Full opinion text
ORDER SAM H. BELL, District Judge. Currently pending before the court in the above-captioned matter are motions to dismiss the complaint on the basis of qualified immunity filed by all of the individual defendants herein: Charles A. Greenlee, Barbara L. Blankenship, Mike Fugo, Bruce Dobbins, Thomas Stetka, Shelli Niederle, Michael L. Satola, L. James Juliano, and James Varga. Plaintiff Donald J. Bettio has filed a brief in opposition to the motions to dismiss and defendants Greenlee, Blankenship, Fugo, Dobbins, Stetka, Niederle, and Varga have filed a reply brief. In the motions to dismiss defendants challenge the legal sufficiency of the complaint, which is premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by arguing that the allegations contained therein do not state a claim which overcomes the defense of qualified immunity. The court’s duty is to determine whether the defendant officials are entitled to this defense based solely upon the factual allegations contained in the complaint. These allegations, for purposes of the subject motion, must of course be regarded as true. See Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983); Lee v. Western Reserve Psychiatric Habilitation Center, 747 F.2d 1062, 1065 (6th Cir.1984). Each of the averments contained in the complaint is pleaded with an abundance of breadth. Thus, to properly rule on the motion now before the court, it is necessary to discuss individually the claims of plaintiff. Any attempt to resolve the issues raised by the motion demands an expansive discussion of those issues. Thus, the length of this opinion is regrettable; it is so not because of desire but rather because of necessity. I. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY The standard for deciding the issue of qualified immunity has been set forth in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). In that case the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment relief in a Bivens action. In vacating the Court of Appeals’s decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the objective test for qualified immunity established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In Harlow, the Court had stated that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. The Court in Creighton not only reaffirmed but expanded upon Harlow by holding that in a qualified immunity analysis, the Court must determine whether a reasonable person could have believed that defendants' actions were lawful in light of clearly established law and in light of the information the defendants possessed at the time of the incident. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. at 3039-40. The Creighton Court clearly places more emphasis on the objective reasonableness of an officer’s actions as based upon the information he or she possesses, whereas the Harlow Court focused more upon whether or not the right asserted is clearly established. In his opinion in Martin v. City of Eastlake, 686 F.Supp. 620, 626 (N.D.Ohio1988), Judge Krenzler states in part: Under the Creighton standard, an officer may be able to successfully assert the qualified immunity defense even though he violated a clearly established constitutional right. The focus of the qualified immunity defense in Creighton is not on whether the constitutional right was established or not, but is on whether a reasonable police officer would have believed that the actions violated clearly established constitutional rights. A right is “clearly established” when the contours of that right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. See also Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 423 (6th Cir.1988) (“The relevant inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable official in the defendant’s position could have believed his conduct to be lawful, considering the state of the law as it existed when the defendant took his challenged actions.”); Good v. Dauphin County Social Services, 891 F.2d 1087, 1091-92 (3d Cir.1989); Yerardi’s Moody St. Rest. v. Board of Selectmen, 878 F.2d 16, 19-20 (1st Cir.1989); Osabutey v. Welch, 857 F.2d 220, 223 (4th Cir.1988). While the immunity issue in Creighton centered about the conduct of police officers, Harlow teaches that the defense is available to government officials in general. Where the official is not engaging in judicial or quasi-judicial activities, the defense applies. Nonjudicial officials, who need protection from claims or harassment which would interfere with their duties, ordinarily are accorded qualified immunity ... when the nonjudicial official undertakes action on his own initiative or when he carries out administrative or investigatory functions of the prosecutor, he can only claim the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 560 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied 481 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 1910, 95 L.Ed.2d 516 (1987). Proper analysis of the application of the qualified immunity doctrine directs the court to begin by making a twofold inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint held to the light of a motion to dismiss. First, the court must ask whether the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated were clearly established at the time of the alleged incidents. This inquiry involves a threshold determination, for “concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional rights asserted by plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. -, -, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277, 287 (1991). In this regard, a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity also serves as an argument that the plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege the deprivation of a constitutional right. In making the determination of whether the right was clearly established, the district court must look to decisions of the Supreme Court or those of the Sixth Circuit. See Hall v. Shipley, 932 F.2d 1147, 1150 (6th Cir.1991); Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701, 706 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied — U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 2631, 110 L.Ed.2d 651 (1990). Finally, in determining whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation, the court should not focus on the right in a generalized, abstract sense. Rather, the court should focus upon the factual allegations in the complaint and examine the allegations regarding the defendant officials’ misconduct in determining whether the right was clearly established in a “particularized” sense. The right in question, however, cannot be simply a generalized right, like the right to due process. Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3038. It must be clearly established in a “particularized” sense, so that “the contours of the right” are clear enough for any reasonable official in the defendants’ position to know that what the official is doing violates that right. Id. at 3039. This particularity requirement does not mean that the very action in question has been held unlawful; it does mean, though, that in the light of the preexisting law, the illegality of the action must be apparent. Ibid. Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1242 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1473, 108 L.Ed.2d 610 (1990). As one can ascertain from this discussion, the second inquiry under the qualified immunity analysis is inextricably intertwined with the first. Under the second inquiry, the court must examine the allegations of the complaint which relate to the alleged misconduct of the defendant officials; in the context of a motion to dismiss, the court must accept these allegations as true. The court must then ask and answer the following question: would any reasonable official in defendants’ position have known that what defendants did, as expressed in the allegations, violated plaintiff’s clearly established rights? In formulating its answer to this question, the court must keep in mind the fact-specific, “particularized” nature of the first inquiry, and determine whether, under the allegations of the complaint, the defendant officials should have known that what they were doing, specifically, was illegal in light of preexisting law. The preceding discussion is but another way of stating that, “where a § 1983 action has been asserted against public officials who may be entitled to ... qualified immunity, the complaint must state with factual specificity the bases upon which the potentially immune defendant will be unable to successfully maintain the defense of immunity.” Scarso v. Cuyahoga County Department of Human Services, 747 F.Supp. 381, 386 (N.D.Ohio 1989), aff'd in part rev’d in part 917 F.2d 1305 (1990). Put in another fashion: “where a plaintiff fails to allege sufficient allegations to withstand the qualified immunity defense, it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss.” Id., citing Dominque v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir.1987). II. THE COMPLAINT To follow the path of analysis indicated above, we look first to the allegations contained in the complaint. Unfortunately, this task is made no less difficult because of the lack of precision used in framing the issues in the complaint. Nonetheless, the court will engage in an attempt to apply the qualified immunity doctrine to the allegations of the complaint as those allegations are set forth. An overview of the complaint reveals that plaintiff alleges, under § 1983, that he was improperly terminated or suspended from his position as police officer for Northfield and that his discharge violated his free speech, substantive due process, and procedural due process rights under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The complaint also alleges that the defendants, out of malice and without cause, filed criminal charges against plaintiff, resulting in a deprivation of rights under the first and fourteenth amendments. Finally, the complaint charges that the nine individual defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his constitutional rights and seeks recovery under this theory pursuant to § 1983 and § 1985(3). The individual defendants are denominated as follows: Fugo, Dobbins, Stetka, and Niederle are councilpersons of North-field; Greenlee is a former mayor of North-field; Satola is presently mayor of North-field; Juliano was law director for North-field at the time of the alleged incidents; and Varga' was “Acting Chief” of North-field at the time of the alleged incidents. The complaint does not reveal the capacity held by Blankenship within the Village of Northfield. For purposes of the motions to dismiss, a more detailed examination of the complaint is necessary. Under the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff tells the following story: 1) From March of 1976 to October 26, 1989, plaintiff was a police officer for Northfield and performed his job in a “competent and efficient” manner (H 13). 2) During the summer and fall of 1989, Dobbins and Fugo, with the knowledge and acquiescence of Blankenship, Stetka, Niederle, and Juliano, “threatened the life and bodily safety” of Satola if the latter “failed or refused to sign charges of employment related misconduct against plaintiff.” In addition, Dobbins and Fugo “thereafter terminated or recommended the termination of plaintiff.” (116). 3) On October 11, 1989, Satola, with the knowledge and acquiescence of Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Stetka, Niederle, and Juliano, brought additional charges of employment related misconduct against plaintiff, viz: a) On September 17, 1988, plaintiff mishandled evidence, resulting in contamination of fingerprint evidence; b) On September 17, 1988, plaintiff used excessive force upon a suspect, beating the suspect about the head and face while the latter was seated and handcuffed; c) On October 6, 1985, plaintiff used similar excessive force against a suspect. (¶ 16). These charges were false and these defendants, with the exception of Dobbins, knew this to be so (¶ 17). 4) On October 26, 1989, the Village of Northfield, Satola, Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Niederle, and Juliano “purported to conduct a pre-termination hearing” on the misconduct charges (1118). At the hearing, these defendants “failed and refused to permit plaintiff or his counsel to see or inspect the evidence against him ...” (1119). 5) On October 26, 1989, the Village of Northfield and Satola, with the knowledge and participation of Blankenship, Dobbins, Niederle, Fugo, and Juliano, and in concert and conspiracy with Varga, terminated plaintiff. Such termination was the result of a conspiracy among these defendants, “was arbitrary and capricious and activated by irrelevant and impermissible reasons,” including but not limited to the aforementioned threats to Satola made by Dobbins and Fugo (¶ 20). Further, the termination was “motivated by a desire to retaliate against plaintiff for his speech in matters of public concern including, but not limited to, his advocacy of recall of former Mayor and defendant Greenlee and his filing, maintenance of the instant action.” (¶ 21). 6) On September 28, 1990, all defendants herein filed an information with the United States Attorney charging the crime of willful use of unreasonable force under color of state law in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (¶ 27). On January 8, 1991, all defendants filed a second information containing the same charge but relating to a different incident (id). Plaintiff was indicted, but the charges were subsequently dismissed after trial on March 8, 1991 (If 28). Defendants filed the information out of “malice, hatred, and ill-will toward plaintiff for the sole purpose of harassing, embarrassing, and causing plaintiff to be wrongfully discharged” from his employment as police officer; out of “a desire to retaliate against plaintiff for his speech in matters of public concern including, but not limited to, his “advocacy of the recall” of Greenlee “and his filing, maintenance, and prosecution of an action against defendants on November 16, 1990” (¶ 29). The filing of the information was made pursuant to a conspiracy among all defendants (¶ 31). Based upon the foregoing factual allegations, plaintiff sets forth the following eight counts: 1) Plaintiffs suspension from employment by the Village of Northfield, Satola, Blankenship, Fugo, Dobbins, Stetka, and Niederle, in conspiracy with Juliano and Varga, resulted in a violation of his fourteenth amendment substantive due process rights under § 1983. 2) Plaintiff’s indefinite suspension by the Village of Northfield and Satola, in conspiracy with Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Stetka, Niederle, Juliano, and Varga, resulted in a violation of his fourteenth amendment procedural due process rights. 3) Plaintiff’s termination by the Village of Northfield and Satola, in conspiracy with Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Niederle, Juliano and Varga resulted in a violation, under § 1983, of his free speech rights under the first and fourteenth amendments. 4) Plaintiff’s termination by the Village of Northfield and Satola, in conspiracy with Blankenship, Fugo, Dobbins, Niederle, Juliano and Varga, resulted in a violation of plaintiff’s fourteenth amendment substantive due process rights under § 1983 and § 1985(3). 5) Plaintiff’s termination by the Village of Northfield and Satola, in conspiracy with Blankenship, Fugo, Dobbins, Niederle, and Juliano, resulted in a violation, under § 1983, of plaintiff’s procedural due process rights under “the Civil Service Laws, Rules, and Regulations of the Village of Northfield” and under the fourteenth amendment. 6) “The action of the defendants Village of Northfield, Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Stetka, Niederle, Satola, and Juliano are direct, deliberate, and intentional violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).” 7) “The actions of defendants Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Stetka, Niederle, Satola, and Juliano are deliberate and intentional violations of the Charter of the defendant Village of Northfield and the Civil Services laws, Rules and Regulations relating to plaintiff as a fully classified civil service police officer.” The Eighth Count sets forth a separate factual background. In Count Eight, plaintiff alleges that on October 10, 1990, the Council of the Village of Northfield and the Northfield Civil Service Commission ordered his reinstatement with back pay (¶ 49). Subsequently, Satola vetoed this action (¶ 50), and thereafter the Council, comprised of members not defendants to this action, overrode Satola’s veto (11 51). Despite the Council’s action, plaintiff claims, Satola and Varga have refused to reinstate plaintiff (11 52). By this refusal, Satola and Varga, under § 1983 and § 1985(3), “in concert and conspiracy,” have violated the following constitutional rights of plaintiff: substantive due process, procedural due process, privileges and immunities, and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment, and due process under the fifth amendment; and, under Art. I, § 10 of the Constitution, impairment of “the obligations of plaintiff’s contracts of employment” (¶ 53). III. THE COMPLAINT ANALYZED UNDER THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE A. Introduction To begin the analysis required concerning this issue we must focus upon the eight counts of the complaint and the underlying factual allegations as those allegations relate to each individual defendant. Initially, it is noted that many of plaintiffs claims rely upon the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As such, it is advisable to set forth a brief background regarding this clause. The Sixth Circuit has stated as follows: The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which imposes the same restraints on the states that the corresponding clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes on the national government, prohibits “any State [from] depriving] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law____” No right to due process arises, under this language, except where a state undertakes to deprive a person of one or more of the three interests specified: life, liberty, or property. Inmates of the Orient Correctional Institute v. Ohio State Adult Parole Authority, 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir.1991). In the case at bar, the complaint might be said to raise both “liberty” and “property” concerns. The complaint, further, purports to allege a violation of both “substantive” due process and “procedural” due process — two theories under which differing standards apply. We focus first upon the first and third counts of the complaint, each of which contains claims based upon alleged violations of substantive due process. These counts set forth two separate types of substantive due process recognized by the law under the fourteenth amendment. Quoting Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.1985), the Sixth Circuit has differentiated between the two facets of substantive due process in the following manner: The first category encompasses claims based on a “right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws other than the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment simpliciter.” Wilson, 770 F.2d at 585 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 at 536, 101 S.Ct. 1908 at 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981)) (emphasis in original). The second category of substantive due process claims identified in Wilson includes allegations of official acts which “may not take place no matter what procedural protections accompany them,” Wilson, 770 F.2d at 586 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3208 n. 4, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (separate opinion of Stevens, J.)), or which “shock the conscience of the court.” Hayes v. Vessey, 777 F.2d 1149, 1152 (6th Cir.1985). More recently, the Sixth Circuit has stated as follows: Courts have analyzed § 1983 actions based on deprivations of due process as falling into two categories: violations of procedural due process and violations of substantive due process. Violations of substantive due process are further divided into two kinds: (1) deprivation of a particular constitutional guarantee and (2) actions that “government officials may not take no matter what procedural protections accompany them,” alternatively known as actions that “shock the conscience.” Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 224-25 (6th Cir.1990). See also G.M. Engineers and Associates, Inc. v. West Bloomfield Township, 922 F.2d 328, 332 (6th Cir.1990) (citing Hayes); Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 831 (6th Cir.1989). The rationale behind a rule which differentiates between these two types of substantive due process is understandable. The fourteenth amendment implicates constitutional concerns, not merely those which may be commonly addressed through state law remedies. “[N]ot every state law tort becomes a federally cognizable ‘constitutional tort’ under § 1983 simply because it is committed by a state official.” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1160, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir.1980); citing to Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979). “Section 1983 imposes liability for violation of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law,” the latter remedy being available in state court, Baker v. McCollan, supra, at p. 146, 99 S.Ct. at 2695. Haag v. Cuyahoga County, 619 F.Supp. 262, 277 (N.D.Ohio 1985), aff'd 798 F.2d 1414 (1986). Thus, where one seeks to redress an injury which is fully compensable under state law, and which would ordinarily be deemed a common law tort, the federal venue is available only where the defendant government official is alleged to have acted so egregiously that his misuse of government power “shocks the conscience.” Such is the case where the plaintiff alleges a violation under § 1983 of substantive due process, but alleges no underlying Bill of Rights or other federal law cause of action. Defendants urge the application of this standard as to Count One of the complaint, but the court finds it difficult to accede to this request, in total. The Sixth Circuit has characterized the “tenured nature of employment” as a “fundamental interest protected by substantive due process.” Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir.1990), citing and interpreting Ramsey v. Board of Education of Whitley County, Kentucky, 844 F.2d 1268, 1274-75 (6th Cir.1988). In Charles, the court cited to cases which indicated to it that one’s interest in a tenured job is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the substantive due process clause. Id. Further, in Parate, supra, the court stated as follows: This Court has long held that the “freedom to choose and pursue a career, ‘to engage in any of the common occupations of life,’ Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923), qualifies as a liberty interest which may not be arbitrarily denied by the State.” Wilkerson v. Johnson, 699 F.2d 325, 328 (6th Cir.1983). Id., 868 F.2d at 831. Certainly, a plaintiff seeking protection for a fundamental liberty interest should not be burdened with having to show that the defendants’ conduct is so egregious as to shock the conscience. In addition, while the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly referred to the “shock the conscience” standard as the applicable test to utilize in cases alleging violation of substantive due process under the fourteenth amendment simpliciter, it has also expressed reservation toward that standard. Applying the “shock the conscience” test in an area other than excessive force, however, is problematic. Not only are there fewer instances in the case law, but the “shock the conscience” test is not as uniformly applied to cases where excessive force or physical brutality is not the basis of the claim. The “shock the conscience” standard, fuzzy under the best of circumstances, becomes fuzzy beyond a court’s power to interpret objectively where there is a dearth of previous decisions on which to base the standard. We doubt the utility of such a standard outside the realm of physical abuse, an area in which the consciences of judges are shocked with some degree of uniformity. Braley, 906 F.2d at 226. See also Cassady v. Tackett, 938 F.2d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 1991). That “the status of the ‘shock the conscience’ test in contexts other than excessive force is uncertain,” Braley, id., is perhaps, an understatement. For this reason and that previously stated, the court declines to apply this standard to the qualified immunity analysis herein. B. Count One As previously indicated, the following question is posed in relation to this Count: are the defendants charged under Count One entitled to qualified immunity? This inquiry, as has been discussed, is twofold, viz., whether plaintiff has stated a violation of a “particularized” constitutional right, and whether that right, if it did exist, was clearly established at the time of the alleged incident. The starting point for this inquiry is the determination of the nature of the right plaintiff claims has been denied him. Is it a “property” or “liberty” interest which is constitutionally cognizable? See Samad v. Jenkins, 845 F.2d 660, 662 (6th Cir.1988). We begin with a look at liberty interests. Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit authority has established that under certain circumstances public employees enjoy a liberty interest in continued employment for purposes of substantive (and procedural) due process protections. The concept of “liberty” recognizes two particular interests of a public employee: 1) the protection of his or her good name, reputation, honor and integrity; and, 2) his or her freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. 564 at 573-74, 92 S.Ct. 2701 at 2707-08. The charges made must be of such a nature as to damage seriously his or her standing and associations in the community. Id. at 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701 at 2707. Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 283 (6th Cir.1976), citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2707-08, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). With regard to these two types of liberty concerns, it must be remembered that “mere defamation by a state or local official is not sufficient to establish a claim under § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment.” Id. Rather, the alleged defamation must “occur in the course of the termination of employment,” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), and “there must be a ‘public disclosure’ of the charges or reasons for discharge,” Sullivan, 544 F.2d at 283 n. 3, citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). The cases thus establish that a terminated public employee’s liberty interest in continued employment is implicated where the defendant government officials make defamatory statements during the course of the termination of employment which harm the employee’s good name, reputation, honor, and integrity, and which are disclosed publicly. Alternatively, a terminated public employee is protected from defamatory statements by the defendant officials which would serve to impose a stigma upon the employee and effectively foreclose his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. Thus, the rights implicated by the liberty interest in one’s employment under the fourteenth amendment can be stated as follows: 1) A public employee possesses the right not to have his good name, reputation, honor, and integrity harmed by defamatory statements made public during the course of the termination proceedings. 2) A public employee possesses the right not to have the state impose a stigma upon him which forecloses his freedom to seek other employment opportunities. There is no doubt that these rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct which, according to the complaint, occurred in 1989. The authority from which these rights were defined— Roth, Sullivan — had been set forth more than ten years prior. The question before the court, with this in mind, is whether the complaint states a violation of these rights on the part of the defendants named in Count One. If the factual allegations do not set forth such a violation, then these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under Count One. The face of the complaint clearly evinces that Blankenship, Fugo, Dobbins, Stetka, Niederle, Juliano, and Varga do not lose the shield of immunity by virtue of the court’s present analysis. With regard to the first right set forth above, the only defamatory statements alleged to have been made which might be said to have harmed plaintiff’s good name, reputation, honor, and integrity, were made by Satola (¶ 16 and 1117 of the Complaint, alleging that Satola brought false charges against plaintiff in support of the subsequent termination decision). In this portion of the complaint, plaintiff also alleges that Satola brought the false charges “with the knowledge and acquiescence of Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Stetka, Niederle, and Juliano” (1116). It is immediately apparent that Varga is protected, as he is not named as part of the alleged termination “conspiracy.” In addition, the allegation that Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Stetka, Niederle, and Juliano knew about and ac quiesced in Satola’s charges is clearly insufficient to overcome the defense of qualified immunity. When this defense has been asserted, it necessary that “the complaint must state with factual specificity the basis upon which the potentially immune defendant will be unable to successfully maintain the defense of immunity.” Scarso, 747 F.Supp. at 386; see also Dominque, 831 F.2d at 676. In other words, plaintiff in pleading his case must set forth some factual setting which indicates with some degree of detail the active roles each of these defendants allegedly played in voicing the defamatory statements. Mere knowledge of and acquiescence in the statements does not amount to conduct which is prohibited by Roth, Sullivan, and their progeny; i.e., such is not a “clearly established right” under the Constitution. The reasonable official in defendants’ position would not have known that such a passive role would violate the claimed liberty right. As such, without more, the complaint fails to overcome the defense of qualified immunity as to these defendants in light of this analysis. There exists a second and equally strong alternative rationale for granting immunity to these defendants with regard to the first liberty right implicated. As discussed, this right protects a public employee from defamatory statements made public during the termination proceedings. There is no claim that Satola issued the allegedly false charges publicly. As such, all of the defendants, including Satola, are immune from suit. With regard to the second type of liberty interest implicated under Count One of the complaint, the freedom to seek other employment opportunities, the complaint is also clearly insufficient. The complaint contains no allegation — nor does it even indicate — that Satola’s allegedly defamatory statements, or any other action of defendants, imposed a “stigma” upon plaintiff which foreclosed his freedom to obtain further employment. Rather, from all that can be ascertained from the complaint, plaintiff remained free to seek another job after his alleged termination. For this reason also, the defendants charged under Count One are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the liberty interest implicated thereunder. The court’s analysis of Count One does not end here. As mentioned previously, one’s employment interest can be said to implicate two alternative interests — liberty, just discussed, and property. We turn now to the latter interest at this point. With regard to this matter, the Supreme Court has had this to say: To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it____ Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules of understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. See also Sullivan, 544 F.2d at 282. In the case at bar, plaintiff alleges that he was a classified civil service employee pursuant to O.R.C. § 124.01 et seq. As such, he possessed a property right in continued employment conferred by state law (1114). See Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491-92, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (specifically discussing O.R.C. § 124). It is important to note here that the Supreme Court’s definition of a property interest in Roth was made for purposes of a procedural, as opposed to substantive, due process analysis. In the former analysis, which will be discussed more fully below, the individual must be afforded constitutionally adequate notice and hearing before he is deprived of his interest in employment. In the procedural due process context, it matters not that the underlying property interest is state-created, rather than constitutionally created and therefore “fundamental.” However, in the substantive due process analysis, this distinction is all-important. Fourteenth amendment substantive due process protects only those interests which are fundamental under the Constitution, not interests which have their source solely in state law. Most, if not all, state-created contract rights, while assuredly protected by procedural due process, are not protected by substantive due process. The substantive Due Process Clause is not concerned with the garden variety issues of common law contract. Its concerns are far more narrower, but at the same time, far more important. Substantive due process “affords only those protections ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ ” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2341, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (Cardozo, J.), overruled on other grounds, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964)). Charles, supra, 910 F.2d at 1353. In Charles, the Sixth Circuit based its reasoning upon Justice Powell’s concurrence in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). In that case, the plaintiff asserted a fourteenth amendment substantive due process right in a state-created interest in continued medical school enrollment. In arguing that the plaintiff had failed to adequately assert a constitutionally protectable property right, Justice Powell stated as follows: Even if one assumes the existence of a property right, however, not every such right is entitled to the protection of substantive due process. While property interests are protected by procedural due process even though the interest is derived from state law rather than the Constitution, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 [92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548] (1972), substantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution____ The interest asserted by [Ewing] ... is essentially a state-law contract right. It bears little resemblance to the fundamental interests that previously have been viewed as implicitly protected by the Constitution. It certainly is not closely tied to “respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms.” Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1691, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965)] (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). For these reasons, briefly summarized, I do not think the fact that Michigan may have labeled this interest “property” entitles it to join those other, far more important interests that have heretofore been accorded the protection of substantive due process. Cf. Harrah Independent School District v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 [99 S.Ct. 1062, 59 L.Ed.2d 248] (1979). Id., 474 U.S. at 229-30, 106 S.Ct. at 516 (concurrence). The Sixth Circuit in Charles adopted this reasoning verbatim. Charles, 910 F.2d at 1354. In the case at bar, the complaint itself alleges that plaintiff’s property interest in his job is purely state-created (1114). As such, it is certainly not a fundamental interest which, if breached, is entitled to substantive due process protection. It follows from this that plaintiff’s allegation of an infringement of a property interest under the substantive due process clause does not set forth a “clearly established right.” This is simply another way of stating that plaintiff has not “asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all,” Siegert, supra, 500 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d at 287. For this reason, the individual defendants named in Count One of the complaint are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the substantive due process claim for violation of a property right. C. Count Three Count Three of the complaint is asserted against the Village of Northfield and individual defendants Satola, Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Niederle, Juliano, and Varga, and raises the second type of substantive due process covered under the fourteenth amendment — a specific constitutional right other than the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment simpliciter. Plaintiff alleges that his termination was made in retaliation for his exercise of first amendment free speech rights. We look first to the nature of the right to free speech as it relates to public employment. Then, we shall determine whether plaintiff has adequately alleged the violation of a clearly established “particularized” right such that the named defendants in Count Three lose the protection of qualified immunity. In a companion ease to Roth, supra, the Supreme Court set forth the general rule regarding retaliatory action by government officials for a public employee’s exercise of free speech rights. For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no “right” to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to “produce a result which [it] could not command directly.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, 1473, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342. Such interference with constitutional rights is impermissible. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). In order to recover under such a theory, a plaintiff need not allege or show an underlying property interest in the job in question. Id. Further, the liberty interest in continued employment discussed above under the fourteenth amendment is a completely different type of liberty interest from that implicated by allegations based upon the first amendment. Roth, 408 U.S. at 574-75, 92 S.Ct. at 2707-08. In an abstract, general sense, the court has no doubt that “[i]t is clearly established that a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.” Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 2896, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987), citing Perry. Another way of framing this right is by stating that: a public employer may not dismiss an employee based [upon] the employee’s speech on matters that concern the public, rather than the personal interest of the speaker, unless the employer’s interest in efficient operation outweighs the employee’s interest in speaking freely. Garvie v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 647, 651 (6th Cir.1988), citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). However, as discussed above, the question before this court is not whether the right alleged to have been violated was clearly established in such a general, abstract sense. In order to resolve the qualified immunity issue, we must, rather, focus upon the particular allegations of the complaint. One particular Sixth Circuit case, Guercio v. Brody, 911 F.2d 1179 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 1681, 114 L.Ed.2d 76 (1991), is highly instructive and, as it turns out, wholly dispositive of the issue herein. In Guercio, the plaintiff, a former secretary of a bankruptcy judge, brought a Bivens action for wrongful discharge based upon alleged retaliation for exercise of free speech rights against two bankruptcy judges. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that she had been discharged for her disclosure of corruption within the bankruptcy court. The district court originally granted both judges absolute immunity, but the Sixth Circuit reversed this decision. Guercio v. Brody, 814 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir.1987). On remand, the defendant judges filed motions to dismiss the complaint based upon qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions to dismiss and, in so doing, analyzed the asserted right in the generalized and abstract manner discussed above. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the district court had erred in not analyzing the qualified immunity defense by means of the particularized, fact-specific approach. According to Guercio, the fact-specific approach to the qualified immunity defense in cases involving the first amendment must focus upon two factors: 1) Whether reasonable officials in defendants’ position “could have disagreed on whether and to what extent [plaintiff’s] speech was protected by the first amendment,” Garvie, 845 F.2d at 650; Guercio, 911 F.2d at 1185, i.e., whether they might disagree on “whether and to what extent [plaintiff’s] speech was on a matter of public concern,” Guercio, 911 F.2d at 1189. 2) Whether reasonable officials in defendants’ position could disagree as to “where the Pickering scale, with all of the parties’ competing interests in the balance, would ultimately come to rest.” Guercio, id So, in order to define the right alleged to be violated, we must examine the particular speech allegedly engaged in by plaintiff. In the case at bar, plaintiff’s claimed right is the right not to be discharged in retaliation for the attempted “advocacy of recall” of a former mayor. Based upon plaintiff’s somewhat inexact allegation, this court finds that plaintiff has not set forth a clearly established right in the particularized manner required to overcome the qualified immunity defense. “Whether an employee’s, speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. Plaintiff has alleged nothing regarding the content, form, or context of the alleged speech, nor anything concerning the circumstances surrounding it. In not properly alleging with more specificity that the “advocacy of recall” of the former mayor involved a matter of public, as opposed to purely private, concern, the complaint itself raises the possibility that the reasonable official might deem the asserted speech a matter of purely personal concern. In addition, assuming that the subject speech is deemed related to a matter of public concern, the complaint sets forth absolutely nothing regarding where the Pickering balance might ultimately lie. As such, based upon the complaint itself, the reasonable official could differ as to where this balance would rest. For these reasons, the court finds that the individual defendants named in Count Three are entitled to qualified immunity. D. Count Two Individual defendants Satola, Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Stetka, Niederle, Juliano, and Varga, along with the Village of Northfield, are the objects of complaint in Count Two. In this count, plaintiff claims that his “indefinite suspension” constituted a violation of his procedural due process rights under the fourteenth amendment. The specific portion of the complaint relevant to this charge is located at HIT 16-19, which can be summarized again as follows: 1) Satola brought charges of employment-related misconduct on October 11, 1989 against plaintiff with the knowledge and acquiescence of Blankenship, Dobbins, Fugo, Stetka, Niederle, and Juliano (¶ 16). 2) The charges are false and pretextual, and known by these defendants to be false and pretextual, with the exception of Dobbins (¶ 17). 3) At the pretermination hearing, held on October 26, 1989, these defendants, with the exception of Stetka, failed and refused to permit plaintiff or his counsel to see or inspect the evidence against him (¶ 19). 4) On October 26, 1989, these defendants, along with Varga, but not including Stetka, terminated plaintiff (¶ 19). See, generally, this court’s summary at pp. 9-11 of this opinion. The court will first discuss the relevant legal aspects underlying the principle of procedural due process, then will determine whether the allegations referred to state a claim under this principle sufficient to overcome the qualified immunity defense asserted by the officials named in Count Two. In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), the Supreme Court held that constitutionally adequate pretermination proceedings must be afforded the aggrieved in termination of employment cases. Of course, the employee must possess an underlying liberty or property right in continued employment in order to be entitled to invoke the protections of procedural due process. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538, 105 S.Ct. at 1491; Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 599, 92 S.Ct. at 2698-99; Roth, 408 U.S. at 569, 92 S.Ct. at 2705. In the case at bar, as noted previously, plaintiff’s complaint adequately sets forth an underlying property interest which entitles him to procedural due process protection. See O.R.C. § 124.01 et seq., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39, 105 S.Ct. at 1491-92 (the Ohio statute creates the sufficient property interest). Thus, where the employee holds a sufficient property interest, the Constitution requires a pretermination hearing as stated in Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493 (footnote omitted). In discussing the nature of the hearing required, the Supreme Court stated that: the pretermination “hearing,” though necessary, need not be elaborate. We have pointed out that “[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings.” Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 at 378, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780 at 786. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-95, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748-49 (1961). In general, “something less” than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, at 343, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 96 S.Ct. 893 at 906-07. Id., 470 U.S. at 545, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. The hearing, at a minimum, requires that the employee be afforded “notice and an opportunity to respond” prior to discharge. Id., 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. This means that he is entitled to the following three things: 1) oral or written notice of the charges against him; 2) an explanation of the employer’s evidence; and 3) an opportunity to present his side of the story. Id., citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170-71, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1652, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (Powell, J., concurrence). The Sixth Circuit has held that the third factor of the Loudermill test is the most significant. The critical element of the Loudermill requirements is the opportunity for the employee to respond to the employer’s evidence. The chance to be heard, to present one’s side of the story, is a fundamental requirement of any fair procedural system. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. The opportunity to respond must be a meaningful opportunity to prevent the deprivation from occurring. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 338, 106 S.Ct. 662, 678, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491, 495 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 137, 112 L.Ed.2d 104 (1990). Thus, where the employee is effectively deprived of an opportunity to respond to the charges, he is denied a meaningful hearing. In the case at bar, plaintiff proffers two charges in the complaint which arguably support the claim that the pretermination hearing held on October 26, 1989 lacked meaning. The allegations indicate, first, that the defendant officials were biased against plaintiff, and thus never intended to provide him with a meaningful hearing. According to the complaint, the bias which led to the filing of the allegedly false charges can be said to have stemmed from defendants’ dissatisfaction with and anger over plaintiff’s attempted “advocacy of recall” of former Mayor Greenlee (¶ 21) (discussed supra). Second, the complaint indicates that the defendant officials hindered plaintiff’s ability to present his side of the story by not allowing him or his counsel to view the evidence against him, a circumstance which also may have deprived him of his right to an explanation of the evidence. In view of plaintiff’s allegations, and with the procedural due process principles in mind, the court defines the “particularized” constitutional right alleged to have been violated as follows: plaintiff, as a public employee, claims to possess the right to a pretermination hearing which is not based upon knowingly falsified charges and at which the ultimate decisionmakers are not biased against him, and at which he is permitted to view the evidence against him. With this in mind, the court’s task in determining whether the defendant officials are cloaked with qualified immunity depends upon the answers to the following two questions: 1) Would the reasonable official in defendants’ position have known that their bringing of false charges and subsequent bias against plaintiff impermissibly deprived the hearing of meaningfulness in violation of the due process clause and the mandates of Loudermill? 2) Alternatively, would the reasonable official in defendants’ position have known that their refusal to allow plaintiff or his counsel to inspect the evidence against him deprived the hearing of meaningfulness in violation of the due process clause and the mandates of Loudermill? If either of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, then it must be concluded that Count Two of the complaint states a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Before the court engages in an analysis of these questions, it is necessary to address specific insufficiencies of the complaint as those insufficiencies relate to certain defendants. First, it is clear that Varga must be dismissed as a party to Count Two of the complaint. Although he is named in the count itself, the underlying factual allegations unarguably establish that he did not engage in any of the asserted conduct which allegedly deprived the pretermination hearing of its meaningfulness. Plaintiff does not allege that Varga took part in the bringing of the charges (¶ 16), that he knew the charges were false (¶ 17), or that he participated at the hearing (¶¶ 18 and 19). In short, the complaint itself establishes that Varga took no part in the termination proceedings or in the events leading up to the proceedings. As such, Varga is clearly entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Two of the complaint. For similar reasons, the court finds that Stetka is not a properly named defendant in Count Two of the complaint. The complaint does not allege that Stetka took part in the pretermination hearing; in fact, plaintiff does not even allege that Stetka attended the hearing (¶¶ 18-19). Thus, there can be no viable claim that Stetka engaged in misconduct at the hearing. Stetka is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Two of the complaint. Let us now analyze the qualified immunity defense as it pertains to the remaining six officials named in Count Two. The due process effect of bias on the part of government officials who conduct pretermination hearings was discussed by the Sixth Circuit in Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1081, 109 S.Ct. 1535, 103 L.Ed.2d 840 (1987). In that case, the court was faced with the following issue: Does Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), aff'g, 721 F.2d 550 (6th Cir.1983), require that a discharged municipal employee receive a pretermination hearing before a neutral and impartial decisionmaker rather than before the supervisor who fired him? Id., 849 F.2d at 1005 (emphasis in original). In answering this question in the negative, Judge Merritt’s opinion emphasized the “limited” nature of the hearing and borrowed from the following language of Loudermill in discussing the nature of the required hearing: It should be an initial check against mistaken decisions — essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. Id., 849 F.2d at 1007, quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. The court stressed that the limited nature of the hearing is necessary in order to serve the balance between the private interest of the employee and the state’s interest in efficient government operation; to require more than the minimal pretermination hearing “would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government’s interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.” Id., 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495; Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1007. The appellate court found that the existence of a neutral posttermination hearing can cure the inadequacies stemming from a pretermination hearing infected with bias which has deprived the hearing of meaningfulness: We acknowledge that there may be cases — perhaps this is one of them — in which the supervisory official is so biased that the Loudermill “right-of-reply” process is meaningless. The full, post-termination, adversary, trial-type hearing will serve to ferret out bias, pretext, deception and corruption by the employer in discharging the employee. The adversary processes employed in an adjudicatory, post-termination hearing controlled by an impartial judge lend themselves to proving wrongful conduct by the employer. The limited, “right-of-reply” pretermination hearing, as defined in Loudermill, is designed “to invoke the employer’s discretion,” his sense of fairness and mutual respect, his willingness to reconsider. It is not designed or well-adapted to uncover the employer’s bias or corrupt motivation. Id., 849 F.2d at 1008. Were the facts in our case similar to those in Duchesne, there would be no difficulty in following this reasoning with regard to the issue of bias on the part of the defendant officials. However, the complaint here alleges facts far harsher than the facts averred in Duchesne. Where the charges brought against the employee are false and are known to be false by the decisionmaking officials, the primary purpose of the minimal “right-of-reply” hearing — to guard against mistaken decisions— is not furthered. Put another way, where the charges which lead to the hearing are fabrications on the part of the defendant officials, the court is faced with a far more dangerous type of bias than that discussed in Duchesne. In such a case, the hearing clearly cannot “invoke the employer’s discretion, his sense of fairness and mutual respect, his willingness to reconsider.” Id., 849 F.2d at 1008. In such a case, the existence of bias clearly cannot be deemed irrelevant. In addition, the Duchesne balance between the private interest of the employee and the public interest of the employer has no place in such a scenario. Where the state knowingly brings false charges against the employee, there clearly can be no deference to the concern “for quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. Thus, the balance which underlay the court’s reasoning in Duchesne regarding the minimal effect of bias on the adequacy of the pretermination hearing weighs wholly in favor of the employee in a case such as this. For these reasons, the expressions of Duchesne have limited applicability to the case at bar. As discussed, underlying the court’s holding that some amount of bias at the pretermination hearing toward the employee does not taint that hearing is the notion that the employer’s interests are to be given some amount of attention and concern. Further, a certain amount of bias will usually not defeat the hearing’s purpose of guarding against mistaken decisions. In the case at bar, the complaint indicates that the bias was so harmful as to totally defeat the concerns and goals of the hearing. For this reasoning, based upon Loudermill itself, the court finds that the following right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct: a terminated public employee has the right to a pretermination hearing which is presided over by officials who have not brought false charges knowingly against the employee and whose bias would deprive the hearing of any and all meaningfulness. Such a hearing, clearly, does not “fulfill its function” and is, therefore, “nothing more than a sham.” Cremeans v. City of Roseville, 861 F.2d 878, 883 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1066, 109 S.Ct. 2065, 104 L.Ed.2d 630 (1984). Plaintiff specifically alleges that five of the defendant officials named in Count Two — Satola, Blankenship, Fugo, Niederle, and Juliano — knew that the charges against plaintiff were false (1119) and were biased against plaintiff for his attempted “advocacy of recall” of defendant Greenlee (1121). These allegations must, of course, be taken as true for the purposes of the motion to dismiss. Under these allegations, the court has no difficulty concluding that the reasonable official in these defendants’ positions would have known that what they were doing — basing the termination decision upon knowingly false charges and their own bias against plaintiff — violated plaintiff's right to a meaningful pretermination hearing within the meaning of Loudermill. Specifically, the reasonable official in such a situation would know that a hearing of this kind would fail to meet the third prong of the Loudermill test, in that the employee clearly has had no opportunity to present his side of the story. For these reasons, we hold that these defendants are not entitled to qualified im