Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER ROBERT D. POTTER, District Judge. THIS MATTER was tried before the undersigned from May 14, 1991 through May 17, 1991 without a jury in Charlotte, North Carolina. The complaint alleges that Defendant engaged in unlawful employment practices at its Mecklenburg County, North Carolina facility by failing to hire Claimant Andria Tribble and other blacks on account of their race. See Plaintiffs Complaint, filed March 21, 1991, at par. 7. Plaintiff was represented at trial by John H. Edmonds, Rickye McKoy-Mitchell, Humphrey S. Cummings, and Julie H. Foshbinder, all from the Charlotte Regional Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Defendant was represented at trial by Richard F. Kane and David L. Terry, both from the Charlotte law firm of Blakeney, Alexander & Machen. Following the close of Plaintiffs evidence, Defendant moved for a directed verdict pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court deferred ruling on the motion. After Defendant had presented its evidence, Defendant renewed its motion. The Court once again deferred ruling on the motion. Based on the Order of the Court herein, the Court now believes Defendant’s motion for a directed verdict is moot, and should therefore be dismissed as such. Having heard the witnesses, weighed the evidence, and considered the arguments made by counsel, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. I. FINDINGS OF FACT. A. Jurisdictional Requirements. (1) This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and 1345. The action is brought pursuant to Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f). That statute authorizes Plaintiff to bring actions on behalf of persons that have been subjected to employment discrimination based on their race. (2) Plaintiff is the agency of the Government of the United States which is statutorily charged with the duty to administer, interpret and enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (3) Defendant is in the business of producing business forms and other graphic materials. Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 9. It maintains a facility on the western edge of Mecklenburg County, bordering Gaston County. Trial Testimony of Catherine Thompson at 186; Defendant’s Ex. 30. At all times relevant to this litigation, Defendant employed in excess of 15 employees and is an “employer” as defined by § 701(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). Plaintiff’s Ex. 9 at par. 3. (4) The subject matter of this action resulted in a charge of discrimination that was timely filed by Claimant Andria Tribble on August 18, 1986. Plaintiff’s Ex. 1. Claimant Tribble alleged in that charge that she was denied employment opportunities with Defendant because of her race. Id. Moreover, Claimant Tribble alleged that Defendant was discriminating against blacks as a class. (5) Thereafter, Plaintiff began an investigation of the charge. Plaintiff’s Ex. 2, 17, and 154-157. The investigation resulted in a letter of determination being issued on January 22, 1988. Plaintiff’s Ex. 3. That letter states that Plaintiff believed reasonable cause existed to conclude that Claimant Tribble’s race was a factor in Defendant’s failure to hire. Id. at 2. The letter further states that Defendant’s practice of utilizing word-of-mouth advertising to fill job vacancies had an adverse impact on blacks as a class. Id. at 3. Finally, the letter invited Defendant to enter into discussion with Plaintiff to bring about a just resolution of the matter. Id. at 4. (6) A conciliation agreement was prepared by Plaintiff and submitted to Defendant. Defendant’s Ex. 23. The proposed conciliation agreement provided that Defendant was to eliminate word-of-mouth advertising and advertise all vacant jobs in the Charlotte Observer, Charlotte Post, and Gastonia Gazette. Id. at 4. Moreover, the agreement required Defendant to offer Claimant Tribble a position and back pay. Id. at 3. As to the class of blacks, the agreement required Defendant to offer three additional Claimants positions and back pay. Id. at 4. (7) Defendant has claimed that Plaintiff failed to offer to conciliate regarding the class of blacks that were allegedly subjected to disparate treatment. However, nowhere in the agreement is it stated that the three (3) additional Claimants are the only members of the affected class. (8) Plaintiff was only required to provide Defendant with reasonable notice of the general type of discrimination alleged and to provide Defendant with an opportunity to remedy the problems out of court. See EEOC v. American National Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1186 (4th Cir.), rehearing denied, 680 F.2d 965 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923, 103 S.Ct. 235, 74 L.Ed.2d 186 (1982). The emphasis of the conciliation provision of Title VII is not to provide a rigid pleading requirement on the EEOC in enunciating the reasonable cause determination, but instead to provide employers with the opportunity to resolve disputes with the EEOC before a lawsuit is filed. See EEOC v. General Electric Company, 532 F.2d 359, 371 (4th Cir.1976) (“[A]s a practical matter, it would seem the defendant was thus given by the EEOC its right of comment and merely because it came during conciliation rather than before the reasonable cause determination would appear immaterial”). It is immaterial that the EEOC did not specifically state in the determination letter all of the alleged discriminatory practices and all of the class members. See EEOC v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 700 F.Supp. 524, 527 (N.D.Fla.1988) (finding that where EEOC in course of investigating a charge of discrimination develops facts which lead it to believe that a separate, uncharged incident or form of discrimination has occurred may attempt to conciliate the finding of the uncharged discrimination, and if conciliation fails, suit may be filed). What is material is whether Defendant was provided with an opportunity to conciliate. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 650 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir.1981). The Court finds as a matter of fact that Plaintiff provided Defendant an opportunity to conciliate. Defendant was aware of the uncharged discriminatory practices and class members alleged by Plaintiff. Moreover, Plaintiff was willing to meet and discuss conciliation regarding these practices and class members with Defendant. Defendant, however, was not amenable to conciliation. Plaintiffs Ex. 4. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff complied with the requirement that it “... [e]ndeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion”. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). (9) All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit have thus been fulfilled. B. Scope of the Action. (10) The relevant class period of this action is February 18, 1986 through May 9, 1989. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, filed July 5, 1991 at par. 15 on page 4; Defendant’s Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, filed July 5, 1991 at par. 2 on page 8. (11) The class members are those persons that applied for entry level positions during the relevant class period. Through running advertisements in local newspapers, Plaintiff initially identified approximately 50 possible class members. After review of the claims of these persons, Plaintiff reduced the applicable class to 24 members. Defendant’s Ex. 48. Before the trial of this matter, Plaintiff failed to timely respond to Defendant’s Second Requests for Admissions. See Order of this Court, filed March 8, 1991, at 6 (deeming admitted Defendant’s Second Requests for Admissions). The effect of these admissions was to reduce the class to only 14 members. On the eve of trial, Plaintiff reduced the class to 9 members. See Plaintiff’s Trial Brief, filed May 7, 1991 at Attachment A. At the trial of this matter, only 6 of the class members appeared and presented testimony. See generally Trial Tr. at 18-176. A seventh class member was hospitalized during the trial. The Court found her to be an unavailable witness and admitted her deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony. Trial Tr. at 665-666. For these reasons, the Court finds that evidence of seven (7) class members was presented at trial. Those persons are as follows: Andria Marie Tribble, Janet Lynn McCorkle, James Howard Allen, Jerry Burch, Patricia Ann Gillespie, Troy Damon Darby, and Johnny Xavier Fewell. (12) It is undisputed that during the relevant class period, Defendant filled 77 vacant entry level positions. Defendant’s Ex. 52. Of the 77 persons hired for these positions, 9 hirees were black. Id. (13) This action is limited to alleged discrimination in Defendant filling entry level positions. The following positions were the only entry level positions at Defendant’s facility during the class period. The number of persons hired for the positions is also provided: assistant truck driver (2); material handler (14); warehouse helper (4); jogger/bindery (10); janitor (6); baler operator (4); label inspector (19); knife operator (1); press trainee (1); bindery (1); collator helper (2); press jogger (10); and general bindery (3). Plaintiffs Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, filed July 5, 1991 at 4-5; Defendant’s Ex. 49 and 50. C. The Hiring Process. (14) During the relevant class period, approximately 600 persons applied at Defendant’s facility for entry level positions. Trial Tr. at 216-217; Plaintiff’s Ex. 152. (15) All of the personnel and management responsible for hiring at Defendant’s facility were white. Channon Tr. at 330-335; Coe Tr. at 227-228. (16) An applicant for an entry level position at Defendant’s facility would apply at a window in the foyer of the Personnel Office. The applicant would receive an application from the Personnel Assistant. The application was completed there and returned to the Personnel Assistant. The Personnel Assistant, Cynthia Ross and later Barbara Blanton, would then forward the applications to the Personnel Manager, Stephen Coe. Coe Tr. at 235-236. (17) Coe became the Personnel Manager at Defendant’s facility in May, 1986. Id. at 227. Prior to Coe, Cathy Stewart was the Personnel Manager at Defendant’s facility. Hiring procedures, however, during the relevant class period were for the most part the same during the tenures of both managers. Id. at 238-239; Plaintiff’s Ex. 153. (18) Coe, with extremely rare exceptions, was not aware of the race of an applicant when the application was submitted. Id. Neither Ross nor Blanton told Coe the race of an applicant. Id. at 236, 237, and 291; see also Blanton Tr. at 322. The application had no race indicator on it, nor did the Personnel Assistant record the race of the applicant on the application. Plaintiff’s Ex. 32-125, 138, and 152. Only once or twice during the class period when Ross or Blanton stepped away from their desks did Coe take an application directly from an applicant. Coe Tr. at 237. Coe’s office was not in view of anywhere where an applicant would be. Id. at 292. (19) Coe did not learn the race of the class members until after Plaintiff submitted the conciliation agreement. Id. at 293. (20) The Court believes that Coe and Blanton were credible witnesses. Based on the unrefuted testimony of Coe and Blanton, the Court finds that Coe did not know the race of an applicant when the applicant applied for a position at Defendant’s facility- (21) Between May 1986 through October 1986, Defendant had an open application period. Any person coming into Defendant’s facility during this time period could submit an application as long as that person had not submitted a previous application within the previous 30 days. Id. at 233. Applications during this time period were kept active more than 30 days, however. No hard and fast rule was used by Coe to determine whether an application would be placed in the inactive file. Id. at 234. (22) Plaintiff, at trial, claimed that Defendant engaged in an illegal employment practice by refusing to hire black applicants with applications 30 days or more old. Trial Tr. at 719-720; Plaintiff’s Ex. 158. In fact, during the entire time period Coe was Personnel Manager, he did not restrain or restrict hiring from applications that were 30 days or more old. Coe Tr. at 309. The Court believes the evidence at trial indicates that the 30 day period only restricted applicants from submitting an application within that time period when a previous application was already on file. The 30 day period did not restrict Coe from considering applications that were more than 30 days old. Even if Plaintiff’s argument that the 30 day rule was a discriminatory practice was convincing, the practice can hardly be characterized as discriminatory. From Plaintiff’s own exhibit, three (3) black applicants were hired more than 30 days after submitting their applications. Plaintiff’s Ex. 158. Thus, the practice was consistent for black as well as white applicants. (23) After October, 1986, applications were maintained in job files. Coe Tr. at 234. The application form had a place for the applicant to indicate for which position he or she was applying. Plaintiff’s Ex. 32-125, 138, and 152. When Coe received the applications from the Personnel Assistant, he would evaluate the job the applicant was interested in and place the application in a file for that particular job. Id. Occasionally, Coe would place the application in an alternative job file if he believed the applicant’s qualifications were better suited for another job. Id. at 295. On some occasions, Coe or a supervisor would remember the application of a person that had previously applied for a filled position and place that application in a job file different than the job noted on the application. Id. (24) Despite occasional incidents out of the norm, Defendant usually filled positions with persons that indicated on their application that they were applying for that particular position. At trial, Plaintiff introduced an exhibit that indicated 18 of the 77 persons hired during the relevant class period were hired for positions other than what they had applied. Plaintiff’s Ex. 157. According to Plaintiff, the exhibit demonstrates that Defendant engaged in a discriminatory employment practice by hiring white persons for positions other than those noted on the application while restricting blacks to only those positions that they stated they were interested in. The exhibit, however, is inaccurate. (a) The first six (6) applicants listed on the exhibit applied for positions prior to Defendant implementing the job file system. Therefore, these applicants were not placed in a job file and were considered under the open application system. Coe Tr. at 271. (b) Will Parnell applied for a shipping/receiving position. He was hired as a material handler. The positions are the same. Thus, this position was the same position for which he applied. Id. at 302. (c) Bryan Jett applied for a shipping/receiving/machinist position. He was hired as a material handler. The positions are the same. Thus, this position is the same position for which he applied. Id. at 303. (d) Sylvia Wentz applied for a warehouse position and was hired as a material handler. Persons that perform the job of material handler do so in the warehouse. Id. at 302-303. Therefore, these positions are the same. (e) Jeffery Vernon applied for the position of warehouse jogger. He was hired as a pressroom jogger. These positions are substantially the same. Id. (f) Jane Kornegay applied for the position of accounts pay clerk. She was hired for the position of label inspector. However, she actually performed clerical duties. For budget reasons, Ms. Kornegay was listed as a label inspector but did not perform those duties. From the time she was hired, Ms. Kornegay was hired to perform clerical duties and has always performed these duties. Id. at 273-274. (g) Reesa Smith applied for a position as an office assistant. She was hired as a warehouse helper. However, Ms. Smith has always performed office work in the warehouse. Id. at 301-302. (25) Based on the information above, only 7 of the 77 persons hired were hired for positions other than what they indicated on their application. Moreover, of the 18 persons listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 157, 4 of those persons are black. From the face of Plaintiffs Exhibit 157, it is apparent that Defendant did not utilize this practice to discriminate against blacks. Rather, the practice was applied to both blacks and whites. For these reasons, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiffs contention that Defendant engaged in the discriminatory employment practice of hiring white applicants for positions that they did not apply for and failing to do the same for black applicants. (26) After Coe received a sufficient number of applications for a particular vacant position, he would review those applications. Id. at 237. (27) The entry level positions did not require any particular skills or expertise. Coe Tr. at 240; Travis Tr. at 324-325; Ad-dis Tr. at 398. Some of the jobs could be learned in 45 minutes with on-the-job training. Deaton Tr. at 349. (28) Despite the lack of particular skills for the entry level positions, Coe kept certain qualities in mind when he evaluated the applications. In particular, Coe considered whether the applicant had (1) a stable work history, (2) no obligations that would prevent him or her from working consistently, (3) no previous convictions of a felony, (4) reliable transportation, (5) previous manufacturing experience, and (6) used an excessive number of sick days at previous jobs. Coe Tr. at 236-237. (29) Although it was considered a plus by Coe if an applicant had these and other qualities, the presence or absence of these qualities was not determinative in the final decision on whether to hire a particular applicant. Id. at 244 and 299. Coe compared each of the applications in the pool of applications for a given job. Id. at 244. If only a few persons applied for a job, Coe could not afford to ensure that the person had each of the qualities that Defendant preferred its employees have. As Coe testified, “I mean obviously stability of employment is an important factor, but they’re all relative in the comparison pool”. Id. For example, although it was preferred that an applicant for the position of baler have lift experience, if no candidates in the job file had such experience, Coe would go with the next best candidate. Id. at 251. (30) Having reviewed the pool of applicants for a particular position, Coe would choose several of the best qualified applicants in the pool and forward those applications to the line supervisor. Id. at 236. The supervisor would only see the applications that Coe forwarded. Id. at 237. The supervisor would then decide which applicants to interview, but he could interview only those applicants whose application had been forwarded by Coe. Id. at 239; see also Travis Tr. at 323. The supervisor would then notify Coe or Blanton which applicants he wished to interview, and Coe or Blanton would arrange for the applicant to come to the facility for an interview. Coe Tr. at 239. Blanton would also do a very limited verification of the employment history of the applicants chosen for an interview. Id. at 240. (31) The supervisors considered generally the same qualities in applicants as did Coe when deciding which persons to hire. Travis Tr. at 323-324. (32) Although Coe as Personnel Manager had theoretical veto power over a supervisor’s selection of an applicant to fill a vacant position, Coe never exercised that power. Coe Tr. at 227. Therefore, the supervisors were the persons that decided which person would be hired for an entry level position. (33) Just as Coe did not know the race of a particular applicant, the supervisor did not know an applicant’s race when he was deciding which applicants to interview. Id. at 237; see also Travis Tr. at 327. “Not only did I not see the applicant so I had no indication of their race, then obviously the supervisors didn’t. It was sort of a double-blind type situation.” Coe Tr. at 237. Based on the uncontradicted testimony of Coe and Travis, the Court finds that the supervisors were unaware of the race of an applicant until that applicant came for his or her interview with the supervisor. Id. at 315. (34) Only one (1) of the class members, Jerry Burch, was successful in receiving an interview with a supervisor. Burch Tr. at 124. Therefore, Burch was the only member of the class of whom Defendant’s supervisors were aware of the applicant’s race. D. Word-of-Moutk Advertising. (35) Throughout the pendency of this matter, Plaintiff has insisted that Defendant relied on word-of-mouth advertising to fill vacant positions with the intent or adverse impact of excluding blacks from the hiring process. The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is stated as follows: “The screening of blacks during the selection process and the lack of hiring of blacks has been the result of word-of-mouth recruitment and subjective hiring criteria implemented by all whites involved in the recruitment, screening and selection of employees at Jordan Graphics.” See Plaintiff’s Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, filed July 5, 1991 at par. 41 on page 15. (36) As the Court has discussed supra, none of those persons with hiring discretion knew of the race of those persons submitting applications at Defendant’s facility prior to being interviewed. Only one (1) of the class members, Jerry Burch, was successful in obtaining an interview. As is discussed infra, the Court believes the facts indicate Defendant was justified in rejecting Burch as a suitable candidate for a position at Defendant’s facility. Therefore, the Court rejects as inconsistent with the facts of this case Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant used subjective hiring criteria to screen out blacks from being hired at its facility. Thus, the only contention remaining for the Court to discuss is whether Defendant used word-of-mouth advertising to screen out blacks from the selection process. (37) The application forms used by Defendant have a section that asks the question, “What prompted you to apply for employment at Jordan Graphics, Inc.?”. Plaintiff’s Ex. 32-125, 138 and 152. Under the question, the applicant may check one or more of the following boxes: company image, friend, relative, newspaper ad, or other. Id. Under the response to the questions are two (2) lines in which the applicant can further respond to the question. Id. (38) According to Plaintiff, Defendant had a predominately white work force. Plaintiff’s Ex. 6. From 1982 through 1987, Defendant’s total work force was comprised of 6 to 8 percent blacks. Id.; see also Plaintiff’s Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, filed July 5, 1991 at par. 37 on page 14. These figures represent the percentage of blacks in the entire work force — not just entry level positions. (39) According to Plaintiff, the effect of having a box for applicants to indicate they were referred to Defendant’s facility by a friend or relative was to perpetuate the predominately white work force. Plaintiff contends that the applicant “was usually of the same race as the person making the referral.” Plaintiff’s Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, filed July 5,1991 at par. 36 on page 13. Of the 66 whites hired by Defendant during the class period, 55 were referred by a friend or relative. Id. at par. 34 on page 13. (40) Plaintiff’s contentions have no basis in fact. Of the 55 white hirees that indicated that they were referred by a friend or relative, only 5 gave a name of the friend or relative that referred them. Plaintiff’s Ex. 63, 64A, 78, 96, and 102; see generally Plaintiff’s Ex. 42-125 and 138. Therefore, Coe was unaware of who was referring 50 of the hirees that checked the friend or relative boxes. Hence, Coe was also unaware of the race of the person referring those applicants. Coe Tr. at 297. Coe had no way of knowing whether the friend or relative that was referring the applicant was an employee at Defendant’s facility or if the referring person was just somebody in the community. Id. at 296. “As a matter of fact, sometimes if it was checked relative, you wondered if it was just their moms sending them out to get a job”. Id. (41) Coe and Travis testified credibly that they placed no weight on whether an applicant checked the friend or relative box. Coe Tr. at 296; Travis Tr. at 327. (42) Plaintiff’s own witnesses at trial contradicted the contention that Defendant gave preference to applicants that checked the friend or relative box. (a) Vicki Beam was hired by Defendant in August, 1986 for an entry level position. Plaintiff’s Ex. 57. Beam checked the newspaper box on the application. Id. Beam s brother, Tim Jones, worked at Defendant’s facility when she applied. Beam Tr. at 356. However, Jones did not assist Beam in obtaining an interview at Defendant’s facility. Id. Based on this unrefuted testimony, the Court finds that Defendant did not favor Beam based on her brother being employed at its facility. (b) David Addis was hired by Defendant in January, 1988 for an entry level position. Plaintiff’s Ex. 46. Addis checked the relative and newspaper boxes on the application. Id. Addis’ brother, Barry Addis, worked at Defendant’s facility. D. Addis Tr. at 367. Coe knew that Addis’ brother worked at Defendant’ facility. Id. However, Addis was not permitted to submit an application because of his brother. Rather, he was required to wait until the vacancy was advertised in the newspaper. Id. at 376. Moreover, Addis’ brother never talked to Coe or Blanton about hiring his brother. B. Addis Tr. at 402. Based on this unrefuted testimony, the Court finds that Defendant did not favor Addis based on his brother being employed at its facility. (c) Stacy Leatherman was hired by Defendant in April, 1986 for an entry level position. Plaintiff’s Ex. 61. Leatherman’s brother and mother worked at Defendant’s facility. Leatherman Tr. at 380, 381 and 386. Leatherman checked the relative and newspaper box on the application. Plaintiff’s Ex. 61. At trial, Leatherman testified that his mother did not tell him about an opening at Defendant’s facility. Leather-man Tr. at 381 and 386. Based on this unrefuted testimony, the Court finds that Defendant did not favor Leatherman based on his brother and mother being employed at its facility. (d) Ryan Stroupe was hired by Defendant in May, 1987 for an entry level position. Plaintiff’s Ex. 121. Stroupe checked the friend and newspaper boxes on the application. Id. Several of Stroupe’s friends from high school worked at Defendant’s facility. Stroupe Tr. at 389. However, none of Stroupe’s friends suggested that Stroupe submit his application. Id. at 390. Instead, Stroupe had heard that Defendant was a good employer. Id. Moreover, Stroupe responded to a newspaper advertisement. Id. at 392. Based on this unrefuted testimony, the Court finds that Defendant did not favor Stroupe based on his friends being employed at its facility. (43) Plaintiffs contention that Defendant excluded blacks from its work force by only hiring those persons that checked the friend or relative box is refuted by the fact that 2 of the class members, Johnny Fewell and Andria Tribble, checked the friend box. Plaintiffs Ex. 36 and 40. Moreover, Fewell noted on his application that he was referred by two (2) employees of Defendant — Haskell Good and Jeff Vernon. Plaintiffs Ex. 36. Jeff Vernon is a white employee of Defendant and Haskell Good is a black employee. Fewell Tr. at 68. Furthermore, Tribble was referred to Defendant’s facility by a black employee, Johnny Nichols. Tribble Tr. at 97. (44) Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant relied on word-of-mouth advertising to exclude blacks from its work force is further contradicted by the fact that Plaintiff failed to dispute that Defendant advertised 85 to 90 percent of its job openings. Coe Tr. at 269, 295, and 312. Moreover, Defendant advertised in widely circulated newspapers — the Charlotte Observer and the Gaston Gazette. Id. at 312. (45) The success of the advertisements in allowing a wide range of persons learn of job vacancies is demonstrated by examining the applications of the class members. Of the 6 applications of class members introduced at trial, 4 checked the newspaper box. Plaintiff’s Ex. 32, 34, 35, and 37. Moreover, most of the applicants hired by Defendant also checked the newspaper box. Plaintiff’s Ex. 42-125 and 138. (46) Based on the testimony elicited at trial and the exhibits introduced at trial, the Court finds Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant discriminated against blacks by word-of-mouth advertising to be completely unsupported by the record in this case. E. The Statistical Case. (47) During its case-in-chief, Plaintiff introduced the testimony of Dr. Farrell Bloch, an expert in employment discrimination statistics. Plaintiff’s Ex. 126. (48) On behalf of Plaintiff, Bloch prepared a study to determine the level of black availability for Defendant’s entry level positions and to compare Defendant’s hiring of blacks against the availability benchmarks. Plaintiff’s Ex. 127 at 1. Bloch concluded that black availability for entry level positions at Defendant’s facility was roughly 28%. Defendant’s hiring of blacks during the class period was 12%. Therefore, Bloch ascertained that the standard deviation of -3.19 was highly significant. Id. at 12. Bloch further concluded that this deviation in the number of blacks hired by Defendant was probably a result of word-of-mouth advertising and subjective hiring criteria. Id. (49) Bloch’s availability study consisted of two (2) dimensions — geographic and occupational. The Court believes that the evidence at trial demonstrated that Bloch’s methodology utilized in the study was significantly flawed as to both of these dimensions. Thus, the conclusion of the study is unreliable. 1. Geographical Dimension. (50) In the geographic dimension of the study, Bloch examined the applications of the 561 applicants during the class period and determined from which county or city each resided. Id. at 4. The address of each applicant was determined from the application itself. Bloch Tr. at 476. Bloch then counted the number of applicants from Gastonia (149 or 27.85% of the total), the rest of Gaston County (219 or 40.93%), Charlotte (122 or 22.80%), the rest of Mecklenburg County (12 or 2.24%), Cleveland County (13 or 2.43%), York County (12 or 2.24%), and Cabarrus County (8 or 1.50%). Plaintiff’s Ex. 127 at 5. Only 535 applications were used in the study because addresses from areas that did not total at least one percent of the total were not used. Id. The final black availability benchmarks are weighted averages from the percents of each area. Id. (51) Separating Charlotte from Mecklenburg County and Gastonia from Gaston County has the effect of increasing the availability of blacks in the overall work force. The percentage of blacks in the cities is much larger than the percent of blacks in the rest of the two (2) counties. Haworth Tr. at 602. By separating out the cities from the counties, the overall availability in the weighted averages increases dramatically. Compare Plaintiffs Ex. 127 at 5 with Defendant’s Ex. 29. (52) Defendant demonstrated at trial that Bloch’s attempt to separate out the cities from the counties was methodologically flawed. Bloch relied solely on the addresses listed on the applications in deciding to count that application in the city or the rest of the county categories. Bloch Tr. at 494. He did not utilize maps of the counties, nor did he visit the addresses. Id. (53) It is not possible to determine whether a person resides in the city or the county based solely on a mailing address. At trial, Defendant showed that 12 of the Charlotte addresses that Bloch categorized in the city were actually located in Mecklenburg County. Id. at 509-521. (54) On redirect, Bloch attempted to deemphasize the flaw in the study by stating that it would take a shift of 25 applicants from Charlotte to the rest of Mecklenburg County to get a drop of 1% in bottom line black availability. Id. at 556. Because Defendant only demonstrated 12 of the addresses are in the wrong category, Plaintiff argues that the Court should disregard this flaw. Trial Tr. at 571-72. (55) The Court finds that it is largely irrelevant that Defendant has only demonstrated that 12 addresses are in the wrong category. A showing of only 1 address in the wrong category would demonstrate Defendant’s point; namely that “you can’t tell by the application where that person lives unless you go to the map and identify the street and the number on the house and determine whether that person is in the city or county”. Bloch Tr. at 559 and 692. A representative of the postal service, John Geeter, confirmed this point by testifying that it “was not possible to look at an address alone, without a map, without contacting the people, without going out to see the road, and tell ever whether they live within the city or without the city of Charlotte. Geeter Tr. at 591 (emphasis added). (56) Moreover, the burden of convincing the fact finder that Bloch’s study is methodologically sound is on Plaintiff. Defendant did not represent that it had done an exhaustive study of all the applications. Id. at 693. Rather, Defendant illustrated through the use of the 12 examples that the methodology in Bloch’s study is seriously flawed. Haworth Tr. at 644-645. For these reasons, the Court finds that the cities cannot be separated from the counties. (57) The Court finds as more factually accurate the weighted averages of Defendant’s expert, Charles Haworth. Defendant’s Ex. 28. Those averages and the number of applicants are as follows: Gaston County (368 or 68.8%), Mecklenburg County (134 or 25.0%), Cleveland County (13 or 2.4%), York County (12 or 2.2%), and Cabarrus County (8 or 1.5%). Defendant’s Ex. 29. (58) The geographic dimension of the study is further flawed by the fact that Bloch included in the applications the tabulated non-entry level applicants. Bloch instructed his assistant to segregate blue collar applicants from white collar applicants. Bloch Tr. at 498. However, the only criteria given to define white collar applicants was managers, clericals, or financial analysts. Id. at 499. It is undisputed that entry level positions were narrowly defined to those listed supra. Finding of Fact 13. It became apparent during the cross examination of Bloch that he did not know which positions were considered entry level. Id. at 499-510. Bloch did not even have available to him job descriptions for entry level positions when he prepared the report of his study. Id. at 524. (59) The effect of Bloch including all blue collar applicants in the geographical dimension of the study was to include highly skilled and paid technicians such as pressmen, laser operators, and film processors in the geographic analysis. Id. at 507-510. Personal commuting distance, an important factor in determining which persons might be inclined to apply at Defendant’s facility, is apt to increase if the pay rate is higher. Id. at 505. For example, a pressman making $14.00 an hour is more willing to travel further than a janitor making $5.75 an hour. Id. (60) The Court believes that the inclusion of non-entry level applicants in Bloch’s geographical analysis caused a wider commuting pattern to be included in the study. Thus, the study places too much emphasis on those persons that reside in Charlotte and Gastonia. It is more likely that applicants for these entry level positions resided outside the cities and closer to Defendant’s facility in the rest of the two counties. Defendant’s Ex. 30. Moreover, it is unlikely that applicants traveled west from Charlotte to the outer western boundary of Mecklenburg County. Defendant’s Ex. 31. The commuting pattern indicates a west to east flow of commuters in a direction towards Charlotte, not away from it. Id. 2. Occupational Dimension. (61) The occupational dimension of the study was an attempt to determine the number of blacks available in the geographical area to fill entry level positions at Defendant’s facility. After examining the applications, Bloch separated out blue collar from white collar applicants. Plaintiff's Ex. 127 at 6. Bloch then placed the blue collar applicants into four occupational categories listed in the 1980 Census. Id. The 1980 Census lists the number of blacks that work in the geographical areas listed above and the categories selected by Bloch. Plaintiff’s Ex. 127A. (62) The Census breaks down occupations into six broad categories. Bloch determined that of the six broad categories, the category titled “freight, stock, and material handlers” was most analogous to the entry level positions at Defendant’s facility. The broad category of “freight, stock, and material handlers” has two major sub-categories including those of “handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers” and “machine operators, except precision”. Bloch considered these two sub-categories in his analysis. A sub-category of the “handlers, etc.” sub-group was also used by Bloch. That sub, sub-category is titled “operators, fabricators, and laborers”. Id. at 9. (63) An inherent problem with using Census data is that the categories do not perfectly match the positions at Defendant’s facility. Bloch Tr. at 480. Some of the categories are too narrow while others are too broad. Id. For example, the category “freight, stock, and material handlers” would include all positions contained in the other three sub-categories. Obviously, the sub, sub-category “operators, fabricators, and laborers” would contain many fewer positions than those of the others. Bloch attempted to compensate for this problem by analyzing the data in the four different categories and comparing the results. Id. Bloch hypothesized that if the results were similar in each of the four categories, he could have confidence that the true representation of blacks among the people who would be interested in an entry level position at Defendant’s facility would be in the ballpark of the estimates in each of the four categories. Id. (64) After multiplying the Census data in four categories by the weighted averages of the geographical areas from which the applicants resided, Bloch determined that the black availability percentages were between 26.40% and 25.71%. Plaintiff’s Ex. 127 at 9. Thus, Bloch estimated that the black availability percentage was approximately 26%, the mid-point of these percentages. (65) As noted supra, the Court believes that Bloch’s weighted averages are flawed based on separating out Charlotte and Gastonia from Mecklenburg County and Gaston County. Findings of Fact 50-56. The black availability percentages without separating the cities from the counties range from 22.72% to 23.65%, with a mid-point of approximately 23%. Defendant’s Ex. 32 Thus, without even considering adjustments in the occupational dimension of the study, the standard deviation utilizing the more accurate benchmark of 23% black availability percentage is -2.4; significantly less than the -3.19 standard deviation suggested by Plaintiff. Plaintiffs Ex. 159. (66) Bloch further increased the black availability percentage. Bloch felt that black availability was understated in his study. Since 1980, the Census with the latest available statistics, blacks in various labor markets have tended to increase as a proportion of the work force. Moreover, Bloch stated that blacks were disproportionally undercounted in the 1980 Census. Id. at 8. (67) To compensate for this perceived understatement in black availability, Bloch determined that the percent of overall available blacks should be increased by approximately 2% for a total black availability percentage of 28%. See generally id. at 8-11. (68) A major flaw in the occupational dimension of the study is that Bloch assumed that the only individuals applying for positions at Defendant’s facility were employed in those occupations solely within the categories used in the study. Bloch Tr. at 538. Bloch did not consider the previous experience listed on the applications. Id. (69) The impact of using general occupational categories was that many persons that might be inclined to apply at Defendant’s facility that were employed in occupations outside the categories used by Bloch were not considered in the study. Haworth Tr. at 606. For example, persons with sales and administrative support experience were not included in the categories utilized by Bloch. Defendant’s Ex. 34(a). Both of these occupations have a low percentage of blacks employed; 5.78% in salés and 9.58% in administrative support. Defendant’s Ex. 34(c). (70) The evidence at trial, however, demonstrated that persons with this type of experience would be interested in a job at Defendant’s facility. Haworth Tr. at 619. For example, one Claimant, Andria Tribble, had child care experience. Plaintiff’s Ex. 40. Child care workers do not fall within any of the categories utilized in Bloch’s study. Bloch Tr. at 532. (71) The impact of excluding a wide range of occupations from the categories used in the study is obvious. People who would be a good source of candidates are eliminated by assumption. Haworth Tr. at 612-613. In connection with occupations with a low percentage of black workers such as sales and clerical positions, the overall black availability percentage is artificially increased if these professions are eliminated. (72) Bloch also included occupations in the study that should not have been included. In three of the four categories, Bloch included garbage collectors. Defendant’s Ex. 34(a). However, no position at Defendant’s facility is analogous to that of garbage collector. That occupation is composed of 52.71% black workers. Defendant’s Ex. 34(b). Thus, the inclusion of this occupation in the study had the effect of increasing the overall black availability percentage. Haworth Tr. at 610. (73) The choice of which occupations to include in the categories is crucial in raising or lowering the availability of blacks in the work force. For example, by looking at all employed persons in the work force, Defendant’s expert determined a black availability rate of 14.4%. Defendant’s Ex. 35. By excluding managerial and professional occupations from that group, the availability of blacks rose to 16%. Id. By further eliminating skilled production and farming occupations, the black availability percentage was 17%. Id. (74) The analysis by Defendant’s expert was no more accurate than that of Plaintiff’s expert. Stock brokers and computer programmers are in the occupational categories used by Haworth. Haworth Tr. at 653. Nonetheless, the testimony of Ha-worth was effective at demonstrating the central point of Defendant’s contention; if the occupational choices are incorrect or if they have been artificially limited, a higher availability figure is produced. Id. at 614. (75) The Court believes Bloch’s attempt to increase the black availability percentage to reflect the proportional increase of blacks in the overall population is speculative and must be rejected as factually inaccurate. Bloch failed to consider facts such as higher mortality and disability rates in blacks as well as the higher enrollment in branches of the military by blacks. Bloch Tr. at 544-546; Haworth Tr. at 622-624. Moreover, Bloch assumed without any supporting evidence that the black population was increasing in North Carolina. The preliminary 1990 Census figures show that the black population has decreased in some states such as Florida. Haworth Tr. at 656. Therefore, the Court finds that the facts do not support the decision by Bloch to raise the black availability percentage by 2%. (76) Based on the credible testimony of Haworth, the Court finds that the occupational dimension of Bloch’s study is unreliable. After compensating for the erroneous separating out of the cities from the counties in the geographical dimension of the study and erroneously raising the availability percentage by 2%, Bloch’s analysis shows that the black availability percentage was approximately 23%. The Court rejects as inconsistent with the facts ascertained at trial that the black availability percentage for entry level positions at Defendant’s facility was 23%. Although Defendant did not attempt at trial to establish a particular black availability percentage, the Court believes that at a minimum Defendant has shown that the black availability percentage lies somewhere between 17 and 23 percent. With these percentages, the standard deviation falls between -1.2 and -2.4. Plaintiff’s Ex. 159. In any event, the Court finds that the standard deviation was well below -3. F. The Individual Claimants. (77) None of the seven (7) individual Claimants were hired for entry level positions at Defendant’s facility. Plaintiff, in its Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, has attempted to compare the qualifications of the individual Claimants with persons hired six (6) months after the Claimants applied. (78) The Court believes that it is disingenuous for Plaintiff to make such comparisons. In some situations, Plaintiff has compared a Claimant to a person that applied for a position other than that which the Claimant applied. As the Court has noted supra, Defendant’s standard practice once the job file system was implemented was to consider applicants for only those positions they noted on their application they were interested in. Finding of Fact 25. Moreover, Plaintiff has been very selective in comparing the Claimants to applicants actually hired. In self-serving fashion, Plaintiff has completely ignored applicants hired within six (6) months of a Claimant’s application if that applicant was more qualified. Therefore, the Court believes that Plaintiff’s purported comparisons are unreliable and must be rejected. (79) During trial, some Claimants suggested that they applied on occasions for which written applications were not produced. Ronald Russell, Defendant’s industrial relations manager, testified that all applications submitted during the class period were kept on file. Russell Tr. at 197. Moreover, all of the applications during the class period were made available to Plaintiff. Trial Tr. at 202. Plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence at trial indicating that Defendant did not supply it with all of the applications. Therefore, the Court rejects as unreliable and in contradiction to the Best Evidence Rule testimony regarding applications of Claimants for whom there is no written application. Thus, the Court will not compare any of the Claimants for whom no written application exists. (80) The Court further finds that Plaintiff has failed to set forth a clear procedure for comparing hirees to Claimants. Moreover, Plaintiff has completely ignored the credible testimony of Coe that individuals were in competition for positions with a pool of applicants. In most cases, Plaintiff has utterly failed to identify which persons were in the pool of candidates for the positions Claimants applied. (81) The Court, below, will discuss each of -the Claimants. However, the Court will not discuss each hiree Plaintiff has attempted to compare the Claimants to. Rather, the Court will only compare the hirees that were clearly in the same job pool for the position for which a vacancy existed. j 1. Claimant Andria M. Tribble. (82) Claimant Tribble, the original charging party, applied for a position with Defendant on June 23, 1986. Plaintiffs Ex. 40. She indicated that the position applied for was “office job or whatever is available”. Id. (83) The position of “office job” is not an entry level position. Finding of Fact 13. Therefore, Tribble’s application is outside the scope of this action. (84) In her charge of discrimination, Tribble stated that a less qualified person, Connie (Last Name Unknown), was hired in the pressroom. Plaintiff’s Ex. 1. That person was later identified as Connie Barnes who was hired as a jogger. Defendant’s Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, filed July 5, 1991 at 19. (85) The most recent job Tribble had pri- or to applying with Defendant was as a child care worker from February, 1984. Prior to that, Tribble worked for three (3) months pairing socks from June, 1983 through August, 1983. From May, 1982 through August, 1982, Tribble turned cloth. And in high school, Tribble worked weekends spinning, crealing (sic), winding, and packing cloth. Plaintiff’s Ex. 40. (86) Although Tribble initially claimed that she had extensive manufacturing experience, she ultimately admitted at trial the extent of her experience was seven (7) months of experience during two (2) summers and weekend work during high school. Tribble Tr. at 109. (87) Barnes, on the other hand, had five (5) years of full-time, uninterrupted manufacturing experience. Defendant’s Ex. If. Moreover, Barnes also had experience at another printing company. Id. Tribble acknowledged at trial that Barnes had more manufacturing experience than herself. Tribble Tr. at 110. (88) As discussed supra, the Court has determined that none of Defendant’s personnel were aware of Tribble’s race when she applied. (89) Plaintiff has also attempted to compare Tribble to Vickie Winchester Beam. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, filed July 5, 1991 at par. 51 on page 18. Plaintiff contends that Beam had only clerical experience prior to applying with Defendant. Plaintiff’s Ex. 57. Beam was hired by Defendant on August 11, 1986, some six (6) weeks after Tribble applied. Id. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Beam was in the same applicant pool as Tribble. To the contrary, it would appear that the position for which Tribble applied was filled when Barnes was hired on July 7, 1986. (90) In any event, Tribble has failed to demonstrate that Defendant hired a less qualified applicant for the position for which she applied. Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds that the decision not to interview or hire Tribble was in no way related to or influenced by her race. 2. Claimant Jerry Burch. (91) Claimant Jerry Burch applied for a position at Defendant’s facility on April 1, 1987. Plaintiff’s Ex. 34. Burch applied for a material handler position. Id. (92) Burch’s application indicates that he had forklift experience in the United States Army from January 15, 1981 through December 11, 1986. Id. The only other experience listed on the application was as a loader at American Efird Mills from June 1980 through January 1981. From the application, it was evident that Burch had been unemployed for four (4) months prior to applying at Defendant’s facility. (93) As discussed supra, the Court has determined that none of Defendant’s personnel were aware of Burch’s race when he applied. (94) Two (2) or three (3) days after submitting his application, Burch was called for an interview. Burch Tr. at 124. After the interview, Burch did not hear again from Defendant. Id. at 125. (95) At the interview, Burch discussed his military background with the plant manager. Id. at 134. In particular, Burch told the plant manager that the reason he was only an E-4 after six (6) years with the Army was because he had been busted in rank on two (2) occasions — once for smoking marijuana and a second time for sleeping on duty. Id. at 135-136. (96) In relation to Burch, the Court believes it unnecessary to compare him to any hiree. The Court finds that Defendant was amply justified in failing to hire Burch based solely on his poor military record. Plaintiff has introduced no evidence that persons actually hired by Defendant had such egregious prior employment records. (97) Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds that the decision not to hire Burch was in no way related to or influenced by his race. 3. Claimant Johnny Xavier Fewell. (98) Claimant Johnny Fewell applied for the position of forklift operator at Defendant’s facility on April 3, 1987. Plaintiff’s Ex. 36. (99) The application indicates Fewell had approximately six (6) months experience as a forklift operator at Gold Circle. The only other job experience listed on the application was at two (2) fast food restaurants. Id. (100) As discussed supra, the Court has determined that none of Defendant’s personnel were aware of Fewell’s race when he applied. (101) Persons actually hired by Defendant shortly after Fewell submitted his application had substantially more forklift experience. Samuel May had over three (3) years forklift and loading experience. Plaintiff’s Ex. 47. Ryan Stroupe had over one (1) year forklift experience. Plaintiff’s Ex. 121. (102) Instead of comparing Fewell to forklift or material handler hirees, Plaintiff has attempted to compare him to Timothy McKinnish who was hired as a general bindery worker. Plaintiff’s Ex. 50. The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Fewell was in the same applicant pool as McKinnish. Therefore, the Court rejects this comparison as having no basis in fact. (103) Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds that the decision not to interview or hire Fewell was in no way related to or influenced by his race. 4. Claimant James Howard Allen. (104) Claimant James Howard Allen testified at trial that he applied at Defendant’s facility on five (5) occasions during the class period. However, only two (2) applications were introduced at trial. Allen was unsure of the dates of the other applications. Moreover, his trial testimony conflicted with his deposition testimony regarding these other applications. For these reasons, the Court believes the only credible evidence regarding Allen’s applications is found in the two (2) applications introduced at trial. (105) As discussed supra, the Court has determined that none of Defendant’s personnel were aware of Allen’s race when he applied on either occasion. (106) Allen applied for an inspector position at Defendant’s facility on March 16, 1987. Plaintiff’s Ex. 32. (107) The work record section of the application indicates Allen had experience from 1965 through 1987 with four (4) different employers inspecting machinery. Id. (108) An inspector at Defendant’s facility does not inspect machinery. Rather, the inspector “inspects and boxes labels”. Plaintiff’s Ex. 6 at 8. Of the two (2) applications submitted by Allen, neither indicates that he had any volume product inspection experience. Allen Tr. at 36. The Court finds from the face of the applications that Allen did not have the type of inspection experience that would qualify him for a position at Defendant’s facility. (109) Defendant hired three (3) persons close to the time period Allen applied for the position of inspector. Donna Aldridge had six (6) years experience inspecting socks for defects. Plaintiff’s Ex. 66. Wanda Byers had over two (2) years experience inspecting hose for defects. Plaintiff’s Ex. 73. Karen Moore had almost seven (7) years inspecting products at Burlington Industries. Plaintiff’s Ex. 105. (110) The type of experience gained from inspecting products in textile mills is commensurate with inspecting business forms at Defendant’s facility. Allen Tr. at 36. Accordingly, the Court finds that the persons hired by Defendant for the position of inspector in March or April, 1987 had more experience and were better qualified than Allen. (111) On October 20, 1987, Allen applied for a position in Defendant’s bindery department. Plaintiff’s Ex. 32A. The application indicated that Allen was last employed in October, 1986 at IBM. (112) At trial, Allen admitted that he had been employed by American Truetzschler just prior to submitting his second application at Defendant’s facility. Allen was less than forthright in admitting that he had been discharged from American Truetzschler for unsatisfactory performance. Allen Tr. at 33-35. Allen was in fact involuntarily discharged by American Truetzschler on August 3, 1987. Wright Tr. at 583; Defendant’s Ex. 53-54. (113) Although Coe was not aware of the falsities contained in Allen’s application when it was reviewed, the Court believes that the false information contained in the application and the evasive manner in which Allen testified places a cloud of doubt on the credibility of Allen as a witness. The Court therefore finds Allen was not a credible witness. (114) Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a bindery position was available when Allen applied in October, 1987. Instead, Plaintiff has attempted to compare Allen to Donna Randolph who was hired as a laser helper and Reesa Smith who was hired as a warehouse helper. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, filed July 5, 1991 at par. 67 on page 25. The Court finds these comparisons to have no basis in fact. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Allen was in the same pool of applicants as Randolph and Smith. (115) Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds that the decision not to interview or hire Allen was in no way related to or influenced by his race. 5. Claimant Troy Darby. (116) Claimant Troy Darby applied for a janitor position at Defendant’s facility on September 12, 1988. Plaintiff’s Ex. 35. (117) Although Darby listed three (3) previous employers on the work experience section of the application, he stated on the application that he had been fired as the reason for wanting to change positions. Id. At trial, Darby admitted to having been fired from another position as well. Darby Tr. at 151. (118) As discussed supra, the Court has determined that none of Defendant’s personnel were aware of Darby’s race when he applied. (119) Plaintiff has attempted to compare Darby to James Martin who was hired as a baler operator. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, filed July 5, 1991 at par. 93 on page 33. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Darby was in the same applicant pool as Martin. (120) The Court believes that it is unnecessary to compare Darby to hirees. The Court finds that Defendant was amply justified in rejecting Darby’s application based solely on the fact that he had been fired from a previous position. Plaintiff failed to introduce any evidence to counter Defendant’s contention that it would have a negative impact on an applicant’s chance of being hired if he had been fired by his most recent employer. Coe Tr. at 299. (121) Based on these undisputed facts, the Court finds that the decision not to interview or hire Allen was in no way related to or influenced by his race. 6. Claimant Patricia Gillespie. (122) At trial, Gillespie testified that she applied at Defendant’s facility on three (3) occasions. Gillespie Tr. at 158. (123) As discussed supra, the Court has determined that none of Defendant’s personnel were aware of Gillespie’s race when she applied. (124) The first occasion Gillespie allegedly applied for a position at Defendant’s facility was in 1985 which is outside the applicable class period. Id. Therefore, the Court finds that no evidence of this application is relevant to this action. (125) The second application was submitted by Gillespie sometime in early 1^986. Id. at 160. However, Gillespie was not sure of the exact date. On direct, she stated that the second application was submitted “sometime in ’86. February of ’86”. Id. On cross examination, Gillespie stated the application could have been submitted somewhere in the late winter, early spring of 1986. Id. at 168. Moreover, on her application of October 27, 1987, Gillespie stated that she had never applied to or been employed by Defendant. Plaintiff’s Ex. 37. Based on this contradictory evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff ha