Full opinion text
OMNIBUS ORDER HOEVELER, District Judge. THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on the several motions of Defendants General Manuel Antonio Noriega and Lt. Col. Luis Del Cid to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the indictment which charges them with various narcotics-related offenses. The case at bar presents the Court with a drama of international proportions, considering the status of the principal defendant and the difficult circumstances under which he was brought before this Court. The pertinent facts are as follows: On February 14, 1988, a federal grand jury sitting in Miami, Florida returned a twelve-count indictment charging General Manuel Antonio Noriega with participating in an international conspiracy to import cocaine and materials used in producing cocaine into and out of the United States. Noriega is alleged to have exploited his official position as head of the intelligence branch of the Panamanian National Guard, and then as Commander-in-Chief of the Panamanian Defense Forces, to receive payoffs in return for assisting and protecting international drug traffickers, including various members of the Medellin Cartel, in conducting narcotics and money laundering operations in Panama. Specifically, the indictment charges that General Noriega protected cocaine shipments from Colombia through Panama to the United States; arranged for the transshipment and sale to the Medellin Cartel of ether and acetone, including such chemicals previously seized by the Panamanian Defense Forces; provided refuge and a base for continued operations for the members of the Medellin Cartel after the Colombian government’s crackdown on drug traffickers following the murder of the Colombian Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla; agreed to protect a cocaine laboratory in Darien Province, Panama; and assured the safe passage of millions of dollars of narcotic proceeds from the United States into Panamanian banks. Noriega also allegedly traveled to Havana, Cuba and met with Cuban president Fidel Castro, who, according to the indictment, mediated a dispute between Noriega and the Cartel caused by the Panamanian troops’ seizure of a drug laboratory that Noriega was paid to protect. All of these activities were allegedly undertaken for General Noriega’s own personal profit. Defendant Del Cid, in addition to being an officer in the Panamanian Defense Forces, was General Noriega’s personal secretary. He is charged with acting as liaison, courier, and emissary for Noriega in his transactions with Cartel members and other drug traffickers. Because of the activities alleged, Defendants are charged with engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the RICO statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d); conspiracy to distribute and import cocaine into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; and distributing and aiding and abetting the distribution of cocaine, intending that it be imported into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 959 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Defendant Noriega is further charged with aiding and abetting the manufacture of cocaine destined for the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 959 and 18 U.S.C. § 2; conspiring to manufacture cocaine intending that it be imported into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; and causing interstate travel and use of facilities in interstate commerce to promote an unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Subsequent to the indictment, the Court granted General Noriega’s motion to allow special appearance of counsel, despite the fact that Noriega was a fugitive and not before the Court at that time. Noriega’s counsel then moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that United States laws could not be applied to a foreign leader whose alleged illegal activities all occurred outside the territorial bounds of the United States. Counsel further argued that Noriega was immune from prosecution as a head of state and diplomat, and that his alleged narcotics offenses constituted acts of state not properly reviewable by this Court. Upon hearing arguments of counsel, and after due consideration of the memoranda filed, the Court denied Defendant’s motion, for reasons fully set forth below. At that time, the Court noted that this case was fraught with political overtones, but that it was nonetheless unlikely that General Noriega would ever be brought to the United States to answer the charges against him. The former observation proved to be considerably more correct than the latter, in light of subsequent events. In the interval between the time the indictment was issued and Defendants were arrested, relations between the United States and General Noriega deteriorated considerably. Shortly after charges against Noriega were brought, the General delivered a widely publicized speech in which he brought a machete crashing down on a podium while denouncing the United States. On December 15, 1989, Noriega declared that a “state of war” existed between Panama and the United States. Tensions between the two countries further increased the next day, when U.S. military forces in Panama were put on alert after Panamanian troops shot and killed an American soldier, wounded another, and beat a Navy couple. Three days later, on December 20,1989, President Bush ordered U.S. troops into combat in Panama City on a mission whose stated goals were to safeguard American lives, restore democracy, preserve the Panama Canal treaties, and seize General Noriega to face federal drug charges in the United States. Before U.S. troops were engaged, American officials arranged a ceremony in which Guillermo Endara was sworn in as president and recognized by the United States as the legitimate head of the government of Panama. Endara was reported to have won the Panamanian presidential election held several months earlier, the results of which were nullified and disregarded by General Noriega. Not long after the invasion commenced, Defendant Del Cid, the commander of about two thousand Panamanian troops located in the Chiriqui Province, surrendered to American forces. He was then transferred into the custody of agents from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, who thereupon arrested Del Cid for the offenses for which he is under indictment in this Court. The apprehension of General Noriega was not quite so easy. He successfully eluded American forces for several days, prompting the United States government to offer a one million dollar bounty for his capture. Eventually, the General took sanctuary in the Papal Nunci-ature in Panama City, where he apparently hoped to be granted political asylum. Noriega’s presence in the Papal Nunciature touched off a diplomatic impasse and a round of intense negotiations involving several countries. Vatican officials initially refused to turn Noriega over to the United States. While he was still ensconced in the nunciature, American troops stationed outside pelted the building with loud rock-and-roll music blasted through loudspeakers. The music was played continuously for three days until church authorities protested the action as offensive. After an eleven-day standoff, Noriega finally surrendered to American forces, apparently under pressure from the papal nuncio and influenced by a threatening crowd of about 15,000 angry Panamanian citizens who had gathered outside the residence. On January 3, 1990, two weeks after the invasion began, Noriega walked out of the Papal Nunciature and surrendered himself to U.S. military officials waiting outside. He was flown by helicopter to Howard Air Force Base, where he was ushered into a plane bound for Florida and formally arrested by agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency. During the course of this litigation, which has included several hearings, no evidence was presented nor suggestion made that Noriega was in any way physically mistreated. As is evident from the unusual factual background underlying this case, the Court is presented with several issues of first impression. This is the first time that a leader or de facto leader of a sovereign nation has been forcibly brought to the United States to face criminal charges. The fact that General Noriega’s apprehension occurred in the course of a military action only further underscores the complexity of the issues involved. In addition to Defendant Noriega’s motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense and sovereign immunity, Defendants Noriega and Del Cid argue that they are prisoners of war pursuant to the Geneva Convention. This status, Defendants maintain, deprives the Court of jurisdiction to proceed with the case. Additionally, Noriega contends that the military action which brought about his arrest is “shocking to the conscience”, and that due process considerations require the Court to divest itself of jurisdiction over his person. Noriega also asserts that the invasion occurred in violation of international law. Finally, Noriega argues that, even in the absence of constitutional or treaty violations, the Court should dismiss the indictment pursuant to its supervisory powers so as to prevent the judicial system from being party to and tainted by the government’s alleged misconduct in arresting Noriega. The Court examines each of these issues, in turn, below. 1. JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE The first issue confronting the Court is whether the United States may exercise jurisdiction over Noriega’s alleged criminal activities. Noriega maintains that “the extraterritorial application of the criminal law is unreasonable under the unique facts of this case, and cannot be relied upon to secure jurisdiction over a leader of a sovereign nation who has personally performed no illegal acts within the borders of the United States.” Although the defendant attempts to weave his asserted status as a foreign leader into his challenge to the extraterritorial application of this country’s criminal laws, the question of whether the United States may proscribe conduct which occurs beyond its borders is separate from the question of whether Noriega is immune from prosecution as a head of state. This distinction is made clear in the defendant’s own discussion of the applicable international law on extraterritorial jurisdiction, which does not look to a foreign defendant’s official status but rather to the nature and effect of the conduct at issue. The Court therefore reserves analysis of Noriega’s claim to head of state immunity and confines its discussion here to the ability of the United States to reach and prosecute acts committed by aliens outside its territorial borders. While the indictment cites specific instances of conduct occurring within the United States, including the shipment of cocaine from Panama to Miami and several flights to and from Miami by Noriega’s alleged co-conspirators, the activity ascribed to Noriega occurred solely in Panama with the exception of the one trip to Cuba. Noriega is charged with providing safe haven to international narcotic traffickers by allowing Panama to be used ^ as a location for the manufacture and shipment of cocaine destined for this country’s shores. Where a court is faced with the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the analysis to be applied is 1) whether the United States has the power to reach the conduct in question under traditional principles of international law; and 2) whether the statutes under which the defendant is charged are intended to have extraterritorial effect. As Noriega concedes, the United States has long possessed the ability to attach criminal consequences to acts occurring outside this country which produce effects within the United States. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285, 31 S.Ct. 558, 560, 55 L.Ed. 735 (1911); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States [hereinafter Restatement (Third)] § 402(l)(c). For example, the United States would unquestionably have authority to prosecute a person standing in Canada who fires a bullet across the border which strikes a second person standing in the United States. See Restatement (Third) § 402, Comment d. “All the nations of the world recognize ‘the principle that a man who outside of a country willfully puts in motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where the evil is done ... ”’ Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 887 (5th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884, 88 S.Ct. 151, 19 L.Ed.2d 181 (1967). The objective territorial theory of jurisdiction, which focuses on the effects or intended effects of conduct, can be traced to Justice Holmes’ statement that “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce or producing effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power.” Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. at 285, 31 S.Ct. at 560. See also Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234, 2 L.Ed. 249 (1804) (“[a nation’s] power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.”). Even if the extraterritorial conduct produces no effect within the United States, a defendant may still be reached if he was part of a conspiracy in which some co-conspirator’s activities took place within United States territory. United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir.1980). The former Fifth Circuit, whose decisions establish precedent for this Court, has on numerous occasions upheld jurisdiction over foreigners who conspired to import narcotics into the United States but never entered this country nor personally performed any acts within its territorial limits, as long as there was proof of an overt act committed within the United States by a co-conspirator. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832, 100 S.Ct. 61, 62 L.Ed.2d 40 (1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825, 96 S.Ct. 39, 46 L.Ed.2d 41 (1975); Rivard v. United States, supra. More recently, international law principles have expanded to permit jurisdiction upon a mere showing of intent to produce effects in this country, without requiring proof of an overt act or effect within the United States. See United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 168 (3rd Cir.1986); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d at 886, n. 39; United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d at 358, 360. According to the Restatement (Third): Cases involving intended but unrealized effect are rare, but international law does not preclude jurisdiction in such instances, subject to the principle of reasonableness. When the intent to commit the proscribed act is clear and demonstrated by some activity, and the éffect to be produced by the activity is substantial and foreseeable, the fact that a plan or conspiracy was thwarted does not deprive the target state of jurisdiction to make its law applicable. § 402, Comment d. In the drug smuggling context, the ‘intent doctrine’ has resulted in jurisdiction over persons who attempted to import narcotics into the United States but never actually succeeded in entering the United States or delivering drugs within its borders. The fact that no act was committed and no repercussions were felt within the United States did not preclude jurisdiction over conduct that was clearly directed at the United States. United States v. Wright-Barker, supra (“The purpose of these [narcotics laws] is to halt smugglers before they introduce their dangerous wares into and distribute them in this country.”) (emphasis in original); United States v. Quemener, 789 F.2d 145, 156 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 829, 107 S.Ct. 110, 93 L.Ed.2d 58 (1986); United States v. Loalza-Vasquez, 735 F.2d 153, 156 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d at 138-39. These principles unequivocally support jurisdiction in this case. The indictment charges Noriega with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States and alleges several overt acts performed within the United States in furtherance of the conspiracy. Specifically, the indictment alleges that co-conspirators of Noriega purchased a Lear jet in Miami, which was then used to transport drug proceeds from Miami to Panama. Moreover, Noriega’s activities in Panama, if true, undoubtedly produced effects within this country as deleterious as the hypothetical bullet fired across the border. The indictment alleges that, as a result of Noriega’s facilitation of narcotics activity in Panama, 2,141 pounds of cocaine were illegally brought into Miami from Panama. While the ability of the United States to reach and proscribe extraterritorial conduct having effects in this country does not depend on the amount of narcotics imported into the United States or the magnitude of the consequences, the importation of over 2,000 pounds of cocaine clearly has a harmful impact and merits jurisdiction. Finally, even if no overt acts or effects occurred within the territorial borders, the object of the alleged conspiracy was to import cocaine into the United States and therefore an intent to produce effects is present. The defendant’s argument that the exercise of jurisdiction over his alleged activities in Panama is unreasonable is simply unsupportable in light of established principles of international law and the overwhelming case law in this Circuit upholding jurisdiction under similar circumstances. Other than asserting his status as a foreign leader, which presents a different question from the one posed here, Noriega does not distinguish this case from those cited above. He cites the principle of reasonableness recently articulated in the Restatement (Third) § 403, but fails to say how extending jurisdiction over his conduct would be unreasonable. In fact, the defendant’s invocation of a reasonableness requirement supports rather than undermines the application of jurisdiction in the present case. Thus, for example, Noriega quotes the following language from the Restatement: In applying the principle of reasonableness, the exercise of criminal (as distinguished from civil) jurisdiction in relation to acts committed in another state may be perceived as particularly intrusive. It is generally accepted by enforcement agencies of the United States government that criminal jurisdiction over activity with substantial foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly than civil jurisdiction over the- same activity, and only upon strong justification. Restatement (Third) § 403, Reporters’ Note 8. However, the same section of the Restatement establishes that narcotics offenses provide the strong justification meriting criminal jurisdiction: “Prosecution for activities committed in a foreign state have generally been limited to serious and universally condemned offenses, such as treason or traffic in narcotics, and to offenses by and against military forces. In such cases the state in whose territory the act occurs is not likely to object to regulation by the state concerned.” Id. (citations omitted). The Restatement therefore explicitly recognizes the reasonableness of extending jurisdiction to narcotics activity such as that alleged here. See also United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d at 168 (construing § 403 to permit jurisdiction over extraterritorial narcotics trafficking). Even if another state were likely to object to jurisdiction here, the United States has a strong interest in halting the flow of illicit drugs across its borders. In assessing the reasonableness of extraterritorial jurisdiction, one of the factors to be considered is the character of the activity to be regulated, including the importance of regulation to the regulating state and the degree to which the desire to regulate is generally accepted. Restatement (Third) § 403(l)(c). The consensus of the American public on the need to stem the flow of drugs into this country is well publicized and need not be elaborated upon in detail. Further, the Court notes that the United States has an affirmative duty to enact and enforce legislation to curb illicit drug trafficking under the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, 18 U.S.T. 1409, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, New York, March 30, 1961, ratified by the United States, 1967, amended 26 U.S.T. 1441, T.I.A.S. No. 8118. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 830-31 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 778, 83 L.Ed.2d 774 (1985) (discussing the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs). Given the serious nature of the drug epidemic in this country, certainly the efforts of the United States to combat the problem by prosecuting conduct directed against itself cannot be subject to the protests of a foreign government profiting at its expense. In any case, the Court is not made aware of any instance in which the Republic of Panama objected to the regulation of drug trafficking by the United States. In sum, because Noriega’s conduct in Panama is alleged to have resulted in a direct effect within the United States, the Court concludes that extraterritorial jurisdiction is appropriate as a matter of international law. This conclusion does not end the Court’s analysis, however, since a further requirement is that the criminal statutes under which the defendant is charged be intended to apply to conduct outside the United States. Noriega is charged with violations of 21 U.S.C. § 959 (distributing a controlled substance with the knowledge that it would be unlawfully imported into the United States); 21 U.S.C. § 952 (importing a controlled substance into the United States from a place outside thereof); 21 U.S.C. § 963 (conspiring to commit the above offenses); and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting the violation of § 959). The indictment also alleges that Noriega participated in a pattern of racketeering activity consisting of the above crimes, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), §§ 1962(c) and 1962(d), and caused the travel and use of facilities in interstate and foreign commerce in furtherance of a narcotics conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). Section 959, prohibiting the distribution of narcotics intending that they be imported into the United States, is clearly meant to apply extraterritorially. The statute expressly states that it is “intended to reach acts of manufacture or distribution committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 959(c). The remaining statutes, by contrast, do not on their face indicate an express intention that they be given extraterritorial effect. Where a statute is silent as to its extraterritorial reach, a presumption against such application normally applies. United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137, 105 S.Ct. 2679, 86 L.Ed.2d 698 (1985). However, “such statutes may be given extraterritorial effect if the nature of the law permits it and Congress intends it. Absent an express intention on the face of the statutes to do so, the exercise of that power may be inferred from the nature of the offenses and Congress’ other legislative efforts to eliminate the type of crime involved.” United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d at 136. (citing United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98, 43 S.Ct. 39, 41, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922). With respect to 21 U.S.C. § 952, it is apparent from the very nature of the offense that the statute was intended to reach extraterritorial acts. Section 952 makes it unlawful to import narcotics “into the United States from any place outside thereof .. ” (emphasis added). Because importation by definition involves acts originating outside of the territorial limits of the United States, the Court can only infer that § 952 applies to conduct which begins abroad; any interpretation to the contrary would render the statute virtually meaningless. United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1259. With jurisdiction over the substantive violations of §§ 959 and 952 established, jurisdiction over the conspiracy and aiding and abetting counts likewise follows. Since a conspiracy to commit an offense is closely related to the offense itself, courts have regularly inferred the extraterritorial reach of the § 963 conspiracy statute on the basis of a finding that the substantive statutes apply abroad. See, e.g., Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1311 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031, 105 S.Ct. 1403, 84 L.Ed.2d 790 (1985); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d at 139. The same must be said for an aiding and abetting charge; if anything, the act of aiding and abetting is even more intimately connected to the underlying crime. In short, the Court perceives no sound jurisdictional reason for distinguishing the conspiracy and aiding and abetting charges from the substantive offense for purposes of extraterritorial application. Section 963 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 must therefore be given extraterritorial effect as well. Whether the RICO and Travel Act statutes reach conduct abroad is a more difficult question. None of the cases cited by the parties address this point and the Court is unaware of any case reaching the issue. The question of these statutes’ extraterritorial effect is therefore a matter of apparent first impression. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d), and the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), apply to conduct outside the United States. Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for “any person associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ...” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (emphasis added). Section 1962(d) similarly makes it illegal for “any person to conspire to violate” Section 1962(c). 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (emphasis added). These prohibitions are on their face all-inclusive and do not suggest parochial application. Indeed, if any statute reaches far and wide, it is RICO. When Congress passed RICO, it was primarily concerned with eradicating the destructive influence of organized crime on our society: (1) organized crime in the United States ... annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy ... (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation’s economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens. RICO Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub.L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1078, 1073. Though its emphasis is on economic effects, RICO itself is not so limited; it’s history demonstrates concern with our domestic security and welfare as well as our gross national product. Marcos III, 862 F.2d at 1366 (Schroeder, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part). While the Statement of Findings and Purpose speaks of criminal activities “in the United States,” the Court must be cognizant of the overall purpose of the Act and the extent to which Congress intended it have effect. The legislative history leaves no doubt that RICO was to be read expansively as a means of attacking organized crime at every level and on an unprecedented scope. Congress noted that: What is needed here ... are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts. S.Rep. No. 91-617, p. 76 (1969) (emphasis added). It is in this spirit of attacking crime “on all fronts” that all of the Act’s provisions must be read. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3286, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). Congress specifically admonished that “RICO be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose,” and toward that end consciously constructed RICO in expansive and far-reaching language. As the Seventh Circuit has observed: [I]n RICO, we confront a statute which is ... above all, deliberately and extraordinarily broad ... In defining the key terms of the statute, such as ‘person,’ ‘enterprise,’ and ‘racketeering activity,’ and in leaving undefined such broad terms as ‘conduct’ and ‘participate,’ Congress deliberately chose to employ broad terms which would defy judicial confinement ... Congress [chose] to employ that extraordinarily broad language in order to achieve its desired goals. In response to suggestions that the statute be more narrowly tailored to prevent unexpected applications, Congress clearly preferred breadth to precision. Haroco Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d at 398. Given the Act’s broad construction and equally broad goal of eliminating the harm- \ ful consequences of organized crime, it is apparent that Congress was concerned with the effects and not the locus of racketeering activities. The Act thus permits no inference that it was intended to apply only to conduct within the United States. Such a narrow construction would frustrate RICO’s purpose by allowing persons engaged in racketeering activities directed at the United States to escape RICO’s bite simply by moving their operations abroad. Yet in the context of narcotics activities, perhaps the greatest threat to this country’s welfare comes from enterprises outside the United States such as the Colombian cocaine cartels. Keeping in mind Congress’ specific instruction that RICO be applied liberally to effect its remedial purpose, the Court cannot suppose that RICO does not reach such harmful conduct simply because it is extraterritorial in nature. As long as the racketeering activities produce effects or are intended to produce effects in this country, RICO applies. Noriega is also charged with violating the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3), by causing foreign travel and the use of facilities in foreign and interstate commerce to promote an unlawful activity. The indictment alleges that, on two separate occasions, co-conspirators of Noriega used an airplane to transport drug proceeds from Miami to Panama. Like RICO, the Travel Act was originally designed to combat organized crime. Specifically, “the purpose of the Travel Act was to aid local law enforcement officials. In many instances, the ‘top men' of a given criminal enterprise resided in one State but conducted their illegal activities in another; by creating a federal interest in limiting the interstate movement necessary to such operations, criminal conduct beyond the reach of local officials could be controlled.” United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 534, 536, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969). The Act was thus an attempt to reach criminal activities uniquely broad and transitory in scope, i.e., those whose influence extend beyond state and national borders and therefore require federal assistance. S.Rep. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1961). While courts have sometimes, as above, referred to persons “residing in one state,” the Act itself indicates no such territorial limitation; the reference is therefore more properly understood as calling attention to the interstate character of the activity rather than the defendant’s location. Stated more broadly, the Act “constitutes an effort to deny individuals who act for criminal purposes access to the channels of commerce.” Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 246, 93 S.Ct. 477, 482, 34 L.Ed.2d 446 (1972). In this case, the defendant allegedly participated in a criminal syndicate which utilized the channels of commerce to carry out illegal drug activities in the United States. His location may have differed from the typical defendant charged under the Travel Act but the nature and effect of the alleged activity is the same, and implicates the same congressional desire to reach conduct which transcends state lines both physically and symbolically. Support for extraterritorial application of § 1952(a)(3) is also found in the statutory language, which suggests no restriction based upon the locus of conduct other than that it result in activity crossing state lines: The words of section 1952 are general; they contain no restriction to particular persons or to particular kinds of gambling, liquor, narcotics, and prostitution offenses. ... [A]s we read the legislative record, Congress meant exactly what the language of Section 1952 states — it deliberately chose to make the statute applicable generally, and without crippling restrictions, to any person engaged in any kind of illicit business enterprise in one of the four fields of activity specified in the statute, which experience showed to be those in which organized racketeers commonly engaged. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 885 (9th Cir.1970), cert. den., 401 U.S. 924, 91 S.Ct. 883, 27 L.Ed.2d 828 (1971). The precise issue in Roselli involved the Travel Act’s application to criminal activity notwithstanding the defendant’s lack of participation in a traditional organized syndicate, but the court’s analysis of the statute’s liberal coverage seemingly applies here as well. In short, the Court finds that where, as here, the defendant causes interstate travel or activity to promote an unlawful purpose, § 1952(a)(3) applies, whether or not the defendant is physically present in the United States. Jurisdiction over Defendant’s extraterritorial conduct is therefore appropriate both as a matter of international law and statutory construction. II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY The Court next turns to Noriega’s assertion that he is immune from prosecution based on head of state immunity, the act of state doctrine, and diplomatic immunity. A. Head of State Immunity Grounded in customary international law, the doctrine of head of state immunity provides that a head of state is not subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts, at least as to official acts taken during the ruler’s term of office. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108, 1110 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890, 108 S.Ct. 212, 98 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 44-45 (2d Cir.1988). The rationale behind the doctrine is to promote international comity and respect among sovereign nations by ensuring that leaders are free to perform their governmental duties without being subject to detention, arrest, or embarrassment in a foreign country’s legal system. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe # 700, 817 F.2d at 1110; see generally, Note, Resolving the Confusion Over Head of State Immunity; The Defined Right of Kings, 86 Colum.L.Rev. 169, 171-79 (1986). In order to assert head of state immunity, a government official must be recognized as a head of state. Noriega has never been recognized as Panama’s Head of State either under the Panamanian Constitution or by the United States. Title VI, Article 170 of the Panamanian Constitution provides for an executive branch composed of the President and Ministers of State, neither of which applies to Noriega. Officially, Noriega is the Commandante of the Panamanian Defense Forces, but he was never elected to head Panama’s government and in fact abrogated the Panamanian presidential elections of May 7, 1989. More importantly, the United States government has never accorded Noriega head of state status, but rather continued to recognize President Eric Arturo Delvalle as the legitimate leader of Panama while Noriega was in power. As this Court held in a previous case involving the Republic of Panama, the Executive’s decision to recognize President Delvalle and not the Defendant as Panama’s head of state is binding on the Court. Republic of Panama v. Air Panama, 745 F.Supp. 669 (S.D.Fla.1988). The ruling in that case — which I find no reason to depart from here — was based on a line of case law holding that recognition of foreign governments and their leaders is a discretionary foreign policy decision committed to the Executive Branch and thus conclusive upon the courts. See Republic of Panama v. Citizens and Southern Int’l. Bank, 682 F.Supp. 1544, 1545 (S.D. Fla.1988); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589, 63 S.Ct. 793, 800, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943); Banco De Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 442 (2d Cir.1940); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137, 58 S.Ct. 785, 791, 82 L.Ed. 1224 (1938); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328, 57 S.Ct. 758, 759-60, 81 L.Ed. 1134 (1937); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212-214, 11 S.Ct. 80, 83-84, 34 L.Ed. 691 (1890). See also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36, 65 S.Ct. 530, 532-33, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945) (“It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow, or allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize.”). Aside from the fact that neither Panama nor the United States recognizes Noriega as a head of state, the defendant concedes that he does not fit within traditional notions of a head of state as defined by customary international law. He nonetheless argues that he is entitled to head of state immunity as the de facto ruler of Panama, “regardless of the source of his power or the nature of his rule.” The defendant cites numerous newspaper reports and excerpts of congressional testimony to the effect that Noriega effectively controlled Panama. In fact, this Court has previously acknowledged that, despite the official recognition of Delvalle, Noriega was the defacto head of Panama’s government. United States v. Noriega, 683 F.Supp. at 1374, n. 3. But simply because Noriega may have in fact run the country of Panama does not mean he is entitled to head of state immunity, since the grant of immunity is a privilege which the United States may withhold from any claimant. The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812); Note, Defined Right of Kings, supra at 188 (“A ‘head of state’ should be defined as the political or ceremonial head of a government recognized by the United States. Because states grant immunity from their jurisdiction as a privilege, the United States would not extend immunity to officials of governments with which it does not have diplomatic relations.”) (emphasis added). Indeed, deference to the Executive branch in matters concerning relations with foreign nations is the primary rationale supporting immunity for heads of state. See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, supra; In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 45. Since the only reason Noriega would be entitled to immunity as a head of state is because of such judicial deference to the Executive, his claim to a “right” of immunity against the express wishes of the Government is wholly without merit. The “head of state” argument comes to the Court unencumbered by evidence; the arguments were made largely on the basis of general information made available by the media. However, accepting as true statements of counsel regarding Defendant’s position of power, to hold that immunity from prosecution must be granted “regardless of his source of power or nature of rule” would allow illegitimate dictators the benefit of their unscrupulous and possibly brutal seizures of power. No authority exists for such a novel extension of head of state immunity, and the Court declines to create one here. Since the United States has never recognized General Noriega as Panama’s head of state, he has no claim to head of state immunity. B. The Act of State Doctrine Noriega next argues that the act of state doctrine prohibits the Court from adjudicating the legality of his official actions in Panama. Unlike head of state immunity, the act of state doctrine presents no jurisdictional question but instead addresses the Court’s permissible scope of inquiry into certain governmental acts. It is more properly understood as an issue preclusion device rather than an immunity prohibiting prosecution. Restatement (Third) § 443, Reporters’ Note 11. See also National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F.Supp. 622, 640 n. 30 (S.D.N.Y.1978) (contrasting sovereign immunity with the act of state doctrine), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.1979). The classic expression of the doctrine is stated in Underhill v. Hernandez: “Every sovereign is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgement on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.” 168 U.S. 250, 252, 18 S.Ct. 83, 84, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897). More than 60 years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, in which case the Court refused to examine the Cuban government’s taking of property in Cuba owned by a Cuban corporation without compensation. 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964). See also Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F.Supp. 358, 364 (N.D.Ill.1983) (act of state doctrine barred court from examining the Soviet Union’s refusal to allow plaintiff’s husband to emigrate to the United States), aff'd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.1985); Banco De Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d at 443 (court may not determine whether Spanish Finance Minister’s alleged diversion of silver was illegal under Spanish law); Hatch v. Baez, 7 Hun. 596 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1876) (doctrine prevented court from reviewing acts of former president of the Dominican Republic in his official capacity). Although stated in terms of acts of the “State” or “sovereign,” the doctrine also extends to governmental acts of State officials vested with sovereign authority. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772, 68 S.Ct. 88, 92 L.Ed. 357 (1947); Banco De Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d at 444. Whether such officials and their governments need be recognized or “accepted” as such is unclear. The Court in Underhill, supra, held that the act of state doctrine “[cannot] be confined to lawful or recognized governments ... The immunity of individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own states, in the exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil officers or military commanders, must necessarily extend to agents of governments ruling by paramount force as a matter of fact.” 168 U.S. at 252, 18 S.Ct. at 84. Sabbatino, however, indicates otherwise: “[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a sovereign foreign government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit ...” 376 U.S. at 428, 84 S.Ct. at 940. (emphasis added). Resolution of the two cases is unnecessary at this time, however, in light of the Court’s disposition below. In order for the act of state doctrine to apply, the defendant must establish that his activities are “acts of state,” i.e., that they were taken on behalf of the state and not, as private acts, on behalf of the actor himself. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 694, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 1861, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976). “That the acts must be public acts of the sovereign has been repeatedly affirmed.” Marcos I, 806 F.2d at 358. (emphasis in original). Though the distinction between the public and private acts of government officials may prove elusive, this difficulty has not prevented courts from scrutinizing the character of the conduct in question. Id. at 359 (distinguishing deposed Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos’ acts as head of state from his purely private acts); Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695, 96 S.Ct. at 1862 (commercial activities are not acts of state); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F.Supp. 538, 544-45 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (Defense Minister’s alleged support of massacre was not the policy of Israeli government and therefore not an act of state); De Roburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir.1984) (act of state doctrine does not apply to foreign ruler’s private, unofficial acts), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 909, 83 L.Ed.2d 923 (1985); Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir.1962) (foreign dictator’s financial crimes were for his own personal benefit and therefore were not public acts sufficient to invoke act of state defense), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914, 83 S.Ct. 1302, 10 L.Ed.2d 415 (1963). The Court fails to see how Noriega’s alleged drug trafficking and protection of money launderers could conceivably constitute public action taken on behalf of the Panamanian state. Certainly no evidence has been presented to this effect, despite Defendant’s burden of proof on the issue. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 694, 96 S.Ct. at 1861. The indictment in this case charges a series of private acts committed by the defendant for his own personal financial enrichment. It does not allege, and cannot reasonably be construed to charge, that Noriega participated in a racketeering enterprise and conspired to import cocaine into the United States in furtherance of Panama’s state' policy or to serve some overriding national interest. The fact that Noriega is alleged to have utilized his official position to engage in criminal activity does not, as Defendant suggests, cast his actions in a public light; as we well know, government officials are as capable of exploiting their positions of power for private, selfish ends as they are for public purpose. The inquiry is not whether Noriega used his official position to engage in the challenged acts, but whether those acts were taken on behalf of Noriega instead of Panama. Defendant does little more than state that, as the de facto ruler of Panama, his actions constitute acts of state. This sweeping position completely ignores the public/private distinction and suggests that government leaders are, as such, incapable of engaging in private, unofficial conduct. Aside from its lack of logic, suffice it to say that this argument has been implicitly rejected in several cases distinguishing the private from public conduct of heads of state and foreign dictators. See Marcos I, 806 F.2d at 359; Marcos III, 862 F.2d at 1361; De Roburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d at 704; Jimenez, 311 F.2d at 557-58. The notion that Noriega, qua dictator, was essentially the sovereign and that all of his acts are therefore acts of state is most thoroughly undermined by the Jimenez case, supra, an authoritative precedent directly contrary to Noriega’s position. In that case, the Republic of Venezuela alleged that Jimenez, its former president and dictator, had used his position to commit financial crimes for his own personal benefit. Jimenez contended “that as a ‘dictator’ he himself would be the sovereign— the government of Venezuela — and that all his acts constituting the financial crimes with which he is charged ... are acts of state or sovereign acts ...” Id. at 557. The Fifth Circuit took issue: Even though characterized as a dictator, appellant was not himself the sovereign — government—of Venezuela within, the Act of State Doctrine. He was chief executive, a public officer, of the sovereign nation of Venezuela. It is only when officials having sovereign authority act in an official capacity that the Act of State Doctrine applies. Appellant’s acts constituting the financial crimes ... were not acts of Venezuela sovereignty ... [E]ach of these acts was “for the private financial benefit” of the appellant. They constituted common crimes committed by the Chief of State in violation of his position and not in pursuance of it. They are as far from being an act of state as rape ... Id. at 557-58. No fundamental difference separates this case from Jimenez. Nor is the Court persuaded by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Marcos II, supra, upon which Defendant heavily relies. The court in that case held that deposed dictator Ferdinand Marcos’ alleged theft and conversion of property and funds belonging to the Philippine republic were acts of state since “they are activities that Marcos could only have undertaken pursuant to his powers as President of the Philippines.” 818 F.2d at 1479. In a lengthy dissent, Judge Nelson persuasively argued that the majority opinion effectively eviscerated the public/private distinction by providing blanket protection to all of Marcos’ acts during his reign. On rehearing en banc (which occurred after defense counsel’s brief was submitted), the Ninth Circuit reversed this aspect of its decision and essentially adopted Judge Nelson’s position, holding that Marcos had not established that the alleged thefts were public acts. As the Court stated: “Our courts have had no difficulty distinguishing the legal acts of a deposed ruler from his acts for personal profit that lack a basis in law.” Marcos III, 862 F.2d at 1361. Marcos II is thus of no precedential value on this question. Yet another consideration counsels against application of the act of state doctrine to this case. Although originally couched in terms of sovereign immunity, the doctrine as presently developed does not rest on principles of international law or respect for sovereign independence. More recent interpretations of the doctrine instead emphasize the separation of powers rationale — more specifically, the need to preclude judicial encroachment in the field of foreign policy and international diplomacy. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421-23, 84 S.Ct. at 936-37; In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 831; International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163, 102 S.Ct. 1036, 71 L.Ed.2d 319 (1982); Marcos III, supra (“The doctrine is meant to facilitate the foreign relations of the United States, not to furnish the equivalent of sovereign immunity to a deposed ruler.”). In questioning the validity of acts of foreign states, the judiciary may well hinder the Executive’s conduct of foreign affairs and the need to speak with one voice on the world stage. No such danger is present here and in fact the opposite is true since the Executive’s position is amply demonstrated by its decision to indict and prosecute the defendant. See United States v. Evans, 667 F.Supp. 974, 987 (S.D.N.Y.1987). Of course, the Executive’s position, though relevant, is not dispositive. Marcos I, 806 F.2d at 358. “Whether to invoke the act of state doctrine is ultimately and always a judicial question.” Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 n. 2 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934, 106 S.Ct. 30, 87 L.Ed.2d 706 (1985). The Court simply notes that this case does not present the possibility of interference with the Executive branch that might otherwise exist. The Court need not rest on this finding, however, since it concludes that Noriega has not demonstrated that his alleged drug-related activities were in fact acts of state rather than measures to further his own private self-interest. Absent such showing, the act of state doctrine cannot apply. C. Diplomatic Immunity Noriega concedes at the outset that his assertion of diplomatic status does not fit within the confines of either the Diplomatic Relations Act or the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the two bodies of law governing diplomatic privileges and immunities. Among other deficiencies, the government of Panama never requested that Noriega be accredited as a diplomat and the United States at no time granted Noriega such status, as required by the Convention, Articles 9 and 10. Nor did Noriega ever meet the Department of State’s standards for accreditation, which require, inter alia, that the individual reside in the Washington D.C. area and devote official activities to diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time basis. As Defendant himself states, “[diplomatic immunity generally deals with eligible persons who are present in the United States.” In this case, Noriega was neither eligible nor present in this country as a diplomat. In light of his failure to satisfy the conventional requirements for diplomatic status, Noriega relies principally on the fact that he traveled on a Panamanian diplomatic passport and was on three occasions granted an “A-2” visa by the United States. In the first place, issuance of the Panamanian diplomatic passport is a matter solely of Panamanian law and has no effect on its holder’s status in another state. Though diplomatic passports issued by Panama to reflect the esteem which that nation assigned to Defendant may have obtained Noriega certain courtesies in international travel, they are without significance in international law and United States law and do not, by themselves, entitle Noriega to any internationally or domestically protected status. “Generally, a sending state issues a diplomatic passport to its diplomatic agent and the receiving state gives him a diplomatic visa, but such passports and visas are sometimes issued as a courtesy also to persons other than diplomats, and they do not prove that the holder enjoys diplomatic status or is entitled to diplomatic privileges and immunities in the receiving state.” Restatement (Third) § 464, Reporters’ Note 1 (citing United States v. Arizti, 229 F.Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y.1964), and United States v. Coplon, 88 F.Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y.1950)). Mere issuance of the passport does not constitute the necessary notification and request for accreditation and, assuming ar-guendo it did, it has no effect in the absence of acceptance as such by the United States. Restatement (Third) § 464, Reporters’ Note 1 (“A person accredited by the sending state does not become a diplomatic agent for purposes of this section unless the receiving state agrees.”). Nor does the “A-2” visa establish anything of significance in the way of diplomatic immunity. The issuance of United States visas is an administrative action in connection with United States immigration law and is quite independent of the process of diplomatic accreditation. In October 1985, the Department of State reminded all diplomatic missions in the United States by diplomatic note that: “[U]nder U.S. law, the issuance of visas is a procedure by which immigration to and visits in the United States are administratively controlled. * * * * Under the applicable regulations A-category visas are issued to thousands of persons each year, many of whom never perform diplomatic or consular functions in the United States. * * * * The mere possession of an A-category visa by a person not accredited to the United States in accordance with these procedures [promulgated by the Chief of Protocol] gives such person no claim to diplomatic or consular status in the United States, and thus no entitlement to the privileges and immunities extended to persons in diplomatic or consular status.” In other words, mere possession of an “A-2” visa does not confer diplomatic immunity; other criteria, none of which are satisfied here, must be met. See United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 246, 83 L.Ed.2d 184 (1984); United States v. Arizti, 229 F.Supp. at 54-55; United States v. Coplon, 88 F.Supp. at 920. For example, Defendant has presented no proof that the United States government accepted him as a member of the Panamanian diplomatic mission, supplied him with a diplomatic identity card, or included him on any official diplomatic list. Absent these indicia of diplomatic status, the “A-2” visa is plainly inadequate. Defendant’s claim to diplomatic immunity must therefore fail. III. DEFENDANTS’ PRISONER OF WAR STATUS Defendants Noriega and Del Cid contend that they are prisoners of war (“POW”) within the meaning of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, (Geneva III), a status, Defendants maintain, which divests this Court of jurisdiction to proceed with this case. For the purposes of the motion at bar, the Government does not maintain that Defendants are not prisoners of war, but rather argues that even were Defendants POWs, the Geneva Convention would not divest this Court of jurisdiction. Thus, the Court is not presented with the task of determining whether or not Defendants are POWs under Geneva III, but proceeds with the motion at bar as if Defendants were entitled to the full protection afforded by the Convention. Defendants’ arguments under the Geneva Convention are grounded in Articles 82, 84, 85, 87, and 99, and 22, each of which is examined, in turn, below, x. Article 82 A prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in respect of any offence committed by a prisoner of war against such laws, regulations or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed. If any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power shall declare acts committed by a prisoner of war to be punishable, whereas the same acts would not be punishable if committed by a member of the forces of the Detaining Power, such acts shall entail disciplinary punishments only. As is evident from its face, Article 82 pertains to disciplinary and penal procedures against POWs for offenses committed after becoming POWs, allowing for prosecutions against POWs only for acts which would be prosecutable against a member of the detaining forces. Thus, Article 82 is clearly inapplicable to the instant case because Noriega and Del Cid are being prosecuted not for offenses committed after their capture but for offenses committed well before they became prisoners of war. x. Article 84 A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect to the particular offence alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war. In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recognized and, in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and means of defence provided for in Article 105. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with military courts over all violations of the laws of the United States committed by military personnel. The indictment charges Defendants with various violations of federal law, including narcotics trafficking, RICO violations, and RICO conspiracy. These are allegations of criminal misconduct for which any member of the United States Armed Forces could be prosecuted. Consequently, the prohibition embodied in Article 84, paragraph 1 does not divest this Court of jurisdiction. It has not been argued by Defense Counsel that the district court does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality “as generally recognized ...” Neither do Defendants contend that they will not be afforded the full measure of rights provided for in Article 105. Those rights include representation of counsel and prior notification of charges. See 6 U.S.T. at 3396. Indeed, Defendants will enjoy the benefit of all constitutional guarantees afforded any person accused of a federal crime. x. Article 85 Prisoners of war prosecuted