Full opinion text
ORDER In these consolidated cases, the court is called upon to either adopt or create plans for the redistricting of South Carolina’s Senate, House of Representatives, and Congressional districts. Following tabulation of the 1990 decennial census, it was apparent the existing Senate, House, and Congressional plans could not be continued. Although the South Carolina General Assembly passed new Senate and House plans, those plans were vetoed by the Governor, the vetoes were sustained, and no compromise was reached. The .General Assembly never passed a Congressional plan. These suits were filed in an effort to break the legislative impasse. I BACKGROUND This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), and 2201; this suit being authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1973j(f) through 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. The three-judge panel was appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). The South Carolina General Assembly (General Assembly) consists of two bodies: a Senate with forty-six (46) seats and a House of Representatives with 124 seats. Senators are elected to serve four-year terms, while House members are elected to serve two-year terms. According to the Office of the Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, South Carolina is entitled to six Congressional representatives. It is primarily the responsibility of the General Assembly, subject to the approval of the Governor, to redistrict or reapportion the Senate, House, and Congressional districts. Redistricting is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination and judicial relief becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to redistrict according to federal constitutional and statutory requisites in a timely fashion after having had an opportunity to do so. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794-95, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 2354-55, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1394, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964)); U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2; 2 U.S.C. § 2c; S.C. Const. Art. III, § 3. We do not tread unreservedly into this “political thicket”; rather, we proceed in the knowledge that judicial intervention in the instant case is wholly unavoidable. In fact, judicial intervention in the South Carolina redistricting process has been frequently unavoidable. In 1984, the General Assembly ultimately fulfilled its constitutional obligation and passed a Senate redistricting plan only after a three-judge panel put an interim plan in place. Graham v. South Carolina, Civil Action No. 3:84-1430-15 (D.S.C. July 31, 1984). South Carolina’s Congressional districts were last drawn in March of 1982 by a three-judge panel. The General Assembly never passed its own plan; therefore, the court’s plan became the state’s plan. S.C. State Conference of Branches of the N.A.A.C.P. v. Riley, 533 F.Supp. 1178 (D.S.C.1982). The House of Representatives was last redistricted in 1981 without judicial intervention. This plan was pre-cleared by the Department of Justice and has been used continuously since. The results of the 1990 census, issued in March 1991, showed South Carolina’s population increased from 3,121,820 to 3,486,703 between 1980 and 1990. In addition to this increase, there were significant shifts in population, primarily from urban and rural areas to suburban and resort areas. Although there was, of course, no way the General Assembly could have foretold the actual results of the 1990 census, it can hardly be argued that the overarching result of the census — unconstitutional apportionment — was a surprise. Both the Senate and the House had sophisticated computer software and highly trained operators in place when the census figures were released. In addition, both branches were politically prepared, to the extent subcommittees were appointed, to study issues exclusively related to redistricting and ultimately to fashion plans on behalf of their respective bodies. Despite this preparation, the General Assembly was unable to pass a redistricting bill before the 1990-91 Legislative Session adjourned. The Senate had passed a redistricting plan for itself (S. 1003) as did the House (H. 3834), but neither body was able to consider the plan passed by the other before adjournment sine die. A concurrent resolution was introduced to extend the session, but it did not receive the two-thirds majority vote required by S.C.Code Ann. § 2-1-180 (1976). The Governor could have effectively extended the session by ordering a special session, S.C. Const. Art. IV, § 19, but he did not exercise this authority. On October 4, 1991, Michael G. Burton, on behalf of the Republican Party and other registered voters of the state, filed suit (the “Burton ” case) against the Speaker of the House, the Lt. Governor, the Governor, and the Executive Director of the Election Commission alleging the present Senate, House, and Congressional plans were unconstitutional based on changes in population and that the plans violated 42 U.S.C. 1973c. The plaintiffs also alleged legislative impasse. As a remedy for their claims, the plaintiffs requested that this court enjoin any future use of the existing plans and either approve the plans submitted by the plaintiffs or create new Senate, House, and Congressional plans which comport with federal constitutional and statutory requisites. In conjunction with the filing of their complaint, the plaintiffs requested a three-judge court be empaneled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a). On October 23, 1991, Congressman Robin A. Tallón moved to intervene as a plaintiff and on October 28, 1991, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Philip T. Jones, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek, and Gwendolyn L. Grooms (the “Vander Linden” defendants) moved to intervene as defendants. On October 31, 1991, the South Carolina Senate also moved to intervene as a defendant. These motions were granted by order on November 13, 1991 under the authority of Fed.R.Civ.P. 24 and Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v. Peninsula Shipbuilder’s Ass’n, 646 F.2d 117 (4th Cir.1981). On October 31,1991, the Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee and others filed a suit (the “SRAC” case) substantially similar to the Burton case and moved, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a), to consolidate the two cases. Consolidation was ordered November 13, 1991. The subsequent requests to intervene in the Burton/SRAC case by the Democratic Party of South Carolina and Kimberly Burch were also granted. On December 12, 1991, Bufort Blanton, Neil A. Vander Linden, Forrest E. Ott, Ann Y. Hart, Peggy A. Dufek, and Vincent Johnson filed suit (the “Blanton ” case) against the state government officers named in the Burton/SRAC case, as well as various members of the General Assembly, alleging the county legislative delegation system is constitutionally flawed. The Blanton plaintiffs moved to consolidate their case with the Burton/SRAC case and consolidation was ordered January 14, 1992. It was agreed before the commencement of the instant trial that the Blanton case would be bifurcated from the Burton/SRAC case insomuch as any claims involving the constitutionality of the state’s county legislative delegation system would necessarily depend upon how, if at all, the new Senate and House plans affected county lines. In addition, this court noted the causes of action raised in the Blanton case were not appropriate for consideration by a three-judge panel. Motions to dismiss and to stay the proceedings were filed by various parties throughout the pre-trial stage on grounds the controversy was not ripe. Essentially the moving parties argued the Senate and House were not at an impasse with one another nor collectively with the Governor and hope remained that plans acceptable to both the General Assembly and the Governor might yet be passed. When the session reconvened, under cloud of judicial intervention, both S. 1003 and H. 3834 were passed, separately, by the General Assembly. On January 29, 1992, Governor Campbell vetoed both bills. His veto messages urged the Senate and House to create more minority districts in their respective bodies and urged the Senate to enhance the minority districts which had been drawn in S. 1003. The veto message went on to express, ostensibly, the Governor’s desire to meet with leaders of the Senate and the House to discuss proposed changes to the two bills. The Governor’s vetoes were sustained. As for the Congressional redistricting plans, both the Senate and the House passed separate bills and a conference committee was formed to study the differences with an eye towards compromise; however, no Congressional redistricting plan was ever passed by the General Assembly. All motions to dismiss or stay were either withdrawn or resolved as moot at the February 10, 1992 pre-trial conference, and the cases were set for trial to commence February 18, 1992. On the morning of the 18th, confronted with the novel circumstance of hearing testimony and receiving evidence on the redistricting of three distinct legislative bodies, the court separated the trial into three phases: the Senate phase, the House phase, and the Congressional phase to be tried in turn. Confronted further with the unusual complexity and difficulty surrounding computer generated redistricting plans and faced with the prospects of drawing and generating its own plan, the court appointed Bobby M. Bowers, Director of the Division of Research of Statistical Services of the State Budget and Control Board, as technical advisor to the court pursuant to the inherent discretion of the court and under the authority of Reilly v. U.S., 863 F.2d 149 (1st Cir.1988). Five plans were proposed during the Senate phase as well as the House phase. To be expedient, certain portions of testimony offered during the Senate phase were incorporated by reference into the record of the House and Congressional phases. Trial concluded March 6, 1992. This court has considered the testimony and evidence received and concludes none of the plans proposed for the redistricting of South Carolina’s Senate, House, and Congressional districts fully comports with the objectives and criteria which should be incorporated in a judicially approved plan. Consequently, the court has drawn its own plans which satisfy all relevant constitutional and statutory requisites. The plan for each body is set forth narratively, numerically, and demographically following a discussion of the law applicable to this case. II SECTION 5 of the VOTING RIGHTS ACT Before discussing the individual plans proposed by the parties or the plans this court has chosen as an interim remedy, the court sets forth certain principles of law which guide our evaluation of the proposed plans and the choice of remedy. When enacted in 1965, Congress intended the Voting Rights Act to “banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting” by increasing the ability of racial minorities, primarily Southern blacks, to participate in the electoral process. At first, the goal of enfranchising Southern blacks was achieved through increased voter registration among minorities. Since 1965, however, the focus of the Voting Rights Act has shifted from providing minorities with equal access to the voting booth to providing minorities with an equal opportunity to elect the candidates of their choice. This shift is evident in the cases which have interpreted the Voting Rights Act and in the legislative history of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. Since this proceeding arises under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, we begin with a discussion of the law under that section. A Deference to State Policies Redistricting of the South Carolina General Assembly and the South Carolina Congressional delegation is, first and foremost, a state legislative responsibility rather than a federal judicial task. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 2496, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978). Nonetheless, as noted above, the court has concluded, based on thé representations of the parties and the evidence of record, that the legislative process was and is irretrievably deadlocked with respect to redistricting and that no plans could be enacted and properly pre-cleared through the United States Department of Justice in time to hold regularly scheduled elections. It is, therefore, necessary for this court to assume the “unwelcome obligation” of devising and approving redistricting plans for the General Assembly and the Congressional delegation pending some resolution of the legislative deadlock at a later time. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1834, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977); Wise, 437 U.S. at 540, 98 S.Ct. at 2497. Discharge of the duty thrust upon this court requires us to adhere more strictly than state legislatures to those constitutional and statutory standards governing the redistricting process. Wise, 437 U.S. at 540, 98 S.Ct. at 2497. A federal court must act “circumspectly, and in a manner ‘free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.’ ” Finch, 431 U.S. at 415, 97 S.Ct. at 1834 (quoting Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710, 84 S.Ct. 1449, 1458, 12 L.Ed.2d 620 (1964)). In fashioning interim relief where state political actors have failed to produce redistricting plans, this court, in both legislative and congressional redistricting, “should follow the policies and preferences of the State, expressed in statutory and constitutional provisions or in reapportionment plans proposed by the state legislature, whenever adherence to state policy does not detract from the requirements of the Federal Constitution.” White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795, 93 S.Ct. 2348, 2354, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973); see also Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 71 L.Ed.2d 725 (1982) (per curiam). Decisions made by “the legislature in pursuit of what are deemed important state interests ... should not be unnecessarily put aside in the course of fashioning relief. ...” Weiser, 412 U.S. at 796, 93 S.Ct. at 2355. While “[t]he remedial powers of an equity court must be adequate to the task ... they are not unlimited.” Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 161, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1878, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971). State policy may be found in a state’s constitution or in the legislative enactments of the state. S.C. Const., Art. VII, § 13, which provides “[t]he General Assembly may at any time arrange the various counties into Judicial Circuits, and into Congressional Districts ... as it may deem wise and proper ...,” reflects a state policy of maintaining the integrity of county boundaries in the redistricting process. See South Carolina State Conf. of Branches of the NAACP v. Riley, 533 F.Supp. 1178 (D.S.C.1982); McLure v. McElroy, 211 S.C. 106, 44 S.E.2d 101, 105 (1947). A historical analysis of the redistricting efforts of the South Carolina Senate also evidences this policy. In 1966, in the wake of the seminal Voting Rights Act case of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), the General Assembly was first confronted with the task of redistricting itself on the basis of population. The result was passage of a compromise plan which “divide[d] the state, along county lines, into 27 election districts from which fifty senators [would] be chosen.” O’Shields v. McNair, 254 F.Supp. 708, 710 (D.S.C.1966) (emphasis added). Thus, the Assembly was willing to enlarge the Senate to fifty members, despite a clear state constitutional proscription against such an action, to avoid cutting county lines. The Senate was next redistricted in 1972. S.C.Code Ann. § 2-1-60 (1976). There, the General Assembly made specific findings of fact and statements of policy included within its plan, the first of which reads: 1. It is the public policy of this State that counties, as constitutionally recognized political subdivisions of this State, shall be treated as basic units to construct election districts for the reapportionment of the Senate ... and it is the public policy of the State that in reapportioning the Senate ... county boundaries should not be disturbed.... Thus, in the quarter century since Reynolds the General Assembly has consistently stated, through its plans and specific statements of policy, that among the various state policies, preserving county lines should enjoy a preeminent role in South Carolina’s redistricting process. This preeminence is highly rational. As a final note, it was suggested at trial that the plans submitted by the respective legislative bodies were state policy and were entitled to deference. We need not decide this issue because none of the districting plans proffered to the court was enacted into law as state policy. See S.C. Const. Art. IV, § 21 (all laws require passage by General Assembly and signature of the Governor); See also Carstens, 543 F.Supp. at 79. Unenacted legislative or gubernatorial plans may only be considered evidence of “proffered current policy.” Id. B Equality of Population and Variances 1. Congressional Plan Redistricting plans for congressional districts are subject to stringent equal population requirements. In Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 2658, 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983), the Supreme Court noted, “Article 1, § 2 [U.S. Const.] ‘permits only limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown.’ ” Karcher, 462 U.S. at 730, 103 S.Ct. at 2658 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 1229, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969)). “[Tjhere are no de minimis population variations, which could be avoided, but which nonetheless meet the standard of Art. 1, § 2, without justification.” Karcher, 462 U.S. at 734, 103 S.Ct. at 2660. Karcher sets forth a two-pronged inquiry for assessing any variation in districts from a standard of equality: (1) Does a plan represent a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population; and (2) Is any “significant” variance between districts necessary to achieve some legitimate state goal? Id. at 731, 103 S.Ct. at 2658; Anne Arundel County Republican Central Committee v. State Administrative Board of Election Laws, 781 F.Supp. 394, 396 (D.Md.1991). The first prong of the Karcher test is essentially a comparative exercise: What are the deviations from equality existing in the proffered plans? Cf Karcher, 462 U.S. at 739-40, 103 S.Ct. at 2662-63 (alternate plans with lower population deviation were presented to legislature); Hastert v. State Board of Elections, 777 F.Supp. 634, 644 (N.D.Ill.1991) (two plans compared for deviation). As to the second prong of the test, important state goals justifying “significant” variations include, but are not necessarily limited to, “making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives.” Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. at 2663. 2. General Assembly Plans The rigorous standard of population equality demanded of congressional districts under U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 2, is not equally applicable to redistricting of state legislative districts. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 732-33, 103 S.Ct. at 2659-60. Such districts are governed by the one man, one vote principle inherent in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). After holding both houses of a state legislature must make an honest and good faith effort to apportion on the basis of nearly equal population, Id. at 577, 84 S.Ct. at 1389, the Reynolds Court explained its reasoning by adding “we realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange' legislative districts so that each one has an identical number of residents, or citizens or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement.” Id. Thus, in redistricting state assemblies, “both houses of the state legislature must be apportioned so that districts are ‘as nearly of equal population as is practicable.’ ” Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 22, 95 S.Ct. 751, 763, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. at 1390). “[Substantial compliance” with the goal of equality, not absolute arithmetic equality, is required. Chapman, 420 U.S. at 22, 95 S.Ct. at 763. Unlike redistricting of congressional districts, the Supreme Court has specifically acknowledged that de minimis variation in state legislative districts is permissible in court-devised redistricting plans for such assemblies. Id. at 26-27, 95 S.Ct. at 765-66; Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. at 414, 97 S.Ct. at 1833. An explanation of and the development of this standard is set forth below. Technology is such today that precise population equality is not only possible but commonplace in state redistricting plans. Thus, the focus has shifted from a question of what can practicably be done to a question of what is desirable within a redistricting process. Despite technology cal modernity, state legislatures remain free to apportion themselves outside the boundaries of mathematical precision, but only if the deviation is “minor” and “based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.” Chapman, 420 U.S. at 23-24, 95 S.Ct. at 764. (explaining Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 815, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973) and quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 579, 84 S.Ct. at 1391)). As a general rule, a legislatively enacted apportionment plan with a maximum deviation under 10 percent falls within this category of minor deviations, Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 2695, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983), whereas a plan with larger disparities in population creates a prima facie case of discrimination and must therefore be justified by the state. Id. at 842-43, 103 S.Ct. at 2695-96. The function of this court, however, is much different from that of a state legislature. It is axiomatic by now that redistricting is primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 2496, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978). This is chiefly because a state legislature is. better situated to identify and recommend traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of substantial population equality. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. at 414-15, 97 S.Ct. at 1833-34. In sharp contrast, this court possesses no distinctive mandate to compromise potentially conflicting state redistricting policies in the people’s name. Id. at 415, 97 S.Ct. at 1834. Rather, we are admonished to “achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation.” Chapman, 420 U.S. at 27, 95 S.Ct. at 766. Given that compliance with the principles of one man, one vote is the preeminent concern of court-ordered plans, the very real possibility exists that certain state policies will be compromised in a court-ordered plan which could have been better served had judicial intervention not been necessary. Although all concede this process is to be guided by the de minimis standard, this standard should be clearly elucidated. Chapman, the seminal case on court-ordered redistricting plans for state ■ legislatures, holds merely this: ' ... unless there are persuasive justifications, a court-ordered reapportionment plan of a state legislature must avoid use of multimember districts, and, as well, must ordinarily achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation, [footnote omitted]. Where important and significant state considerations rationally mandate departure from these standards, it is the reapportioning court’s responsibility to articulate precisely why a plan of single-member districts with minimal population variance cannot be adopted. Id. at 26-27, 95 S.Ct. at 766. There is no definition or demarcation of the de minimis standard offered except to say district courts are not required to “attain the mathematical preciseness required for congressional redistricting.” Id. at 27 n. 19, 95 S.Ct. at 766 n. 19. While population equality may well have been the goal of the Chapman Court, it was not the requirement. Rather, the opinion clearly states “[w]ith a court-ordered plan, any deviation from approximate population equality must be supported by enunciation of historically significant state policy or unique features.” Id. at 26, 95 S.Ct. at 765-66. Thus, this quote equates approximate population equality directly with the de minimis standard. In sum, the de minimis standard is approximate population equality, not exact population equality coupled with justification. ' Under this theory, there are but three types of court-ordered state redistricting plans: 1) those plans which meet the standard of de minimis deviation, 2) those plans which do not meet the de min-imis standard but whose departure is justified by the court; and 3) those plans which neither meet the standard nor are justified. A non-exhaustive list of state policy factors which might justify greater than de min-imis variations includes: maintenance of county or other political subdivision boundaries, Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. at 419, 97 S.Ct. at 1836; compactness and contiguity of legislative districts; and recognition of historical and natural boundaries, Meier, 420 U.S. at 23, 95 S.Ct.. at 764. See also Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. at 2663 (listing factors justifying possible deviations from equality). If a plan meets the de minimis standard, there need not be any discussion of state policy unless there are other plans which are constitutionally acceptable. Then, of course, a discussion of a state’s policies and unique features is relevant, and in fact necessary, to determine which of the constitutionally acceptable plans best serves those policies or unique features. Importantly, the standard by which the court chooses from among acceptable plans is not the same standard by which a court would have to justify departure from the de minimis standard in the first instance. Cf. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. at 420-421, 97 S.Ct. at 1836-37. If the court must, as some assert, elucidate the reasons behind any departure from exact population equality and articulate clearly the relationship between the deviation and the state policy furthered, then there is no cognizable distinction between the de minimis standard and the standard for congressional redistricting. Assuredly, this was not the aim of the Chapman Court as footnote 19 clearly evidences. As support for this footnote, the Court cited a litany of cases, including Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 89 S.Ct. 1225, 22 L.Ed.2d 519 (1969), in which the Court refused an invitation to apply the de minimis standard to congressional redistricting. In discussing the proposed de minimis standard in Kirkpatrick, the Court offered an illuminating, if not dispos-itive, description of the de minimis standard: We reject Missouri’s argument that there is a fixed numerical or percentage population variance small enough to be considered de minimis and to satisfy without question the ‘as nearly as practicable’ standard. The whole thrust of the ‘nearly as practicable’ approach is inconsistent with the adoption of fixed numerical standards which excuse population variances without regard to the circumstances of each particular case ... There are other reasons for rejecting the de minimis approach. We can- see no nonarbitrary way to pick a cutoff point at which population variances suddenly become de minimis. Id. at 530-31, 89 S:Ct. at 1228-29. Thus, it is clear the Chapman Court knew full well that the advantages, or disadvantages, of the de minimis standard included “a fixed numerical or percentage population variance small enough to be considered de minimis ... without question.” Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530, 89 S.Ct. at 1228. (emphasis added). Not only did the Chapman Court not take pains to distinguish the characteristics proposed in Kirkpatrick, which dealt with congressional plans, it cited to Kirkpatrick immediately upon announcing the new rule for court-ordered plans for state legislatures. Chapman, 420 U.S. at 27 n. 19, 95 S.Ct. at 766 n. 19. Thus, it is patently clear to this court the de minimis standard, with regard to state legislative bodies, “excuse[s] population variances without regard to the circumstances of each particular case,” which is precisely what the Chapman opinion intended. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 530, 89 S.Ct. at 1228. (emphasis added). [18] In addition to representing a lucid reading of Chapman and Kirkpatrick, this conclusion protects the established trichoto-my between state legislative plans enacted by state legislatures, state legislative plans ordered by courts, and congressional reapportionment plans. We conclude, without quantifying the de minimis standard, that the standard lies somewhere between the 10 percent presumption of Brown and the mathematical preciseness required for congressional redistricting under Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), and in the opinion of this court, it lies closer to Wesberry than Brown. C Dilution of Minority Voting Opportunities The redistricting of the General Assembly and the Congressional delegation of the state reflects a change in voting procedures and practices which would require preclearance under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, if the General Assembly and Governor had discharged their respective duties in such manner that redistricting plans were enacted. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 535, 93 S.Ct. 1702, 1708, 36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973). Because, as set forth below, the court does not adopt any plan proffered to the court by the parties in toto, but rather has fashioned its own remedial plans as to the General Assembly and congressional seats, such preclearance is not required for the court’s plans to take effect. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 138, 101 S.Ct. 2224, 2230, 68 L.Ed.2d 724 (1981) (“[T]he Act’s preelearance requirement does not apply to plans prepared and adopted by a federal court to remedy a constitutional violation”). In fashioning relief, however, the court must be cognizant of § 5 concerns that voting changes have neither the “purpose ... [nor] the effect-of denying or abridging the right to vote” on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. See McDaniel, 452 U.S. at 148-49, 101 S.Ct. at 2235-36. We take it as a given that this court, in fashioning its remedy, is not acting with a racially discriminatory purpose. See Seamon v. Upham, 536 F.Supp. 931, 944 (E.D.Tex), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub. nom., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 71 L.Ed.2d 725 (1982) (per curiam). In assessing a proposed plan for discriminatory effect under § 5, the Supreme Court has set forth a “retrogression” standard. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 1363, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976); City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 103 S.Ct. 998, 74 L.Ed.2d 863 (1983). As set forth in Beer, the application of retrogression analysis is “straightforward.” Id., 425 U.S. at 142, 96 S.Ct. at 1364. In Beer, the Supreme Court compared “the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise” under the plan of apportionment as it existed immediately before the proposed change and the position of racial minorities after implementation of the change. Id. at 142, 96 S.Ct. at 1364. Thus, where under the old plan no district had a majority of minority population or voters; and under the new plan two districts had majority-minority populations, and one of those districts also contained a majority of minority voters, no retrogression occurred and the plan was valid under § 5. Id.; See also City of Lockhart, 460 U.S. at 135, 103 S.Ct. at 1004 (where minorities are m at least the same position with respect to electoral opportunities before and after a change, no retrogression occurs). Thus, retrogression refers to diminution in minority opportunity from what it had been under an earlier plan. See discussion, infra, regarding “majority/opportunity” districts, page 1354. The Department of Justice regulations pertaining to retrogression utilize this same benchmark: “In determining whether a submitted change is retrogressive the Attorney General will normally compare the submitted change to the voting practice or procedure in effect at the time of the submission.” 28 C.F.R. § 51.54 (1991). [21] The court notes two permissible bases and one false basis for assessing retrogression. Retrogression may be measured by simply comparing the gross number of districts with minority population and voting majorities in the old plan and the number of such districts drawn in the proposed plan. This was essentially the approach taken in Beer. See also Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1402 n. 2 (7th Cir.1984). There are two possible points at which to measure minority voting opportunities under an old plan: (1) at the time the old plan was originally drawn, or (2) at the time the new plan is proposed to replace the old plan. The point is illustrated by reference to the old General Assembly plans in this case. As originally drawn using 1980 census figures, the State Senate contained ten districts with total black population majorities; the State House of Representative contained 26 such districts. When 1990 census figures are applied to the Senate districts, each retains a majority black population, though the total percentage of blacks decreased in .three of the ten districts as a result of “natural retrogression.” See, supra, note 34. In the State House, application of the 1990 figures shows that eight of the districts declined in percentage of black population, and two districts actually became majority white districts. Id. This “natural retrogression” reflects either black emigration from existing black majority districts in greater proportion than whites (House Dist. 110 Charleston County), or án influí of proportionally greater numbers of whites into a district (House Dist. 49, Rock Hill, York County). The Department of Justice regulations suggest that use of the most current census data as applied to the old plan serves as an appropriate benchmark from which to measure the effect of the new plan: In determining whether a submitted change is retrogressive the Attorney General will normally compare the submitted change to the voting practice or procedure in effect at the time of submission .... The Attorney General will make the comparison based on the conditions existing at the time of the submission. 28 C.F.R. § 51.54 (1990) (emphasis added); See also Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1402. A second possible and permissible means of evaluating retrogression could involve a district by district comparison of black population and voting age population in the old and new plans. This comparison, however, has great potential to mislead. Where a new plan does not substantially reincorporate the geographic territory of black majority districts from the old plan, the comparison diminishes in value. Where, as in South Carolina, black majority districts are generally geographically contiguous and have suffered dramatic declines in population through natural retrogression, see note 34, supra, it may be necessary to shift black population from one district to another, or bring additional white population into a district to satisfy one man, one vote constitutional requirements. Such shifting of population can make district by district comparisons meaningless. Consequently, the court looked first to retrogression in' the total number of districts in a given plan and only then to decreases in population within a given district, where meaningful comparisons, if any, could be made. The erroneous basis for measuring retrogression, urged upon the court by certain parties to this suit, is to compare proffered plans one to another without reference to the existing plan. This proposed methodology is flawed in at least two respects. First, it has no basis in case law, the statutes, or § 5 regulations. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 142, 96 S.Ct. at 1364 (comparison of proposed plan to existing plan); City of Lockhart, 460 U.S. at .134-36, 103 S.Ct. at 1004-05 (same); Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1402 (same); 28 C.F.R. § 51.54(b) (benchmark is the old plan). Second, such methodology serves as a “racial ratchet,” which presumes that the plan offering the greatest number of black majority districts is, for that reason alone and regardless of all other considerations, the benchmark against which all other plans must be measured. Such an approach enshrines the notion that the Voting Rights Act insures proportional representation by race, a proposition that flies squarely in the face of case law and statute. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 141, 96 S.Ct. at 1363; 42 U.S.C. § 1973b. Ill SECTION 2 of the VOTING RIGHTS ACT As previously noted, this proceeding arises under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. While the provisions of § 5 are directed at specific jurisdictions, the provisions of § 2 are national in scope. Nevertheless, sections 2 and 5 of the Act are not necessarily mutually exclusive and the court has been guided by several aspects of § 2 in developing its remedy. A brief history of the evolution of § 2 is discussed herein and the relationship between sections 2 and 5 is discussed more fully below. A 1982 Amendments As amended and in pertinent part, § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 protects the voting rights of members of protected classes and language minorities and reads as follows: (a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b). (b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the state or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one “circumstance” which may be considered, provided that nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. As originally passed, the language of § 2 was intended to parallel the language of the Fifteenth Amendment. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60-61, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 1495-96, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980) (plurality opinion). Based on this parallel, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff was required to prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of § 2. Id. at 62, 71, 100 S.Ct. at 1497, 1501. In response to the Supreme Court's ruling in City of Mobile v. Bolden, Congress amended § 2 in 1982 to include a “results,” or “effects,” test to determine if racial vote dilution has occurred. See Senate Report at 27; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2758, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). B Thornburg v. Gingles In 1986, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the amendments to § 2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). Gingles involved a § 2 challenge to the use of mul-ti-member districts in North Carolina. The Court held that “[t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Id. at 47, 106 S.Ct. at 2764. In determining if a § 2 violation has occurred, “a court must assess the impact of the contested structure or practice on minority electoral opportunities ‘on the basis of objective factors.’ ” Id. at 44, 106 S.Ct. at 2763 (quoting Senate Report at 27). The Court then reiterated, the list of “typical” factors which may be relevant to, and probative of, a § 2 claim as set forth in the Senate Report. Now known as the “Senate factors,” these factors are: 1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touches the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process; 2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized; 3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group; 4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process; 5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals; 7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. Additional factors that in some cases have added probative value as part of plaintiffs’ evidence to establish a violation are: whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness oh the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group', whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision’s use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. Id. '.at 37, 45, 106 S.Ct. at 2759, 2763. The Court noted, as did the Senate Report, that this list is not exhaustive, nor is it required that any number of factors be proved, and other factors may be relevant. Id. at 45, 106 S.Ct. at 2763. The Court did note, however, that “the most important Senate Report factors bearing on § 2 challenges to multi-member districts are the ‘extent to which minority group members have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction’ and the ‘extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.’ ” Id. at 49 n. 15, 106 S.Ct. at 2765 n. 15. The Court, however, set forth important limitations on the extent to which these factors establish liability under § 2 by stating: . , [wjhile many or all of the factors listed in the Senate Report may be relevant to a claim of vote dilution through submergence in multimember districts, unless there is a conjunction of the following circumstances, the use of multimember, districts generally will not impede the ability of minority voters to elect representatives of their choice. The Court then listed three circumstances which “are necessary preconditions for multi-member districts to operate to impair minority voters’ ability to elect representatives of their choice.” Id. at 49-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. These preconditions are: 1) the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member district; 2) the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive; and 3) the minority group must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it— in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed — usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate. Id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766. Thus, the Gingles decision provided a framework with which to analyze § 2 challenges. The practical application of these factors, however, has been the subject of considerable discussion and it is not entirely clear to what extent Gingles applies to the single-member districts involved in this case. Lacking any further guidance, we have applied the decision in Gingles as set forth below. Floating through the framework of Gin-gles and its progeny are several concepts, the definitions of which are important to the court’s decision. Briefly, these definitions are 1) How does the court define a “majority?”; 2) What is the definition of “compactness?”; 3) What is the definition of “community of interest?”; and 4) What is the definition of “political cohesion?” Before defining these concepts, however, the court must first address the extent to which it has considered § 2 in its analysis. C Application of § 2 to this Proceeding The application of § 2 to this case has its genesis in the admonition of the Supreme Court in Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 425, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1839, 52 L.Ed.2d 465 (1977) that “it is imperative for the District Court, in drawing up a new plan, to make every effort not only to comply with the established constitutional standards, but also to allay suspicions and avoid the creation of concerns that might lead to new constitutional challenges.” It would be incongruous for the court to adopt a plan which did not comport with the standards and guidelines of § 2. The issue, however, is not whether § 2 considerations áre considered — they most certainly are; but rather, whether the court is obligated to completely graft the tests and requirements of § 2, including the searching evidentiary requirements, into a § 5 proceeding. First, we will establish why a complete adoption of § 2 standards is unwarranted in this proceeding under § 5. Then, we will set forth the standard by which we have reviewed the various plans with respect to § 2 considerations. Finally, we will return to the definition of the four concepts mentioned above. 1. The Substantive Standards for § 2 Should not be Completely Imported into this § 5 Proceeding Based on three factors, in conjunction with the particularized facts of this ease, the court holds that it is not obligated to completely import the standards and requirements of § 2 into a proceeding under § 5. These factors are: 1) the fundamental differences between § 2 and § 5; 2) the particular time factor associated with this case, and 3) the lack of a clear legislative intent or judicial interpretation that the results test of § 2 should be completely imported into § 5. a. Important differences between § 2 and § 5 Although sections 2 and 5 are similar in their goal of providing minorities with an equal opportunity to elect the representatives of their choice, several important differences exist between the sections. First, each section was designed to address different manifestations of the same problem — disenfranchisement of minorities. As noted earlier, the parameters of § 5 were developed in response to the exclusion of primarily Southern blacks from the voting booth through the use of poll taxes, literacy tests, and other overt forms of racial discrimination and the persistence of the covered districts in developing new methods of vote dilution as the former methods were judicially invalidated. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 384-85, 86 S.Ct. 803, 841-42, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). As a state with a history of such discrimination, South Carolina is a covered district under § 5. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Consequently, the original focus of § 5 was to provide minorities in those districts with a history of overt racial discrimination with special protections, which included the preclearance requirement for any change in voting procedure. See Id. An action under § 5 therefore, must be precleared by the Justice Department or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Under § 5, the effect of the new plan is determined by its retrogressive effect on the ability of minorities to elect representatives of their choice. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 103 S.Ct. 998, 74 L.Ed.2d 863 (1983); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 96 S.Ct. 1357, 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976); See supra pages 1345 to 1348. Section 2, on the other hand, was national in scope and provided a private right of action to remedy the denial or abridgement of the right to vote. See Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida, 899 F.2d 1012, 1023-32 (11th Cir.1990) (en banc) (Tjoflat, J., concurring). As a result, the provisions of § 2 had to address the more subtle forms of race discrimination. See McGhee v. Granville County, North Carolina, 860 F.2d 110, 116 (4th Cir.1988). Thus, as the law has evolved under § 2, a broader, “results,” test has developed. Senate Report at 23-31. It is important to remember, however, that § 2 involves a challenge to the effects or intent of a specific plan and the crucial aspect of the proceeding is the determination of liability. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44, 106 S.Ct. at 2762 (quoting Senate Report at 27). In turn, the different tests and the different means by which an action under either section proceeds give rise to additional considerations. First, there are the differences in the burden of proof. In a § 5 proceeding, the jurisdiction proposing the change in the voting structure bears the burden of proof whereas in a § 2 proceeding the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c et seq. Since a § 2 plaintiff is attacking an existing practice and a plan being challenged under § 5 must be advocated, the difference in the nature of the proceedings makes the necessity for this allocation obvious. Yet, in the context of this case, in which no less than five plans have been submitted for each political body, the burden of proof becomes more complex, especially if the whole of the results test is injected into the proceeding. The court, which is operating more in the nature of a forum, is thus reluctant to tamper with the burden of proof in the absence of sufficient legislative or judicial guidance. The differences between § 2 and § 5 also give rise to several concerns regarding the advisory nature of an opinion of a three-judge panel that the adopted plans completely conform to § 2 criteria. First, there is the obvious difficulty that in the broad spectrum of the “results” test of § 2, any testimony regarding the effect of the proposed plans is sheer speculation. In a § 5 proceeding, this difficulty is minimized by the focus on retrogression — a relatively finite concept. See suma pages 1345 to 1348. Second, under existing law, if a plan has been precleared by the Justice Department, an individual is still entitled to bring a § 2 challenge against the plan. Similarly, when a district court approves or adopts a legislatively approved plan in a § 2 proceeding that is not of its own making, the plan is still subject to § 5 review. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 150, 101 S.Ct. 2224, 2236, 68 L.Ed.2d 724 (1981). Our concern, however, is that by completely grafting the requirements of § 2 into § 5, the court would impair the duality of remedies currently afforded aggrieved parties under principles of res judicata or separation of powers. We do not resolve this issue today; however, this issue is indicative of the potentially broad reaching effects of importing § 2 into § 5. b. Time considerations Time is also a crucial factor for the court. The fact finding requirements under § 2 are strenuous and appellate courts have required great specificity with regard to the facts determined by local district courts in a § 2 proceeding. Westwego Citizens for Better Government v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir.1989); Watkins v. Mabus, 771 F.Supp. 789, 799 (S.D.Miss.1991) aff'd in part, vacated in part — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 412, 116 L.Ed.2d 433 (1991) (vacated on other grounds). Yet, courts have also recognized that with elections pending on the horizon, the exigency of the circumstances in voting rights cases mandate special consideration. Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 44, 102 S.Ct. 1518, 1522, 71 L.Ed.2d 725 (1982); Mabus, 771 F.Supp. at 799. As stated above, no less than five plans were submitted for each political body; and in the case of the Congressional districts, a total of nine plans were offered. The scant case law which advocates a complete incorporation of § 2 into § 5 involves cases where at most two or three plans were under consideration for a single legislative body. Aside from the burden of proof difficulties discussed above, the evidentiary burden presented by a § 2 challenge to each proposed plan in this case would have been staggering and would likely still be ongoing. The filing dates and primaries have already been postponed once; therefore, in an effort to avoid further delay and mindful of the time considerations which fully incorporating § 2 into our proceeding would have produced, the court decided against conducting a full § 2 inquiry. c. Insufficient legislative history Given the foregoing discussion of the differences between § 2 and § 5, as well as the particular considerations presented by this case, the lack of legislative or judicial guidance persuades the court that this is not the case in which to create a blanket rule that § 2 guidelines should be infused into § 5. As noted above, the case law supporting such an interpretation of the Voting Rights Act is scant and is not analogous to this case. See supra notes 42-43. Admittedly, the Justice Department has incorporated the substantive standard of § 2 into their § 5 review procedures 28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b)(2). Nevertheless, not only is the Justice Department conducting a review of a specifically proposed plan, but the Justice Department is entitled to more latitude with respect to speculation over the effect of a proposed plan than a federal court. Finally, in light of all of the foregoing, we are not persuaded that in amending the provisions of § 2 in 1982 that Congress had the intent of amending the standard to be applied in § 5 actions. The proponents of such an incorporation cite to footnote 31 of the Senate Report at 12 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, at 188, fn. 31 which states that “[i]n light of the amendment to § 2, it is intended that a § 5 objection also follow if a new voting procedure itself so discriminates as to violate section 2.” While this may be true, it does not necessarily speak to the standard the court is to apply to the § 5 objection. More to the point, in the vast consideration of both § 2 and § 5 during the amendments to § 2 in 1982, had Congress intended to change the well-known standard applied to § 5 in Beer, it would not relegate such an important decision to a single footnote. 2. The Standard of Analysis In shaping our application of § 2 to § 5, we are guided by the admonition in Gingles that a determination of “whether the political processes are ‘equally open’ depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present reality.’ ” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. at 2764 (citations omitted). In addition, since it would be anomalous for this court to adopt a plan which immediately lends itself to an attack under § 2, our analysis should ensure that the threshold requirements of a § 2 action cannot be established under the adopted plan. In this regard, we are guided by the decision in Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F.Supp. 196, 205 (E.D.Ark.1989), aff'd, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 662, 112 L.Ed.2d 656 (1991): We agree that Thornburg and Smith [v. Clinton, 687 F.Supp. 1310 (E.D.Ark. 1988) ] cannot be automatically applied to the single-member context. Dilution may be much more obvious in a case like Smith, where a potential majority of black voters was submerged in a two-member district. But the basic principle is the same. If lines are drawn that limit the number of majority-black single-member districts, and reasonably compact and contiguous majority-black districts could have been drawn, and if racial cohesiveness in voting is so great that, as a practical matter, black voters’ preferences for black candidates are frustrated by this system of apportionment, the outlines of a section 2 theory are made out. Therefore, with the goal of providing minorities with an equal opportunity to elect the representatives of their choice in mind, we have analyzed the proposed plans as well as the plans we adopt today based on the following factors: 1) the extent to which the plans proposed and the plans adopted are consistent with the retrogression standard set forth in Beer and City of Lockhart; 2) the extent to which reasonable compact and contiguous majority black districts were and could be drawn; 3) the extent to which the minority group is politically cohesive; 4) the extent to which racially polarized voting patterns exist; 5) the extent to which the lines which have been drawn limit the number of majority-black single-member districts in light of the expressed state policies of the State of South Carolina. The Senate factors may be applied to the extent that they aid the court in its determination of these factors. This approach allows the court to formulate a plan which is consistent not only with the provisions of § 5, but insures that the court’s plan will not violate the threshold requirements for liability under § 2. 3. Defining the Parameters Having set forth the extent to which the court has applied § 2 requirements to this case, we return to the four terms which we set forth at the outset as important concepts in our analysis. a. The definition of majority Webster’s has two alternative definitions for majority. One definition is “the excess of such a greater number over the remainder of the total,” while the other definition is “the group or party whose votes preponderates.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1363. The two definitions highlight the different interpretations of majority in the context of the Voting Rights Act. While one definition speaks purely in terms of number, the other definition speaks in terms of votes and, by inference, political power. As a result, courts have attempted to reconcile the pure numerical sense of majority with the concept of an equal opportunity to elect the representative of one’s choice. Typically, the reconciliation of these two definitions has occurred in the decision of the court to use either voting age population or total population as the measure of opportunity within a given district. See McDaniel v. Mehfoud, 708 F.Supp. 754, 756 (E.D.Va.1989). The distinction is obviously important because defining majority sets the benchmark by which effective political opportunity is measured. In this case, the court has looked to the voting age population as the measure of the opportunity to elect the candidate of one’s choice. In this regard, we are guided by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in McGhee, 860 F.2d 110, in which the court held that a 51.8 percent black voting age population was sufficient to establish a remedy for a § 2 violation. Mehfoud, 708 F.Supp. at 756. The McGhee court relied heavily throughout its opinion on the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in McNeil v. Springfield Park District, 851 F.2d 937, 944-45 (7th Cir.1988) (emphasis in original) in which Judge Cudahy wrote that “[i]n explaining its requirement, the Gingles Court consistently refers to ‘minority voters,’ for only voters can demonstrate the potential to elect candidates of their choice.” Although the Ninth Circuit has held that total population may be an adequate measure, Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 774-76 (9th Cir.1990), the implication in McGhee that voting age population is the correct measure, as