Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OPINION CAHN, District Judge, Sitting by Designation. The plaintiff, General Offshore Corporation, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from this court, claiming that the Virgin Islands Wrongful Discharge Act, V.I.Code Ann. title 24, §§ 76-79 (Supp.1989) [hereinafter VIWDA], violates various portions of the United States Constitution made applicable to the Virgin Islands by the Revised Organic Act of 1954, 48 U.S.C. § 1561. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons below, this court grants the defendants’ motion insofar as it addresses a facial challenge to the VIWDA, and dismisses this action as unripe insofar as it mounts an “as applied” challenge. I. BACKGROUND This action stems from the Territorial Legislature’s enactment of Act No. 5227 on December 29, 1986. This act, the VIWDA, sets forth a list of reasons for which an employer might dismiss an employee. V.I. Code Ann. title 24, § 76(a) (Supp.1989). The Commissioner of Labor is also empowered to adopt other grounds by rule or regulation. V.I.Code Ann. title 24, § 76(b) (Supp.1989). Otherwise, only economic hardship, going out of business, or unprotected concerted activity can warrant discharge. V.I.Code Ann. title 24, § 76(c) (Supp.1989). An employee believing himself wrongfully discharged is given a choice of remedies. He may file suit in the appropriate court for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. V.I.Code Ann. title 24, § 79 (Supp.1989). Instead, or in addition, an employee may file a complaint before the Commissioner within thirty days of discharge. V.I.Code Ann. title 24, § 77(a) (Supp.1989). The Commissioner then serves the complaint and schedules a hearing, set for ten days after the complaint is served. V.I.Code Ann. title 24, § 77(b) (Supp.1989). The Commissioner may set forth the applicable rules of evidence. Id. If the Commissioner finds that the discharge is wrongful, he shall issue an order directing the employer to reinstate the employee with back pay. V.I.Code Ann. title 24, § 77(c) (Supp.1989). Such orders are appealable to Territorial Court. V.I.Code Ann. title 24, § 78 (Supp. 1989). On November 6, 1986, shortly before the statute was enacted, Gordon Martin II was hired by General Offshore. Complaint, Exh. A. He passed his probationary period, and received several satisfactory work appraisals. Id. However, on May 21, 1987, General Offshore fired him. Id. On June 8, 1987, Martin filed a complaint with the Commissioner, alleging that he was discharged because he was an active member of the Virgin Islands National Guard and hence that his discharge was wrongful. Id. The Commissioner sent a letter to General Offshore on October 7, 1987, which stated that Martin had filed a complaint alleging wrongful discharge with the Commissioner and that a copy of the complaint and a notice of hearing would be sent later. Complaint, Exh. B. On March 11, 1988, the Commissioner sent a copy of the complaint to General Offshore, along with a notice that a hearing was scheduled for March 23, 1988. Complaint, Exh. C. This hearing was later rescheduled for May 20, 1988. Complaint, Exh. D. After filing an objection to the hearing with the Commissioner (Complaint, Exh. E), General Offshore filed the complaint in this action. The administrative hearing has not taken place. The complaint contains three counts. Count I requests injunctive relief, stating that the VIWDA violates the Revised Organic Act of 1954 by impairing General Offshore's contractual obligations and effecting a taking of General Offshore’s property without due process of law, and that the Commissioner violates General Offshore’s procedural due process rights by failing properly to set forth regulations effecting the statute. Complaint, ¶¶ 17-22. Count II requests an injunction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. It states that the defendants have acted under color of law to violate General Offshore’s due process and equal protection rights and to impair General Offshore’s contracts. Complaint, Mi 24-25. Finally, Count III states that the defendants have impaired General Offshore’s contractual obligations, deprived General Offshore of its property without due process of law, and denied General Offshore its procedural due process rights. Complaint, ¶ 30. It also states that the VIWDA is preempted by federal labor law. Complaint, 11 31. It thus seeks a declaration that the VIWDA is unconstitutional. Complaint, ¶ 33. The ad damnum clause asks for an injunction barring enforcement of the statute until appropriate rules and regulations are promulgated and for a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional because it impairs General Offshore’s contracts, denies substantive and procedural due process, and effects a taking without due process of law. The clause asks for all appropriate relief, which presumably is both equitable and legal. The parties have since filed motions for summary judgment. This court’s jurisdiction rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a). One threshold matter needs to be addressed. The plaintiff earlier filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, based upon the procedural due process issues. In a later memorandum, the plaintiff stated that the motion had been denied, and that the court had stated that the procedural due process issues should be raised by a writ of review. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3. While this court does not question the accuracy of this statement, no order denying the motion was ever entered. Consequently, for the sake of completeness, this court shall briefly consider the motion here. To secure a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate: (1) a reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation and (2) that the movant will be irreparably injured pen-dente lite if relief is not granted. Moreover, while the burden rests upon the moving party to make these two requisite showings, the district court “should take into account, when they are relevant, (3) the possibility of harm to other interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction, and (4) the public interest.” West Indian Co. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 812 F.2d 134, 135 (3d Cir.1987) (per curiam) (quoting Professional Plan Examiners v. LeFante, 750 F.2d 282, 288 (3d Cir.1984)). Here the plaintiff, as the discussion below will demonstrate, has not shown a reasonable probability of success, at least on the facial challenges. While the as-applied challenge may prove successful, it necessarily must await administrative resolution. At this point, we simply do not know what regulations will be applied in the Martin hearing, or how they will be promulgated; as a result, a procedural due process challenge would be entirely speculative until the hearing takes place. In addition, in light of the findings below, enjoining the administrative process would significantly impair the public interest, as expressed by the legislature, in an efficient means of resolving wrongful discharge disputes. This court thus renders concrete Chief Judge O’Brien’s denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction. This obviates any need to consider the procedural due process issues below, espeically insofar as they were not raised in the briefing for the summary judgment motions. Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c). The court must construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tigg Corp. v. Dow Corning Corp., 822 F.2d 358, 361-62 (3d Cir.1987). The evidence so construed, though, the movant will prevail if there are no genuinely disputed issues that could support a verdict for the non-moving party and that would prove essential to the claim. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The facts stated, except where dispute is noted, are uncontradicted. Before this court can address the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, it must consider whether they are justiciable. Even where the defendants do not challenge this court’s jurisdiction, this court must do so itself. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138, 95 S.Ct. 335, 355, 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974); Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 535 (3d Cir.1988). After these threshold issues are resolved, this court will consider the substance of the motions for summary judgment. II. JUSTICIABILITY The defendants argue that the plaintiff’s claims are only partly justiciable. Relying upon the distinction between facial and as applied challenges to the constitutionality of a statute, they maintain that only the facial challenges to the statute are ripe for adjudication. Memorandum of Defendants Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 1-15. The plaintiff argues that the whole dispute is justiciable. Reply of General Offshore Corporation to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 19-22. Justici-ability has many components, which differ more in emphasis than in content. See, e.g., Solar Turbines, Inc. v. Seif, 879 F.2d 1073, 1080 (3d Cir.1989) (finality and ripeness substantially overlap); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 669 F.2d 903, 908 & n. 3 (3d Cir.1982) (finality and exhaustion serve same interests). The least specific component is standing, which focuses primarily upon the existence of a cognizable harm. The doctrines that remain generally take the existence of harm for granted, but direct inquiry to other aspects of justiciability. The pertinent doctrines here are ripeness, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and finality, which will be discussed after standing. A. Standing Standing has both Article III and prudential components. Warth v. Sel- din, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Article III requires that a suit present a “case or controversy.” Without this, a court has no power to entertain a suit; the federal courts are not empowered to issue advisory opinions. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361, 31 S.Ct. 250, 255, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.(a) (1792). This is also true for a declaratory judgment action. Although, by definition, declaratory judgments are sought in advance of the full harm expected, they must still not present “abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions.” Alabama State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 1389, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945) (Stone, C.J.). Article III thus requires the party seeking relief to show that it “has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.” Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 1148, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). The party must thus have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” as to warrant a federal court’s exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). In addition, the injury complained of must be “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Finally, the injury must be “likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1924, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); see also Whitmore, 110 S.Ct. at 1723; Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. at 3324. These requirements are met here. If the VIWDA is constitutional, it would raise General Offshore’s costs of doing business by restricting its ability to release employees and subjecting it to increased administrative expenses stemming from the hearing and judicial review clauses for those it does release if enforcement were likely. The Court has made clear that there is no case or controversy if a complained-of statute or regulation is not likely to be applied against the complainant. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494-96, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675-76, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 508, 81 S.Ct. 1752, 1758, 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961); see also Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834 F.2d 1163, 1170 (3d Cir.1987); Luis v. Dennis, 751 F.2d 604, 607-08 (3d Cir.1984). However, a threat of enforcement, even one “implicit in the attitude of the defendant,” is enough. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 257 F.2d 485, 490 (3d Cir.1958) (Maris, J.); see also Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 100 S.Ct. 1156, 63 L.Ed.2d 413 (1980) (per curiam) (threatened to secure injunction enforcing nuisance statute; held justiciable); Public Utils. Comm’n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 537-38, 78 S.Ct. 446, 449, 2 L.Ed.2d 470 (1958) (sought enforcement of rate statute; held justiciable); Railway Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93, 65 S.Ct. 1483, 1487, 89 L.Ed. 2072 (1945) (appeal from state declaratory judgment applying state statute to petitioner held justiciable). As the Court has phrased it, the plaintiff must demonstrate “a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979); see also Whitmore, 110 S.Ct. at 1724-25; Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. at 143, 95 S.Ct. at 358 (“ ‘One does not have to await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.’ ”) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593, 43 S.Ct. 658, 663, 67 L.Ed. 1117 (1923)). Here, the statute has already been enforced against General Offshore. The record also reflects a steady series of complaints filed with the Commissioner since the VIWDA was enacted. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for Preliminary Injunction at 4. Because there is a very real threat of enforcement, the case or controversy requirement of an injury in fact has been met. The remaining elements pose no difficulties. The injury is direct; with no statute, there would be no injury. Finally, a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, or an injunction prohibiting its use, would eliminate the alleged burden. This court thus has no difficulty in finding that the Article III requirements of standing have been met. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 661, 664-65, 107 L.Ed.2d 696 (1990) (standing to challenge franchise tax upheld). The defendants do not challenge this element of justiciability. Rather, they argue that the prudential requirements have not been met here for the claims that seek to void this statute as it is applied. Although the plaintiff addressed only the Article III component of standing in its briefs, this court will assume that this deficiency was not motivated by a desire to concede the issue, but, rather, by a misplaced overemphasis on the Article III aspects of this problem. Accordingly, the prudential questions require some discussion. The prudential factors are in place in part to insure that the courts not resolve issues better left to other governmental institutions or to the electorate. Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222, 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2932, 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974). Although the Constitution may not require courts to defer, principles of sound judicial administration and the proper role of the judiciary inform this area. The courts are sufficiently burdened with active disputes without reaching out to address inchoate or moot matters. Prudential considerations are especially important when a court is asked to render a constitutional opinion; while a court’s reading of a statute may be overturned by the legislature with relative ease, its reading of the Constitution may be altered only by the immensely difficult process of constitutional amendment, or, here, amendment to the Organic Act. The Court has thus developed a series of principles employed to avoid constitutional decision-making. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482-83, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The prudential concerns unique to standing doctrine do not bar adjudication here. Thus, for example, the vigor with which this case has been litigated amply demonstrates that it is not collusive. See, e.g., Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47, 48, 91 S.Ct. 1292, 1293, 28 L.Ed.2d 590 (1971) (per curiam); Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 255, 12 L.Ed. 1067 (1850). Likewise, there is no worry here that the plaintiff seeks to invoke the rights of another, so the thorny problems of constitutional jus tertii are irrelevant. There remains, however, one important obstacle to adjudication: the complaint before the Commissioner is unresolved. A court seeking to avoid constitutional deci-sionmaking might thus defer action until the Commissioner has acted, on the chance that a ruling for General Offshore might moot the dispute. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs Application for Preliminary-Injunction at 4 (70% of rulings for employer). This is a legitimate element of the prudential aspect of justiciability. CEC Energy Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 891 F.2d 1107, 1109 (3d Cir.1989). While this can be treated as an aspect of standing doctrine, its stress on the temporal attributes of adjudication suits it best to discussion under ripeness, exhaustion of remedies, and finality. B. Ripeness As Professor Davis has put it, “[t]he basic purpose of ripeness law is ... to conserve judicial machinery for problems which are real and present or imminent, not to squander it on abstract or hypothetical or remote problems.” 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 25:1 (1982). In this, it follows closely the purpose for standing doctrine. Ripeness, however, looks at whether the dispute is ready for adjudication, not whether it is genuine (a prerequisite to ripeness). The doctrine thus prevents “the courts ... from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way.” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); see also CEC Energy, 891 F.2d at 1109. The courts have laid down general principles for resolving ripeness problems, though the determinations are necessarily made case by case. As Abbott Laboratories, the leading ripeness case, instructs us, a court must “evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. at 1515; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 201, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1720, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983). The first point invokes a number of related factors. Where a decision would require extensive factual findings of the sort normally made by an agency in the course of its deliberations, the courts have held the dispute unripe. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 9-10, 108 S.Ct. 849, 856-57, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988) (takings claim unripe where agency had not yet supplied factual predicate); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 199-200, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 2123, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985) (same); Toilet Goods Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 165-66, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 1525, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967) (challenge to FDA regulations unripe where administrative hearing would set forth basis for regulations, supply factual basis of order); Wilmac Corp. v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 809, 812 (3d Cir.1987) (challenge to Medicaid regulation unripe where controversy rested upon factual issues). In contrast, purely legal or constitutional issues are generally fit for adjudication. See, e.g., Pennell, 485 U.S. at 11-14, 108 S.Ct. at 857-59 (due process and equal protection issue ripe); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81-82, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2634-35, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. 167, 171, 87 S.Ct. 1526, 1528, 18 L.Ed.2d 704 (1967); Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. at 1515; Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 588 F.2d 895, 903 (3d Cir.1978); L. Tribe, Constitutional Law § 3-10, at 80 (2d ed. 1988). These issues are even suitable for adjudication when the factual findings “would be useful,” but are not necessary. Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 201, 103 S.Ct. at 1720. The second point — whether the parties would suffer hardship if the court stayed its hand — also contains several interrelated elements. It must be clear that the plaintiff is in fact injured by the actions of which he complains, or, at least, that injury is threatened. See, e.g., Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 507, 92 S.Ct. 1749, 1755, 32 L.Ed.2d 257 (1972) (constitutional challenge to statute ripe when compliance costly); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 204, 79 S.Ct. 178, 179, 3 L.Ed.2d 222 (1958) (per curiam) (threatened enforcement of statute enough to allow challenge). Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 126-27, 93 S.Ct. 705, 713-14, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (no declaratory relief available for physician whose rights are not immediately threatened by state statute). Moreover, the harm complained of must be “immediate and significant.” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 153, 87 S.Ct. at 1517; see also, e.g., Felmeister, 856 F.2d at 537; Wilmac, 811 F.2d at 813; L. Tribe, § 3-10, at 82. If the plaintiff alleges adequate harm, though, the claims are ripe if delay would injure the parties. If, for example, the challenged statute or regulation is not enforced vigorously because its constitutionality is in question, prompt resolution would benefit both parties. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 154, 87 S.Ct. at 1518. The issues in this case are, by these standards, partially ripe for judicial resolution. The ripe aspect of this case is the facial challenge to the VIWDA’s constitutionality. By definition, a facial challenge is made in a factual vacuum; the court’s job is merely to determine whether the statute, however applied, is constitutional. Consequently, the issues presented in a facial challenge are purely legal, making whatever factual determinations the Commissioner could supply irrelevant. See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 46, 81 S.Ct. 391, 393, 5 L.Ed.2d 403 (1961). Moreover, the Commissioner could at best rule on whether Martin was wrongfully discharged and what back pay he would be owed. These areas are not germane to a constitutional challenge based upon a general impairment of employment contracts, as is the case here. Accordingly, the facial challenges meet the first part of the Abbott Laboratories test. The second part is also met. The harm complained of is not insubstantial. In economic terms, it amounts to the value of the plaintiffs loss of the ability to discharge its employees essentially at will. Besides the expense of the administrative proceedings, the plaintiff is exposed to potential liability for back pay awards and, in judicial proceedings, punitive damages. This court must add to these the chilling effect upon firing that this statute could engender. While the actual value of these is not before the court, and while determining it would be very difficult, this court concludes that, for the purposes of deciding whether the facial challenges are ripe, the harm is significant. The expense is also immediate, as the VIWDA has exerted its economic effect from its enactment. Finally, it is clear that a prompt decision would benefit both parties. If the VIWDA is facially unconstitutional, the plaintiff, and all other employers in the Virgin Islands, will not have to go through further proceedings. They will be able to make personnel decisions that they were hitherto reluctant to effect. If the VIWDA is facially constitutional, on the other hand, the employers can make permanent whatever temporary adjustments they may already have made. The Commissioner can also resolve all pending complaints without the uncertainty that now besets his actions. He, too, can make permanent the regulatory mechanism (for example, by promulgating formally the regulations that govern the administrative hearings). Finally, this court takes judicial notice of the cases raising similar issues that lay heavy upon its docket. All parties in those cases would be well-served if this court ruled on the facial constitutional challenge before it, thus obviating the need for the other facial challenges. Therefore, this court concludes that the facial challenges to the constitutionality of the VIWDA are ripe for adjudication. The as-applied challenges, however, are not ripe. Though it is true that the constitutional issues in question are not within the capacity of the Commissioner to resolve, the Commissioner can decide whether the specific discharge to which the statute would, the plaintiff argues, be unconstitutionally applied, was wrongful, and can set the back pay award. These facts are critical to the constitutional challenge; if there was no wrongful discharge, then the as-applied challenge is moot. CEC Energy Co., 891 F.2d at 1109. In addition, the specific grounds raised by the plaintiff require some factual development. The takings and impairment arguments require that the extent of the deprivation of property or the impairment of contract be determined. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n, 473 U.S. at 199-200, 105 S.Ct. at 3123. Finally, the procedural due process claims rely of necessity upon the process actually afforded the plaintiff; consequently, they must await administrative resolution. The second prong of the Abbott Laboratories test dictates the same conclusion. The likelihood of mootness undergirds this finding; since the Commissioner may well rule for the plaintiff, the plaintiff would not be unduly burdened by delay. Deciding an as-applied challenge would also not grant any great benefit to either party, because the facial validity of the statute could still be in question. In addition, the value of this single case is sufficiently low that a delay in judicial resolution will not cause substantial harm to either party. Given the strong policy of Ashwander and its progeny in favor of avoiding constitutional issues, and given the legislature’s strong interest in administrative resolution of wrongful discharge claims, it would be inappropriate for this court to hear the as-applied challenge before the Commissioner has addressed the underlying dispute. This dichotomy between facial and as-applied challenges is borne out by the case-law. An early case to this effect is Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). There the Court found that a pre-enforcement due process, equal protection, and takings challenge to a zoning ordinance was justiciable, even in the absence of any record of actual or threatened enforcement. In so holding, the Court said that: the attack is directed, not against any specific provision or provisions, but against the ordinance as an entirety. Assuming the premises, the existence and maintenance of the ordinance, in effect, constitutes a present invasion of appel-lee’s property rights and a threat to continue it. Under these circumstances, the equitable jurisdiction is clear. 272 U.S. at 386, 47 S.Ct. at 117-18. The Court specifically noted that the ordinance as applied might still be unconstitutional; that question, however, was not properly before the Court. 272 U.S. at 395, 47 S.Ct. at 121. More recently, the Court explicitly drew the facial/as-applied distinction when deciding whether disputes were justiciable. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981), the plaintiff brought a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, alleging that it effected a taking. The Court held that the takings claim was justiciable insofar as it presented a facial attack upon the statute. 452 U.S. at 295, 101 S.Ct. at 2370. However, an as-applied challenge would have to await the factual findings that would be made in an administrative hearing; in addition, the challenge might be mooted by the administrative proceedings. 452 U.S. at 294-95, 297, 101 S.Ct. at 2368-70, 2371. In a companion case, Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981), the challenges were rooted in the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Commerce Clause. Here, too, the Court held that the facial challenges were ripe. 452 U.S. at 330-31, 101 S.Ct. at 2386. However, because the statutory penalties had not yet been imposed, the challenges to them would have to await their application. 452 U.S. at 335-36, 101 S.Ct. at 2388-89. The Hodel cases, like the Ambler case, thus squarely support a distinction between facial and as-applied constitutional challenges for ripeness determinations. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this court finds that the facial challenges are ripe for adjudication, but that the as-applied challenges are not, and will not be until the Commissioner has ruled on the underlying wrongful discharge action. C. Exhaustion of Remedies Exhaustion of remedies doctrine, a more focused version of ripeness doctrine, concentrates on whether the complainant has availed itself of all the administrative remedies that the statute affords. As our Court of Appeals has observed, this rule rests upon three policy concerns. First, it shows deference to the legislative determination that an administrative tribunal should hear a dispute initially. Second, it respects administrative autonomy by preventing the courts from impairing administrative functions. Third, it fosters judicial economy by allowing an administrative tribunal to render the dispute moot, and by supplying a factual predicate for any future judicial proceedings. Republic Indus., Inc. v. Central Pa. Teamsters Pension Fund, 693 F.2d 290, 293 (3d Cir.1982) (Aldisert, J.); see also, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662-63, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969); LaVallee Northside Civic Ass’n v. Virgin Islands Coastal Zone Management Comm’n, 866 F.2d 616, 620 (3d Cir.1989); Facchiano v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 859 F.2d 1163, 1166-67 (3d Cir.1988). An extreme version of the rule appears in an early Supreme Court opinion: “[N]o one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.” Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 462-63, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938). This statement has, however, been qualified greatly by subsequent opinions. For example, in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975), the Court held that exhaustion would not be required when the only issue raised was the constitutionality of the statute; since the agency was not authorized to address the constitutional issue, there would be no loss of deference to an administrative body were a court to resolve it. 422 U.S. at 765-66, 95 S.Ct. at 2466-67; see also Public Utilities Comm’n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40, 78 S.Ct. 446, 450-51, 2 L.Ed.2d 470. (1958) (where only question is validity of administrative procedure, judicial relief available without exhaustion). The Court of Appeals has laid out three exceptions to the Myers rule, saying that: We have declined to require exhaustion when the challenged agency action presents a clear and unambiguous violation of statutory or constitutional rights, when resort to administrative procedures is “clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable injury,” or [3] when exhaustion is “futile.” Facchiano, 859 F.2d at 1167-68 (quoting Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 245 (3d Cir.1980)); see also, e.g., LaVallee Northside Civic Ass’n, 866 F.2d at 620-21; Flying Tiger Line v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 830 F.2d 1241, 1252-53 (3d Cir.1987); Republic Indus., 693 F.2d at 293; Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. EPA, 669 F.2d 903, 907-10 (3d Cir.1982). Whether to command that remedies be exhausted is ultimately a matter for “sound judicial discretion.” Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 620 F.2d 964, 970 (3d Cir.1980); see also Flavo-Rich v. Quinn, 18 V.I. 530, 533 (D.V.I.1981). As with the ripeness section above, this question is best addressed by looking at the facial and as-applied challenges separately. The facial challenges fall within the exceptions to the exhaustion rule of Myers. As in Salfi, the sole questions raised here are constitutional; allowing the agency to hear the claims will thus not resolve the questions raised here, and a judicial hearing will not infringe upon the domain of the Commissioner. Cf. Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544, 66 S.Ct. 712, 714, 90 L.Ed. 839 (1946) (where administrative agency empowered to determine whether contract within statutory purview, exhaustion required before court may make that determination); Cost Control Mktg. and Management, Inc. v. Pierce, 848 F.2d 47, 49 (3d Cir.1988) (per curiam) (declaration sought that plaintiff not within scope of statute; since agency could make that finding, no relief granted). Furthermore, the facial challenges are premised upon the assertion, difficult to deny, that the statute diminishes somewhat the value of all labor contracts entered into before it was enacted. They hence do not depend upon the outcome of any particular discharge; rather, they depend upon the impairment of General Offshore’s ability to discharge its employees and upon the generally lowered worth of its labor contracts. The legislature has not delegated this sort of dispute to the Commissioner to resolve, so the separation of powers would not be breached were the only body competent to decide it — this court — did so. In addition, the facial dispute would not be made easier to resolve were Mr. Martin’s discharge to be adjudicated by the Commissioner. The administrative record would not address the larger questions, such as the extent to which all contracts were impaired or their value taken, which the facial challenge presents. All the Commissioner can do is decide whether General Offshore was justified in discharging Mr. Martin and, if not, determine how much back pay Mr. Martin is owed. These questions are not unimportant, but they are irrelevant to the facial challenge. Finally, there is no chance that administrative adjudication might moot the facial challenge. All that it could do is moot the Martin dispute. Insofar as all other contracts are impaired, the Commissioner’s actions are irrelevant. Since the record reflects that the Commissioner does not always rule for the employer, there would remain a real threat of enforcement sufficient to overcome the justiciability threshold. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for Preliminary Injunction at 4. Consequently, the reasons behind the exhaustion doctrine are not served by deferring resolution of the facial challenge. Within the Court of Appeals’ rubric, requiring administrative exhaustion before hearing the facial challenges would subject the plaintiff to a futile process, because the administrative procedures afforded the plaintiff could not grant the plaintiff the relief sought. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 641 n. 8, 95 S.Ct. 1225, 1230 n. 8, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975) (no exhaustion required where plaintiff challenges statute that on its face bars relief); Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 625, 66 S.Ct. 445, 449, 90 L.Ed. 358 (1946) (no exhaustion required where remedy inadequate). The as-applied challenge presents quite another question. Because that focuses upon the discharge of one particular employee, a ruling for General Offshore could moot the dispute. Moreover, though the Commissioner cannot resolve the constitutional issues that the as-applied challenge presents, he can make them more concrete. The plaintiff can only complain of the manner in which the Commissioner has applied the statute and regulations after they have been applied. Thus, for example, a procedural due process claim can arise when a facially valid set of regulations is applied unfairly. Hence, the as-applied challenges must await administrative adjudication before this court may rule on them, should the dispute not have been rendered moot in the meantime. D. Finality Finality doctrine focuses upon whether the administrative action complained of is final; if not, judicial resolution must await final agency action, in order that the record may be made clearer, the agency may have the opportunity to refine its actual position without judicial disruption, and the agency may create an actual ease or controversy by inflicting an actual injury. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n, 473 U.S. at 193, 105 S.Ct. at 3120; Bethlehem Steel, 669 F.2d at 908-09. Thus, the Court has held that a complaint filed by an agency is not final agency action. FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 246, 101 S.Ct. 488, 496, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980); see also Solar Turbines, 879 F.2d at 1077, 1081 (notice of violation not final agency action). However, an agency's regulations are final agency actions. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. at 1515. Put generally, this court must consider “whether the process of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences will flow from the agency action.” Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71, 91 S.Ct. 203, 209, 27 L.Ed.2d 203 (1970). These determinations must be made “in a pragmatic way.” Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149, 87 S.Ct. at 1516. The facial/as-applied dichotomy is hence relevant here, for much the same reasons as for ripeness and exhaustion. For the facial challenge, the complaint focuses on the unconstitutionality of the statute per se, and so the final necessary act is the enactment of the statute. Whether the administrative hearing has taken place is hence not relevant, as such legal consequences as there are flow entirely from the existence of the statute. The test above is thus largely beside the point; judicial review would not disrupt orderly adjudication, because it proceeds indifferent to whether administrative adjudication exists in this or in any other case. However, the as-applied challenge depends upon just what the Commissioner does in the course of the administrative hearing. The Standard Oil case above precludes this court’s review on the basis of the bare existence of a complaint; even if that case had not been decided, though, the basic principles of finality law demonstrate that a court may not hear a challenge to an agency’s actions until the actions complained of are final. See, e.g., Virgin Islands Conservation Soc’y, Inc. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Land Use Appeals, 881 F.2d 28, 32 (3d Cir.1989) (petitions for rehearing render agency actions non-final); Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Brodka, 643 F.2d 159, 161 (3d Cir.1981) (remand for determination of attorney’s fees removes finality). Here the Commissioner has not determined General Offshore’s rights or obligations; it is thus difficult to speak of a final agency action. Consequently, the as-applied challenges would, at this stage, attack non-final proceedings. The plaintiff must therefore await finality. The result, given the disposition of the procedural due process claims, is thus the same as for ripeness and exhaustion of remedies: the facial challenges may be heard, but the as-applied challenges must await administrative resolution. This court shall thus dismiss the as-applied challenges for want of jurisdiction. They, along with the procedural due process challenge, may, if appropriate, be heard on a writ of review. This court shall now turn to the facial challenges to the VIWDA. III. FACIAL CHALLENGES A. Substantive Due Process In the first of the facial attacks, the plaintiff maintains that the VIWDA violates its rights to substantive due process, as protected by the Due Process Clause of the Virgin Islands Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. § 1561, by impairing its rights to contract freely. This argument is unavailing. The modern scope of the right to economic substantive due process is very limited. Courts begin with the principle that, as our Court of Appeals has put it, “the process of democratic political decisionmaking often entails the accommodation of competing interests, and thus necessarily produces laws that burden some groups and not others.” Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680, 687 (3d Cir.1980) (Adams, J.); see also, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424, 72 S.Ct. 405, 407, 96 L.Ed. 469 (1952). It is presumed that legislatures will have ample scope within which to advance the public good, and hence that courts will not look too closely upon legislative attempts to do so. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 1031, 10 L.Ed.2d 93 (1963); Day-Brite Lighting, 342 U.S. at 423, 72 S.Ct. at 407; In re Ashe, 669 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 1082, 103 S.Ct. 563, 74 L.Ed.2d 927 (1982). No longer is it appropriate for a court to evaluate the wisdom of a statute by its own lights; rather, it is for the legislature, using whatever standards it chooses to adopt, to find a proposed statute wise or unwise. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124-25, 98 S.Ct. 2207, 2213, 57 L.Ed.2d 91 (1978); In re Ashe, 669 F.2d at 111. As Justice Douglas phrased it, “[t]he day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.” Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). The courts have thus fashioned an extremely relaxed test by which economic regulations are tested for substantive due process violations. For a regulation to be upheld, it need only be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 124-25, 98 S.Ct. at 2213; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hallowell, 816 F.2d 907, 912 (3d Cir.1987); Rushton Mining Co. v. Morton, 520 F.2d 716, 721 (3d Cir.1975). Moreover, the challenger must establish that the legislature could have had no rational basis, or that the legislation was wholly unrelated to any legitimate state goal. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. at 15, 96 S.Ct. at 2892; Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124, 1129 (3d Cir.1988); Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1035 (3d Cir.1987). It is not enough to show that the legislation is unlikely to promote the announced end, or that it is otherwise imprudent; as noted above, “it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation.” Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 729, 83 S.Ct. at 1030. Unless the challenger shows that the challenged regulation is a wholly arbitrary abuse of governmental power, the regulation must stand. Harrah Indep. School Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194, 198, 99 S.Ct. 1062, 1064, 59 L.Ed.2d 248 (1979) (per curiam); Bello, 840 F.2d at 1129. The plaintiff has failed to meet this daunting standard. The object of this legislation — regulating the conditions of the workplace — is well within the “broad and inclusive concept” of public welfare that a legislature may act to advance. Day-Brite Lighting, 342 U.S. at 424, 72 S.Ct. at 407; see also, e.g., Lincoln Fed’l Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536, 69 S.Ct. 251, 257, 93 L.Ed. 212 (1949) (working conditions regulable). Indeed, statutes that regulated wages and hours were held constitutional even at the high-water-mark of substantive due process protection for business. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S.Ct. 324, 52 L.Ed. 551 (1908). Were it otherwise, the National Labor Relations Act, among others, could hardly be constitutional. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937). The purpose of the VIWDA is inherent in the legislation, and the legislative history appended to the defendants’ memorandum in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment supports this obvious inference. For example, some legislators were concerned about employment discrimination against native Virgin Islanders. Defendants’ Memorandum Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment Exh. A at 11-12, 13-14 (statement of Sen. O’Bryan); id. at 19-20 (statement of Sen. Redfield). Others supported the VIWDA because of more general concerns about unreasoned discharge. Id. at 14 (statement of Sen. Bell). Yet other senators expressed dismay that, under then-current law, an employer could fire its employees for socializing with patrons after work hours. Id. at 6, 8 (statement of Sen. Bryan); id. at 18 (statement of Sen. Bell). These concerns are all within the broad and inclusive powers of the legislature. This portion of the substantive due process analysis hence does not aid the plaintiff. Neither is this legislation demonstrably irrational, given these interests. Once the legitimacy of protecting employees from wrongful discharge is accepted, this statute is necessarily a rational attempt to address the legislative concern. It sets forth a long list of reasons for which discharge is acceptable, and proscribes all others, barring a showing of economic hardship, unprotected concerted activity, or business closure. V.I.Code Ann. title 24, § 76 (Supp.1989). Furthermore, it creates a two-tiered system of administrative and judicial remedies. V.I.Code Ann. title 24, §§ 77-78 (Supp. 1989). Though it may not be the ideal system in all respects, and though General Offshore may argue that it is insufficiently solicitous of the welfare of an employer, the scheme seeks to advance its object in a manner that cannot be said to lack all vestiges of rationality. Here, too, General Offshore loses. Ultimately, General Offshore’s arguments about impairment of contract and substantial harm done to business expectations, even if true, are simply beside the point under this type of analysis. As the Court put it, “legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations.” Turner Elkhorn Mining, 428 U.S. at 16, 96 S.Ct. at 2893. Such arguments are more appropriate for Takings Clause or Contracts Clause challenges, which are discussed below. Here, they can only be construed as invitations to re-enter the age of Lochner and its progeny — an invitation that this court cannot, and will not, accept. The facial challenge under substantive due process is denied. B. Equal Protection General Offshore maintains that the VIWDA violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the Virgin Islands by the Organic Act. The statute does so, it is argued, because it places impermissible burdens upon the class of employers, as opposed to the class of employees. Like the substantive due process claim, this one must fail. The basic requirement of an Equal Protection Clause claim is that there be governmental action creating a classification that burdens one class and benefits another. Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1016 (3d Cir.1987). Of this there is little doubt. The VIWDA plainly benefits workers, by expanding both the scope of their remedies for wrongful discharge and the circumstances under which those remedies are available. In doing so, it necessarily abridges somewhat the ability of employers to discharge workers. General Offshore’s claim thus passes this threshold requirement. To show the existence of a classification is, however, only the start of equal protection analysis. It is clear that the Equal Protection Clause does not require that the state treat all persons alike. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 84 L.Ed. 1124 (1940). Social and economic legislation almost by definition grants benefits to some, but not all, of those governed by it. Philadelphia Police and Fire Ass’n v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 162 (3d Cir.1989). Just as with substantive due process analysis, “the courts are not empowered to second-guess the wisdom of state policies. Our review is confined to the legitimacy of the purpose.” Western and S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 670, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 2084, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1981). At the same time, the courts must be sensitive to the possibility that a group inadequately represented in the legislative process and traditionally without the means to have its views considered may be the target of legislation for which the normal workings of the democratic process afford no remedy. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (per curiam); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778, 783 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). The courts thus use a three-tier analysis when considering the validity of a statute. Which tier is used depends upon the nature of the classification. The strictest scrutiny is directed toward classifications based on race. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706, 720-21, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989). Classifications based on gender or legitimacy merit intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99, 97 S.Ct. 451, 456-58, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). Legislation not employing these suspect criteria is subject to the most lenient of these forms of analysis. See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14, 108 S.Ct. 849, 859, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 2386, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981); Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, 845 F.2d 1216, 1222 (3d Cir.1988). The parties agree that this last form of analysis applies here; even if they did not, though, it self-evidently does. Under this last type of review, the legislative classification will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 14, 108 S.Ct. at 859; Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 196, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 2308, 76 L.Ed.2d 497 (1983); Philadelphia Police and Fire Ass’n, 874 F.2d at 163; Lindquist v. Xerox Corp., 571 F.Supp. 470, 471 (D.V.I.1983). The statute will be upheld if “the legislature could have reasonably concluded that the challenged classification would promote a legitimate state purpose.” Exxon, 462 U.S. at 196, 103 S.Ct. at 2308; see also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111, 99 S.Ct. 939, 949, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979). Indeed, the reasons relied upon by the court need not be those actually relied upon by the legislators or proffered by them post hoc; as long as the court can construct plausible reasons in support of the state action, the action passes muster. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. at 196, 103 S.Ct. at 2308; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-05, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Anderson, 845 F.2d at 1223. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that there are no reasonable grounds for upholding the classification. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 463, 108 S.Ct. 2481, 2490, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464, 101 S.Ct. 715, 723, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981); Philadelphia Police and Fire Ass’n, 874 F.2d at 163. This standard is virtually the same as that for a substantive due process challenge to social or economic regulation. Rogin, 616 F.2d at 689. Unsurprisingly, then, the analysis yields the same result. Without repeating the findings above, which this court incorporates here, the legislature’s purposes were legitimate and the means by which they were reached were not clearly irrational or arbitrary. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 331-82, 101 S.Ct. at 2386-87. The plaintiffs strenuous attempts to persuade this court that the VIWDA is pointless, or needlessly redistributive, or potentially harmful to employers, are thus at best irrelevancies. Since West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937), these types of arguments have been restricted to the legislative halls. The facial challenge on equal protection grounds must thus be denied; accordingly, summary judgment is granted for the defendants on this issue. C. Contracts Clause Here the plaintiff maintains that the VIWDA, by restricting its ability to discharge employees, impaired contracts that existed at the time of its passage and thus violated the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const, art I., § 10, as applied to the Virgin Islands in the Revised Organic Act. At the outset, this court observes that a Contracts Clause challenge, like the Takings Clause challenge discussed below, subjects a statute to more searching scrutiny than do the more amorphous equal protection and due process arguments dealt with above. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 2719, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984); Lincoln Fed’l Labor Union, 335 U.S. at 536, 69 S.Ct. at 257. The result here, however, is the same: the VIWDA does not violate the Contracts Clause, and thus the facial challenge must be resolved in favor of the defendants. The resolute language of the Contracts Clause has been qualified greatly by the courts. As the Court has put it, “[although the language of the Contracts Clause is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the State ‘to safeguard the vital interests of the people.’ ” Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410, 103 S.Ct. 697, 704, 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1983) (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434, 54 S.Ct. 231, 238, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934)); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1251, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 2720, 57 L.Ed.2d 727 (1978). This police power, as suggested above, is substantial indeed; in one oft-cited formulation, the Court stated that it “is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.” Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480, 26 S.Ct. 127, 130, 50 L.Ed. 274 (1905). Were the Contracts Clause absolute, private parties could immunize themselves against future legislative action merely by entering into long-term contracts. In Justice Holmes’ words, “[o]ne whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.” Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357, 28 S.Ct. 529, 531-32, 52 L.Ed. 828 (1908); see also Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 190, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 2305, 76 L.Ed.2d 497 (1983); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198, 37 S.Ct. 247, 250, 61 L.Ed. 667 (1917). Consequently, the courts have fashioned a test whereby the police power of the state may be reconciled with the proscription against impairing contracts. It thus becomes possible for a statute to work a substantial, or, indeed, total impairment of certain contracts without violating the Contracts Clause. Exxon Corp., 462 U.S. at 190, 103 S.Ct. at 2305. Under this test, the threshold inquiry is whether the statute or regulation has, in fact, substantially impaired a contractual relationship. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411, 103 S.Ct. at 704; Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 244, 98 S.Ct. at 2722; West Indian Co. v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 844 F.2d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir.1988). If the plaintiff cannot demonstrate an impairment, or if the impairment is minimal, the inquiry ends here. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 245, 98 S.Ct. at 2723; Nieves v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 819 F.2d 1237, 1243 (3d Cir.1987). If the challenger can establish that its contracts are significantly impaired, then the government must be able to point to “a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation, such as the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem.” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411-12, 103 S.Ct. at 704-05 (citation omitted); see also United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 1517, 52 L.Ed.2d 92, (1977); Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287, 296-97 (3d Cir.1984). If a legitimate public purpose exists, the legislation will be upheld if it is based “ ‘upon reasonable conditions and [is] of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying [the legislation’s] adoption.’ ” Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412, 103 S.Ct. at 705 (quoting United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22, 97 S.Ct. at 1517); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 505, 107 S.Ct. at 1252-53; West Indian Co., 844 F.2d at 1022. In making this last determination, the courts use somewhat different standards, depending upon the type of contract at issue. If the contract is between private parties, then the courts generally defer to the legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of the statute. Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 505, 107 S.Ct. at 1252; Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412-13, 103 S.Ct. at 704-05; Nieves, 819 F.2d at 1249. If, however, the state is a contracting party, then the legislative motives are more readily put into question; though the considered views of the legislature are still not without significance, the courts may scrutinize legislative intent more probingly. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22-23, 97 S.Ct. at 1517-18; West Indian Co., 844 F.2d at 1022. This court thus begins by considering whether the plaintiff has established that its contracts are significantly impaired. It is clear, as a first step, that they have been impaired; the statute definitely reduces an employer’s ability to discharge an employee. Moreover, the statute, by its terms, covers both contracts made before its enactment and contracts made after. Whether the statute significantly impairs employment contracts is, of course, another matter. To determine this for a facial challenge, it is necessary to examine the legal background against which the VIWDA operates. To the extent that an area is already the subject of regulation, the likelihood that the courts will find that contracts in that area are impaired will decline. Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 411, 103 S.