Full opinion text
ORDER DOTY, District Judge. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs, thirty-two former division managers with IDS Financial Services, Inc., IDS Life Insurance Company and IDS Financial Corporation (collectively referred to “IDS”), allege that IDS discriminated against them in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Various plaintiffs also assert state law claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. IDS and plaintiffs brought twenty-one separate motions on various issues. This order will set forth the facts and law relevant to each motion in turn. DISCUSSION Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” This standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Stated in the negative, summary judgment will not lie if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. In order for the moving party to prevail, it must demonstrate to the court that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. On a motion for summary judgment, all evidence and inferences are to be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. The nonmoving party, however, may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Moreover, if a plaintiff cannot support each essential element of its claim, summary judgment must be granted because a complete failure of proof regarding an essential element necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. With this standard at hand, the court will examine the various motions. 1. Defendants’ Motion for Dispositive Sanctions IDS seeks dispositive sanctions for plaintiffs’ alleged violations of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 37(b) and 53(g), 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the “underlying duty to litigate fairly and honestly.” IDS specifically alleges that plaintiffs engaged in sanctionable misconduct relating to the piggybacking issue. IDS also seeks attorneys’ fees associated with various motions and discovery matters. Such sanctions are within the court’s discretion. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2123, 2132-33, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2463, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980)). Based on a review of the file, record and proceedings, the court denies IDS’s motion for dispositive sanctions and attorneys’ fees. 2. Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Sufficiency of the Glass Charge On September 2, 1986, Jerolene Glass (“Mrs. Glass”), the wife of plaintiff Milo Glass (“Glass”), called the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (“ICRC”) on behalf of her husband and read a written statement to Robert King, an intake employe of ICRC (“King”). The parties hotly dispute the actual contents of that statement. In her affidavit dated April 19, 1989, Mrs. Glass claimed that the written statement included the following allegations: IDS is gaming further by the demotion of other Division Managers who are in similar positions as I am. They are demoting and terminating older men and replacing them with other persons who are much younger in age generally in their thirties. She also testified that she told King that other division managers had been demoted and “named J.R. Klukas and Jerry Gant.” She further testified that she had ended their conversation “by stating: ‘M.E. Glass is one of many IDS Financial Services is replacing with younger persons.’ ” IDS contends, however, that those portions of Mrs. Glass’s affidavit is false. The audio tape of that telephone conversation shows that Mrs. Glass actually told King the following: KING: And the regional manager indicated that on April 30th that he was going to be replaced as divisional manager with a younger man? MRS. GLASS: Yes. Yes. Well, he named the man who happens to be younger, yes. Decidedly younger. Now they have done this in four other ... right at the same time, with four other, umm, at four other offices. We do know that on contact with one of the persons that they did this, divisional managers that they replaced, he was placed in another position lower. (Transcript of audio tape, typed by Debra Maher on April 10, 1990.) The parties further dispute whether additional oral communications occurred between the Glasses and the ICRC. It is undisputed, however, that Glass filed a timely written charge with the ICRC in September 1986 that stated: I believe my age was a factor in the following incident: (1) I am a 59 year old male and I have worked for the IDS Financial Services, Inc. Company for 35 years. I was promoted to Divisional Manager some 15 years ago and increased my commission income which is based on volume of business, from $25,000 per year to $128,000 per year with the company paying all office expenses. On April 30, 1986, I was told by the Regional Manager that effective May 21, 1986, I would be demoted to a District Manager’s position and would be replaced as Divisional Manager by a less senior, younger co-worker in his mid-thirties. I was also told that as District Manager I would be required to pay all office expenses. It is further undisputed that Glass filled out an intake questionnaire alleging that: Younger persons are being promoted to a Divisional Sales Manager status and are employees of the Company. Some are receiving salaries while others are in high commission income. Older Divisional Sales Managers are being terminated and are being offered self-employeed [sic] positions. Some of the younger men promoted to Divisional Sales Managers are: Brian Rucks, Roy Evanovich, Mitre Kutanovski, Lorenzo Wilson. Some of the older men demoted from Divisional Sales Managers are: J.R. Klukas, Jerry Gant, M.E Glass, Thor Nygren, Carl Fazzini. Although the parties dispute whether Glass’s intake questionnaire was prepared at the same time as his written charge, it is clear that the ICRC had his written questionnaire in its files prior to its preparation of an amended charge on January 21, 1987, but never added those allegations to Glass’s charge or sent IDS a copy of his intake questionnaire. Plaintiffs also proffer evidence that the ICRC, during the period of time in which Glass filed his charge, handled every charge as an individual charge, no matter what the claimant actually alleged. IDS again moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Glass’s administrative charge is sufficient to permit twenty-three plaintiffs to piggyback on that charge. The court has entered three prior orders on the sufficiency of Glass’s charge. In its first order, dated September 27, 1989, the court denied IDS’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that Glass’s charge of discrimination, combined with his intake questionnaire and the statement read by Mrs. Glass over the telephone to the ICRC (as described in her affidavit), provided sufficient information to allow the ICRC an “opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices through informal methods of conciliation”, thereby fulfilling one of the two purposes underlying the ADEA charge filing requirement. Glass v. IDS Fin. Servs., No. 4-89-76, slip. op. at 6 (D.Minn. September 27, 1989) (Glass I) (quoting Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir.1986)). The court further stated that the second purpose, providing formal notice to IDS, was not satisfied but found that ICRC had failed in its statutory duty to provide such notice and that plaintiffs should not be penalized by its failure. Id. at 7. After the first order, the parties submitted further evidence on the issue and the court, in an order dated June 22, 1990, reversed the first order and granted IDS’s motion for partial summary judgment. Glass v. IDS Fin. Servs., No. 4-89-76 (D.Minn. June 22, 1990) (Glass II). The court based its second order on newly proffered evidence, including a transcript of Mrs. Glass’s telephone call to the ICRC that “materially differ[ed] from the statement Mrs. Glass asserted she read to the ICRC.” Id. at 3. The court found that the contents of her statement, as reflected by the transcript, and the information contained in Glass’s intake questionnaire did not apprise the ICRC of the class nature of Glass’s claim. The court thus concluded that neither of the purposes underlying the charge-filing requirement had been fulfilled and granted IDS’s motion for partial summary judgment. The court’s third order, issued August 8, 1990, denied partial summary judgment and reinstated the first order, finding a material fact dispute based on “additional evidence which demonstrated that there may have been additional conversations between Mrs. Glass and [the ICRC] prior to the ICRC’s drafting of the formal charge, and that even the taped conversations between Mrs. Glass and [the ICRC] may have been only partially recorded.” Glass v. IDS Fin. Servs., No. 4-89-76, slip. op. at 2 (D.Minn. August 8, 1990) (Glass III). IDS argues that the court should again grant partial summary judgment on three grounds. IDS first contends that in its third order, dated August 8,1990, the court improperly considered oral communications as part of Glass’s charge. IDS also asserts that newly proffered deposition testimony calls into question affidavits submitted by plaintiffs in July of 1990 in opposition to the motion that was the subject of the third order. Finally, IDS contends that even if the oral communications were properly considered part of Glass’s charge, that charge is still insufficient to give IDS adequate notice of any class claims under Eighth Circuit law, specifically Kloos v. Carter-Day Co., 799 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.1986) and Ulvin v. Northwestern National Life Ins. Co., 943 F.2d 862 (8th Cir.1991). The court will address each contention in turn. A. Oral Communications [2] IDS first claims that the court, in its third order, improperly considered oral communication as part of Glass’s charge. IDS argues that “oral communications cannot, as a matter of law, constitute the Charge of Discrimination.” Courts apply the following standard when evaluating communications alleged to be charges: [i]n order to constitute a charge that satisfies the [statutory] requirement ..., notice to the EEOC must be of a kind that would convince a reasonable person that the grievant has manifested an intent to activate the Acts’ machinery. Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 542 (7th Cir.1988) (citing Bihler v. Singer Co., 710 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir.1983)); cf Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 283 (8th Cir.1983) (letter signed by claimant may be construed as charge). Courts generally hold that oral communications alone are insufficient to constitute a charge. See, e.g., Woodard v. Western Union Tel. Co., 650 F.2d 592, 593-94 (5th Cir.1981) (claimant’s oral communications gave insufficient notice of an intent to sue); Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363, 368 (2d Cir.1978) (oral communications, without written charge, are not sufficient); Greene v. Whirlpool Corp., 708 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir.1983) (claimant never filed a written charge and the oral communications merely constituted “a request for information concerning age discrimination”). IDS, however, misinterprets the third order; for purposes of summary judgment, the court considered evidence of oral communications as perhaps comprising a portion of Glass’s charge, but his charge clearly involved more than mere oral communications. Cf. Church v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 294, 301-02 (N.D.Cal.1991) (EEOC may receive notice of class claims from other sources in addition to actual charges filed). Moreover, plaintiffs allege that the ICRC failed to reduce all of the relevant oral communications to writing, contrary to EEOC regulations providing that: A charge shall be in writing and shall name the prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s). Charges received in person or by telephone shall be reduced to writings. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.6 (1991) (emphasis added). Thus, the cases on which IDS relies are distinguishable from the present case. The present situation is also unique because the Glass charge was filed with an agency that characterized all charges, whether class or individual, as individual claims. Under such circumstances, the court rejects IDS’s claim that oral communications cannot comprise part of Glass’s charge. See also Glass I, slip op. at 6 (charge consists of “not only the ‘charge of discrimination’ drafted by the Iowa Commission, but also the statement read over the telephone and the answers to the questionnaire sent to the commission”). B. Recent Depositions IDS also proffers deposition testimony that allegedly calls into question various affidavits submitted by plaintiffs pursuant to the motion that was the subject of the court’s third order. This evidence, however, merely affirms that material fact disputes exist concerning the sufficiency of the Glass charge. See supra. Moreover, it is not the function of the court when ruling on a motion for summary judgment to resolve existing factual issues through a trial by affidavits. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. Thus, the court denies partial summary judgment on the basis of IDS’s newly proffered evidence. C. IDS’s Claims of Inadequate Notice Under the ADEA, an individual claimant is required to file an administrative charge prior to bringing a civil action. The Eighth Circuit states that the charge-filing requirement serves two purposes: First, it provides the state agency or the EEOC with information and ‘an opportunity to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices through informal methods of conciliation.’ Second, it provides formal notice to the employer and prospective defendant of the charges that have been made against it. Kloos, 799 F.2d at 400 (citation omitted). In a class action, however, class members may piggyback on an individual’s timely charge as long as that charge contains either “[a]n allegation of class-wide discrimination or claim of class representation.” Id. Such a representation should “inform and give notice to the employer that the consequences of an individual plaintiff’s charge may ‘transcend[ ] an insolated [sic] individual claim.’ ” Id. (quoting Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (quoting Bean v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir.1979)). Thus, the Eighth Circuit holds that “fair notice of class claims is necessary to satisfy the charge filing requirement of section 626(d) in an ADEA class action.” Id. at 401 n. 5. IDS contends that Glass’s charge is flawed because it failed to provide notice of any potential class claims. The court, however, determines that under Kloos, a reasonable jury could find that the Glasses provided the ICRC with “fair notice” of the existence of class claims. First, the audio tape of Mrs. Glass’s telephone conversation with King demonstrates that she told him that: [IDS has] done this in four other ... right at the same time, with four other, umm, at four other offices. We do know that on contact with one of the persons that they did this, divisional managers that they replaced, he was placed in another position lower. Although the audio tape indicates that Mrs. Glass either stuttered or was otherwise having difficulty expressing herself, the court finds that this portion of her statement, which is undisputed, may have been sufficient to give the ICRC “fair notice” of the existence of class claims based on her reference to four other offices in which division managers were subjected to similar treatment. Viewing ADEA plaintiffs as generally inexperienced in legal matters and filing their ADEA charges pro se, other jurisdictions have also found general allegations of class-wide age discrimination sufficient to permit plaintiffs to assert class-wide claims. See, e.g., Church, 137 F.R.D. at 302 (charge alleging “the company preferred younger managers” and that “younger managers were transferred to other positions rather than discharged” provided sufficient notice of classwide claims); Levine v. Bryant, 700 F.Supp. 949, 956 (N.D.Ill.1988) (one charge, alleging that “many employees over 50 years old in managerial positions have been discharged [and] ... replaced by younger employees” found sufficient); Walker v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 112 F.R.D. 44, 46 (D.Colo.1986) (two charges filed, sufficient notice given by allegation in one that “I have reason to believe that many older employees who were near retirement were forced to retire at the same time I was and in the months following”). Thus, the court concludes that Mrs. Glass’s reference to similar situations in four other division offices may have been sufficient to provide fair notice of class claims because the ICRC could have reasonably concluded that there were other managers similarly situated to Glass and properly notified IDS of the potential class claims. The court further finds that Glass’s intake questionnaire alone may have been sufficient to provide ICRC with fair notice of the existence of class claims. It is undisputed that Glass’s intake questionnaire stated that younger persons were being promoted and older divisional managers were being terminated or offered self-employed positions. In addition, the intake questionnaire specifically named four younger people who had been promoted and five “older men” who had been demoted. See Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 852 F.2d 1008, 1010 & n. 3, 1017 (7th Cir.1988) (the fact that a charge mentions other individuals by name is relevant to the determination of whether class-wide discrimination is alleged). The ICRC could have reasonably concluded from this language that the consequences of Glass's charge may have transcended an isolated individual claim. See Kloos, 799 F.2d at 400. Thus, even if the ICRC did not receive the intake questionnaire until after it received Glass’s charge, the ICRC could have properly included class claims when it subsequently amended his charge. Cf. Best v. St. Clare’s Hosp., 51 Fair Empl. Prac.Cas. (BNA) 588, 1989 WL 135266 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (letter, describing different forms of discrimination and sent by claimant after filing of original charge, was properly considered an amendment to claimant’s charge). IDS does not allege that the language in the intake questionnaire was insufficient to provide notice of class claims, but instead argues that the language should be ignored because the ICRC never sent the intake questionnaire to IDS nor included the information when it amended Glass’s formal charge. As the court previously noted in its third order: [defendants’ position that under no circumstances can they be held to face a class claim unless they receive notice of that claim in the formal charge drafted by the commission effectively would render plaintiffs’ statutory right to maintain a class claim through the Iowa Commission void. Glass III, slip op. at 6. In similar circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that: It is the EEOC, not the claimant, who is responsible for notifying the employer of the claims alleged in the EEOC charge. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1988). Thus, the claimant should not be penalized because of the EEOC’s own errors. Albano v. Schering-Plough Corp., 912 F.2d 384, 386 (9th Cir.1990); see also Steffen, 859 F.2d at 544 (“The EEOC’s failure to act on a charge, however, does not bar a person from maintaining an ADEA action.” (citations omitted)); cf. Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 923 n. 2 (9th Cir.1982) (claimant’s right to file a Title VII action will not to be prejudiced by the EEOC’s failure to properly process a grievance after it has been filed). In Alba-no, the Ninth Circuit further held that because the EEOC was at fault for failing to adequately investigate plaintiffs’ claims of constructive discharge, plaintiffs would be allowed to assert those claims in their civil action even though the claims were not reasonably related to the failure to promote claims originally included in the EEOC charge. Albano, 912 F.2d at 388; see also Best v. St. Clare’s Hosp., 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 588, 1989 WL 135266 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (EEOC’s failure to investigate will not undermine plaintiff’s cause of action). As previously stated in its first and third orders, the court declines to penalize plaintiffs because of the ICRC’s alleged failure to properly handle either Glass’s charge or his intake questionnaire. This conclusion is further bolstered by the evidence demonstrating that during the period in which Glass filed his charge, the ICRC mishandled all potential class claims. IDS also argues that Glass’s charge is insufficient to permit piggybacking of various other plaintiffs pursuant to a recent Eighth Circuit decision that limits the nature and type of claims that can be raised by such opt-in plaintiffs. Ulvin v. Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 943 F.2d 862 (8th Cir.1991). In Ulvin, the Eighth Circuit held that: when the filed charge is quite specific as to the scope of the class claim it raises, opt-in plaintiffs should not be permitted to raise claims that are far outside of that scope. Otherwise, the purposes of requiring an administrative filing would be thwarted; the EEOC would not be able to achieve any meaningful conciliation and employers would not be on notice as to the nature of the potential claims of opt-in plaintiffs. 943 F.2d at 865. Ulvin filed a charge on which various other plaintiffs sought to piggyback. Six of those plaintiffs asserted claims based on defendant’s early retirement program. Although Ulvin’s charge stated that a general pattern and practice of age discrimination existed, it further alleged only that the defendant had demoted and subsequently fired Ulvin because of his age; his charge did not mention any claims based on the early retirement program nor contain any allegations that the defendant had coerced older employees into accepting early retirement. Id. at 864 n. 2. Moreover, Ulvin was not eligible to participate in the early retirement program and he was terminated seven days before the deadline set for eligible employees to announce their decision regarding the program. Id. at 865. No early retiree filed a charge with the EEOC until almost one year after that deadline. The Eighth Circuit thus held that: Ulvin’s EEOC charge did not alert Northwestern to the claims of the early retirees, nor did it create the possibility that the EEOC or Northwestern would attempt to conciliate the claims of early retirees. Ulvin’s EEOC charge was too narrow to support the discrimination claims of the early retirees. Id. at 865-66. Because Ulvin’s charge fulfilled neither purpose for charge filing under Kloos, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the six participants in the formal early retirement program could not piggyback on Ulvin’s charge. Id. The court finds that the situation in Ulvin is distinguishable from the present case. First, Ulvin’s personal situation was not similar to that of the early retirees and his charge gave absolutely no notice that other claimants would seek to attack Northwestern’s early retirement program. In addition to allegations concerning Glass’s own demotion and removal, the Glasses notified the ICRC of the demotion and removal of other, older division managers; the intake questionnaire specifically named five such division managers. Glass’s own situation was thus similar to that of the other division managers, and the undisputed allegations contained in Glass’s intake questionnaire and Mrs. Glass’s telephone call are not so far outside the scope of the proposed class as to bar other opt-in plaintiffs. See also infra (discussing similarity of Glass’s claims for purposes of IDS’s motions on the scope of the class and class decertification). Unlike Ulvin’s charge, Mrs. Glass’s reference to four other offices coupled with the information contained in the intake questionnaire may have been sufficient to fulfill at least one of the purposes of charge filing, creating an opportunity to conciliate class claims by informing the ICRC of the existence of other division managers who were similarly situated. See also Glass I, slip op. at 6-7. If the ICRC had properly processed the Glass charge, the information received from the Glasses during the intake process may also have been sufficient to fulfill the other purpose of charge filing, to put IDS on notice of the existence of class claims that were similar to Glass’s individual claim. Moreover, although IDS never received such notice from the ICRC, plaintiffs also proffer evidence that in 1986 IDS had actual knowledge of the existence of other potential claimants. In response to the Glass charge, IDS prepared a division manager age distribution that apparently indicated a: dramatic shift towards a younger group of division managers since 1985. One could conclude that our increased expectations from field managers over the past two years has eliminated a number of the older managers who were not prepared to aggressively grow divisions, [sic] This shift also suggests that we now have in-place many new and improving managers to help us to continue to grow. (Mem. from M. Svobodny to R. Weller of 12/21/86) (“Svobodny memo”). Ulvin also proffered no direct evidence of a pattern or practice of age discrimination, thus giving further credence to Northwestern’s contention that they had no notice of the early retirees’ claims. The district court in Ulvin specifically found that: the evidence shows ... that Northwestern's] ... plan to reduce the workforce specifically provided that age may not be a factor in any termination decision. Moreover, the plan’s implementation was to be achieved on a decentralized level by local management and to the extent that central authority would be involved, it was only to assure that reductions in force did not have a disparate impact on any protected group. Ulvin v. Northwestern Nat’l Life Ins. Co., No. 3-88-730, slip op. at 3 (D.Minn. Aug. 8, 1991). Thus, Ulvin was a disparate impact case, involving a policy that was neutral on its face. Plaintiffs in the present case proffer direct evidence of a deliberate pattern or practice of age discrimination, coupled with evidence that IDS was aware of the potential for class claims as a result of a survey that it conducted in response to Glass’s charge. As a result, IDS’s claims of lack of notice are not as compelling as those in Ulvin. See, e.g., EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 553 F.Supp. 704, 712-13 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (concerns about prejudice to defendants because of lack of notice diminish or disappear when evidence of a continuing violation exists). The situation in Ulvin also differs because the EEOC was not a party to that action. The EEOC, unlike private litigants, is authorized to seek direct relief without regard to any plaintiff’s charge filing. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 1653, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991); see also infra. The EEOC also gave IDS actual notice of the claims that it would litigate if it filed suit and provided IDS with an actual opportunity to conciliate all of the class members’ claims. IDS nonetheless rejected all of the EEOC’s conciliation overtures. In Ulvin, however, there was no indication that the employer ever rejected any conciliation offers or had any notice of the early retirees’ claims. The court thus finds that the EEOC’s participation distinguishes the present case. Finally, Ulvin did not present a situation where an agency allegedly failed to properly investigate claims or notify defendants because of a policy that mischaracterized all class claims, and also allegedly failed to amend a charge with information contained in an intake questionnaire. Under similar circumstances, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs’ could assert claims not reasonably related to those in the charge because the EEOC failed to adequately investigate those unrelated claims. Albano, 912 F.2d at 388. The effects of the ICRC’s alleged mishandling are significant in the present case. In its interrogatory answers to this action, IDS gave the following reasons why the individuals who were specifically named in Glass’s intake questionnaire were no longer division managers: J.R. Klukas (“voluntarily stepped down”); Gerald Gant (“was stepped down ... to district manager”); Thor Nygren (“voluntarily retired”); and Carl Fazzini (“was stepped down”). Those four discharge mechanisms mirror the discharge methods challenged by plaintiffs in this litigation; thus, the intake questionnaire may have provided sufficient information to allow the ICRC to conciliate those claims and pass such information to IDS by properly characterizing the claims and forwarding the intake questionnaire. Plaintiffs also proffer evidence demonstrating that ICRC employees knew that the Glasses informed them during the intake process of a pattern of age discrimination against similarly situated division managers. Cf. Church, 137 F.R.D. at 302 (“the method from which the EEOC receives notice should not serve to defeat a classwide claim of discrimination; rather it should suffice that the EEOC has notice from the charge or notice in fact, however received, so that it can begin the conciliation process”). Thus, the court concludes that the standard set forth in Ulvin does not bar the claims of any of the claimants who seek to piggyback on Glass’s charge. IDS also claims that the Glass charge was insufficient because the alleged absence of class allegations deprived IDS of an opportunity to conciliate claims. Although the issue of failure to conciliate is discussed more fully infra (see motion concerning the EEOC’s alleged failure to conciliate), the court notes that IDS, in response to Glass’s charge alone, generated a study that showed a “dramatic shift towards a younger group of division managers” (Svobodny memo), thus suggesting that IDS had actual knowledge of a potential class as early as November 21, 1986. The court further notes that IDS rejected the ICRC’s offer to mediate the Glass charge just ten days later. Moreover, as previously discussed, IDS’s alleged deprivation of an opportunity to conciliate may flow from the ICRC’s actions and policy rather than any purported inadequacies in the Glass charge. IDS finally alleges that Glass believed that he was filing an individual charge, thus his charge cannot support a class action. Some circuits seem to require an intent to represent a class. See, e.g., Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 697 (9th Cir.1981) (because claimant’s notices expressed no intention to sue on behalf of anyone other than himself, “the district court properly dismissed the claims of the ‘opt-ins.’ ”). Citing Eighth Circuit precedent, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected this requirement: [w]e understand that each of these cases expresses the notification requirement somewhat differently and that some can be read as requiring that the charge expressly state that the complainant intends to represent himself and others similarly situated. However, we do not believe that such an explicit mention that a representative action is contemplated is necessary. Like the Kloos court, we believe that ‘[t]o be faithful to the purposes of the filing requirement, an administrative charge must allege class-wide discrimination or claim to represent a class in order to serve as the basis for an ADEA class action____’ Anderson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 852 F.2d 1008, 1017 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting Kloos, 799 F.2d at 400). The court thus rejects IDS’s contention. Under Eighth Circuit law, Glass’s charge is sufficient if it provided the ICRC with “fair notice” of the existence of class claims, see Kloos, 799 F.2d at 401 n. 5; it is not a requirement that Glass also intended to represent a class. Based on the foregoing, the court finds that material fact disputes exist concerning the sufficiency of the Glass charge based on the undisputed allegations made by Mrs. Glass and the contents of the intake questionnaire, and thus denies IDS’s motion for partial summary judgment. 3. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Equitable Tolling Plaintiffs urge the court to equitably toll the ADEA statute of limitations because IDS allegedly failed to post notices informing employees of their rights under the ADEA, in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 627. Plaintiffs also contend that IDS lulled several plaintiffs into sleeping on their rights by offering those plaintiffs alternative employment. Plaintiffs further claim that IDS deliberately concealed an illegal pattern or practice of age discrimination, thereby misleading various plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that IDS is equitably es-topped from asserting a statute of limitations defense against any plaintiffs who have been misled in that fashion. IDS moves for summary judgment on the issue of equitable tolling. The ADEA’s charge-filing requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit and may be excused in certain circumstances. See, e.g., DeBrunner v. Midway Equip. Co., 803 F.2d 950, 952 (8th Cir.1986) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs who have failed to file a timely charge have the burden of establishing the facts necessary to justify equitable tolling. See, e.g., Byers v. Follmer Trucking Co., 763 F.2d 599, 600-01 (3d Cir.1985). An employer’s failure to post notice of employees’ ADEA rights may provide grounds for equitable tolling; plaintiffs, however, are not entitled to such tolling if they are generally aware of their rights not to be discriminated against on the basis of age or if they have the means of obtaining such information. DeBrunner, 803 F.2d at 952. Plaintiffs need not be aware of specific provisions of the law, such as the length of relevant filing periods; general knowledge of their rights is sufficient to preclude equitable tolling. Id. Equitable tolling is generally not available to plaintiffs who have supervisory responsibility for EEOC compliance or other personnel matters because such plaintiffs are “ideally placed” to obtain general knowledge about their rights. See Pruet Prod. Co. v. Ayles, 784 F.2d 1275, 1280 (5th Cir.1986) (permitting no tolling when employee had the means to learn of the existence of his rights as a result of his personnel duties). The court determines that plaintiffs in the present case are not entitled to invoke the equitable tolling doctrine based on IDS’s alleged failure to post ADEA notices. First, all of the plaintiffs subject to this motion are well educated. In order to work in the financial services industry they had to be licensed to sell insurance and securities, and as divisional managers, they were also responsible for compliance with all NASD and SEC regulations. Second, all of the plaintiffs were senior managers in a complex industry, responsible for hiring, firing and promoting planners, district managers and clerical staff. Third, almost all of the plaintiffs have either admitted that they were responsible for insuring compliance with state and federal employment discrimination laws or have admitted that they knew that age discrimination is illegal. The court finds that by virtue of their education, training and experience as personnel managers, all twenty plaintiffs subject to this motion possessed a general awareness of their ADEA rights or had the means to obtain such knowledge and thus are not entitled to invoke equitable tolling on the basis of IDS’s alleged failure to post ADEA notices. Nielsen v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 603 F.2d 741, 744 (8th Cir.1979) (no tolling because plaintiff was well educated, had supervisory position, had attended educational seminars, meetings and lectures and was generally familiar with the ADEA); Fressell v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 35 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 658, 660, 1984 WL 1002 (N.D.Ga.1984) (supervisory personnel who were required to be acquainted with ADEA not entitled to tolling for failure to post). Plaintiffs also contend that IDS is estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because it concealed a pattern and practice of age discrimination from various plaintiffs. When determining whether the statute of limitations should be tolled as a result of an employer’s acts of concealment, the Eighth Circuit has held that: [wjhether or not an employer tells its employees the true reason for the adverse employment decision is not the standard. Nor is it especially relevant that, as the facts show, [the employer] has attempted to conceal its discriminatory actions. Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1262, 1266 (8th Cir.1990). Rather, the proper inquiry is whether an employer successfully misled plaintiffs regarding the nature of their ADEA rights or prevented them from discovering or pursuing those rights. Id. Plaintiffs present no evidence of such misconduct by IDS. Plaintiffs also had general knowledge of their ADEA rights through information provided to them by IDS and through their personnel activities with IDS. Accordingly, the court rejects plaintiffs’ claim that IDS is equitably es-topped from asserting a statute of limitations defense on the basis of concealment. The court further rejects plaintiffs’ contention that IDS is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because its promises of future employment lulled ten plaintiffs into sleeping on their rights. In such cases: [t]he statute of limitations will not be tolled on the basis of equitable estoppel unless the employee’s failure to file in timely fashion is the consequence of either a deliberate design by the employer or of actions that the employer should unmistakably have understood would cause the employee to delay filing his charge. Kriegesmann v. Barry-Wehmiller Co., 739 F.2d 357, 358-59 (8th Cir.1984) (citing Price v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 694 F.2d 963, 965 (4th Cir.1982)). In Kriegesmann, the Eighth Circuit determined that an employer’s actions to mitigate the harshness of a discharge will not justify equitable estoppel in the absence of an intent to cause an employee to delay his filing of a charge. Id. Even assuming plaintiffs’ allegations are true, plaintiffs provide no evidence of IDS’s intent to delay their timely filing of charges. Thus, IDS’s offers of alternative employment are insufficient to justify equitable tolling. Based on the foregoing, the court grants IDS’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of equitable tolling. 4. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss EEOC’s Complaint In Intervention or to Limit EEOC’s Participation On April 16, 1990, following a seven-month investigation of plaintiffs’ age discrimination allegations, the EEOC filed a complaint and motion to intervene in the present action. Magistrate Judge Floyd E. Boline granted that motion in an order dated May 2,1990. IDS moves to dismiss the EEOC’s complaint in intervention, contending that the EEOC failed to fulfill its statutory duty to conciliate. In the alternative, IDS seeks a ruling that the EEOC may not, by its intervention, revive any of plaintiffs’ claims that would otherwise be untimely. A. The EEOC’s Alleged Failure to Conciliate IDS argues that the EEOC has two separate duties to conciliate: one that arises after a charge is filed and a separate duty to conciliate before a lawsuit is filed. It is undisputed that IDS waived any defense concerning the adequacy of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts conducted after January 1, 1990. IDS nonetheless urges the court to dismiss the EEOC’s complaint in intervention because the EEOC allegedly failed to conciliate during the period of time after plaintiff Milo Glass filed his charge in 1986. The ADEA has two conciliation provisions. Section 626(b), which applies to direct actions brought by the EEOC, provides in pertinent part that: [bjefore instituting any action under this section, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance with the requirements of this chapter through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). Section 626(d), which applies to civil actions brought by individuals, requires that an individual file a charge with the EEOC and that: [u]pon receiving a charge, the Commission shall promptly notify all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1988). The ADEA, however, does not define the EEOC’s duty to conciliate in those actions in which it intervenes and IDS offers no cases to support the proposition that the sufficiency of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts should be evaluated by focusing solely on its activities during the period of time after a charge is filed. Moreover, the Eighth Circuit allowed the EEOC to intervene in a Title VII action even though it had made no efforts to conciliate prior to its intervention. The Court held that: the EEOC cannot be precluded from intervention because it failed to conciliate. Because we believe strongly in the value of conciliation, we hold that while the EEOC is not barred from intervention by its failure to attempt to conciliate, it is under a continuing obligation to attempt to conciliate even after it has intervened in the action. Johnson v. Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co., 558 F.2d 841, 847-48 (8th Cir.1977). The Eighth Circuit also permitted the EEOC’s suit in intervention to broaden the issues beyond those raised by the individual’s charge because the “EEOC is not so restricted if it brings a direct suit.” Id. at 846-47. IDS nonetheless attempts to distinguish Nekoosa-Edwards because it arises under Title VII rather than the ADEA. The conciliation language of Title VII, however, is virtually identical to that of the ADEA. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584, 98 S.Ct. 866, 872, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978) (stating that the substantive ADEA provisions “were derived in haec verba from Title VII”); cf Vance v. Whirlpool Corp., 716 F.2d 1010, 1012 (4th Cir.1983) (judicial interpretation of Title VII provision provides “significant interpretive authority of ... like provision^] of the ADEA”, citing Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756, 99 S.Ct. 2066, 2071, 60 L.Ed.2d 609 (1978)). In light of the similar goals and conciliation provisions of the statutes, the court finds no reason to adopt a different standard for the EEOC’s conciliation duties after its intervention in an ADEA case. See, e.g., Bauman v. Suchard, Inc., 52 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1013, 1990 WL 37659 (N.D.Ill. March 21, 1990) (applying Nekoosa-Edwards to an ADEA class action and permitting the EEOC to intervene notwithstanding its failure to conciliate). The adequacy of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts must also be evaluated in light of IDS’s response to those efforts, specifically IDS’s repeated assertions that EEOC charge processing would be pointless and its rebuff of every EEOC conciliation overture. Cf. Marshall v. Sun Oil Co., 605 F.2d 1331, 1334-35 (5th Cir.1979) (holding that adequacy of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts must be measured in light of the employer’s response). Based on IDS’s waiver and its repeated refusals to conciliate, the court finds that the EEOC’s conciliation efforts prior to its intervention were sufficient to satisfy any statutory duty that it may have. The court thus rejects IDS’ claim that the EEOC’s complaint should be dismissed for its failure to conciliate, denies IDS’ motion to dismiss the EEOC’s complaint in intervention and grants summary judgment in favor of the EEOC on this issue. B. Limiting the EEOC’s Participation In the alternative, IDS seeks a ruling to prevent the EEOC from reviving any age discrimination claims that IDS argues would otherwise be untimely. Individuals must file timely administrative charges pri- or to bringing suit under the ADEA. IDS argues that the EEOC should also be subject to the same requirement because it merely intervened in the present case rather than pursuing its own direct action. Advancing an argument which has never been accepted by a federal court, IDS contends that the EEOC’s power in the present action rests on 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), which requires the filing of a timely charge, rather than on 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c) or 217, which include no such requirement. IDS thus argues that the EEOC does not have the power to assert claims on behalf of any individual who has not filed a timely charge. Section 626(d), however, expressly refers to the charge-filing requirements for individuals seeking to bring ADEA actions, making no reference to the scope of the EEOC’s enforcement powers. Moreover, all of the cases on this point reject IDS’s position and hold that timeliness for purposes of direct litigation by the EEOC is controlled by the two or three-year statute of limitations found in 29 U.S.C. § 255, and not the time period for filing charges pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). See, e.g., Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1653; Marshall v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., 601 F.2d 100, 101 (3d Cir.1979) (EEOC is not required to follow charge-filing procedures of 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2)). IDS further argues that "it defies common sense to hold that an individual may recover under the ADEA when his claim is time barred by the simple convenience of having the EEOC bring a claim on his behalf.” Such power, however, is consistent with the statutory language of the ADEA. As one court noted: Nothing in the express language of the ADEA or the incorporated provisions of the FLSA conditions EEOC enforcement actions upon the timely filing of private charges of discrimination under § 626(d)____ The requirement that individuals file charges of discrimination is not intended as the triggering mechanism of EEOC’s enforcement authority.... Unless the agency commences its action beyond the 2-year/3-year period specified by § 255(a) as adopted by § 626(e), the cause of action, even on behalf of a single individual, cannot be said to be time-barred. EEOC v. Sperry-Univac Corp., 36 Empl.Prac.Dec. (CCH) ¶ 35,019, 1982 WL 649 (D.Utah 1982). Thus, the EEOC’s ability to assert a direct action is not predicated on the filing of a timely charge, see, e.g., Gilmer, 111 S.Ct. at 1653 (“the EEOC’s role in combating age discrimination is not dependent on the filing of a charge”), rather it may assert claims for which no timely charge is filed as long as those claims fall within either the two-year or three-year statute of limitations period provided by the incorporation provision of 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(1). See, e.g., Marshall, 601 F.2d at 105; Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363, 368 (2d Cir.1978). IDS asks the court to not extend this rule to present case, arguing that the EEOC must stand in the shoes of an individual claimant when it intervenes in an ongoing ADEA class action. The court finds no reason, however, to adopt a different rule solely because the EEOC intervened in the present case rather than bringing its own direct action. The court thus determines that the EEOC’s ability to assert claims after intervening is limited only by the two or three-year limitation period set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 255(a), as adopted by 29 U.S.C. § 626(e), not the charge-filing period, and denies IDS’s motion to limit the EEOC’s ability to assert any allegedly untimely claims if such claims fall are timely pursuant to Section 255(a). 5. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the ADEA Claims of Plaintiffs Chapdelaine, Silver and Treaster IDS moves for summary judgment on the age discrimination claims of three plaintiffs, Edward Chapdelaine (“Chapdelaine”), Phillip Silver (“Silver”) and Carolyn Treaster (“Treaster”). IDS contends that those claims are untimely because the plaintiffs did not file suit within three years of receiving notice of their terminations. IDS characterizes that notice as the relevant adverse employment decision for purposes of the statute of limitations. IDS further contends that Treaster’s age discrimination claim is untimely because she was discharged more than 300 days before Glass filed his charge. IDS argues that because Treaster was unable to file a timely individual charge at the time that Glass submitted his charge, her age discrimination claim is also barred on this basis. Plaintiffs concede that IDS notified plaintiffs Treaster, Chapdelaine and Silver of their initial demotions outside of the limitations period. Plaintiffs contend, however, that IDS maintained a pattern or practice of age discrimination and that their claims are timely because IDS, within the relevant limitations period, committed other discriminatory acts against those plaintiffs in furtherance of its allegedly illegal pattern or practice. To establish a continuing violation [a plaintiff] would have to show ‘a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period, or the maintenance of a discriminatory system both before and during the [limitations] period.’ Valentino v. United States Postal Serv., 674 F.2d 56, 65 (D.C.Cir.1982) (quoting Barbara Lindemann Schlei & Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 232 (Supp.1979)) (Title VII case). A continuing violation “can either be a company-wide policy of discrimination or a series of related acts taken against a single individual.” Bruno v. Western Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957, 961-62 (10th Cir.1987) (ADEA case). Moreover, a formal, written policy is not required to establish such a pattern or practice. Courts have determined that an informal or unstructured method of decision making may be sufficient to invoke this doctrine. See, e.g., Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 757, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff’s allegations of discrete, specific acts may be construed as evidence of a policy of discrimination that pervaded defendant’s personnel decisions). Under the continuing violation theory, a plaintiff who shows a continuing policy and practice that operated within the statutory period has satisfied the filing requirements. When the policy and practice is company-wide, the plaintiff can show that a violation occurred within the statutory period by showing some application of the policy within that period. On the other hand, if the defendant can show that the policy was discontinued before the limitations period, then, as a matter of law, plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed. Bruno, 829 F.2d at 960-61 (citations omitted) (ADEA case). Courts have applied the theory to toll both the charge-filing period for individuals contained in 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), see, e.g., id., and also the statute of limitations contained in 29 U.S.C. §§ 255 & 259 (as incorporated by § 626(e)). See, e.g., Blumenthal v. G-K-G Inc., 737 F.Supp. 493, 496-97 (N.D.Ill.1990) (where plaintiff alleges continuing violations, claims will survive a “motion to dismiss if a discriminatory act occurred during the limitations period”); EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 553 F.Supp. 704, 712-13 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (applying the theory to suspend the ADEA two or three-year statute of limitations). Thus, an ADEA claim: may be based on a continuing policy and practice of discrimination that began before the statutory filing period, as long as the employer continues to apply the discriminatory policy and practice to a point within the relevant filing period____ There must be at least one instance of the discriminatory practice within the filing period for the continuing violation theory to apply. Furr v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 1543 (10th Cir.1987). IDS nonetheless argues that the court should not apply the continuing violation doctrine in the present case because that doctrine is not applicable to “discharge actions.” The court, however, rejects IDS’s attempt to narrow plaintiffs’ action, finding that plaintiffs allege a series of related acts, in addition to discharges, that may comprise an illegal pattern or practice' of age discrimination. The court therefore finds the cases on which IDS relies distinguishable because they all involve situations that are more appropriately characterized as discharge actions. IDS also contends that the Eighth Circuit has not adopted the continuing violation doctrine in ADEA actions. The Eighth Circuit applied the doctrine, however, in an ADEA action in which plaintiffs filed EEOC charges more than fifteen years after they allegedly became aware of an ongoing discriminatory practice. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1439 v. Union Elec. Co., 761 F.2d 1257, 1258 n. 1 (8th Cir.1985). The Eighth Circuit held that in cases where plaintiffs can prove such a practice: the relevant law for calculating the time period [for filing an age discrimination charge] is the termination of the allegedly unlawful practice. Because the Company is still maintaining the challenged age bar, the alleged violation is continuing and the [plaintiffs’] charges were timely filed. Id. Although the Eighth Circuit applied the continuing violation theory to determine the relevant period for filing a charge under 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), the Court explicitly relied on EEOC v. Home Ins. Co., 553 F.Supp. 704 (S.D.N.Y.1982), which applied the theory to toll the ADEA two or three-year statute of limitations. Thus, two other questions must be resolved before the timeliness of plaintiffs’ claims may be determined: did IDS engage in a pattern or practice of age discrimination, and if so, when did the pattern or practice end? Depending on the answers to those two questions, plaintiffs may also be able to piggyback on Stephen’s charge. See also supra. In another ADEA action, the Fourth Circuit applied the continuing violation doctrine to a situation very similar to the pattern and practice of discrimination alleged by plaintiffs. Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., Ill F.2d 849 (4th Cir.1985). Taylor managed a regional office of the defendant insurance company for nine years. Despite evidence that he was a capable and successful manager, the insurance company gave Taylor the choice, at age fifty-three, of either resigning, accepting a demotion and transfer to another city in the position of underwriting manager, or seeking work in another regional office. Taylor became an underwriting manager, but the company substantially curtailed his authority and duties after he had held that position for a few months. Id. at 851-52. After two years, the company again transferred Taylor to fill what the company characterized as a newly created position, which turned out to be a sales position. Taylor alleged that the company essentially set him up to fail by imposing unreasonable sales quotas. Id. at 852-53. The Fourth Circuit allowed Taylor to include the earlier demotion in his ADEA claim despite the fact that it occurred more than 180 days before Taylor filed his EEOC complaint. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the earlier demotion was part of an unlawful practice that continued into the relevant charging period. Id. at 856. Taylor was thus allowed to bring claims based on both demotions. Plaintiffs in the present case allege a similar pattern of discrimination. After their initial demotions from the position of division manager, Treaster, Chapdelaine and Silver continued with IDS as either district managers, planners or consultants. Plaintiffs contend that IDS continued to discriminate against them by further demoting Treaster and Silver within the limitations period, and ultimately terminated all three plaintiffs within the limitations period. Plaintiffs argue that those acts are evidence of a continuing policy of discrimination against older division managers. Plaintiffs thus allege discriminatory acts, taken by IDS against Treaster, Chapdelaine and Silver within the relevant limitations period, which comprise part of the ongoing pattern or practice of discrimination. The court finds that these allegations are sufficient to raise a material fact dispute regarding the existence of a pattern or practice of age discrimination. The court further finds that if such a pattern or practice existed, plaintiffs proffer evidence that it continued into the relevant statute of limitations period, thus plaintiffs’ claims are not untimely. Following the same analysis, the court determines that Treaster’s age discrimination claim may also be timely even though her initial demotion was more than 300 days before Glass filed his charge. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1439, 761 F.2d at 1258 n. 1 (relevant point in time for calculating the charge-filing period is the termination of the discriminatory pattern or practice). Accordingly, the court denies defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the age discrimination claims of plaintiffs Chapdelaine, Silver and Treaster. 6. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Various Plaintiffs’ Claims of Constructive Discharge [22] IDS seeks summary judgment on the claims of eleven plaintiffs, contending that those plaintiffs were never actually discharged, but instead either resigned or retired. IDS contends that those plaintiffs must rely on the legal fiction of constructive discharge to prove that IDS took an adverse employment action as required by the ADEA. IDS argues that because the eleven plaintiffs are unable to meet the requirements of that doctrine their claims must fail. The court first rejects IDS’s claim that those plaintiffs must prove constructive discharge in order to prove the requisite adverse action. Courts have recognized that a wide variety of acts in addition to constructive discharge may constitute adverse employment actions for purposes of the ADEA. See, e.g., Bruno, 829 F.2d at 961-62. In Bruno, the plaintiff alleged that his employer engaged in a series of related acts as a part of its overall plan to force him into voluntary or involuntary retirement, including the employer’s refusal to promote or transfer him, his transfer to a position for which he was not qualified “to build a record that would justify his voluntary dismissal”, offers of early retirement, a demotion and decrease in salary, harassment on the basis of his age and various other adverse working conditions. Id. at 962-63. The Tenth Circuit held that those acts may constitute a continuing violation of the ADEA if the employer’s “intent was to take any action necessary to get rid of plaintiff.” Id. at 961. Plaintiffs in the present action allege a similar pattern and practice of age discrimination based on a wide variety of employment actions. If proven, the court finds that those acts will be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of adverse action. IDS also contends that once various plaintiffs were demoted, they ceased being employees thereby losing the protection of the ADEA. In light of the evidence regarding a pattern or practice of age discr