that an employee who prevails in a Title VII action who resigned his employment may not receive backpay unless he was constructively discharged by his employer. Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381 n. 1 (9th Cir.1984), citing, Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825, 96 S.Ct. 39, 46 L.Ed.2d 41 (1975). According to the Ninth Circuit in Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir.1987) (Title YII action alleging constructive discharge): A constructive discharge occurs when, looking at the totality of circumstances, “a reasonable person in [the employee’s] position would have felt that he was forced to quit because of intolerable and discriminatory working conditions.” Watson, 823 F.2d at 361, quoting, Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381, (9th Cir.1984), and citing, Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 812 (9th Cir.1982), quoting with approval, Bourque v. Powell Electrical Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir.1980) (“a constructive discharge exists when ‘working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.’ ”). The “reasonable person in the employee’s position” test is an objective standard. Watson, 823 F.2d at 361, citing, Satterwhite, 744 F.2d at 1383 and Nolan, 686 F.2d at 814 n. 17. The Satterwhite decision explicitly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reliance upon the employer’s “intent” as being out of step with the weight of authority and the law of the Ninth Circuit regarding constructive discharge. Satterwhite, 744 F.2d at 1383, citing, Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825, 96 S.Ct. 39, 46 L.Ed.2d 41 (1975). The outcome of this objective test, therefore, must turn on the facts of each case. Watson, 823 F.2d at 361, quoting, Satterwhite, 744 F.2d at 1382. Moreover, in a bench trial, it is the district court judge who determines whether the facts of the case meet this objective standard: The determination whether conditions were so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify a reasonable employee’s decision to resign is normally a factual question left to the trier of fact. Watson, 823 F.2d at 361, citing, Lojek v. Thomas, 716 F.2d 675, 677, 689 (9th Cir.1983). The Ninth Circuit, however, has not left the trial judge without guidance in determining whether a plaintiff has met the “reasonable person” test. The Watson panel stated the generally accepted proposition that “a ‘single isolated instance’ of employment discrimination is insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of constructive discharge.” Watson, 823 F.2d at 361, citing, Nolan, 686 F.2d at 813-14 (held that evidence of four incidents of differential treatment over two years was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact for trial); Satterwhite, 744 at 1381-82 (“courts which have considered the question [of constructive discharge] are reluctant to predicate a finding of constructive discharge solely on the fact of employment discrimination.”); see also, Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir.1981) (holding that the mere fact of discrimination sans aggravating factors would not sustain a constructive discharge action). In order to prevail in a Title YII constructive discharge action, therefore: [A] plaintiff alleging a constructive discharge must show some “ ‘aggravating factors,’ such as a ‘continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment.’ ” Watson, 823 F.2d at 361 (emphasis in original), quoting, Satterwhite, 744 F.2d at 1382. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has upheld findings of constructive discharge in circumstances wherein plaintiffs have established the existence of incidents of differential treatment that spanned a period of months or years. See, e.g., Wakefield v. NLRB, 779 F.2d 1437, 1439 (9th Cir.1986) (a variety of discriminatory incidents occurred over two year period of time culminating in a physical assault upon plaintiff by agents of the employer); Satterwhite, 744 F.2d at 1383 (employer refused to promote black “casual employee” to permanent position thereby preventing him from gaining access to training and any hope of advancement; employer regularly promoted white men above plaintiff whom plaintiff was forced to train; plaintiff relegated to spending disproportionate amount of time performing dull and demeaning tasks); Nolan, 686 F.2d at 813 (reversing district court’s grant of employer’s motion for summary judgment because: plaintiff deprived of participation in employer’s education program; senior agent of employer discriminatorily refused to provide plaintiff with required evaluations; inaccurate personal evaluation from another agent of employer that was discriminatorily motivated; discriminatory-retaliatory assignment to position not requested by employee); Watson, 823 F.2d at 361-62 (discriminatory notice to plaintiff of potential relative rule violation; employer conspired to create trumped up charges of inadequate job performance where plaintiff had history of excellent employment ratings; discriminatory subjection to abusive treatment and harassment; employer told plaintiff she was a poor and incompetent supervisor; supervisory duties transferred away from plaintiff; plaintiff told she was considered a “bitch” and that she could either resign or be demoted below her subordinate trainees); Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 841-42 (9th Cir.1986) (a Fair Labor Standards Act ease finding constructive discharge where employee was physically threatened, harassed for two weeks, and not given sufficient work assignments). In the instant case, Plaintiff has not even met her initial burden of demonstrating any level of employment discrimination on the part of Defendants. On the contrary, corroborated evidence has been heard by this Court in support of finding that McDonough actually discriminated in favor of Plaintiff rather than to her detriment. Moreover, there have been presented to this Court no “aggravating factors” of any kind and certainly none that would rise to the level of the factors that existed in Wakefield, Satterwhite, Nolan, Watson, and Ford. Accordingly, this Court holds that Plaintiff was not constructively discharged from her employment. Attorney’s Fees Defendant has requested an award of attorney’s fees.. Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) provides that a court may allow payment of attorney’s .fees to the prevailing party in a Title VII action. Payment of attorney’s fees, however, lies within the sound discretion of the district court and should be awarded only where the plaintiff’s case was so meritless and vexatious as to warrant such payment. [A] district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. * * * Hence, a plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so. And, needless to say, if a plaintiff is found to have brought or continued such a claim in bad faith, there will be an even stronger basis for charging him with the attorney’s fees incurred by the defense. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412, 421-22, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). Although it is held herein that Plaintiff has failed to establish Title VII liability on the part of either Hilton or McDonough, this Court does not conclude that Plaintiff’s action was frivolous, unreasonable, without foundation, or that it was brought in bad faith. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for an award of attorney’s fees is hereby denied. This decision is further based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be entered herein. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.558 I.INTRODUCTION.559 II.FINDINGS OF FACT.559 III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.574 IV. ORDER.582 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGE NOS. Bodnar v. Synpol, 843 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.1988).575, 579 Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir.1985).576, 579, 580 Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.1977).576, 581 Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 431 U.S. 412 (1978).582 Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Div.), 437 F.Supp. 1138 (E.D.Pa.1977).580 EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir.1989).574 EEOC v. Murphy Motor Freight, 488 F.Supp. 381 (D.Minn.1980).'..580 Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835 (9th Cir.1986).577, 582 Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.1989).577 Gay v. Waiters and Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, 694 F.2d 531 (9th Cir.1982).577 Grant v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 638 F.Supp. 1528 (S.D.N.Y.1986).574 Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.1982).581 Hollcroft v. Dept. of Treasury, I.R.S., 687 F.Supp. 510 (E.D.Cal.1988).576 International Broth, of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).582 Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170 (10th Cir.1982).576, 579 Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir.1981).576, 579 Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 768 (1989).576 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).-....577 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).574, 575, 577, 578, 580, 581 Miles v. M.N.C. Corp. 750 F.2d (11th Cir.1985).575 Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.1982).577, 582 Pejic v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 840 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.1988).575 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, — U.S. —, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989).577 Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.1971).578, 581 Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir.1984).574, 577, 578, 579, 582 CASES PAGE NOS. Schuler v. Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 793 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.1986).575 Staton v. Maries County, 868 F.2d 996 (8th Cir.1989).574 Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 1989).574 Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).575, 577 United States Postal Services v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).575 Wakefield v. NLRB, 779 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir.1986).577, 582 Watson v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 823 F.2d 360 (9th Cir.1987).574, 575, 577, 578, 579, 582 Wilson v. City of Aliceville, 779 F.2d (11th Cir.1986).575 Young v. General Foods Corp., (1989).575 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ^ c— LO 28 U.S.C. § 1391 ^ u-LO Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) ^ ^ c- t- 00 lo lO lO OTHER AUTHORITIES Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed., 1979) 575 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER I. INTRODUCTION Based upon the Court’s review of the record, pleadings, evidence, memoranda, argument, and having had an opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of the witnesses, the Court finds and concludes, as stated below, that Plaintiff, Bunny Ki-shaba has not met her burden of proving the merits of her Title VII action or that she was constructively discharged. II. FINDINGS OF FACT The Court makes the following findings of fact: 1. If any of the findings of fact are determined to be conclusions of law, they shall be so treated, notwithstanding their inclusion here as a finding of fact. 2. Plaintiff Bunny Kishaba (“Kishaba”) is a resident of Honolulu, Hawaii. 3. Defendant Earl McDonough (“Mc-Donough”) is a resident of Tarrytown, New York. Defendant Hilton Hotels Corporation (“Hilton”) is a California corporation. Hilton is engaged in the ownership and operation of hotels including, inter alia, the Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel (“Village”) located in Honolulu, Hawaii. 4. Kishaba was employed at the Village from November 1968 to March 3, 1987. Kishaba resigned her employment on February 17,1987, effective March 3,1987. At the time she resigned, Kishaba was employed as the senior Executive Secretary to McDonough. In her letter of resignation, Kishaba did not state any reason for her resignation (Plaintiff’s Exhibit, hereafter “PX,” 34). At no time prior to her resignation, did Kishaba complain to McDonough that his conduct toward her was racially discriminatory or unwelcome. Nor did Ki-shaba complain to McDonough’s superiors at Hilton with whom she had a personal acquaintance and frequent contact. 5. McDonough was employed by Hilton as its Senior Vice President for the Hawaii Region and Managing Director of the Village from April 1, 1984 until his retirement on November 1, 1988 due to ill health. 6. During 1982, Kishaba suffered a nervous breakdown requiring hospitalization which resulted in a loss of her short term memory. After a two week absence, Kishaba resumed her duties as Executive Secretary to then Senior Vice President for the Hawaii Region, Don Madsen (“Mad-sen”). Kishaba continued working for Madsen until his retirement on March 31, 1984. Madsen was very solicitous of Ki-shaba after her nervous breakdown and made concessions regarding her work load and work pace to accommodate Kishaba (Madsen Depo. at 72-74). 7. In her sworn statement to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and in her subsequent February 24, 1989 sworn affidavit submitted in this action by her legal counsel (“affidavit”), Kishaba stated that she resigned because she thought she was going to be fired or transferred to another job, and not because of McDonough’s alleged race discrimination (PX 37 at ¶ 2; PX 39A at 1110; Defendants’ Exhibit, hereafter “DX,” 29 at ¶ 19). As Kishaba noted in her March 10, 1987 letter to Barron Hilton, she resigned to avoid having her reputation discredited by the termination which she believed was forthcoming. (PX 38, p. 2) 8. Prior to arriving in Hawaii, McDon-ough was the Senior Vice President for Hilton’s Western Region where he supervised an expansion from 8 to 15 hotels and a renovation of several of the original hotels. While in charge of the Western Region, McDonough often visited Hawaii and developed a fondness for Hawaii. Accordingly, when the Hawaii Region became available in 1984, he applied for the position. Hilton selected McDonough to replace Madsen and oversee a substantial expansion of Hilton’s business activities in Hawaii, including the creation of two new hotels (the Turtle Bay Hilton and Country Club and the Kauai Resort and Beach Villas) and a $100 million dollar reconstruction of the Village (the “Master Plan”). The Master Plan was a major undertaking by Hilton to upgrade the Village from the class “B” hotel McDonough believed it had become over the years, to a class “A” resort. The Master Plan included a complete reconstruction of the Village, as well as the hiring and training of several hundred additional employees. 9. McDonough met with Kishaba, shortly after arriving in Hawaii. During their meeting, McDonough told Kishaba he was happy to be in Hawaii and informed her that Hilton’s substantial expansion of activities in Hawaii, including the Master Plan, would significantly add to their duties. McDonough also explained he was a hands-on manager whose style of work involved extensive dictation requiring a secretary with strong grammar and composition skills. McDonough told Kishaba that Mad-sen informed him of her previous nervous breakdown and loss of memory, but Mc-Donough believed having her as his secretary would be an asset because of her years of service and familiarity with the local community and customs. 10. Kishaba shared with McDonough her concerns as to whether she could both cope with the increased work load in view of her previous nervous breakdown and short term memory loss and also adjust to McDonough’s different work style. Mc-Donough encouraged Kishaba to stay on as his Executive Secretary and see if she could do the job. He stated that he would give her assistance and she should set up procedures to cope with the work load. Kishaba agreed to stay on as his Executive Secretary. 11. During McDonough’s entire tenure in Hawaii, the Executive Office staff was a multi-racial group of Caucasians, Asians, and Pacific Islanders. When McDonough assumed his position on April 1, 1984, the Executive Office was located in the Ocean Tower and included the Senior Vice President (McDonough) and the Regional Director of Sales (Fred Samo). The clerical staff included Kishaba (Asian); Tina Cain, Sarno’s secretary; and Joyce Hurst (Caucasian), the receptionist and part-time secretary to the Regional Director of Leasing who was located in another office, Pat Stone. By the time McDonough retired in 1988, the Executive Office had grown to include three managers and five secretaries: the Senior Vice President, the General Manager, the Resident Manager, and their respective secretaries, Sheila Stimmel (Caucasian), Eleanor Jackson (Asian/Pacific Islander), Gladys Inamine (Asian), Charlene Lee (Asian), and the Resident Manager’s secretary. After Kishaba resigned, McDonough replaced her with Janet Matsu-ko (Asian). When Matsuko resigned to accept a better paying position, McDonough hired Eleanor Jackson (Asian/Pacific Islander). 12. During McDonough’s tenure, the work load in the Executive Office was constantly increasing as the new hotels became fully operational and the Master Plan moved into high gear. McDonough’s hands-on management style necessitated more meetings (e.g., monthly Department Head meetings became weekly meetings) and correspondence (e.g., copying McDon-ough on all department head correspondence), which in turn resulted in more dictation, typing, filing, and scheduling for Kishaba. Kishaba was not able to cope with the increased work load. The office was in disarray. There were files stacked everywhere, documents waiting to be filed, and dictation to be transcribed. As a result, McDonough was often sent to “wing it” at meetings with incomplete files. He was forced to either borrow files from other managers or in some instances, cancel the meeting. He was also confronted by visitors with appointments that had never been noted on his calendar. 13. McDonough tried to help Kishaba cope with the increasing work load. Initially, he moved the General Manager and his secretary into the Executive Office and reassigned Hurst to Kishaba full time to provide more secretarial help. When the backlog persisted, McDonough authorized the hire of a temporary secretary to work Saturdays to assist Kishaba with her work load. Yet, the backlog persisted so McDon-ough suggested that Kishaba adopt the Sales Office’s filing system and told her to transfer the “Red Border” (V.I.P. reservations) procedures to the Front Office to lessen the work load. McDonough also tried using speed memos rather than dictating all correspondence. Despite these efforts, Kishaba still could not keep up with the increasing work load and fell further behind. The files continued to pile up around the office. McDonough continued to attend meetings and try to respond to inquiries from his superiors with incomplete files or without any files at all. 14. So again, to assist Kishaba, McDon-ough instructed her to hire a full-time assistant, but at the same time, refused to hire an assistant for the General Manager’s Caucasian secretary, Beverly Stratton (“Stratton”). Kishaba hired Brenda Sur-Matsui (“Sur-Matsui”) (Asian), as her assistant, with the job title of Correspondence Secretary. At the same time, Rhonda Hartney (Caucasian) was hired as a receptionist replacing Hurst. McDonough retained Sur-Matsui upon the completion of her probationary period, but terminated Hartney, whom he felt was not qualified. After a few months, Sur-Matsui transferred to another position outside the Executive Office and was replaced by Candis Chang (“Chang”) (Asian). When Chang transferred to another position, she was replaced by Marty Anderson (“Anderson”) (Caucasian). 15. Even with the help of a second full-time secretary (i.e., Sur-Matsui, Chang, and finally, Anderson), Kishaba still could not cope with the increasing Executive Office work load. Indeed, McDonough originally authorized the hire of Anderson in late August 1985 as a temporary secretary while Chang served as Kishaba’s regular full-time assistant, in order to provide additional manpower to help Kishaba catch up. During Anderson’s entire tenure, the files were still stacked throughout the office and McDonough’s dictation was still backlogged. 16. In November 1985, McDonough asked Ted Baird (“Baird”), the Director of Human Resources, to find a replacement for Chang, who was being transferred because her secretarial skills were inadequate (PX 18). When Baird screened applicants for the Executive Secretary position, he determined that Anderson was the best qualified. Anderson initially refused to take the job if she, like Chang, had to report to Kishaba. Anderson believed Ki-shaba deliberately harassed her and sought to undermine her work and therefore conditioned acceptance of the job upon only working directly for McDonough. McDon-ough initially agreed to Anderson's demand and Anderson was hired as General Executive Secretary. When Kishaba learned that Anderson would report directly to McDon-ough, she complained, and McDonough then instructed Anderson to report to Ki-shaba. Rather than resign, Anderson reluctantly agreed to work under Kishaba. 17. Despite Anderson’s presence, however, Kishaba still could not keep up with the increasing work load. McDonough was frustrated at the continued inability of the Executive Staff to keep abreast of his work load, especially with filing and dictation. McDonough believed that the backlog was due in part to Kishaba’s failure to delegate work to other Executive Office staff and Kishaba’s insistence upon using her own coding system for filing documents. The other secretaries found the coding system unintelligible and unworkable and, therefore, had to wait for Kishaba to code the documents before they could help her file. Kishaba was also backlogged because she first typed McDonough’s dictations in draft, rather than typing a final directly from the dictation. 18. In order to break the filing logjam caused by Kishaba’s coding system, Mc-Donough assigned Robert Strom (“Strom”), a hotel operations analyst, to design a workable master filing system for the office. McDonough originally assigned Strom to the task in March 1986, but then told him to hold off after Kishaba made an emotional appeal for another chance to develop a workable system. McDonough’s agreement to afford Kishaba an opportunity to establish a “workable” central filing system was reflected in her April 1986 Performance Review (PX 28). 19. The Performance Review contains McDonough’s overall rating of Kishaba’s performance as Exceeds Requirements, a “B” rating, while also noting that Kishaba had problems in managing the Executive Office’s heavy work load. McDonough believed that the overall rating was warranted because Kishaba was extremely effective in handling confidential information, as well as dealing with guest complaints, department heads, and corporate executives. At the same time, McDonough also reiterated his prior oral advice to Kishaba that she needed to delegate more of her clerical duties because of the increasing work load. Kishaba also acknowledged in the Performance Review the need to improve Executive Office efficiency and productivity, create a “workable” master filing system, and organize McDonough’s daily operations. 20. Kishaba’s difficulty in coping with the work load was exacerbated by her conflicts with Anderson and Stratton. Anderson and Stratton described Kishaba as emotionally unstable, disorganized, petty, and “out of her depth.” Gladys Ina-mine (“Inamine”) (Asian) also described Ki-shaba as overly sensitive and unstable. Stratton and Anderson described several incidents in which they believed that Kisha-ba harassed them or tried to undermine their work. These included, inter alia, highlighting their mistakes on documents which would be seen by McDonough and placed in office files; persuading McDon-ough to deny Anderson compensatory time off to visit her sick mother; refusing to help Stratton or to permit any of her assistants to do the same; assigning Stratton to answer Strom’s telephone calls; and writing demeaning statements on Anderson’s mail (DX 18, 20, 21). Kishaba denied harassing Stratton and Anderson and insisted instead that Stratton and Anderson were overly sensitive and misunderstood her motives. 21. The conflict and rivalry between Ki-shaba and Anderson/Stratton, combined with the continued office backlog and disarray, came to a head in early February, 1986. McDonough had again been sent to a department meeting (i.e., the Laundry Department) only to find that his file was missing critical documents. He cancelled the Laundry Department meeting in great embarrassment. Upon returning to the Executive Office, he convened a meeting with the entire staff and once again implored in frustration, “Why can’t you people organize my files?” and instructed them to establish a workable system. The next day, Stratton and Anderson approached Ki-shaba and told her they were ready to work with her on a filing system. Kishaba replied that she was too busy and “when Mr. McDonough tells her these things, she just nods and then comes out of the office and does it her own way.” Kishaba then told them to return to their desks and leave things the way they were. Kishaba’s recollection was only slightly different. Kisha-ba claims she told Stratton and Anderson that she would do coding and if they caught up with the filing, McDonough would forget his directive to devise a new filing system. Stratton and Anderson prepared a memorandum reflecting this incident for Baird, whom they hoped would help resolve their conflict without involving McDonough (DX 19). 22. Instead of handling the matter himself, however, Baird took the memorandum to McDonough. McDonough called Kisha-ba into his office and showed her the memorandum. He was critical of Kishaba for the continued dysfunctioning of the office and stated that he was going to hold a meeting with the three secretaries to resolve their discord. Kishaba asked McDon-ough not to hold the meeting, but instead, let her resolve the problem with Stratton and Anderson. When McDonough refused, Kishaba grew distraught and left his office to regain her composure. She then decided to go home and skip the meeting because she believed McDonough would side with Stratton and Anderson. 23. When McDonough and Baird met with Stratton and Anderson, however, instead of siding with Stratton and Anderson, McDonough supported Kishaba to the “nth” degree. McDonough responded to Stratton and Anderson’s criticism by stating that he had to support Kishaba, who “has been here for 18 years,” and that Stratton and Anderson had to learn to work with Kishaba or leave. At one point, McDonough sharply admonished Stratton for criticizing Kishaba because “Bunny is not here to defend herself.” 24. McDonough’s support of Kishaba contributed to Stratton’s resignation on June 13, 1986, when McDonough refused to give her a raise in excess of the corporate policy ceiling after approving such a higher raise for Kishaba. Similarly, Anderson resigned in August 1986, when a secretarial job became available at Aloha Airlines. Because Kishaba was still behind in her filing and McDonough’s dictation, McDon-ough knew he had to hire another secretary after Anderson left. Yet, fearing a repeat of the Anderson experience if he hired another person who reported to Ki-shaba, he decided to create a second secretarial position equal to Kishaba, which reported directly to him. McDonough asked the Human Resources Department to find a qualified Executive Secretary. 25. During October 1986, McDonough hired Sheila Stimmel (“Stimmel”) (Caucasian), as his second Executive Secretary. Stimmel was recommended to McDonough by the Human Resources Department, which had screened the various applicants and selected Stimmel as among the most qualified. Stimmel was interviewed by Nancy Isenberg (“Isenberg”), the Director of Human Resources, and McDonough, both of whom told Stimmel she was hired to work alongside Kishaba as an equal. Stimmel was never told by Isenberg, Mc-Donough, or anyone else that she was hired to replace Kishaba, that McDonough planned to fire Kishaba, or that she would be senior to Kishaba in any respect. Mc-Donough told Stimmel he was hiring another secretary because the workload was too great for Kishaba alone and the job required someone with good communication and writing skills. McDonough was impressed with Stimmel’s success as Director of Communications for Liberty House, as well as her many years of residency in Hawaii. Prior hotel experience was unnecessary. McDonough offered the job to Stimmel and stated that he would assign work to her and Kishaba on an ad hoc basis initially, and then later evaluate the effectiveness and fairness of the allocation. Mc-Donough offered Stimmel an annual salary of $25,000 which was $1,250 less than Ki-shaba’s salary. After considering the offer for a day, Stimmel accepted. 26. Stimmel started work at the Village on October 6, 1986 and continues there to the present date. Stimmel observed Kisha-ba at work until mid-January 1987, when Kishaba left on sick leave and subsequently resigned. Stimmel and Kishaba performed the same basic secretarial duties (i.e., dictation, typing, filing, answering telephones). In addition, McDonough assigned Kishaba the opening of his mail and the marrying of correspondence with proper files, while Stimmel was charged with maintaining his calendar and expense accounts. Stimmel neither requested, nor was she assigned, less onerous tasks than Kishaba. Nor was Stimmel assigned more important or desirable tasks than Kishaba. Moreover, except for certain familiarization instructions (e.g., storage of certain files or materials, procedures for V.I.P. reservations), Kishaba neither provided training to Stimmel, nor offered Stimmel Kishaba’s alleged office procedures manual. The manual itself states on its first page that it belongs to Kishaba personally and that she authorized copies only for Lee and Sur-Matsui (PX 58). 27. Even after Stimmel’s arrival, Kisha-ba continued to insist on coding her own documents and resisted McDonough’s efforts to create a single centralized filing system. Kishaba’s insistence on maintaining a separate filing system for McDon-ough’s files, rather than integrating the files of all the Executive Office managers, prevented Stimmel and the other secretaries from helping Kishaba catch up on the filing of McDonough’s work. Stimmel described the Executive Office when she started working as “disorganized and littered with paperwork waiting to be filed”. Inamine, who ultimately replaced Stratton as the General Manager’s secretary, also described the Executive Office as “chaotic” and littered with files stacked everywhere on the floor, desks, and filing cabinets when she arrived in October 1986. Again, to help Kishaba cope with the filing backlog, McDonough held two staff meetings in November 1986 with Strom to organize the office and design an efficient centralized filing system (PX 23, 24). Despite Strom’s efforts and the November 1986 staff meetings, it was not until after Kishaba resigned that the Executive Office staff was able to centralize the files and create a workable master filing system. 28. During the three months they worked with Kishaba and McDonough, neither Inamine, nor Stimmel, ever observed or heard McDonough express a racial slur or other racially derogatory statement to or about Kishaba. Nor did Stimmel or Inamine ever see McDonough throw papers or any other objects at Kishaba. Stimmel did observe McDonough express anger and frustration with Kishaba on several occasions and speak to her in a frustrated or firm tone of voice which Stimmel believed was rude. Stimmel acknowledged, however, that McDonough used the rude tone of voice only when he became frustrated because Kishaba had failed to perform her work satisfactorily and never because of her Asian race. Stimmel and Inamine stated that McDonough used the same frustrated or angry tone of voice with them when they did not perform to his satisfaction. Stimmel and Inamine also testified that they heard McDonough use the phrase “you people” when expressing his frustration over the failure of the Executive Staff to resolve the problems with filing and his dictation. Stimmel and Inamine always understood that the phrase “you people” referred to the entire Executive Office staff, and not just Kishaba or persons of any one race. 29. Kishaba decided to resign in late January 1987, because of her excessive sensitivity to the hiring of Stimmel and triggered by her erroneous conclusion that McDonough had decided to fire her or transfer her to Assistant Manager which Kishaba believed would discredit her professional reputation and cause her humiliation (DX 29, ¶ 19). Kishaba’s belief that McDonough was planning to fire her is not based upon any probative evidence, but instead upon Kishaba’s speculation surrounding the following two events in mid-January 1987. On Friday, January 9, 1987, Kishaba was in McDonough’s office and saw her personnel file on his desk along with the files of several other employees. Kishaba immediately concluded that McDonough planned to take her file to a corporate meeting in order to discredit her as a prelude to discharge or transfer (PX 39A at 1110). In fact, McDonough was not taking her file to corporate headquarters to discredit her, but rather, to obtain suggestions from William McDonald, Hilton’s Senior Vice President for Human Resources, on how to help Kishaba cope with the office work load. McDonough left on Sunday, January 11, 1987 for the corporate meeting. As he was leaving, he told Peter Schall (“Schall”), Village General Manager, that he had decided to hire a full-time file clerk to help implement the new centralized filing system suggested by Strom at the November 1986 staff meeting. McDonough asked Schall to have the Human Resources Department screen applicants for the position. Because Kishaba was bogged down with filing, and perhaps not realizing Kishaba’s sensitivity about the matter, McDonough also told Schall to have Stimmel and Inamine interview the candidates referred by the Human Resources Department. McDonough left for his trip that evening and was not able to discuss his file clerk decision with Kisha-ba and the other Executive Staff when they returned to work on Monday morning, January 12. Instead, when the secretaries reported to work on Monday, Schall asked Stimmel and Inamine to interview the candidates referred by the Human Resources Department. Kishaba insisted the meeting between Schall, Inamine and Stimmel lasted 45-60 minutes; Stimmel and Inamine testified the meeting lasted 5 minutes. In any event, Kishaba concluded that assigning the file clerk interviews to Stimmel and Inamine ominously confirmed her conclusion on January 10, 1987, that McDonough planned to fire her. Kishaba left on sick leave at the end of the week, January 16, 1987, and never returned. Instead, she resigned on February 17, 1987, effective March 3, 1987. 30. McDonough never disciplined Kisha-ba during her employment as his Executive Secretary. In fact, McDonough gave Ki-shaba a favorable job performance evaluation. He also approved a wage increase which was the largest among the Executive Staff and exceeded corporate ceilings for Kishaba, who was the highest paid secretary in the Hawaii Region. Even after Kishaba gave notice of her resignation, Mc-Donough responded by letter dated February 27, 1987, offering Kishaba the opportunity to transfer to an Assistant Manager’s job at no reduction in salary if Kishaba could not cope with the stress and workload of her Executive Secretary position (PX 35). McDonough also stated in his letter that he would continue her employment even if she refused the offer of an Assistant Manager’s position (PX 35). Ki-shaba never replied to McDonough’s February 27, 1987 letter, and instead, filed a race discrimination charge with the EEOC and sent a letter to Barron Hilton. In her detailed EEOC filing and letter to Barron Hilton, Kishaba attributed her resignation to her belief that McDonough planned to fire or transfer her to another position because of his preference for Stimmel (PX 37, 38, 39A). At the trial, Kishaba also alleged several examples of harassment, many for the first time, which she now claims evince discrimination against her because of her Asian ancestry. These examples include statements and conduct of which Kishaba had personal knowledge pri- or to her resignation, as well as statements and actions of which she had no personal knowledge until after this action was filed. 31. The alleged discriminatory statements of which Plaintiff claims personal knowledge include statements referring to Kishaba, as well as statements referring to other Asian and non-Asian employees. The statements which Kishaba claims referred to her Asian ancestry include the following: The “You People”Statements. Kishaba stated that the first instance of a discriminatory “you people” statement occurred when McDonough arrived in Hawaii in April 1984 and allegedly told Kishaba, “I don’t know how you people run things down here, but I run a tight ship.” Kisha-ba conceded during cross examination that the “you people” who were running things in Hawaii prior to McDonough’s arrival were Madsen (Caucasian) and his management staff. Other “you people” statements included instances in which McDon-ough became angry or frustrated because of a mishap in the office and exclaimed “Why can’t you people do my work?”, or “I’ll get Robert Strom in here to teach you people how to do things right”, or “Why can’t you people get things organized?” The other secretaries (Stratton, Anderson, Stimmel, and Inamine) testified that McDonough frequently used the phrase “you people” in their presence as well. All understood the term to refer to the entire Executive Staff, which included both Asian and non-Asian employees. None of the secretaries believed the statement referred simply to Hawaii resid