Full opinion text
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER MacLAUGHLIN, District Judge. This matter is before the Court on defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The motion of the Hennepin County defendants will be granted. The motion of the remaining defendants will be granted in part and denied in part. FACTS Plaintiff is a physician specializing in ne-phrology, a field of medicine involving the treatment of diseases and conditions of the kidney. Defendant Hennepin County Medical Center (HCMC) is a public hospital owned and operated by defendant Henne-pin County; HCMC, Hennepin County, and the Hennepin County Board of Commissioners will be referred to in this memorandum as “the Hennepin County defendants.” Defendant Hennepin Faculty Associates (HFA) is a nonprofit corporation formed in 1984 that has contracted with Hennepin County to provide all physician services at HCMC. Defendant Regional Kidney Disease Program (RKDP) operates outpatient kidney dialysis centers throughout Minnesota and adjoining states; RKDP was originally an unincorporated operating division of Minneapolis Medical Research Foundation (MMRF), a nonprofit corporation formed by physicians at HCMC to promote medical research. On May 17, 1989, MMRF (and therefore its component RKDP) became a wholly-owned subsidiary of HFA. Defendants Shapiro, Davidman, and Collins are nephrologists employed by HFA. Shapiro is president of HFA and Davidman is currently chief of the nephrol-ogy division at HFA and HCMC; when the events giving rise to this action occurred, Davidman was medical director of RKDP and Collins was director of dialysis operations for RKDP. Defendants HFA, RKDP, Shapiro, Davidman, and Collins will be referred to in this memorandum as “the HFA defendants.” The facts underlying plaintiff’s claims, which will be briefly summarized here, are more fully set forth in the discussion of the separate claims. From 1977 to 1984, plaintiff was employed by the University of Minnesota as an assistant professor assigned to HCMC. In 1984, when the physicians of HCMC formed HFA, plaintiff became a member and employee of HFA. Plaintiff had full attending staff privileges at HCMC both as an employee of HCMC and as an employee of HFA. Pl.’s Mem., Bloom Aff. ¶ 2. While technically a specialist in nephrology, plaintiff also had an interest in the treatment of multiple sclerosis, and developed a protocol for using a technique called lymphocytapheresis to deplete a patient’s lymphocytes to modify the patient’s immunological responses. Id. ¶ 4-7. This treatment proved successful for several of plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis patients. Id. ¶ 16. In January 1989, plaintiff was informed that his employment with HFA would be terminated; on April 13, 1989 he received written confirmation of his termination. HFA Def.’s Mem., Bloom Dep. at 13-15; Pl.’s Mem., Bloom Aff., Ex. C. Because HFA had an exclusive contract to provide physician services for HCMC, HCMC took the position that plaintiff could no longer see patients at HCMC. When plaintiff attempted to schedule a lymphocytapheresis treatment for one of his multiple sclerosis patients on May 25, 1989, HFA informed him that he would not be permitted to treat any patients within HFA clinics or HCMC facilities that were under HFA control; plaintiff took this to mean that he would be denied access to all RKDP facilities. Pl.’s Mem., Bloom Aff., Ex. G. HFA also stated that the lymphocytapheresis treatments would continue under the supervision of an HFA doctor. Plaintiff commenced this action, alleging state and federal antitrust violations, deprivation of due process, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, misappropriation of trade secrets, fraud, conspiracy, and wrongful interference with business relationships. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims. DISCUSSION A movant is not entitled to summary judgment unless the movant can show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a summary judgment motion, a court must determine whether “there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The role of a court is not to weigh the evidence but instead to determine whether, as a matter of law, a genuine factual conflict exists. AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir.1987). “In making this determination, the court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party and to give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts.” AgriStor Leasing, 826 F.2d at 734. When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported with affidavits or other evidence as provided in Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), then the nonmov-ing party may not merely rest upon the allegations or denials of the party’s pleading, but must set forth specific facts, by affidavits or otherwise, showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Lomar Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter’s Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 585 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010, 108 S.Ct. 707, 98 L.Ed.2d 658 (1988). Moreover, summary judgment must be entered against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 1. The Antitrust Claims Plaintiff alleges that HFA and RKDP have entered into a market allocation conspiracy to monopolize the End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) market in the Twin Cities in violation of state and federal antitrust laws. Plaintiff asserts that HFA and RKDP, together with three private ne-phrology groups who are not parties to this action, have agreed to act as a single firm within the Twin Cities market. Acting as a single firm, plaintiff claims, these groups control the supply of ESRD treatment, permit demand to outstrip supply, and allocate patients among themselves according to geographical “turfs,” thus monopolizing the market and creating barriers that prevent nephrologists outside the cartel from entering the market. Pl.’s Mem., Sloan Aff. if 34. Plaintiff alleges that HCMC participated in this scheme by denying staff privileges to all doctors not employed by HFA and by participating in the market allocation plan. Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Henn.Cty. Def.’s Mot. for Summ.J. at 14; Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to HFA Def.’s Mot. for Summ.J. on Antitrust Claims at 7. In arguing for summary judgment, the Hennepin County defendants argue that they are immune from federal antitrust liability under the Local Government Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 34, et seq., and the state action doctrine and that they are immune from state antitrust liability under the terms of the Minnesota Antitrust Act. The HFA defendants argue that, to the extent plaintiff alleges that the HFA/ HCMC contract violated antitrust laws, they are immune from suit. The HFA defendants also argue that there is no evidence of a market allocation conspiracy or a monopoly and that, in any event, plaintiff has not suffered an antitrust injury. A. Are the Hennepin County Defendants Immune from Federal Antitrust Liability? The Local Government Antitrust Act provides that “[n]o damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorney’s fees may be recovered under section 15 ... of this title [providing for private actions for antitrust violations] from any local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity.” 15 U.S.C. § 35(a). The definition of “local government” includes counties as well as any special function governmental unit established by state law. 15 U.S.C. § 34(1). Plaintiff does not dispute that HCMC is a special function governmental unit established under Minn. Stat. § 383B.217 or that HCMC acted within its official capacity in its dealings with plaintiff. Therefore, the Local Government Antitrust Act immunizes the Henne-pin County defendants from private suits seeking damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15. As plaintiff notes, the Local Government Antitrust Act does not immunize the Hennepin County defendants from suits seeking injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 26. 15 U.S.C. § 35; Sandcrest Outpatient Services v. Cumberland County Hospital, 853 F.2d 1139, 1142 (4th Cir.1988). However, the Hennepin County defendants may be immune from plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief under the state action doctrine. The state action doctrine derives from Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to the anticompetitive conduct of a state acting through its legislature. While state action immunity does not automatically devolve to municipalities, a municipality may be immune from federal antitrust liability if its anticompetitive activities were authorized by the state “pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.” Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 105 S.Ct. 1713, 1716, 85 L.Ed.2d 24 (1985) (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413, 98 S.Ct. 1123, 1137, 55 L.Ed.2d 364 (1978)); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1344, 1349, 113 L.Ed.2d 382 (1991) (Parker immunity attaches where a municipality’s restriction of competition is an authorized implementation of state policy). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test to determine whether a party may claim immunity from antitrust suits under the state action doctrine. First, the challenged activity must be clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy. California Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105, 100 S.Ct. 937, 943, 63 L.Ed.2d 233 (1979); see also Town of Hallie, 105 S.Ct. at 1718. A state policy to displace competítion can be inferred if the challenged restraint is a necessary and reasonable consequence of engaging in an authorized activity. Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 430, 116 L.Ed.2d 450 (1991). Second, the activity must be actively supervised by the state. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105, 100 S.Ct. at 943. The purpose of the second prong is to assure that the activity was indeed undertaken in accordance with state policy. Where the allegedly anticompetitive conduct is undertaken by the municipality itself, rather than by a private party, and state authorization is established under the first prong of the test, it is presumed that the municipality acted in accordance with state policy and active state supervision need not be established. Town of Hallie, 105 S.Ct. at 1720. The Hennepin County defendants assert that under these standards, they are immune from plaintiffs federal antitrust claims. The Hennepin County defendants rely largely on Minn.Stat. § 383B.211, which allows the Hennepin County Board of Commissioners to establish a department “for the purpose of providing comprehensive health care and related services as required by law and as determined by the board to be in the best interest of the county.” The Hennepin County defendants argue that because the number of services to be provided under this statute is large, the board’s powers are broad and could be expected to replace competition with regulation in order to provide medical services to all county residents. The legislature’s intent to replace competition with regulation is underscored, the Hennepin County defendants argue, by Minn.Stat. § 383B.145(4), which provides that contracts for professional, medically related services authorized by the Hennepin County Hospital Act are not governed by Minnesota’s competitive bidding statute. Plaintiff disputes that the statutory scheme creating HCMC contemplates replacing competition with regulation. Plaintiff notes that Minn.Stat. § 383B.211 only enables the Hennepin County board of commissioners to provide medical services; it does not enable the board to regulate them. Similarly, plaintiff continues, Minn.Stat. § 383B.217(1) provides only that “Hennepin county may establish a medical center to provide hospital and medical services to the general public.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff then points to provisions of Minn.Stat. § 383B.217 that he claims specifically contemplate that the medical center will compete with other health care providers, not displace them. Subdivision 1 provides that if the board determines that health care services are better provided by other hospitals, it may pay the reasonable costs of those services rather than provide them itself and may even disband the center entirely in favor of providing medical services through some other means. Subdivision 7(b) provides that, notwithstanding Minnesota’s open meeting law, the board “may meet in closed session to discuss and take action on specific products or services that are in direct competition with other providers ... in the public or private sector, if disclosure of information pertaining to those matters would clearly harm the competitive position of the medical center.” Finally, subdivision 7(d) provides that “[d]ata concerning specific products or services that are in direct competition with other providers of goods or services in the public or private sector are trade secret information ... to the extent disclosure of information pertaining to the matters would clearly harm the competitive position of the medical center.” Plaintiff argues that these provisions in HCMC’s enabling statute establish the legislature’s intent that the center act not as a regulator, but as a commercial participant in the hospital market. Plaintiff asserts that the Hennepin County defendants engaged in two types of anti-competitive activity: first, they limited HCMC staff privileges to HFA physicians and second, they participated in the market allocation scheme. The first activity, limiting HCMC staff privileges to HFA physicians, is authorized by clearly expressed state policy. Minn.Stat. § 383B.217 specifically authorizes Hennepin County to provide health care services in the way the board deems most appropriate, to establish rules and regulations for the management of the medical center, and to contract with private organizations to provide medical services. Thus, the legislature clearly contemplated that HCMC would engage in the very activity that plaintiff challenges: determine who will practice at HCMC by contracting with private organizations to provide medical services. Indeed, as the Hen-nepin County defendants note, the legislature even facilitated HCMC’s ability to contract for medical services by exempting such contracts from competitive bidding requirements. See Minn.Stat. § 383B.145(4). Any restraint on trade flowing from contracts entered into by HCMC is a necessary and reasonable consequence of the exercise of its statutory authority to contract for services, thus giving rise to an inference that state policy favors such displacement of competition. Therefore, the Court concludes that any anticompetitive effects of HCMC’s contract with HFA or of its rule limiting staff privileges to HFA physicians are shielded from antitrust attack under the state action doctrine. The Hennepin County defendants would not, however, be immune from liability for participating in the alleged market allocation scheme. The Court agrees with plaintiff that the statutes creating HCMC contemplate that the medical center will compete with other health care providers, not displace them. Moreover, the mere fact that the legislature granted the county board authority to act does not necessarily confer on the board the authority to preclude others from acting. Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope Hospital District, 940 F.2d 397, 401 (9th Cir.1991). However, while plaintiff asserts that the Hennepin County defendants participated in the market allocation scheme, he has not come forth with evidence sufficient to support that assertion. Plaintiff states that “the record unequivocally demonstrates that HCMC in no way sought to, or did, regulate, supervise, direct, encourage, or make decisions respecting the anticompeti-tive acts of HFA Defendants.” PL’s Mem. in Opp. to HFA Def.’s Mot. for Summ.J. on Antitrust Claims at 14. As the Hennepin County defendants point out, plaintiff also admits that HCMC left provision of medical services entirely to HFA’s discretion and that the ESRD services allocated under the scheme were unrelated to the HFA/HCMC contract. Id. at 2. Finally, plaintiff states that HFA employees, not the Hennepin County defendants, were responsible for pricing dialysis services. Id. at 5. Plaintiff’s market allocation claim against HCMC appears to be only that HCMC knew about and acquiesced in the scheme. Plaintiff provides no authority for the proposition that mere knowledge of an illegal scheme leads to antitrust liability. In any event, he has failed to point to evidence that HCMC actually did know about the scheme. Plaintiff states that the HCMC medical director knew of the plan to allow only certain private nephrologists to follow transplant patients at HCMC, that he knew RKDP intended to create new dialysis units, and that he knew the plan was intended to locate the units where the nephrologists practiced. PL’s Mem. in Opp. to HFA Def.’s Mot. for Summ.J. on Antitrust Claims at 7-8. In fact, however, the medical director testified that he knew community nephrologists were permitted to follow patients at HCMC, not that only certain nephrologists had this privilege. PL’s Mem., Raile Dep. at 91-92. Moreover, the medical director specifically stated that he did not know whether the location of the new dialysis units were linked to where the private nephrologists practiced. Id. at 93. Finally, while the medical director was present at a board meeting in which an HFA physician presented a plan to open suburban dialysis units, he testified that he did not even recall the discussion. Id. at 102-03. Thus, it appears that HCMC, through its medical director, knew only that RKDP intended to compete in the dialysis market by opening new centers; plaintiff has pointed to no evidence that HCMC knew of an illegal scheme to allocate the ESRD market. In summary, the Court concludes that because the contract between HFA and HCMC was specifically authorized by statute, the Hennepin County defendants are immune from liability for any anticompeti-tive effects resulting from the contract. While HCMC did not have statutory authorization to participate in a market allocation scheme, plaintiff has not proffered evidence indicating that HCMC did participate in that scheme. Therefore, the Hennepin County defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the federal antitrust claims. B. Are the Hennepin County Defendants Immune from State Antitrust Liability? The Minnesota Antitrust Act provides that “[njothing contained [in this act] shall apply to actions or arrangements otherwise permitted, or regulated by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state.” Minn.Stat. § 325D.55(2). The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that this exemption from antitrust liability applies only to activities that are required or specifically permitted by the government. Minnesota-Iowa Television v. Watonwan Television Improvement Ass’n, 294 N.W.2d 297, 306 (Minn.1980). The Hennepin County defendants argue that because their actions were specifically authorized by state statute, they are immune from state antitrust liability under section 325D.55(2). As noted above, the Hennepin County defendants’ actions in limiting staff privileges to HFA physicians were authorized by statute. Therefore, the Hennepin County defendants are immune from state antitrust liability for those actions. While the Hennepin County defendants are not immune for any role they played in the market allocation scheme, plaintiff has not produced evidence showing that the Hennepin County defendants were involved in the scheme. Therefore, the Hennepin County defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the state antitrust claims. C. Does Hennepin County’s Immunity Shield HFA from Antitrust Liability? The HFA defendants argue that, to the extent plaintiff’s antitrust claims arise from the exclusionary effect of the contract between HFA and HCMC, they are barred by the state action doctrine. The Court has concluded that the Hennepin County defendants are immune from antitrust liability alleged to arise from the HFA/HCMC contract. Thus, the issue here is whether that immunity extends to the HFA defendants. As noted above, a private defendant seeking to invoke state action immunity must establish not only that the challenged activity was authorized by state statute, but also that the activity was actively supervised by the state. However, several circuits have held that once a municipality is found to be immune from antitrust liability, the immunity for that conduct should also be extended to private parties. City Communications, Inc. v. City of Detroit, 660 F.Supp. 932, 934-35 (E.D.Mich.1987), aff'd., 888 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir.1989); Cine 42nd Street Theater Corp. v. Nederlander Organization, 790 F.2d 1032, 1048 (2d Cir.1986); Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch v. Sida of Hawaii, 810 F.2d 869, 878 (9th Cir.1987). Recognizing that the state action doctrine protects state action, not state actors, these courts reason that to allow suits against private parties for actions immunized as to municipalities would allow plaintiffs to circumvent the state action doctrine and challenge protected municipal decisions through artful pleading. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has not explicitly addressed the question of whether a municipality’s immunity extends to private parties. However, the Eighth Circuit has held that where a municipality grants a contract under statutory authority, the state action doctrine precludes an unsuccessful bidder from pursuing antitrust claims against the successful bidder. L & H Sanitation v. Lake City Sanitation, 769 F.2d 517 (8th Cir.1985). In reaching this result, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that private parties invoking the state action doctrine were generally required to establish active state supervision. Id. at 520. However, having concluded that the municipality was statutorily authorized to award the contract at issue, the court did not impose the active supervision requirement, instead concluding that the award of the contract itself was immune from attack. Id. at 522. In the instant case, as in L & H Sanitation,. HCMC was statutorily authorized to award the contract for medical services to HFA and is immune from antitrust attack for that action. Under L & H Sanitation, then, the HCMC’s immunity extends to HFA, the party to whom the contract was awarded. A contrary holding would allow plaintiff to defeat the state action doctrine and attack a protected decision. Plaintiff makes a protracted argument that the HFA defendants cannot benefit from the Hennepin County defendants’ immunity absent a showing that the Henne-pin County defendants, and not the HFA defendants, made the “effective decision” that injured plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that because HCMC did not direct or supervise the anticompetitive acts of which plaintiff complains, the HFA defendants made the decisions that injured plaintiff. To the extent that plaintiff complains of the alleged market allocation scheme, this argument may have some merit. However, to the extent that the anticompetitive activity complained of is HCMC’s limitation of staff privileges to HFA physicians, HCMC clearly made the decisions that injured plaintiff, by awarding HFA the exclusive contract under which only HFA physicians could have staff privileges at HCMC. Because HCMC was statutorily authorized to award the exclusive contract to HFA, the contract itself is immune from attack under the state doctrine action. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment for the HFA defendants on the issue of whether plaintiff can assert antitrust claims against them based on the HCMC/HFA contract. D. Has Plaintiff Produced Sufficient Evidence of a Market Allocation Conspiracy? Plaintiff asserts that the HFA defendants have entered into a conspiracy with three private nephrology groups to allocate the ESRD market in the Twin Cities in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § l. In order to survive the HFA defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue, plaintiff must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the HFA defendants entered into an illegal conspiracy. Matushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). However, “[cjonduct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy.” Id. at 588, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. Thus, plaintiff must present evidence “ ‘that tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators acted independently.” Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 1471, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984)). In support of his claim of market allocation conspiracy, plaintiff relies largely on three pieces of evidence. First, he claims that RKDP’s transplant and dialysis facilities are shared by nephrologists of HFA and the three groups, and are closed to nephrologists who are not affiliated with those entities. Second, he cites testimony that, because RKDP’s St. Paul and Minneapolis dialysis facilities are full, some residents of those cities had to go to the Arden Hills and Edina units for dialysis. Pl.’s Mem., Sloan Aff. 115. Finally, he relies on the testimony of defendant Davidman, who stated that nephrologists “have certain, what they call, turf areas.... Turf areas are areas that nephrologists seem to be prominent in. And the other nephrologists say, I think, well, that is their turf, let’s not go after it.” Pl.’s Mem., Davidman Dep. at 298-99. Davidman went on to state that in assigning medical directors to head RKDP’s suburban clinics, RKDP selected the private nephrologists who had the most patients in the area of the clinic, that is, the nephrologist in whose “turf” the clinic was located. Id. at 300. Plaintiff asserts that the nephrologists of HFA and the three private groups respect these turfs, and that they therefore do not compete with each other for patients. Thus, plaintiff concludes, HFA and the three groups act as a single firm within the market, allocate patients among themselves, and preclude ne-phrologists who are not affiliated with HFA or the three groups from offering ESRD services in the Twin Cities. The HFA defendants dispute the existence of a market conspiracy on several grounds. First, they assert that RKDP transplant and dialysis facilities are open to patients of all nephrologists, subject only to the availability of space at the more crowded units. HFA Def.’s Mem., David-man Aff. 11 6. To back up this assertion, the HFA defendants submit affidavits of doctors not affiliated with HFA or the three groups who have used RKDP facilities. See HFA Def.’s Mem., Rubin Aff., Olson Aff., Ehler Aff., Duncan Aff. Second, the HFA defendants deny that any agreement exists to divide the Twin Cities market into turfs. The HFA defendants point out that defendant Davidman’s testimony about turfs merely reflects his speculation that nephrologists did not go after other nephrologists’ turf, and that Davidman specifically stated that nephrolo-gists from one of the three groups “basically go everywhere.” Pl.’s Mem., Davidman Dep. at 299. Davidman did not testify that these turfs exist by agreement, and in his affidavit states that he knows of no such agreement. HFA Def.’s Mem,, Davidman Aff. U 3-4. The HFA defendants also present testimony of the three groups that their decisions to concentrate their practices in certain geographic locations resulted from their independent decisions, not from any agreement with other nephrologists. HFA Def.’s Mem., Breitenbucher Aff. 114, Sweet Aff. 114, Husebye Aff. ¶ 4. Third, the HFA defendants assert that the evidence reveals that no geographical turfs actually exist. The HFA defendants point out that, contrary to the assertion of plaintiff’s expert that HFA does not practice in the suburbs, HFA has patients in RKDP’s suburban dialysis units. HFA Def.’s Mem., Lynk Aff. Tables 7, 8. Moreover, all three of the private groups have competing offices in St. Paul, and two of the groups have competing offices in Edi-na, Minneapolis, and St. Louis Park. HFA Def.’s Mem., Breitenbucher Aff. 113, Huse-bye Aff. If 3, Sweet Aff. ¶ 4. Fourth, the HFA defendants assert that in order to show a market allocation scheme implemented through RKDP dialysis units, the scheme would have to both assign all patients in a given geographic area to a particular unit and allow only one of the conspiring groups access to that unit. Unless both of these allocations were made, ESRD patients would have access to alternative competing nephrologists, and the market allocation scheme would fail. HFA Def.’s Mem., Lynk Aff. II26. The HFA defendants then point to their expert’s analysis of the patient and physician mix at each RKDP facility, which indicates that all patients in a given geographic area do not receive dialysis at the same unit and that no dialysis unit is patronized solely by a single practice group. Id. II29-39. Finally, the HFA defendants assert that no anticompetitive inference arises from the fact that doctors from the three groups have been appointed medical directors of various RKDP dialysis units. The HFA defendants proffer evidence that the director’s function is to supervise the non-physician staff and insure compliance with Medicare regulations. HFA Def.’s Mem., Davidman Dep. at 257-58. While the HFA defendants do not dispute that directors make policy decisions about patient care and establish protocols for medical procedures (Pl.’s Mem., McCormick Dep. at 14-15, Davidman Dep. at 7, 258), they assert that directors do not decide what patients are admitted to the units or make medical decisions for any patients in the unit other than their own. HFA Def.’s Mem., Breit-enbucher Aff. II8-9, Husebye Aff. 118-9, Collins Dep. at 52-58, 62-63, 142. Moreover, the HFA defendants argue that there are substantial reasons for RKDP’s decision to appoint doctors from the three groups as medical directors that are inconsistent with an inference of anticompetitive intent: the non-HFA nephrologists wanted to participate in decisions affecting the units where their patients were treated, and RKDP thus decided to appoint as directors doctors who had significant numbers of patients at the units and could therefore be expected to take their jobs seriously. HFA Def.’s Mem., Davidman Dep. at 262-63, Collins Dep. at 171. Plaintiff’s primary defense of his market allocation theory is that the HFA defendants have failed to recognize that HFA and the three groups operate as a single firm, and that their analysis of the market is therefore flawed. However, the HFA defendants point to evidence of vigorous competition between HFA and the three groups that refutes plaintiff’s assertion that those entities function as a single firm within the Twin Cities market. While plaintiff’s expert asserts that HFA limits its market to public assistance and Group Health patients, leaving to the three groups private patients (Pl.’s Mem., Sloan Aff. 113), the HFA defendants proffer evidence that HFA has patients that are neither on public assistance nor insured by Group Health (HFA Def.’s Mem., Shapiro Dep. at 53), and that one of the three groups is currently competing with HFA for the Group Health contract (HFA Def.’s Mem., Breitenbucher Aff. 1111). The HFA defendants also point to evidence that one of the groups has supplanted RKDP as the provider of in-patient dialysis services at three hospitals whom RKDP previously served and that another of the groups has done the same at a fourth hospital. HFA Def.’s Mem., Sweet Aff. II10, Breitenbucher Aff. ¶ 11. Moreover, none of the three groups relies on RKDP exclusively for dialysis services. HFA Def.’s Mem., Breitenbucher Aff. ¶ 5, Husebye Aff. 116, Sweet Aff. 11 5. One of the three groups has been particularly aggressive in seeking out other dialysis facilities; in addition to opening its own dialysis unit in Golden Valley, it was instrumental in establishing a unit at Abbott-Northwestern Hospital. HFA Def.’s Mem., Sweet Aff. 115, 10. In its first year of operation, the Abbott-Northwestern unit diverted seventy patients from RKDP, causing RKDP a loss of more than three-quarters of a million dollars. HFA Def.’s Reply, Davidman Dep. at 252, Collins Dep. at 153. Finally, defendants note that the three groups have no control over where RKDP opens dialysis facilities; RKDP opened a unit in Burnsville despite one group’s opposition (HFA Def.’s Mem., Breitenbucher Aff. 1110), and refused that group’s request to open a unit in Edina until the group threatened to find a vendor who would better serve it and its patients (HFA Def.’s Reply, Davidman Dep. at 468-70). Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing that there is a genuine issue of material fact that the HFA defendants have entered into a conspiracy to allocate the ESRD market. There does appear to be a factual dispute regarding whether the RKDP dialysis facilities are open to all nephrologists: while the HFA defendants have proffered testimony that the facilities are open, plaintiff has presented evidence, in the form of a letter barring him from HFA-controlled facilities, that he has been excluded. Defendant Davidman asserts that that letter was intended to exclude plaintiff from HCMC and HFA facilities only, that the RKDP dialysis units and transplant clinic are not HCMC or HFA facilities, and that plaintiff has not, in the two-and-one-half years since the letter was written, asked him to clarify the meaning of his letter. Plaintiff does not respond to this assertion. In any event, however, this factual dispute does not preclude summary judgment, for several reasons. First, defendants have submitted evidence that at least some nephrologists that are not affiliated with HFA or the three groups have access to RKDP facilities; thus, plaintiff’s exclusion does not, by itself, support the existence of a conspiracy to allocate the ESRD market between HFA and the three groups. Second, although plaintiff’s market allocation theory is based on the assertion that HFA and the three firms operate as a single firm, plaintiff has not pointed to evidence to support this assertion. The HFA defendants, on the other hand, point to substantial evidence that HFA and the three groups do not act as a single firm, but compete vigorously amongst themselves. Finally, the evidence plaintiff offers to support his market allocation theory — the testimony of one HFA physician that ne-phrologists had certain “turfs,” the fact that dialysis patients were put in units farther from their homes when nearer units were full, and the fact that non-HFA directors were appointed as medical directors for the RKDP clinics — is insufficient to give rise to an inference that a market allocation conspiracy exists. Aside from defendant Davidman’s speculation that Twin Cities nephrologists had carved out turfs that other nephrologists respected, there is no evidence that the “turfs” exist. Plaintiff, through his expert, disputes the validity of the defendants’ studies showing that the patients at RKDP facilities are not allocated according to geography; however, he submits no analysis of his own to show that the patients are so allocated. Nor does plaintiff submit any statistical evidence suggesting that physicians from HFA and the three groups limit their practices to geographical turfs. Indeed, defendants have shown that none of the entities charged with the conspiracy have turfs that are exclusively theirs. Moreover, even if patients and physicians using certain RKDP facilities were geographically clustered, that would not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy under Matushita, because such geographic clustering would be consistent with permissible competition: as the HFA defendants note, doctors may choose to limit their practices geographically for their own convenience, and patients may choose physicians and dialysis centers near their homes for the same reason. Plaintiff’s other two instances of allegedly anticompetitive conduct are similarly consistent with permissible competition. The fact that RKDP put patients from St. Paul and Minneapolis in suburban dialysis units is as consistent with permissible competition resulting in overcrowded city facilities as it is with an impermissible scheme to allocate patients to suburban turfs. The fact that RKDP appointed nephrologists from the three groups to be medical directors is as consistent with a permissible determination that doctors with more patients at a facility are better suited as directors as it is with an impermissible scheme to limit physician services on a geographical basis. Because plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the HFA defendants have entered into an illegal conspiracy, much less met his burden of presenting evidence tending to exclude the possibility that HFA and the three groups have acted independently, the Court will grant summary judgment for the HFA defendants on this issue. E. Has Plaintiff Produced Sufficient Evidence of a Monopoly? Plaintiff also claims that the HFA defendants and the three private nephrolo-gy groups have monopolized or attempted to monopplize the Twin Cities ESRD market in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. To prevail on a monopoly claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant possesses a monopoly power in a relevant market and that the defendant willfully acquired or maintains that power. Midwest Radio Co. v. Forum Publishing Co., 942 F.2d 1294, 1297 (8th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). To prevail on an attempted monopoly claim, a plaintiff must establish specific intent to control prices or destroy competition, anticompetitive conduct directed to accomplish the unlawful purpose, and a dangerous probability that the purpose will be achieved. Id. Plaintiffs monopoly claim appears to be inextricably linked to his market allocation claim; he does not argue them separately, but claims that “HFA and RKDP have conspired with the three independent ne-phrology groups ‘to act as one firm so as to assure their monopoly power, which is predicated on their control over the number of nephrologists in the ESRD market providing [ESRD] services.’ ” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to HFA Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. on Antitrust Claims at 19 (quoting Sloan Aff. 1134). Plaintiff defines the relevant product market as the market for ESRD services—that is, the market for long-term dialysis and kidney transplants. Pl.’s Mem., Sloan Aff. ¶ 11. Plaintiff defines the relevant geographical market as the Twin Cities metropolitan area. He then bases his claim of monopoly on the fact that “the dialysis supplied by RKDP is equal to approximately 65% of the market, and ... HFA and the Three Groups comprise well over 90% of the physicians in the market.” Id. ¶ 12. While the HFA defendants agree that the relevant geographical market is the Twin Cities metropolitan area, they define the relevant product market differently. The HFA defendants argue that plaintiff’s analysis conflates three distinct markets: the nephrology market, within which doctors offer their services to kidney patients; the dialysis market, in which operators of dialysis centers offer their services to ESRD kidney patients; and the kidney transplant market, in which renal surgeons and hospitals offer their services to ESRD kidney patients. HFA Def.’s Mem., Lynk Aff. Ü 8. Defendants argue that as a ne-phrologist, plaintiff competes with HFA in the first market; plaintiff does not compete with RKDP, which operates in the second and third markets. Defendants then point out that HFA physicians constitute eighteen percent of the nephrologists in the Twin Cities area, and serve only twenty percent of the dialysis patients in the area. Id. ¶ 10-17; HFA Def.’s Reply, Sloan Supp. Aff. 1110. As a matter of law, defendants argue, these figures are too low to support the existence of monopoly power (necessary for plaintiff’s monopoly claim) or the dangerous probability that the HFA defendants will destroy competition (necessary for plaintiff’s attempted monopoly claim). See Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 974 (8th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 961, 89 S.Ct. 2096, 23 L.Ed.2d 748 (1969) (twenty percent insufficient for actual monopolization); United States v. Empire Gas Co., 537 F.2d 296, 305 (8th Cir.1976), cer., denied, 429 U.S. 1122, 97 S.Ct. 1158, 51 L.Ed.2d 572 (1977) (forty-seven to fifty percent insufficient to show dangerous probability of success). The Court concludes that plaintiff has failed to adduce evidence sufficient to support his monopolization claims. Absent evidence that HFA and the three groups act as a single firm, plaintiff’s assertion that they comprise ninety percent of the physicians in the market cannot support his claim. Rather, in order to establish a monopoly, plaintiff would have to show that HFA physicians hold monopoly power; this he has not done. Moreover, the Court agrees with the defendants that in relying on RKDP’s sixty-five percent market share to support his monopoly claim, plaintiff has improperly conflated two distinct markets. Whether products are in the same market for antitrust purposes depends upon the extent to which one can be substituted for another; if buyers consider products to be substitutes for each other, that is, if the products are reasonably interchangeable, they can be considered to be within the same product market. H.J., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1537-38 (8th Cir.1989). As the HFA defendants note, however, the products of HFA and RKDP cannot be substituted for one another. RKDP provides dialysis services only; it employs no nephrologists and provides no physician services. A consumer seeking a nephrologist could not turn to RKDP to meet that need. HFA, on the other hand, provides physician services, including ne-phrology services. A consumer seeking dialysis services could not find them at HFA. Because plaintiff provides physician services, not dialysis services, he competes in a different product market than RKDP, and cannot rely on RKDP’s market share to show a monopoly in the nephrology market. Although the composition of the relevant product market is a factual question, summary judgment on the issue is appropriate if there is no material question of fact regarding the market composition. Midwest Radio Co., 942 F.2d at 1297. Because plaintiff has not presented evidence establishing that HFA and the three groups act as a single firm or that he competes with RKDP in providing dialysis services, plaintiff’s figures do not support an inference that a monopoly exists or is a dangerous probability. Therefore, the Court will grant the HFA defendants summary judgment on plaintiff’s monopoly claims. F. Has Plaintiff Suffered an Antitrust Injury? Finally, the HFA defendants contend that, regardless of the merits of plaintiff’s antitrust claims, he cannot recover because he has suffered no antitrust injury. The HFA defendants note that the antitrust laws were enacted to protect competition, not competitors. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 110 S.Ct. 1884, 1891, 109 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990) (citations omitted). Antitrust injury is therefore an essential element of an antitrust claim. Midwest Radio Co., 942 F.2d at 1297. When plaintiff was fired, HFA recruited a nephrologist from Stanford University to replace him. HFA Def.’s Mem., Lynk Aff. ¶ 41. Thus, even if plaintiff’s firing resulted in his exclusion from the Twin Cities nephrology market, the HFA defendants argue that there would be no injury to competition, because the number of nephrologists practicing in the Twin Cities was the same before and after plaintiffs termination. The HFA defendants maintain that because there is no connection between plaintiffs injury—the loss of his job—and injury to competition, his antitrust claims must fail. In response, plaintiff argues that he has indeed shown antitrust injury, because the HFA defendants’ conduct has created barriers that preclude nephrologists who are not affiliated with HFA or the three groups from entering the Twin Cities market. To refute plaintiffs claim of barriers to market entry, the HFA defendants point to evidence that the number of nephrologists practicing in the Twin Cities increased by sixty-nine percent between 1982 and 1990. Plaintiffs assertion that all new entrants are affiliated with HFA or one of the three groups does not negate the significance of this figure, absent evidence that HFA and the three groups operated as a single firm. Moreover, defendants have proffered testimony of numerous nephrologists practicing in the Twin Cities who are affiliated with neither HFA nor the three groups and who make minimal use of RKDP’s facilities; these nephrologists in turn testify that other nephrologists have joined their practices throughout the 1980s. See, e.g., HFA Def.’s Mem., Ehlers Aff., Olson Aff., Rubin Aff., Duncan Aff. The Court concludes that, in the face of this evidence, plaintiffs assertion of barriers to market entry is unsupported. Therefore, the Court agrees with the HFA defendants that, even if plaintiff had set forth facts reflecting the existence of a monopoly, his claim would fail for lack of antitrust injury. 11. The Contract Claims Plaintiff has brought breach of contract claims against both the HFA defendants and the Hennepin County defendants. He alleges that the Hennepin County defendants breached his contract by terminating his staff privileges without a hearing, and that the HFA defendants breached his contract by interfering with his treatment of multiple sclerosis patients and by immediately relieving him of patient care duties upon his termination. A. The Hennepin County Contract Article 8 of the HCMC bylaws allows the Hennepin County Board of Commissioners (the board) to take corrective action against a practitioner who engages in conduct that is detrimental to patient safety or the delivery of medical care or that is disruptive to HCMC operations. Pl.’s Mem., Bloom Aff., Ex. H § 8.1-1. Section 8.1-7 of the bylaws provides that when the board takes an action that “is adverse as defined in Section 9.2-3, the Chief Executive Officer shall promptly so inform the practitioner by special notice, and he/she shall be entitled to the procedural rights as provided in Article 9.” Section 9.2-3 provides: The following recommendations or actions shall entitle the practitioner affected thereby to a hearing upon his/her written request within 15 days after receiving notice of the adverse recommendation or adverse Board decision: (4) Revocation of staff membership (12) Revocation of clinical privileges .... It is undisputed that after HFA terminated plaintiff, he requested, but did not receive, a hearing from HCMC regarding his staff privileges. The Hennepin County defendants argue that Article 9 provides for a hearing only if the board takes corrective action under Article 8. They argue that plaintiff lost his staff privileges because HFA terminated his employment contract and because under HCMC’s exclusive provider contract with HFA, only HFA physicians were allowed to attend patients at HCMC. Because HFA, and not the board, took the action that resulted in plaintiffs loss of privileges, the Hennepin County defendants maintain that plaintiff was not entitled to a hearing under the bylaws. In response, plaintiff asserts that the bylaw provisions entitle practitioners to a hearing “when an adverse action occurs.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp. to Henn. Cty. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 23. Because revocation of staff membership and clinical privileges is defined as an adverse action under Article 9.2-3, plaintiff reasons, the bylaws entitled him to a hearing, and HCMC’s failure to provide that hearing constitutes a breach of the bylaws. The Court concludes that plaintiff’s reading of the bylaws is without merit. Section 9.2-3 states that a practitioner is entitled to a hearing upon notice of an “adverse Board decision.” (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff has pointed to no language supporting his contention that the bylaws entitle a practitioner to a hearing anytime an adverse action occurs. Moreover, plaintiff’s reading of section 9.2-3 takes the section out of context; read in conjunction with article 8, section 9.2-3 guarantees a hearing only when the board takes corrective action. Thus, it does not matter whether HFA or HCMC took the action that terminated plaintiff’s staff privileges, because any action HCMC took was not corrective action as it is defined in article 8. Because the bylaws provide for a hearing only when the board takes corrective action, and because plaintiff’s staff privileges were not terminated as the result of corrective action, the Hennepin County defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the contract claim. B. The HFA Contract Plaintiff alleges that HFA breached two clauses of his employment agreement. First, plaintiff alleges that HFA breached section 5.4 of the agreement, which provides that “in the practice of medicine, Employee shall retain independent judgment and responsibility to the extent required by law and medical ethics.” Pl.’s Mem., Bloom Aff., Ex. B. Plaintiff asserts that HFA interfered with his independent judgment and responsibility by prohibiting plaintiff from using the special HCMC hematology laboratory, which plaintiff believed was the only laboratory capable of providing him with accurate blood counts; utilizing an impractical and potentially dangerous machine procedure for administering the pheresis treatment; and stopping the tabulation of certain data that plaintiff believed was necessary to properly evaluate his multiple sclerosis patients. Pl.’s Mem., Bloom Aff. U19. The HFA defendants argue that section 5.4 did not guarantee plaintiff unlimited staff support or the right to dictate how equipment would be used in treating his patients; rather, it guaranteed only that he would retain the right to make professional treatment decisions in accordance with the dictates of law and medical ethics. They point to deposition testimony in which plaintiff elaborated on the changes in HFA policy that allegedly interfered with his independent judgment and responsibility. In that testimony, plaintiff stated that HFA refused to provide staff to transfer data from laboratory reports to patient flow sheets, so that plaintiff had to either use raw data or transfer the data himself; that HFA required him to use the RKDP laboratory rather than the HCMC laboratory; and that HFA required him to use a pheresis procedure that, while it allowed him to conduct his tests, was inefficient. Def.’s Mem., Bloom Dep. at 200-208, 217-22. These policies, the HFA defendants assert, affect only the procedures by which plaintiffs treatment decisions were to be effected. Absent evidence that plaintiff was prevented from obtaining the tests or administering the therapy he believed appropriate, they argue, the actions he complains cannot be seen as interfering with his judgment and responsibility. The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to come forth with sufficient evidence to raise a genuine question of fact regarding whether HFA breached section 5.4 of the agreement. The agreement did not guarantee plaintiff the right to exercise his independent judgment on all matters and at all times. Rather, section 5.4 of the agreement specifically subjected plaintiff to the control and supervision of HFA, with the exception that in the practice of medicine, plaintiff was to “retain independent judgment and responsibility to the extent required by law and medical ethics.” Pl.’s Mem., Bloom Aff., Ex. B. Thus, plaintiff retained only the degree of independent judgment required by law and ethics. Plaintiff has failed to argue—much less produce evidence—that law or medical ethics required him to retain control over any of the actions of which he complains. At best, plaintiff’s claim is that HFA made certain aspects of his multiple sclerosis research more difficult. The agreement did not, however, guarantee plaintiff the right to have his data recorded in a particular way or to use the laboratory of his choice. Nor did it guarantee him the most efficient methods of carrying out procedures. While plaintiff’s claim that HFA required him to use a machine procedure that was potentially dangerous could, if properly supported, be viewed as an intrusion on his independent judgment, plaintiff has neither produced evidence that he was required by law and medical ethics to dictate the machine procedure nor produced evidence that the procedure was potentially dangerous, beyond his conclusory allegation that it was. In addition, that concluso-ry allegation conflicts with plaintiff’s deposition testimony, in which he stated merely that the procedure was less efficient than the one that he advocated. Def.’s Mem., Bloom Dep. at 222. Because plaintiff has failed to argue or produce evidence showing that law and medical ethics required him to retain control over the HFA procedures at issue and because plaintiff has failed to point to evidence that he was prevented from carrying out his treatment decisions, the Court concludes that the HFA defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s first contract claim. Plaintiff’s second contract claim is that the HFA breached section 7(e) of the employment agreement, which provides that “HFA may terminate this Agreement at any time by giving written notice to Employee at least 60 days prior to the intended termination date.” Pl.’s Mem., Bloom Aff., Ex. B. Plaintiff received written notice of termination on April 13, 1989. The notice stated that the termination would be effective July 1, 1989, and it is undisputed that HFA paid plaintiff his salary until that date. However, the notice also relieved plaintiff of his duties and responsibilities immediately, ordering him to cease treating and examining HFA patients. Pl.’s Mem., Bloom Aff., Ex. C. The HFA defendants argue that the employment agreement does not confer a right to perform specific duties and that by paying plaintiff for sixty days after he received notice of termination, they complied fully with the agreement. The HFA defendants point out that plaintiff testified in his deposition that HFA had never promised him that he would perform a particular job, that his duties had changed from time to time during his five years with HFA, and that his supervisor had the authority to change his work assignments. Def.’s Mem., Bloom Dep. at 164-65. The right to assign plaintiff different duties, they argue, necessarily includes the right to assign him no duties at all. In response, plaintiff argues that the plain language of section 7(e) states that the agreement was to remain in effect for sixty days following written notice of termination. The agreement includes not only HFA’s obligation to pay plaintiff, but HFA’s obligation under section 5.4 to allow plaintiff to exercise his independent judgment and responsibility. By barring plaintiff from HFA and HCMC facilities immediately, plaintiff argues, the HFA defendants deprived him of his contractual right to continue making professional decisions about his existing patients for sixty days after receiving notice of termination. As the HFA defendants note, the general rule is that “[a] principal does not, by contracting to employ an agent, thereby promise to provide him with an opportunity for work....” Restatement (Second) of Agency § 433 (1958). Rather, absent evidence of a promise to provide an opportunity to work, a contract to employ represents only a promise to pay compensation during the contract period. Id. cmt a. The Court concludes that plaintiff has not pointed to evidence of a promise to provide an opportunity to work. Section 5.4 of the agreement provides only that plaintiff was to “retain independent judgment and responsibility to the extent required by law and medical ethics.” Pl.’s Mem., Bloom Aff., Ex. B. It does not guarantee plaintiff an opportunity to treat certain patients. Indeed, section 5.4 also provides that plaintiff was to be “subject to the control and supervision of HFA and the policies of HFA,” id., and plaintiff himself testified that HFA had exercised that control periodically to alter his duties throughout his tenure at HFA. HFA’s argument that the right to assign and alter plaintiff’s duties includes the right to remove those duties in their entirety is a persuasive one. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment for the HFA defendants on plaintiff’s second contract claim. III. The Civil Rights Claims It is undisputed that plaintiff lost his staff privileges when HFA terminated him, and that HCMC did not provide plaintiff with a hearing regarding the privileges. Plaintiff asserts that by revoking his HCMC medical staff privileges without a hearing, the Hennepin County defendants and the HFA defendants have deprived him of due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order for plaintiff to prevail on his civil rights claims, he must point to a property interest entitled to due process protection. Property interests do not derive from the Constitution; rather, “they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source.such as state law— rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). In addition to being defined by state law, property interests may be created by contract. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (a property interest in employment may be created by contract); Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 18, 102 S.Ct. 31, 34, 70 L.Ed.2d 13 (1981) (principles of contract law serve as useful guides in determining whether constitutionally protected property interests exist). To claim a protected property interest in a given benefit, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it; a need or desire for the benefit will not suffice, nor will a unilateral expectation of receiving the benefit. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that where a person claims a property interest in employment, he must point to some source, such an employment contract allowing dismissal only for just cause, that entitles him to continued employment. Id. at 578, 92 S.Ct. at 2709. The parties agree that in order to determine whether plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in his medical staff privileges, the Court must consider the contractual relationship out of which those privileges arose. They dispute, however, which contracts define plaintiffs interest. Defendants base their arguments primarily on plaintiffs employment contract