Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER MAZZONE, District Judge. In September, 1985, this court entered a finding of liability against the Metropolitan District Commission of Massachusetts and its successor agency, the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (“MWRA”), for polluting Boston Harbor with untreated sewage from the greater metropolitan Boston area in violation of the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1377. United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm’n, 23 Env’t Rep.Cas. (BNA) 1350, 16 Envtl.L.Rep. (Envtl.L.Inst.) 20621, (D.Mass. Sept. 5, 1985). After the finding of liability, MWRA began cooperating with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in planning and organizing the construction of a new $6 billion sewage treatment system necessary to comply with federal law. This court has overseen and continues to oversee the parties’ progress in completing this project. MWRA has filed monthly compliance reports, and this court has entered corresponding compliance orders based on those reports, since November, 1985. On the basis of my involvement in the Boston Harbor case, the two instant actions were assigned to me as “related civil cases” pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(e). The cases were subsequently consolidated. In them, the Towns of Walpole and Norfolk, Massachusetts (“the Towns”), challenge the adequacy of EPA’s Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for Long-Term Residuals Management for Metropolitan Boston (the “EIS”) under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347. The reason for the Towns’ challenge is that one component of the proposed residuals management program is the construction of a residuals landfill at a site adjacent to the Massachusetts Correctional Institute at Cedar Junction in Walpole, near the Town of Norfolk (the “Walpole site”). The injury is made all the more acute by the fact that the Towns are outside of the area serviced by MWRA. The Towns seek an adjudication that the EIS does not comply with NEPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, a remand to EPA to reconsider the landfill siting decision and to revise the EIS, and an injunction to prevent MWRA from taking any further action regarding the Walpole site. The cases are before me now on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. I A brief summary of the Boston Harbor clean-up project is necessary to place the present litigation in context. According to present plans, sewage from MWRA’s member communities will continue to be processed at Deer Island in Winthrop, where new primary and secondary sewage treatment plants will be built. Treated liquid effluent will be pumped from Deer Island out approximately nine miles by underwater tunnel to a point in Massachusetts Bay. The solid portion of the sewage will be separated into two primary components: (1) grit and screenings and (2) sludge. The sludge will be piped by underwater tunnel from Deer Island to the Fore River Staging Facility in Quincy, where MWRA is constructing a residuals management facility. At this facility, the sludge will be processed into pelletized form. MWRA’s residuals management plan calls for market distribution of the pellets as commercial fertilizer. The grit and screenings will be transferred to a landfill to be constructed at the Walpole site. In the event MWRA is unable to market or otherwise legally dispose of the pelletized sludge, it will be deposited in the landfill as well. MWRA’s proposed residuals management program was required to undergo environmental review at both the state and federal levels. MWRA and EPA worked together in the environmental review process; EPA describes its EIS as a “piggyback” document, building on MWRA’s reports. MWRA issued its state-mandated Draft Environmental Impact Report (the “DEIR”) in February, 1989. In May, 1989, EPA published its Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (the “DSEIS”), as required by NEPA. Following the formal public comment period, MWRA’s Final Environmental Impact Report (the “FEIR”) and EPA’s Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (the “FSEIS”) were issued in August and November of 1989, respectively. On November 20, 1989, the Massachusetts Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs issued a certificate accepting MWRA’s FEIR, which designated the Walpole site as the preferred site for a residuals landfill. In January, 1990, the Towns of Norfolk and Walpole filed actions in state court challenging the state environmental review process. These cases have been joined and are pending in Suffolk County Superior Court. On March 30, 1990, after additional public comment, EPA issued its Record of Decision (the “ROD”) accepting MWRA’s long-term residuals management plan, including selection of the Walpole site. Soon thereafter, the Towns filed the instant suits. II The proper scope of judicial review of NEPA cases is well established. The Supreme Court, in a recent NEPA case, described the purpose of NEPA as follows: The sweeping policy goals ... of NEPA are ... “realized through a set of ‘action-forcing’ procedures that require that agencies take a ‘ “hard look” at environmental consequences,’ and that provide for broad dissemination of relevant environmental information. Although these procedures are almost certain to affect the agency’s substantive decision, it is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the necessary process. If the adverse- environmental effects of the proposed action are adequately identified and evaluated, the agency is not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the environmental costs.” Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350, 109 S.Ct. 1835, 1846, 104 L.Ed.2d 351 (1989) (citations omitted). Similarly, the First Circuit has stated, NEPA is not designed to prevent all possible harm to the environment; it foresees that decisionmakers may choose to inflict such harm, for perfectly good reasons. Rather, NEPA is designed to influence the decisionmaking process; its aim is to make government officials notice environmental considerations and take them into account. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 952 (1st Cir.1983). See also Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068, 1072 (1st Cir.1980) (“This substantive review ... is quite narrow in scope. The court should only assure itself that the agency has given good faith consideration to the environmental consequences of its actions and should not pass judgment on the balance struck by the agency among competing concerns.”). Thus it is clear that the reviewing court’s function is not to second-guess the choices made by government officials, but rather to assess their process of arriving at those choices. The court’s review of an agency decision under NEPA encompasses two aspects. First, the court must conduct a substantive review of the agency’s action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, “to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary and capricious.” Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98, 103 S.Ct. 2246, 2252, 76 L.Ed.2d 437 (1983). Accord Grazing Fields Farm, 626 F.2d at 1072. Second, “a reviewing court must assess the agency’s compliance with the duties NEPA places upon it.” Id. Expanding on the content of this review, the First Circuit has stated, In a typical case, a reviewing court, in answering this legal question, looks first and foremost at the record before the agency. That is because one cannot ordinarily expect an agency to do more than make reasonable efforts to gather relevant information and then to evaluate that information in light of the comments interested parties have made. The relevant legal question therefore is normally whether the Statement is “adequate” in light of the information and comments before the agency at the time it produced the Statement. Valley Citizens for a Safe Environment v. Aldridge, 886 F.2d 458, 460 (1st Cir.1989) (citations omitted). Summary judgment is issued when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c). In a NEPA case, “summary judgment ... [is] appropriate unless [plaintiffs] raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the agency’s] substantive decision was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion.” Concerned Citizens on 1-190 v. Secretary of Transp., 641 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1981). The Towns’ and EPA’s submissions in connection with this motion present a variety of issues and “factual claims that diverge so widely that one is tempted to think some ‘material’ factual issue must be in dispute.” Aldridge, 886 F.2d at 460. In reviewing this motion, I have closely read the briefs and have endeavored “to track those divergent claims to their sources in the record.” Id. Furthermore, I am mindful of the fact that the Towns, understandably, have subjected the EIS to intense scrutiny, and “of the tendency of such searching scrutiny to magnify retrospectively any possible defect.” Concerned Citizens on 1-190, 641 F.2d at 5. Having thus surveyed the lay of the legal landscape for this aspect of the Boston Harbor clean-up project, I now proceed to the task before me. Ill One collateral matter must be resolved before I can address the merits of the summary judgment motion. At the early stages of this litigation, EPA sought a protective order prohibiting all discovery beyond the administrative record compiled in the NEPA process. On August 31, 1990, I allowed the protective order “to the extent that discovery is deferred until a ruling on proposed motions for summary judgment is issued, at which time I will be in a better position to determine if the administrative record is adequate, or whether valid information has be[en] withheld.” Subsequently, the Towns filed a motion to allow for further discovery, arguing that “[t]he dispute over the technical issues and the existence of new technical information ... requires this Court to allow the Towns to supplement the administrative record by conducting discovery.” Joint Motion of Plaintiffs to Allow for Discovery 11 5 [hereinafter Discovery Motion]. The general rule in NEPA cases is that the reviewing court should constrain its review to the record before the agency. Aldridge, 886 F.2d at 460. Cf. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 1244, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973) (in applying APA arbitrary and capricious standard, “the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court”). This limited review is appropriate because the relevant legal question in NEPA cases “is normally whether the Statement is ‘adequate’ in light of the information and comments before the agency at the time it produced the Statement.” Aldridge, 886 F.2d at 460 (emphasis added). Accord Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284 (1st Cir.1973). Exceptions to this general rule exist, sometimes compelling the reviewing court to consider additional information. These situations include, for example, when new information that confirms or contradicts agency predictions becomes available, Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Clark, 590 F.Supp. 1467, 1474-75 (D.Mass.1984), when the evidence indicates that the agency relied on secret sources unavailable for public scrutiny, Aldridge, 886 F.2d at 460, or when the plaintiff presents previously available evidence that the agency should have considered but did not. Id.; Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 829 (9th Cir.1986). More often, new evidence is relevant only to the question of whether a supplemental EIS should be filed. Aldridge, 886 F.2d at 460; Watt, 716 F.2d at 948. After careful review of the issues the Towns raise—discussed thoroughly below — I conclude that the “new” information offered by the Towns is not of the ilk that makes additional discovery appropriate. In general, the Towns present evidence and studies that merely disagree with EPA’s conclusions, but nothing to indicate that EPA ignored relevant information or relied on secret sources. The Towns also encourage me to “allow the introduction of new evidence, including expert testimony, in order to aid the court in understanding highly technical environmental matters.” Discovery Motion 117. True, the court, in its discretion, may admit additional evidence in NEPA cases for aid in understanding complex evidence. Aldridge, 886 F.2d at 460-61. I decline the Towns’ generous offer. While I make no claim to the expert’s understanding of every technical nuance of the residuals management effort, I have reviewed the record carefully, I have researched the applicable legal standards, I have the benefit of six years of experience in overseeing the Boston Harbor project, and I have viewed and walked the site. With that as support, I believe I understand the issues presented, and I believe those issues can be fairly addressed with the existing record. I therefore deny the Towns’ motion to allow further discovery and proceed to assess the merits of the summary judgment motion of basis the voluminous and adequate record already before me. IV The Towns filed with their opposition memo a Statement of Contested Facts, as required by Local Rule 56.1. The Towns’ statement lists fifteen issues of fact they contend are disputed and that preclude summary judgment from being entered against them. The record is extensive and, consequently, this memorandum will be lengthy. To facilitate public scrutiny and the appellate review that will follow, I have addressed each of the fifteen issues raised in the Statement of Contested Facts seri-atim. A. Completeness of the Administrative Record The first disputed issue is whether the court has before it the entire administrative record on which EPA based the EIS. Statement of Contested Facts If 1. The Towns state that the entire record is not before the court; they contend that EPA considered sources not included in the administrative record. EPA has filed with the court a 59-page index (with roughly 40 entries per page) entitled “Residuals Management Administrative Record.” The index was authenticated by the affidavits of Gwen S. Ruta, Chief of the Marine and Estuary Protection Section of the Water Quality Branch of the Water Management Division of EPA Region I, and of Richard P. Kotelly, Deputy Director of the Water Management Division, who was officially designated custodian of the records relating to the EIS. See Defendants’ Exhibit 16 [hereinafter Def. Ex.]. The plaintiffs’ brief suggests that the following items are missing from the administrative record: MWRA’s scoring sheets for the 300 sites originally screened for disposal of residuals, the sensitive receptor list for the Walpole site, the documents relied upon by EPA’s consultants, and the documents relied upon by MWRA. Memorandum of the Plaintiffs ... in Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 15-17 [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Brief]. While EPA concedes that the actual scoring sheets for each of the 300 sites are not included in the administrative record, it points out that the record does contain MWRA’s two-volume Draft Report on Site Screening Analysis. Administrative Record Document No. 423 [hereinafter A.R. No.]. This document, which was publicly available in the state environmental review process, describes the methodology and results of MWRA’s site screening process; it contains as appendices the actual scoring sheets for the twelve candidate sites that MWRA recommended (ten of which are discussed in the EIS), as well as several tables in the text showing the overall ratings of all 300 sites for various indi-cia of technical and environmental suitability. EPA further argues that it did not rely solely on MWRA’s data, but subjected the screening to its own analysis. The record contains EPA’s detailed responses to MWRA’s screening process, A.R. No. 573 (Def.Ex. 3), which was critical of MWRA’s results. EPA’s reliance on MWRA studies is discussed at length below, infra Part IV. C, but suffice to say for the moment that the absence from the record of detailed scoring sheets for the 290 sites not evaluated in the EIS does not compromise this court’s ability to assess whether EPA’s discussion of alternatives was arbitrary and capricious. As to the sensitive receptor list for the Walpole site, this is listed at page 47 of the index as A.R. No. 1412. The administrative record, though not actually filed with this court because of its extreme bulk, has been available for my review. For the record, it is stored in Room 1118A of this courthouse building. It is comprised of about 25 boxes of documents and covers the floor of the room in which it is located. A trip to Room 1118A confirmed the existence of A.R. No. 1412. In addition, the DSEIS itself contains a list and map of sensitive receptors near the Walpole site. DSEIS app. C, at C-1 to -3. This list included in the DSEIS, incidentally, is more extensive than A.R. No. 1412. The administrative record also contains documents prepared by and relied upon by EPA’s consultant, Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. Affidavit of Richard P. Kotelly ¶[ 6 (Def.Ex. 18). The Towns present no evidence to contradict Mr. Kotelly’s sworn statement. To the extent that the Towns argue that the administrative record must also contain all documents on which MWRA relied to create the documents on which EPA relied, I must disagree. EPA has made a good-faith effort to collect every document on which it actually relied in preparing the EIS, and I am not prepared to ask for more. I therefore find that the Towns have not established a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the court has the full administrative record before it. B. Groundwater Issues The second purported issue of contested fact is that “[n]ew factual information has come to light since the publication of the ROD which demonstrates that the SEIS did not adequately consider the groundwater impacts of the proposed landfill.” Statement of Contested Facts H 2. As noted above, see supra note 2, this new factual information concerns the boundary of the Head of the Neponset Sole-Source Aquifer, threats to nearby drinking water supply wells, and the public health concerns posed by the travel of the contaminants contained in landfill leachate. While the Statement of Contested Facts specifies that the groundwater disputes center around “new factual information,” the briefs also focus on the adequacy of the EIS with respect to these issues. For the sake of completeness, I will review both the adequacy of the EIS and the materiality of the new factual information. I preface this discussion by noting that the damage to groundwater sources of the Towns will be realized only upon the occurrence of a leak in the landfill. Conversely, EPA’s assessment of the threats to the groundwater supplies were predicated on its background assumption that the landfill will incorporate state-of-the-art design and will be surrounded by devices to monitor and detect any leakage so that remedial steps can be taken as early as possible. See infra Part IV./ for a more detailed account of the landfill design and contingency plans in the event of leakage. The following discussion of groundwater threats must be viewed in this context. 1. Aquifer One of the contested issues that most troubles the Towns — and with which the court is deeply concerned — involves the threat of danger to public drinking water supplies caused by the proximity of the landfill site to the Head of the Neponset Sole-Source Aquifer recharge area. A “sole-source aquifer” is the Safe Drinking Water Act’s designation for an area’s aquifer “which is the sole or principal drinking water source for the area and which, if contaminated, would create a significant hazard to public health.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-3(a)(l) (West 1982). The Town of Walpole draws its entire drinking water supply from the Neponset Sole-Source Aquifer, which EPA designated in response to a petition from the town residents. See 53 Fed.Reg. 49,920 (1988), A.R. No. 2421 (Def.Ex. 8). State law prohibits placement of solid waste landfills over the recharge area of a sole-source aquifer, Mass.Regs.Code tit. 310, § 16.40(3)(a)(6) (1990), while the Safe Drinking Water Act prohibits federal funding of projects that will harm aquifers. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-3(e); 40 C.F.R. § 149.102(a) (1990). EPA argues that neither of these laws would be applicable to the landfill even if it were located within the aquifer boundary. This contention aside, the purpose of my review here is to assess EPA’s determination that the landfill does not lie within the aquifer recharge area. The boundaries of the aquifer, as designated by EPA, include the surface area above the aquifer system and its recharge area. In designating the Neponset Sole-Source Aquifer, EPA adopted the boundaries proposed by the Town in its petition. The EIS concludes that the proposed landfill lays entirely outside the aquifer boundary, particularly noting that the groundwater at the site flows to the Charles River drainage basin rather than toward the Nep-onset River. The DSEIS flags this determination as an area of substantial concern: The site falls just outside of the head of the Neponset Sole-Source Aquifer (Figure 4.4-2) as petitioned for the town of Walpole and designated by EPA in November 1988. The aquifer boundaries are based on the delineated surface water drainage divide of the Charles and Neponset River drainage basins. Walpole is currently considering re-petitioning the boundaries of its sole-source aquifer designation based on groundwater drainage divides. Additional sampling would be needed to definitively verify that no groundwater from the site contributes to the Neponset Sole-Source Aquifer. If the aquifer’s boundary was determined to extend into the landfill footprint, more extensive review of the potential landfill by EPA would be necessary to determine if it could contaminate groundwater and pose a threat to public health. DSEIS § 4.4.3.2, at 4-93. The FSEIS states the results of additional sampling, “The MWRA has also conducted additional field reconnaissance and evaluation of topography, groundwater elevations, bedrock outcroppings and overall site drainage and has confirmed the previous findings that groundwater from the site drains away from the Neponset Sole Source Aquifer and into the Charles River Basin.” FSEIS § 5.1.1, at 5-2. The FSEIS thus incorporates by reference — albeit rather obliquely —MWRA’s additional studies. It is permissible for an EIS, in order to “cut down on bulk,” to incorporate by reference studies that are “reasonably available for inspection by potentially interested persons.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21 (1990). The studies to which the FSEIS refers are contained in the state environmental impact report, 1 FEIR app. B, at B-28 to -60, and were readily available for public perusal. Based on my review of the EIS, I conclude that the Towns have not produced evidence that EPA, based on the evidence available at the time, arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith considered the boundary of the Neponset Sole-Source Aquifer. Rather, the EIS clearly discloses EPA’s concern with the issue and the additional steps it took to confirm its preliminary conclusions. The Towns also wish to present new evidence compiled after completion of the EIS. As the DSEIS anticipated, the Towns eventually did petition for redesignation of the aquifer in August, 1990. See Affidavit of John P. Jemsek ¶ 16 & Ex. A. The petition suggests that the groundwater divide between the Charles River and Neponset River basins is actually located in the middle of the landfill site. EPA has not yet ruled on this petition; in response, it asked the Towns to revise certain figures, which had been derived from monitoring wells that were found to be incorrectly mapped, and to submit additional data. See Affidavit of Joanne Muti ¶ 5 & Ex. A. As previously noted, the EIS’s original consideration of the aquifer boundary was reasonable. The question presented by the Towns’ new information with respect to the location of the groundwater divide is whether EPA should supplement its EIS pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c). The court must review EPA’s decision not to supplement the EIS “by asking whether that decision was reasonable under the circumstances.” Watt, 716 F.2d at 948. At this juncture, however, such review is premature. After studying the Towns’ petition, EPA concluded that “additional field data would be necessary to describe aquifer flow patterns and geology with sufficient accuracy to enable EPA to reach a determination as to the validity of the conclusion in the [redesignation] Petition.” Affidavit of Douglas L. Heath 117. See also id. Ex. A (letter of Richard Kotelly to Joanne Muti (Oct. 18, 1990)). Currently, EPA is simply unable to determine whether the Towns have raised “significant new circumstances or information” that would require EPA to prepare a supplement. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (1990). The function of this court is not to sit in judgment over the agency’s technical conclusions. I need consider only whether EPA’s consideration of the location of the groundwater divide, and the discussion of that issue in the EIS, are adequate. I find that they are, and the Towns have not demonstrated a material issue of disputed fact that needs to be resolved before I can hold that the treatment of the aquifer issue in the EIS was adequate as a matter of law. Rossy v. Roche Prods., Inc., 880 F.2d 621, 624 (1st Cir.1989). 2. Water Supply Wells a. Zone II Boundary Determination Ten water supply wells are located in the vicinity of the Walpole site. Of particular concern to the plaintiffs are four wells that supply water to the prison facilities at MCI-Norfolk and also serve as a back-up drinking water supply to the Town of Norfolk. The Towns argue that EPA’s delineation of the “Zone II Recharge Area” for the prison wells was based on “groundwater modeling ... [that] involved a number of serious erroneous and prejudicial assumptions.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 27. The DSEIS includes a fairly detailed explanation of the groundwater characteristics of the Walpole site. DSEIS § 4.4.3.2. It refers to two studies conducted to determine the Zone II boundary for the wells in question and includes a map showing the result of these studies. Id. at 4-97, -99. Both studies concluded that the landfill footprint is not within Zone II. In the public comment period, the Towns objected to the methodology and results of the Zone II studies. In assessing challenges to the FSEIS, the court must determine whether the agency reasonably addressed public comments or instead thwarted NEPA’s intent by “preventing] stubborn problems or significant criticism from being shielded from internal and external scrutiny.” Grazing Fields Farm, 626 F.2d at 1072. The regulations suggest an array of possible responses to public comments. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4. With regard to Zone II, the FSEIS states, Additional analyses conducted by MWRA have demonstrated that the landfill does not lie within the Zone II area of the prison wells and that only a small portion of the landfill footprint is located within Zone III.... Based on a detailed examination of the procedures and assumptions of MWRA’s investigations and a thorough review of additional sources of information as outlined in the Draft SEIS (Section 4.4.3.2), EPA supports the conclusion that the landfill footprint lies outside of the Zone II and Neponset Sole Source Aquifer boundaries. FSEIS § 5.1.1, at 5-1 to -2. MWRA’s additional analyses, which responded to the Towns’ and others’ comments regarding the Zone II boundary by reformulating its groundwater modeling, is set out in 1 FEIR app. B, at B-63 to -120. Having reviewed MWRA’s revised study, on which the EIS relies, I conclude that EPA adequately responded to the Towns’ comments. The EIS did a rather poor job, however, of incorporating by reference MWRA’s studies with respect to both the Zone II delineation and the aquifer groundwater divide, see supra p. 877, for it does not cite the FEIR with specificity. See FSEIS § 5.1.1, at 5-2. Nonetheless, I do not believe that this compromises the adequacy of the EIS with regard to these issues. The regulations call for the incorporated material to be “cited in the statement and its content briefly described.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.21. While the EIS did not exactly cite the FEIR in traditional form, the reference was adequate to steer potentially interested persons toward the source document. Having thus disposed of the question of adequacy of the EIS, I turn to the Towns’ assertion of “new factual evidence.” As I have previously noted, see supra pp. 874-875, the situations in which the court must consider new evidence are uncommon. Having reviewed the affidavits of David Lang and John P. Jemsek, I find that the asserted new evidence does not support any of the exceptions that would warrant looking beyond the administrative record. On the contrary, the Towns’ experts again, and rather predictably, raise the same objections to which MWRA and EPA have already responded. For example, Dr. Jemsek cites the results of a report submitted with the Town of Walpole’s aquifer redesignation petition, which, he says, “documents the existence of pathways for contaminant, including bedrock fractures and permeable basal glacial deposits, which, in my opinion, were not addressed adequately in either the EIR or the SEIS.” Affidavit of John P. Jemsek 1117. Yet these are precisely the issues that EPA already considered, perhaps not adequately in Dr. Jemsek’s opinion, but adequately as far as NEPA is concerned; furthermore, EPA concluded that the Towns’ report, on which the Jemsek affidavit relies, was based on unreliable evidence. See supra p. 878. The Towns raise a few specific objections to the Zone II determination that merit further comment, although none ultimately rise to the level of creating a genuinely disputed issue of material fact. For instance, the Towns flourish certain internal memoranda written by EPA hydrogeologist Douglas Heath discussing the possible presence of fractures in the bedrock near the landfill site that might affect the flow of water toward the prison wells. Quotations chosen by the Towns create the impression that there were serious misgivings within EPA regarding the bedrock, and that these were “swept under the rug” by EPA. Indeed, the EIS makes only a passing reference to “bedrock outcroppings.” FSEIS § 5.1.1, at 5-2. On closer inspection, however, the hydro-geologist’s memoranda do not discredit the EIS. In fact, read in their entirety, Mr. Heath’s statements actually support the conclusion that the Zone II boundary is smaller than the EIS studies indicated, and hence that the wells are less vulnerable than MWRA and EPA assumed they were. See Memorandum from Douglas L. Heath to Gwen Ruta at 2 (Nov. 2, 1989), A.R. No. 2167 (Pl.Ex. 5); Responses of Douglas L. Heath to Issues Presented in Letter to Joanne Muti at 3 (Mar. 16, 1990), A.R. No. 2551 (Pl.Ex. 6). In addition, Mr. Heath’s comments were part of a larger discussion among federal and state regulators about the groundwater issues. The determination of the regulators, as evidenced in the memorandum of an EPA consultant, was that “although the Zone II modelling is deficient in many respects, it is probably adequate to determine if the landfill falls within the Zone II and ... changes to the model would probably not greatly affect the boundary delineation.” Memorandum from Roger Grenier to Distribution (Sept. 19, 1989), A.R. No. 1762 (Def. Ex. 21). The Towns characterize this statement as an admission that the Zone II delineation was faulty; EPA characterizes it as a reasoned judgment that enough research had been done and that the issues raised were properly taken into account. While an agency may not rely on the administrative record as a substitute for what should be contained in the EIS, the court may consult the administrative record to determine whether a particular item is of enough significance that it must be contained in the EIS. Grazing Fields Farm, 626 F.2d at 1074. Based on my review of the administrative record, I find that EPA’s decision not to include in the EIS a detailed discussion of the bedrock was not unreasonable in light of the many factors involved in the Zone II boundary delineation. See Coalition on Sensible Transportation, Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 66 (D.C.Cir.1987) (“It is of course always possible to explore a subject more deeply and to discuss it more thoroughly. The line-drawing decisions necessitated by this fact of life are vested in the agencies, not the courts.”). A review of the record also supports the conclusion that this decision was made in good faith. The Grenier memorandum indicates that the regulators’ greatest reservation regarding the Zone II determination concerned “pumping scenarios,” that is, the effect of increased use of the prison wells. This issue, unlike the bedrock issue, was later studied in depth. See 1 FEIR app. B, at B-94 to -120. Moreover, the Grenier memo concluded that EPA “will likely approve the Walpole-MCI Site provided that a very extensive monitoring and mitigation plan is established.” (Emphasis added.) This statement indicates that EPA took the Zone II question seriously, had conducted tests that it believed were reasonably necessary, and sought to be prepared with a fail-safe should their assessment prove incorrect. The Towns also wish to present new evidence that “virtually every MWRA monitoring well within the site had been incorrectly mapped.” Affidavit of Joanne Muti ¶ 7. The Towns argue that these errors in monitoring affect the accuracy of the Zone II and Neponset Sole-Source Aquifer boundary determinations. The defendants argue that this evidence is irrelevant because the incorrectly mapped wells to which the Muti affidavit refers were installed after the EIS had been issued and, therefore, were not relied upon for any data in the EIS. Affidavit of Douglas L. Heath H 4; id. Ex. A at 3 (Def. Ex. 28). A careful inspection of the record confirms Mr. Heath’s statements. The locations of the monitoring wells used in the Zone II and aquifer delineations are shown in volume one of the FEIR, Figures 4-15 and 4-16. A.R. No. 423. The Muti affidavit states that MW-20, MW-22, MW-24, and OW-1 are mapped incorrectly. None of these appear on the FEIR maps, MW-19 being the highest number on any of the wells shown, thus verifying the Heath affidavit. The plaintiffs have failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact with respect to the Zone II boundary determination. b. Time of Travel Calculations Another important consideration in assessing the threat to the drinking-water wells in the vicinity of the landfill, should a leak occur, is the time it would take any released contaminants to reach the sources from which the wells draw their water. The Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j, require the states to develop programs “to protect wellhead areas ... from contaminants which may have any adverse effect on the health of persons.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 300h-7(a) (West Supp.1990). EPA is charged with issuing technical guidance to the states in making their determination of wellhead areas. The time of travel of contaminants in various hydrologic conditions is an important factor in these determinations. The Towns challenge that EPA did not follow its own regulations in calculating the time of travel of groundwater from the landfill to the drinking water wells near the site. The Towns have culled from an EPA consultant’s memo, A.R. No. 1634 (Pl.Ex. 22), a “smoking gun” to support this charge — a hearsay statement of EPA supervisor Ruta to the effect that “the calculation was done under time & budget pressure and was therefore somewhat quick & dirty.” I need go no further than the EIS to answer the Towns’ concerns here. The DSEIS, although stating that the landfill would contain several design features that would make a leak unlikely, discussed the possible impact of a leak of contaminants. It summarized in some detail the study it conducted, which took into account time of travel calculations and certain rates at which it assumed water would be pumped from existing wells. DSEIS § 5.5.2.2. In response to public comment, the FSEIS noted, “Commentors [sic.] asked for a more thorough discussion of the method used to develop the time of travel estimate.” FSEIS § 5.1.3. The FSEIS contained a more thorough discussion in § 3.3.2, and in Appendix A. Appendix A includes a detailed explanation of the mathematical model that EPA used to estimate groundwater flow, including a discussion of the time of travel calculations. See id. § A.6. The time of travel section states, “In response to commentors on the Draft SEIS and as part of the expanded technical evaluation of the MWRA-preferred plan, additional analyses of the groundwater travel time have been prepared for the Final SEIS.” Id. at A-5. There are many adjectives that may describe the calculations discussed in. Appendix A — “sophisticated” and “complex” come to mind — but “quick” and “dirty” are not among them. The EIS supports the conclusion that EPA considered the groundwater time of travel issue and adequately responded to comments. NEPA asks no more. The plaintiffs invite me to quibble with the scientific conclusions at which the EPA scientists arrived, but this is not the purpose of judicial review of NEPA cases, nor are such determinations within the courts’ institutional competence. Having found that EPA has followed NEPA’s procedural mandate with regard to the time of travel calculation, “the only role for a court is to ensure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences.” Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227, 100 S.Ct. 497, 500, 62 L.Ed.2d 433 (1980) (per curiam). The EIS clearly demonstrates that EPA considered the time of travel calculations. Another time of travel dispute concerns the two private wells located nearest the site. See FSEIS § 3.3.1, at 3-5 & Figure 3.3-1, at 3-6. Appendix A states that the groundwater travel times for these two wells were estimated at nine and eleven years, respectively. Id. at A-7. Indicative of the detailed level of scrutiny to which the Towns have subjected the EIS, the Towns have unearthed a document that calculates a “rough estimate” of groundwater travel time from the landfill to a nearby dog kennel’s wellfield (one of the two private wells) as 5.8 years rather than 9, as stated in the EIS. Affidavit of David Lang H 4 & Ex. B. The defendants, in response, produce what they say is a superseding calculation, which estimated the landfill-dog kennel groundwater route at 9.6 years. A.R. No. 1766 (Def. Ex. 27). I cannot conclude that the plaintiff’s evidence of a dog-kennel travel-time cover-up calls into question the good faith of the EIS. What this evidence indicates to me, rather, is that EPA has considered every detail of this project in depth. 3. Leachate Contents A third challenge to the adequacy of the EIS’s consideration of groundwater impacts centers around the Towns’ assertion that the “leachate travel time analysis and sludge characterization” on which EPA relied were “totally erroneous.” Plaintiff’s Brief at 34. With regard to the travel time calculations, I need not repeat the discussion above; I merely restate my conclusion that EPA’s consideration of groundwater time of travel calculations, as evidenced in the EIS, was not arbitrary and capricious. With regard to the chemical analysis of residuals, the Towns are not unreasonably concerned by statements in the DSEIS concerning EPA’s public health analysis for the Walpole site. Although the DSEIS includes a toxicity analysis of 52 pollutants likely to be found in “digested” sludge and concludes that the sludge is not hazardous, DSEIS § 3.1.1.2, at 3-6 to -9, the DSEIS quite candidly discusses the risk posed by public contact with leachate from the landfill. See id. § 5.9.3.2. The DSEIS also includes an estimate of pollution to drinking water that would be caused by the “highly unlikely” event of a leak in the landfill liner. Id. § 5.5.2.2. In challenging the rationality of EPA’s analysis, the Towns offer the opinion of Dr. Bela T. Matyas, M.D., M.P.H., M.S. (submitted in response to the FSEIS), which states that EPA’s choice of chemicals for analysis “completely overlooks VOCs, PCBs and PAHs, virtually completely overlooks SVOCs, and is even incomplete for likely metals.” Plaintiffs’ Brief app., Comments of the Town of Norfolk, at 338 [hereinafter Norfolk Comments]. Dr. Matyas further states, The inclusion of toxic VOCs in the exposure assessment modeling would almost certainly have yielded results showing potential contamination of groundwater by VOCs at concentrations hazardous to public health (based on the concentrations of VOCs present in scum and likely present in sludge, and on the leaching characteristics of VOCs). In any case, the indicators chosen clearly do not represent the true spectrum or realistic degree of potential public health risks posed by the Walpole-MCI landfill. Id. Dr. Matyas’s analysis provides the court with a background against which to review the EIS’s public health assessment. As to Dr. Matyas’s criticism of EPA’s choice of indicators, it is not for the court to tell EPA which pollutants and metals it need consider. From my review of the EIS, I am satisfied that EPA’s choice of 52 toxins was reasonable. Although Dr. Matyas’s concerns about the exclusion of VOCs give me pause, I need look no further than the FSEIS for reassurance. In EPA’s responses to comments about its toxicity analysis, the FSEIS first clarified the difference between “minor residuals” — that is, grit and screenings — and sludge. With respect to the former, the FSEIS states, “No testing was done for Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC’s) in grit and screenings because no VOC’s are expected to be present in them.” FSEIS § 5.5.1, at 5-15. The EIS goes on to explain this conclusion. With respect to sludge, the EIS states that it would be “extremely unlikely” for VOCs to be present “because these pellets are heat dried at 700 degrees Fahrenheit and routed through an afterburner which would volatilize and destroy any VOC’s remaining.” Id. § 5.5.2, at 5-17. This is an adequate explanation. Once again, despite their reference to “new factual information” in their statement of contested facts, the plaintiffs offer no evidence that requires looking beyond the EIS and the administrative record. C. Discussion of Alternatives The Towns claim that there is a disputed issue of fact regarding whether EPA adequately discussed alternatives to the proposed project. Statement of Contested Facts ¶ 3. The procedures mandated by NEPA require the proponent agency to prepare a detailed statement of alternatives to any proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284 (1st Cir.1973). The Towns first argue that EPA has not satisfied NEPA because the final EIS does not include a detailed discussion of alternatives. For this proposition, they cite Grazing Fields Farm v. Goldschmidt, 626 F.2d 1068 (1st Cir.1980). Grazing Fields Farm, however, distinguished between the EIS and the administrative record, not between the draft and final EIS. EPA counters correctly that NEPA can be satisfied when the discussion of alternatives is included in the draft EIS and the final EIS consists only of responses to comments on the discussion of alternatives contained in the draft. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(m), 1503.4(c). In addition, the EIS may incorporate other publicly available documents by reference. Id. § 1502.21. Satisfied that the relevant discussion of alternatives from the draft EIS can satisfy NEPA, I turn to the merits of plaintiffs’ argument. Accurately foreseeing the demise of their draft/final EIS distinction, the Towns prudently addressed the bulk of their challenges to the alternatives discussion included in the DSEIS. They argue that the discussion of alternatives, even when the DSEIS is considered, is insufficient. With regard to discussions of alternatives, the applicable NEPA regulations are as follows: This section is the heart of the environmental impact statement.... [I]t should present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and providing a clear basis for choice among options by the decision-maker and the public. In this section agencies shall: (a) Rigorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated. (b) Devote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in detail.... (c) Include reasonable alternatives not within the jurisdiction of the lead agency. (d)Include the alternative of no action. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14. The Towns argue that the EIS failed to comply with these standards because EPA (1) wrongly relied on MWRA’s site selection process (which, the Towns further argue, was biased); (2) did not adequately discuss the reasons why sites were eliminated from detailed study; and (3) did not properly consider the no-action alternative. Each of these contentions, however, fails to create a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiffs’ first argument is that EPA’s conceded practice of “piggybacking” its site selection research on MWRA’s prevented it from independently and objectively considering alternatives. The statute and the regulations, however, encourage sharing information and cooperation between state and federal agencies. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D); 40 C.F.R. § 1506.2(b)-(c). The extent to which a federal agency may properly rely on a state or local body in preparing an EIS was discussed in Concerned Citizens on 1-190 v. Secretary of Transp., 641 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1981). The plaintiff had challenged as procedurally inadequate the U.S. Department of Transportation’s reliance on the Metropolitan District Commission’s determination that the proposed site of a segment of highway did not constitute “significant publicly-owned recreation lands.” The First Circuit held that for “threshold questions” the agency may, and in fact should, consider the views of local officials. Id. at 7. The court distinguished such threshold matters from “the agency’s ultimate decision as to the lack of ‘feasible and prudent alternatives,’ ” which must be made independently. Id (citation omitted). The Towns in essence argue that EPA’s reliance on MWRA’s site screening was procedurally inadequate. This argument would certainly win the day if the Towns could show that EPA’s final choice of the Walpole site merely rubber-stamped MWRA’s decision. But this is not what the Towns’ evidence shows. MWRA began with a list of 300 sites and narrowed the list to twelve alternative sites. See Draft Report on Site Screening Analysis, A.R. No. 423. EPA admits that it relied on MWRA’s screening process up to this point, although the EIS states that “[a]t each major milestone in MWRA’s screening process, EPA employed NEPA-mandated screening criteria to ensure that the results of MWRA’s screening were consistent with the requirement for coverage of a full, reasonable range of alternatives.” DSEIS § 2.1.2. EPA’s independent review resulted in the elimination of two of MWRA’s sites. See Letter from Gwen Ruta to James Hoyte, Sec’y of Environmental Affairs (Nov. 20, 1987), A.R. No. 573 (Def. Ex. 3). I conclude that it was both procedurally permissible and reasonable for EPA to rely on MWRA’s initial screening to narrow the set of alternatives to twelve, and then to eliminate two under its own criteria. As to the Towns’ second contention, I hold that EPA did not violate 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) by failing to include in the EIS a brief discussion of why each of the 290 sites evaluated by MWRA in the preliminary screening was eliminated. While it cannot comfortably be characterized as either, this screening process was more like a threshold decision than an ultimate conclusion. Concerned Citizens on 1-190, 641 F.2d at 7. Keeping in mind that, in reviewing agency action under NEPA the court must apply a “rule of reason,” I hold that the ten sites ultimately considered encompassed a sufficient range of “reasonable alternatives” to satisfy NEPA. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 551, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1215, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978) (alternatives section “cannot be found wanting simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by the mind of man”); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC, 598 F.2d 1221, 1232 (1st Cir.1979) (“[alternative sites cannot be studied ad infinitum”). The court’s substantive review of the DSEIS’s evaluation of alternatives is limited to considering whether the agency’s action was “arbitrary and capricious,” that is, whether there was a balanced, good faith consideration of environmental factors. “The legal question ... is whether the EIS’s discussion of the alternatives was a reasonable one.” Aldridge, 886 F.2d at 461 (citing Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 551, 98 S.Ct. at 1215). I conclude that the discussion of alternatives was reasonable. The screening process, discussed above, resulted in the selection of ten candidate sites using different combinations of technologies for sludge disposal. Four of these were eliminated, and, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a), the EIS gives brief explanations why they were. DSEIS § 2.4. The bulk of the DSEIS contains detailed analysis and comparison of the six remaining combinations of sites and technologies using the following criteria: land use, transportation and traffic, air quality and odors, water and soils, noise, visual, aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems, public health, historic and archaeological, and socioeconomic. On my review of the EIS in light of the administrative record, I find no basis for the claim that the discussion of alternatives was arbitrary and capricious or conducted in bad faith. On the contrary, the DSEIS presents a carefully conducted study of the six alternatives. Finally, the Towns argue that the EIS does not comply with NEPA because EPA did not adequately consider the no-action alternative. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d). The EIS states that the no-action alternative—that is, not developing a long-term plan for disposal of residuals—would result in the resumption of the dumping of sludge in the Harbor, the very infraction that the plan seeks to cure. DSEIS § 2.1.3. This rejection of the no-action alternative was reasonable. The Towns argue that the no-action alternative in this case need not be as bleak as EPA suggests, but instead could consist of commercial disposal or ocean disposal of residuals. See, e.g., Affidavit of Dr. Derek W. Spencer (discussing ocean disposal option). The EIS, however, does consider both of these options and states reasons for rejecting them. Ocean disposal, for example, was rejected because of opposition by Congress, including passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988, codified at 33 U.S.C.A. § 1414b(a)(1)(B) (West Supp.1990), which prohibits ocean dumping of municipal sludge after 1991. DSEIS § 2.2, at 2-5. Privatization was also ruled out “[o]n the basis that this would remove control of sludge processing from the MWRA.” Id. at 2-7. I find the discussions of these “no-action” alternatives reasonable. See also Roosevelt Campobello Int’l Park Comm’n v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1041, 1047 (1st Cir.1982) (stating that “an intervenor must offer tangible evidence that an alternative site might offer ‘a substantial measures of superiority’ as a site”) (citing Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC, 598 F.2d 1221, 1228-33 (1st Cir.1979)). The Towns have not established a genuine issue of fact to support the conclusion that this rejection of the no-action alternative was arbitrary and capricious. One last issue raised by the Towns should be addressed before leaving this subject. The Towns have produced a memorandum submitted to MWRA from a public relations firm called “Fanfare” describing “public acceptance strategies” for the residuals management plan; the memorandum describes a method of isolating opposition to any chosen site. Memorandum from Howard Coffin et al. to Melanie Thomas et al. (Dec. 29, 1986), Pl.Ex. 12. This memo, they argue, supports an inference that the site-selection process was not conducted in good faith. I reject this argument for several reasons. First, the Towns produce no evidence that this strategy was ever actually employed. Second, on my reading of the Fanfare memo, I find that the purported strategy does not suggest any method for selecting a site; rather, it explains how to publicize the final site selection without generating widespread opposition to the entire project. Finally, even if the site-screening process was tainted by this alleged bad faith on the part of MWRA, EPA’s detailed discussion of alternatives certainly cures any taint by providing a balanced, objective, and independent analysis on the public record. See De Ar-teaga v. Pall Ultrafine Filtration Corp., 862 F.2d 940, 941 (1st Cir.1988) (at summary judgment, “the question is not whether there is literally no evidence favoring the non-movant, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict in that party’s favor”). D. Expansion of the Walpole Prison Next, the plaintiffs argue that it is disputed whether EPA considered “the fact that the landfill will foreclose expansion of the Walpole prison site.” Statement of Contested Facts II4. The Towns assert that there is a “crushing need” in the Commonwealth for additional prison facilities. In their public comments, they suggested that the landfill site, as it is currently owned by. the Department of Corrections, would be an ideal site for prison expansion; moreover, the Town of Walpole’s Board of Selectmen has expressed a willingness to accept a new prison in lieu of a landfill. See Walpole Comments at 56. The DSEIS acknowledged that “[development of the landfill would inhibit use of the site for major construction activities in the future,” although it also asserted that the site could eventually be reclaimed. DSEIS § 5.2.2. The FSEIS states that “the Department of Corrections has established expansion plans for MCI Cedar Junction, which involve an addition from the west wall of the prison. This will not be affected by the residuals management facilities in Walpole.” FSEIS § 5.8. Although the Towns characterize this conclusion as “myopic,” a glance at the map clearly shows that expansion of the west wall is not incompatible with landfill operation. The Towns have not established a factual issue that prevents me from concluding that the EIS adequately discusses prison expansion. E. “Equitable Distribution of Regional Responsibilities” The Towns argue that EPA “failed to properly apply the evaluation criterion of ‘equitable distribution of regional responsibility’ during the MEPA [sic.] process.” Statement of Contested Facts II 5. At the early stages of residuals management planning, MWRA and EPA developed a list of technical, environmental, institutional, and cost criteria for screening and evaluating proposed sites for residuals management facilities. Those utilized in the DSEIS are laid out in § 2.4.1, under the heading “Evaluation Criteria.” One of these is “equitable distribution of regional responsibility,” defined as “[t]he extent to which candidate site communities already host major permanent wastewater treatment facilities.” DSEIS § 2.4.1.4, at 2-11. The Towns point out that in an early draft of MWRA’s evaluation criteria, A.R. No. 716 (Pl.Ex. 17), the term “regional responsibility” was much more broadly defined to include “public utilities and facilities.” A.R. No. 716, at 2-17. As an example of such facilities, the draft stated, “Walpole is home to the state prison facility.” Id. The Towns pointed out this discrepancy in their public comments. In response, the FSEIS stated, This criterion was difficult to define and no real consensus on its definition or importance was possible among the relevant parties, including state and federal agencies and citizens task forces and advisory committees.... However, the Massachusetts Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs ... endorsed DEP’s [the Department of Environmental Protection] opinion that ‘this criteria [sic.] should be used to highlight the distribution of regional responsibility specifically with regard to permanent long-term wastewater facilities.’ ” FSEIS § 5.2.2. For such threshold decisions, especially as they implicate how a state chooses to evaluate the competing uses of its land, EPA can reasonably rely on the determination of state officials. See the discussion of Concerned Citizens of 1-190, supra pp. 883-884. Thus, I hold that EPA’s limitation of the equitable distribution criterion to include only wastewater treatment facilities was procedurally adequate. The Towns do not purport to argue that the EIS improperly applied this criterion as so defined. F. Impact of Prison Population Two prisons, MCI-Cedar Junction and MCI-Norfolk, are located near the landfill site. The plaintiffs argue that the EIS failed to consider the “adverse environmental effects of the landfill on the prison population.” Statement of Contested Facts 116. Generally, the Towns charge that EPA inadequately addressed the effect on prison inmates of air pollution and odors emanating from the landfill and the danger of explosions caused by the build-up of methane gas; more specifically, the Towns complain that the EIS failed to consider that such odors might cause inmate disturbances. EPA vainly argues that the Towns do not have standing to raise the concerns of the prison population. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). The Towns persuasively counter that, having an independent basis to challenge the EIS, they may also raise public interest concerns in support of their claim. See Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389, 392-93 (D.C.Cir.1978) (allowing plaintiff/appellee environmental groups with independent basis of standing to raise the effects of proposed projects on Cuna and Choco Indian tribes). EPA dropped its standing defense in its Reply Brief. With regard to air pollution, odors, and methane gas, however, the EIS belies the plaintiffs’ substantive claim. First, EPA was aware that air quality and odors would affect the prison populations as well as other nearby “sensitive receptors.” DSEIS § 5.4.3. The DSEIS frankly discusses air pollution and odors from the proposed landfill. It concludes that the facility will not emit pollutants into the air, DSEIS § 4.3.5.6, but it' did disclose the possibility of odors from grit and screenings and dewatered sludge. Id. § 5.4.3.1. NEPA, of course, does not require an agency to eliminate adverse environmental effects; it merely requires agencies to take these considerations into account. Watt, 716 F.2d at 952. The DSEIS suggests mitigating these potential odors by covering the residuals daily with soil. DSEIS § 6.2.1, at 6-1. In addition, the EIS accounts for the possibility of build-up and explosions of methane gas and suggests design features and mitigation measures for such an occurrence. Id. § 3.2.6, at 3-35; FSEIS § 6.4.3. In response to comments, the FSEIS states that