Full opinion text
ORDER SAM H. BELL, District Judge. Currently pending before the court in the above-captioned matter are four motions for summary judgment. As the facts which have given rise to plaintiff’s claims and defendants’ contentions are intertwined so, too, are the elements of analysis which pertain to any ruling on the motions presented. It is the intention of this court to address each of the motions presented in a single opinion rather than in separate findings. To do so necessitates some reflection of precedent opinion and, as well, some quotation from the record. The readers’ patience is requested in perusing a combination ruling. It is hoped that such an opinion in form may be superior to four independent opinions with a necessary redundancy in fact and legal analysis. Plaintiff filed his complaint in this cause on February 14, 1991. Count One of the complaint is premised upon an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement by plaintiffs employer, defendant Amweld Building Products, Inc. (Amweld), and upon breach of the duty of fair representation on the part of defendant United Steelworkers of America (the Union). Plaintiff seeks recovery under these theories pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Count Two alleges that Amweld failed to provide notice to plaintiff of continuation coverage under a health and pension plan in violation of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA), 29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq. On September 27, 1991, Amweld moved for summary judgment on Count Two of plaintiffs complaint. Plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment as to the same count on November 1, 1991. On October 17, 1991, the Union filed a motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs claim against it for breach of the duty of fair representation under Count One. Finally, on November 12, 1991, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the arbitrator’s opinion and award rendered on November 30, 1990; this motion is styled a “Motion for Summary Judgment on Request for Order Vacating Arbitrator’s Award.” All motions have been opposed by response briefs. The court will proceed, first, with an analysis of the factual background as revealed by the evidence in the record submitted to date. In this portion of the order, we shall also include an examination of the arbitration decision itself. The court will then address each motion separately, beginning with plaintiff’s motion to vacate the arbitrator’s award, then the Union’s motion for summary judgment, and finally the cross motions for summary judgment on Count Two. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff and the Union filed a total of four grievances against Amweld during the winter of 1990. The first, AWN-3-90, was filed with Amweld on January 29, 1990, and stems from at least two incidents involving one Tom Brest, Amweld’s Production Superintendent, on January 26 and 29, 1990. It would appear that in late January Brest informed plaintiff that he was required to view a safety film along with other employees. Plaintiff disagreed, and the grievance complains that Brest threatened plaintiff with insubordination and that “the Union feels Brest is unstable and his attitude will lead to further unnecessary confrontations.” Union’s Exhibit B to Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff and the Union demanded that Amweld post laws requiring the mandatory viewing of films and that Brest cease verbal abuse. Id. Amweld denied the grievance for the stated reason that it was not covered under the terms of the CBA. Id. This grievance was not pursued to arbitration and is not otherwise involved in the instant cause. On February 2, 1990, Amweld issued plaintiff written notice of discipline stemming, inter alia, from the altercation between plaintiff and Brest. Brest called plaintiff and members of the local Union into his office and rendered the discipline in person, while also giving plaintiff a written “personal report.” This personal report charged plaintiff with “egregious misconduct, loafing, being uncooperative and inattentive, misrepresentation, a pattern of blatant, insubordinate, disrespectful attitude and conduct towards Company supervision.” Plaintiff’s Deposition I at 57-58. This personal report gave plaintiff a five-day suspension with intent to discharge, effective February 5 through 9. Id. February 2 fell on a Friday; February 5 on a Monday. A grievance protesting this discipline was not filed immediately. Rather, suspension hearings were held on two separate days, February 9 and February 13, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement and at the request of plaintiff. Willie Hall, Union representative, attended these meetings on behalf of plaintiff and the Union. Plaintiffs Deposition I at 27. At the February 9 hearing, plaintiff was given an opportunity to set forth his version of what happened between him and Brest, i.e., to state all facts which he believed to be relevant to the personal report. Id. at 78, 82-83. Plaintiff also gave his side of the story at the February 13 meeting. Id. at 83-84. Each hearing lasted approximately one and one half hours. Id. at 82. At the hearing on February 13, plaintiff was presented with an offer of reinstatement by Amweld. Complaint at ¶ 26. This offer was in the form of a “Reinstate Agreement” and reads as follows: The parties agree that Tony Bruno’s employment with Amweld Building Products would be reinstated based upon the following terms and conditions. This agreement is the result of the disciplinary action issued Feb. 2, 1990. The period from the date of Mr. Bruno’s suspension to the date of reinstatement will be recorded as a disciplinary suspension. Reinstatement is without back pay or loss of seniority. Mr. Bruno acknowledges that his conduct was unacceptable and makes the commitment that he will take corrective action to ensure no future incidents of this nature will occur. It is understood that future violations of this nature by Mr. Bruno will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment. Mr. Bruno and the Union agree to forego the filing of grievances and/or other claims which have or may be made as a result of this issue. This settlement is made without precedence or prejudice to the Company and Union in any other disciplinary cases. Id., Exhibit 4. This offer was not accepted. Rather, on February 15, the Union filed plaintiff’s second grievance, AWN-7-90, protesting as follows: The Union contests Anthony Bruno’s Feb. 2, 1990 five day suspension, extended into a ten day suspension by the Company as premeditated and discriminatory, as the alleged charges are unjustified. Exhibit E to Motion for Summary Judgment. Thus, this grievance, in reality, complained of two events: the February 2 suspension itself, and the extension of that suspension from five days to ten days. On February 16, plaintiff received a letter from Amweld which the latter characterized as a “response to the suspension hearing.” Exhibit 6 to complaint. The letter, dated February 15, included the following “Reinstatement Offer” which is substantially the same as that presented at the February 13 hearing. As a result of the suspension hearing on February 9 and 12, 1990, the Company hereby takes the following action. The disciplinary suspension of February 2, 1990 is established as a 10 working day suspension with a return to work day of Monday, February 19, 1990. The 10 working day suspension period will be without pay or loss of seniority. It should be understood by Mr. Bruno that future violations of this nature will result in further disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment. Mr. Bruno by his signature below, agrees to return to work as outlined above. He acknowledges his conduct was unacceptable and makes a commitment that he will take corrective actions to ensure no further incidents of this nature will occur. Exhibit 7 to complaint. Plaintiff found this offer to be unacceptable and communicated this to Hall. Plaintiff’s Deposition I at 104. A “Step Three” meeting was held with regard to grievance AWN-7-90 on February 23, 1990. Plaintiff, Hall, and several local Union representatives were present at this meeting. Plaintiffs Deposition at 123. Once again, the confrontations between plaintiff and Brest occurring on January 26 and 29 were discussed. Id. Amweld, through one Glennard Pelphrey (Director of Industrial Relations), did not allow witnesses to come in and testify as to this subject. Id. at 124. Plaintiff does not recall discussing Amweld’s reinstatement offer. Id. at 125. Rather, he and the Union representative “wanted retraction of the personal report, we wanted discrimination stopped, we wanted full compensation for time lost.” Id. On February 28, 1990, Amweld denied grievance AWN-7-90. Along with a letter received by plaintiff on March 1 (complaint at II33), Amweld included this denial and characterized the events which transpired on January 26 and 29 as follows: Mr. Bruno’s actions on Friday, 1/26/90, and Monday, 1/29/90, were deliberate, intentional acts of insubordination and egregious misconduct which were serious and warranted the disciplinary action in question. Mr. Bruno specifically failed to attend required safety instructional meetings on two occasions on Friday, 1/26/90, lied to his supervisor concerning his attendance and was loafing while he should have been attending the training session. On Monday, 1/29/90, in a confrontation with the Production Superintendent, Mr. Bruno again displayed his defiant and uncooperative attitude when he was being instructed to attend the training session. He did attend the required meeting after being instructed to do so for the third time. During the training session on 1/29/90, Mr. Bruno was disruptive, defiant and refused to cooperate and participate in the program. His misconduct was observed by multiple individuals, both hourly and salary. Upon Mr. Bruno entering the session he stated in the presence of other employees — “Do I have to watch this shit?” He then proceeded to sit during the initial part of the training session with his face turned to the wall, refusing to watch the taped presentation. Further, approximately half way through the presentation, Mr. Bruno turned his head to the T.V. screen and began to engage in disruptive conversation with other employees to the extent that the presentation had to be stopped and Mr. Bruno warned to be quiet. It is clear from Mr. Bruno’s disciplinary record, as well as his conduct on the dates in question, that the disciplinary suspension issued by the Company was for just cause. Exhibit 8 to Complaint. In addition, in the letter plaintiff was instructed that, unless he returned to work within seven days “per the company’s reinstatement letter of February 14, 1990,” he would be terminated. Exhibit F to Motion for Summary Judgment. A copy of the February 14 reinstatement offer was attached to this letter. Id. Plaintiff returned to work at 12:16 P.M. on March 1, 1990. Plaintiff’s Deposition I at 132; complaint at 1137. Plaintiff did not understand precisely the nature of the February 28 denial of grievance AWN-7-90, due to the fact that the accompanying letter instructed him to return to work. Plaintiff’s Deposition I at 133-34. He thus returned to work, believing this the best course of action. Id. Immediately upon arriving upon Amweld’s premises, he approached Brest with several Union representatives and informed Brest that he was prepared to resume working. Brest, however, would not allow this until plaintiff signed the reinstatement agreement. Plaintiff recounts his conversation with Brest in the following manner: A. I returned to work and I called Dave Darbey, who was close, and asked him to get Rich Williamson and Bob Ulrich. Q. All of those people were working at the time? A. Yes. Q. All right. Then what happened? A. I said that I would like them to stay with me while I punched in my time card and asked Tom Brest to — to tell Tom Brest that I was here and ready to go to work. So, they came over and I punched in my time card. I asked Bob Ulrich to make me a copy of it, which he did. Meanwhile, Tom Brest came up the aisle and I explained to him, I said, “Tom, I’m here and I am ready to go to work.” He said, “Sign a reinstatement offer and you can go to work.” I said, “Tom, I’m here to go to work.” He said, “Sign the offer or go home.” I asked him again, I said, “Tom, I’m here and I’m ready to go to work.” He said, “Sign the offer or go home.” And I went home. I left at that time. Q. And why did you refuse to sign the offer? A. The same reason I refused the first couple of times, it was unreasonable, I didn’t really do anything. I thought that it’s gone further than it should have gone. The third step answer should have been final. I should have been allowed to return to work and I wasn’t. Id. at 135-36. On March 12, 1990, plaintiff and the Union filed their third grievance, AWN-17-90. This grievance protested Amweld’s actions of March 1, viz., not allowing plaintiff to return to work on that date unless he signed the reinstatement agreement. Grievance AWN-17-90 reads as follows: The Union contests the co. actions, March 1, 1990, taken against Anthony Bruno, by instructing his return to work, then not allowing him to do so unless he signed the reinstatement offer. The Union will not tolerate forcing an employee to perjure himself by signing an offer containing false and harmful statements and conditions in the attempt to circumvent the agreement and other employee rights. This deliberate, discriminatory action against Mr. Bruno, and the attempt at clouding and confusing the issue to do harm, is evidenced throughout, and the co. must cease and desist once and for all. Exhibit G to Motion for Summary Judgment. Two days later, on March 14, Am-weld terminated plaintiff by letter for his “refusal to return to work per the Company’s letter of February 29, 1990” and his “previous disciplinary record.” Exhibit H to Motion for Summary Judgment. The fourth grievance, AWN-18-90, was filed on March 15, and protested the March 14 termination. Exhibit I to Motion for Summary Judgment. This final grievance also charged that the March 14 discharge was untimely. Id. A Step Three grievance meeting was held on March 29, 1990 concerning grievances AWN-17-90 and AWN-18-90. The parties were unable to resolve any of their differences at this meeting. Plaintiff’s Deposition I at 158. However, on April 9, 1990, Amweld issued their Step Three answer to grievances AWN-17-90 and AWN-18-90, and in this answer again offered plaintiff an opportunity to return to work if he complied with the terms of the reinstatement agreement. The pertinent portion of the Step Three answer reads as follows: While the Company maintains its actions in this case have been for just cause, the Company, in consideration of Mr. Bruno’s many years of service, is willing to provide the grievant with one last opportunity to return to work as follows. The period from February 2, 1990 to day of return to work will be considered as a disciplinary suspension without pay. Mr. Bruno by his return to work acknowledges his conduct has been unacceptable and makes a commitment to take corrective action to ensure no further incidents of this nature will occur, with it being understood that subsequent violations of this nature will result in disciplinary action up to and including termination of employment. This last opportunity will only be available until Monday, April 16, 1990. Exhibit J to Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff did not return to work by April 16, and Amweld thereafter labeled plaintiff’s failure to return a voluntary resignation. April 20, 1990 letter to plaintiff from Pelphrey, Exhibit 15 complaint. On July 26 and August 14, 1990, grievances AWN-7-90, AWN-17-90 and AWN-18-90 were arbitrated before one Nicholas Duda (the Arbitrator). On November 30, 1990, the Arbitrator issued his opinion and award. In this opinion, the Arbitrator initially stated the issues presented as follows: first, whether there was proper cause to discharge plaintiff; second, whether Amweld discriminated against plaintiff because of his Union activity, his filing of grievances, or his oral complaints. In making his findings of fact, the Arbitrator first noted that plaintiff had been suspended by Amweld from July 27, 1989 to August 1,1989 for the following misconduct: Gross insubordination, use of profane and abusive language toward Company representative, has been absent from work without just cause, failed to report, gross misconduct, repeatedly made false, malicious, inflammatory, defamatory, and slanderous statements and allegations about and against the Company and management representatives. Arbitrator’s Opinion at 12. Then, the Arbitrator detailed the misconduct allegedly undertaken by plaintiff on January 26 and 29, 1990. The Arbitrator, initially, stated his Opinion that Amweld’s witnesses were credible, while the Union’s were not. With regard to the latter testimony, the Arbitrator commented as follows: The Company witnesses were accurate and without bias; they were creditable and persuasive. The same cannot be said about the Union witnesses. The Arbitrator notes that some of the Union testimony very closely matched detailed notes which the witnesses claimed to have written many months before, suggesting that the information had been recently memorized. Furthermore, the language used on the notes and in testimony by some witnesses was different than that used by the same witnesses in other statements. Also, the testimony between different witnesses, who had been separated was almost identical in vocabulary, verbs, tense, adjectives, etc. The events raised a suspicion that the witnesses were following a “script” written by someone other than the witnesses. Even if the Arbitrator had not suspected that someone had orchestrated the testimony, he did not find it sufficient to destroy or even significantly harm the overall effect of the testimony by the Company, if only because Grievant admitted much of the Company’s version, particularly about his conduct on January 26, 1990. Of course he claimed innocent misunderstanding or confusion. If the claim of miscommunication had been asserted by an inexperienced employee who did not also commit the other proved acts and did not have a disciplinary record of the type possessed by Grievant, the claim would be entitled to serious consideration. Given the specifics of the admitted communication, other proved items and Grievant’s long experience and history, his claim of innocence in respect to the facts he admits is highly implausible. Id. at 12-13. As to the events which occurred on January 26 and 29, the Arbitrator first found that Amweld required employees to view a chemical safety film because it, the employer, had been notified by the Department of Labor that it was in violation of Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations and because the collective bargaining agreement required it to inform employees of such safety hazards. Id. at 13-14. Two sessions of the film were held on January 26. Id. On January 26, plaintiff’s supervisor, one Foriska, notified plaintiff and another employee, one Maxwell, that they were to attend that day’s session, but Foriska was told by these men that they had attended an earlier session. Id. Foriska later found out through one Pam Mealy, who conducted the January 24 sessions, that these men had in reality not attended on that day. Id. Foriska then returned to plaintiff and Maxwell and instructed them to attend the January 26 film session. Id. The Arbitrator found that neither plaintiff nor Maxwell attended the January 26 session. Plaintiff was approached about this on January 29, and the Arbitrator relates what happened next: On Monday, January 29, 1990, the Company, in reviewing the training session attendance records, found that the Griev-ant and Maxwell had not attended any session. Production Superintendent Tom Brest, questioned Supervisor Foriska concerning their failure to attend. Foris-ka related to Mr. Brest what had transpired on Friday, January 26, 1990. Superintendent Brest approached the Griev-ant concerning his failure to attend. Grievant questioned by whose authority did he have to attend. Mr. Brest instructed the Grievant that the Company was requiring his attendance to comply with OSHA and Labor Agreement requirements. At this point the Grievant unleashed verbal abuse on Brest calling him a “Hitler,” a “Communist,” and a “Nazi.” On hearing these words from Grievant, Brest told Grievant that if he continued that behavior, disciplinary action similar to the discipline which had been issued to him in June 1989 would be forthcoming. Brest left saying he would be back with a specific make-up for Grievant. After establishing a time for the makeup training session Brest returned to the Grievant accompanied by Supervisor Tom Marshal. Brest informed the Griev-ant of the session he was assigned to attend. Grievant again made a verbal attack on Superintendent Brest, questioning his authority to require him to attend any type of session. Again Mr. Brest instructed the Grievant he was required to attend Grievant stated he saw that Mr. Brest had brought along his spy (Mr. Marshall). Brest told Maxwell to attend the same make-up session later that afternoon. Grievant attended the make-up session. However, the Grievant displayed blatant misconduct during the session, failing to participate properly and instigating such disruptive conduct the session had to be stopped. When Grievant entered the room, he asked Ms. Mealy, who was conducting the session, “Do I have to watch this piece of shit?” She told him he had to attend and asked him to sign the attendance sheet. He refused saying he would not “sign it against his will.” The Grievant sat with his face turned to the wall, instead of facing the video screen. While the film and audio played Grievant initiated disruptive conversation with other employees in the room. At that point, Ms. Mealy left the room to get assistance from other supervisory personnel. When management representatives came to the room, Grievant was still turned with his back to the film, talking with other employees. Operations Manager Paul Weymer, entered the room and turned off the film. He told the group the session was required and disruptions would not be tolerated. After a brief exchange between Grievant and Weymer, the session resumed. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Griev-ant was again asked to sign the attendance sheet. After holding the sheet for several minutes the Grievant scribbled something illegible across the signature line, it did not look like his handwriting or signature. Id. at 15-16. Due to plaintiff’s stated misconduct on the days of January 26 and 29, as well as his disciplinary suspension of the previous summer, Amweld found proper cause for discharge, and thus issued the five day suspension with intent to discharge. Id. at 16-17. Maxwell was given a three day suspension. Id. The Arbitrator characterized the events which occurred thereafter from February 2 to April 20 in substantially the same manner as the record reveals in the case at bar, see discussion supra regarding plaintiff’s grievar/'¿ó. Id. at 17-19. The Arbitrator found that Amweld’s conduct throughout this period did not violate the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and that plaintiff had been discharged for just and proper cause, and that there occurred no timeliness or due process violations. Id. at 19-21. The Arbitrator also found no merit to the Union’s claim of discriminatory treatment. Id. at 21-22. Neither did the Arbitrator find any evidence of retaliatory action on the part of Amweld for plaintiff’s Union activity. Id. at 22. Finally, the Arbitrator concluded that, although “ordinarily discharge would be upheld with little further consideration, ... severe discipline short of discharge is appropriate and reasonable” in this case. Id. at 23. The Arbitrator found it reasonable to order plaintiff’s reinstatement subject to the following conditions. 1. No later than December 14, 1990, Grievant may give Mr. Pelphrey a letter stating: a. Grievant’s willingness and desire to return to work; b. and his agreement that such return is on a “last chance basis” so that any violation within the next two years of a Company rule or any of Grievant’s responsibilities as an employee including any violation of the type committed on January 26 and 29, 1990 will subject him to suspension and discharge. 2. The Company may agree to such terms of reinstatement. 3. If grievant does return as provided in 1 and 2 above, the period of his absence will be deemed an extended suspension without pay and Grievant’s seniority will be restored. Id. at 24-25. Finally, the Arbitrator held that “[i]f the Grievant does not apply for reinstatement to employment as provided above, the subject suspension and discharge are found to be with just cause and the grievances are dismissed.” Id. at 24. While Count One of the complaint in this case alleges both breach of the collective bargaining agreement by Amweld and breach of the duty of fair representation by the Union, the court’s remaining factual analysis will focus upon the latter allegation, which is the only one put to issue in the Union’s motion for summary judgment. According to plaintiff, the following Union actions and/or failures to act during the course of the Union’s representation of plaintiff amount to breach of the duty of fair representation: 1)The Union did not protest the untimeliness of the “personal report” issued to plaintiff by Amweld on February 2,1990. Complaint at If 17. 2) The Union did not protest Amweld’s failure to give plaintiff a hearing prior to Amweld sending him home on February 2, which hearing is required under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at ¶! 19. 3) After the February 9 and February 13 hearings regarding the February 2 suspension, Amweld did not render prompt notice of its disposition regarding its decision as required by the collective bargaining agreement, and the Union did not protest Amweld’s untimeliness in failing to provide this prompt notice. Id. at 1HÍ 21-23. 4) The Union did not object to Amweld’s failure to return plaintiff to work on February 12. Id. at TUT 27, 30. 5) The Union failed to object to the reinstatement agreement presented to plaintiff on February 13. Id. at ¶ 27. 6) At the Step Three meeting of February 23, Amweld did not allow plaintiff to call witnesses or give evidential facts, and the Union did not protest Amweld’s actions in this regard. Id. at 1132. 7) The Union failed to protest Amweld’s March 1 notice to plaintiff that unless he signed the reinstatement agreement and returned to work, he would be terminated. Id. at II36. 8) The Union did not protest when Am-weld ordered plaintiff off of its premises on March 1 unless he signed the reinstatement agreement. Id. at ¶ 38. 9) The Union did not protest Amweld’s failure to provide plaintiff a hearing pri- or to ordering him off of the premises on March 1. Id. at 1140. 10) The Step Three meeting for grievances AWN-17-90 and AWN-18-90 held on March 29 was untimely under the collective bargaining agreement and the Union did not object to this untimeliness. Id. at 111142, 46. 11) Amweld’s Step Three answer to grievances AWN-17-90 and AWN-18-90, rendered on April 12, was not “final” and was not timely under the collective bargaining agreement, and the Union failed to object. Id. at ¶ 49. 12) To plaintiffs prejudice, the Union combined grievances AWN-7-90, AWN-17-90, and AWN-18-90 for purposes of arbitration. Id. at ¶ 51. 13) Over plaintiffs objections, the Union consented to have Duda hear the arbitration. Id. at ¶ 53. 14) The Union denied plaintiffs request to obtain his own counsel to represent him during the arbitration proceedings. Id. at 1154. 15) The Union made no arrangement for the preservation of a transcript or other recording of the arbitration hearing. Id. at 1156. 16) The Union did not object when the Arbitrator characterized all of plaintiffs grievances as “discharge” grievances. Id. at 1157. 17) The Union representative, Hall, failed to meet with plaintiffs witnesses until immediately prior to the arbitration hearing. Id. at 11 58. 18) The Union failed to notify plaintiffs witnesses of the date and time of the arbitration hearing. Id. at 11 59. 19) The Union failed to raise objections to Amweld’s untimeliness under the collective bargaining agreement, as previously alleged, during the arbitration hearing. Id. at ¶ 60. 20) The Union failed to object to Am-weld’s failure to provide suspension and discharge hearings during the arbitration hearing. Id. at 11 61. 21) During the arbitration hearing, the Union did not object to Amweld’s discharge of plaintiff for reasons other than those given by Amweld. Id. at H 62. 22) The Union did not object when the Arbitrator refused to permit plaintiff to speak, submit evidence, make objections, question witnesses, or otherwise participate in the arbitration proceedings. Id. at 1163. 23) The Union did not object when the Arbitrator permitted Amweld’s key witness to remain in the hearing room while ordering plaintiff’s witnesses sequestered. Id. at 1164. 24) The Union did not object when the Arbitrator attempted to intimate plaintiff into signing the reinstatement agreement prior to hearing plaintiff’s witnesses. Id. at 11 65. Plaintiff, finally, alleges that the above-described conduct on the part of the Union constituted gross negligence and bad faith representation in perfunctory, unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory fashion. Id. at 111167-69. Before scrutinizing the above allegations as called for by the Union’s motion for summary judgment, the court will first address plaintiff’s motion to vacate the Arbitrator’s decision. II. ANALYSIS A. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Request for Order Vacating Arbitrator’s Award Before the court can analyze the issues raised in the Union’s motion for summary judgment, the court must, as an initial matter, address plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Request for Order Vacating the Arbitrator’s Award (hereinafter plaintiff’s motion). The procedural posture of this case, along with plaintiff’s framing of the issue in his motion, necessitates this threshold inquiry. In his motion, plaintiff contends that the Arbitrator’s opinion and award must be vacated because it fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. The principle upon which plaintiff relies has its genesis in what has come to be referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy, which sets forth the standard to be utilized by federal courts when reviewing labor arbitration decisions. Under this standard, district courts are to afford substantial deference to the arbitrator’s decision. The court, in fact, is not permitted to overrule an arbitrator’s decision even where that decision contains factual errors, except in two narrowly circumscribed instances: It is well settled that the courts are generally required to refrain from reviewing the merits of an arbitrator’s award due to the policy favoring arbitration as a means of resolving labor disputes. This was established in the Steelworkers Trilogy and has been applied numerous times by this court. But there are at least two important exceptions to this general rule. First, “the arbitrator is confined to the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement, and although he may construe ambiguous contract language, he is without authority to disregard or modify plain and unambiguous provisions.” Detroit Coil Co. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 594 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir.1979), citing cases. Thus, the courts are empowered to set aside an award if the arbitrator exceeds these confines. Second, “although a court is precluded from overturning an award for errors in the determination of factual issues, ‘[nevertheless, if an examination of the record before the arbitrator reveals no support whatever for his determinations, his award must be vacated.’ ” Id. at 580-81, citing NF & M. Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 524 F.2d 756, 760 (3d Cir.1975). See also Timken Co. v. Local Union No. 1123 United Steelworkers of America, 482 F.2d 1012, 1014-15 (6th Cir.1973). Storer Broadcasting Company v. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, Cleveland Local, AFL-CIO, 600 F.2d 45, 47 (6th Cir.1979) (footnotes omitted). This rule and the reasons underlying it have been stated even more strongly by the Supreme Court in United Paperworkers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987). In that case, the Supreme Court reiterated the standard for judicial review of arbitration awards as follows: The courts are not authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract. “The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits of the awards.” Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 80 S.Ct. 1358 [1360] (1960). As long as the arbitrator’s award “draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement,” and is not merely “his own brand of industrial justice,” the award is legitimate. Id., at 597, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 80 S.Ct. 1358 [1360]. Because the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an arbitrator chosen by them rather then by a judge, it is the arbitrator’s view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract that they have agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts. To resolve disputes about the application of a collective-bargaining agreement, an arbitrator must find facts and a court may not reject those findings simply because it disagrees with them. The same is true of the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract. The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract; but the parties having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the agreement, a court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract. Enterprise Wheel, supra, at 599, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424, 80 S.Ct. 1358 [1361]. So, too, where it is contemplated that the arbitrator will determine remedies for contract violations that he finds, courts have no authority to disagree with his honest judgment in that respect____ [A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision. Id., 484 U.S. at 36-38, 108 S.Ct. at 369-370. Moreover, “[t]his highly deferential standard of review is perhaps most commonly extended to the substantive issue of what constitutes sufficient and reasonable cause for discharge.” Interstate Brands Corporation, Butternut Bread Division v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers Local Union No. 135, 909 F.2d 885, 889 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 1104, 113 L.Ed.2d 214 (1991). Finally, “ ‘procedural’ questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition are the exclusive province of the arbitrator.” Id. Thus, “an arbitrator’s procedural rulings must not be disturbed by a court unless the arbitrator’s error is ‘in bad faith or so gross as to amount to affirmative misconduct.’ ” Id., quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 40, 108 S.Ct. at 371. Plaintiff’s argument that the Arbitrator’s award fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement is based, first, upon the following proposition (plaintiff’s motion at 3-11): 1) The Arbitrator failed to consider matters raised by grievance AWN-7-90 and ignored contractual provisions relevant to a decision on this grievance, viz.: a) The Arbitrator ignored the provision of the agreement which requires Amweld to give prompt notice of the suspension prior to its occurrence (Article X, § 2); b) The Arbitrator ignored the provision which requires Amweld to provide a hearing prior to the suspension (M); c) The Arbitrator ignored the provision which requires Amweld to provide prompt notice of its disposition of the employee’s case subsequent to a post-suspension hearing {Id.). In sum, plaintiff maintains that these errors on the part of the Arbitrator were caused by the latter’s disregard for the true nature of grievance AWN-7-90 as shown by his labeling Amweld’s action a “discharge” rather than a “suspension.” Due to this error, according to plaintiff, the Arbitrator failed to consider the relevant portions of the collective bargaining agreement which ensure the employee the procedural safeguards attendant to suspensions embodied in the collective bargaining agreement. In the second part of his motion, plaintiff argues that the Arbitrator failed to consider the matters raised by grievances AWN-17-90 and AWN-18-90 (plaintiff’s motion at 12-14). This argument amounts to the contention that the Arbitrator improperly characterized these grievances as objections to the discharge of plaintiff, when in reality plaintiff was protesting Amweld’s attempt by means of the reinstatement offer “to force plaintiff to abandon his contractual right to appeal his suspension grievance through the arbitration process,” which attempt “is a working condition not contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement.” Id. at 12. A review of the Arbitrator’s decision establishes that, with regard to plaintiff’s first proposition (that regarding grievance AWN-7-90), the Arbitrator did not ignore the contractual provisions relied upon by plaintiff. The Arbitrator did, in fact, cite and discuss Article X, § 2 of the collective bargaining agreement. The Arbitrator held that Amweld conducted a pre-suspension hearing on February 2. Arbitrator’s Opinion at 16. The Arbitrator also found that the presentation of the reinstatement offer to plaintiff on February 12 amounted to a prompt disposition of plaintiff’s case subsequent to the post-termination hearing and that this satisfied the requirements of Article X, § 2. Finally, the Arbitrator concluded that plaintiff, in sum, was treated properly pursuant to this portion of the collective bargaining agreement. At the suspension hearing on February 12, Mr. Pelphrey said Grievant would be discharged unless he agreed to the terms that would be sent to him. That satisfied the requirements of Section 2 of Article X. Despite the explanation by the Company of its offer, Grievant mischaracterized the “Reinstatement Offer” to be a unilateral reduction from discharge to ten day suspension and made it the subject of Grievance 7-90. The documents which Grievant considered a ten day suspension was a “reinstatement offer” by the face and terms of the document. It was explained as such to Grievant and to other Union officials. Grievant knew or should have known from what supervision told him beginning on February 2, 1990 that he would be discharged for his misconduct unless he agreed to the reinstatement offer on a last chance basis. An offer to settle a discipline dispute on the basis of an agreement for extended suspension in lieu of discharge does not violate the Agreement. Grievant relies on the various Company letters saying Grievant “will” or “would be discharged” as showing that discharge was not timely imposed. Those letters were simply intended to emphasize to Grievant that the reinstatement offer would not be open indefinitely but in any event he had already been discharged within the terms of the Agreement after his suspension hearing. Grievant was given his suspension hearing and grievance hearings as provided in Article X. There was no violation of due process or any timely requirements. Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added). The Arbitrator, clearly, considered the relevant portions of the collective bargaining agreement in rendering his decision. The evidence indicates that, at most, the Arbitrator may have misconstrued the collective bargaining agreement or misapplied the facts before him. But such errors, if made, do not support the charge that his decision fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. As the Supreme Court has warned, “a court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract.” Misco, supra. In order to succeed on his claim, plaintiff must show that the Arbitrator disregarded or modified plain and unambiguous contract provisions. Storer Broadcasting, supra. With regard to the Arbitrator’s alleged treatment of Article X, § 2 of the agreement, this the plaintiff clearly has not done. Plaintiff’s second contention in support of his motion, that the arbitrator mischar-acterized the nature of grievances AWN-17-90 and AWN-18-90, also fails to support the request to vacate the Arbitrator’s Opinion. First, the Arbitrator specifically held that the reinstatement offer satisfied the requirements of Article X, § 2 of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 19; see supra. Contrary to plaintiff’s assertions, the arbitrator thus clearly considered the validity of Amweld’s offer held to the light of the collective bargaining agreement. The contention that the Arbitrator failed to consider the matter raised by grievance AWN-17-90 is therefore without merit. Whether the Arbitrator erred in this regard or misinterpreted the contract are not proper issues before the court. Misco, supra. Further, while he argues that Amweld’s offer is not contemplated by the collective bargaining agreement and that the Arbitrator erroneously failed to realize this, plaintiff does not set forth any specific contractual provisions allegedly disregarded by the Arbitrator in this regard. This he must do as a threshold matter in a suit to vacate an arbitrator’s award, Storer Broadcasting, supra. As to plaintiff’s argument regarding grievance AWN-17-90, then, there is no validity to the contention that the Arbitrator’s decision fails to draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. The same is true regarding plaintiff’s argument concerning grievance AWN-18-90. This grievance protested the termination of plaintiff by Amweld. The arbitrator specifically held that the discharge was based upon just cause and was not discriminatory. Arbitrator’s Opinion at 21-23. Plaintiff has proffered no evidence that the Arbitrator disregarded any specific provisions of the collective bargaining agreement when he drew these conclusions. Moreover, the Arbitrator’s findings of fact and his credibility determinations evince some factual support for these determinations. Under such circumstances, an overturning of his decision is not warranted. Misco, Interstate Brands, Storer Broadcasting, supra. For the foregoing reasons, the court declines to disturb the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award in this case. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, therefore, must be denied. B. The Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must consider the pleadings, related documents, evidence, and all reasonable inferences in a manner most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Smith v. Hudson, 600 F.2d 60 (6th Cir.1979). Rule 56 provides, in relevant part, as follows: (c) ... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (e) ... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Three Supreme Court cases have provided guidance as to the nature of the respective burdens allocated under Rule 56. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The ultimate burden lies with the non-moving party to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. “When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... In the language of the Rule, the non-moving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 56(e).” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-587, 106 S.Ct. at 1355-56 (emphasis supplied). “In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. The court in Anderson held that “the plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. This is true even where the evidence is likely to be within the possession of the defendant, as long as the plaintiff had had a full opportunity to conduct discovery.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. On the other hand, the moving party’s burden under Rule 56 is lighter. Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c) ... suggests the absence of such a requirement. Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552 (emphasis supplied). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Street v. J.C. Bradford and Co., 886 F.2d 1472 (6th Cir.1989) recently reviewed court decisions and commentary regarding the impact of Anderson, Celotex, and Matsushita on summary judgment practice. The court concluded that a “new era” in summary judgment practice has opened in the court system as a result of these opinions. Scholars and courts are in agreement that a “new era” in summary judgments dawned by virtue of the Court’s opinions in these cases ... On the whole, these decisions reflect a salutary return to the original purpose of summary judgments. Over the years, decisions requiring denial of summary judgment if there was even a suggestion of an issue of fact and tended to emasculate summary judgment as an effective procedural device. Street, supra, at 1476. The court enunciated the following “new era” principles, among others: as on federal directed verdict motions, the “scintilla” rule applies, i.e., the respondent must adduce more than a scintilla of evidence to overcome the motion; the respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must “present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment”; the trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 1479-1480 (footnotes and citations omitted). In its motion for summary judgment, the Union contends that the conduct which is claimed to form the basis of the alleged breach of the duty of fair representation on its part is either factually misrepresented by plaintiff or insufficient as a matter of law under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The court’s analysis which follows will focus in large part upon these two aspects of the Union’s argument. First, however, it is well to characterize the nature of this lawsuit and the statute under which it is brought, § 301 of the LMRA. Section 301 provides as follows: Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Under this statute, an aggrieved employee may bring what has come to be known as a “hybrid 301” suit against his employer and the union. The action against the employer rests on § 301 itself and is based upon the claimed breach of the collective bargaining agreement, while the action against the union is implicitly premised upon the National Labor Relations Act. Clearly, the case at bar is properly labeled a hybrid 301 suit. The Supreme Court has discussed the nature of this type of action as follows: Such a suit, as a formal matter, comprises two causes of action. The suit against the employer rests on § 301, since the employee is alleging a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. The suit against the union is one for breach of the union’s duty of fair representation, which is implied under the scheme of the National Labor Relations Act. “Yet the two claims are inextricably interdependent. ‘To prevail against either the company or the Union, ... [employee-plaintiffs] must not only show that their discharge was contrary to the contract but must also carry the burden of demonstrating breach of duty by the Union.’ ” Mitchell, supra, [451 U.S. 56] at 66-67, 67 L.Ed.2d 732, 101 S.Ct. 1559 [1565-66] (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment), quoting Hines, supra, [424 U.S. 554] at 570-571, 47 L.Ed.2d 231, 96 S.Ct. 1048 [1059-1060]. The employee may, if he chooses, sue one defendant and not the other; but the case he must prove is the same whether he sues one, the other, or both. The suit is thus not a straightforward breach-of-contract suit under § 301, as was Hoosier, but a hybrid § 301/fair representation claim, amounting to “a direct challenge to ‘the private settlement of disputes under [the collective-bargaining agreement]’ ” Mitchell, supra, [451 U.S.] at 66, 67 L.Ed.2d 732, 101 S.Ct. 1559 [1565] (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment), quoting Hoosier, 383 U.S. at 702, 16 L.Ed.2d 192, 86 S.Ct. 1107 [1111]. Delcostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164-65, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2290-91, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), citing United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966). In recent time our own circuit has reiterated the established rule that the two constituent claims in every hybrid action — breach of collective bargaining agreement and breach of a union’s duty of fair representations — are interdependent; if the first claim anchored in the employer’s alleged breach of the collective bargaining agreement fails, then the breach of duty of fair representation claim against the union must necessarily fail with it. As this court held in Bagsby v. Lewis Bros. Inc. of Tennessee, 820 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.1987): In this hybrid suit under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, to recover against either the company or the Union, [plaintiff] must show that the Company breached the Agreement and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 570-71, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1059, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976). Unless [plaintiff] demonstrates both violations, he cannot succeed against either party. Id. at 801 (emphasis in original); accord Adkins v. Intern. Union of Elec. Radio & Machin., 769 F.2d 330, 336 (6th Cir.1985). White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559-60 (6th Cir.1990). It follows from this reasoning that if plaintiff’s claim for breach of the duty of fair representation against the Union does not survive summary judgment scrutiny, then his claim against Amweld for breach of the collective bargaining agreement must also fail as a matter of law. See also Black v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc., 930 F.2d 505, 510 (6th Cir.1991) (“when the union cannot be held liable for unfair representation, of course, the employer cannot be held liable for breach of the collective bargaining agreement”). The Union’s motion for summary judgment and plaintiff’s response thereto suggests some misunderstanding on the part of each party concerning the precise standards to apply in a § 301 fair representation suit in this cause. An inquiry into plaintiff’s claim against the Union involves much more than an analysis of the alleged breach of Union duty under the circumstances before the court. It is necessary, additionally, that an examination be made of the relationship, if any, between the alleged duty and the Arbitrator’s decision. That this is so is made evident by a review of several relevant higher court decisions which will be discussed at length below. A reading of these cases sets forth the following principle of labor law: where the collective bargaining agreement provides for binding arbitration, where the Union has processed an employee’s grievances through arbitration, and where a final arbitration decision has been rendered, the plaintiff employee cannot succeed on his fair representation claim against the union unless he shows breach of the union duty of fair representation and a causal connection between the breach and an erroneous arbitration decision. The seminal case which represents this principle is Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, supra. In that case, the plaintiff employees brought a hybrid 301 suit against their employer and union alleging wrongful discharge and breach of the duty of fair representation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, holding that there was no evidence of breach of union duty and that the decision of the arbitrator was binding on plaintiffs and their employer, thus barring relit-igation of the wrongful discharge issue. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s finding that no factual issues existed as to plaintiffs’ claim for breach of union duty. Hines v. Local Union No. 377, Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers, 506 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (6th Cir.1974). The court, however, affirmed the district court’s conclusion that, in the absence of evidence of misconduct on the part of the employer, plaintiffs were barred from relit-igating the claim against the employer due to the finality of the arbitrator’s decision under the collective bargaining agreement. Id., 506 F.2d at 1157-58. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s affirmance of the district court’s judgment in favor of the employer. The Court reasoned that, where the union has breached its duty of fair representation in processing a grievance through arbitration, and where this breach has contributed to an erroneous arbitration decision, the employer cannot utilize the decision as a bar to the employee’s § 301 breach of contract claim against it. Hines, 424 U.S. at 570-71, 96 S.Ct. at 1059-60. In other words, an arbitration decision in favor of the employer is “reviewable and vulnerable if tainted by breach of duty on the part of the union,” regardless of whether the employer is guilty of conspiracy with the union or of other misconduct during the grievance or arbitration proceedings. Id. In so reasoning, the Court set forth an aspect of the nature of fair representation suits highly significant for our purposes. The Sixth Circuit has utilized the language of Hines which discusses the effect of an otherwise final arbitration decision tainted by breach of union duty, and from this language has prescribed a particular standard to apply in such situations. Where the employee seeks recovery from the union for breach of the duty of fair representation after a final arbitration decision in favor of the employer has been rendered, he is in reality seeking to vacate the arbitration decision; in such a case, the following reasoning is applicable: A court may not review the merits of an arbitration decision, even when the basis for the decision is ambiguous, as long as the award draws its essence from the bargaining agreement. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598-99, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361-62, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). Even in the event of a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation, an arbitration award is not quickly set aside. Kroger correctly asserts that to vacate an arbitration award on this ground, there must be two findings. First, the Union must have breached its duty of fair representation to the employee. Second, the breach of duty by the Union must have tainted the arbitrator’s decision. The breach must have contributed to the arbitrator’s making an erroneous decision. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976). Wood v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 406, 807 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir.1986) (emphasis added), cert. denied 483 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 3232, 97 L.Ed.2d 738 (1986). See also United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 61-62, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1562-1563, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corporation, 879 F.2d 1344, 1355 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied 495 U.S. 947, 110 S.Ct. 2206, 109 L.Ed.2d 533 (1990); Taylor v. Ford Motor Company, 866 F.2d 895, 896 (6th Cir.1989) (“When a dispute proceeds to arbitration with a decision in favor of the employer, the employee must not only prove unfair representation, he must also prove that ‘there is substantial reason to believe that a union breach of duty contributed to the erroneous outcome of the contractual proceedings,’ ” quoting Hines). In White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, supra, the Sixth Circuit further clarified this standard: Thus, the validity of any hybrid 301 claim is anchored as equally in a finding that the union has breached its duty of fair representation as it is in a finding that the collective bargaining agreement has been breached and that an arbitrator or its equivalent erroneously failed to rule in favor of the grievant employee. Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent teaches that a federal court’s jurisdiction to review an arbitrator’s decision is predicated on an allegation that the arbitrator reached an erroneous decision. As the Supreme Court has noted, in a hybrid 301 action, “the focus is ... on whether, contrary to the arbitrator’s decision, the employer breached the contract and whether there is substantial reason to believe that a union breach of duty contributed to the erroneous outcome of the arbit