Full opinion text
ORDER VOLLMER, District Judge. Plaintiffs, William E. Swint and his wife, Louise Von Swint, as guardian and next friend of Roy Ivie (the “Swints”), brought this action pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., and certain amendments made to ERISA by the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (“COBRA”), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1161 etseq. Plaintiffs’ complaints essentially emanate from the “termination” or “denial” by defendant Protective Life Insurance Company (“Protective Life”) of health insurance coverage on Roy Ivie seven months following Roy Ivie’s catastrophic injury in a September 1987, automobile collision. Beginning on March 2,1987, said coverage was provided to Mr. Swint, as a full-time Ward employee, and to Mrs. Swint and Roy Ivie, as dependents of Mr. Swint, pursuant to a policy issued by defendant Protective Life through an employee welfare benefit plan (the “Plan”) funded and sponsored by defendant Ward International Trucks, Inc. (“Ward”), the company by which Mr. Swint was employed. More specifically, plaintiffs contend that Protective Life breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA when it made a determination to provide insurance coverage to Roy Ivie on the information it initially obtained and thereafter, on April 4, 1988, following further investigation into the coverage issue, “terminated” or “denied" additional payments to Roy Ivie under the aforementioned policy. Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that each defendant breached its fiduciary obligations under ERISA when it failed to recognize that Roy Ivie had made a COBRA election to continue coverage under the policy or when it failed, during Roy Ivie’s incompetency, to make a COBRA election on his behalf. Furthermore, the Swints maintain that each defendant violated either their ERISA fiduciary obligations or the COBRA amendments to ERISA when they failed, following Mr. Swints’ notification to them of the occurrence of a qualifying event involving Roy Ivie, to inform Mr. Swint and/or Roy Ivie of Roy Ivie’s right to elect, and to elect on behalf of Roy Ivie, continuation coverage under COBRA. Finally and alternatively, plaintiffs assert that Protective Life should be estopped from asserting and/or deemed to have waived its right to deny coverage to Roy Ivie (1) due to its failure to make an adequate and timely inquiry into the issue of Roy Ivie’s eligibility for depen-dant coverage until after the period for Roy to elect continuation coverage under COBRA apparently had lapsed, or (2) due to its own conduct in determining from the information received that coverage would be provided and, months later, avowedly prompted by documentation requirements imposed by its excess insurance carrier, revisited the coverage issue and determined that coverage, indeed, was not available. A bench trial was held in this case on the liability issues only, commencing on Monday, July 22, 1991. After due and proper consideration of the arguments of counsel, of all evidence presented by counsel, which evidence was not excluded by the court, of the agreed upon contentions of fact contained in the parties’ joint “pretrial order” (see tab 61), and of the facts to which the parties stipulated, on the record, the first morning of trial, the court issues the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. Findings of Fact A. The Principals Defendant Ward International Trucks, Inc. (“Ward”), is a corporation, the principal place of business of which is located in Mobile, Alabama. As a local International Harvester Trucks franchisee, Ward is engaged in business in and affecting interstate commerce and, in fact, maintains an additional office in Pensacola, Florida. At all times material to this action, Ward employed approximately forty employees, including plaintiff William E. Swint. Defendant Protective Life Insurance Company (“Protective Life”) is an insurance business entity alleged to be organized and existing under Alabama law. Protective Life has its principal place of business in Birmingham, Alabama, and does business in Mobile County, Alabama. In March 1987, Ward established an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA. Ward funded this plan by applying for and purchasing a medical and life group insurance policy (the “Policy”) from Protective Life. As will be discussed more fully hereinafter, the Policy, which no longer is in effect but which was implemented on March 1, 1987, and was in effect at all times material to this action, covered each Mobile-based, full-time Ward employee. Additionally, the Policy covered each full-time employee’s eligible defendants for which the employee elected dependant coverage. Alvin McPherson (“McPherson”) is the independent insurance broker/agent who was hired by Ward in 1987 to “shop” for group insurance coverage for Ward. McPherson negotiated the purchase of the Policy by Ward from Protective Life and, in fact, later handled the process by which Ward enrolled its employees for coverage under the Policy. John Sturdivant (“Sturdivant”) is, and at all times material to this action was, the secretary/treasurer of Ward. In his capacity as secretary/treasurer, Sturdivant was involved in the enrollment of Ward employees in the group insurance program and handled disputes regarding the same. Brenda Doss (“Doss”) is, and was at all times material hereto, the office manager of Ward. As office manager, Doss was responsible for distributing insurance certificates to Ward employees, processing group insurance claims, and answering specific questions regarding coverage under the Policy. Sue Sweatt (“Sweatt”) was a claims examiner with Protective Life during the events made the basis of this suit. Sweatt processed the initial claims filed on Roy Ivie’s behalf against the Policy and was the first Protective Life employee with whom Ward employees had contact following Roy Ivie’s accident. Patrick West (“West”) was an assistant manager and claims review examiner in Protective Life’s group health claims department during the events made the basis of this suit. Following a routine review of and investigation into Roy Ivie’s file, West made a determination on April 4, 1988, that Roy Ivie was not eligible for coverage under the Policy or for COBRA continuation coverage. John Wright (“Wright”) is, and was at all times during his involvement with this case, vice-president and senior associate counsel for, and a stockholder in, Protective Life Corporation, the parent corporation of Protective Life. Wright integrally was involved in making the April 4, 1988, determination that Roy Ivie was not eligible for coverage under the Policy or under COBRA. The plaintiffs herein are William E. Swint and his wife, Louise Von Swint, as guardian and next friend of Roy Ivie. Mr. Swint, a fifty-four (54) year old man who has an eighth grade education, has been employed as a diesel engine mechanic by Ward since it was formed in May 1985. Roy Ivie is the natural child of Louise Von Swint and step-son of William E. Swint. Louise Von Swint was appointed legal guardian of Roy Ivie on December 18, 1987, by the Probate Court of Jackson County, Mississippi. Roy Ivie, who, as noted, was grievously injured in an automobile collision in September 1987, remained mentally incompetent from the date of the collision through the date of trial. B. Ward’s ERISA Employee Welfare Benefit Plan and the Protective Life Policy As noted, effective March 1, 1987, Ward established an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA, which plan was funded by Ward’s purchase of the Policy from Protective Life. Also, as noted, the Policy covered each full-time Ward employee and each employee’s eligible dependents for which the employee elected dependent coverage. Under the express terms of the Policy, Ward paid one hundred percent (100%) of the group health insurance premiums for its full-time employees, and each employee was responsible for paying one hundred percent (100%) of the group health insurance premiums attributable to that employee’s covered, eligible dependents). The Policy, which consisted of the insurance certificate and riders and endorsements thereto, provided for various types of insurance coverage, including medical care insurance, for full-time employees and covered dependents. The overall maximum benefit for all covered charges under the medical care insurance provisions of the policy was one million dollars ($1,000,-000.00). Under the Policy, moreover, the filing of claims directly with Protective Life was prohibited; instead, the Policy instructed claimants to “give claims to Employer who will verify insurance status and file them with us.” The Policy, however, reserved to Protective Life responsibility for examining, processing, and paying all claims which Protective Life “decided” were payable thereunder and, further, states that “[n]o claim for benefits which are clearly ... outside the coverage of the Policy will be considered a valid claim.” Protective Life interpreted that provision of the Policy as giving it the authority to make coverage eligibility determinations. The insurance certificate, copies of which were distributed to each covered Ward employee, including Mr. Swint, consisted, inter alia, of a general description of persons who were eligible for health insurance coverage and of medical conditions and procedures for which coverage was available. Of relevance to the present action are those provisions which pertained to health insurance coverage for dependents of covered Ward employees. In relevant part, the insurance certificate defined the term “eligible dependent” for purposes of medical care insurance to include an unmarried child who is “age 19 but under age 24 years, if the child (1) attends school full-time and (2) depends on you for more than one half of his or her support; ...” A child, moreover, was defined as including “a step-child who lives with the employee in a regular parent-child relationship and for whom the employee (or the employee's spouse who lives with the employee) has permanent legal custody.” Significantly, the group health certificate in question did not define what was meant by the term “attends school full-time,” and Protective Life’s claims department did not maintain any written guidelines to assist in interpreting that provision of the Policy. Instead, it was Protective Life’s Policy to defer to the involved school’s policy to determine whether a particular dependent was attending school full-time. With respect to the termination of dependent coverage, the Policy generally provided that health insurance coverage would end on the date that a dependent ceased to be eligible. The Policy, however, did offer conversion coverage, as well as COBRA continuation coverage, to dependents who no longer were eligible for coverage under the Policy. Although the conversion option was described in detail in the Insurance Certificate, the COBRA continuation privileges were described in an endorsement to the Policy (the “COBRA endorsement”). The COBRA endorsement provided continuation coverage to, among others, an employee’s child whose eligibility as a dependent under the Policy had ceased. The COBRA endorsement required either the employee or the dependent to notify the “ERISA plan administrator” of the occurrence of an event which caused the dependent not to qualify for coverage under the Plan. Nowhere in the endorsement, however, was the ERISA plan administrator identified. The COBRA endorsement, moreover, did not specify the manner in which the notice had to be given (that is, either in writing or orally) and did not set forth the period of time in which the notice had to be given. Under the terms of the COBRA endorsement, the ERISA plan administrator had to give qualified persons notice of their continuation rights within 14 days after receipt of the notice of the occurrence of a dependent’s loss of eligibility for coverage under the Policy. Once that notice was given, an election for continuation coverage had to be made within 60 days after the later of (1) the qualifying event; or (2) “the date the employee or dependent is advised by the ERISA plan administrator of the right to continued coverage.” The endorsement did not require or refer to a “written election,” nor did the endorsement state that the qualified beneficiary had to make the election. In addition to the foregoing, the Policy required that for unscheduled and emergency hospital admissions, a phone call should be made to Protective Life before the end of the next working day after the admission to a hospital to certify the admission for full coverage benefits under the Policy. The Policy further stated that “|jj]ust because a Hospital admission is Certified does not mean that all charges incurred will be Covered Charges or that benefits will be payable for all Covered Charged incurred. All other terms, limits, and exclusions of the Policy still apply. C. The Events Preceding the Accident In early 1987, Ward hired independent insurance agent/broker McPherson to “shop” for a group insurance plan for Ward. McPherson’s efforts culminated in Ward’s purchase of the Policy from Protective Life. On March 2,1987, following the purchase of the Policy by Ward and, in fact, following the effective date (March 1) of the Policy, McPherson met individually with Ward’s Mobile, Alabama, employees to explain to them the benefits available under the Policy, to differentiate between benefits available under that policy versus Ward’s previous policy, and to resolve any questions that the employees might have pertaining to coverage. Plaintiff William E. Swint was among the Ward employees with whom McPherson met. McPherson, in fact, spoke with Mr. Swint on two occasions, once on March 2 and, again, the following day. During their initial meeting, Mr. Swint inquired as to whether Mr. Swint’s stepson, Roy Ivie, could be covered under the Policy and, if so, for what period of time. It was McPherson’s recollection that, at that time, he essentially informed Mr. Swint that Roy Ivie would be covered at least until Roy Ivie turned nineteen (19) years old, unless thereafter and continuing until his twenty-third or twenty-fifth birthday, Roy Ivie remained a “full-time” student. McPherson further told Mr. Swint that he (McPherson) would have to check with Protective Life to verify that information. Following that meeting, Mr. Swint filled-out an insurance enrollment card, listing thereon his wife, Louise Von Swint, and two sons, Robert Edward Swint and Roy Ivie, as dependents. The following day, McPherson, while at Ward, briefly met with Mr. Swint to verify the information that McPherson previously had conveyed to Mr. Swint. Essentially, McPherson, after consulting with a representative of Protective Life, confirmed to Mr. Swint that Roy Ivie would be covered at least until Roy Ivie turned nineteen (19) years old, unless thereafter and continuing until his twenty-fourth birthday Roy Ivie remained a full-time student. The group insurance certificates, certificate declarations, and certificate riders and endorsements were sent to Ward by Protective Life in mid-May 1987. Copies of a COBRA continuation notice additionally were forwarded to Ward, although conflicting testimony was presented as to who provided those notices and when the notices were provided. After receiving the aforesaid documents, Sturdivant directed Doss and Ward’s receptionist to distribute the materials to Ward’s employees. Prior to distributing the certificates, Doss placed a copy of the COBRA continuation endorsement, as well as a current “physicians’ list,” with each certificate, which the receptionist then twice stapled to the inside front cover of each certificate. On the outside front cover of each certificate the receptionist wrote the name of the Ward employee to whom the certificate was to be given. Thereafter, Doss hand-distributed the certificates to each employee, including Mr. Swint. Mr. Swint acknowledged receiving a certificate from Doss, which had appended to it a new physicians’ list, but denied receiving a copy of the COBRA continuation endorsement. At no time were Ward employees given a summary description of any kind of benefits available to them under the Policy. After receiving an insurance certificate, Mr. Swint took the certificate home and, a few days later, reviewed portions of it with his wife, Louise Yon Swint. Mr. Swint, additionally, removed the physicians’ list from the front inside cover of the certificate and gave the list to Mrs. Swint. Notwithstanding their general familiarity, garnered from Mr. Swint’s conversations with McPherson, with coverage provided under the Policy, the Swints read portions of the certificate, including that which pertained to the availability of coverage for eligible dependents. At the time during which Ward was undergoing the transition from its former insurer to Protective Life, Roy Ivie, then eighteen years old, was enrolled in his senior year at George County High School in Lucedale, Mississippi. Originally, Roy Ivie was scheduled to graduate in May 1987; however, he did not do so because of his failure to pass an American History course during the previous school year. In an effort to make-up the failed history course, Roy Ivie enrolled in an independent study correspondence course in American History on August 22, 1986, through the Division of Lifelong Learning of The University of Southern Mississippi. Roy Ivie never completed any written work assignments or tests as part of the course or physically attended class. He, however, requested two extensions of time in which to complete the requirements for receiving course credit, ultimately being permitted until March 22, 1988, to complete his assignments. Because he did not graduate in May 1987, Roy Ivie’s high school records were placed with those of the school’s 1987-88 senior class. At that point, Robert Walker, principal of George County High School, still considered Roy Ivie to be a student, even though the school did not have an official policy at that time which made a distinction between “active” versus “inactive,” or “part-time” versus “full-time,” students. Roy Ivie did not physically attend classes at the high school after May 1987. In September 1987, when classes resumed at the high school, Roy Ivie’s name did not appear on the school’s student register or on any class grade or attendance registers, the school did not maintain a student card on him, and the school did not receive any attendance funds from the state of Mississippi attributable to him. Because of his enrollment in the correspondence course, however, Roy Ivie was eligible, during the 1987-88 school year, for school guidance counseling and to participate in school activities. During the 1985-86 and 1986-67 school years, Roy Ivie participated in a work cooperative program, through which he was able to earn school course credit while working part-time at Bellbro Auto Parts store (“Bellbro”). At the end of the 1986-87 school year, Roy Ivie began working for Bellbro full-time, earning $175.00 per week. As a full-time employee, Roy Ivie was eligible for coverage under Bellbro’s group health insurance policy. John Andrews, Roy Ivie’s supervisor at Bellbro, in fact, offered Roy Ivie the option of purchasing health insurance through the store’s group policy. Roy Ivie declined to do so, however, because he could not afford the coverage and because he already was covered under Mr. Swint's policy. Roy Ivie told Andrews that he would purchase coverage under the Bellbro policy once he no longer was eligible for coverage under his father’s policy. The Swints testified that they were aware that Roy Ivie did not graduate in May 1987. They further testified, however, that Roy Ivie told each of them that he would “make things up” to them. Although Mr. Swint was aware that Roy Ivie had enrolled in a correspondence course, Mrs. Swint was not thus informed. Roy Ivie turned nineteen years old on August 4, 1987. As of that date, Roy Ivie, as noted, was enrolled in an American History correspondence course and was working fifty hours per week at Bellbro. Roy Ivie remained listed as an eligible dependent on Mr. Swint’s insurance enrollment card. Moreover, neither Roy Ivie nor Mr. Swint specially notified either Ward or Protective Life of the occurrence of Roy Ivie’s nineteenth birthday prior to Roy Ivie’s accident. At the time of and following his birthday, Roy Ivie resided with the Swints and received more than one half of his support from them. D. The Accident and the Aftermath On Friday, September 18,1987, forty-five days after Roy Ivie’s birthday, Roy Ivie was catastrophically injured in an automobile collision. Roy Ivie, who was rendered comatose in the accident, immediately was taken to the Mobile Infirmary in Mobile, Alabama, for treatment. On Monday morning, September 21, 1987, forty-eight days after Roy Ivie’s nineteenth birthday, Mr. Swint reported to work and told Doss about the accident and where Roy Ivie then was hospitalized. Doss' initial concern was with making sure that Roy Ivie had been assigned a pread-mission certification number. According to Doss, no questions concerning Roy Ivie’s age and student status arose during that conversation. After speaking with Mr. Swint, Doss conferred with Sturdivant. Doss told Sturdi-vant about the accident and, further, told him that she would verify that a preadmission certification number had been issued by the admitting hospital. Doss then called Sweatt at Protective Life to find out if anything else needed to be done. Sweatt, who, at the time of this initial notification, had not received any claims for benefits attributable to Roy Ivie’s accident, told Doss that there was nothing further to be done at that point. Doss thereafter again conferred with Sturdivant, who directed Doss to determine Roy Ivie’s age and whether Roy Ivie still was in school. At that point, Doss was aware of Roy Ivie’s age, having pulled Mr. Swint’s Policy enrollment card earlier that morning. Doss again met with Mr. Swint, whom she asked if Roy Ivie was “still in school.” Mr. Swint replied by saying that Roy Ivie had not passed the twelfth grade but had enrolled in a course to graduate. Mr. Swint did not tell Doss, and Doss did not ask, whether Roy Ivie was enrolled in a correspondence course. Doss conveyed Mr. Swint’s reply to Sturdi-vant. On September 30, 1987, the fifty-seventh day following Roy Ivie's nineteenth birthday, Doss met with Mr. Swint for the purpose of having Mr. Swint complete a claims form for group medical insurance benefits. Portions of the “employee’s statement” on the form were completed by Ward’s receptionist, based on information derived from Mr. Swint’s Policy enrollment card. Mr. Swint signed the form, even though that portion of the form which requested information on Roy Ivie’s student status was not complete and notwithstanding the fact that Roy Ivie’s birthdate was incorrectly designated as being August 4,1986. Doss completed the “employer’s statement” portion of the form, indicating thereon that Roy Ivie was covered under the Policy as a dependent and, further, that Roy Ivie’s coverage currently was in force. Within days following Roy Ivie’s accident, McPherson, on one of his routine visits to Ward, met with Sturdivant and Doss to discuss Roy Ivie’s condition. During their conversation, the focus of which was on whether Roy Ivie properly had been certified for hospital admission, the subject of Roy Ivie’s age was mentioned. The three, in fact, discussed the fact that Roy Ivie’s age could terminate coverage and also discussed the impact that Roy Ivie’s school status could have on Roy Ivie’s coverage. The three also discussed Roy Ivie’s right to receive notice of his right to elect COBRA continuation coverage. McPherson suggested to Sturdivant and Doss that they determine Roy Ivie’s student status. He further reminded Sturdivant and Doss that if Roy Ivie was not a full-time student, then Roy Ivie would be entitled to receive a COBRA election notice. McPherson subsequently met with Stur-divant and Doss on several of his routine visits to Ward. During one of those visits, the three discussed the fact that Sturdivant and Doss had determined that Roy Ivie, indeed, was a full-time student at the time of the accident. Upon learning of that determination, McPherson advised Sturdi-vant and Doss not to give Roy Ivie notice of his right to elect COBRA continuation coverage, since Roy Ivie’s status as a full-time student extended his insurance coverage under the Policy. The first group of medical providers’ claims attributable to Roy Ivie’s accident was sent to Protective Life by Ward on or about September 30, 1987, but was not received by Sweatt until approximately October 12, 1987, the sixty-ninth day following Roy Ivie’s accident. Sweatt testified that that group of claims was the first written documentation of Roy Ivie’s accident that she received and noted that she had not made a record of her initial conversation with Doss. Doss subsequently forwarded several claims to Sweatt in November, December, and January. Sometime in mid-November, Sweatt, after noting that Roy Ivie’s student status had not been indicated on the initial claims form from Ward and needing to verify coverage to George County Hospital, the medical institution to which Roy Ivie was to be transferred, contacted Doss to find out if Roy Ivie was then attending school full-time at the time of his accident. Although Sweatt could not recall the specifics of her conversation with Doss, a “telephone call documentation” signed by Sweatt and dated November 13, 1987, stated that “Roy failed 12th grade last year. He was already enrolled to complete his 12th year in high school when the accident happened.” Sweatt testified that the information contained on that “documentation” was obtained by her from Doss. After speaking with Doss, Sweatt called Debra Dixon, an administrator at George County Hospital, and informed her that Protective Life would need to receive a completed repayment agreement before it could commence processing insurance claims. Sweatt further stated that, based on information Protective Life obtained from Ward, Roy Ivie was a full-time student at the time of his accident and, therefore, was covered under the Policy. Protective Life received a “repayment agreement,” executed by Mr. Swint on Roy Ivie’s behalf, from Ward on November 19, 1987. Thereafter, on or about December 1, 1987, Sweatt again contacted Doss to confirm Roy Ivie’s student status. An undated “telephone call documentation” executed by Sweatt reflects that Doss told Sweatt that “Roy was enrolled for his senior year in high school when the accident happened.” Sweatt began paying claims attributable to Roy Ivie’s accident on December 2, 1987. West became involved with Roy Ivie’s file in early January 1988. At the time of his initial involvement, West was conducting a routine review of insurance files, including Roy Ivie’s, which indicated “large” claims. Because those files, according to West, most likely were going to be sent to Protective Life’s reinsurance carrier, West needed to be sure that the files included all documentation that was necessary to coverage under Protective Life’s reinsurance policy. Upon reviewing the file, West noted the absence of a written verification of Roy Ivie’s student status. Knowing that Protective Life’s reinsurance carrier would require such a verification, West directed Sweatt to contact Ward for the purpose of obtaining such verification. Pursuant to West’s directive, Sweatt, in an undocumented conversation, called Doss and asked her to obtain a written verification of Roy Ivie’s student status. Doss, in turn, asked Mr. Swint to obtain the necessary document. Ultimately, Mrs. Swint went to George County High School to obtain the written verification. While at the school, Mrs. Swint met with Mrs. Johnnye Taylor, the school’s guidance counselor, who agreed to prepare a written verification of Roy Ivie’s student status. Taylor, in fact, authored a letter dated January 21, 1988, signed by Taylor, as Counselor, and Walker, as Principal, of George County High School, which stated the following: To Whom It May Concern: This is to verify that Roy E. Ivie is currently enrolled in a correspondence class at the University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, Mississippi and upon its completion, Roy will be eligible for graduation. He enrolled in American History August 1986. Mr. Swint promptly delivered the letter to Doss, who then forwarded the letter to Sweatt. Sweatt received the letter on January 26, 1988. Believing the January 21 letter to be inconsistent with the information that Protective Life previously had obtained from Doss concerning Roy Ivie’s student status, Sweatt called Taylor on February 1, 1988. A “telephone call documentation” executed by Sweatt reflects that Sweatt asked Taylor if Roy Ivie was “enrolled as a full-time student in September 1987.” Taylor responded by saying that “Roy was enrolled for his senior year in September 1987 and was attending school full-time.” Sweatt thereafter reported her conversation with Taylor to West and gave West a copy of Taylor’s January 21 letter. At some time subsequent to Protective Life’s receipt of Taylor’s January 21 letter, but prior to March 2, 1988, West conferred with Wright about Roy Ivie’s file. Wright reviewed Roy Ivie’s file, which had been provided to him by West, and determined what Protective Life needed to do in order to complete their investigation of Roy Ivie’s student status. After conferring with Wright, West called Sturdivant to ask Sturdivant if Ward thought Roy Ivie was a “full-time” student. Although West generally recalled talking with Sturdivant about COBRA and being told by Sturdivant that Mr. Swint was given a COBRA continuation notice when he enrolled in the Plan, West could not recall whether he and Sturdivant discussed whether Roy Ivie should have been given a COBRA continuation notice. In addition to recalling speaking with West, Sturdivant was contacted by Edward Zeviernik, Jr., head of Protective Life’s customer service department, in February 1988. Zeviernik, who also questioned Stur-divant about Ward’s position on Roy Ivie’s student status, testified that Sturdivant asked him for information on COBRA. Sturdivant told Zeviernik that he (Sturdi-vant) thought that Roy Ivie’s accident occurred during a “grey area” under COBRA and suggested that Protective Life consider that fact in assessing Roy Ivie’s eligibility for insurance coverage. It was Zeviernik’s position with Sturdivant that Protective Life was to determine whether COBRA applied to Roy Ivie’s case. Wright testified that Zeviernik may have relayed to him Sturdivant’s suggestion regarding the applicability of COBRA. On February 23, 1988, West, confronted with apparent conflicting information, wrote directly to Taylor, requesting clarification of the information Protective Life had received from her regarding Roy Ivie’s student status. In pertinent part, the letter stated as follows: Based on the information you advised Sue Sweatt during your telephone conversation [of February 1], there seems to be a discrepancy or some confusion on our part concerning the status of Roy Ivie on the date of his injury during September, 1987. I have attached a copy of your letter to Protective Life dated January 21, 1988 for your convenience. Within this letter you advised us that our Insured was enrolled in a correspondence class at the University of Southern Mississippi, Hat-tiesburg, Mississippi. You also advised us that he was enrolled in American history during August of 1986. We wish for your to advise us if he was considered a full-time student at George County High School. ****** Taylor and Walker responded to West’s letter by letter dated March 2, 1988. In their letter, which appears to have been received by Protective Life on March 8, 1988, Taylor and Walker, in pertinent part, stated as follows: Our records show that [Roy Ivie’s] last physical attendance at this school was May 1987 at which time he was scheduled to graduate. Because of credit and/or course deficiencies he could not graduate and was advised to take correspondence at the University of Southern Mississippi. When this was done, his diploma would be issued to him. He, therefore, was not in physical attendance at this school September 1987 and was not a part-time nor full-time student here. With reference to his enrollment in American History in 1986, yes, he was enrolled in this course at this time because it is a requirement for graduation. He passed the first semester but failed the second semester credit and therefore was responsible for completing this requirement. This was the basis of the correspondence course. After receiving the aforesaid letter, West wrote a fill-in-the-blank letter to the Swints, on March 15, 1988, requesting Mr. Swint to provide more detailed information on Roy Ivie’s student status. The letter, in pertinent part, read as follows: We have been advised that your dependent, Roy Ivie, was not a full-time student at George County High School during September 1987. We wish for you to advise and verify the following information (Please check or complete as needed): Was Roy Ivie enrolled as a full-time student in September, 1987 at George County High School? _ YES _NO Was Roy Ivie enrolled in any educational institution during September, 1987? _YES_NO If yes, please give name and address of institution: ****** Mrs. Swint assisted Mr. Swint in completing the questionnaire/letter by filling in the relevant information. Mr. Swint thereafter signed the letter on March 19, 1988, thereby attesting to the truthfulness and accuracy of the information contained therein. In response to the first question quoted above, the Swints did not simply answer “yes” or “no.” Instead, they wrote the following explanation: “Roy Ivie was enrolled in George County High School with the course or courses to graduate in May of 1988. He was a member of DECA or called a co-op class. He went to school and also worked.” To the second above-quoted question, the Swints answered in the affirmative, noting thereafter that Roy Ivie “was enrolled in Division of Life-Long Learning at University Southern Mississippi in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.” No claims were paid by Protective Life after Protective Life received the completed letter. In fact, March 2,1988, is the last date on which any claims were paid. In addition to the sending the foregoing letter to the Swints, West directed Sweatt to contact Mrs. Larry Ladner, Office Supervisor of the Independent Study Office of The University of Southern Mississippi’s Division of Lifelong Learning, presumably to confirm Roy Ivie’s enrollment in a correspondence course. Sweatt spoke with Lad-ner on or about March 28, 1988, and, the following day requested written confirmation from Ladner of the contents of their telephone conversation. By letter dated April 6, 1988, and received by Protective Life on April 11, 1988, Ladner informed Sweatt of the following: Roy E. Ivie, Rt. 8, Box 485 A, Lucedale, MS 39452, SS # [ XXX-XX-XXXX ], registered in Independent Study course American History, 1st Semester for lh credit. The fee pari was $53.00 for the tuition only. His registration date was August 22, 1986. From that date forward, no materials from the student or tests from the supervisor were ever received. He requested and was granted two time extensions which allowed his additional time until March 22, 1988. During that time and as of this date, no materials or tests have been received. Sweatt forwarded Ladner’s letter to West. Armed with all of the foregoing information except, perhaps, Ladner’s written confirmation of her March 28, 1988, telephone conversation with Sweatt, West, Wright, and all remaining members of the group health claims department, including Charles Gardner, second vice president of group administration, who was uniquely familiar with the requirements of COBRA, convened a meeting in late March to discuss Roy Ivie’s case. The meeting, which was attended by “eight to ten people,” did not include any Ward employees. In fact, no one at Ward was notified that the meeting was going to occur or had occurred. Among other matters discussed were the issues of whether an “initial COBRA notice had been sent” and whether Roy Ivie had made a COBRA election. Those present were advised that a COBRA election had not been made. Further, West advised Wright that he (West) previously had contacted Sturdivant, who advised that a COBRA notice had been given to all Ward employees shortly after the effective date of the Policy. Ultimately, it was determined at the meeting that a COBRA election had not been made, that Roy Ivie was not a full-time student at the time of his accident, and that Roy Ivie was not eligible for coverage under the Policy. Those present at the meeting discussed Protective Life’s next course of action. It was determined that West should notify the Swints about Protective Life’s decision. Following the meeting, West, by letter dated April 4, 1988, informed the Swints of Protective Life’s determination concerning Roy Ivie’s ineligibility for benefits under the Policy. In pertinent part, the letter stated as follows: After a review of information recently submitted to Protective Life, we have determined that claims have been processed by Protective Life in error. Based on incorrect information given by you to your employer, ..., we processed charges that were not in accordance with the group insurance policy. ****** Due to the fact that Protective Life was mislead and given inaccurate information, we processed and paid charges that were not covered under the terms and conditions of the group insurance policy issued to your employer. We acted in good faith believing that your stepson, Roy Ivie, was eligible for coverage. ****** According to recently received information, your step-son, Roy Ivie, was not a full-time student, as defined within the terms of the group insurance policy, therefore his coverage terminated on his 19th birthday which was August 4, 1987. All charges incurred by Roy Ivie on or after that date are not covered under this group insurance policy. The benefits paid to date total $80,-329.29. Protective Life is due to have this amount refunded to it unless our latest information concerning your stepson’s status is inaccurate. ****** If you feel that this determination of your step-son’s eligibility has been determined improperly, we will be glad to consider any additional information you wish to submit. Also, on April 4, 1988, West sent letters to at least twenty medical care providers who previously had rendered services to Roy Ivie and to whom benefits had been paid by Protective Life. In those letters, West essentially conveyed information similar to that which was contained in West’s April 4 letter to Mr. Swint and requested reimbursement of all benefits received by them from Protective Life. Similar letters were sent to medical care providers who submitted bills for payment by Protective Life after April 4, 1988, but to whom medical benefits had not been paid by Protective Life. Upon learning of the denial of coverage for Roy Ivie under the Policy, Mr. Swint met with Sturdivant. Sturdivant advised Mr. Swint that there was nothing that he (Sturdivant) could do and suggested that Mr. Swint contact an attorney. Sturdivant distributed an interoffice memorandum dated April 28, 1988, to all Ward employees, encouraging them to re-familiarize themselves with their COBRA rights. Appended to that memorandum was a copy of the “IMPORTANT NOTICE: CONTINUATION OF GROUP HEALTH COVERAGE FOR QUALIFIED PERSONS.” At no time did Ward give Mr. Swint any other notice indicating that Roy Ivie had any continuation rights under COBRA. In fact, Mr. Swint testified that when he received Ward’s April 28 memorandum, he did not know that the COBRA law applied to Roy Ivie. The Swints testified that they have been ready and willing, at all times since the accident, to make a COBRA election on Roy Ivie's behalf. Concurrent with the Spring 1988 controversy over Roy Ivie’s eligibility for insurance coverage, other events relevant to this action were occurring. In December 1987, Jim Duke, a medical review coordinator for Protective Life, began evaluating Roy Ivie’s progress to determine if and where Roy Ivie should be placed for rehabilitation therapy. In February 1988, Duke contacted Paula Wade, a registered nurse and rehabilitation coordinator with Continental Rehabilitation Resources, essentially to obtain Wade’s recommendation on an appropriate rehabilitation program for Roy Ivie. In mid-February 1988, Duke called Mrs. Swint to make her aware, and gain her approval, of Wade’s involvement with Roy Ivie’s case. Duke, who at the time understood Roy Ivie to have insurance coverage, told Mrs. Swint not to worry, that Protective Life would “stand behind” them. He also told Mrs. Swint about an extended rehabilitation policy offered by Protective Life, called the “ROSE,” and promised to send her information regarding that policy. Subsequently, Wade and Duke determined that Roy Ivie should be placed in an intensive rehabilitation facility located in Birmingham, Alabama. The Swints met with Wade on at least one occasion to talk with her about the facility. In late March or early April 1988, the Swints made preparations to move Roy Ivie to the new facility; however, on the eve of the planned move, one of Roy Ivie’s doctors cancelled the transfer plans. Shortly thereafter, the Swints received West’s notification to them of Roy Ivie’s ineligibility for coverage under the Policy. Conclusions of Law This essentially is an action brought by an ERISA-governed employee welfare benefit plan participant and beneficiary to enforce the beneficiary's rights and recover benefits allegedly due to the beneficiary under the terms of a group health policy and to clarify the beneficiary’s right to future benefits under the terms of that Policy. To facilitate an understanding of the court’s analysis and ultimate conclusions, a brief description of plaintiffs’ claims and of the factual underpinnings of those claims is necessary. Furthermore, a brief explanation of the statutory scheme of ERISA and the COBRA amendments thereto will provide a useful context for the court’s analysis. A. Contentions of the Plaintiffs As noted, plaintiffs’ complaints emanate from the “termination” or “denial” by Protective Life of health insurance coverage on Roy Ivie on April 4, 1988, after Protective Life determined that their excess insurance carrier would be involved in the loss which resulted from Roy Ivie’s catastrophic injury in an automobile collision. Plaintiffs’ claims are three-fold: First, plaintiffs contend that Protective Life and Ward, each of which allegedly had fiduciary obligations under ERISA, breached their duties, thereby damaging the plaintiffs. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that Protective Life, by “terminating” or “denying” coverage to Roy Ivie under the Policy or, alternatively, each defendant, by failing to recognize that Roy Ivie had made a COBRA election to continue coverage under the Policy, breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA. In response to this claim, defendants primarily contend that they had no fiduciary obligations to the Swints under ERISA and, further, that even if they did have such duties, neither defendant was arbitrary and capricious in its performance or fulfillment of those duties. Second, the Swints maintain that each defendant violated either their fiduciary obligations under ERISA or the COBRA amendments to ERISA when they failed, following Mr. Swints’ notification to them of the occurrence of a qualifying event involving Roy Ivie, to inform either Mr. Swint or Roy Ivie of Roy Ivie’s right to elect continuation coverage under COBRA. Implicit in that claim are plaintiff’s contentions that Mr. Swint provided Ward with sufficient information from which Ward could determine and, indeed, should have determined, that a COBRA qualifying event had occurred and that Protective Life at least was partially responsible for determining whether a qualifying event had occurred and, consequently, whether a COBRA continuation notice should have been provided to Roy Ivie. Ward primarily denies that Mr. Swint informed Ward of the occurrence of a qualifying event and, thus, denies that it wrongfully failed to provide Roy Ivie or the Swints of Roy Ivie’s notice of his right to elect COBRA continuation coverage. Protective Life, moreover, in addition to adopting the foregoing denials asserted by Ward, strenuously maintains that it has no obligations under the COBRA amendments to ERISA, since those amendments delineate obligations of employers only and impose no express responsibilities on other entities or persons. Finally and alternatively, plaintiffs assert that Protective Life should be es-topped from asserting and/or deemed to have waived its right to deny coverage to Roy Ivie due to its failure to make an adequate inquiry into the issue of Roy Ivie’s eligibility for dependant coverage until after the period for Roy to elect continuation coverage under COBRA apparently had lapsed. In defense, Protective Life primarily contends that plaintiffs cannot prove that they relied in any identifiable, tangible manner on Protective Life’s alleged failure to conduct a prompt investigation of Roy Ivie’s student status and consequent payment of some benefits on Roy Ivie’s behalf. B. The Statutory Scheme of ERISA and the COBRA Amendments to ERISA ERISA, a voluminous, complex piece of legislation, now codified at Chapter 18, Title 29 of the United States Code, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, regulates the establishment, operation, and administration of employee welfare and pension benefit plans. “ERISA was enacted ‘to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans,’ Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 77 L.Ed.2d 490, 103 S.Ct. 2890 [2896] (1983), and ‘to protect contractually defined benefits,’ Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. [134], at 148, 87 L.Ed.2d 96, 105 S.Ct. 3085 [3093],” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 113, 109 S.Ct. 948, 955, 103 L.Ed.2d 80, 94 (1989). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1001. 1. General Definitions and Obligations.—In addition to enumerating guidelines for the establishment and administration of employee welfare benefit plans, ERISA contains numerous terms of art and definitions which are of relevance to this action. For example, ERISA defines an “employee welfare benefit plan,” in relevant part, as any employer-maintained plan or program established and maintained for the purpose of providing medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, or disability, for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). ERISA’s coverage extends to, inter alia, any employee welfare benefit plan which is established or maintained by an employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a). See also Hoover v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 855 F.2d 1538, 1540 n. 2 (11th Cir.1988). In the case of an employee welfare benefit plan established or maintained by a single employer, the employer is deemed to be the “plan sponsor.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B). The term “administrator,” moreover, is identified as: (i) the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which the plan is operated; (ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or (iii) in the case of a plan for which an administrator is not designated and a plan sponsor cannot be identified, such other person as the Secretary [of Labor] may by regulation prescribe. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A). ERISA imposes various duties on plan administrators. Of relevance to this action is the requirement that the plan administrator furnish each plan participant and beneficiary with a so-called summary plan description (“SPD”), within 90 days after one becomes a participant or, in the case of a beneficiary, first receives benefits. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a) and 1024(b)(1). A SPD, a copy of which also must be filed with the Secretary of Labor, see 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a), is a written document, worded in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, that summarizes the rights and obligations of participants and beneficiaries under the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1). A SPD must be “sufficiently accurate and comprehensive” reasonably to apprise participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations, id., and must contain, inter alia, [t]he name and type of administration of the plan; the name and address of the person designated as agent for legal process, if such person is not the administrator; the name and address of the administrator; names, titles, and addresses of any trustee or trustees (if they are persons different from the administrator); ... the plan’s requirements respecting eligibility for participation and benefits; ... circumstances which may result in disqualification, ineligibility, or denial or loss of benefits; the source of financing of the plan and the identity of any organization through which benefits are provided; ... the procedures to be followed in presenting claims for benefits under the plan and the remedies available under the plan for redress of claims which are denied in whole or in part (including procedures required under [29 U.S.C. § 1133]). 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). Finally and most importantly to this case, a “fiduciary” with respect to an employee welfare benefit plan essentially includes any person who is charged with administration of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). See also Hoover v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 855 F.2d 1538, 1541 (11th Cir.1988). A person is a plan fiduciary to the extent that “he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets,” or “has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) & (iii). Cf. Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86 (11th Cir.1989). The duties of a plan fiduciary are described in 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1), which provides, in relevant part, that a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and— (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i)providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; ****** (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; [and] ****** (D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan.... Section 1105(c), 29 U.S.C., allows, in appropriate circumstances, for the allocation of fiduciary responsibilities among named fiduciaries and to persons other than named fiduciaries. Section 1105(a), 29 U.S.C., in fact, provides that “a fiduciary with respect to a plan shall be liable for a breach of fiduciary responsibility of another fiduciary with respect to the same plan (1) if he participates knowingly in, or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or omission of such other fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach; (2) if, by his failure to comply with [29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) ] in the administration of his specific responsibilities which give rise to his status as a fiduciary, he has enabled such other fiduciary to commit a breach; or (3) if he has knowledge of a breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to remedy the breach. Clearly, a person need not be designated in writing as a fiduciary in order so to qualify; nor must the plan sponsor or administrator necessarily serve at all or as the sole plan fiduciary. Indeed, although a particular single-employer plan may have only one sponsor and perhaps even one administrator, the plan may have more than one fiduciary. After all, it is the nature and extent of one’s designated or actual duties and obligations with respect to a plan which determines if one qualifies as a fiduciary. 2. General ERISA Plan Guidelines.— As noted, ERISA delineates guidelines for the establishment and administration of employee welfare benefit plans. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1145. Under those guidelines, every employee welfare benefit plan must be in writing, with one or more named fiduciaries, “who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan,” being expressly designated therein. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). Furthermore, every plan must, inter alia, “describe any procedure under the plan for the allocation of responsibilities for the operation and administration of the plan,” including procedures for the allocation of fiduciary responsibilities pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1). 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2). Every plan, additionally, may provide, inter alia, “that any person or group of persons may serve in more than one fiduciary capacity with respect to the plan; ...” 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(1). 3. The COBRA Amendments to ERISA. — In 1986, Congress enacted the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act, commonly referred to as COBRA, which, in relevant part, amended ERISA by providing for limited continuation coverage rights under employer-provided group health insurance plans. See Gregory, COBRA: Congress Provides Partial Protection Against Employee Termination of Retiree Health Insurance, 24 San Diego L.Rev. 77 (1987). Passage of the amendment was motivated primarily by a Congressional concern that certain spouses and dependent children abruptly and unwittingly might be deprived of health benefits due to a change in their family status and, secondarily, by the notable absence of a federal requirement, corresponding with then-common state-enforced requirements, for the provision of continuation options, under employer-based group health insurance plans, for insurance loss-risk individuals. 1986 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.Report 42, 322. Codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-67, the amendments require certain employer group health plans to offer qualified beneficiaries an election to continue their group coverage for a period of time following termination of the beneficiaries’ eligibility for coverage as group members under the plan. Id.; Oakley v. City of Longmont, 887 F.2d 249 (10th Cir.1989). Section 1161(a), 29 U.S.C., requires the plan sponsor of each group health plan to provide “qualified beneficiaries,” who otherwise would lose coverage under the plan as a result of a “qualifying event,” the right under the plan to elect, within the statutory election period, continuation coverage under the plan. A “qualifying event,” is an event which, but for the continuation coverage required under ERISA, would result in the loss of coverage of a qualified beneficiary, and includes, inter alia, “a dependent child ceasing to be a dependent child under the generally applicable requirements of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1163(5). The election period under COBRA is defined as the period which: (A) begins not later than the date on which coverage terminates under the plan by reason of a qualifying event, (B) is of at least 60 days’ duration, and (C) ends not earlier than 60 days after the later of (i) the date [of the qualifying event], or (ii) in the case of any qualified beneficiary who receives notice under [29 U.S.C. § 1166(4)], the date of such notice. 29 U.S.C. § 1165(1) [emphasis added]. With respect to the foregoing, COBRA contains certain notice provisions. First, the group health plan, presumably acting through the plan sponsor, is obligated to provide written notice to each covered employee and spouse of the employee, if any, of the continuation rights provided under the COBRA amendments to ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a). That notice must be provided at the time coverage commences under the plan. Id. Additionally, 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(3) provides, with respect to the occurrence of a qualifying event of the type described in section 1163(5)—that is, when a dependent child ceases to qualify as a dependent under the generally applicable provisions of the plan, that either the covered employee or the qualified beneficiary must notify the plan’s administrator of the occurrence of the qualifying event within sixty days after the occurrence of the event. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(3). That notification, which, significantly, is not required to be in or to assume any particular form, then triggers notification obligations on the part of the plan administrator. Specifically, upon receiving notification of the occurrence of a section 1163(5) qualifying event, the administrator must notify the qualified beneficiary with respect to such event of such beneficiary’s rights under the COBRA amendments to ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4)(B). Such notice must be given within fourteen days of the date on which the administrator is notified of the occurrence of the qualifying event. Id. In enacting the COBRA amendments to ERISA, Congress did not attempt to pass a comprehensive statute concerning the right of plan beneficiaries to elect continuation coverage. Indeed, the amendments provide only general guidelines for the provision and exercise of such rights, appropriately reserving resolution of issues concerning their application to administrative (rule-making) agencies and the courts. On June 15, 1987, the Treasury Department, acting pursuant to statutorily-delegated rule-making authority, see 29 U.S.C. § 1204(a), promulgated proposed regulations concerning COBRA continuation coverage, which supplement the COBRA amendments. See Treas.Reg. § 1.162-26, 52 Fed.Reg. 22,716 (1987)(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed Apr. 6, 1987) (the “Treasury regulations”). Although the regulations have not been adopted in final form, they are considered indicative of the Treasury Department’s official policies regarding continuation coverage and are given great judicial deference. See Communications Workers of America v. NYNEX Corp., 898 F.2d 887, 888-89 (2d Cir.1990); Johnson v. Reserve Life Insurance Company, 765 F.Supp. 1478 (C.D.Cal.1991). The Treasury regulations, which are set forth in question-and-answer form, contain several provisions of relevance to the present action. The answer to question 33, for example, sets forth the period of time in which a covered employee or qualified beneficiary must inform the employer or plan administrator of the occurrence of a qualifying event. See 52 Fed.Reg. at 22,-729. If, according to that provision, notice is not “sent ” to the employer or other plan administrator “within 60 days after the later of (a) the date of the qualifying event, or (b) the date that the qualified beneficiary would lost coverage on account of the qualifying event,” notice of the right to elect continuation coverage need not be given. Upon giving timely notification of the occurrence of a qualifying event, a qualified beneficiary has “60 days after the later of {a) the date that the qualified beneficiary would lose coverage on account of the qualifying event, or (b) the date that the qualified beneficiary is sent notice of his or her right to elect COBRA continuation coverage,” to elect continuation coverage. See Q & A 32, 52 Fed.Reg. at 22,728-29 (emphasis added). “An election is considered t