Full opinion text
OPINION LECHNER, District Judge. This is an employment discrimination suit brought by plaintiff Elizabeth G. Miller (“Miller”) against defendants Beneficial Management Corporation (“Beneficial Management”), Beneficial Management Corporation of America (“Beneficial of America”) and Beneficial Corporation. (“Beneficial Corp.”) (collectively, “Beneficial”). Jurisdiction is alleged pursuant to the Equal Pay Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 216 et seq. (“EPA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (“ADEA”); Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq. (“Title VII”) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Beneficial now moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) on the ground that Miller’s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In addition, Beneficial moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 on the ground there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the alleged discrimination against Miller. Miller has filed a cross motion appealing three orders of Ronald J. Hedges, United States Magistrate Judge, to compel discovery. For the reasons set out below, the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is converted to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. The motion for summary judgment is granted. The cross-motion to compel discovery is denied. Facts Beneficial is incorporated in the State of Delaware and has its principal place of business in Peapack, New Jersey. Complaint, filed 20 July 1989 (“Complaint”), ¶ 2. Beneficial is in the business of providing management services. The Government Relations Department (“Government Relations”) is involved in lobbying, organizing political action committees (“PACs”) and collecting political contributions. Id., ¶ 3; Moving Brief, 6. Miller graduated from law school in the Spring of 1980. Defs.’ 12G Statement, ¶ 2. Prior to attending law school, Miller was employed as a teacher. Id. Miller’s first job as an attorney occurred when she was hired by Beneficial Management on 2 September 1980. Defs.’ 12G Statement, ¶ 2. Miller’s resume indicated she was born in 1931; however, Miller was actually born in 1927 or 1928. 1st Ward Aff., Ex. 14. Miller held the starting position of Associate Counsel in the Legal Department of Beneficial. Id. As Associate Counsel, Miller’s starting annual base salary was $25,000. Miller Aff., 111. Miller’s duties in the Legal Department included the following: cross state lending; Canadian operations; bankruptcy; antitrust; loan production offices for Beneficial’s national bank subsidiary; Equal Credit Opportunity Act audits; Truth-in-Lending audits; writing statutory amendments concerning state and federal insolvency and bankruptcy laws for the Government Relations Department; usuary laws; disclosure laws; credit insurance laws; business registration laws; consumer credit laws; interest rate regulation; small loan laws; installment sales laws; and fair credit laws. Miller Aff., ¶ 2. During Miller’s employment in the Legal Department she received the following compensation: Year Base Salary Year-End Compensation $25,000 $1,000 O 00 05 i — I H OO 05 r-H $29,000 $3,000 Cn OO o^> I $31,000 CQ OO i-H Id., ¶ 4. The above increases in annual base salary and additional year-end compensation were based on merit. Id.; Schwartz Certif., Ex. 11. In the Legal Department, Miller reported to Charles Hance, Esq., Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Legal Department (“Hance”). Hance Aff., ¶ 2. In 1983 Hance prepared a formal review of Miller’s performance in the Legal Department (the “1983 Bentrak”). Id., 114. Miller was ranked eighth out of eight attorneys who reported to Hance. Id., II3. The 1983 Bentrak gave Miller good remarks with respect to her organizational and planning skills, motivation, initiative and energy. Id., Ex. 2. The 1983 Bentrak, however, rated Miller’s overall performance as below expectations. It noted a difficulty in providing practical advice satisfactory to senior personnel. Additionally, the 1983 Bent-rak stated Miller’s personal impact must be improved to be effective in her position. Id. As an Associate Counsel in the Legal Department Miller became acquainted with David B. Ward, Senior-Vice President of Government Relations (“Ward”), Charles Walsh, Vice President and Counsel of Government Relations (“Walsh”) and Kenneth Raatz, a corporate attorney in Government Relations (“Raatz”). Miller Aff., 11 6. Through her contact with these individuals, Miller learned about the function of Government Relations. Government Relations develops and presents Beneficial’s views relating to legislative and regulatory groups at the federal and state levels. Moving Brief, 6. In addition, Government Relations handles PACs and corporate sources. Ward Aff., U 3. Employees in Government Relations must ensure the appropriate disclosure and filing requirements are followed with respect to lobbying and political contributions. Id., ¶ 4. Walsh was hired by Beneficial on 30 October 1966. 1st Walsh Dep., 7. Walsh graduated law school in 1954 at which point he worked at a Philadelphia law firm for two years. Id., 4-5. In 1956 Walsh joined the Attorney General’s Office in Pennsylvania as an associate counsel for the Insurance Commission. Id., 5. At the Attorney General’s Office, Walsh was promoted to general counsel and subsequently deputy insurance commissioner for Pennsylvania. Id. Walsh's duties at the Attorney General’s Office included reviewing proposed legislation which had an impact on insurance laws or industry, advising the governor’s office and leaders of both political parties of the Attorney General’s position on such legislation and conducting and adjudicating hearings involving the insurance industry. Id. In 1963, Walsh left the Attorney General’s Office and became the executive vice president of Reliable Insurance Company where he reported directly to the Chairman of the Board of Reliable Insurance Company. Id., 6. Around 1 May 1966, Walsh became deputy insurance commissioner for the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Id., 7. As deputy insurance commissioner in Kentucky, Walsh was involved in setting rates, policy filings and endorsements as well as conducting hearings and advising the insurance commissioner. Id. Walsh held the position as deputy insurance commissioner until 30 October 1966 when he accepted employment with Beneficial. Id. Walsh began his employment at Beneficial as Director of Insurance Relations. Id. In that position, Walsh reviewed legislation and insurance offered by Beneficial and testified at hearings on legislation at the federal and state level. Id. In 1968 Walsh was promoted to Assistant Vice President, Beneficial Management. Id., 8. In 1973 Walsh was asked to join the Legal Department of Beneficial Management as Assistant Vice President, Associate Counsel. Id., 10. Walsh also represented Beneficial in various trade associations and became the Chairman of the Board of the Consumer Credit Insurance Association. Id., 9. In the Legal Department, Walsh reported directly to Helmuth Miller, who was at that time the Vice President of Government Relations. Id., 10. In 1976 or 1977 Walsh was promoted to Vice President of Government Relations. Id. In this position, Walsh advised Helmuth Miller, consulted with other employees of the Government Relations on areas concerning legislation, reviewed laws relating to PACs, set up the Beneficial Political Action Committee (“Ben-Pac”), made decisions as to who should receive contributions from Ben-Pac and reviewed material disseminated by Beneficial for legal compliance. Id., 10-12. In 1975 Raatz was hired as Associate Counsel in the Legal Department. Raatz was assigned to work for Helmuth Miller and Walsh in Government Relations where he assisted Walsh with the review of legislation. Id., 18. In 1979 or 1980 Helmuth Miller retired and was replaced by Ward. Id., 17. Ward assumed Helmuth Miller’s responsibilities as Senior Vice President. Ward did, however, become more involved and took over tasks that Helmuth Miller had allowed Walsh to handle. Id., 25. In addition, after Ward took over, Walsh had less contact with the Chairman of the Board. Id., 28. Walsh testified he had “less authority and independence” under Ward. Id., 29. As Walsh stated, by the time he left Beneficial “men who had been with the company for a period of time became more familiar with Mr. Ward and would call him on matters that they previously might have called me on.” Id., 31. Throughout Walsh’s employment in Government Relations with Ward as his supervisor, his duties can be paraphrased to include the following: as secretary of Ben-Pac, preparing the forms necessary for contributions, filing reports required by the Federal Election Commission on a monthly or quarterly basis, preparing, for signature of the Chairman of the Board, letters to those employees eligible to participate in Ben-Pac, preparing and disseminating detailed itemizations of contributions, requisitioning checks signed by the Ben-Pac treasurer and determining who would receive contributions and the amounts of the contributions; with respect to corporate contributions, reviewing state laws to determine the legality of corporate contributions — to whom corporate contributions may be made, the dollar limitations of corporate contributions and deciding with Ward what contributions would be made at the recommendation of the Government Relations field director in the particular state; with respect to the expense accounts of the Government Relations directors, reviewing the expense accounts to make sure the expenses complied with any legal requirements and to ascertain whether there were any outstanding expenditures; preparing and filing reports and disclosures by lobbyists; reviewing proposals for political candidates or political fund raising purposes before such functions were held; receiving copies of any proposed legislation and advising Government Relations field directors of legislative developments; planning and organizing political fund raisers held at Beneficial’s corporate headquarters, organizing the annual Government Relations conference; approving and establishing retainers paid by Beneficial to attorneys; and providing lectures and training of district managers throughout the year. See generally, 2d Walsh Dep. Walsh’s income during his employment in Government Relations was as follows: Year Ease Salary Year-End Additional Compensation 1977 $41,000 $14,000 1978 $43,000 $16,000 1979 $46,000 $18,000 1980 $49,000 $20,500 1981 $52,000 $23,000 1982 $53,000 $27,000 1983 $55,000 $28,500 1984 $55,000 $28,500 LeRoux Aff., Ex. 6. In early 1984 Ward informed Miller that Walsh’s and Raatz’ employment in Government Relations was going to be terminated. Miller Aff., ¶[ 7. At that time, Ward decided to consolidate the positions previously held by Walsh and Raatz into one position. Schwartz Certif., Ex. 1. Ward asked Miller if she wanted to fill the newly created position in Government Relations. Miller Aff., 117. Miller states that Ward told her “once [she] had settled in the job, with hard work [she] would become a Vice President ... and would receive compensation at a level equivalent to Walsh’s.” Id. A memorandum from Ward to David J. Farris (“Farris”), President of Beneficial Management, dated 14 March 1984, informed Ward of his decision to hire Miller for the new position. Schwartz Certif., Ex. 1. Prior to formally beginning in Government Relations, Miller met with Walsh on several occasions. 1st Walsh Dep., 44-45. During these meetings, Walsh reviewed with Miller the various tasks which he had done in Government Relations. Id., 45; Miller Aff., 119. Walsh could not recall whether he met with Miller at the instruction of Ward. Walsh testified he mentioned training Miller to Ward, but Ward never told Walsh to go ahead and train her. 1st Walsh Aff., 44. Miller testified she met with Walsh at the specific instruction of Ward. Miller Aff., 119. Miller also met with Raatz to learn about his responsibilities in Government Relations. Id., ¶ 10; 1st Walsh Dep., 47. Miller stated during the entire training process she was never informed, nor was it implied, that she would not take on all of Walsh’s responsibilities. Miller Aff., U 12. In May 1984 Miller was appointed to certain offices and positions previously held by Walsh which were necessary for the job. Id., ¶ 14. Miller was appointed as Secretary, member of the Finance Committee and member of the Board of Ben-Pac and Vice President of Beneficial Management. Id. In July 1984 Miller formally began her position as Associate Counsel in Government Relations. Id., ¶ 6. Miller received a $9,000 increase in salary raising her annual base salary to $40,000. When Miller began her position in Government Relations, she had four years of legal experience; at the time Walsh had received an annual base salary of $41,000 and began in Government Relations, he had twenty-two years of legal experience. Id. Miller was a grade 15 employee when she took over the position in Government Relations. 2d Ward Aff., If 3. Miller moved into Walsh’s office and two secretaries were assigned to her. Id., 1115. Miller stated she was involved with all of Walsh’s duties from the onset of her employment in Government Relations. Id., 1116. Miller concedes she initially had disagreements with Ward over the practices of Government Relations. Id., ¶ 18. Miller received a $5,000 additional year-end compensation bonus for her performance in 1984. Id., 1117. In addition, Miller received a pay increase in her annual base salary in the amount of $3,000 in Government Relations in January 1985. Id., ¶ 17. In June 1985 Miller was promoted to Assistant Vice President and became a grade 16 employee. Id., ¶ 18; Schwartz Certif., Ex. 3. Miller received a copy of a memorandum from Ward to memorialize the promotion which stated: Mr. Caspersen [ (“Caspersen”), Chairman and CEO of Beneficial Corporation,] has reviewed and approved my recommendation for promotion of Elizabeth G. Miller to Assistant Vice President effective June 15, 1985. This will carry with it a promotional increase of 10% of current salary or $4,300, for annual [base] rate of $47,300. Id., Ex. 4. At the time Miller received this increase, she had five years of legal experience; Walsh had twenty-four years of legal experience when he had an annual base salary of $46,000 and twenty-five years of legal experience when his base salary was $49,000. Miller states Ward also informed her that he was pleased with her work. Id., ¶ 18. Miller also received a letter from Farris congratulating her on the promotion. Id., 1119. In connection with Miller’s promotion, she was requested to complete a Job Analysis Questionnaire (“JAQ”). Id., 11 20. The completed JAQ contained a comprehensive description of the duties and responsibilities performed by Miller as of July 1985 (“1985 JAQ”). Id., ¶ 20, Ex. 6. Miller states she did not assist in preparing the job description. Id., 11 21. Ward, however, states Miller helped prepare the job description contained in the 1985 JAQ. 1st Ward Aff., ¶ 12. After the 1985 JAQ was completed, Miller did not receive any feedback, positive or negative, regarding it. Miller Aff., 11 20. In December of 1985 Miller received additional year-end compensation in the amount of $6,500 for 1985. Id., ¶ 24. Miller also received a $2,000 salary increase for 1986 making her annual base salary $49,300 for 1986. Id., ¶ 25. In January 1986 Miller first spoke to her superiors about being promoted to Vice President of Government Relations. Walsh was the last person to hold a Vice President position in Government Relations. At the time he assumed the position, he had twenty-two years of legal experience. Id., ¶ 26. Miller spoke to Ward about a possible promotion in March 1986. Id., ¶ 27. Ward, in turn, handed Miller a Bentrak which he had prepared (the “1986 Bentrak”). The 1986 Bentrak expressed critical views regarding Miller’s Interpersonal Skills and Professional Skills. Id., 1127; 1st Ward Aff., II13. Beneficial paraphrased the 1986 Bentrak remarks as follows: In the category of “Interpersonal Skills,” it was noted that [Miller’s] motivation was excellent, but that she had problems in communications and in supervising subordinates. With regard to “Professional Skills,” an improvement was noted in substantive knowledge, but also a consistent tendency to jump to conclusions without fully understanding the problem. The Bentrak stated that [Miller’s] inability to distinguish important legislation and problems from unimportant ones adversely affected her productivity. The Bentrak did note that her technical skills such as bill drafting and analysis were good and improving and stated that these skills should continue to improve as she gained a better understanding of the business context. With regard to “Management Skills,” it was noted that [Miller’s] initiative, energy, dependability and ambition were excellent, with the caveat that her ambition sometimes appeared excessive. It also was noted that [Miller’s] attitude toward others was considered condescending and counterproductive. In addition, the Bentrak stated that her decision-making ability suffered from her reluctance to inquire into the background of matters and to ask penetrating questions.... Finally, the Bentrak noted that [Miller’s] judgment was not trusted by some and suggested that this may have been due to [Miller’s] relative lack of business and industry experience. Defs.’ 12G Statement, H 19. Discussion of the 1986 Bentrak was postponed to the weekend at which time Ward agreed not to put the 1986 Bentrak in her personnel file. 1st Ward Aff., H 13. After Miller received the 1986 Bentrak, Ward stated Miller worked hard in connection with Legislative monitoring, however, she continued to have problems giving helpful practical advice and making sound decisions. Id., 1114. Ward stated, therefore, he never gave her the same authority which Walsh had. Id. On 25 June 1986 Miller attended a fund raiser sponsored by Beneficial. Miller Aff., 1128. Miller states that during the fund raiser she spoke to Caspersen regarding a political contribution. During her conversation with Caspersen, Miller stated the following was said: ... Caspersen referred to me as “the bag lady.” I then told Mr. Caspersen that I was not a “bag lady” at which point he said “I meant a bag lady in New York.” After this conversation, I walked over to talk with David Ward. When he asked me what had gone on between me and Mr. Caspersen, I informed him that Caspersen had called me a “bag lady.” Id. Miller stated Ward referred to her as the bag lady on 26 June 1986 at her office and again on 27 June 1986 at a party for a colleague. Id., Ml 29-30. After Ward’s second reference to Miller as the bag lady, Miller indicated she did not like being referred to by the term. Id., H 29. On 30 June 1986, Miller states Ward once again referred to her as the bag lady, at which point she requested that he not refer to her by the term again. Id., 1130. Throughout 1986 and 1987 Miller spoke to Ward about the fact that she had not been promoted to Vice President. Id., 1132. Miller maintains Ward responded by saying she was “making the money,” therefore, did not need the title. Id. In January 1987 Miller received year-end additional compensation in the amount of $8,000 for 1986. Id., ¶ 33. Miller also received an increase in her salary making her total annual base salary $50,200. Id. Miller contends that throughout 1987 her workload continued to increase. The increase was due in part from Ward’s appointment to the Operating Executive Committee of Beneficial Management which took away from his time to spend on Government Relations matters and from his involvement in a comprehensive restructuring of Beneficial. Id., ¶ 34. In September 1987 Miller again raised the issue of a promotion to Ward basing her request upon her increased workload. At this time, Miller stressed she had assumed the position of two attorneys and had increased the contact with legislators, regulators and high-level employees of companies. Id., 1135. In January 1988 Miller received $11,000 in year-end additional compensation for 1986 and received an increase in the amount of $3,000 making her annual base salary $53,200 for 1987. Id., ¶ 36. Miller further states at the time of her raise, Ward assured her she was making the same pay as Walsh. Id. Ward states he never told Miller her compensation was close or equal to Walsh’s compensation. 2d Ward Aff., 112. According to Ward, he told Miller “she was making money and getting good increases.” Miller Aff., 1136. Miller’s salary increases track Walsh’s annual base salary increases. In fact, given Walsh’s legal experience, Miller’s annual base salary increases were in excess of Walsh’s. When Miller was making $53,200, she had been in Government Relations for four years and had eight years of legal experience. At the time Walsh earned $53,000, he had been in Government Relations for six years and had twenty-eight years of legal experience. Ward states despite his concerns regarding Miller’s interpersonal skills, in February 1988, he recommended Miller for a promotion to Vice President. 1st Ward Aff., 1Í15. This promotion was to be in title only. Id. As to this recommendation, Miller states the following: For the first time ... Ward told me that a recommendation that I be made a Vice President would not stand a chance because I did not have enough “seniority” with the company. I then pointed out that Mary Ann [sic] Schneider and Ann Stephenson had been brought into Beneficial as Vice Presidents (obviously without seniority at the company) and that Wheeler Neff, who began his employment at Beneficial the same day I did, had been promoted to Vice President. I noted how I had replaced Charles Walsh (and Kenneth Raatz) and had taken on some of Ward’s duties over the years (all of which Ward acknowledged). I also told Ward that I did not think that David Farris would object to making me a Vice President.... Miller Aff., 11 38. Caspersen, however, told Ward the consideration for promotion would not occur at that time. Id. Sometime before 26 May 1988 Miller began to fill out a JAQ (the “1988 JAQ”) upon the suggestion of Maryann Schneider, Senior Vice President for Human Resources (“Schneider”). Miller Aff., 1140. On 4 March 1988 Ward took a leave of absence from Beneficial to participate in an eleven-week program at Harvard University. Id., 1116. During Ward’s absence, Miller was instructed to handle State legislation and administrative matters. The Government Relations Field Directors were to review any major policy decisions with Caspersen or Farris and all federal Government Relations matters were to be referred to an outside consultant. Id. Miller presents a different account of her duties during Ward’s leave of absence. While Ward was at Harvard, I ran the Government Relations Department without supervision by David Farris, Finn Caspersen or any other higher ranking executive. Miller Aff., H 41. Ward returned to Beneficial on 23 May 1988. On or around 26 May 1988, Miller approached Ward regarding her promotion to Vice President. Id., ¶ 42. Miller contends the conversation proceeded as follows: Ward responded that he had recommended to Finn Caspersen earlier in the year ... that I be made a Vice President and that Caspersen had turned down that recommendation.... When I asked Ward why he had not told me of this previously, he simply said something about it being a “white lie.” Ward then went on to say that I would never get the title of Vice President and that Finn Cas-persen had the total say in the matter. I then told Ward that Mary Ann [sic] Schneider had recommended that I draft a JAQ for the committee which evaluated promotions. Ward laughed and said that the committee did not make those decisions. Id. According to Miller, Ward said “your best bet is to leave and sue on age discrimination” and to go work for the government who could not discriminate on the basis of age. Id. Ward states he never told Miller she should sue for age discrimination. 2d Ward Aff., ¶ 4. Miller also states Ward asked her how long she intended to work if she got the title of Vice President. Miller Aff., 1142. Ward allegedly told Miller he would recommend her for Vice President in July 1988 and she should compile a list of recent promotions from personnel. Id. Miller maintains that Ward suggested Miller ask Gilliam to assign her to another attorney position so Ward could hire someone who would be able to take over his position in three or four years. Id. Ward concedes Miller and he spoke of a replacement for Ward. 2d Ward Aff., ¶ 5. Ward states, however, he advised Miller she would most likely not replace Ward because he intended to stay at Beneficial for another seventeen years when he would be at retirement age. Id. According to Miller, Ward suggested perhaps Caspersen would promote Miller to Vice President if Ward could hire someone beneath him to eventually replace Ward. Miller Aff., ¶[ 43. Miller indicated to Ward if she were not going to be made Vice President, she would be interested in an available Field Director position. Id. According to Miller, Ward told her the position was not available because he could not have Miller carrying home drunks late at night. On 31 May 1988 Miller had a conversation in her office with Helen Perry. Miller secretly taped this conversation because “a certain level of mistrust had developed between [Perry and Miller.]” Id., II43. Within a few days, Miller informed Ward she had taped the conversation with Perry. Id. Miller states Ward made no comment about the taping incident. Id. According to Ward, he felt the taping incident was sufficient grounds to terminate Miller’s employment. 1st Ward Aff., If 17. Therefore, Ward told Miller she would no longer be recommended for a promotion. Id. After learning of the taping incident, Ward decided to make a formal Bentrak documenting the taping incident and other performance problems. Id. Miller contends Ward assured her on 14 June 1988 that he would submit Miller’s name for Vice President to be considered at the Group Presidents’ Mid-Year Conference in July. Miller Aff., ¶ 44. On 2 August 1988 Miller asked Ward what the results were of his proposal to promote Miller. Id., ¶ 45. Miller states: Ward responded that I had been turned down for Vice President by David Farris and Finn Caspersen. When I asked Ward if I could speak with Caspersen about the subject, Ward said that I would “be out the door” if I tried to do so. Ward agreed that I could speak with David Farris and Mary Ann [sic] Schneider about the Vice President title. Id. Schneider advised Miller to prepare a list of job responsibilities including ten tasks Miller had recently completed. Id., If 46. Miller prepared the list and submitted it to Farris. Miller then met with Farris on the afternoon of 2 August 1988. Id. Miller stated Farris informed her he and Caspersen had not turned the promotion down and would consider it at the end of the year. Id. In addition, Farris instructed Miller to complete a JAQ. Id. Miller completed the 1988 JAQ on 29 August 1988. The 1988 JAQ was delivered to Ward on 30 August 1988. Id. Ward was not able to complete the formal Bentrak until 24 August 1988 (the “1988 Bentrak”). Id., 1119. On 1 September 1988 Ward added comments from the 1986 Bentrak to the 1988 Bentrak. On that same date, Ward received the 1988 JAQ from Miller which requested her job be upgraded to Vice President. Id., K 20. Ward informed Miller she was not going to become Vice President and never would. Miller Aff., 1148. In addition, Ward told Miller her performance would have to be discussed. 1st Ward Aff., ¶ 20. Miller became upset; therefore, Ward requested the meeting be held with Lawrence Cole (“Cole”), Vice President of Human Resources. Id. Miller remained upset and was taken home. Id. Miller was out of work due until 26 September 1988. Miller Aff., ¶ 48. Ward drafted an addendum concerning the taping incident and the loss of trust of Miller at Beneficial to the 1988 Bentrak after the 1 September 1988 meeting with Miller and Cole. Ward did not, however, include the addendum in the 1988 Bentrak. Id., II21. During Miller’s absence from work, she wrote Ward a letter, dated 19 September 1988 (“19 September 1988 Letter”). Id., ¶ 49; Hance Aff., Ex. 3. The 19 September 1988 Letter stated Miller consistently refused to participate in what she contended were illegal or unethical activities. Id. The 19 September 1988 Letter further stated Beneficial’s failure to promote her to Vice President was due to the fact that Miller was sixty years of age. Id. When Miller returned to work on 26 September 1988, Cole and Schneider questioned Miller about the 19 September 1988 Letter. Id. On that same day, Ward removed the majority of Miller’s principal duties. Id. As a result of the 19 September 1988 Letter an internal investigation was conducted regarding Miller’s employment history at Beneficial. Id., 11 52. On 30 September 1988 Miller telephoned Walsh to apprise him of her frustrations at Beneficial. Id., ¶ 50. During their conversation, Walsh mentioned his compensation when he left Beneficial was an annual base salary of $55,000 and an additional year-end bonus of $28,500. Id. Walsh also informed Miller that Raatz had an annual base salary of $40,500 and had an additional year-end bonus in the amount of $6,500 for 1983. Id. Miller states this was the first time she became aware Walsh received higher compensation than her. Id., 1151. On 3 October 1988 Ward submitted to Human Resources a written response to the 1988 JAQ. Id., 1122. On 5 October 1988 Human Resources advised Ward that Miller’s position should remain at the same salary grade level. Id. The 1988 Bentrak was signed and delivered to Miller on 14 October 1988. Id., ¶¶ 19, 23. Upon receipt of the 1988 Bentrak, Miller stated she would respond to Hance after her attorney reviewed the matter. Id., 11 23. On 20 October 1988 Miller was removed from Government Relations and reassigned to the Legal Department as Assistant Vice President and Associate Counsel where she reported to Hance. Miller Aff., ¶ 53. On 14 December 1988 Miller was informed her temporary removal from Government Relations was permanent. Id. In connection with her notice of the permanent transfer, Miller received a memorandum from Hance, dated 14 December 1988. Defs.’ 12G Statement, 1130; Hance Aff., 1110. The memorandum stated the reasons for the transfer and directed Miller to discuss the 1988 Bentrak with Hance. Id. On 19 December 1988 Miller met with Hance to discuss the 1988 Bentrak. Id., ¶ 11. Miller contends her removal from Government Relations foreclosed any possibility of her being promoted to Vice President. Miller Aff., 11 54. Any promotion to Vice President would have been based on the scope and nature of Miller’s duties and the fact that Walsh had been a Vice President. Id. On 22 December 1988 Beneficial’s Executive Committee considered and denied Miller’s request for promotion to Vice President. Defs.’ 12G Statement, ¶ 32. The decision was based in part on Hance’s recommendation that Miller not be promoted for reasons stated in the 1988 Bentrak. Id.; Hance Aff., II12. Miller was informed of Beneficial’s decision on 23 December 1988. Id. On 6 January 1988 Miller’s employment at Beneficial was terminated. Id., 11 60. On 27 February 1989 Miller filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Id., ¶ 61, Ex. 37. On 20 July 1989 Miller filed the Complaint alleging discrimination under the EPA, ADEA, New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, (“NJLAD”), NJ.Stat.Ann., 10:5-1 et seq., and the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Act, NJ.Stat.Ann. 34:19-1 et seq. Complaint. On 21 November 1989 Miller filed an Amendment to Complaint alleging discrimination under Title VII. On 29 June 1990 Beneficial moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss Count Five of the Complaint alleging a violation of the New Jersey Conscientious Employment Act. On 24 July 1990 Count Five of the Complaint was dismissed for lack of pendant jurisdiction. Letter-Opinion and Order, filed 24 July 1990. Discussion Beneficial moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) on the ground that Miller’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. In the event any claims are not time barred, Beneficial moves for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Beneficial argues it had justified business reasons for not promoting Miller and for not paying Miller the same annual base salary as her predecessor Walsh. Moving Brief, 34-39; Reply Brief, 28-34. A. Motion to Dismiss Beneficial has moved to dismiss all Counts of the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the ground that the Complaint is time barred by the statute of limitations. Because dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) results in a determination on the merits at an early stage in the plaintiffs cause, the plaintiff is afforded the safeguard of having all its allegations taken as true and all reasonable factual inferences drawn in its favor. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273, (3d Cir. 1985); Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). “[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Accord Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935, 106 S.Ct. 267, 88 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985). When making a determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court cannot consider matters outside the pleadings. In this case, the parties have submitted affidavits in connection with the motion of Beneficial. When either or both parties present extraneous material as part of their motion or opposition, the court has the discretion to accept the extraneous material and convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339-40 (3d Cir.1989); Elysian Fed. Sav. Bank v. First Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F.Supp. 737, 740 (D.N.J.1989); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 at 678 (West 1969 & Supp.1989). In this case, the affidavits submitted by Beneficial and Miller directly impact upon the substantive issues raised by the motion to dismiss. Because affidavits have been submitted in support of and in opposition to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and because each side has had an opportunity to address a Rule 56 motion, the motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Elysian Fed., 713 F.Supp. at 740. Accordingly, the motion will be treated as a summary judgment motion in its entirety. B. Summary Judgment Standard of Review To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must establish “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The present task is to determine whether disputed issues of fact exist, but a district court may not resolve factual disputes in a motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see Nathanson v. Medical College, 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir.1991) (Summary judgment may not be granted “if there is a disagreement over what inferences can be reasonably drawn from the facts even if the facts are undisputed.”). All evidence submitted must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Boyle v. Governor’s Veterans Outreach & Assistance Center, 925 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 1991); Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793, 797 (3d Cir.1990); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Todaro v. Bowman, 872 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir.1989); Joseph v. Hess Oil, 867 F.2d 179, 182 (3d Cir.1989). “‘Any “unexplained gaps” in material submitted by the moving party, ... if pertinent to material issues of fact, justify denial of a motion for summary judgment.’ ” Ingersoll-Rand Fin. Corp. v. Anderson, 921 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting O’Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir.1989)). Although the summary judgment hurdle is a difficult one to overcome, it is by no means insurmountable. As the Supreme Court has stated, once the party seeking summary judgment has pointed out to the court the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... In the language of the Rule, the non-moving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56 (emphasis in original, citations and footnotes omitted). In other words, the inquiry involves determining “ ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1111 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2511-12), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2827, 115 L.Ed.2d 997, 59 U.S.L.W. 3837 (1991). The Supreme Court elaborated on the summary judgment standard in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. “If the evidence [submitted by a party opposing summary judgment] is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court went on to note in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, ill U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986): “One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose.” Id. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2553-54 (footnote omitted). Once a case has been made in support of summary judgment, the party opposing the motion has the affirmative burden of coming forward with specific facts evidencing a need for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Maguire v. Hughes Aircraft Corp., 912 F.2d 67, 72 (3d Cir.1990) (non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancor-poration, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir.1990) (neither unsupported allegations in pleadings and memoranda of law nor conclusory allegations in affidavits will establish genuine issue of material fact); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 (3d Cir.1990) (cannot create issue of fact merely by questioning credibility of mov-ant’s witnesses; circumstantial evidence may raise issue of fact); Aronow Roofing Co. v. Gilbane Building Co., 902 F.2d 1127, 1128 (3d Cir.1990) (“summary judgment will be granted where the non-moving party fails to ‘establish the existence’ of an element essential to the ease”); Carlson v. Arnot-Ogden Memorial Hosp., 918 F.2d 411, 413 (3d Cir.1990) (“nonmoving party must adduce more than a mere scintilla of evidence in its favor”) (quoting Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir.1989). C. Statute of Limitations 1. EPA and ADEA Claims Claims arising under the EPA must be “commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued....” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). The ADEA incorporates by reference the statute of limitations provided in the EPA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1) (“Section 255 and 259 of this title shall apply to actions under this chapter.”). “[T]he proper focus [in an employment discrimination suit] is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of the act become painful.” Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 29, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (emphasis in original). “Mere continuity of employment, without more, is insufficient to prolong the life of a cause of action for employment discrimination.” Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257, 101 S.Ct. 498, 503-04, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980). Accordingly, the court must determine when the alleged discriminatory act occurred. If the alleged discriminatory act is a “continuing violation” the statute of limitations accrues on the date of the last occurrence of the discrimination rather than the first. Bronze Shields, Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Civil Serv., 667 F.2d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122, 102 S.Ct. 3510, 73 L.Ed.2d 1384 (1982); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of America, 679 F.Supp. 495, 499 (W.D.Pa.1988). a. Continuing Violation When confronted with a continuing violation claim, the first step is to determine the timeliness of the claim. Erd-mann v. Board of Educ., 541 F.Supp. 388, 392 (D.N.J.1982). The district court must “identify precisely the ‘unlawful employment practice’ of which [plaintiff] complains.” Bronze Shields, 667 F.2d at 1083 (quoting Delaware College, 101 S.Ct. at 503). The Third Circuit has stated: To prevail on a continuing violation theory, however, the plaintiff must show more than the occurrence of isolated or sporadic acts of intentional discrimination. The preponderance of evidence must establish that some form of intentional discrimination against the ... [plaintiff] was the company’s ‘standard operating procedure.’ Jewett v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 653 F.2d 89, 91-92 (3d Cir.) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969, 102 S.Ct. 515, 70 L.Ed.2d 386 (1981); see also James v. International Bus. Machines Corp., 737 F.Supp. 1420, 1424 (E.D.Pa.1990). The plaintiff may not base his or her claim upon conclusory allegations, but rather must provide factual support showing the defendant had a “standard and pervasive practice of intentionally discriminating against a class or classes of employees of which [the plaintiff] was a member.” James, 737 F.Supp. at 1424-25. Moreover, “[t]he continuing violation theory does not cover ‘isolated instances of discrimination concluded in the past, even though the effects persist into the present.’ ” Cuffy v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 648 F.Supp. 802, 810 (D.Del.1986) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 725 F.2d 211, 218 (3d Cir.1983) (emphasis in original)). “[T]o withstand a motion for summary judgment as to untimely charges, a plaintiff must at a minimum identify the policy or practice upon which the claim of continuing violation is based_” Erdmann, 541 F.Supp. at 393; see also Porta v. Rollins Environmental Servs., Inc., 654 F.Supp. 1275, 1281-82 (D.N.J.1987), aff'd 845 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir.1988). In this case, Miller’s EPA and ADEA claims are based on an alleged disparity in salary and a failure to promote. Miller alleges Beneficial discriminated against her when it established and continued Miller's compensation and position in Government Relations. Complaint, Count 1, 3. With respect to Miller’s claim based on the disparity in salary, Miller argues the alleged discrimination occurred when Beneficial promoted Miller to Government Relations without giving her the same compensation as Walsh. Complaint, 4-5; Opp. Brief, 21. Miller avers this discrimination continued each time she received a paycheck from Government Relations. Id. Miller claims because there was a continuing violation, the statute of limitations has not run on her claims based on the alleged disparity in salary. Opp. Brief, 20. In making her assertion of a continuing violation, Miller relies on Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1399-40 (9th Cir.1986) (“The policy of paying lower wages to female employees on each payday constitutes a ‘continuing violation.’ ”) and Bartelt v. Berlitz School of Languages, Inc., 698 F.2d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.1983) (same). These cases are distinguishable, however, because Miller failed to establish a policy of paying females lower wages than male counterparts. All of Miller’s allegations with respect to unequal pay deal only with her salary compared to the salary of Walsh. Opp. Brief, 20-22. Miller makes no allegations with respect to the salary of other females or employees over forty years of age. Even assuming Beneficial discriminated against Miller when her position in Government Relations was established, the fact that Miller’s subsequent promotions never reached the annual base salary level of Walsh does not constitute individual acts of discrimination. Beneficial gave Miller percentage raises based on merit. Any subsequent raises Miller received were based upon her initial annual base salary received in Government Relations. See Miller Aff., Ex. 34. Therefore, the amount of the raises were but a consequence of the initial discriminatory act. See e.g., Churchill v. Int’l Bus. Machines, Inc., 759 F.Supp. 1089, 1100 (D.N.J.1991) (where salary increases are based on merit and performance, prior salary has significant impact on subsequent salary level). “As a consequence, the continuing violation theory will not resuscitate a failure to promote claim_” Cuffy, 648 F.Supp. at 810. Miller also seeks to apply the continuing violation theory to her claim based on Beneficial’s failure to promote her. Opp. Brief, 23. Miller argues because she filled the positions of Walsh and Raatz she was discriminated against when her position as Associate Counsel was established in Government Relations. Id., 22-24. Miller contends each subsequent denial of her requests for a promotion to Vice President constituted a continuing violation on the part of Beneficial. Id. Miller does not allege a policy of failure to promote on the basis of age or gender. Miller argues, however, a continuing violation can exist if there is a series of separate but related discriminatory acts. Id., 24; see Fuchilla v. Prockop, 682 F.Supp. 247, 258 (D.N.J.1987) (pattern of discrimination shown because incidents were related to action taken against plaintiff in retaliation for filing claim); Porta v. Rollins, 654 F.Supp. 1275, 1281-82 (D.N.J.1987) (where there were no other women at her level, plaintiff established continuing violation by showing she was subject to series of related discriminatory acts); Brown v. Brown, 528 F.Supp. 686, 690 (D.N.J.1981) (continuing violation established where practices complained of included denial of specific promotion and denial of opportunity to prepare for promotional opportunities). In this case Miller does not argue she was the only female at Beneficial at the level of Assistant Vice President seeking a promotion to Vice President. In fact, Miller admits there were other female Vice Presidents, albeit not a large number, at Beneficial. Miller’s 12G Statement, 111176-80. Accordingly, Porta is distinguished from the instant case. In Erdmann, plaintiff argued the repeated rejection of her job application evidenced a continuing violation. 541 F.Supp. at 393. The court rejected plaintiffs claim that there was a continuing violation because: Although plaintiff’s claims do fall into a consistent pattern of rejection, she has given no indication that the pattern has been generated by operation of any policy or practice used by defendants in making employment decisions, or that the pattern holds true with respect to female applicants in general. Erdmann, 541 F.Supp. at 393. The court further considered the evidence and held even if plaintiff had alleged a systematic practice of discrimination, the facts do not support the allegations. Id. at 393-94. Erdmann is on point in this case. Miller has not alleged a specific policy or practice of discrimination. Miller has only raised allegations that Beneficial has repeatedly rejected her requests to be promoted to Vice President. Even assuming Beneficial discriminated against Miller by not initially promoting her to Vice President, the facts do not support a showing of a discriminatory policy. Miller has presented statistical evidence to show that Beneficial only had two female Vice Presidents at the close of any given year. Miller does not, however, provide the requisite factual evidence to support a claim of a discriminatory policy against promoting women. Because Miller has failed to identify and factually support a showing of a discriminatory policy at Beneficial, Miller cannot withstand summary judgment on the basis that her claims were a continuing violation. Accordingly, it must be determined when the specific alleged discriminatory conduct occurred and whether her claims are barred by the statute of limitations. b. Accrual of the Statute of Limitations Miller argues the statute of limitations did not begin to run on her claim for equal pay until she discovered the disparity in salary in September 1988. Likewise, Miller contends the statute of limitations on her claim for failure to promote did not begin to run until she discovered, in September 1988, she would never be promoted. In the alternative, Miller argues the statute of limitations for her claims for unequal pay and failure to promote should be tolled under principals of equitable tolling. i. Discovery Relevant decisions of the Supreme Court clearly indicate that the limitations periods require prompt filing of discrimination charges. Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 2261, 104 L.Ed.2d 961 (1989); Delaware State College, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498; United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). In E.E.O.C. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 651 F.Supp. 1172 (D.N.J.1987), aff'd, 907 F.2d 1365 (3d Cir.1990), three requirements for the accrual of the statute of limitations were laid out. First, there must be an allegedly discriminatory policy or decision. Second, the allegedly discriminatory policy or decision must be communicated to the alleged victims of the policy. Finally, the policy or decision must be applied to the alleged victims. Id., at 1174; see also Delaware State College, 449 U.S. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 504 (accrual is when discriminatory acts occurred, not when the effects were felt). The second factor, knowledge of the alleged victims, can be established by actual or constructive knowledge. Miller v. Aluminum, 679 F.Supp. at 500 (“filing period does not begin to run ‘until the facts that would support a charge of discrimination ... were apparent or should have been apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights(quoting Tucker v. United Parcel Service, 657 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir.1981)); Westinghouse, 651 F.Supp. at 1174-77 (same). In this case, Miller defends against the motion on the ground that she did not have actual knowledge of the disparity in pay until 20 September 1988 when Walsh told her what his salary was at the time of his departure. Opp. Brief, 26. Beneficial argues, however, Miller should have known about the disparity in salary in 1984. Defs.’ Reply Brief, 11-12. In Westinghouse, the surrounding circumstances were considered to determine when the operative accrual date should be set. 651 F.Supp. at 1176; see also Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 928 F.2d 86, 89 (4th Cir.1990) (The court rejected discovery principal for unequal pay claims because “unequal pay claims provide an employee the greater incentive to inquire: the typical pay violation occurs over a longer period of time than the typical discharge, and the employee ... is in constant contact with those who may provide evidence of discriminatory treatment.”). In this case Miller alleges Ward informed her on several occasions she was making the same money as Walsh. Miller Aff., ¶¶ 32, 36. Miller at times, however, indicates she had knowledge to the contrary. Significantly, when Miller replaced Walsh in Government Relations she had a different title than Walsh. Walsh was Vice President and she was an Associate Counsel. Id., ¶ 6. Indeed, at the time of her promotion to Government Relations, Ward told Miller “with hard work and more experience in this facet of the business [she] could achieve Vice President status and pay.” Miller Aff., 117. Miller’s EEOC charge stated: “David Ward assured me at [the time I started] that I would eventually be awarded the title of Vice President with its accompanying salary and benefits.” Id., Ex. 37 (emphasis added). Miller also stated she assumed she was making a salary comparable to Walsh’s salary because Ward had told her she was replacing Walsh and Raatz. Id., II8. Moreover, Miller had known Walsh throughout her employment in the legal department and was aware he had almost twenty years of legal experience at Beneficial by the time of his departure. By comparison, at that time Miller had four years of legal experience when she entered Government Relations. Importantly, Miller, as an attorney is attuned to the issues of employment discrimination. See e.g., Miller v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 26 (2d Cir.) (distinguishing uneducated person unfamiliar with the law from well-educated lawyer for purposes of determining knowledge), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 851, 106 S.Ct. 148, 88 L.Ed.2d 122 (1985); Pfister v. Allied Corp., 539 F.Supp. 224, 227 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (equitable tolling claim weak since plaintiff is experienced attorney). The record indicates Miller was cognizant of the fact she may be subject to age discrimination. When Miller applied to Beneficial in 1S80, Miller stated she was bom in 1931. Beneficial later learned that Miller was actually bom in 1927 or 1928. Moving Brief, 4 n. 1; 1st Ward Aff., Ex., 14. The contradictions in Miller’s statements and Miller’s heightened knowledge and sensitivity to the issues of employment discrimination are persuasive evidence that if Miller did not know, she should have known she did not receive the same salary as Walsh when she replaced him in Government Relations. Cf Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co., 935 F.2d 1407, 1419 (3d Cir. 1991), cert, denied — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 379, 116 L.Ed.2d 330 (poor evaluation did not trigger Colgan’s knowledge of discrimination because evaluation stated he could redeem himself by improved performance over next sixty to ninety days). Accordingly, from a view most favorable to Miller, she had at least constructive knowledge she was not making the same salary as Walsh when she accepted the position in Government Relations. The statute of limitations began to run when Miller formally assumed the position in Government Relations in July 1984. The statute of limitations also began to run in July 1984 for Miller’s claim for failure to be promoted to Vice President. The Complaint alleges she was discriminated against when her position was established in Government Relations. Complaint, 6-7; Amendment to Complaint, 2. Miller does not assert she was unaware that Walsh’s position was Vice President when she accepted the position as Associate Counsel. Accordingly, Miller had actual knowledge of any alleged discrimination at the time she accepted and assumed the position in July 1984. Miller asserts, however, she was unaware that she would never be promoted until she was removed from Government Relations in October 1988. Opp. Brief, 28. Miller states Ward had never told her she would not be promoted to Vice President until her discussion with Ward on 1 September 1988. Miller Aff., 1148. Miller states, however, Ward told her in February 1988 that any request for promotion to Vice President would not stand a chance because she lacked seniority. Id., 1138. Miller responded to Walsh by naming various employees at her level who had received promotions. Id. This response indicates she suspected some form of discrimination. Events prior to February 1988 indicate Miller had constructive knowledge of discrimination. As previously mentioned, Miller was an attorney and was sensitive to the issues of age discrimination. Moreover, to establish her case of discrimination, Miller cites statements made in 1986 referring to her as a “bag lady.” At the time of these statements, Miller had already requested promotions to Vice President. Assuming the “bag lady” references are evidence of a discriminatory animus, Miller should have known in 1986 that she was not going to be promoted to Vice President. Accordingly, Miller has not laid out a proper situation to prevent the accrual of the statute of limitations. ii. Equitable Tolling Miller argues, in the alternative, the statute of limitations was tolled by the principles of equitable tolling. Opp. Brief, 30-32. Equitable tolling “permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if despite all due diligence [s]he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of [her] claim.” Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir.1990) (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397, 66 S.Ct. 582, 585, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946)); see also Meyer v. Riegel Products Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 309 (3d Cir.1983) (humanitarian purposes of employment discrimination claims implies limitation is subject to tolling in appropriate cases). The Third Circuit has noted, however, the “restrictions on equitable tolling ... must be scrupulously observed.” Williams v. Army and Air Force Exchange Service, 830 F.2d 27, 30 (3d Cir. 1987). The doctrine can be applied where “the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff.” Kocian v. Getty Refining & Marketing, Co., 707 F.2d 748, 753 (3d Cir. 1983); Miller v. Aluminum, 679 F.Supp. at 500. In such cases where the “employer’s own acts or omissions have lulled the plaintiff into foregoing prompt attempts to vindicate his rights” equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is appropriate. Meyer, 720 F.2d at 307; Labus v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 740 F.Supp. 1053, 1058-59 (D.N.J.1990). It has also been noted, however: An employee’s hope for rehire, transfer, promotion, or a continuing employment relationship ... cannot toll the statute absent some employer conduct likely to mislead an employee into sleeping on his rights. Price v. Litton Bus. Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 963, 965-66 (4th Cir.1982). To invoke equitable tolling, the employee must “show that it would have been impossible for a reasonably prudent person to learn” of the discriminatory conduct. Miller v. IT & T, 755 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 851, 106 S.Ct. 148, 88 L.Ed.2d 122 (1985). Miller has not established a case for equitable tolling with respect to her claims based on disparity in salary. Miller alleges Ward actively misled her when he told her she was making the same money as Walsh. Opp. Brief, 31. The facts are disputed as to whether Ward told Miller she was making the same salary as Walsh. 2d Ward Aff., ¶ 2. A resolution of the dispute is neither necessary nor proper, however. As previously stated, Miller had constructive knowledge of the fact that she was not making the same salary as Walsh. Not only did Miller have constructive knowledge of the alleged discrimination, but any statement of Ward’s would not be “extraordinary enough” to have prevented Miller from gaining knowledge of her claim. See e.g., Dillman v. Combustion Eng’r, Inc., 784 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir.1986) (offering employee severance benefits was not misleading conduct responsible for employee’s unawareness of discrimination); M