Full opinion text
TABLE OF CONTENTS I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE. A. Defendant Frank Camiscioli, Jr. B. Defendant Peter Mylenki. C. Defendant William Odierno. D. Defendant Alan Grecco. E. Defendant Joseph Gatto. F. Defendant Louis Gatto Sr. G. Defendant Louis Gatto Jr. H. Defendant Stefano Mazzola. II. DISCUSSION. A. Motions for Severance . 1. Prejudicial Joinder. 2. Need for Exculpatory Testimony. B. Motions Attacking the Indictment. 1. Motion to Strike Violent Acts from Indictment. 2. RICO’s “Pattern of Racketeering” Requirement is Unconstitutionally Vague. 3. Motion to Strike Prejudicial Surplusage. a. Reference to the “Gatto Group” and “Genovese Crime Family” b. Aliases. c. “Catch-all” Phrases. d. References to Acts of Violence. 4. Motion to Dismiss Counts Charging Multiple Offenses. 5. Motion to Dismiss Count One for Failure to Specify Predicate Acts 6. Motion to Dismiss Count Two because Predicate Acts are Not Related to Objectives of the Enterprise. 05 7. Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Violating the Statute of Limitations 05 C. Motions In Limine to Bar Introduction of Certain Evidence. 05 1. Admissibility of Coconspirators’ Statements. 05 2. Motion to Suppress Statements of Mylenki and Camiscioli. 05 3. Motion to Suppress Post-Hypnotic Statements of Frank Galimi. 05 (a) Right to Confrontation. Oí (b) Due Process Rights . —3 4. Motion to Suppress Grecco’s Statements and Physical Evidence. -»3 5. Motion for a Hearing on Admissibility of Mazzola’s Convictions. —3 D. Motions for Evidence from the Government. —3 1. Motion for Brady and Giglio Materials. —3 2. Early Disclosure of Jencks Materials. —3 3. Motion for Coconspirators’ Statements . -«3 4. Motion for a Witness List. —5 5. Motion for a Bill of Particulars. *~3 6. Motion for the Names of Informants . —3 7. Motion for Rough Notes . —3 8. Motion to Serve Subpoenas. —3 9. Motion for Disclosure of Grand Jury Transcripts. "~3 10. Motions for Disclosure of 404(b) Material of Prior Bad Acts. OO E. Motions to Dismiss for Improper Governmental Conduct. CO F. Motion to Transfer. OO III. CONCLUSION. OO OPINION BROTMAN, District Judge. Currently before the court are the pretrial motions of all defendants. The court heard oral argument on defendants’ motions on June 8, 1990 and held two eviden-tiary hearings on defendant Grecco’s motion to suppress statements of Frank Gali-mi on June 13,1990 and July 30, 1990. The motions fall within four general categories; motions attacking the sufficiency of the indictment; motions in limine to bar introduction of certain evidence; motions for certain evidence from the government; and motions for relief based on the government’s improper conduct. Additionally, each defendant has moved for severance of his trial from his codefendants’ and to transfer the trial to the Newark vicinage. Many defendants raise the same issues in their briefs; this court will address them seriatim. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE A.Defendant Frank Camiscioli, Jr. Camiscioli is named in Count 1 (RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), Count 3 (collection of unlawful debt), and Count 5 (numbers gambling business) of the indictment. The government contends that Camiscioli is incorporated by reference in the remaining counts of the indictment although he is not named nor specifically alleged to have a particular role in the conduct charged in Count 2 (substantive RICO count under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2), Count 4 (sports gambling business), Count 6 (use of interstate telephone in aid of racketeering), Count 7 (interstate travel in aid of racketeering), Count 8 (interstate transportation of wagering records), and Count 9 (extortionate extensions of credit). Camiscioli moves for severance of his trial because (1) he will be unduly prejudiced by harmful “spill over” evidence against other defendants such that the jury will be unable to compartmentalize the evidence effectively as it relates to different defendants; (2) Camiscioli’s counsel, in rigorously defending his client, may be required to make prejudicial comments regarding other defendants’ exercise of their right to silence, necessitating a separate trial from these codefendants; and (3) Camiscioli’s alleged coconspirators can exculpate him in the five counts in which he is not named; therefore, he is entitled to a separate trial so he may compel his coconspirators to testify. B. Defendant Peter Mylenki Mylenki also moves for severance raising substantially similar arguments. Mylenki is named in Count 1 (RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), Count 4 (sports gambling), Count 6 (use of interstate telephone facilities in aid of racketeering activities), Count 7 (interstate travel in aid of racketeering), and Count 8 (interstate transportation of wagering records) of the indictment. He is not, however, alleged to have participated in any of the eight racketeering acts that involve violence. Mylenki argues that his minuscule participation in the enterprise presents a stark contrast in the degree and kind of evidence against Mylenki as compared to his codefendants; therefore, joinder of his trial with these codefendants is unduly prejudicial. C. Defendant William Odierno Odierno is named in Count 1 (RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), Count 4 (sports gambling), Count 6 (use of interstate telephone facilities in aid of racketeering activities), Count 7 (interstate travel in aid of racketeering), and Count 8 (interstate transportation of wagering records) of the indictment. Odierno is not named in any of the acts of violence. He moves to sever his trial from his codefend-ants based on the gross disparity in the quantity and venality of the evidence; he contends that the jury can not reasonably compartmentalize the evidence that relates to separate defendants and he is, therefore, prejudiced by joinder of the trial with his codefendants. D. Defendant Alan Grecco Defendant Grecco is named in Count 1 (RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), Count 2 (substantive RICO count under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2), Count 3 (collection of unlawful debts), Count 4 (sports gambling), Count 5 (numbers gambling), Count 6 (use of interstate telephone facilities in aid of racketeering activities), Count 7 (interstate travel in aid of racketeering), and Count 8 (interstate transportation of wagering records) of the indictment. In Count 2, the indictment charges Grecco with participation in seven “racketeering acts,” including: 1. the 1976 or 1977 conspiracy to take over the Belli gambling business through the murder of Arthur Belli and the threatening of Robert Belli (“Racketeering Act 1”); 2. the 1977 conspiracy to take over the Stumpo-Barbarulla gambling business through threats to Anthony Stumpo and James Barbarulla (“Racketeering Act 2"); 3. the April 1979 conspiracy to murder Vincent Mistretta (“Racketeering Act 3”); 4. the extortionate collection of credit from Howard Clarke (“Racketeering Act 4”); 5. the 1983 or 1984 conspiracy to collect a debt from Anthony Stumpo (“Racketeering Act 5”); 6. the unlawful operation of a sports gambling business from 1973 “up to and including the date of filing of the indictment” (“Racketeering Act 8”); 7. the unlawful operation of a numbers gambling business from 1974 “up to and including the date of filing of the indictment” (“Racketeering Act 9”). Grecco argues that this court should strike from the indictment any reference to homicides and other violent acts because the charges have been brought in bad faith by the government, are stale, and severely prejudice defendant’s ability to obtain a fair trial. He contends that the government, in bad faith, has converted a gambling case into a murder case by including inflammatory allegations of violent acts. Alternatively, Grecco argues that the indictment must be dismissed in its entirety because he has been severely prejudiced by the undue delay of the government in bringing the indictment. Such prejudice includes the absence of potential alibi witnesses who by reason of death or unavailability are unable to testify for defendants concerning the violent acts. Grecco contends that the government deliberately delayed the indictment to gain a tactical advantage; therefore, the court should dismiss the entire indictment. He also contends that the probative value of the evidence of violent acts does not outweigh its unduly prejudicial effect on defendants. Grecco requests that the court determine in limine whether evidence relating to the violent acts in the indictment is admissible under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Grecco also contends that the government has failed to turn over all exculpatory evidence within the purview of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (suppression of evidence favorable to accused violates due process regardless of government’s good faith). Defendant contends that the government has not turned over any material relating to the credibility of significant government witnesses as required by Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility of government witness falls within Brady rule). Grecco disputes the government’s distinction between Brady material and Giglio material and argues that the government must supply these materials in useable form, such as trial transcripts. Defendant also argues that, to the extent materials fall within the definition of both Giglio and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (statements of government witnesses not subject to pretrial disclosure), constitutional due process requirements govern the timing of the turnover of the materials rather than the statutory limits in the Jencks Act. Grecco requests a bill of particulars under Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure identifying all his alleged coconspirators. He also requests dates, times, and locations of the alleged offenses charged in the indictment as well as every offense that the government intends to prove at trial. Defendant requests disclosure of the names and last known addresses of government informants. Grecco contends that the balance between the government’s need for confidentiality and the defendants’ need for the information tips in favor of the accused. Grecco seeks a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that the government intends to introduce at trial under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Grecco argues that a pretrial determination of admissibility is necessary so that he may argue against this evidence in his opening statement to the jury. He also argues that the evidence the government seeks to introduce will require substantial investigation by defendants; therefore, defendants must have immediate disclosure if they are to receive a fair trial. Additionally, he argues that a pretrial determination will avoid undue delay during the trial. Defendant requests an order for the government to preserve rough notes and handwritten drafts prepared by any government agent in connection with this investigation. Grecco argues that the definition of a “pattern of racketeering activity” is unconstitutionally vague; therefore, those counts of the indictment charging him with RICO violations must be dismissed. He contends that courts’ widely divergent definitions of “pattern” do not put defendants on notice of what conduct is proscribed by the statute. Grecco requests an order striking sur-plusage from the indictment. Essentially, defendant requests that the court strike any reference to the “Gatto group” or “group;” to any acts of violence; and to any “racketeering act” as unduly prejudicial. He also argues that prosecutorial abuses in this case require disclosure of all grand jury transcripts and attendance records of the grand jury. According to Grecco, disclosure is mandated here because the government delayed the indictment in bad faith, the government failed to turn over exculpatory evidence, and defendant suspects the government did not present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Grecco contends that the government failed to comply with Rule 16(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by its failure to disclose the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant to a government agent or the substance of co-conspirators’ statements that the government will seek to introduce under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendant’s brief also refers to a “significant amount of documentary evidence that defendant has reason to believe is in the government’s possession” that the government allegedly has not disclosed to defendant; however, he does not specify what materials are held by the government. The defendant argues that, although he is not entitled as a matter of right to a list of witnesses, the circumstances in this case warrant pretrial disclosure of the names of anticipated witnesses. Specifically, Grecco contends that the acts alleged are so old that he will not be able to prepare his defense properly without the names of potential witnesses. In his motion to dismiss the indictment, Grecco again cites to preindictment delay as egregious governmental conduct that warrants dismissal. Defendant notes that the government’s failure to provide discovery adds to outrageous nature of the government’s misconduct. Grecco moves to suppress the post-indictment statements of codefendants Mylenki and Camiscioli. He argues that the statements are not admissible under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1628, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) (admission of codefendant’s confession in joint trial violates defendant’s right to cross-examine) because such evidence violates his constitutional right to confrontation if the declarant does not testify at the trial. According to the defendant, the indictment charges multiple offenses within a single count, thereby violating Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Grecco asserts that, in the first count of the indictment and in subsequent counts that incorporate Count 1 by reference, the government charges two separate conspiracies — one for sports gambling and one for numbers gambling. Noting that a jury could find a defendant guilty of sports gambling but not of numbers gambling yet its verdict would not reflect that outcome, defendant argues that counts charging multiple offenses in a single count must be dismissed. Grecco argues that his trial must be severed from that of his codefendants because certain codefendants could exculpate him if they testified at a separate trial. Specifically, Grecco asserts that Joseph Gatto could exculpate him from the government’s charge that he threatened Stumpo in Gat-to’s presence and that he attended a meeting to plan the murder of Arthur Belli. Contending that a separate trial would serve the interests of judicial economy, Grecco also notes that Gatto is not easily impeachable because he has no prior record. Additionally, he argues that his trial must be severed because the disparity in the quantum of evidence against him as compared to his codefendants will result in prejudice if their trials are joined. He maintains that the jury will be unable to compartmentalize the evidence against each defendant and to avoid using evidence relevant to another against him. The defendant also seeks an in limine ruling on the admissibility of alleged cocon-spirators’ statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. He contends that the government can not meet its burden to show existence of a conspiracy or that statements occurred during the course of the conspiracy or were in furtherance of the conspiracy. Grecco contends that Count 1 of the indictment fails to specify the predicate acts to establish a pattern of racketeering activity because it alleges the pattern was “of the type” alleged in Count 2 of the indictment. He argues that this language fails to give notice of the specific predicate acts he is alleged to have committed. Defendant also argues that the predicate offenses alleged in the indictment are not related to each other or to the alleged objectives of the enterprise as required by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Under Sedima, S.P. R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285 n. 14, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), sporadic activity does not establish a pattern under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); rather, the predicate acts must be continuous and relate to the objectives of the enterprise. Id. Grecco argues that the predicate acts are unconnected because they occurred sporadically over a long period of time; thus, this court must dismiss Count 2 for failure to state an essential element of the crime. Defendant seeks an order permitting him to serve subpoenas upon third parties who possess documents and other materials that are, according to defendant, critical to his defense. Grecco argues that the statute of limitations for most federal crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 3282, bars the RICO offenses charged. He argues that those cases that hold a RICO charge is timely charged if at least one predicate racketeering occurs within five years of the indictment do not apply here because the predicate acts are not continuous and are not related. Grecco moves to suppress the statement of Frank Galimi, a witness to the Mistretta murder, that was made while Galimi was under hypnosis. He argues that the statement is inadmissible because it is inherently unreliable and was given under suggestive circumstances. Defendant fails to specify what conditions existed at the time of the statement. Defendant notes that the statement is inconsistent with Galimi’s prior statements and with police reports of the incident. Although the government has not advised defendant that it possesses statements or evidence from him, however, defendant requests a suppression hearing in the event that the government comes forward with any such evidence. Additionally, Grecco moves to transfer venue to the Newark vicinage because the attorneys, parties, are evidence are located in the Newark area. He argues that the length of this complex trial reduces his attorney’s time for preparation and increases the cost of his defense. Finally, Grecco moves to join in all motions of his codefendants. E. Defendant Joseph Gatto Defendant Joseph Gatto is named in Count 1 (RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), Count 2 (substantive RICO count under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2), Count 3 (collection of unlawful debts), Count 4 (sports gambling), Count 6 (use of interstate telephone facilities in aid of racketeering activities), Count 7 (interstate travel in aid of racketeering), Count 8 (interstate transportation of wagering records), and Count 9 (financing extortionate extensions of credit) of the indictment. In Count 2, the indictment charges Joseph Gatto with participation in five “racketeering acts,” including: 1. the 1976 or 1977 conspiracy to take over the Belli gambling business through the murder of Arthur Belli and the threatening of Robert Belli (“Racketeering Act 1”); 2. the 1977 conspiracy to take over the Stumpo-Barbarulla gambling business through threats to Anthony Stumpo and James Barbarulla (“Racketeering Act 2”); 3. the 1983 or 1984 conspiracy to collect a debt from Anthony Stumpo (“Racketeering Act 5”); 4. the unlawful operation of a sports gambling business from 1973 “up to and including the date of filing of the indictment” (“Racketeering Act 8”); 5. financing extortionate extensions of credit (“Racketeering Act 10”). Joseph Gatto joins in all motions of code-fendants Grecco and Mazzola. F. Defendant Louis Gatto Sr. Defendant Louis Gatto Sr. is named in Count 1 (RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), Count 2 (substantive RICO count under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2), Count 4 (sports gambling), Count 5 (numbers gambling), Count 6 (use of interstate telephone facilities in aid of racketeering activities), Count 7 (interstate travel in aid of racketeering), and Count 8 (interstate transportation of wagering records) of the indictment. In Count 2, the indictment charges Louis Gatto Sr. with participation in two “racketeering acts,” including: 1. the 1976 or 1977 conspiracy to take over the Belli gambling business through the murder of Arthur Belli and the threatening of Robert Belli (“Racketeering Act 1”); 2. the April 1979 conspiracy to murder Vincent Mistretta (“Racketeering Act 3”). Louis Gatto Sr. join in all motions brought by all codefendants. G. Defendant Louis Gatto Jr. Defendant Louis Gatto Jr. is named in Count 1 (RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), Count 2 (substantive RICO count under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2), Count 4 (sports gambling), Count 6 (use of interstate telephone facilities in aid of racketeering activities), Count 7 (interstate travel in aid of racketeering), and Count 8 (interstate transportation of wagering records) of the indictment. In Count 2, the indictment charges Louis Gatto Jr. with participation in two “racketeering acts,” including: 1. the 1977 conspiracy to take over the Stumpo-Barbarulla gambling business through threats to Anthony Stumpo and James Barbarulla (“Racketeering Act 2”); 2. the unlawful operation of a sports gambling business from 1973 “up to and including the date of filing of the indictment” (“Racketeering Act 8”). Louis Gatto Jr. joins in all motions of code-fendant Grecco and point two of codefend-ant Mazzola’s brief. H. Defendant Stefano Mazzola Defendant Mazzola is named in Count 1 (RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)), Count 2 (substantive RICO count under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2), and Count 4 (sports gambling) of the indictment. In Count 2, the indictment charges Mazzola with participation in five “racketeering acts,” including: I. the 1976 or 1977 conspiracy to take over the Belli gambling business through the murder of Arthur Belli and the threatening of Robert Belli (“Racketeering Act 1”); 2. the 1983 or 1984 conspiracy to collect a debt from Anthony Stumpo (“Racketeering Act 5”); 3. the 1977 conspiracy to collect a debt from Robert Lipani (“Racketeering Act 6”); 4. the 1983 conspiracy to collect a debt from Robert Lipani (“Racketeering Act 7”); 5. the unlawful operation of a sports gambling business from 1973 “up to and including the date of filing of the indictment” (“Racketeering Act 8”). Mazzola moves for essentially the same relief as Grecco. In his omnibus motion, Mazzola seeks: (1) a severance based on the same prejudice arguments as Grecco’s motion; (2) a pretrial hearing to determine admissibility of other crimes and wrongdoings under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; (3) a bill of particulars for substantially the same information as Grecco; (4) that this court strike prejudicial sur-plusage from the indictment; (5) an order for the government to disclose Brady and Giglio materials; (6) a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of coconspirators’ statements, arguing that the government must show, by independent evidence, that a conspiracy existed; (7) early disclosure of Jencks Act material; (8) an order that the government retain all rough notes and reports, including the rough notes of the government attorney from interviews of witnesses which notes, according to Mazzola, may not be protected by the attorney work product privilege; (9) an in limine hearing to determine whether his prior conviction is admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(1) and (2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. He argues that a pretrial determination is required so he may make a tactical decision whether he should testify at trial; (10) an order that the government to disclose the identity of confidential informants because, considering the requirements of fundamental fairness, the informer’s privilege should not apply; (11) an in camera review by the court of the grand jury transcripts to determine whether the transcripts should be disclosed to defendants. Mazzola’s motion to dismiss Counts 1, 2, and 4 of the indictment argues that these counts are barred by the statute of limitations. Mazzola notes that four of the five racketeering acts with which he is charged occurred more than five years before the indictment. He also contends that, by virtue of his imprisonment, he affirmatively withdrew from and abandoned any conspiracy; therefore, he is not liable for the acts of his alleged coconspirators. To satisfy the statute of limitations for the substantive RICO offense, here Count 2, the government must show that the defendant committed at least one predicate racketeering act within the five year limitations period. II. DISCUSSION A. Motions for Severance 1. Prejudicial Joinder Under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this court may order separate trials, or whatever other relief justice requires, if it appears that a defendant is prejudiced by joinder of offenses. Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. A motion for severance is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir.1978). Denial of a motion for severance is inappropriate, however, if there is a great disparity in the amount of evidence between the moving defendant and his or her codefendants. United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1302 (7th Cir.) (disparity in quantum of documentary evidence did not cause actual prejudice), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847, 107 S.Ct. 168, 93 L.Ed.2d 106 (1986). In such instances, the relevant inquiry is whether a jury has the capacity to follow the trial court’s limiting instructions requiring separate consideration for each defendant and the evidence admitted against that defendant. Id. (limiting instructions during course of trial and in final charge sufficient to prevent transference of guilt); United States v. DiPasquale, 740 F.2d 1282, 1294 (3d Cir.1984) (court’s repeated instructions to jury and government’s well-ordered presentation of case averted serious prejudice to defendant who played comparatively small part in conspiracy), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228, 105 S.Ct. 1226, 84 L.Ed.2d 364 (1985); United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 137 (7th Cir.1981) (interim instructions and “positive and clear instructions at the close of the case” not likely to result in jury confusion), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021, 102 S.Ct. 1719, 72 L.Ed.2d 140 (1982). “[T]he primary consideration is whether the jury can compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defendants.... ” United States v. De Larosa, 450 F.2d 1057, 1065 (3d Cir.1971) (unfavorable impression created by codefendant’s identification with unpopular social and political group and prior imprisonment did not require severance), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 927, 92 S.Ct. 978, 30 L.Ed.2d 800 (1972). Alleged participants in a single conspiracy, however, “should ordinarily be tried together for purposes of judicial efficiency and consistency, even if the evidence against one is more damaging than that against another.” United States v. Ward, 793 F.2d 551, 556 (3d Cir.1986). See also United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963 (3d Cir.1985) (defendant not entitled to severance merely because evidence against code-fendant more damaging than against him or her), cert. denied sub nom., Pede v. United States, 475 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 1518, 89 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986); United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 427 (3d Cir.1985) (neither disparity in evidence nor evidence more damaging to one defendant than another entitles less culpable defendant to severance), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 725, 98 L.Ed.2d 673 (1988). To war rant severance among alleged coconspira-tors, “[s]ome exacerbating circumstances, such as the [prospective] jury’s inability to ‘compartmentalize’ the evidence, are required.” United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1112-13 (3d Cir.) (citing United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 62 (3d Cir.1976) (with frequent and clear instructions, jury can compartmentalize complex evidence of codefendants’ prior diversion of corporate funds), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971, 106 S.Ct. 336, 88 L.Ed.2d 321 (1985)). A defendant must demonstrate clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial. Ward, 793 F.2d at 556. Among the factors the court must consider in determining whether the prejudice of a joint trial rises to the level of a “miscarriage of justice” are the following: the number of defendants and the number of counts; the complexity of the indictment; the estimated length of the trial; disparities in the amount or type of proof offered against the defendants; disparities in the degrees of involvement by defendants in the overall scheme; possible conflict between the various defense theories or trial strategies; and, especially, prejudice from evidence admitted only against co-defendants but which is inadmissible or excluded as to a particular defendant. United States v. Gallo, 668 F.Supp. 736, 749 (E.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d Cir.1988). See also United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 306 (3d Cir.1989) (severance not required where defendant offered conclusory allegations that his defense was “truly antagonistic” and “mutually exclusive” to codefendant’s), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1831, 108 L.Ed.2d 959 (1990); United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 977-78 (D.C.Cir.1976) (disparity in amount of evidence against defendant charged with conspiracy and not with substantive counts makes fairly strong case for severance where defendant made 5 of 45 overt acts in furtherance of conspiracy). “None of the factors are themselves dis-positive; instead, the court must decide whether the jury would be ‘reasonably able’ to consider the evidence as to each defendant separately, independent of the evidence against his or her coconspirators.” Gallo, 668 F.Supp. at 749. Courts have frequently severed trials based on these factors. In United States v. Gallo, 668 F.Supp. 736 (E.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd, 863 F.2d 185 (2d Cir.1988), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that compartmentalization of evidence would be very difficult or unlikely as to several of the fourteen defendants; thus, severance of the trial into seven discrete trials was appropriate. Id. at 749, 758-60. The twenty-two count indictment originally named sixteen defendants; Count 1 named thirteen of the sixteen defendants for conspiring to participate in the affairs of a racketeering enterprise and the remaining counts named fourteen defendants with various substantive offense relating to the affairs of the alleged enterprise. Id. at 738. The non-RICO counts all concerned crimes that were alleged as predicate acts in the RICO conspiracy count. Id. The court noted that, as the number of counts and defendants in an indictment increases, the resultant complex trial record makes it more difficult for a jury to keep straight the specific evidence and charges against each defendant. Id. at 749. Such difficulties are compounded for those defendants against whom only a small portion of the evidence is relevant. Id. at 750. The court noted that “ ‘[inevitable prejudice’ to the peripheral defendants is caused by the ‘slow but inexorable accumulation of evidence’ against the major players.” Id. (quoting United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 759 (2d Cir.1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947, 86 S.Ct. 1467, 16 L.Ed.2d 544 (1966)). Such prejudice would be “especially acute for those defendants whose alleged activities did not include the sort of violent or heinous offenses with which some of their brethren are charged.” Id. The court noted, however, that as alleged members of the crime family, these defendants were likely to be aware of the nature of the ongoing activity and the jury could infer that they may have acquiesced in the more violent aspects of the racketeering enterprise. Id. at 751. The court added that the various defenses offered would almost inevitably be antagonistic to one another given the sheer number of defendants, weighing in favor of severance. Id. According to the court, the morass of alleged conspiracies within conspiracies, defendants joining and leaving certain conspiracies, and conspiracies to conceal other conspiracies would require that the jury heed extraordinarily intricate limiting instructions which, given the numerous defendants and charges, would be virtually impossible. Id. at 752. While the court recognized that the jury can and will follow limiting instructions, it nonetheless found the trial judge must first be convinced that the jury “has a reasonable chance of understanding and acting upon instructions from the court.” Id. Given that the jury would be expected to retain precise distinctions for weeks and months until they retired to deliberate, the court found that such limiting instructions would be inadequate. Id. at 753. Finally, the court considered the inherent power of the court to control the administration of complex cases. The court noted that these “monster” trials work severe hardships on the jurors selected because they are removed from their normal lives for inordinate stretches of time. Id. at 754. See also United States v. Vastola, 670 F.Supp. 1244, 1263 (D.N.J.1987) (exceedingly long trial hinders jury’s ability to devote its full attention to trial), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 899 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.1990), vacated on other grounds, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3233, 111 L.Ed.2d 744 (1990). Those defendants detained before trial are especially disadvantaged. Gallo, 668 F.Supp. at 753. The defense attorneys virtually sacrifice the remainder of their practices during the extended trial. Id. at 754. Finally, the court must adjourn the remainder of its civil and criminal calendars for an indefinite period of time. Id. at 755. See also Vastola, 670 F.Supp. at 1263 (scheduling problems reduced by severance). Acknowledging that severing a large conspiracy case often necessitates “duplicitous, time-consuming and expensive trials,” the court found that the primary duplicative evidence was the “enterprise” evidence introduced to show the existence, structure, and operations of the “Family,” and that this evidence did not consume a great deal of trial time. Gallo, 668 F.Supp. at 756, 757. The court noted that the prosecution’s familiarity with the strength of its proofs and the jury’s response to it and the court’s familiarity with the nature of the case and the evidence would result in a quicker and smoother pace in later trials. Id. at 757. Additionally, trial time could be saved if, after exposure to the government’s case in early trials, defendants may plea. Id. The court, therefore, severed the trial into (1) a group of three defendants charged with offenses and predicate acts involving a single, discrete episode of criminal activity; (2) a single defendant charged only with obstruction of justice — a count that was ultimately dismissed without going to trial; (3) a single defendant not charged with the substantive RICO count, but with assisting in bribery and interstate travel relating to a single episode of criminal activity—a charge that resulted in a guilty plea; (4) a group of three defendants who were the only defendants charged in the predicate acts of obstruction of justice by disseminating grand jury matters, although other discrete charges were filed against two of the three; (5) a single defendant who was the only defendant charged with predicate acts that also formed the basis of two substantive counts; (6) a group of four defendants whose conduct concerned two primary areas of criminal activity which were substantially unique to these defendants; and (7) a single defendant for which all charges against him involved no other defendants. Id. at 758-60. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently given further guidance to district courts in considering severance motions in large-scale criminal trials. In United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990), the Second Circuit held that severance was not required notwithstanding the complexity of joint trial of twenty-one defendants that spanned more than seventeen months and involved the introduction of thousands of exhibits and the testimony of over 275 witnesses. Id. at 1154. Having misgivings about trials of this magnitude, the court set forth bench marks for the district court to guide the exercise of its discretion for severance motions. Id. at 1151-52. According to the Second Circuit, a trial judge should first elicit from the prosecutor a good faith estimate of the time reasonably anticipated to present the government’s case; the court need not accept the estimate without question but should be free to make an independent assessment based on various factors, including the number of defendants, the time and territorial scope of the crimes charged, the number of witnesses likely to be called, and the number and size of exhibits likely to be introduced, including wiretaps. Id. The court stated that, when the government’s case will last more than four months, the prosecutor should “present a reasoned basis to support a conclusion that a joint trial of all the defendants is more consistent with the fair administration of justice than some manageable division of the case into separate trials for groups of defendants.” Id. at 1152. When the government’s case will last more than four months and is brought against more than ten defendants, then the prosecutor should make “an especially compelling justification for a joint trial....” Id. In making a showing for a joint trial, the court should weigh the interests of the prosecution, the defendants, the jurors, the court, and the public. Id. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York applied these criteria in United States v. Gambino, 729 F.Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y.1990). In Gam-bino, the district court severed the trial of fifteen defendants, ten of whom were before the court, into two groups on a seven count indictment alleging 172 overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. Id. at 971. One group consisted of the “core of conspirators” who were alleged to have committed almost all acts of violence, including murders, set forth in the indictment. Id. The second group consisted of those who “oversaw and facilitated the transportation, smuggling and storage of ... narcotics” and whom the grand jury found participated in a single narcotics conspiracy. Id. The court noted that this division would minimize the prejudicial spillover of the alleged acts of violence. Id. In United States v. Vastola, 670 F.Supp. 1244 (D.N.J.1987), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 899 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.1990), vacated on other grounds, — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 3233, 111 L.Ed.2d 744 (1990), this court declined to sever individual defendants charged in the substantive RICO counts from those named in the RICO conspiracy counts of a 114-count indictment naming twenty-one defendants. Id. at 1261-62. Rather, the court severed those defendants charged in the substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy counts from those named only in counts for narcotics, usury and extortion, mail fraud, wire fraud, copyright fraud, insurance fraud, bankruptcy fraud, gambling, and firearms offenses. Id. The court reasoned that, to force the government to try some of the alleged criminal activities separately from others alleged to be part of the same RICO enterprise would prevent the government from prosecuting the type of crimes the statute was intended to combat. Id. at 1262 (citing United States v. Persico, 621 F.Supp. 842, 854 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.1985)). The court continued that the indictment properly pleaded a RICO enterprise conspiracy and, thus, all defendants so named to be members of the enterprise could be joined under Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. (citing United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 729 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 832, 95 S.Ct. 56, 42 L.Ed.2d 58 (1974) (Rule 8(b) motion addresses pleadings and not subsequent proof)). The court noted its continuing obligation under Rule 14 to evaluate the prejudicial effect of evidence of different types of criminal activity, such as white collar crime and extortion and narcotics activity, and to take necessary steps to avoid such prejudice. Id. Here, eight defendants are named in a nine count indictment. Each defendant is named in Count 1 alleging a RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The indictment does not specify overt acts taken in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy in Count 1; rather, it incorporates by reference the racketeering acts, and the overt acts in furtherance of those racketeering acts, alleged in Count 2. Each defendant is either named or incorporated by reference in Count 2, the substantive RICO charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. The indictment sets forth ten predicate acts establishing a pattern of racketeering activity, including two conspiracies to take over competing gambling operations, threats and acts of violence including conspiracy to commit murder, operating a sports gambling business, operating a numbers gambling business, and financing extortionate extensions of credit. The indictment lists at least two overt acts to support each allegation for conspiracy to take over the Belli gambling business, conspiracy to take over the Stumpo-Barbarulla gambling business, and conspiracy to commit the murder of Vincent Mistretta. Operating a sports gambling business, operating a numbers gambling business, and financing extortionate extensions of credit are also listed in separate counts as substantive offenses (Counts 4, 5, and 9). Defendants Mylenki, Odierno, and Camis-cioli are incorporated by reference in Count 2; however, the predicate acts for which they are named are nonviolent crimes, that is, Mylenki for sports gambling; Odierno for sports gambling; and Camiscioli for numbers gambling. Likewise, defendant Louis Gatto Jr. is named in Count 2 only for the nonviolent predicate act of operating a sports gambling business. All eight defendants have moved for severance of his trial based on Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court notes initially that this indictment names fewer defendants and has fewer counts than the cases discussed supra, in which each district court severed the trials of certain defendants. See Gambino, 729 F.Supp. at 956-57, 970 (7 counts, 15 defendants); Vastola, 670 F.Supp. at 1251 (114 counts, 21 defendants); Gallo, 668 F.Supp. at 738 (22 counts, 16 defendants). Thus, the complexity of the trial here is not as extreme as the cases cited. Although the complexity of the trial increases as the number of counts and defendants in the indictment increases, this case presents neither double-digit defendants nor double-digit counts. The indictment, however, charges more than one conspiracy. Count 1 charges a RICO conspiracy; Count 2 lists (1) conspiracy to take over the Belli gambling business as a racketeering act; (2) conspiracy to take over the Stumpo-Barbarulla gambling business as a racketeering act; and (3) conspiracy to commit the murder of Vincent Mistretta as a racketeering act. Each conspiracy involves different defendants in different combinations. Thus, the jury will be required to distinguish separate conspiracies and conspirators. As alleged members of the same conspiracy, statements of one coconspirator would be conditionally admissible against all other defendants alleged to have participated in that conspiracy; thus, the jury may have to segregate or to remember over the course of a lengthy trial which statements were admissible against which defendant. Limiting instructions to the jury regarding what evidence was admissible against which defendant would be extraordinarily complex. In making its determination on severance, the court must also consider “disparities in the amount or type of proof offered against the defendants; disparities in the degrees of involvement by defendants in the overall scheme; possible conflict between the various defense theories or trial strategies; and, especially, prejudice from evidence admitted only against co-defendants but which is inadmissible or excluded as to a particular defendant.” Gallo, 668 F.Supp. at 749. A lengthy trial may prejudice those defendants against whom much of the evidence is not relevant simply by the “ ‘slow but inexorable accumulation of evidence’ against the major players.” Id. at 750. This prejudice would be especially acute for those defendants not charged with violent acts, since proof of the substantive RICO count includes, inter alia, acts of murder, beatings, and threats. Those defendants charged with operating gambling businesses that are predicate acts for the substantive RICO charge may be prejudiced by this evidence at a joint trial. Such prejudice is presented by the admission of cocon-spirators’ statements made in the course of a conspiracy to commit a violent act, such as the murder of Vincent Mistretta, when a defendant was not a member of that conspiracy. Although admissible against some defendants, such statements would not be admissible against all defendants. Joint trial would put these statements before the jury and could prejudice defendants not charged with the conspiracy. This disparity in the degree of participation in the violent crimes charged as predicate acts substantially prejudices those defendants not charged with heinous acts. Nonetheless, if members of the enterprise, these defendants may have acquiesced in the acts of violence or tacitly approved of such acts. Defendants have offered no evidence that any will present antagonistic defenses. Three defendants are currently detained before trial. See United States v. Gatto, 727 F.Supp. 903 (D.N.J.1989). Thus, the length of detention before they may be proved guilty of any crime may be further extended by a prolonged trial. This factor weighs heavily in favor of expediting their trial by severing the trials of peripheral defendants. This court has previously determined that severance of trials for defendants named in a substantive RICO count from those named in a RICO conspiracy count was not appropriate. See Vastola, 670 F.Supp. at 1261-62. Cf. Gambino, 729 F.Supp. at 970-71 (alleged coconspirators divided into two groups, one of which contained leaders of conspiracy who were active over its entire length and committed nearly all alleged acts of violence). In Vas-tóla, the court reasoned that the government should not be prevented from prosecuting those cases that the RICO statute was intended to combat. Vastola, 670 F.Supp. at 1262. Additionally, the similarities in proofs for the substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy counts substantially overlap. Alleged participants in a conspiracy should ordinarily be tried together for purposes of judicial efficiency and consistency, even when the quantum of evidence against each defendant varies widely. See United States v. Ward, 793 F.2d 551, 556 (3d Cir.1986). Nonetheless, the rationale of judicial efficiency that supports joint trial of coconspirators is not met when the size of the conspiracy is so large that trial consumes months and months of the court’s schedule. Here, the government estimates that its case will take three months to present. Defendants estimate that the complete trial will take over a year. The court is extremely reluctant to ask jurors to spend the next.year serving in federal court because such service causes an enormous disruption in their lives. This disruption may distract from the jury’s ability to devote its full attention to the trial and to render a fair verdict. This court may also consider judicial administration in determining whether to sever the trial of certain defendants. A lengthy trial would necessitate adjournments and cause delays in this court’s already overloaded civil and criminal calendar. Although severing a conspiracy trial may require the presentation of duplicative evidence, the pace of later trials would quicken with the government’s and the court’s familiarity with the case. See Gallo, 668 F.Supp. at 757. The court is also concerned about the potential for prejudicial spillover from the government’s case against defendants Louis Gatto Sr., Alan Grecco, Stefano Maz-zola, and Joseph Gatto. These defendants are named in racketeering acts that include acts of violence, such as conspiracy to commit murder and extortionate collections of credit. Defendants Louis Gatto Jr., Odier-no, Mylenki, and Camiscioli, however, are named only as managers in the sports or numbers gambling businesses. The court finds that a lengthy trial that requires proof of violent crimes may prejudice the defendants not charged with violent crimes. The court concludes that, due to the multiple conspiracies charged in the indictment, the jury may be unable to compartmentalize the evidence against each defendant for each conspiracy. Additionally, because the lengthy joint trial of this case would cause extreme hardship to the court, the jury, the defendants, and counsel, and because those defendants not charged with violent predicate acts may be prejudiced by substantial proof of violent acts by code-fendants, this court will sever the trials into two group trials. The first group will consist of defendants Louis Gatto Sr., Alan Grecco, Stefano Mazzola, and Joseph Gatto. The second group will consist of defendants Louis Gatto Jr., Odierno, Mylenki, and Camiscioli. Severance along these lines will permit expedited trial of all defendants currently detained before trial. Additionally, those defendants charged with violent predicate acts will be segregated from those defendants who are not, minimizing the potential for prejudicial spillover. While the court recognizes that such a severance may require some duplicity, in a complicated, multi-count, multidefendant RICO and RICO conspiracy trial, such a severance may serve judicial economy and improve the likelihood that the jury will return a fair verdict. 2. Need for Exculpatory Testimony Defendants Camiscioli and Grec-co also move for severance of their trials based on the need for codefendants’ testimony that purportedly will exculpate them. Defendants Louis Gatto Sr., Joseph Gatto, and Louis Gatto Jr. (“Gatto defendants”) join in all motions of defendant Grecco; presumably, they each assert the need for the exculpatory testimony of a codefend-ant. Persons who are properly joined in an indictment generally are to be tried together, particularly if conspiracy is charged, so that the full extent of the conspiracy may be developed. United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d 194,199 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071, 103 S.Ct. 492, 74 L.Ed.2d 634 (1982). Severance of trials may be required, however, where one defendant’s testimony will exculpate a eodefendant. Where a motion for severance is based on the asserted need for a codefendant’s testimony, the moving defendant must establish (1) a bona fide need for the testimony of his codefendant, (2) the likelihood that the co-defendant would testify at a second trial and waive his fifth amendment privilege, (3) the substance of his codefendant’s testimony, and (4) the exculpatory nature and effect of such testimony. United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827, 832 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 2248, 56 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978). Once defendant has made such a showing, the court must (1) examine the significance of the testimony-in relation to the defendant’s theory of defense; (2) assess the extent of prejudice caused by the absence of the testimony; (3) pay close attention to judicial administration and economy; (4) give weight to the timeliness of the motion; and (5) consider the likelihood that the codefendant’s testimony could be impeached. Provenzano, 688 F.2d at 199; United States v. Butler, 611 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir.1980). To satisfy the requirement to show that the codefendant would testify and waive his fifth amendment privilege at a severed trial, the movant is not required to establish such willingness to “an absolute certainty;” he need only show “[a] reasonable probability ... that the proffered testimony would, in fact, materialize.... ” United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 778 (4th Cir.1971). The requirement of a showing of willingness to testify if there is a severance is not met when that offer to testify is conditioned on the codefendant’s case being tried first. United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 779 (4th Cir.1983) (no severance required where codefendant did not testify in own defense); United States v. Frazier, 394 F.2d 258, 261 (4th Cir.) (gamble that codefendant would “throw [defendant] a bone by way of alibi” insufficient), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 984, 89 S.Ct. 457, 21 L.Ed.2d 445 (1968) (condition that codefend-ant be tried first vitiates good faith of the proffer). The requirement that the movant establish the “exculpatory nature and effect” of the codefendant’s testimony demands more than a “vague and conclusory statement of counsel of facts of purely cumulative or negligible weight or probative value,” Par-odi, 703 F.2d at 780; the showing must be sufficiently definite for a determination by the trial court of the testimony’s exculpatory nature and effect. United States v. Butler, 611 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830, 101 S.Ct. 97, 66 L.Ed.2d 35 (1980) (testimony not so clearly exculpatory to justify midtrial severance). The showing must be such as to establish that the moving defendant “will be unable to obtain a fair trial without severance, not merely that a separate trial would offer him [or her] a better chance of acquittal,” United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 (7th Cir.1977), or to offer evidence that “merely contradicts part of the Government’s proof.” United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 680 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124, 102 S.Ct. 2944, 73 L.Ed.2d 1340 (1982). The trial court must also assess the “degree to which the testifying co-defendant could be impeached.” United States v. Provenzano, 688 F.2d at 199. Finally, the court must consider judicial economy and timeliness of defendant’s motion. Applying these factors to the individual defendants, the court finds that no defendant has met his burden to show that this court must sever his trial to permit a code-fendant’s testimony that would exculpate him. Defendants Camiscioli, Louis Gatto Sr., Joseph Gatto, and Louis Gatto Jr. have failed to make a bona fide showing of the need for the testimony of a codefendant. The court will deny their motions to sever on this basis. Defendant Grecco contends that Joseph Gatto can exculpate him from charges that he threatened Stumpo or that he attended a meeting at which the murder of Arthur Belli was planned. Grecco has failed to establish, however, any likelihood that Joseph Gatto would waive his fifth amendment privilege to testify at a second trial for Grecco. While the substance of such testimony shows it would be exculpatory, Grecco has not met his initial burden to show there is a reasonable probability that Joseph Gatto would testify at separate trials. Thus, this court need not consider whether Joseph Gatto is impeachable. Grecco’s motion for severance of his trial will be denied on the basis of the need for a codefendant’s exculpatory testimony. B. Motions Attacking the Indictment 1. Motion to Strike Violent Acts from Indictment Defendant Grecco and the Gat-to defendants argue that this court should strike from the indictment any reference to homicides and other violent acts because the charges are brought in bad faith by the government, are stale, and severely prejudice defendants’ ability to obtain a fair trial. They maintain that the government deliberately delayed the indictment to prejudice defendants by the absence of potential alibi witnesses through death or unavailability and that such prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of such evidence. Defendants contend that the allegations of violent acts are brought in bad faith because they have nothing to do with the central charge of gambling; therefore, this court must strike the acts of violence from the indictment, (citing United States v. Aiken, 373 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 833, 88 S.Ct. 32, 19 L.Ed.2d 93 (1967)). Aiken, however, stands for the proposition that, where join-der of offenses is originally proper under Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for severance after dismissal of the count justifying joinder will not be granted unless defendant is prejudiced by joinder or the count dismissed was not alleged in good faith, that is, with reasonable expectation that sufficient proof would be forthcoming at trial. Id. The case in no way supports striking the violent acts from the indictment for charges brought in bad faith. Even if Aiken stood for this proposition, defendants have not shown that the government brought the charges without reasonable expectation that sufficient proof would be forthcoming at trial to link the violent acts with the gambling operations. In fact, the prolonged detention hearings in this case show that the government has adequate evidence to support a reasonable expectation that sufficient proof will be presented at trial. See United States v. Gatto, 727 F.Supp. 903, 915 (D.N.J.1989) (evidence of dangerousness is clear, convincing, and overwhelming). At the detention hearings, the government presented evidence that violent acts were committed to accomplish the takeover of competing gambling businesses; this nexus sufficiently links the acts of violence to the central charge of gambling to warrant inclusion of the violent acts here. The government also presented evidence that Vincent Mistretta was murdered to prevent his becoming an informant against defendants, thereby protecting the gambling business from law enforcement. This nexus likewise connects the allegations of violence to the gambling business. In the alternative, defendants argue that they are severely prejudiced by the delay of the government in returning an indictment on these acts of violence; thus, the court must dismiss the indictment. The due process clause of the fifth amendment may require dismissal for preindictment delay where the delay is an intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325, 92 S.Ct. 455, 466, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) (due process claims premature where no actual prejudice alleged and no showing that government intentionally delayed to gain tactical advantage). Defendants here claim that preindictment delay gives the government a tactical advantage because witnesses who could exculpate them are dead or otherwise unavailable; therefore, they are substantially prejudiced. The United States Supreme Court, however, has stated that, while prejudice is an element of a claim for due process violation by preindictment delay, it is not necessarily sufficient evidence of a due process violation. See United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2049, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (due process inquiry into reason for delay). Rather, the court must consider the reason for the delay; a good faith investigative delay does not violate due process. Id. at 790-91, 97 S.Ct. at 2049. The Court noted that a prosecutor abides by the elementary standards of “fair play and decency” by refusing to seek indictments until he or she “is completely satisfied that he [or she] should prosecute and will be able promp