Full opinion text
FINDINGS OF FACT CURTIN, District Judge. I. Background Evidence in this non-jury case is now closed. The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the court has considered summation. The following constitutes the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiff Louise K. Nolley, a former inmate at the Erie County Holding Center (“ECHC”), has brought this suit against the ECHC and various administrators of the facility alleging that their treatment of her during her confinements in 1988, 1989, and 1989/90 violated her constitutional and statutory rights. Ms. Nolley was confined at the ECHC on three separate occasions: (1) June 14, 1988, through November 9, 1988 (“1988 confinement”); (2) February 15, 1989, through May 31, 1989 (“1989 confinement”); (3) December 18, 1989, through February 13,1990 (“1989/90 confinement”). Prior to her first incarceration, Ms. Nolley tested positive for the human immuno-defi-ciency virus (“HIY+”), the virus associated with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (“AIDS”). This fact was known by the ECHC’s Medical Department throughout Nolley’s three confinements. Based on this information, defendants placed on Ms. Nolley’s inmate records, medical records, and transportation documents a red sticker to indicate to those who came in contact with her that she was infected with a contagious disease. Defendants also chose to segregate Ms. Nolley from the general population because of her HIV status. She was placed in an area of the Holding Center known as Female Delta Medical Pod (“Female Delta”). Female Delta is a pod for female inmates who are mentally disturbed, suicidal, or dangerous to themselves. Ms. Nolley was also deprived of access to the ECHC’s law library and, for most of her three confinements, to the ECHC’s regularly scheduled Catholic services. Other inmates housed in Female Delta were, at the same time, permitted to attend religious services and the law library. Four defendants remain in the case: Erie County, Sheriff Thomas Higgins, Superintendent John Dray, and Nurse Jane O’Mal-ley. Sheriff Higgins is the policy-making official responsible for the operation of the ECHC and the Erie County Sheriff’s Department. John Dray is the acting Superintendent of the ECHC. He is responsible for promulgating policies for the Holding Center and supervising its day-to-day operations. Jane O’Malley is the Nursing Supervisor/Administrator at the ECHC. A fifth defendant, Willie Brown, has been dropped from the case. Plaintiff Nolley seeks damages and in-junctive relief. She alleges that ECHC’s policy of placing red stickers on various documents and other items violated article 27-F of New York State’s Public Health Law, N.Y.Pub.Health Law § 2780 et seq. (McKinney 1991 Supp.), State Commission of Correction regulations adopted in accordance with that law, and her constitutional right to privacy. Plaintiff also argues that her segregation in Female Delta violated her state rights under article 27-F and her constitutional rights of privacy, due process, and equal protection. Further, Ms. Nolley alleges that the conditions of her confinement violated her Eighth Amendment rights. She also brings constitutional claims for ECHC’s denial of access to the law library and religious services. Finally, Ms. Nolley argues that defendants discriminated against her in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. II. HIV and AIDS Dr. Ross Hewitt was called by plaintiff as an expert in the diagnosis and treatment of AIDS and research regarding HIV and AIDS. Defendants accepted his qualifications by also using Dr. Hewitt as their expert. Dr. Hewitt has been Director of AIDS Services at the Erie County Medical Center (“ECMC”) since 1988. Dr. Hewitt testified that AIDS is a syndrome characterized by complications indicative of an underlying immune deficiency. The viral agent identified with AIDS is known as HIV. It was identified in late 1983 and was confirmed in 1984. The virus invades the T4 cell, which is a key cell in the human body’s immune system. Over time, the number and function of these cells decline as the virus progresses. Serious complications can occur when an infected individual’s T-cell count drops below 200. The most common complications are: pneumocystis pneumonia (non-contagious but potentially fatal), chronic viral infections, bacterial infections, tuberculosis (“TB”), meningitis, lymphoma, and kaposi sarcoma. Technically, an HIV-l- person is not diagnosed or described as having AIDS until she is experiencing one or more of these complications. Louise Nolley’s T-cell count never dropped below 300 during her three confinements at the ECHO. Nor did Ms. Nol-ley develop the complications that would lead her to being diagnosed as having AIDS. Nurse O’Malley was aware that HIV + inmates are only at risk in the general population when their T-cell count drops below 200. She could have obtained Nolley’s T-cell count from Dr. Hewitt at any time during Nolley’s confinements but did not do so. An infected person may be HIV + for as long as ten years before developing the full-blown complications of AIDS. Even persons with AIDS generally do not require hospitalization unless some acute complication of AIDS develops. Unfortunately, there is no known cure for the disease. There are only five known ways of transmitting the HIV virus: (1) sharing needles with an infected person; (2) having intimate sexual contact with an infected person; (3) carrying a developing fetus or breast-feeding a newborn; (4) receiving a transfusion of tainted blood or blood products; and (5) in rare circumstances, by blood-to-blood contact initiated through per-cutaneous cuts. AIDS cannot be transmitted by books, casual contact, being present in the same room as an infected person, toilet seats, door knobs, air conditioning, coughing, sneezing, urine, feces, sputum, nasal secretions, saliva, sweat, tears, or vomit. It certainly cannot be transmitted by attending church with an infected person or by sharing books with him or her. Sometime in the fall of 1986 or 1987, Dr. Hewitt gave a presentation on AIDS at ECHO to some of the administrative staff of the facility. This presentation was attended by O’Malley and Dray. During that presentation, Dr. Hewitt explained the five known means of transmitting HIV and AIDS, and presented an overview of the disease which consisted of the same information provided in his trial testimony. This testimony is consistent with the findings of the National Center for Disease Control (“CDC”). The knowledge concerning the transmission of HIV and AIDS has not changed since the time of his presentation. Defendant O’Malley knew of the CDC’s findings about the transmission of HIV in 1986 and 1987 and discussed these findings with Dray and with Deputy Judith Lips. Dray received publications about the transmission of HIV, which he made available to his staff. Sheriff Higgins also sent a memo to Dray in late 1987, which emphasized that AIDS could not be spread by casual contact. That memo contained a 1987 publication of the U.S. Department of Justice entitled “AIDS and the Law Enforcement Officer: Concerns and Policy Responses.” This publication was also received by O’Malley. As a result, both defendants Dray and O'Malley knew by 1987 that AIDS could not be transmitted by casual contact. Nevertheless, Dray, in his testimony, said that he did not believe the information he had received about the limited way in which HIV could be transmitted. He believed that HIV could be transmitted through saliva, tears, spit, mucus, urine and feces, by casual contact, by plaintiff using the typewriter in the law library, and even by coming into contact with plaintiff’s personal items but not plaintiff. Dr. Hewitt testified that a drug known as AZT, which first became available in September, 1987, is used to combat HIV. AZT works by slowing down the process of HIV replication. It is necessary to take AZT every four hours because, by then, it is effectively gone from the bloodstream. Missing an entire day's dose of AZT can lead to uncontrollable replication of the virus, which could have long-term, serious consequences for an HIV+ person. After his one presentation to ECHC administrators in 1986 or 1987, the defendants did not again solicit Dr. Hewitt’s assistance, even though he was available to train ECHC staff. Therefore, the only training of staff at ECHC about AIDS was in-service training provided by Deputy Lips for newly hired employees. Universal Precautions III. Since 1987, the CDC has recommended that universal precautions replace a policy of special precautions in dealing with HIV + inmates. Universal precautions are a system of infection-control that assumes that you cannot identify all persons who are potential carriers of blood-borne diseases. Staff are urged to take appropriate precautions with all inmates, rather than inmates identified as HIV+, to prevent blood-to-blood contact. The population in the ECHC facility changes frequently, and it is impossible for the staff to know which inmates are infected with HIV. Nurse O’Malley admitted that at any given time, in addition to the inmates identified as being HIV+, there are inmates in the general population who are HIV-f or have AIDS. Thus, ECHC’s policy of using special precautions with inmates known to be HIV-f is less effective than universal precautions in protecting staff from potential infection by HIV + inmates because it fails to cover inmates in the general population who may be HIV+ or have AIDS. Other correctional facilities have for some time practiced a system of universal precautions. Since December, 1988, for example, the New York State Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”) has followed the policy of universal precautions in New York State correctional facilities. DOCS stopped isolating HIV-f inmates from the general population in 1987. Defendant O’Malley recommended to defendant Dray that the ECHC follow universal precautions. IV. The Red Sticker Policy During Louise Nolley’s three confinements, she was subject to a written ECHC policy and procedure, promulgated as a general order by Sheriff Higgins, known as the “red sticker alert.” See Trial Exhs. 1-4. This alert was developed by defendants O’Malley and Dray in 1986. Tr.Exh. 1. It was reissued in revised form on November 25, 1987. Tr.Exh. 4. This revised order is still in effect today. The purpose of the red sticker alert is to ensure the safety of staff by identifying inmates known to be or suspected of suffering from contagious or infectious diseases. The use of the RED STICKER will alert the Clerks, Search/Change Area Deputy, Housing Area Deputy, Medical Department, Transportation Division and other personnel who might come in contact with the [contagious] inmate, to exercise additional precautions. Tr.Exh. 4 at 2. A red sticker was affixed on intake to plaintiffs paperwork, clothing bag, court papers, cell card, and other items. It was even affixed to plaintiff’s cash record index card, which was seen by civilian personnel assigned to handle the personal property of plaintiff — her wallet, belt, change, keys, etc. — but who never came in physical contact with Ms. Nolley. Thus, the red sticker was seen by dozens of persons, many of whom may never have had any close contact with plaintiff. The red sticker policy was not always in effect. It was developed in 1986 “when AIDS became the epidemic that was terrorizing everybody in the business, that we had to get and sit down and [write] policy and procedure.” Dray, Oct. 16,1990, at 19. See also Higgins, Oct. 17, 1990, at 115-16. Prior to the red sticker policy, ECHC simply isolated inmates with infectious diseases. The deputies would be told that a particular inmate was isolated and precautions should be taken, but they would not be told what disease the inmate was carrying. On its face, the red sticker does not identify any particular disease and is used whenever an inmate is suspected or known to be carrying an infectious or contagious disease, including HIV+, AIDS, TB, hepatitis, chicken pox, measles, or syphilis. See Tr.Exh. 4. In practice, however, plaintiff argues that the red dot revealed to staff and other persons who saw it that Louise Nolley was HIV + or had AIDS. This is a central contention in the case and must be carefully evaluated. There is no question that the red sticker policy was developed, not in response to contagious diseases in general, but specifically in response to the hysteria over HIV and AIDS. Sheriff Higgins, when testifying about the development of the general order requiring red stickers, stated: Higgins: But when this came out — when the AIDS came out and the fear and the excitement and suspicions and — of all the officers both in the holding center and in the street and everybody ' that is handling these people, we had to address this specifically. Coleman: So it’s fair to say, sir, that although these orders speak generally of contagious diseases, the principle [sic] focus of this was AIDS, right? Higgins: I would say that’s a fair evaluation. Coleman: It’s fair to say also that it was understood as such by your staff, isn’t it? Higgins: Yes, ma’am. Higgins, Oct. 17, 1990, at 116. See also Dray, Oct. 16, 1990 at 19; O’Malley, Oct. 15, 1990, at 35-36. It also appears that staff people and others who saw the red dot either knew or strongly suspected that Ms. Nolley was HIV+. Ms. Nolley testified that an inmate trustee named Leroy who worked in the clothing room, after seeing the red dot, asked her if she had AIDS or something contagious. Nolley, Aug. 21, 1990, at 47. On a trip to court in Cheektowaga a matron named Vi saw the red dot and told Nolley that meant she had AIDS. When Nolley complained of this statement to the judge, on her next visit the matron informed Nolley’s transporting officer, Deputy Lonnie Williams, that Nolley had AIDS. Plaintiff testified that Deputy Williams told plaintiffs cousin, Layna Williams, that plaintiff had AIDS. Deputy Williams denied this. Nevertheless, Nolley testified, Layna Williams subsequently asked plaintiff if she was okay. Id. at 48-51. Deputy Williams later admitted, with respect to a different red-dotted inmate he was transporting, that he pressed Undersheriff Payne to confirm whether that inmate had AIDS. He did so because he was fearful of AIDS. Williams, Oct. 16, 1990 at 146-48. On yet another occasion, plaintiff was being transported with another inmate who asked her for a cigarette. One of the transporting deputies denied the inmate’s request, stating that plaintiff had AIDS. Nolley, Aug. 21, 1990 at 53-59, 144. Plaintiff has made a compelling case that the red stickers placed on her documents and other items revealed her HIV status to non-medical ECHC staff and others. This falls short of proving that a red dot reveals to every person who sees it that a particular inmate is HIV+. Indeed, plaintiff cannot deny that many non-HIV inmates were red-dotted. This fact, however, may not be critical for this case. Based on all the evidence, the court finds that the red stickers placed on Ms. Nolley’s items disclosed to non-medical ECHC staff and others that Ms. Nolley was HIV+. V. Segregation During each of the confinements at issue in this ease, plaintiff was segregated from the general inmate population in the five-cell ward known as Female Delta. Three of the cells in the ward are used principally for confinement and observation of inmates who are suicidal or who have demonstrated severe psychiatric problems or mental illness. The other two cells are used for inmates with infectious or contagious diseases who, in the judgment of the medical department, do not require solitary isolation. Inmates with highly infectious airborne diseases such as TB, chicken pox, or measles are also segregated from the general population, but in single cells in a different part of the jail than Female Delta. All five inmates in Female Delta eat together and share a lounge/television area and shower facilities. They have frequent contact with each other. Their movements are monitored from a control area adjacent to the pod. Louise Nolley was assigned to Female Delta upon intake during each of her three confinements and remained there for the duration of her stays. The decision to segregate her from the general population was made by the medical department. This decision was made solely on the basis of her HIV status. Once plaintiff was so assigned, her segregation was never reviewed by the medical department nor by any other administrator at the ECHC. It was automatically renewed during Ms. Nol-ley’s 1989 and 1989/90 confinements. Plaintiff was never afforded an opportunity to contest her segregation. Other administrative or disciplinary segregation decisions are appealable. Dray, Oct. 17, 1990, at 9; Lips, Oct. 15, 1990, at 161. See also Tr. Exhs. 20, 21 (inmate handbooks). The decision to segregate HIV + inmates is made pursuant to General Order 87-14, Tr.Exh. 4, promulgated by Sheriff Higgins in revised form on November 25, 1987, and still in effect today. This same order was discussed above as the “red sticker alert.” Sheriff Higgins drafted General Order 87-14 on the recommendations of a staff committee which included Nurse O’Malley. Before recommending segregation, O’Malley spoke with Dr. Maddi, the ECHC Chief Physician at that time, who recommended that inmates suspected or known to be HIV + be isolated from the general population. When the 1986 version of this order was issued, the ECHC had only one or two known AIDS cases but had already begun isolating such inmates on the recommendation of Dr. Pietrak, who was Dr. Maddi’s predecessor. For some time, the ECHC had a practice of isolating inmates known or suspected of having other infectious or contagious diseases such as TB, hepatitis, herpes, syphilis, measles, and chicken pox. General Order 87-14, to the extent it calls for automatic segregation of HIV+ inmates, cannot be reconciled with ECHC Medical Policy and Procedure HCM 23.00.-00, issued in December, 1989, which states: Housing decisions, in the Erie County Holding Center, will not be made solely on the basis of the protected individual’s HIV status. Special housing decisions can be made, however, for medical reasons or for the safety and security of the facility and the persons therein, in the same manner as any inmate housed in general population. Tr.Exh. 30J at 3 (emphasis in original). HCM 23.00.00 does allow for segregation of HIV + inmates, but only after a determination that “the medical condition of the protected individual is ‘at risk’ in general population housing or if medical needs or treatment indicate” or “[i]f a protected individual is behaviorally disruptive and making threatening statements/gestures due to his [or her] HIV status_” Tr.Exh. 30J at 3. None of these findings was made in Louise Nolley’s case. Defendants have offered several reasons to support their isolation policy for HIV+ inmates. The first reason ECHC isolates HIV+ inmates is to protect the non-HIV general inmate population from the possibility of exposure to the virus. This purpose is undercut by ECHC’s policy of housing HIV + inmate with non-HIV inmates in Female Delta. In the court’s view, it would appear that the prospects for accidental transmission of HIV to non-HIV inmates are greater in Female Delta than in the general population, given the volatility of the inmates housed there. See infra (discussing conditions in Female Delta). Louise Nolley testified to instances where an inmate with whom she was housed tried to commit suicide by cutting herself with her dentures. ECHC staff subsequently asked Ms. Nolley to take the inmate’s dentures from her should she contemplate another attempt at suicide. Ms. Nolley also was approached by a Female Delta inmate to engage in homosexual activity. Defendants also argue that Louise Nol-ley was isolated to protect her from contracting opportunistic viruses from the general inmate population. The court finds this argument unsupported by the record for two reasons. First, if defendants’ purpose was to protect Ms. Nolley, the decision to house her in close proximity with inmates known to carry communicable diseases was peculiar indeed. Second, the court heard expert testimony that an HIV+ inmate is not at risk until their T-cell count drops to a level below 200. Louise Nolley’s T-cell count never dropped below 300 — a safe level — during any of her three confinements. Nurse O’Malley was aware of these facts, yet never inquired as to Ms. Nolley’s T-cell count to determine if she, in fact, would be at risk in the general population. In other words, there was never a finding pursuant to HCM 23.00.00 that “the medical condition of the protected individual [wa]s ‘at risk’ in general population housing or [that] medical needs or treatment indicatefd]” segregation for Ms. Nol-ley. Finally, defendants argue that HIV + inmates are isolated because of their concern that inmates might react violently to the presence of such an inmate in their midst. Defendant Dray admitted that this was merely a concern; he testified that there had never been such an incident at ECHC. He knew of no such incidents in other correctional facilities. The court finds that this concern, even if valid and not wholly speculative, does not support ECHC’s practice of automatically isolating HIV+ inmates. Since, according to defendants’ theory, it is the other inmates’ knowledge of an HIV + inmate in their midst that would trigger a violent response, if an inmate is not known to be HIV+ by the general population, there would be no risk of violence. Defendants admit that there are HIV+ inmates in the general population that neither ECHC nor the general population inmates know about. There is no difference in terms of security between this type of inmate and an inmate known by ECHC but unknown by the general population to be HIV+. The court also finds that defendants’ alleged concern with violence is undercut by the fact that Ms. Nolley was intentionally housed with inmates known to be psychologically unstable and often violent, although Mr. Dray testified that those housed in Female Delta were only violent toward themselves. Inmates known to be violent toward others are isolated completely, he stated. Plaintiff argues that the ECHC, by segregating Louise Nolley in Female Delta, revealed to staff and other inmates that plaintiff was HIV + or had AIDS. There is little question that Female Delta was known by staff and at least some of the ECHC inmate population to house HIV+ inmates. One inmate, for example, testified that several sheriff’s deputies told her that Louise Nolley had AIDS. It is also clear that ECHC inmates going to sick call in the Medical Department must pass by Female Delta. They can see into the unit and communicate with inmates housed there. These factors might lead all those who passed Female Delta to assume that each inmate therein had AIDS. This assumption would be wrong because Female Delta also housed non-HIV inmates, but it would not be significantly off the mark given the small number of inmates confined there. Thus, although the court finds that segregation in Female Delta did not conclusively reveal plaintiff’s HIV status to ECHC inmates, it did strongly suggest to these persons that she was HIV+. The question whether Ms. Nolley’s isolation in Female Delta revealed her HIV status to ECHC staff will be discussed more fully below. See infra § 11(A). VI. Conditions of Confinement Plaintiff also complains that her confinements amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. As noted, plaintiff was segregated for the duration of each of her confinements in the Female Delta Medical Pod. Medical treatment was not provided in Female Delta, however, but only in the Medical Department. Plaintiff testified that at times she did not get her medicine, especially her AZT, or received it late. The overall conditions in Female Delta were extremely stressful. Three of the five cells in the unit were used to confine inmates who were suicidal or who demonstrated severe psychiatric problems. Louise Nolley was under constant pressure from these inmates. As plaintiff testified, “[i]t was a lot of pressure. It was hectic and it was crazy. It was depressing.” Nolley, Aug. 21, 1990, at 59-60. People were attempting to commit suicide. It was just never quiet. Somebody was always crying or trying to hurt theirselves [sic] and they didn’t shut their doors, you know, they couldn’t lock in their rooms because the officers had to be able to get right into their cells if anything happened, so they were always running around, even at night when I could lock in they could come out of their cells and be running around and asking for cigarettes and trying to kill theirself [sic], and officers always had to come up there to rescue one of them and it would take a while. It was a mental ward. Id. at 59-60. During her 1988 and 1989 confinements, plaintiff was housed with an inmate who was accused of murdering her four children. This inmate attempted suicide on a number of occasions, including at least one instance where she used her dentures to attempt to cut her wrists. After that, sheriff’s deputies asked plaintiff to take her dentures away from her if she spoke of suicide. The inmate frequently described the murder of her children in gruesome detail, even while plaintiff was eating. Often the staff asked the plaintiff to give her medicine, to take spoons away from her (which she attempted to swallow), or to do other things which plaintiff claims the staff was afraid to do. During her 1989 confinement, plaintiff was housed with another inmate who was accused of murdering her child. This inmate also spoke frequently about the murder. Plaintiff testified that staff asked her to give this inmate medication too. In the 1989 and 1989/90 confinements, plaintiff was housed with an inmate accused of helping her boyfriend commit murder. This inmate also spoke graphically of her crime. Another inmate housed with plaintiff was homosexual and approached plaintiff for sex on several occasions. Still another inmate repeatedly ate out of the garbage. Plaintiff had to get her out of the garbage and place it outside the door where she could not get to it. Defendant Dray was fully aware of the distressing conditions in Female Delta. He acknowledged that inmates should not be subjected to such behavior. VII. Law Library and Religious Services Throughout her 1988 and 1989 confinements, plaintiff was not permitted direct access to the ECHC law library, despite her repeated requests. The library is available to female general population inmates once each week on Friday mornings. During her 1989/90 confinement, plaintiff was allowed in the law library on four occasions after she requested to use a typewriter, but was required to wear plastic gloves while typing and was not permitted to touch the law library’s books. In June, 1988, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant Dray asking for use of the law library. Dray sent an official to explain to plaintiff that she would not be allowed to go the law library but could request the staff librarians to copy specific cases to be delivered to her in Female Delta. Plaintiff was also denied face-to-face contact with inmate law clerks. Although plaintiff was able to correspond with inmate clerks and staff librarians, the process of being forced to request specific materials without being able to conduct general research caused undue delay. Many times the materials she needed would not be delivered because the librarians did not understand what she wanted. Other non-HIV inmates who were housed in Female Delta, even those with red stickers, were permitted to use the law library on the same basis as those in the general population. During her 1988 and 1989 and most of her 1989/90 confinements, plaintiff was not permitted to attend Catholic mass with inmates from the general population, even though she identified herself as a Catholic and frequently asked for permission to attend. She was finally granted permission to attend communal services during the last weeks of her 1989-90 confinement. The Catholic chaplain was permitted to meet with plaintiff in Female Delta during each of her confinements to distribute communion and hear her confessions, albeit not in a private place. He testified, however, that it was also very important for a Catholic to attend church. Other inmates from Female Delta were permitted to attend mass. During her confinements, plaintiff was not permitted access to the general library maintained at the ECHC. Instead of being permitted to borrow any book from the library, plaintiff was brought books which were torn, outdated, and marked with an “X” on the cover. After she was finished with them, the books were thrown away. ECHC policy and procedure HCM 10.09.-01, effective December 10, 1987, provides that the decision to deny an inmate housed in Female Delta access to the law library or other ECHC programs is to be made by the Medical Department. Tr.Exh. 25. HCM 23.00.00, adopted in December, 1989, states unequivocally that: No inmate housed in the Erie County Holding Center will be denied access to programs based solely on HIV status. Protected individuals will have access to programs in the same manner as the general population except as required by the individual’s medical condition or for the protection of the safety and security of the inmate or facility. Tr.Exh. 30J at 3. Dray testified that he discussed plaintiff’s access to programs with defendant O’Malley, and claimed that she made the decision to deny plaintiff access to ECHC programs. O’Malley denied this. It was her opinion that plaintiff did not pose a medical threat to anyone at ECHC. Sheriff Higgins testified that it was not his intention to deny HIV+ inmates access to the law library or church services. The court finds that the decision to deny plaintiff access to the law library and other ECHC programs was the result of an ad hoc policy implemented by defendant Dray. Dray testified that the fact plaintiff was isolated in Female Delta, to his mind, meant that she could not go to programs with the general population. He said that he denied plaintiff access to the law library and other facilities based solely on the fact that plaintiff was HIV+. ECHC policy and procedures were not followed in plaintiff’s case. VIII. Rehabilitation Act Plaintiff contends that she was denied access to services and activities at the holding center in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Defendants have admitted that in the years 1988, 1989, and 1990, the County of Erie received approximately $779,060.00 in federal funds for the detention of federal prisoners at the ECHC. DISCUSSION I. THE RED STICKER POLICY A. Article 27-F of the Public Health Law and CoC Regulations Plaintiff complains that by placing red stickers on Louise Nolley’s intake card, cash record index card, clothing bag, court papers, cell card, and other items, defendants violated article 27-F of New York State’s Public Health Law, N.Y.Pub.Health Law § 2780 et seq. (McKinney’s 1991 Supp.), State Commission of Correction (“CoC”) regulations adopted pursuant that law, and ECHC policy and procedure. Her complaint, however, is limited to her 1989/90 incarceration and her request for injunctive relief because article 27-F only became effective February 1, 1989. Article 27-F, entitled “HIV and AIDS Related Information,” “requires that HIV related information be kept confidential and permits disclosure only in narrowly defined need-to-know circumstances_” V. v. State, 566 N.Y.S.2d 987, 988 (Ct.Cl. 1991). Pursuant to article 27-F, the CoC issued regulations applicable to all local correctional facilities, defining the circumstances under which confidential HIV-related information can be revealed. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7064 (1991). The regulations became effective October 24, 1989. To comport with these regulations, the ECHC issued policy and procedure HCM 23.00.00 in December, 1989, after consulting with the CoC. Before the court can address the merits of plaintiff’s claims, the court must first determine whether article 27-F provides a private cause of action for plaintiff. There has been one decision to date addressing this precise question. V. v. State, 566 N.Y.S.2d 987. In that case, Judge Cor-bett, after reviewing the legislative history of the act and applying the test set forth in Sheehy v. Big Flats Community Day, Inc., 73 N.Y.2d 629, 543 N.Y.S.2d 18, 20, 541 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1989) and Bums, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716, 451 N.E.2d 459, 463 (1983), held that claimant, an inmate housed at Attica Correctional Facility whose HIV confidentiality had allegedly been breached, qualifie[d] as one of the class for whose benefit Article 27-F was enacted, that recognition of his right to pursue this action would promote the legislative purpose of confidentiality, particularly as articulated by the legislative sponsors and the Governor, and, in further harmony therewith, this right is consistent with the statutory scheme given the reference to Section 12 of the Public Health Law in Section 2783(l)(b). V v. State, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 989. The court concurs in Judge Corbett’s analysis and finds that plaintiff has a private cause of action under article 27-F. Defendants offer two arguments in support of the red sticker policy. First, defendants point out that because inmates afflicted with infectious diseases-such as TB, hepatitis, herpes, chicken pox, measles, or syphilis-who are not HIV+ are also subject to being red-stickered, the red sticker policy does not disclose "confidential HIV-related information" about any particular inmate to ECHC staff and others. CoC regulations specifically restrict disclosure of "confidential HIV-related information." 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7064.8. That phrase is defined in § 7064.2(g) as follows: "Confidential HI V-related information" means any information, in the possession of a person who provides health or social services or who obtains the information pursuant to a release of confidential HIV-related information, concerning whether an individual has been the subject of an HIV-related test, or has HIV infection, HI V-related illness or AIDS, or information which identifies or reasonably could identify an individual as having one or more of such conditions, including information pertaining to such individual's contacts. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, pursuant to CoC regulations, if the placement of a red sticker on an inmate's documents and other items identified or "reasonably could [have] identif[ied] an individual" as being HIV+, their HIV confidentiality would have been breached. As the court found above, the red sticker policy was developed, not in response to infectious diseases in general, but directly in response to the hysteria at ECHC over HIV and AIDS. This was understood by ECHC staff. Accordingly, the presence of a red sticker on an inmate's documents first and foremost suggested (and still no doubt suggests) that the inmate is HIV+. It is also clear to the court that staff people and others who saw the red dot on Ms. Nolley's documents either knew or strongly suspected that she was HIV+. The incidents with inmate trustee Leroy and court matron Vi, as well as the incident where transporting deputies denied the request of another inmate to borrow a cigarette from plaintiff because she had AIDS, indicate to this court that the red sticker revealed plaintiff's HIV status to them. Therefore, the court finds, based on the testimony of plaintiff and others, that the red stickers placed on Louise Nolley's intake card, clothing bag, court papers, cell card, and other items disclosed her confidential HIV-related information to ECHC staff and inmates who were exposed to the stickers. As noted, CoO regulations require confidential HIV-related information to remain confidential. The section entitled "Confidentiality and disclosure," states: (a) No person who obtains confidential HIV-related information in the course of providing any health or social service or pursuant to a release of confidential HIV-related information may disclose or be compelled to disclose such information, except to the followingS 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7064.8(a). Defendants' second argument is that, even if a red sticker reveals confidential HIV-related information, it does so only to personnel authorized under § 7064.8 to receive it. Defendants rely on § 7064.8(15), which states that confidential HI V-related information can be disclosed to: (15) an employee or agent of a provider of health or social services, including but not limited to the Department of Correctional Services and local correctional facilities, when reasonably necessary to provide supervision, monitoring or administration of services and when these employees or agents have access in the ordinary course of business to records relating to the care, treatment, or provision of a health or social service, and in accordance with such provider's regulations promulgated in accordance with article 27-F of the Public Health Law. Disclosure to an employee or agent of a local correctional facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be consistent with section 601 of the Correction Law and Part 7033 of this Chapter and shall be authorized only when such disclosure is necessary to: (i) enable the chief administrative officer to appropriately maintain custody and supervision of the protected person or provide for the safety and protection of the protected person or provide for the safety and protection of staff, other inmates, or the facility; and (ii) the medical director reasonably believes that without disclosure circumstances will exist creating a significant risk of contracting or transmitting HIV infection. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7064.8(a)(15) (emphasis added). Plaintiff contends that the red stickers reveal confidential HIV-related information to persons who are not employees or agents of ECHC. Plaintiff further contends that even if disclosure of her HIV status were limited to transportation deputies, guards, and other non-medical ECHC staff, such disclosure is not permitted under this section. The court agrees. As an initial matter, defendants do not contend that inmates who saw Louise Nol-ley’s red stickers and concluded she was HIV+ are authorized to receive this information under article 27-F. The court heard testimony that at least one inmate, upon seeing the red stickers, concluded that plaintiff had AIDS. Defendants’ second argument must fail on this ground alone. The court also concludes, based on a plain reading of the statute and regulations, that transportation deputies, change guards, and other non-medical ECHC staff were not intended, as a general policy, to be privy to confidential HIV-related information under § 7064. See V. v. State, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 989. Section 7064 has been promulgated by the CoC pursuant to § 45(6) of the New York Correction Law and § 2786 of the Public Health Law, which is part of article 27-F. Section 2786(2)(a) directs the chairperson of the CoC to issue regulations pursuant to §§ 2782(l)(n) and (o), determining which employees of local correction facilities, § 2782(l)(n), and the Commission of Correction, § 2782(l)(o), “may, in the ordinary course of business of the agency or provider, be authorized to access confidential HIV related information_” N.Y.Pub. Health Law § 2786(2)(a). Section 2782 of the Public Health Law states that “[n]o person who obtains confidential HIV related information in the course of providing any health or social service ... may disclose or be compelled to disclose such information, except to the following,” and then includes a list of sixteen categories of persons who may be disclosed such information. N.Y.Pub.Health Law § 2782(1). The only section applicable to employees of local correctional facilities is found at § 2782(l)(n), which permits disclosure to: a medical director of a local correctional facility as defined in [§ 40] of the correction law, in accordance with [§ 2786(2)(a) ], to the extent the medical director is authorized to access records containing such information in order to carry out his or her functions, powers and duties with respect to the protected individual.... N.Y.Pub.Health Law § 2782(l)(n) (emphasis added). Thus, there is no mention in article 27-F authorizing disclosure of HIV-related information to non-medical correctional facility personnel. Indeed, one of the lead sponsors of article 27-F in the legislature stated in a letter to the Governor, Beyond disclosure of HIV-related information to medical personnel, it is the intent of this legislation to only allow disclosures of such information within correctional facilities to those employees who normally have access to such medical information in the course of carrying out their work-related responsibilities. Broader provisions were considered and rejected. See V. v. State, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 989. Therefore, the court does not read § 7064.-8(a)(15) as permitting blanket disclosure of confidential HIV-related information to transportation deputies, change guards, and other non-medical ECHC staff. There is also no provision in the local regulations authorizing non-medical ECHC staff to receive HIV-related information. ECHC policy and procedure HCM 23.00.00, Tr.Exh. 30J, adopted pursuant to article 27-F, reaffirms the CoC’s policy of ensuring the maximum confidentiality of information related to an inmate’s HIV status. For example, under section (A)(1), the regulations state: “The medical records and/or condition of any inmate housed in the Erie County Holding Center is strictly confidential.” HCM 23.00.00(A)(1), Tr.Exh. 30J at 2. In addition to the court’s previous finding that the red stickers on Louise Nolley’s items disclosed her HIV status to non-medical ECHC staff, see supra, the court now finds that such disclosure was not authorized under § 7064.8(a)(15). The sole purpose behind disclosure of confidential HIV-related information to these staff people is to enable them to take precautions against exposure to the virus. This purpose seems to have been contemplated in § 7064.-8(a)(15)(i) upon a finding that “disclosure is necessary to ... enable the chief administrative officer to ... provide for the safety and protection of staff_” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7064.8(a)(15)(i). The regulations, however, also require a finding by the medical director that “without disclosure circumstances will exist creating a significant risk of contracting or transmitting HIV infection.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7064.8(a)(15)(ii). There is no evidence that such a finding was ever made. Moreover, given the efficacy of universal precautions in protecting ECHC staff from the legitimate danger of being exposed to the HIV virus, a fact that was uncontroverted at trial, the court finds there is no need to disclose to transportation deputies and other non-medical ECHC staff which inmates are HIV+ in order to protect them from exposure. Because there are likely to be several unidentified HIV + inmates at ECHC at any given time, a fact admitted by Nurse O’Malley, handling all inmates as if they were HIV + is more protective of Holding Center staff than informing them of known HIV+ inmates. Further, defendants have admitted that, even where the HIV status of an inmate is known, no protections greater than advised by universal precautions are taken in handling that inmate. Thus, disclosure of confidential HIV-related information is not necessary to provide for the safety and protection of these ECHC staff members, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7064.8(a)(15)(i); similarly, failure to disclose the HIV status of known HIV+ inmates to them cannot, as a general matter, create a “significant risk of contracting or transmitting HIV infection.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7064.8(a)(15)(ii). Therefore, disclosure of confidential HIV-related information to transportation deputies, change guards, and other non-medical ECHC staff is a violation of article 27-F. Accordingly, the placement of red stickers on plaintiff’s documents and other items during her 1989/90 confinement violated article 27-F of the New York State Public Health Law. N.Y.Pub.Health Law § 2780 et seq. B. Constitutional Right to Privacy Plaintiff also challenges ECHC’s practice of placing red stickers on Louise Nolley’s documents and other items as violative of her constitutional right to privacy. The right plaintiff asserts is the right to be protected against unwarranted disclosure of her medical condition; namely, her HIV status. Determining whether this right exists is our first task. If there is such a right, the court must then determine if ECHC violated this right. Finally, even if the answer to this latter question is yes, the court must then decide whether the red sticker policy is nevertheless “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). The starting point for our analysis must be the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977). In Whalen, plaintiffs challenged a New York statute that directed the establishment of a centralized database of names and addresses of individuals who obtained drugs by prescription for which both a legal and illegal market existed. Plaintiffs argued that the accumulation of this data, and its potential release to the public, violated their constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 600, 97 5.Ct. at 877. After noting that the right to privacy discussed in prior Supreme Court decisions is based on “the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action,” id. at 598 n. 23, 97 S.Ct. at 876 n. 23 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 93 S.Ct. 705, 727, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)), the Court identified two interests protected by this right. “One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” Id. at 599-600, 97 S.Ct. at 876-77 (footnotes omitted). The Court found, however, that given the confidentiality protections embraced in the law, the New York statute did not infringe upon these interests sufficiently to establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 603-04, 97 S.Ct. at 878-79. Whalen’s holding that privacy embraces the “individual interest in avoiding disclosure of private matters” was affirmed by the Court in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 457, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2797, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977), decided the same term. Nixon involved a suit by the former President to strike down a congressional statute authorizing archival review of a mountain of Presidential materials. Balancing interests, the Court held that given the important public interest in preservation of the President’s papers, the appellant’s status as a public figure, and the limited intrusion of the archival screening, the President’s constitutional right to privacy was not abridged. Id. at 465, 97 S.Ct. at 2801. The Court has continued to affirm the privacy interest in non-disclosure of personal matters. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3364, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982), the Court found constitutional a New York criminal statute which prohibited distribution of child pornography. The Court supported its holding that States “are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children,” id. at 756, 102 S.Ct. at 3354, by noting the harm caused to children exposed in photographs and films depicting them engaged in sexual activity. Id. at 759, 102 S.Ct. at 3356. Distribution of this material violates the child’s interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters, the Court held. Id. at 759 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. at 3355 n. 10 (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 599, 97 S.Ct. at 876). In United States Dep’i of Justice v. Reporters Comm, for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 769-70, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 1479-80, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989), the Court again cited Whalen with approval. Numerous courts since Whalen have held that the constitutional right to privacy includes protection against unwarranted disclosure of one’s medical records or condition. See Schaill ex rel. Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1322 n. 19 (7th Cir.1988); In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Rochman v. United States, 483 U.S. 1007, 107 S.Ct. 3233, 97 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); Trade Waste Management Ass’n, Inc. v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 233-34 (3d Cir.1985); Doe v. Borough of Barrington, 729 F.Supp. 376, 382 (D.N.J.1990). Other courts have recognized that the right protects non-disclosure of analogous personal information. See, e.g., Pesce v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch. Dist. 201, 830 F.2d 789, 795-97 (7th Cir. 1987); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir.1981). One court, reviewing the law for qualified-immunity purposes, stated that “as of June 1983 a majority of courts considering the question had concluded that a constitutional right of confidentiality is implicated by disclosure of a broad range of personal information_” Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir.1987). Precisely on point with this case, several courts have held that prison inmates are constitutionally protected from the unwarranted disclosure of their HIV status. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir.1991); Inmates of New York State With Human Immune Deficiency Virus v. Cuomo, 1991 WL 16032 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1991); Rodriguez v. Coughlin, 1989 WL 59607 (W.D.N.Y. June 5, 1989); Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F.Supp. 1234, 1238 (N.D.N.Y.1988); Woods v. White, 689 F.Supp. 874, 876 (W.D.Wis.1988), aff'd without opinion, 899 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1990). In Hams, HIV+ inmates in Alabama’s State prisons brought a class action challenging Alabama’s practice of testing all inmates and segregating those who tested positive for HIV. The district court had sweepingly concluded that prisoners were completely without privacy rights. Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F.Supp. 1564, 1571 (M.D.Ala.1990), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir.1991). The Eleventh Circuit rejected this conclusion and held that “prison inmates, in spite of their incarceration, ‘retain certain fundamental rights of privacy.’ ” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1513 (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n. 2, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 2592 n. 2, 57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978)). Although the court found this right to be ill-defined, it stated: We nevertheless believe and assume ar-guendo that seropositive [HIV+] prisoners enjoy some significant constitutionally-protected privacy interest in preventing the non-consensual disclosure of their HIV-positive diagnoses to other inmates, as well as to their families and other outside visitors to the facilities in question. Id. In Cuomo, inmates infected with HIV in New York State prisons filed a class action claiming that the prisons’ lack of medical and other services was violative of their rights under the Constitution. Within the context of a discovery dispute over plaintiffs’ request for the names or identification numbers of inmates who were known by defendants to be HIV+, the court accepted as uncontested “the proposition that the federal Constitution protects against the unwarranted and indiscriminate disclosure of the identity of HIV-infected individuals and of their medical records.... ” Cuomo, 1991 WL 16032. The court concluded that the identity of HIV+ inmates need not be disclosed for plaintiffs to litigate their case. Id. The court also directed authorities to maintain even general information about such inmates (with specific identities redacted) under the tightest confidentiality. Id. In Rodriguez, 1991 WL 59607, an inmate transported in a “hygiene suit” enveloping his entire body, brought suit claiming the outfit revealed his HIV status to fellow inmates, who in turn threatened him with bodily harm. Judge Elfvin denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the pleading stated a valid constitutional claim on right to privacy grounds. “Such right precluded New York’s corrections officers from disclosing to other inmates that he suffers from AIDS.” Id. In Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F.Supp. at 1243, the court granted preliminary injunctive relief to HIV+ inmates who complained, inter alia, that their transfer to a separate dormitory reserved for HIV + inmates would reveal their HIV status to other inmates and, subsequently, to the world outside prison. The court based its decision on both prongs of Whalen v. Roe. In the court’s view there are few matters of a more personal nature, and there are few decisions over which a person could have a greater desire to exercise control, than the manner in which he reveals [his HIV] diagnosis to others. Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F.Supp. at 1237. The court was especially sensitive to the emotional implications and potential ostracism entailed in notifying others of one’s HIV status. “Within the confines of the prison the infected prisoner is likely to suffer from harassment and psychological pressures. Beyond the prison walls the person suffering from AIDS is often subject to discrimination.” Id. The court concluded that “the prisoners subject to this program must be afforded at least some protection against the non-consensual disclosure of their diagnosis.” Id. at 1238. Finally, in Woods v. White, 689 F.Supp. at 876, the court denied defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings where plaintiff had alleged that medical personnel at the Waupun Correctional Institution’s Health Service Unit revealed to non-medical staff and other inmates the fact that plaintiff had tested positive for HIV. The court upheld plaintiff’s right to privacy, stating: Given the most publicized aspect of the AIDS disease, namely that it is related more closely than most diseases to sexual activity and intravenous drug use, it is difficult to argue that information about this disease is not information of the most personal kind, or that an individual would not have an interest in protecting against the dissemination of such information. Id. The court added that it was not necessary to balance plaintiff’s right to nondisclosure against a contrary state interest because no such state interest was suggested by defendants. Id. This court is persuaded by the reasoning of the above-cited cases and expressly holds that prison inmates are protected by a constitutional right to privacy from the unwarranted disclosure of their HIV status. The cases that have rejected this conclusion are not compelling. See Baez v. Rapping, 680 F.Supp. 112, 116 (S.D.N.Y.1988); Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F.Supp. 9, 11 (S.D.N.Y.1984). Both Baez and Cordero rejected inmates’ claims on the grounds that prisoners enjoy only limited privacy rights. Baez, 680 F.Supp. at 115; Cordero, 607 F.Supp. at 11. The cases cited in support of this hold, however, that “convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) (citing Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2539-40, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), and other cases). Prison inmates retain some right to privacy. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d at 1512-13; Kimberlin v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 439 n. 6 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 478 U.S. 1009, 106 S.Ct. 3306, 92 L.Ed.2d 719 (1986). The question is: how much? The Supreme Court’s analysis under Whalen and subsequent cases has always balanced the state’s interest in assembling, Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600, 97 S.Ct. at 877, or reviewing, Nixon, 433 U.S. at 451-52, 97 S.Ct. at 2794, personal information against the individual’s interest in non-disclosure to determine if a constitutional violation of privacy has occurred. Where constitutional violations are alleged by prisoners, however, the Court has struck this balance differently, given its policy of judicial restraint toward review of prison regulations. See, e.g., Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586-89, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3232-33, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 550-51, 99 S.Ct. at 1880; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. at 129-30, 97 S.Ct. at 2539-40; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 827, 94 S.Ct. at 2806. To balance the policy of judicial restraint for prisoners’ complaints against the need to protect constitutional rights, the Court has set forth the following test: when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62. See also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 1877, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2404, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). Thus, the privacy rights of an inmate must be weighed against the strong deference due prison administrator’s judgments in the operation of their prisons. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d at 1515; Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir.1990). Our analysis under Turner is therefore necessary to answer the question whether Louise Nolley’s constitutional right to privacy was violated in this case. The court reaffirms the finding made in section 1(A) that ECHC’s practice of placing red stickers on plaintiff’s documents and other items disclosed her HIV status to staff and inmates who were exposed to the stickers. The question under Turner v. Safley is whether the regulation which led to these disclosures was nevertheless reasonably related toTegitimate pe-nological interests. Turner v. Safley identified four factors to consider to make this determination: First, there must be a “valid, rational connection” between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.... Moreover, the governmental interest must be a legitimate and neutral one.... A second factor ... is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates .... A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.... Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.... By the same token, the existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable.... Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. at 2261-62 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. at 586, 104 S.Ct. at 3232). Courts interpreting the first of these factors have held that, although prison officials are due substantial deference, “[pjris-on officials must ‘put forward’ a legitimate governmental interest to justify their regulation ... and must provide evidence that the interest proffered is the reason why the regulation was adopted or enforced.” Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d at 385. See Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1990); Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 598 (7th Cir.1986). The Walker court added: Prison authorities cannot rely on general or conclusory assertions to support their policies. Rather, they must first identify the specific penological interests involved and then demonstrate both that those specific interests are the actual bases for their policies and that the policies are reasonably related to the furtherance of the identified interests. An evidentiary showing is required as to each point. Wal